

This paper takes the hypotheses by Nepstad's article, Mutiny and Nonviolence, and applies it to three new cases of nonviolence. The analysis explores each hypothesis in each case and the discussion dissects the most interesting pieces of information, mainly regarding the hypotheses' high characterization of ethnicity/sectarian groups. Via these discussions' suggestions are made on how the hypotheses could improve to have greater validity over more cases in the future

Defections In Nonviolent Conflicts

A Theoretical Case Study
Based on Nepstad's Mutiny
and Nonviolence Hypotheses

Emanuel A. del Rio Leal
Bachelor Paper for C Seminar, 15 HP
International Peace and Conflict Management
Umeå University, Spring 2019

Table of Contents

1.0 Introduction	1
1.1 Problematization:	1
1.2 Aim:	1
1.3 Scientific Questions:	2
1.4 Delimitation:	2
1.5 Acronyms:	2
2.0 Theoretical Framework:	3
2.1 Past Research	3
2.2 Mutiny and Nonviolence	3
2.2.1 Regime Persistence:	4
2.2.2 Ethnic Factors:	4
2.2.3 International Factors:	5
3.0 Method	6
3.1 Method:	6
3.2 Scientific Design:	6
3.3 Materials and Source Criticism	7
3.4 Description of Analysis	8
4.0 Empirical Evidence	9
4.1 Tragedy on Tiananmen Square	9
4.1.1 Regime Persistence and Ethnic Factors	10
4.1.2 International Factors	12
4.2 The Indian Liberation Movement	13
4.2.1 Regime Persistence and Ethnic Factors	13
4.2.2 International Factors	15
4.3 The Downfall of Pinochet	16
4.3.1 Regime Persistence	16
4.3.2 International Factors	17
5.0 Analysis	18
5.1 Table 1	24
6.0 Discussion	25
7.0 References	29

1.0 Introduction

1.1 Problematization:

Defections in nonviolent conflicts are important to look at since loyalty shifts within the opposing party is, by many social scientists, considered as one of the main factors that contribute to a successful nonviolent campaign (Nepstad, 2011, pp. 127-128). With the continued prominence of nonviolent rebellions in recent decades, we must also face the fact that theory on how to counter nonviolent campaigns is also on the rise. Describing, explaining, and analysing, problematic areas in nonviolent theory is therefore a vital aspect in making sure our understanding of the topic is always growing and developing. Theory detailing nonviolent conflicts is well explored, but as Sharon Nepstad explains in *Mutiny and Nonviolence in the Arab Spring*; theory on the security personnel often opposing nonviolent protestors needs to be explored further (Nepstad, 2013, p. 347). One of the main issues within the scientific field of nonviolence is that scientists many times focus on the perspectives and actions of the nonviolent protestors themselves, and not so much their respective counterparts; the states. This paper will be jumping into a popular scientific field but looking at it from opposing side to gain new perspective and insight in the nonviolence field of research.

1.2 Aim:

The aim is to use the theory that Nepstad presents in *Mutiny and Nonviolence*, which explores military defections in three cases in the Arab Spring and test it against new cases. The cases being the Massacre on Tiananmen Square (China), the Fall of Pinochet (Chile), and the Indian Liberation Movement. The theoretical parts will display the conditions and hypotheses by Nepstad, and the empirical part will aim to lift the strategies that the state used to prevent defections in the conflicts, display the relationship between the military and state, and military and civilian population; and ultimately attempt to lift interesting aspects that are relevant to the hypotheses. The idea is that by applying the hypothesis to these new cases we can further asses their validity to cases other than the ones Nepstad has written about.

1.3 Scientific Questions:

- What factors can have major effects in SP defections in nonviolent conflicts?
- What relevancy exists between the hypotheses and the three new cases? In what instances are the hypotheses true? Are there cases where the hypotheses are refuted? Why?
- What do these cases tell us about the overall quality of the hypotheses? What further research can be made to further improve their legitimacy and universality?

1.4 Delimitation:

For the sake of scoping in this paper some limitations have been made. This paper does present, in its discussion, eventual suggestions for change in the hypotheses and for further study. However, this paper will not detail the effects that these changes could have on the hypotheses themselves, and only slightly explores the effect that such changes could have on the results this paper presents. Because fully exploring these ideas would require too much space to fully explore and is argued as more fitting to be analysed as another research topic entirely; where the full extent of the legitimacy of this paper's claims can be analysed. Ultimately, suggestions for further study are made throughout the discussion based on the analysis, but all explorations of how those studies could result have been excluded.

1.5 Acronyms:

Security Personnel = SP

2.0 Theoretical Framework:

The theory that is being used in this paper is from Mutiny and Nonviolence, by Sharon Nepstad. This section will give some context to the topic of defections in nonviolence, context behind the article's hypotheses, and then present the hypotheses.

2.1 Past Research

Past research into the topic of SP defection in nonviolence seems to have emerged as a prevalent topic after the Chenoweth and Stephen book, *Why Civil Resistance Works*. When they in this book presented the important factor that SP defection was, this topic became important to explore by researchers of nonviolence. Notable works in this topic include McLaughlin's *Loyalty Strategies and Military Defection in Rebellion* (the role of self-identity and groups in the military), Albrecht and Ohl's *Exit, Resistance, Loyalty* (the moral and ethical questions that emerge in SP in nonviolent conflicts) and LaFlamme's *Question of Trust* (examining trust between officers and opposition forces). Literature and research in this topic have been popularized but is simultaneously a new research-area to nonviolence theory, meaning that there are still many parts of the topic that remain underexplored.

2.2 Mutiny and Nonviolence

The hypotheses were created, similarly to how this paper will be created, by using established data and literature for research. She uses a mix of social constructivist science and rational choice to explain and justify her analysis; such as McLaughlin's *Loyalty Strategies* and Gould's *Beyond Rational Choice* do as well. Nepstad then delves into the cases of Bahrain, Egypt, and Syria, and attempts to find common characteristics in the Arab Spring conflicts to then create universal hypotheses. The specification of the defection aspect is connected to, just as this paper states in the introduction, the Chenoweth and Stephen book, *Why Civil Resistance Works*; where they state military defection as one of the defining factors in the success rate of a nonviolent conflict. The divisions made in the hypotheses and the empirical section of Regime Persistence, Ethnic Factors, and International Factors, is something that is created in this paper to create structure for the empirical part. Ultimately, Nepstad states that the reason that the creation of these hypotheses is important is because it aims to further develop the nonviolent theory, especially the militaristic aspect. The hypotheses are made to be analysed, constructively criticised, and then improved upon; which this paper will attempt.

