Sweden and Poland Entering the EU

Comparative Patterns of Adaptive Organization and Cognition
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Abstract
This thesis is a comparative study of how elites in Sweden and Poland approach and make sense of EU membership. It begins with the observation that the public debates in several EU member countries are becoming increasingly politicized around a dichotomy, i.e. enthusiasm and skepticism vis-à-vis European integration. Whereas a lot of research in this field covers the characteristics of the European integration process itself, fewer studies focus upon the cognitive complexity involved in national strategic policy choices. The aim of this thesis is to explore, compare and contrast the organizational and cognitive aspects of how Sweden and Poland entered the EU and thereby to contribute to an understanding of how national policymakers in Europe believe that national and supranational integration can work together.

The theoretical point of departure is Stein Rokkan’s model of political integration, which emphasizes the importance of functional and territorial political cleavages in the development of modern European nation states. The model is used to identify political actors and structures that are transnationalizing forces in Europe and to determine in what ways they form a challenge to national governments in the process of adaptation to the EU. Representing different theoretical points of intersection in the Rokkanian model, these challenges are defined as Integration, Trade and Industry, Functional Regionalism and Territorial Regionalism. The empirical analysis builds on these theoretical categories and covers three different areas. First, the ways in which adaptation to the EU was organized by the governments of Sweden (1988-1994) and Poland (1998-2004) are scrutinized. Second, documents concerning the strategic policy deliberation of both organizations are analyzed in the light of Rokkanian integration categories. Third, the results of two sets of research interviews, one in each country, are analyzed. A major conclusion drawn in the study is that Rokkanian integration theory holds the key to an understanding of how national policymakers believe that European integration can be segmented and how supranational integration in the economic sphere can evolve separately from other areas of social and political integration. Although from very different countries and political experiences, elites in Sweden and Poland show remarkable cognitive similarities.

Another contribution to a cross-national understanding of adaptation to the EU is the cognitive model, which is developed on the basis of empirical study. The model expands upon and goes beyond the simple dichotomy of Enthusiasts and Skeptics in the discussion about European integration. Two new categories are introduced and defined as Voluntarists and Pragmatists. The argument is that new cognitive categories are necessary to improve the description and analysis of how national policy makers in Europe set up long-term political goals and manage complex issues in the process of European integration.

Key words: Integration, transnationalization, adaptation, Sweden, Poland, European Union, enlargement, Stein Rokkan, political cognition, national elites, strategic policy deliberation, qualitative research interviewing, Enthusiasts, Voluntarists, Pragmatists, Skeptics.
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Many thanks are due, however. If it had not been for Professor Gunnel Gustafsson, this thesis would probably never have been finished. Her moral and intellectual support goes back several years now, and I can only hope that in my future work I will be able to prove myself worthy of her efforts up to this point. Another person at my home department who has never stopped believing in me and who has contributed with professional support and encouragement is my friend Dr. Kerstin Kolam. I would also like to thank Professor Douglas Nord, for his contribution as a faculty opponent at the presentation of my Licentiate dissertation in 1999, and for making me feel enthusiastic about my research ideas again. Professor Joe Board, thank you for proofreading my manuscript! Anita Lidén, thank you for your patience and diligence regarding the technical aspects of making this happen, and I wish you all the best as you too will be floating away! Thank you Professor Katarina Eckerberg for being optimistic about financial concerns and, of course, a big thanks to all the hard-working people in Stockholm and Warsaw!

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Umeå in April 2005

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1. Understanding European Integration

This thesis is about how two national elites adapt to and reflect upon the long-term effects of European integration. More specifically, it explores how national elites in Sweden and Poland think about what political changes will be necessary because of EU membership and what changes would be desirable for their respective countries. The research also concerns how the work with political adaptation was organized in these countries at the two particular time periods when the Swedish and Polish elites have the most influence over the political terms on which each country shall join the union. The Swedish study is set against the EU:s fourth enlargement process, which successfully expanded the number of EU member countries from 12 to 15 in 1995. The Polish study refers to the context of the fifth enlargement process, which in 2004 resulted in 10 new EU-members and consequently a total of 25.

The aim of this thesis is to explore, compare and contrast two aspects of how Sweden and Poland entered the EU and thereby to contribute to an understanding of how national policymakers in European countries think that national and supranational integration can work together. The first aspect is organizational, bringing into view how each government chooses to carry out preparations for membership negotiations with the EU, how the content of negotiations is presented to the national publics and which societal partners are brought into the deliberation process in each of the two countries. The second aspect is cognitive, throwing analytical light on how representatives of the two national elites explain what they think European integration is about and what the process might entail in terms of political change for their country. Looking at European integration from the perspective of two nation-states in Europe, it is hoped that some of the finer points of national policy deliberation in the evolving process of European integration can be elucidated.

The work on this thesis starts with the observation that European integration is becoming an intractable policy issue in the political lives of most European nations. The practical relevance of this observation is that as a European you are either for or against the EU, defined either as an Enthusiast or a Skeptic1 in the political discussion about European integration. The research about enthusiasm and skepticism in the EU is still rather new, the terms vary to describe these and similar cognitive categories. In some cases the two categories are referred to as Euroenthusiasts and Euroskeptics, but after the heated political debate over the common currency, the Euro, the prefix has taken on that specific meaning. Sometimes these categories are referred to as Europhiles and Euroskeptics with specific reference to political actors who are inclined towards a supranational federation in Europe (Europhiles) and those more taken with the principle of intergovernmentalism (Euroskeptics). See Mény, Yves (2003) “The Achievements of the Convention” in Journal of Democracy, vol. 14, no. 4, pp. 57-8ff.

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integration, and this is a dichotomy that goes beyond other civil and political loyalties, such as for example party-political affiliation. When work on this thesis started, originally as a single-case study on Sweden in the 1990s, few political scientists had begun to problematise the Enthusiasm-Skepticism dichotomy.\(^2\) With the passage of time and the continued territorial expansion of the EU, more have come to do so. Today some political scientists go so far as to say that the yes-no dimension, seen as an emergent intractable policy issue in European politics, might become a threat to the internal political stability of some European countries.\(^3\) Some countries will become “difficult partners” in the long run.\(^4\) Many observe that the way European integration is politicized nationally, when a government negotiates its entry into the EU, will have long-term effects upon the European integration process. As illustrated by the quotes below, policy makers are aware of the fine balance between skepticism on the one hand and the economic and other potential gains from integration on the other.

