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The boundaries of policy learning and the role of ideas: Sweden, as a reluctant policy learner?

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1. Introduction

This chapter aims to bring the study of ideas into the analysis of education policy and governance, and to explore their transfer, dissemination and feedback between the international and national policy making arenas. In a globalised education context, policy ideas about education often reflect changes in the dynamic relations between society and schooling – manifested for example in the pursuit of the knowledge economy as the future paradigm underpinning education reforms. Across Europe and other parts of the world, new policy ideas about education have driven major restructuring projects that dismantled older forms of schooling and welfare provision. Invariably, these have been replaced by new ways of defining education policy problems that draw on the market place as a new social and policy space where knowledge and policy solutions are contextualised and utilised differently to the norms of the past.

The shifts in the assumptions about education policy knowledge and policy ideas, raise a number of interesting questions, such as, what produces policy changes in education systems and what is the influence of international actors? And, who are the agents of change in education reforms? Our
ambition in this chapter is to connect some of these issues to the restructuring of Swedish education over the last 30 years.

Sweden underwent a radical shift in the early 1990s from strong central state governing of education and very few private schools to a highly decentralized system promoting school choice and competition between public as well as private actors. Based on generous vouchers and liberal authorization rules, the private school sector expanded at a high pace, particularly in the 2000s. Allowing profitmaking without demands on re-investment in schools, education has increasingly attracted large limited liability companies – something that makes the Swedish case outstanding in an international comparison (Lundahl et al. 2013; Alexiadou, Lundahl & Rönnberg 2019). In this chapter, we discuss if and to what extent the introduction and continuation of school choice and marketization policies in Sweden were guided by policy learning from external actors, in particular supranational organizations such as the European Union and the OECD.

2. Travelling policies and policy learning: boundaries for education

The idea that education policy is not a purely national affair is well established by now in the research literature on education and comparative studies. Global policy actors such as the EU and the OECD are encouraging education policy change through forms of policy learning to lead to the redesign of schooling systems along the lines of particular desirable outcomes, a process increasingly visible since the late 1990s (Antunes 2006; Auld et al. 2019). Education and education policy are
conceptualized, constructed and delivered through actors that 
fund, provide, regulate, and own schools – actors that are located 
in local, national or private institutions, in local, national or 
international arenas (Pereyra et al. 2013; Robertson & Dale 
2016). This means that both the process of policy formation but 
also ideas about education and schooling are the products of 
travel, transfers, selective adoption, mutations and mediation 
between national and international contexts (Alexiadou 2014; 
Peck & Theodore 2010) – a long term concern in the studies of 
comparative education.

The turn of nation states to international contexts for policy 
ideas, advice, and solutions leads to questions of if, when and 
why states look towards international actors for solutions to 
national education questions and what kind of learning do they 
expect to gain. What are the mechanisms of such learning and 
their consequences for education? And, what are their outcomes 
in the form of either visible policy change or more subtle change 
in policy ideas? Still, this is a nascent area of research, 
especially regarding specific mechanisms of policy exchange 
and learning leading to specific outcomes. These are difficult 
connections to make, since they would require an assessment of 
causality in policy change (national change because of inter-
national developments), and the direction of influence (top-to-
bottom, bottom-up, or as a process of constant feedback), both 
particularly difficult to establish.

In this chapter, we discuss the concept of ‘policy learning’ as 
a useful heuristic to explore the relationships between Swedish 
education policy and policy ideas that emanate from 
supranational organisations, in particular the OECD and the EU. 
Although there have been serious attempts to explore the
relationships between Sweden and the OECD (see, Pettersson et al. 2017) and the EU (Nordin & Sundberg. 2016), the knowledge on Sweden’s inclination to learn from these organisations is scarce, particularly if we look at matters of school choice and marketization.

Both the OECD and the EU promote particular policy agendas and ideas for reform, present solutions to what they identify as common problems across national boundaries\(^1\), and promote these through soft forms of governance instead of legislation (for example, the publication of comparative statistics and league tables of performance, the promotion of ‘best practices’, and reputational incentives). However, these two organisations vary in a very significant way in relation to their links to national policy: the EU governance structure is to some extent formally institutionalised within national systems of government, whereas the OECD is not.