These are all of the hypotheses directly quoted from the Nepstad article, *Mutiny and Nonviolence*:

2.2.1 Regime Persistence:

- Hypothesis 1: The military as an institution will side with civil resisters if it perceives that regime persistence will harm the military's financial, material, or power base.

2.2.2 Ethnic Factors:

- Hypothesis 2: In stratified societies where the regime is dominated by and privileges one particular ethnic or sectarian group, individual security force members will remain loyal if they are members of that privileged group. Security force members who are part of an underprivileged group are less likely to remain loyal.
- Hypothesis 2a: When a military is structured so that officers are largely from a privileged ethnic/sectarian group, but the rank-and-file are from a disadvantaged group, there is a higher likelihood that the military will divide, with officers remaining loyal and recruits defecting.
- Hypothesis 2b: When the military is structured so that officers and recruits come from the same privileged ethnic/sectarian group, the military institution as a whole is likely to remain loyal.
- Hypothesis 3: When troops from a disadvantaged ethnic or sectarian group are ordered to repress their own people, they face high moral costs for loyalty. These moral costs may override fears of punishment for defecting.
- Hypothesis 4: When troops share a common ethnic or sectarian identity with civil resisters, the perceived moral costs of repressing demonstrators and remaining loyal to the regime are greater.
- Hypothesis 5: When ethnically/religiously homogenous troops face civil resisters from an opposing ethnic/religious group, the perceived moral costs of repressing demonstrators may be lower.

2.2.3 International Factors:

- Hypothesis 6: Political costs for regime loyalty will be greater if the regime has little strategic, military, economic, or political relevance to the international community.
- Hypothesis 7: Political costs for regime loyalty will be minimal if the regime holds great strategic, military, economic, or political relevance to the international community.
- Hypothesis 8: The intervention of foreign troops increases the perception of regime stability, thereby deterring defections.
- Hypothesis 9: When the international community does not impose sanctions or withhold support, the regime's strength appears intact, thereby deterring defections.

(Nepstad, 2013, pp. 345-347)

3.0 Method

3.1 Method:

This paper is a qualitative case study that seeks to test out already established theory on new empirical cases. The reason as to why a qualitative case study is the most fitting method here is because they are effective at extracting details and context to empirical data, and frankly, using any other type of methodology would be ineffective in this case. A quantitative study would prove far too large an undertaking for the scope and size of this paper. If the aim of this paper was simply to test whether cases reject or accept the hypotheses, perhaps a quantitative study could be conducted. However, this paper aims to look at the deeper meaning behind why the cases apply to the hypotheses or not; a layer of information that would be lost were this a quantitative study. State strategies and military defections are usually highly complex situations, even though this paper is unable to capture all those complexities, the summary of them can be described, which they couldn't were this another type of study. (George & Bennett, 2005, pp. 18-21)

However, there are weaknesses to our chosen type of study as well. With larger quantitative studies, data tends to be less biased than in the qualitative method. The instance of nonviolent conflict and military politics is a highly divisive one, and bias on these subjects are inevitable. When finding information and data on the cases, it is up to the writer to attempt to find the most neutral information and perspective as possible. Ultimately, the way that researchers interpret and analyse material is going to have an effect on the results; this paper is no exception. (George & Bennett, 2005, pp. 30-31)

3.2 Scientific Design:

When it came to choosing cases there were a couple of factors that were accounted for. There are many nonviolent campaigns through history, but this paper aims to look at a specific type. Firstly, a nonviolent campaign that had either direct involvement and/or confrontation with SP was to be preferred, since SP defection and direct contact with demonstrators is highly connected (Stephan & Chenoweth, 2008, pp. 7-11). The cases also had to involve a nonviolent campaign with the aim of creating regime change of some sort, whether it was to change the politics of the current regime such as in Tiananmen, or to cast away the current leadership completely; such as in India. Since this paper is focusing on the aspects presented in the hypotheses, it was also important to find cases which reflected a

civilian vs state scenario, or a civilian vs military vs state scenario; and not have cases where most of the conflict involves internal conflicts between smaller groups, as the hypotheses are presented this way. Lastly, finding information about not only the conflicts, but also the military and SP during that conflict, is also a factor. Some nonviolent campaigns, especially the smaller ones e.g. the 8888 uprising, has to my experience had limited information available; and have therefore been excluded from this paper. With all these factors in mind these chosen cases have been the best ones, to adequately answer the scientific questions.

The empirical section, and the information that has been chosen to be used there, is completely based on the theoretical framework; the hypotheses. The idea is that by structuring the empirical evidence the same way that the hypotheses are, it is easier to find and highlight the information of each case that is relevant.

3.3 Materials and Source Criticism

This paper will exclusively use documentary data to answer its research questions. A mix of meeting records, articles, journal articles, and books, have provided the basis for the empirical section of this paper. The reason for using these sorts of materials and not for instance interviews, is because they directly provide the information that is needed; they simply hold the highest relevancy to this type of paper, other methods to obtain materials would simply not be fit for the type of materials needed. Additionally, documentary data have a high accessibility rate through the university and the internet which is helpful (Denscombe, 2010, pp. 116-120). It is deemed that solely with documentary data all the required information about the conflicts will be acquired.

This paper is going to be limited to finding case evidence in terms of what the hypotheses are asking. This means that when scouring for information on each case, the information that will be deemed valuable is going to be the information that can answer the hypotheses. However, the scope of what information is available to find this evidence is limited. The journal articles and literature that this paper will take part of will all be a part of the universities' own catalogue of free information. This means that certain books and information is not going to be available here; which could limit the overall quality of the paper. However, it is deemed that this has not been a major issue for this paper since the array of information available for free from the university and the internet have been

enough to craft the empirical evidence deemed needed to present an adequate picture of each case.