Over the course of the past few decades, communications have knit countries more closely together. People are showered in written and spoken words, in picture media. The economies have been interwoven – job opportunities, interest rates, trade statistics are all dependent upon decisions and processes outside national boundaries. Threats against our common environment have evinced themselves as transnational. Necessity has caught up with the dream of Europe.\(^5\)

The economics can tell us only one side of the enlargement story. However important, it cannot provide us with a complete picture of what may happen after enlargement, both to the CEEC and the member states of the Union. Therefore, we have to call upon politics, because political decisions – though supported by an economic analysis – are made on the basis of values and convictions. (…) This is why we have to make a political choice.\(^6\)

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\(^5\) Gradin, Anita (1991) ”Det Nya Europa”, foreword to information booklet distributed by the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, August issue.

Over time my initial observation on the polarization of the public debate turned into two simple questions. In the political world of Enthusiasts and Skeptics, where are all the Pragmatists? Is it possible to imagine the otherwise sagacious and circumspect national elites in Europe suddenly possessed by a “dream of Europe”? One of the most pressing issues of European integration over the past decade has been the emergence of negative or indifferent responses to European integration among citizens at large. For a long time, European citizens were acquiescent to integration elites constructing an ever larger, ever more complex body of supranational institutions in response to perceived economic and social needs. European elites interpreted this acquiescence as a political go-ahead signal. Currently, however, increasing numbers of Europeans are saying no to further integration and European integration is being more heavily politicized in national politics in ways that only rarely happened before. The Euroskepticism – Euroenthusiasm cleavage seems to have become entrenched in most member countries. If there is a “dream of Europe” among national elites in Europe, then there are also vital political signs that it is not shared by regular citizens. So what does the elite dream look like and what is the elite perception of linkage between citizen attitudes and adjustment to pressure for integration from the outside world?

In answer to these driving questions, the idea was formed that perhaps the political focus on Enthusiasm and Skepticism hides important insights into what really motivates elites pursuing integration in Europe. It would be naïve not to see such polarization as productive when elites are rallying electoral support in a referendum, or when political parties strategize their positions in national politics. However, what national elites see as necessary and desirable in the matter of European integration might be as relevant for a proper understanding of ongoing integration processes. Underpinning this thesis is the observation that there is more to European integration than sheer political enthusiasm or skepticism, perhaps even a combination of both. Whether this then is the dream of an economically and technologically interwoven transnational society or the overcoming of differences in economic and political practice, or both, or something in between could perhaps be studied empirically.

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Once a European nation decides that it wants to join the EU it also relinquishes some of its national sovereignty. It joins an open-ended integration process in which the cohesion of the national political system becomes inextricably linked with that of the supranational system. Short of an outright exit from the EU, member nations will in the long run be part of an evolving experiment in how power can be balanced between the member states and the union. Regardless of whether contemporary Europeans are for or against the European integration process, much of the political change that they can see happening around them is somehow related to this interplay between national and supranational integration. What remains puzzling from the perspective of nation states in Europe is not so much whether or not Europe matters, but rather “How does Europe matter?”

What was Europe for people like me and my friends in Poland before 1989? Europe meant freedom, normalcy, economic rationality. Europe was the West, to which we naturally belonged, even if we were forcibly exiled from it by Soviet dictate. Europe was a light on the western horizon, a hope that our country, too, might one day become free. But even then we knew another face of Europe – not the Europe of the Declaration of the Rights of Man, the land of liberty; not the Europe of democracy, wealth, tolerance, and multiculturalism. We also knew the Europe of Nazism and its collaborators. We knew the Europe whose left-wing intelligentsia was fascinated by the totalitarian Soviet Union. We knew the Europe of ego-driven and short-sighted political leadership, the enduring symbols of which were Munich in 1938 and Yalta in 1945.

As indicated above, I argue that it is far from certain that the image of European integration elites (enthusiastically doing integration) pitted against the masses (either passively going along or skeptically saying no) provides an accurate picture of the political landscape. Sometimes integration elites in

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Europe can also be skeptical towards European integration. So, again, what do European integration elites think that supranational integration entails for nation-states? This dissertation tries to answer this question by analyzing on the one hand how national elites in Sweden (1988-1992) and Poland (1998-2004) organized their work on political adaptation to the EU and on the other hand how these elites define various aspects of European integration in focus interviews. Thus, the research is focused empirically both on what the elites do and on what they think they are doing.

1.1 Components of the Research Problem

As already indicated, the intent of this thesis is to say something about cognitive predispositions among national elites facing European integration. Such exploration and comparison across national boundaries presupposes a conceptually focused research design. Furthermore, the core concepts upon which the design is built must be recognizable to those actors which are under scrutiny. The research problem and the aim of the thesis should ideally be possible to delineate with certain core concepts which indicate both the intended scope of the inquiry and some of the phenomena under question. This also serves to delimit the research design. In this thesis the analysis is built up around three analytical concepts, in relation to which the research questions are identified.

Integration goes to the core of the research problem and it gives rise to both theoretical and empirical questions. It has to do with the relationship between a political system seen as a whole and its component, sub-systemic parts. It is normally assumed that the nation-states of Europe are integrated political units, each with a unique historically determined set of sub-systemic relations. But which are the linkages between the forces of national and supranational integration in Europe? Can the abstract macro-historical forces of national political integration somehow be translated into integrating actors and interests working for supranational integration? Another vexing issue is how the process of supranational (European) integration itself can be understood, and whether or not the move towards political integration on the supranational level has a disintegrating effect on the national political level. What does it look like from the vantage point of nation-states in Europe? Do national elites believe that national and supranational integration forces are intertwined, or do they see something else emerging? What do national elites expect European integration to do for their countries as they are about to enter the EU as member states?

Organization is the second analytical concept which mainly relates to the empirical analysis. As European countries participate in processes of

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11 Eklund (1999), pp. 52-86.
EU enlargement and negotiate for a position inside of EU institutions, a well-known protocol is followed, i.e. the Acquis Communautaire. The principle is that each applicant country negotiates its way into the EU by adapting to a set of chapters that relate to different sectors of the national legal and socio-economic structure. This format, however, only stipulates two things politically. One is that it is the government of the applicant state that negotiates on behalf of the nation and the second is that the content of each functional/sectoral chapter of the Acquis should be covered in its entirety. National governments are therefore free to choose which level of involvement they wish to seek from other political actors, such as parliament or social and economic partners. What do such choices look like in European countries entering the EU? Are there any major differences between how adaptation to the Acquis is organized in the cases of Sweden and Poland, or are the actors and institutions that each government chooses to involve more or less similar?