Before we discuss the specific international contexts, we discuss the concept of policy learning and its links to comparative education studies.

3. **Conceptualising policy learning in education: boundaries of policy movements**

Policy learning is not a new idea. Ever since 1974 and the publication of Heclo’s study comparing British and Swedish

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\(^1\) In the strategic framework for European cooperation in education and training (“ET 2020”), the EU has identified 4 common objectives for education systems to pursue. These refer to: Making lifelong learning and mobility a reality; Improving the quality and efficiency of education and training; Promoting equity, social cohesion, and active citizenship; and, Enhancing creativity and innovation, including entrepreneurship, at all levels of education and training.
social policy, learning has been seen to provide supplementary explanations to conflict-based theories on policymaking. Since then, there have been many studies that use the term, either in its more instrumental applications looking for policy impact (Has learning been effective in changing policies and political behaviour? Has it produced enduring policy change? Heclo 1974), or with an emphasis more on the process of learning and what this suggests for changing thinking about policy (Hay 2006). The evolution of policy learning as an approach to understanding policy formation, change and innovation, was boosted by the growth in the literature on the role of ideas and discourses both in terms of their substantive content, and in the “interactive processes by which ideas are conveyed and exchanged through discourse” (Schmidt 2010: 3).

In the comparative education field both approaches to the role of travelling ideas have been present, even if researchers did not necessarily use the language of policy learning preferred by political scientists. In two seminal studies, Dale (1999) and Phillips (2006) were concerned with ‘cross national attraction’ and the complex processes of policy borrowing, and with the particular mechanisms of policy influence and transfer. For example, Dale identified ‘learning’, ‘borrowing’, ‘teaching’, ‘imposition’, ‘standardization’, ‘interdependence’, ‘harmonization’ and ‘dissemination’, through which outside influences on national policies are delivered. Both authors view the processes of policy learning as underpinning policy transfers and the policy-making assumptions, but also point to the methodological difficulties of identifying the source, direction and power of particular ideational frames on national reforms.

There is not a single definition of policy learning, nor is there
consensus on how it should be used in research (Bakir 2017; Goyal & Howllett 2018). For our purposes, and from the perspective of comparative education, policy learning refers to processes of policy movement across boundaries when these are produced by shifts in ideas about the purposes of schooling, the means through which to achieve them, or the desirable outcomes of schooling.

Shifts in policy ideas do not need to be radical, sudden or complete. Similarly, the purposes, means or outcomes of policy learning processes do not need to be well defined, ‘good’, or uncontested. Learning also does not suggest that change in policy is primarily or exclusively the result of paradigm shifts in the ideas about education. Policy change is often caused by deep structural economic changes at the root of education reforms, with economic globalization as a major driver of the global economic reform agenda (Verger et al. 2012). In those cases, ideas and discourses are used to communicate, legitimate and justify policy change, rather than for the purposes of policy learning. This approach can provide a deeper understanding of education reforms and their causes, but it tends to marginalize the role ideas can play in generating change in how education policy is conceptualized or constructed. So, while we fully acknowledge such structural changes as often the drivers of policy change, we wish to turn our attention here to the role of ideas as having a distinctive role that may provide explanation and new insights into education policy shifts. We begin by outlining some operational dimensions for the concept of policy learning.

The three fundamental questions of: Who learns by who? What is learnt? To what effect? (Bennett & Howlett 1992)
provide a possible point of departure for researching policy movements and policy change. Identifying the ‘boundaries’ of such movements, corresponds to the first and second questions of ‘who learns’, ‘who teaches’, and ‘what is the object of learning’. These boundaries may be national, for example, states learning from each other, or states learning from and feeding into international organizations and their policies. The latter aspect is dealt with in this chapter. Other types of boundaries are local, organizational, temporal, between groups of policy actors, and between different areas of policy activity.

In their study of historical and international comparative learning, Hodgson and Spours (2016) researched upper secondary education policy across the four countries of the UK, within the context of global influences. They found increasing divergence between the four systems that can be explained by the extreme neo-liberal policy direction of English policy making in education. Learning was taking place in rather silent ways between policy makers and civil society organizations, as well as in the different responses towards the publication of PISA results. The desire of policy makers to learn “as a process of mutual reflection” from each other’s systems was very much defined by “policy motivation; governance structures and forms of exchange; international comparison and historical understanding” (522).