3.4 Description of Analysis

In terms of how the analysis was created, a research-centred method is used to create the analysis. This means is that the experience and perspective of the author has a significant relation to the analysis itself. If this paper were written by someone completely different, from another continent perhaps, the analytical results could look different (Denscombe, 2010, p. 273). This is because of two major factors; the hypotheses themselves, and the data collection. The hypotheses are presented vaguely at times, this means that depending on how one defines the hypotheses, the data you're looking for could differ. Expressions like "high relevance to the international community" and "higher moral costs" are all dependant on how we define them. Secondly, the type of data and documents collected and used in this paper approach controversial political subjects; subjects that often take different sides depending on who you ask. What sort of data is picked to be included in this paper and what data is seen to have the highest relevancy are all going to depend on the person collecting the data. Ultimately, this paper's analysis makes its own interpretations of how certain expressions can be defined and proceeds to analyse the hypotheses and the cases based on those interpretations. Further analysis of the effects that these interpretations can have on the results is made in the discussion. A large portion of the analysis of this paper is going to be spent dissecting the meaning behind how one expresses a hypothesis and why this is important to the subject overall. How we present a question is going to have a major role in defining the answer.

In terms of how the analysis is constructed, it goes through each hypothesis and puts them up against each case, and a statement of each cases' relevancy to the hypotheses is made. The idea behind this method, instead of addressing each case to all the hypotheses, is to clearly highlight the perspective coming from the hypotheses, with the cases serving as complements and not the other way around to clearly answer the scientific question. To further facilitate navigation in the analysis, as it is quite lengthy, a table has been created at the end to summarize the results this paper has produced.

4.0 Empirical Evidence

This section will highlight the empirical evidence that is relevant to answer the questions posed by the hypotheses. To maintain structure and increased relevancy to the hypotheses, each case's evidence is divided into the same parts that the hypotheses are divided to in the theory sections. These parts being Regime Persistence (regime effects on SP), Ethnic Factors (the effect that ethnicity or sectarian groups had on SP), and International Factors (the effect that the international community and their actions had on SP). How this is divided however is different depending on the contextual significance of each case, and it is worth noting that in some of the sections here the divided parts touch upon each other's subjects. This part is the backbone to the analysis part that comes after.

4.1 Tragedy on Tiananmen Square

Before beginning this chapter, it is worth noting the distinction between Nepstad 2015 and Nepstad 2011; the work cited here is a different one from the Mutiny and Nonviolence but comes instead from an older book by Nepstad called Nonviolent Revolutions.

Political discourse groups turned nonviolent protestors took over Tiananmen Square in 1989 to protest controversial policy change and lack of educational investments from the Chinese government. The university students used the grievance memorial for Hu Yaobang to start a nonviolent campaign on the square in hopes that it would lead to change in the political structure of China, however; most of us know it as an event that led to the deaths of thousands of civilians in one of the bloodier nonviolent campaigns in history. (Nepstad, 2011, pp. 1-4)

Even though most works surrounding the subject of Tiananmen and its failure are related to inner conflicts within the demonstrators themselves, the government used many different strategies to increase the probability of success within their own SP. This is especially true after the first attempt at crowd dispersion failed and the SP were sent in again, this time with martial law behind them. The lesson learned here is that governments have counterstrategies against nonviolent protestors even from the 1980: s, and that with precise and specific tactics to counter these protests, states can turn the conflict to their favor. (Nepstad, 2011, pp. 15-18)

Additionally, while most would look at the Tiananmen Square Massacre as a failure to fulfill their goals, and with many protestors dying in the process, the Chinese regime also for the most part viewed the demonstrations as a failure. The massacre of the students led them to become martyrs in eyes of the world and the reputation and legitimacy of the Chinese

government was severely damaged after the event. The Chinese government considered the Chinese Liberation Army to have failed in Tiananmen, and several restructuring programs were instated to further centralize the army's leadership and give more power over the army to president Jiang Zemin. (Mulvenon & Yang, 2002, pp. 557-558)

4.1.1 Regime Persistence and Ethnic Factors

What roles does pure empathy have on SP defections and how did the Chinese government counter this? Chinese government and military generals were made aware of SP reluctance to use violence against protestors after spending weeks on the square facing them. The longer time SP were exposed to the protestors the more the SPs' reluctance would grow. To counter the increased chance of defection the Chinese government mobilized vast additional numbers of SP from areas outside Beijing (between 150 000-350 000), and even some from Mongolia. This had several effects on the SP; firstly, these newly acquired SP had not been subjected to protestor pleas during weeks which would fix the established problem of growing empathy. Additionally, the other SP had mostly very little awareness of the events that had transpired on the square, since media is tightly surveilled in China; this meant that there was little room to doubt the legitimacy of the orders they were given. Lastly, many of the other imported SP did not speak Mandarin and could therefore not understand the protestors; rendering vocal pleading useless (Nepstad, 2011, pp. 15-18). Something worth noting is that the Beijing Military Region battalion were the last ones to move into Tiananmen Square when martial law was declared, and orders of dispersing the groups violently had been given. The Beijing battalion finally decided to follow the orders and intervene after the Shenyang and Jinan battalions had arrived in the capital (Lee, 2015, p. 155). The imported SPs also belonged to many different military battalions with a large mix of commanders. The result of the decentralized and mixed military leadership would help prevent large groups of SP from defecting and forming a coup since the decentralization made collective decision-making to be harder. (Scobell, 1992, p. 201).

To prevent defections in SP the Chinese government also used the protestors desperation. One of the reasons defections could be minimized were the inner conflicts occurring within protestor circles. Differing opinions and strategies and inner turmoil eventually led to some protestors breaking their nonviolent principle. When SP started facing aggressive and hostile crowds on the square this was capitalized on by leaders to lower SP empathy to protestors

and further justify aggressive orders. One case even describes one soldier defecting mid conflict to aid the protestors and being consequently beaten to death by the protestors; stories which were quickly spread throughout SP which hardened their resolve to remain loyal. (Nepstad, 2011, pp. 15-18)

Another reason as to how overall defection was low in China is due to the close bond between the military and government. In China during this time, the military and the government were so closely intertwined, one could almost consider them one unified governmental body. In fact, almost all the leaders of the Communist Party of China were generals and political commissars in the Chinese military. Many SP in the army therefore looked up and had great respect for the political leaders of China and were more willing to believe that the SP interests were taken into consideration. The decision to violently engage with the protestors was a decision made mainly by Deng Xiaoping (Scobell, 1992, pp. 199-200), the paramount leader of China. The idea is that if the decision would have come from any lower authority, the chance of SP refusing to follow order and to shift loyalties would have been much higher. (Scobell, 1992, pp. 198-199)

In relation to the unity between the military and government, there was also a strategy between almost entirely skipping the police and going directly to the military for help. The problems that were highlighted in using riot police was that even though they had training and equipment for handling large crowds, it was theorized that crowd police would react and be reacted to differently by the crowds than if the military were called. Regional police personnel first of all tend to lack the overall numbers that the army can provide, even though they may be more effective and educated in this sort of thing, the Chinese government believed that with simply a higher number of SP on site would instill more fear within the protestors, and less fear within the SP; therefore lowering the chance of defection. Also, the lives lead by the troops versus the police are very different as well. Full-time military personnel tend to live in more enclosed military societies than police; often spending large amounts of time in military encampments rather than with the rest of civil society. The police however, lives in the same cities and environments that most other people do and were therefore considered to be a larger risk-group than the military would be. Related to this, the Chinese government also believed the army to be more capable and overall willing to enforce deadly force than police, for the same reasons as earlier described.