*Cognition* is the third conceptual component of this research, which raises empirical questions but also issues of interpretation. When national elites bring about integration, acting on behalf of their countries, they are motivated by different ideas of what task it is they are engaged in and why. Entering the EU, national elites not only base their actions on certain ideas about what their national system is all about. They also have ideas about what it is they are doing and why. To which aspects of integration do they commit by necessity? What do they see as desirable in European integration, and how do aspects of necessity and desirability balance off in their way of thinking? Are they all Enthusiasts at the prospect of making their own country a sub-system to the European Union, or do they have other ideas? Do the cognitive patterns of elites in Sweden and Poland contribute with new categories that can enrich and inform the Enthusiast-Skeptic dichotomy?

### 1.2 Theoretical Underpinnings of the Approach

There is dispute in the academic community regarding different theories about supranationality in Europe. Different ideas about where integration takes Europe are supported by different theorists. More often than not, the view a political analyst will take of European integration depends upon which theoretical model of European integration he or she starts from. Integration theory, by and large, can be seen a competing set of ideas that focus on different aspects of the supranational integration project in Europe.\(^{12}\) From a purely theoretical point of view, it is as valid to argue today that European

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integration is limited by intergovernmental cooperation\textsuperscript{13} as it is to say that European integration stands for a new political order in its own right.\textsuperscript{14} The old question about what effect supranational integration has upon national integration is still open to interpretation and debate. Among those political scientists in Europe that have spent time and effort looking for direct effects of supranational integration upon the nation states of Europe the common question is still why there are so few directly observable effects.\textsuperscript{15}

“So, for better or worse, the EU is not a federation or a confederation, not even a state, but a \textit{sui generis} system of multilayered and polycentric governance – that is, a unique combination of the following properties: 1) \textbf{Governance}. A method or mechanism for dealing with a broad range of problems and conflicts in which actors regularly arrive at mutually satisfactory and binding decisions by negotiating and deliberating with one another and cooperating in the implementation of the decisions. 2) \textbf{Multilayered}. An arrangement for making binding decisions that engages a multiplicity of politically independent but otherwise inter-dependent actors – private and public – at different levels of territorial aggregation in more or less continuous negotiation/deliberation/implementation, but does not assign exclusive policy \textit{compétence} to any of these levels or assert a stable hierarchy of political authority. 3. \textbf{Polycentric}. An arrangement for making decisions binding over a multiplicity of actors that delegates authority over functional tasks to a set of dispersed and relatively autonomous agencies which are not themselves controlled – de jure or de facto – by any single collective institution.”\textsuperscript{16}

Starting from the national perspective, however, studies of European integration have generated important empirical observations that amount to significant differences between the ways European nations respond to supranational integration. First, looking at old EU member countries such as the United Kingdom, France, Spain and Germany, there are significant changes in domestic politics that can be directly linked to EU membership and the


\textsuperscript{15} Claes & Hagen (2004), p.3.

constant pressure for adaptation to the EU system. Second, there are significant differences between how governments in different countries approach EU membership once they have become members, not least concerning how much importance they attribute to the role of public opinion in deciding what European policies to pursue. Finally, there is an invisible wall between on the one hand ideological debates, and by extension party politics, on the national level and on the other hand debates and ideas expressed at the European level. Putting the three observations together, the image of European integration becomes blurred rather than clear. Although there are elements of integration in some areas, particularly in functional sectors such as transportation, national policies and interpretations of the concept and development of supranational integration tend to vary greatly within the European Union.

“So for some time the European creature is condemned to ambivalence: It is not yet a state but much more than an international organization; not yet a federation but more than a simple confederation of nation-states; not yet a united political body, but bound together by a strong mutual commitment to a Charter of Fundamental Rights; and it will not yet have a full-fledged constitution, but it is working to approve a foundational document that has most of the traditional attributes of a constitution.”

In this thesis, some aspects of Stein Rokkan’s theory about the mechanisms of nation-state integration in Europe are utilized as a conceptual framework, in order to clarify if and in what ways European integration can be seen as challenging to the integrity of the nation-state in Europe. Since this theory is based upon assumptions about dynamics and political change, there are elements of it that are well suited to an analysis of the present period of transformation in Europe. His is a theory about how social structures, economic and political interest groups and political power elites interact and how this interaction changes the scene in European politics. Most important, the focus of Rokkan’s theory is on the evolution of the modern nation state, which makes it a good point of departure for a discussion of what may or

may not be seen as a challenge to European states that are in the process of adaptation to supranationality, such as Sweden and Poland. Which are the important contemporary transnational phenomena, and in what ways do they challenge the democratic nation state?

Since the interest in European integration in this dissertation is empirical, as opposed to normative, prescriptive or evaluative, the role of the theory is to provide a conceptual framework with the help of which political aspects of transnationalization can be chosen and made relevant in an analysis of challenges to the modern state in Europe.\(^{22}\)

It is the part of Rokkan’s theory that focuses on political cleavages and their translation into the contemporary politics of European state systems that is of high relevance here.\(^{23}\) Cooperating with Seymour Martin Lipset, Rokkan uses part of his macro-model to analyze the interplay between territorial and functional forces in the political life of European states. The crossing political dimensions of functional and territorial forces are seen as a cornerstone of the modern-day evolution of political parties, electoral systems and interest group representation in Europe.\(^{24}\) The two political dimensions are thus applicable to forces that motivate the existence of political phenomena that are both national and non-national in their scope, such as national government, political mass-movements, party systems, interest organizations and a variety of social and economic elites. For the most part, Rokkan focuses upon the integrative strategies of political, social and economic elites in the light of their historical ambition to shape, unite and reshape the nation, building a theory about what Michael Laver has called “the essential inevitability of the political” in the life of nations.\(^{25}\)

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24 Ibid. The original version of the theory and how it was applied to explain party politics in Europe can be found in Lipset, Seymour & Rokkan, Stein (1985) “Cleavage Structures, Party Systems and Voter Alignments” in Lipset, Seymour (ed.) *Consensus and Conflict. Essays in Political Sociology*. New Brunswick: Transaction Books, pp. 113-185. In the following, although their essay attempts to explain political parties and the formation of party systems, the focus is on an interpretation of their ideas about the interplay of political forces in European societies and the structural prerequisites for national politics. Essentially, the essay is about the visceral political cleavage structures in European society at large, with a particular application on the mature, democratic nation state in Europe.