With a similar focus on education policy learning, Lange and Alexiadou (2010) categorised the relationships between the European Commission and member states along the lines of ‘competitive’, imperialistic’, ‘mutual’, and ‘surface’ styles of learning. The learning policy process that structures the EU-national relations in education allows some states to be rather
passive, while others try to export their preferences (in terms of policy ideas, policy outcomes, and mechanisms), and at the same time enhance their particular national and European interests. In both these examples of research, the relation between policy change and learning is present but rather weak, conditional on historical and administrative structures, as well as on particular definitions of national interest and education national identities. Interestingly, both studies highlight the power dimensions in the learning process, and the fact that learning is not necessarily well-intended and nor does it lead to the intended outcomes.

The third question of ‘what is learnt’ in education policy studies is a very difficult one to answer, especially if we wish to demonstrate that certain policy change is the result of policy learning. The global agenda setting of organisations such as the OECD and to a lesser extent the EU, have been given perhaps too strong a role, at least when it comes to the learning of policy ideas within the European context. The role of ideas in policy change may be significant and can produce incremental changes at national level. But, we acknowledge that policy ideas are not always the primary explanatory dimension for why certain education change takes place (or not). Similarly, the notion that education systems converge in a process of isomorphism (Powell & DiMaggio 1991) may be more applicable to a surface discursive level – although the discursive level can be significant for slower movements towards particular reforms.

Researchers identify certain policy themes that are found almost everywhere (for example, ‘inclusion’, ‘quality’, ‘good governance’, ‘school choice’ ‘effectiveness’). These have proved to be significant in several national contexts as underpinning reforms, or as providing legitimating arguments
for education changes. Phillips (2006) cautioned, we should not fall into the trap of causally attributing education policy changes to particular external influences, merely because they are present in a large number of systems or because they are promoted by powerful international organisations. Still, the presence and even dominance of such policy themes in driving schooling reforms is so widespread that we need to take them into account as powerful policy ideas, while acknowledging that they are understood and embedded differently across national and local school contexts, and “differing sociohistorical conditions” (Schriewer & Keiner 1992: 27).

In addition to these methodological considerations, the ideas and policies that emerge from international organisations are themselves constituted by national contributions, lobbying and relations between states and the international levels. This is particularly applicable to the EU, but also the OECD (Alexiadou 2016; Kleibrink 2011; Prøitz 2015). As such, we suggest that both the causality and the direction of the policy movement need to be researched in each case, allowing for variation in the origins and links between policy ideas and change in specific case-by-case studies.

4. **Swedish decentralisation and marketization of education: a brief introduction**

When discussing policy learning in the Swedish context, we focus on marketization of education – parental/student choice and school competition – as the most spectacular aspect of the recent educational reforms in Sweden.
A social democratic government (1982-91)\(^2\) initiated a first set of decentralisation and deregulation reforms. The aim was both to promote the development of education and local democracy by giving municipalities and schools considerable freedom to allocate and use resources aligned to local conditions and needs. A consecutive set of school choice reforms, initiated by a conservative-liberal coalition government (1991-94) should ensure that parents and children had the ‘greatest possible freedom’ to choose a school, thereby raising cost efficiency and improving public education by ‘stimulating competition’ (Alexiadou et al. 2019). The reforms included generous state subsidies for establishing private (‘free’) schools (Govt. Bill 1991/92:95; 1992/93:230)\(^3\). The policy rationale was similar to that in other countries: to ensure parents and children maximum freedom of school-choice. Competition between schools would help raise the quality of schools and the whole education system. Finally, such market solutions would result in more effective and efficient allocation of resources (Govt. Bill 1991/92:95).

The government carried through the market reforms at an unusually fast pace, without prior investigations or experiments, in stark contrast to how larger reforms are normally prepared in Sweden.