Even with these factors considered however, many SP were still reluctant to move into the demonstrators and cases of defection and insubordination was considered an issue by the regime during this conflict. (Scobell, 1992, pp. 197-201)

4.1.2 International Factors

The international reaction to the massacre and the effect that it had on Chinese citizens, the Chinese government, and Chinese SP was limited in most aspects. East Germany and the USSR supported the governments' decision of cracking down on the protests whereas most western states condemned it. There were few embargos and sanctions imposed such as the EU and US implementing an arms-embargo stopping all arms and private military sales to China, however, all other trade relations were untouched and Bush expressed a desire to continue working on the stabilization and normalization of relations between the two states even amidst the conflict. The sales of arms to China was a minor market at the time and there were no other major actions taken. China was a major trade hub and states were careful in not damaging their own economies by blocking off trade with the state (Executive Intelligence Review, 1989, pp. 30-31). The US was for instance China's most favored nation to trade with, and even though there reportedly was fear within the Chinese government of China losing that status with the US post Tiananmen, it did not lose the status. (Mansingh, 1991, pp. 325-326)

4.2 The Indian Liberation Movement

When the British colonial rule over India started faltering in the early 1900s, several campaigns of nonviolence took place; the Swadeshi movement and the Salt March to name a few. After several controversial decisions made by the British to maintain their power in India, the division of Bengal being the most notable in 1905, marked the beginning of what would be the end of the British rule in India, with Gandhi as the movements' symbolic leader (Hardiman, 2018, pp. 2-6). This era had many different nonviolent campaigns acting simultaneously and with many different actors participating; therefore, this section will exclusively look at the Indian Army and the Indian Police force. The landowners and Indian regions own SP did play large parts in these conflicts, but this paper will exclusively look at the British-Indian state. Defection in this part is also characterized the loyalty battles between the British and the Indian liberation movement, here, the nonviolent conflict aspect takes a smaller role whereas the actual military structures in India take a larger portion of the text.

4.2.1 Regime Persistence and Ethnic Factors

The style and way that the military was structured and conducted in India pre and post colonialism were vastly different. Pre colonialism armies were mostly divided by state and lacked military technologies. Desertion and mutiny were high and military structure was vague and messy at best. Discipline and training were solely provided by the different Indian princes and clan leaders and punishment was decided and conducted by the chiefs of these military groups. The introduction of the British style of military reform created huge change for the Indian Military in the way the army was conducted with the goal of reducing army defection as well. The British formula introduced cash payments, medical care, and housing arrangements for SP in the army; something that was non-existent in pre-colonial India. This meant that individuals from poor castes and communities could join the military and be guaranteed improved quality of life for themselves and their families. The British also focused on the morale and ethos of the SP; otherwise called *esprit de corps*. The factor of community, brotherhood, loyalty, and creating an identity within the military, all served the purpose of making sure SPs' loyalty remained high. A combination of flags, medals, and rank systems also increased the feeling of unity Also, limitation of the amount of capital punishment that generals and commanders could deliver their SP, and the implementations of clear punishment rules also helped reduce defections. The British wanted the joining of

the army to become an honour, instead of a last option as it had been pre-colonial era. This made SP want to enlist in the military and gave them incentive to remain loyal. (Roy, 2001, pp. 937-940)

The Indian military was ethnically divided and consisted mostly of Indians, but with British generals, officers, and leaders. This was done to prevent the loss of control of the Indian military, and to prevent any major groups rebelling. With British higher-ups in control, the British could maintain their power over the military institution more effectively. Conflicts and complexities between the British state and the British colony of India plagued the British-Indian military for most of the 1900s. These conflicts revolved mainly around the role of the British-Indian military, it's responsibility to protect the British empire in the first and second world wars versus it's responsibility to protect the Indian nation in its war with Afghanistan and internal conflicts (Leake, 2014, pp. 301-303).

The power of state and rule in India was also highly complex at the time, the Indian government was mostly controlled by British will, but a government that had to work closely and sometimes compromise with the Indian elite and Indian landowners. However, through government agents the states actions were closely monitored, and signs of disloyalty or inefficiency would quickly lead to deposing (Hardiman, 2018, pp. 5-7). It is worth noting as well that for the most part Indian elites worked cooperatively with the British as it benefited them in maintaining their power. British rule in India is a unique case where colonial rule was not, for the large part, established through force; but with the consent of the state elite. This meant that for the most part, the Indian people did not fear the British state as a militaristic regime, but instead feared the Indian elite that the British ruled over (Hardiman, 2018, pp. 49-50).

The idea of the British was also to see the rule of law as the foundation for strategies to prevent defection. The British acted lawfully (laws that they themselves created which might be worth adding) and justly according to them and were even willing to negotiate and compromise policies and laws that created dissidence within the local population. The moral costs of SP in the Indian military were relatively low throughout these nonviolent campaigns since they were never expected and/or ordered to commit any radical inhumane acts. The times where civilian casualties for example was the case it was often an answer to violent

rebels who broke away from the Gandhian nonviolent principle, creating a justification for counter-violent acts such as the Chauri Chaura event (Silvestri, 2017).