This particular theory of the macro-historical origins and evolution of the contemporary nation-state seems ideal in trying to determine exactly where national integration meets supranational integration. The core notion of the theory is the assumption that also underpins most modern democratic governments in the Western world, i.e. that the primary function of a political system is to integrate all functions within the confines of the national territory. The benefit of this model here is that it contributes to an understanding of which concepts, political relationships, structures, actors and processes in a country that may or may not challenge national integration when subjected to the forces of European integration.

In addition to the macro-historical integration theory, this dissertation has a second theoretical underpinning. More precisely, theories of political cognition are used to interpret the strategic deliberations of political elites. In the words of Robert Jervis, “It is hard to see how we can ever gain anything like a complete understanding of politics without understanding how people think.”

In this dissertation, the focus is on similarities and differences in how integration elites think about the political consequences of European enlargement. In other words, action and ideas among national integration elites in Europe are seen as an important part of the story behind why national policy choices look the way they do and, consequently, why some aspects of the overall process of European integration are more likely to succeed than others. Consequently, the empirical focus is upon how and why national elites get involved in two different processes of European enlargement, the fourth and fifth enlargements of the EU.

What is interesting is how national elites do “thinking, knowing, perception, judgment, ordering and learning” from the two processes. From this, a set of cognitive categories to define differences and similarities between integration elites can be developed for the empirical parts of the study. In this thesis, the cognitive patterns of national integration elites in Europe are empirically interesting for three distinct reasons.

First, the focus on elite strategies and their definitions of integration is motivated by Stein Rokkan’s political theory. To the extent that there is a change taking place in the overall balance between those historically defined cleavages that have shaped and defined modern democratic states in Europe, it is interesting to find out whether or not this change is taken into consideration by national elites when they adapt their country to the European Union. With the help of Rokkan’s conceptual map, transnationalizing tendencies in economic


and social life can be translated into political categories directly relevant to national political integration. In effect, the merger of Rokkanian concepts and a cognitive approach will say something about whether or not elites define European integration as intertwined with national integration.

Second and as already indicated, there is still widespread academic uncertainty concerning the process of European integration as such. For all the enthusiasm that Western European governments were displaying at the dawn of the fourth enlargement process in the late 1980s, there has been political turmoil and serious set-backs to the integration process during the fifth enlargement process. Against this background it becomes interesting to analyze and compare the similarities and differences between national elites involved in both enlargement processes. Are national elites involved in the process of enlargement as Euro-enthusiasts, as the current popular saying goes, or are they actually Euro-skeptics at heart, playing along to the tune of a song that they actually do not like?

Third, the shortcomings of the theories of European integration call for a better understanding of how political decision makers actually make sense of what they are doing in Europe, and political cognition theory is a useful complement to the dominant institutional approach in this field of knowledge.28

“…actor strategies and changes in the general perception are about as important as changes in the material world. The same holds true for the relation between actual practice and the interpretation of that practice (…) the proliferation of the concept is as relevant as are the actual changes in roles, structures and procedures. Change is brought about not so much by what political actors and their social and economic counterparts do, but by the understanding that what they are doing constitutes a “new mode of governance”.”29

In this thesis, the concept of cognitive frames is considered crucial. Thus, perceptions as well as normative and affective ways of evaluating what is going on are assumed to impact on how decision makers act.30 What actually

comes out of negotiations in rooms where policy makers meet is seen as heavily dependent upon the interpretations that key decision makers make of concepts such as European integration. In this perspective, the nation-states of Europe are seen as the basic units in an “analytical grid” in which differences and similarities in political interpretation and policy action are studied systematically.\footnote{Surel (2000), pp. 506-510.} This is done without any prior assumptions about, for example, the role of sovereignty or the relative autonomy of particular institutions obscuring the analytical object, which is integration.

With these two theoretical underpinnings put together, this dissertation represents an effort to join the more traditional form of political theory, such as that of Rokkan and Lipset, with new ideas about European integration inspired by the literature on political cognition. Particularly important is a model of cognitive categories (Enthusiast, Voluntarist, Pragmatist and Skeptic) which is utilized in the analysis. The model was originally developed on the basis of elite attitudes towards European integration in Sweden.\footnote{Eklund (1999), pp. 15-21.}

Political cognition as a scientific subfield has its roots in policy analysis.\footnote{Majone, Giandomenico (1993) ”Wann ist Policy-Deliberation wichtig?” in Politische Vierteljahresschrift Sonderheft, vol. 24, pp. 97-115.} The leading notion in this type of research is that political action, for example in the form of policies or particular political decisions, is not solely determined by any one rationale or influence. Rather, the study of political cognition singles out and scrutinizes the thinking and deliberative aspects of such action in an effort to complement other explanatory models based on structures, situations or individual- and group-psychological aspects.\footnote{Lindström, Per (1996) On the Conditions for Political Opinion Change. Dissertation, Department of Psychology, Stockholm University. For a broader view of this and related fields of analysis, see Monroe, Kristen (ed.) (2002) Political Psychology. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.} Politics is thereby defined as something more than an art of the possible.\footnote{This turn of phrase is mostly attributed to Lord Butler. See Scruton, Roger (1982) A Dictionary of Political Thought. London:Macmillan, p. 361.} In effect, the approach represents an effort to link structural and systemic explanations to strategic thinking and decision making by putting the searchlight on how actors think and make judgments concerning specific political issues and processes.\footnote{Hermann, Margaret (2002) “Political Psychology as a Perspective in the Study of Politics” in Monroe (2002), pp. 43-60; Jervis, Robert (2002) “Signaling and Perception: Drawing Inferences and Projecting Images” in Ibid., pp. 293-312.} An important finding in the field is that political decision making takes place mostly among actors with wholly different conceptions of what needs to be done, why and with what effects. The fact that a political decision is taken in good democratic order, and that all involved actors abide
by the outcome of that decision, does not alone guarantee that a lasting consensus has been reached. What is more, the participants in making the decision perhaps believed the outcome to be in accordance with their own strategic preferences, not a compromise which potentially might turn in a direction they dislike. The result is a situation in which political conflict is built into the agreement that was made in order to overcome the original differences of view. The reason, so political cognition research explains it, is differences in how actors frame political issues and processes.37