Particularly in the 2000s, Sweden saw an un-paralleled growth of the private education sector. A decision in 1995 to introduce full tax funding of private, so-called free schools in order to ban tuition fees rested on justice motives – all pupils


\(^3\) Initially, the value of the school voucher for free schools was 85% of the average per capita cost in the public schools of the municipality concerned (the costs vary between municipalities).
should have equal right to choose a free school. Ironically, this
decision became a major driver of marketization; now the big
businesses and chains saw a major profit-making potential in
education by cost reductions, especially by lowering the teacher-
pupil ratio. From constituting a few percent of all compulsory
school students at the turn of the millennium, the proportion of
students in compulsory free schools rose to approximately 12
percent ten years later – about twice as high percentage in
Stockholm. At upper secondary level, the development was even
more explosive. Here the proportion of free school students rose
from a few percent to 25 percent in the whole country and in
Stockholm to more than 50 percent (SNAE 2016). The free
school sector underwent a development that we recognize from
proper markets and few would associate with schools and
education, such as aggressive competition, increasing owner
concentration, international venture capitalism – and even tax
flight and bankruptcies. Later, the minister who signed the two
freedom of choice reforms declared that the decision makers had
not envisaged this development (Holm & Lundahl 2019;
Lundahl et al. 2013).

The education reforms of the early 1990s have been clearly
successful in one respect: parental and student choice
opportunities have increased considerably, at least in the urban
regions where the number of competing schools has multiplied.
In other respects, the emerging picture is disappointing. Firstly,
evaluations and reports unanimously conclude that the local
variations resulting from decentralisation and deregulation are
unacceptably large, given the longstanding political objective of
educational equity. Secondly, Sweden, which previously
belonged to the countries with low degrees of school
stratification, has faced increased segregation between schools. Most researchers agree that the school choice system has contributed to this development (c.f. Brandén & Bygren 2018). Thirdly, starting from a high level, the average educational achievement of Swedish students has declined markedly from the 1990s and onwards, as measured by large international assessments (PISA, TIMSS and PIRLS) – both over time and compared to other countries, even if a certain recovery took place in the mid-2010s (OECD 2015). The reforms mentioned above are not the only reasons for the observed development. Increasing social differences more generally, large refugee immigration in the 1990s and 2000s, considerable teacher shortages and low attractiveness of the teaching profession are some other factors, but the decentralized and marketized education system amplifies rather than counteracts the negative processes of segregation and declining achievement (e.g. Östh, Andersson & Malmberg 2013). Fourth and finally, the assumed economic and efficiency benefits of the 1990s neoliberal reform has been little evaluated, but a recent OECD report on vocational upper secondary education indicates negative consequences in these respects (Kuczera & Jeon 2019).

5. Choice-market reforms and policy learning

In 1992, at a time when Sweden was taking the decisive step into privatisation and marketization of education, the OECD commissioned three experts to review Swedish education policy – the third examination of its kind since 1967 (OECD 1992). The 1992 report was critical and revealing. The expert group
commented on the fact that the reform work was not preceded by the usual thorough investigations and preparation, and expressed concern over the extensive, hasty and little elaborated policy changes – decentralisation, steering by goals, and not least, the introduction of school choice. The experts pointed to the fact that Sweden could learn from available extensive international experience, e.g. from Australia, with school choice and the risks of resulting growth of school segregation. *The evidence on the effects of these policies is far from clear, but it does suggest some caution in moving towards a system of unfettered choice* (OECD 1992). The reviewers concluded:

\[ \text{… it seemed to us in the end that a more extensive discussion of the detailed questions of the policy design, and perhaps some systematic experimentation and inquiry around the whole issue of school choice, would be a more fruitful course of action (OECD 1992: 26).} \]

The Swedish government did not listen to this advice, and in fact never made the OECD report public. Being more open to policy learning at this point of time would probably have prevented some of the negative developments in the coming years.

When interviewed in the large European project Education Governance and Social Integration and Exclusion in Europe (EGSIE) in 1998, leading Swedish education actors, including the aforementioned school minister, hardly anyone brought up any international influences. On an explicit question about this, some of them however briefly mentioned that OECD reports had had a certain impact (Lundahl 2005). After the publication of the first PISA report in 2000, such references started to appear more frequently, but not in relation to the increasingly visible market situation in education (see below).