The Indian police was, just as the military, consisting of British superintendents and with Indian grass-root personnel. At the behest of the Fraser commission (a commission in India that investigated the police work and conditions) however, the Indianization of the police force started, and Indian superintendents were hired to oversee police work in the Indian nation. The decision of Indianization was done to reduce dissidence within the Indian population regarding the British rule of India. The goal was to show and display the Indians' local population in positions of power, since the Indians police intendants all being white British men resulted in a bad reputation for the Indian police. This did however result in several other conflicts emerging within the police force as the new Indian superintendents' role was experienced as more symbolical than practical, and with many complaining that most of their work hours was spent translating documents to English. (Campion, 2002, p. 182)

4.2.2 International Factors

Internationally there was also much pressure from the global community to grant India independence. Two of the major allies and victors of WW2, the US and USSR, both had anti-colonial politics at the forefront; politics manifested in the Atlantic Charter. Having Britain grant independence to their colonies meant more potential markets that these superstates could trade in. This further solidified the support that the Independence Movement had and further legitimized and rationalized loyalty shifts. (Sokolsky, 1979)

Ultimately, with the combination of the Indians not fearing the British, the Indianization of the Indian police force, a reduction of the amount of punishment an SP could receive from the government, and with growing dissidence from the local populace regarding British elitism in India. When the liberation movement started to take off in the 1920s, many SP in both the police and military, grass root and higher-ups, stated their support for Gandhi's' non-cooperation movement, and even stated openly an unwillingness to take orders from British leadership (Silvestri, 2017, pp. 975-977). One could say that the British relative leniency regarding civilian brutality and SP punishment is what eventually helped cause their own collapse.

4.3 The Downfall of Pinochet

In this section there is no Ethnic Factor part, as ethnicity did not play a substantial role in the Chilean conflict.

After almost 150 years of democracy Chile saw itself switching directions suddenly with the prominent rise of Pinochet. The then president Allende was defeated in a bloody coup 1973 and replaced by a military dictatorship led by military commander in chief and leader Pinochet. The disassembling of democratic institutions and assassinations of thousands of political adversaries and civilians defined this dark time in Chilean history. However, in the late 1980s several nonviolent campaigns emerged which would result in the eventual downfall of the dictatorship. (Nepstad, 2011, p. 1)

4.3.1 Regime Persistence

Nepstad claims that one of the main reasons for Pinochet's government falling was the defection of top ranked military officials. Pinochet took great interest in maintaining the Chilean army loyal to him, as he understood the power that they had. To maintain loyalty Pinochet used different strategies to minimize defection. (Nepstad, 2011, pp. 15-18)

Firstly, the case of defection within Pinochet's SP was not mainly dependent on the involvement of civilians; in fact, there are very few detailed instances of civilians interfering with SP at all. Military authorities greatly sanctioned social interactions between SP and civilians, and military culture enshrined on the Chilean military maintaining their exclusivity and elitism; the military was not an organization as any other, but one of prestige and importance in the Chilean society. An attempt to distance SP and civilians was made to minimize the chance of defection. As a result of this, a survey indicated that 73% of the civilian population at the time distrusted Chilean SP. (Nepstad, 2011, pp. 15-16)

Actions to maintain loyalty in Pinochet's government had started ever since the 1973 coup when the military granted Pinochet exclusive rights to retirement and promotions of officers. All potential political opponents were thrown out and he started quickly to promote officers and hire new generals for the military, many of them young. Between 1973 and 1985 the number of generals more than doubled in the Chilean army (25 to 52). These SP however understood that their entire careers depended on their loyalty to Pinochet, and Pinochet also made all of them sign resignation letters that he would enact if any of them showed sign of disloyalty. (Nepstad, 2011, pp. 15-16)

Pinochet ensured that the military in Chile could have great power, especially in emergencies, power surpassing all government bodies. Also, changes were made to strongly protect the military budget; as to not weaken them by withholding funds. With these constitutional changes made by Pinochet being very hard to change, the power of the military in Chile was also very stable; the militaries' strong position in Chilean society would probably not be at risk for a long time. All these changes made to maintain loyalty and minimize defection by Pinochet, ended with being his downfall. When popularity for Pinochet started waning towards the end of his reign, the military concluded that they did not need Pinochet in power to maintain their own power, quite the opposite in fact, if the military could be a part of the liberation factor of Chile, they would fall into the good graces of the civil society, and with the constitutional rights they had being hard to budge, they did not need to fear their own privileged and influential positions in society. Therefore, the generals could defect from Pinochet with very little personal cost (Nepstad, 2011, pp. 16-18). Lastly, the Pinochet regime was not afraid to use punishment and coercion to maintain loyalty. Instances of violence and executions within the army was relatively prevalent which was used as a tool to maintain loyalty. However, such tools did at times backfire into more SP being willing to defect due to those threatening conditions. (Nepstad, 2011, pp. 14-17)

4.3.2 International Factors

Internationally there was some condemnation, but from the major superpowers there was mostly silence. The U.S. saw Pinochet as a right-wing ally in a sea of growing leftist politics of South America and remained mostly neutral throughout the conflict. Through Operation Condor however it was revealed that the U.S. government was in secret supporting the junta. The USSR also maintained their neutrality. A remarkable lack of international interest enshrined the Chilean conflict. (Kornbluh, 2013, pp. 403-405)

Nepstad concludes by saying that *"The nonviolent withholding of authority, cultural attitudes of submission, and cooperation did not cause the regime to crumble. Protesters had not persuaded troops on the street to refuse orders or desert. Rather, the definitive moment came when ruling military leaders sided with the population and refused to support an unjust leader any longer. The undermining of a state's repressive capacity and sanctioning powers —initiated by high-ranking officers or low-ranking troops—is what ultimately incapacitates any ruler"* (Nepstad, 2011, p. 17)

5.0 Analysis

This section will combine the empirical and theoretical parts of this paper and attempt to link the hypotheses to each case. Most of the hypotheses serve relevancy to at least one of the cases but most of the hypotheses lack relevancy to all three cases; as to each case unique circumstance. The analysis part will present each hypothesis independently and then each case will be addressed.

- **Hypothesis 1:** The military as an institution will side with civil resisters if it perceives that regime persistence will harm the military's financial, material, or power base.

China: There is no evidence to support this claim as there is no evidence that proves that the military as an institution perceived that regime persistence was dangerous. No data here to prove or disprove the hypothesis legitimacy.

India: There is evidence to refute this claim, but it is a complex issue. Most of the military institution in India did deem that the Indian Army was plagued inner conflicts between the Indian parliament and the British Crown; particularly during the time between world wars. The role of the Indian army in terms of size, purpose, and budget, was something that India and the British were at odds about. The British wanted to increase the military in preparation for the growth of Nazi-Germany whereas the Indian parliament and the military institution in India wanted to slice the army budget to save money. The British wanted the Indian army to serve as an army of British colonies whereas the India wanted the army to focus on protecting the Indian borders. Regime persistence of the British was perceived to harm the military's power base as they wanted more control over the military. This did not however end with the military as an institution siding with civil resisters. Imported British generals held all the higher-up's positions in the Indian military with Indians holding the roles of grassroot SP. Even though many of the Indians sided with civil resisters, almost all the British remained loyal.