1.3 Why Compare Sweden and Poland?

Sweden and Poland are compared in this thesis as applicant countries in the process of entering the EU. They are chosen primarily for explorative and pragmatic reasons. From the aim of this thesis it is clear that both the cognitive and organizational environment of national elites in Sweden and Poland are the objects of study. To some extent, the way questions are asked also helps to delimit the scope of possible inferences with regard to national and supranational institutions.38 The focus is on the immediate institutional environment of national elites and upon what they think is going on inside and across countries in Europe and not on why the countries are structurally composed in different or similar ways. Raising questions about national


This is not the place to enter into a discussion of the merits and demerits of a partially constructivist approach to political studies. In the words of Stephen M. Fish, “Political constructivism provides a causal theory, and therefore does not resemble many other theories that borrow the label “constructivism”, including postmodern theories, that eschew causal explanation. Yet, like some other non-structural theories, including those current in international relations theory, political constructivism emphasizes the autonomous importance of actors themselves and does not assume their behaviour to be predetermined. In contrast with other major approaches in comparative politics, virtually all of which emphasize “constraints” of one form or another, political constructivism illuminates will, choice, and action.” See Fish, Steven (1999) “Postcommunist subversion: Social Science and Democratization in East Europe and Eurasia” in Slavic Review, no. 4, vol. 58, pp. 794-823, at pp. 799-800.

38 To generate empirical cognitive data from national elites in this way is not a novelty, particularly not in the field of comparative politics. Richard L. Merritt writes: “For “dual” politicians, those whose concerns bridge the national and international systems some types of questions are of special interest [in comparative perspective] … What are their images of the international environment? (...) What are the attitudes of these elites toward other states, toward international institutions, toward measures designed to enhance the area of regularity and predictability … Do they value the predominance of the nation-state …?” (1970) Systemic Approaches to Comparative Politics. Chicago: Rand McNally & Company, p.127. See also Goldstein & Keohane (1993), pp. 3-30.
elites, however, inevitably means also putting into question the meta-cultural and institutional environments in which they think, discuss and make strategic decisions.\footnote{The logic of qualitative inquiry is to remain well-informed by the theoretical and conceptual tools one has chosen while at the same time being open to inferences made by subjects. See for example: Silverman, David (2001) \textit{Interpreting Qualitative Data. Methods for Analysing Talk, Text and Interaction}. London: Sage, pp. 285-300.}

Originally, Sweden was chosen for the purpose of conceptual and empirical exploration. The core elements of the approach utilized in this thesis were identified and tested in a single-case study on the Swedish elite 1988-94.\footnote{Eklund (1999), passim. Compare w/ Yin, Robert K. (1981) “The Case Study as a Serious Research Strategy” in \textit{Knowledge: Creation, Diffusion, Utilization}, Vol. 3, No. 1, pp. 97-114.} Different ideas and hypotheses were tried on the organizational and cognitive data that was collected in the study.\footnote{In Eklund (1993) an institutional hypothesis was tested in an effort to look for traces of national corporatism in the material. Although some of the organizational aspects of how the Swedish government organized its adaptation to the Acquis lent themselves to at least soft conclusions along those lines, the cognitive data patently did not. At a very early stage in this research, a hypothesis about regional institutional change was developed in Eklund, Niklas & Östhol, Anders (1991) “Politik över gränser”, European Networks Report no. 2, Center for Regional Studies (CERUM), Umeå University. This one fell through completely, however, and was consequently dropped.} The one that remained is basically summarized by the problematization in this chapter. Importantly, the single-case study on Sweden was fruitful in that it provided empirical support for the development of new cognitive categories. Enthusiasts and Skeptics were supplemented with Pragmatists and Voluntarists. Two realizations came in the conclusion of the original Swedish study. One, the original research design was theoretically and empirically fruitful. Second, although the empirical results had been generated based on only one country in the fourth enlargement process, their general applicability was begging for comparison with similar cognitive data from other countries. Time, however, had passed and the other relevant countries (Finland and Austria) had long since discarded their adaptive organizations.

By the time the Swedish study had acquired proper form and recognition, however, the fifth enlargement process was already under way. By the turn of the Millennium, twelve new European democracies were in the early stages of entering the EU. The similarities between how the main actors, both national and supranational, organized the political process were striking between the fourth and fifth EU enlargements. Again, each national government had to organize national adaptation starting from the negotiations chapters of the Acquis and again, national governments were faced with administrative principles stipulated by the EU, but which allowed
for certain national variations.\textsuperscript{42} The opportunity to replicate the Swedish study on a different country about to enter the EU had presented itself.\textsuperscript{43}

Poland was chosen largely for pragmatic reasons at the outset. In this country, the initial contacts with relevant people turned out well in the sense that people seemed interested in participating. Also, senior researchers at the academic department at which this thesis was being written had active contact with persons in the Polish government working with EU adaptation. This made it possible to arrange pilot interviews in Poland before actually carrying out the actual interview series and the pilot interviews were crucial in deciding whether or not it would be fruitful to try out the conceptual model and, more generally, the research design on a different country entering the EU at a different time.

As the fifth enlargement process wore on, however, two more reasons to go ahead and choose Poland for the comparison also emerged. One was that as the literature and reports on the fifth enlargement process started growing, Poland’s status was becoming increasingly problematic for the EU. In effect, fitting Poland into the model of the Acquis was difficult for the EU Commission.\textsuperscript{44} Basically a very big country with more than 38 million citizens and a recent history of economic ‘shock-therapy’, Poland in the fifth enlargement process was emerging as something of an opposite to what Sweden was in the fourth enlargement.\textsuperscript{45} A good reason to look at Poland in the process of European integration, then, is that it is a big but relatively poor and structurally challenged country. It might be expected then that the elite outlooks should be different from those of a small, relatively rich and structurally fit country. Whether there are such elite differences or not is an empirical question.