When Grek et al. (2009) some years later interviewed “policy brokers” in four European countries about their inclination to
use data from the European Commission to justify education policies in their own national contexts, Sweden did not show any eagerness to learn from the European policy space:

However Sweden, according to these interviewees, does not import, borrow or copy ideas or models from anywhere. Indeed it is the expressed opinion in the Ministry and at the Swedish National Agency of Education (SNAE) that Sweden is already very good at assuring the quality of its education. Thus the collective narrative of excellence and experience remains strong, although interaction with the EU is growing. (Grek et al. 2009: 13)

A similar self-sufficient attitude to education policy learning was expressed in an OECD survey among the national members of the PISA Governing Board (PGB)\(^4\) in connection to PISA 2009 (Breakspear 2012). Although the Swedish respondent believed that the poor PISA results had contributed to the introduction of national testing in the natural science subjects and earlier testing in maths, the general policy direction remained unaffected – there was no perceived need of changing it

Some respondents emphasised that PISA policy findings had confirmed the countries’/economies’ previously determined policy direction rather than contributing to new policy decisions (e.g. Sweden and Singapore). (Breakspear 2012: 16)

Sweden got its own “PISA chock” when the PISA 2012 study was published. After having scored above the OECD average in natural science, reading literacy, and mathematics in the first PISA assessments, the average achievements of Swedish 15-year olds were continuously declining, and in PISA 2012 Sweden showed the worst outcome development of all OECD countries. Equally important, the increasingly stratified school landscape, with growing ethnic and socio-economic divisions between schools, had become a major policy problem. Now Sweden

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\(^4\) Appointed by their governments, PGB members oversee the international work with PISA and report back to their ministries of education.
actually turned to the OECD for advice. In 2015, the OECD advised Sweden to introduce stronger regulation of school choice:

Revise school choice arrangements to ensure quality with equity, arguing that Sweden could benefit from managing school choice to prevent segregation and increased inequities. Providing full parental school choice can result in segregating students by ability and/or socio-economic background and generate greater inequities (OECD 2015: 101).

Later the same year, the new Social Democrat-Green Party coalition government appointed a School Commission\(^5\) to investigate and propose measures to raise academic performance and improve equity in Swedish education along the lines suggested by the preceding OECD report. In an interim report, the School Commission argued that school choice had come to stay. In the section ‘Measures against school segregation and for equitable school choice’, the Commission argued in favour of strengthened school choice as a solution:

Like the OECD, the Commission considers that there is a need to develop a model that enables school choice while countering segregation and reductions in equity. Mandatory school choice, combined with provision of relevant and comprehensive information for pupils and their parents/guardians, should be considered. (SOU 2016:38: 34, our translation).

We will not go further into this line of reasoning as it falls outside of our focus; it is enough to say that the School Commission proposed corresponding changes in its final report in April 2017 (SOU 2017: 35). Before that, a massive campaign in conservative and liberal media backed up the proposal of “mandatory free school choice”. In 2018, the government appointed a commissioner for further investigation of revised

\(^5\) The commission consisted of 14 members representing different social fields (industry, teacher unions, researchers, etcetera), and it had a reference group representing the political parties.
admission and selection regulations in order to promote social heterogeneity of schools (Kommittédirektiv 2018). The commissioner is to present his proposal in spring 2020.

Whereas this was an example of Sweden giving an interesting interpretation of the OECD recommendations (interpreting ‘regulation of school choice’ as ‘making school choice compulsory’), there are other examples where there seems to be convergence between international and national policy directions. PISA studies have been seen as catalysts for Swedish education policy discussions in the 2000s (Ringarp & Rothland 2010). Also, OECD reporting on the low level of school autonomy over curriculum and assessment (OECD 2014) seemed to be in line with the evaluations from the National Agency for Education. Similarly, the most recent Recommendations to Sweden by the Council of the EU have been consistent with national policy actions with regard to migrant students’ support, completion of upper secondary education, sharpening of introductory programmes at upper secondary schools, promoting equality and reducing segregation (Regeringskansliet 2018)\(^6\).