Chile: There is no evidence to support this claim. The military as an institution did side with civil resisters in this case, but it also did not perceive that regime persistence was dangerous. No data here to prove or disprove the hypothesis legitimacy.

- **Hypothesis 2:** In stratified societies where the regime is dominated by and privileges one particular ethnic or sectarian group, individual security force members will

remain loyal if they are members of that privileged group. Security force members who are part of an underprivileged group are less likely to remain loyal.

China: There is no evidence to support this claim as there is no evidence that shows that the regime is dominated by one particular ethnic or sectarian group. No data here to prove or disprove the hypothesis legitimacy.

India: There is evidence to support this claim. The British would be the privileged ethnic group and the Indians the underprivileged ones. It strikes true that the British SP, commanders, generals, and officers mostly, remained loyal throughout the independence movement. The Indian SP in the military expressed support for the nonviolence protestors and the independence movement in large numbers.

Chile: There is no evidence to support this claim as there is no evidence that shows that the regime is dominated by one particular ethnic or sectarian group. No data here to prove or disprove the hypothesis legitimacy.

- **Hypothesis 2a:** When a military is structured so that officers are largely from a privileged ethnic/sectarian group, but the rank-and-file are from a disadvantaged group, there is a higher likelihood that the military will divide, with officers remaining loyal and recruits defecting.

China: There is no evidence to support this claim as there is no evidence that shows that the regime is divided in privileged and unprivileged groups. No data here to prove or disprove the hypothesis legitimacy.

India: There is evidence to support this claim. Officers in the Indian Army did consist mostly of the British (privileged ethnic group) whereas the rank-and-file were Indians. When the independency movement began most Indian SP defected while the British officers remained loyal.

Chile: There is no evidence to support this claim as there is no evidence that shows that the regime is divided in privileged and unprivileged groups. No data here to prove or disprove the hypothesis legitimacy.

- **Hypothesis 2b:** When the military is structured so that officers and recruits come from the same privileged ethnic/sectarian group, the military institution as a whole is likely to remain loyal.

China: There is no evidence to support this claim as there is no evidence that shows that the military is structured so that officers and recruits come from the same groups. No data here to prove or disprove the hypothesis legitimacy.

India: There is no evidence to support this claim as there is no evidence that shows that the military is structured so that officers and recruits come from the same groups. No data here to prove or disprove the hypothesis legitimacy.

Chile: There is no evidence to support this claim since most of the officers and recruits in the Chilean military did come from the same Chilean ethnic groups. However, there is no evidence that points towards the Chilean military being more loyal; probably because of the Chilean conflict lacking an ethnic aspect.

- **Hypothesis 3:** When troops from a disadvantaged ethnic or sectarian group are ordered to repress their own people, they face high moral costs for loyalty. These moral costs may override fears of punishment for defecting.

China: There is evidence to support this claim. Even though large parts of the troops participating in Tiananmen came from other regions of China and other ethnic groups, some did come from the local military. These SP did seem to perceive high moral costs and these moral costs did override fears of punishments for defecting, proved by them defecting despite eventual punishments.

India: There is evidence to support this claim. SP openly expressed an unwillingness to perform repression on the Indian protests as the moral costs were too high, risks of punishment was ignored in favor of not repressing.

Chile: There is no evidence to support this claim as troops were not a part of a disadvantaged group. No data her to prove or disprove the hypothesis legitimacy.

- **Hypothesis 4:** When troops share a common ethnic or sectarian identity with civil resisters, the perceived moral costs of repressing demonstrators and remaining loyal to the regime are greater.

China: There is weak evidence to support this claim. As mentioned, there were SP that belonged to the same ethnic groups as the protestors, and this factor could contribute to higher moral costs and greater chance of defection. However, there is no evidence that shows that these SP perceived the moral costs as being higher, and there is no evidence that shows that the specific reason for their moral costs being high was because of the ethnic factor.

India: There is evidence to support this claim. Indian SP's moral costs of suppressing their fellow Indians were higher, and the cost of remaining loyal was higher as well. This led to many of them defecting and showing support to the independence movement.

Chile: There is evidence to refute this claim. Troops and civil resisters shared ethnicity but troops still mainly remained loyal during repressions. Troop defections didn't appear in Chile until the senior officers in the military shifted loyalty, not when asked to suppress demonstrators.

- **Hypothesis 5:** When ethnically/religiously homogenous troops face civil resisters from an opposing ethnic/religious group, the perceived moral costs of repressing demonstrators may be lower.

China: There is evidence to support this claim. The Chinese government did bring in SP from other regions of China for the purpose of lower moral costs and lower empathy, something that can be theorized contributed to the low defection numbers and overall willingness to perform repression against the demonstrators.

India: There is no evidence to support this claim. No data here to prove or disprove the hypothesis legitimacy.

Chile: There is no evidence to support this claim. No data here to prove or disprove the hypothesis legitimacy.

- **Hypothesis 6:** Political costs for regime loyalty will be greater if the regime has little strategic, military, economic, or political relevance to the international community.

China: There is no evidence to support this claim. China did not have little relevance to the international community. See Hypothesis 7. There is no data here to prove or disprove the hypothesis legitimacy.

India: There is evidence to support this claim. Britain and British India were in turmoil both in India but also in the international community. Both the US and USSR (both victors after WW2) held greatly negative attitudes against towards colonialism and the British empire. This leads to the conclusion that the British Indian government had weak relevance to the international community, which would therefore increase political costs for remaining loyal.

Chile: There is no evidence to support this claim as Chile did not have little relevancy to the international community. There is no data here to prove or disprove the hypothesis legitimacy.

- **Hypothesis 7:** Political costs for regime loyalty will be minimal if the regime holds great strategic, military, economic, or political relevance to the international community.

China: There is evidence to support this claim. China was a major trade hub, had vast military power, and an overall large role as a global superpower in the international community. International sanctions were limited and were more symbolic than effective. Chinas great relevance and high status in the international community does point towards minimizing political costs for regime loyalty. The state of China was powerful and lacked fragility, therefore lowering defections as the state was perceived as stable; even amidst controversial times.

India: There is no evidence to support this claim. Britain's colonies and their relevance to the international community was highly damaged after WW2. No data here to prove or disprove the hypothesis legitimacy.