The other reason for choosing Poland is related to the first, the question being how cognitive changes relate to ‘shock-therapy’ and adaptation to standards from Western Europe. In the words of Karl Cordell,

\textsuperscript{42} Quick and easy reference to the organizations of applicant countries in the fifth enlargement is available at www.cec.eu.int/enlargement
\textsuperscript{43} From the academic world came warnings that the Eastern enlargement of the EU would create interests and needs among the actors which would eventually make the ‘classical method’ redundant, i.e. having membership preparations done on the basis of the Acquis in the same way for all candidate countries. See Preston (1997), pp. 227-235. The EU Commission did make some procedural changes during the accession process in terms of content, but none concerning the organizing principles for national preparation and negotiation. See European Commission (2000, 2001), passim.
“It would be both unreasonable and churlish to expect Poland simply to attempt to mimic any of the countries of Western Europe.”

Poland has come a long way in its development as a modern European democracy only in the last decade. As a political system and in less than a decade, Poland has built its new democratic polity around its own unique experiences, some of which are new and others which are old. What makes it interesting for comparison are the differences, temporal as well as contextual, in relation to the Swedish experience. Here too, it might be expected that elite perceptions of European integration should differ. Whether they do or not in relation to European integration, however, is equally an empirical issue.

“Rokkan’s models are, as has been emphasized, characteristically open. They can also be called heuristic. They offer points of departure and they help in ordering and sorting different kinds of information but they do not generally contain specific hypotheses which can be tested directly. Rokkan himself always emphasized that his basic models have to be elaborated and given historical content.”

It may or may not be vital for a comparative study to problematise national data in the form of cultural and institutional variables, social relations, standards of living and so on. This however, is not a prerequisite for doing comparison. In this thesis, the empirical interest lies in elite cognition and organization. To the extent that the study of these phenomena makes structural data relevant, such data is investigated. Which particular data, however, is by and large a question of the outcome or the analysis rather than the starting point. This is the nature of the research design.

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1.4 Organization of the Study

The initial chapter sets the stage for two types of analysis that are done in this dissertation. In chapter 2, a more profound look is taken at the theoretical underpinnings that have been so far been presented only briefly. First of all, the nature of Rokkanian integration theory is described and empirical integration categories relating to the nation state in Europe are derived from it. Secondly, the epistemological nature of the political-cognitive perspective is described in some detail, and the ideas upon which rest the four cognitive categories later used in the empirical chapters are presented. Chapter 2 ends with a discussion of the methodological ramifications of the approach that has been chosen for this study, and how the theoretical perspectives are to be put together and used in the empirical approach to organizations in Sweden and Poland.

Chapters 3 and 4 constitute one of the two empirical legs on which this dissertation stands. In Chapter 3 the way the Swedish government chose to organize its work with adaptation to the EU 1988-94 is analyzed and discussed. Chapter 4 makes a similar analysis of the organization chosen by the Polish government between the years 1998 and 2004, emphasizing how political and economic actors were joined in when it came to practical work with integration issues and EU enlargement.

Chapters 5 and 6 make up the other leg of empirical support. In these two chapters the political thinking among the members of the Swedish and the Polish organizations is analyzed. The four cognitive categories (Enthusiast, Voluntarist, Pragmatist and Skeptic) are utilized in the description of type answers and dominant cognitive patterns. Based on interviews, patterns of reasoning about the Rokkanian integration categories (EU integration, Trade and Industry, Functional and Territorial Regionalism) are described. Chapter 5 deals with the predominant views in the Swedish organization and Chapter 6 with the thinking in the Polish organization. The analysis describes the dominant cognitive patterns in each organization and during each of the two different enlargement processes, emphasizing the cognitive frames concerning the relationship between national and transnational forces of integration.

Chapter 7 ends the study with a summary discussion, comparing the main similarities and differences between the organizational and cognitive studies in the foregoing chapters. Last but not least, it is discussed whether there are some general lessons to be learned from how national integration and the processes of EU enlargement intersect in the cases of Sweden and Poland.
2. Conceptual and Methodological Applications

What are the links between national and supranational processes of integration in Europe? The starting point of this dissertation is that not enough attention has been given in the field of integration theory to the integrative forces of nation-states themselves, and to what extent such forces can be seen as changing. Few if any would assume that the process of European integration gives rise to a whole new set of political actors and structures that simply supersede or replace those that have been at play in the integration and development of the European nation state. Other than the interaction among elites, supranationality in itself has very few direct links with those economic and social forces that have been pivotal to the development of the modern nation-state in Europe. The development of supranational institutions and activities in the EU seem to lack the political roots that national institutions and activities have in the form of territorially and functionally determined actors and structures.

This chapter is divided into three sections. The first expounds upon Rokkanian integration theory in an effort to define how the linkage between supranational and national integrative forces. The precepts of Rokkan’s conceptual map are further clarified and operationalized into empirically viable categories. These categories then form the basis for research interviews and the results presented in later chapters. The second section of this chapter begins with a deepened discussion of the theoretical ramifications of political cognition. Moreover, the model of the four cognitive categories (Enthusiasts, Voluntarists, Pragmatists and Skeptics) is elucidated. The third and last section of this chapter discusses some of the concrete methodological and material issues that pertain to the chosen line of inquiry.

2.1 Integration: Territory and Function

Norwegian political scientist Stein Rokkan is the founding father of a coherent theory of those macro-historical forces that have given rise to modern, democratic nation states in Europe. The body of theory is vast. Drawing on rich historical data, Rokkan describes and explains the historical growth of state-building political forces in Europe. The explanation for the

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1 The standard reader on Rokkan’s theory is Flora, Peter et.al. (1983,1987) State, Economy and Society in Western Europe 1815-1975, Volume I-II. Frankfurt am Main: Campus Verlag. The basic concepts and models are presented in the introduction by Peter Flora in the first volume, pp. 11-26. A more updated scrutiny of the components in Rokkan’s theory is available in Flora et.al. (eds.) (1999).
rise and maturity of the sovereign democratic nation state is sought in the 
long-term interplay between state, society and various forms of political 
elites in the form of interest groups. The theory also includes the notion that 
political relations in states and societies are dynamic, and that all political 
systems constantly are under pressure from the forces and counter forces of 
economic and social development. Thus, states are challenged by alternative 
social actors and structures throughout history. It is only with the dawn of 
modern political parties and democratic mass-politics in the 20th century that 
the model offers a possibility to foresee long-term political stability in Europe.