### 6. A paradoxical picture

The case of Sweden presents a paradoxical picture. On the one

\(^6\) Member States submit a national reform programme to the European Commission, which reports on implementation of the Europe 2020 strategy in national policies. The reporting reflects the key priorities for the European semester, which is a framework for the coordination of economic policies across the European Union.
hand, it has adopted global neoliberal ideas of introducing choice, quasi-markets and managerialism in the public sector, not least in the education system – actually to such extent that it appears as the “foremost learner in class”. In that sense, Sweden may thus be regarded a good example of policy learning. However, this is almost never done explicitly, and it is not used to justify the reforms. As we illustrated above, Swedish politicians have persistently regarded it as unnecessary to look at international experience and listen to organisations like the EU or OECD in precisely these matters.

Instead of referring to international inspirers and parallels, Swedish decision makers tended to regard particularly the reforms of decentralisation and deregulation of education as almost inevitable answers to the new demands on education resulting from the rapid transition from an industrial to a knowledge society. The range and possibilities of political action appeared to be limited in this discourse. For example, the Swedish interviewees in the EGSIE project did not bring up alternatives to the transformation of education governance in the 1980s and 1990s – a return to the older governance system was hardly regarded as possible (Lundahl 2005). In other words, they did not perceive themselves as having learned something from somebody, but as acting from changed circumstances. Hence the question “who learns from whom?” could be reformulated to “who learns from what?” Notwithstanding this, it would have been possible and even reasonable to learn from external experience when designing the reforms. How can one understand the reluctance to do so?

The reform work in the fifties and early sixties, resulting in the introduction of the 9-year comprehensive compulsory
education, rendered Sweden a long-lasting international reputation of being a progressive and successful school nation, also confirmed by good results in the then existing international assessments and comparisons (see e.g. Ringarp & Rothland 2009). A lingering self-image of still being at the forefront may partly explain this reluctance to recognize international contributions to national education policies (c.f. Lundahl 2005).

The Conservative-Liberal government first priority was that of carrying through and implementing the school-choice reforms during their four-year period in office. To learn from experiences from marketization and choice reforms outside of Sweden and do other preparations was clearly not on their agenda. As the OECD experts noted in 1992, “We formed the impression, talking with officials, that the present government would like to move quickly to get a national commitment to educational choice” (OECD 1992: 26). Furthermore, the interviewed government officials argued that there was little to be concerned about; only a few percent of the pupils would go to private schools, and the Swedes would not allow growing disparities and inequalities (sic) (ibid. 25). Actually, for several years, the introduction of free schools and choice did not seem to have a major impact. The controversies were commonly more about the level of state subsidies than about ideological principles (c.f. Wahlström 2011) and no-one seemed to feel a need of learning from the outside world.

After the school market virtually exploded in the 2000s, powerful business actors in close collaboration with non-socialist politicians have vigorously defended the status quo, arguing that a change would threaten education and even the welfare system – irrespective of the fact that similar for-profit
systems are (in principle) lacking in the rest of the world. Political expediency and pressures from an increasingly powerful private actors school lobby meant that learning from policy mistakes in other national contexts were not heeded, certainly not when acting on that learning would lead to stricter regulation of the private school sector.

From the perspective of comparative education scholars, exploring policy learning in conjuncture with other forms of policy analysis can provide a set of tools to examine the policy directions and their consequences, but also to critically analyse the global ideas that often underpin such policy travel. However, the case of Sweden bears little witness of policy learning about the risks connected to school choice reforms, and possible methods to prevent and minimize such risks. Previous research and theorizing on policy learning have indicated that such learning is less probable at times of major change and more likely in times of incremental change (see above). In the Swedish case, it seems as if the initial decision on competition and choice was perceived more as a rhetorical ‘choice revolution’ than a real structural change. A decade later, a new and powerful market structure was emerging – and one that it would take considerable struggle and pressure from powerful actors to re-orientate and tame. We have not seen this happen yet. More generally, the opportunity windows for genuine and reflexive policy learning may be few and narrow – not only in Sweden.

The challenge for education researchers is to provide knowledge on the consequences of policy change for schools, teachers, and students, and disseminate this knowledge to policy participants across the different arenas of policy production.
This should lead to the redefinition and recontextualisation of policy ideas that govern education policy and practice in ways that are more consistent with both genuine forms of policy learning, and with the idea of equality for all - still assumed to underpin schooling reforms.

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