Chile: There is not enough evidence to support or refute this claim, but it depends on what we define as "minimal". I would again argue that Chile did have some relevance to the international community (also depending on our definition of "great relevance" in the

hypothesis), but political costs were not minimal. SP's political costs for remaining loyal were not necessarily high or low in relation to the international community, they could defect because of the immense power the Chilean military had garnered.

- **Hypothesis 8:** The intervention of foreign troops increases the perception of regime stability, thereby deterring defections.

China: There is no evidence to support this claim. There was never any intervention of foreign troops in this conflict. No data here to prove or disprove the hypothesis legitimacy.

India: There is no evidence to support this claim. There was never any intervention of foreign troops in this conflict. No data here to prove or disprove the hypothesis legitimacy.

Chile: There is no evidence to support this claim. There was never any intervention of foreign troops in this conflict. No data here to prove or disprove the hypothesis legitimacy.

- **Hypothesis 9:** When the international community does not impose sanctions or withhold support, the regime's strength appears intact, thereby deterring defections.

China: There is weak evidence to support this claim. Even though there were some sanctions imposed on China by the EU and US, these were minimal sanctions that only affected a minor market. Mostly, China's role as the main trade hub with the EU and US remained intact after the conflict, which can be linked to the regime's strength remaining intact and linking this to reduced defections.

India: There is weak evidence to support this claim. The international community did not impose sanctions, but it can be argued that support was withheld. With the Atlantic Charter parts of the international community expressed the support of the liberation of the colonies. This is a matter of definition.

Chile: There is no evidence to support this claim. There were sanctions imposed on Chile during the conflict. No data here to prove or disprove the hypothesis legitimacy.

5.1 Table 1

A summarizing table stating the conclusion for each state in each hypothesis

Table 1	China	India	Chile
Hypothesis 1	No Evidence	Refuting Evidence	No Evidence
Hypothesis 2	No Evidence	Evidence	No Evidence
Hypothesis 2a	No Evidence	Evidence	No Evidence
Hypothesis 2b	No Evidence	No Evidence	No Evidence
Hypothesis 3	Evidence	Evidence	No Evidence
Hypothesis 4	Weak Evidence	Evidence	Refuting Evidence
Hypothesis 5	Evidence	No Evidence	No Evidence
Hypothesis 6	No Evidence	Evidence	No Evidence
Hypothesis 7	Evidence	No Evidence	No Evidence
Hypothesis 8	No Evidence	No Evidence	No Evidence
Hypothesis 9	Weak Evidence	Weak Evidence	No Evidence

6.0 Discussion

This section will provide a discussion of the analytical results that the paper has produced, it will be divided into three main parts. Firstly, the hypotheses that held low, or no, relevance or data to the case studies will be addressed. Secondly the paper will discuss the hypotheses that had the highest relevancy and what this information reveals. Thirdly this paper will discuss the hypotheses that were refuted by the cases. Lastly, otherwise interesting aspects that emerged from these cases will be discussed and ideas for further research and study will conclude the paper.

Hypothesis 2B and 8 were the only ones where there was no evidence to support the claims from any of the three cases. For hypothesis 2B there was a lack of a major ethnic factor behind China and Chile, and the ethnic factor that was prevalent for the Indian case was simply irrelevant. None of the three cases matched the cases in description so therefore there was no analysis done. For hypothesis 8 the case is similar, in neither of these three cases was there an intervention of foreign troops, rendering this hypothesis irrelevant as well. This paper will argue that hypothesis 9 also held weak relevancy to the cases. This is, as is the case for many of these hypotheses, a question of definition. The term “withhold support” can have varied meanings, and while it can be argued that there was a case of this in India it is defined as weak evidence here; as it could only apply if international opinion and dissidence classifies as withholding support. The problem is finding a direct link between lack of sanctions and deterrent of defections.

Something that is highly evident is the lack of relevant hypotheses and cases. The hypotheses were not proven right once in all three cases. This points towards the hypotheses being too specific in their nature. For instance, some of the hypotheses were directly linked to ethnical aspects in a nonviolent conflict; something that was not relevant to all cases. India is the only case where ethnicity was a major part of the conflict, China had some minor ethnic aspects, and Chile had none. Instances like these made it hard to find relevancy and evidence to support some of the hypotheses but this does perhaps say more about the hypotheses’ nature than the cases themselves. There is also a problem in the formulation of hypotheses like 5, 8, and 9, where SP perception is the key aspect of the hypothesis. Finding evidence and measuring perception is very difficult and therefore lead to many cases lacking evidence to support them in a legitimate way. However, just because there is no evidence to support the hypothesis does not render the hypothesis untrue. Hypotheses where there was evidence from at least one case to support it are 2, 2A, 3, 5, 6,

7. These hypotheses have evidence from at least one case that state that they are true, and with no cases refuting them. Therefore, it can be claimed that these hypotheses are true for nonviolent conflicts from the perspective of these three cases.

In the hypotheses 1 and 4 we find instances where there was evidence to refute the claims.

In hypothesis 1 the case of India reveals the complexities that exist behind military institutions. The hypothesis would claim that if the government could potentially harm the military's quality, that it would side with civil resisters. What is not considered however is the possibility of the military institution consisting of officers and generals from other states; meaning that there is no direct personal effect if the institution fares well or bad.

Worst case, officers and generals can simply return to Britain and work there. By claiming that the military as an institution would side with civil resisters this paper assumes it is implied that all SP are accounted for; the Indian SP combined with the British ones.

Therefore, it can be argued that hypothesis 1 is untrue, the military as an institution will not always side with civil resisters if it perceives the regime as dangerous for the military.

Hypothesis 4 would claim that repressing your own sectarian/ethnic group comes with high moral costs; something this paper refutes in the case of Chile. There is evidence that shows that SP did not have major problems following orders of coercion and violence against the Chilean people, the military and civil society belonging to one singular ethnic/sectarian group, did have very different lives in Chile. The Chilean military was highly removed from civil society culturally and did therefore have seemingly low overall moral costs for repressing civilians. Defections and an unwillingness to follow regime orders did not appear until senior officers started defecting, and that on a basis of having more power than the government, not because of high moral costs. On that basis hypothesis 4 can be refuted, repressing your own ethnic or sectarian group does not always result in higher moral costs. Suggestion for further study on this matter could be deeper qualitative case study of these two hypotheses in other cases to see if there are more examples that refute them.