Part of Stein Rokkan’s vast theory is about political change and how 
social structures, economic and political interest groups and political power 
elites interact in European politics. Focus is on the evolution of the modern 
nation state in Europe, which seems to make it a good point of departure for 
a discussion of how contemporary transnational phenomena may or may not 
challenge states in the process of adaptation to supranationality. In the cases 
of Sweden and Poland for example, how can Rokkanian theory inform an 
analysis about how transnational phenomena and political integration coincide? 
Since the interest of this dissertation in transnational phenomena is empirical, as 
opposed to normative, prescriptive or evaluative, the role of the theory is to 
function as a conceptual framework with the help of which relevant political 
challenges to states undergoing integration in Europe can be identified.

It is the focus on political cleavages and their translation into the 
contemporary politics of European state systems that is of crucial interest 
here. Rokkan uses part of his macro-model of political change to analyze 
the interplay between territorial and functional forces in the development of 
European states. The crossing political dimensions of functional and territorial 
forces in political life are seen as a cornerstone of the modern-day evolution 
of political parties, electoral systems and interest group representation in 
Europe. Thus, the two dimensions illustrate political phenomena that are

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2 Flora et al. (1999), pp. 279-302. The theory about the interplay between territorial and functional forces applied here will simply be referred to as Rokkan’s, or as Rokkanian theory, although some of the material was either worked out or co-published with other authors. For example: “Rokkan’s application of Talcott Parson’s AGIL-scheme is an illuminating case. It has been much publicized because it appeared in Lipset’s and Rokkan’s path breaking introduction to the important volume ‘Party Systems and Voter Alignments’, mainly written in the early 1960s but published in 1967. Still, it is entirely clear that Rokkan never was a Parsonian in the sense that he would have shared all the assumptions and priorities of Talcott Parsons. Rokkan’s application of Parson’s scheme was probably partly motivated by the fact that Parson’s work in its day provided a kind of theoretical terminal, and that it was both fruitful and fashionable to relate one’s work to Talcott Parsons. Parson’s theories of course contained an abundance of insights into the workings of society, and Stein Rokkan used this insight in his own particular and select manner.” See Allardt (1982), pp. 3-4.

3 Flora et al. (1999). The original version of the theory can be found in Lipset & Rokkan (1985), pp. 113-185.
both national and transnational in scope, such as government, political mass-
movements, party systems, interest organizations and a variety of social and
economic elites. For the most part, Rokkan focuses upon the integrative
strategies of political, social and economic elites in the light of their
historical ambition to harmonize, unite and consolidate the nation state.4

Figure 1. The territorial and functional dimensions of political conflict.

The transitologist – consolidationist debate that has raged among scholars over the past
decade, concerning developments in Eastern Europe, is a recurrent one in a longer time
perspective. See for example King, Charles (2000) “Post-Postcommunism: Transition,
Even in the public debates of Western European welfare states, such as Sweden, similar
debates were frequent still in the 1960s, making reference to the drive among national
elites to ”shape and unite the nation, in many cases create a nation”. See Tingsten, Herbert
with Higley, John & Pakulski, Jan (1999) ”Elites in the Study of Consolidated Democracy” in
Jasinska-Kania, Aleksandra et.al. (eds.) Power and Social Structure. Essays in honor of
To Rokkan, the national territory of a modern state is the obvious arena within which the territorial and functional forces come into play. Furthermore, it is the arena where the interplay between different political forces eventually comes to rest in a legal and institutional setting which is normally referred to as the nation state. The extreme points of the intersecting axes in Figure 1 are, as pointed out by Rokkan himself, theoretical ideal types that can rarely be found in their pure form in real political life. The benefit of the model, nevertheless, is that it contributes with concepts, relationships among phenomena and a starting point from which a better understanding of the transformation of structures and processes can be formed. In the words of the theorist himself, “The model essentially serves as a grid in the comparative analysis of political systems…”

The vertical, territorial dimension is symbolic of a crucial dichotomy in political science, one between center and periphery. Importantly, according to Rokkan, it symbolizes two types of political tension. One is the tension between center and periphery, and between those political elites that are driven by centralizing or localizing ambitions. Importantly, it is also symbolic of the strategic interaction between different elites on different levels, i.e. central elites competing with each other internally and peripheral elites acting strategically between themselves.

At the [one] end of the territorial axis we would find strictly local oppositions to encroachments of the aspiring or the dominant national elites and their bureaucracies: the typical reactions of peripheral regions, linguistic minorities, and culturally threatened populations to the pressures of the centralizing, standardizing, and “rationalizing” machinery of the nation-state. At the [other] end of the axis we would find conflicts not between territorial units within the system but over the control, the organization, the goals, and the policy options of the system as a whole. These might be nothing more than direct struggles among competing elites for central power, but they might also reflect deeper differences in conceptions of nationhood, over domestic priorities and over external strategies.

The model points to the rationale behind territorial conflict in modern European countries in terms of the center-periphery dichotomy. Importantly, it also problematizes the fact that conceptual and functional-strategic battles between elites are an important political force in democratic states. The fight

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for control over the organization and activity of national institutions is important. Equally important to the overall political situation is the fight for control of the political agenda and, ultimately, the definition of the situation. An important note is that there is a difference between how the model plays out in federal and quasi-federal, as opposed to unitary states.

Indeed, the model seems suited for an analysis of those historical forces that might in the end lead to a federal political system. But, importantly, in a federal system there are explicit legal rules that once and for all tie down certain divisions of power between center and periphery in the system. This is not to say that federal systems are frozen, but merely to point out that the Rokkanian model probably works better in an analysis of political systems where there is less legal definition of the relationship between center and periphery and, importantly, where the balance between peripheral, territorial loyalty and loyalty to the center or elite organization is upheld by the individual political representative.

The horizontal dimension represents the functional dimension, which has to do with the formulation, organization and production of loyalty to political interests. It is on the cross-cutting political dimension where the political struggle for universal ideologies and principles for the allocation of resources in society is waged.