What have these cases shown us in terms of the quality of the hypotheses and the eventual improvements that can be made upon them? Mainly, this paper will argue that the expression of ethnicity in the hypotheses limits its universality. If the expression of "ethnic or sectarian groups" were to be changed to e.g. social groups; more potential cases could be applied more efficiently. To exemplify, hypothesis 3 expresses that SP from a similar

ethnic/sectarian group will have lower moral costs when asked to repress civilians from another ethnic/sectarian group; in the case of Chile there was no evidence to support this, however, if the chosen word was social group instead of ethnic/sectarian group Chile could be argued to have relevance here. Ethnicity is a wide expression, but it is limited as to what groups it can apply to, at least in the context of this paper. Social group is a more expansive word that applies to more groups, which is especially effective in states/conflicts where an ethnic aspect is missing; as is the case in Chile. Simultaneously, using the term social groups can be used to include sectarian and ethnic groups as well, but also e.g. privileged military social groups. The effects that this type of change to the hypotheses wording would have on the results will not be explored in this paper but would be an interesting topic for further analysis in another paper.

India presented a unique case aspect that the other cases lacked; the occupation factor. India was the only case that lacked sovereignty over its own nation and was at the time a colony of the British Empire. This resulted in some unique situations when answering certain hypotheses regarding the military as an institution; since the institution is so heavily divided in its core between the local Indians and the British colonial powers. Interpreting and analysing how the military institution reacted and changed throughout the conflict was a complex issue which could be explored further in future research with modern cases depicting similar circumstances. The Israel and Palestine conflict have similar dimensions to the one in India and could make for an interesting case study regarding the relationship between military institutions and civil society, and how this relationship changes when one of the parties are occupied by an external actor. In this paper, the material used described the Indian military as being highly divided between the British commanders and officers and the Indian populace; similar divisions were present in the police as well. This interpretation made finding evidence for the hypotheses easy since this case fit in mostly.

Another important point to be made of the hypotheses is how they express themselves. As part 3.4 (Description of Analysis) expresses slightly, some of the wording used in hypotheses are very broad and can be defined in many ways, for example, hypotheses 1 refers to what the military institution “perceives”, and hypotheses 4 looks at the perception of SP when repressing demonstrators. These types of expressions are a recurring theme in the Nepstad hypotheses and stem from the social constructivism perspective, as is the issue with many

social constructivist perspectives, they are often hard to define properly. Perception and individual opinion of individuals and institutions are very hard to summarize and write about, as they are all such contextual and unique concepts. Finding evidence for how people think and resonate is a difficult task, often limiting itself to looking at individual and institutions actions and assuming that is their free will; when it is often not so. If SP engage in repression, is it because they want to, or do contextual aspects compel them to do so? Does differentiating between what SP end up doing, and what they want to do, improve the quality of our results; or are our perceptions characterized completely by our actions? For this paper, the latter applies. Even though these questions are all very difficult to answer in practice, they are important questions to ask when crafting and analysing these types of papers and their results since that gap of insecurity is always going to occur when answer hypotheses like these.

Conclusively, this paper has aimed and attempted to find new perspectives and aspects on the Nepstad hypotheses to further improve their potential and legitimacy. Further studies on the refuting hypotheses has been suggested to further the legitimacy that this paper presents in its analysis. The paper has highlighted the complexities behind the wording of the hypotheses and has given suggestions for further study on how changing the hypotheses affect their universality in nonviolence. The paper has also attempted to explore the effect that perspective and individual definition incur when analysing these types of hypotheses. Overall however, only two of the hypotheses had evidence to be refuted whereas the rest only had evidence in support or no evidence, these hypotheses have strong universal value, but more research needs to be done to further strengthen that value.

7.0 References

- Campion, D. A., 2002. *Watchmen of the Raj: The United Provinces police, 1870–1931 and the dilemmas of colonial policing in British India*. Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations Publishing.
- Denscombe, M., 2010. *The Good Research Guide*. 4th ed. Berkshire : Open University Press.
- Executive Intelligence Review, 1989. China struggle, a turning point for the world. *Executive Intelligence Review* , 16(25), pp. 30-31.
- George, A. L. & Bennett, A., 2005. *Case Studies and Theory Development in*. Massachusetts: MIT Press.
- Hardiman, D., 2018. Building a Nationalist Base in Rural India. In: *The Nonviolent Struggle for Indian Freedom*. s.l.:Oxford Scholarship Online, pp. 110-158.
- Kornbluh, P., 2013. *The Pinochet File : A Declassified Dossier on Atrocity and Accountability*. s.l.:The New Press .
- Leake, E. M., 2014. British India versus the British Empire: The. *Modern Asian Studies*, Volume 48, pp. 301-329.
- Lee, T., 2015. *Defect or Defend*. Baltimore : John Hopkins University Press.
- Mansingh, S., 1991. Beijing and the Overseas Chinese. *China Report* , 27(4), pp. 309-328.
- Meixler, E., 2018. How a Failed Democracy Uprising Set the Stage for Myanmar's Future. *Time*, 8 Augusti.
- Mulvenon, J. C. & Yang, A. N., 2002. *People's Liberation Army as Organization*. Online: RAND Corporation.
- Nepstad, S., 2011. Ousting General Pinochet. In: *Nonviolent Revolutions: Civil Resistance in the late 20th century*. Online: Oxford Scholarship Online.
- Nepstad, S., 2013. Mutiny and nonviolence in the Arab. *Journal of Peace Research*, 50(3), pp. 337-3349.
- Nepstad, S. E., 2011. How Civil Resistance Works. In: *Nonviolent Revolutions: Civil Resistance in the Late 20th Century*. s.l.:Oxford Scholarship Online.
- Nepstad, S. E., 2011. The Tiananmen Tragedy and the. In: *Nonviolent Revolutions: Civil Resistance in the 20th Century*. s.l.:Oxford Scholarship Online.
- Roy, K., 2001. Coercion through Leniency: British Manipulation of the Courts-Martial System in the. *The Journal of Military History*, 65(4), pp. 937-964.
- Scobell, A., 1992. Why the People's Army Fired on the People: The Chinese Military and Tiananmen. *Armed Forces & Societies* , Volume 18 (2), pp. 193-213.
- Silvestri, M., 2017. 'A Fanatical Reverence for Gandhi': Nationalism. *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, 45(6), pp. 969-997.

Sokolsky, W., 1979. Human Dimension of Foreign Policy: An American Perspective. *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, March , pp. 142-143.

Stephan, M. J. & Chenoweth , E., 2008. Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict. *International Security* , 33(1), pp. 7-44.