At the [one] end of this dimension we would find the typical conflict over short-term or long-term allocations of resources, products, and benefits in the economy: conflicts between producers and buyers, between workers and employers, between borrowers and lenders, between tenants and owners, between contributors and beneficiaries. At this end the alignments are specific and the conflicts tend to be solved through rational bargaining and the establishment of universalistic rules of allocation. The farther we move toward the [other] end of the axis, the more diffuse the criteria of alignment, the more intensive the identification with the “we” group. At the end of [this] dimension we find the typical “friend-foe” oppositions of tight-knit religious or ideological movements to the surrounding community. The conflict is no longer over specific gains or losses but over conceptions of moral right and over the interpretation of history and human destiny; membership is no longer a matter of multiple affiliation in many directions, but a diffuse “24-hour” commitment incompatible with other ties within the community; and communication is no longer kept flowing freely over the cleavage lines but restricted and regulated to protect the movement against impurities and the seeds of compromise.  

The cross-cutting functional axis represents the perpetual political tug-of-war in a modern democracy between an open, universalistic debate about the

8 Ibid., p.124.
principles of life in the community, across all localities on the one hand, and
the membership-restricted, internalized plight of closed groups on the other.
The latter are often territorially localized, but not necessarily so. Taken
together, the two dimensions are intended to form an analytical grid that
provides the analyst with a conceptual map of those political forces that have
made the democratic nation state in Europe what it is today. For Rokkan, it
is an empirical question to ask to what extent any single nation is
characterized more or less by one of the dimensions and, similarly, to ask
whether any one government has done away with all irredentist or “we”
group” opposition to universalistic political aggregation principles. What is
particularly interesting in the context of this dissertation is that territorial-
functional model, or grid, allows us to link a macro-historical model of the
political forces of change in modern, democratic Europe with the idea of
transnationalization. What happens when functional and territorial forces
expand across national boundaries?

It should be remembered that the theory presented here precedes the
‘End-of-history´ debate that pervaded Western societies in the last decade of
the 20th century.\(^9\) Rokkan is careful to point out that politics, particularly in
Western Europe in the 1970s, was looking more and more to him as a game
over the principles of economic allocation, which lies on the left extreme of
the functional axis. At the same time it seemed to him as if the territorial
dimension was becoming less important and that, in general, the centralizing
and universalizing tendencies in modern, industrial economies were pointing
Western European states in the same direction. In the longer historical
perspective, however, he concludes that the evolution of the modern nation-
state is mostly marked by conflicts on the vertical, territorial axis. It is
important, however, that Rokkan does not say that the end of political
history is near. Nor does he explicitly say that universalist, ideological and
centralist tendencies have taken over European politics for good.\(^10\) Contextually,
Rokkan’s theory belongs to a period in time, the 1960s, when political
activists in the debate were beginning to claim that nation-building and the
development of national democratic institutions was becoming a thing of the
past:

The powers of state do under these circumstances not only play the
role of the judge, over every detail between different economic
interests. The activity becomes so technical that politics more and
more resembles applied statistics. To have an informed debate
about current affairs it takes a level of insight into detail that in

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Hamilton.
10 Flora et al. (eds.) (1999), Ibid.
almost every thinkable case can only be possessed by a few individuals. Thus, the struggle for political power transforms, the political parties and the politicians acquire new roles that are different from what they had in the days of democratic break-through and break-up.11

Contrary to the activists in the political development debate of that decade, however, Rokkan stuck to his basic model of cross-cutting cleavages based on territorial and functional political forces. In times of change, his model continues to contribute its heuristic and analytical values. When, in the latter half of the 20th century, economic and social modernization in Western Europe began to reach unforeseen levels and problems of transnational governance became increasingly pressing national policy makers, the macro-historical relevance of Rokkan’s conceptual model once again became clear.12 Almost identically with the 1960s, today’s debate in Europe is riddled with theorists and public debaters arguing that the territoriality and social institutions of European politics are, once again, set once and for all.

Regardless of the spirit of the age when Rokkan constructed his theory, the point here is that the nation state prevails in Europe in the perspective of the past 150 years. European integration has emerged as a new challenge, opening up for transnational alternatives to the integrating forces of the sovereign nation state, but both in theory and practice Rokkanian concepts and mechanisms still stand. In the current day and age, the challenges to the nation state in Europe look different, but the vexing questions introduced by Rokkan’s conceptual model still linger. Can the modern state in Europe control the evolution and aggregation of political interests in society, or will alternatives continue to challenge it?13 The theoretical strength of Rokkanian theory lies in its conceptual adaptability between the historical structuration of the nation state in Europe and its interface with modern challenges.

Rokkan points out that at the time of his writing, which took place from the mid-1960s to late 1970s, it did indeed seem to him as if the nature of European politics was undergoing change. He implies, among other things, that the European nation state seemed to have reached a certain level of political maturity and, not least because of successful democratization, also reached a stage in its development where political conflict was becoming increasingly centralized and more universalistic in scope. The reason, Rokkan concluded, was the development of national political systems almost wholly centered upon partisan (or party) politics.\(^{14}\) In a sense, it could be argued that his observations were precursors to the 'End-of-History' debate of the 1990s, although obviously based on observations and conclusions relevant to the first two decades of development in Postwar Europe. Nowhere was Rokkan so affected by the spirit of the times that he chose to conclude that the plight of irredentist groups, regional or ethnic, was forever lost to universalist values. Nor did he agree that the centralizing ambitions of national elites had screened out the localizing political strategies of peripheral interest groups.

To Rokkan theoretically, the European nation state is the relevant arena for the study of European politics in a comparative perspective. Indeed, the outspoken ambition of Stein Rokkan himself was always to try to develop general concepts and a generic set of theories that might be applicable to the evolution of all states in Europe, in contemporary as well as historical perspective.\(^{15}\) The tendency among political scientists has been to apply the theory to party and mass politics and to leave out the question of recurrence and change. What is important for the use of the conceptual model in this dissertation, however, is not the issue of universalistic dominance in political life, nor is it the issue of causality. It is rather the heuristic value of the model when it comes to identifying concrete challenges to the nation state in Europe which is important, and the fact that it allows such challenges to be translated into linkages with the established elites of real-life political systems. Thus, the model is useful as a framework for analysis of the often quoted theoretical gap between the seemingly well-known and well-organized national political arena and the potential for transnationalization of economic and political interests that is connected with the later stages of European integration.\(^{16}\)


What happens when a formally sovereign and democratic European state enters a process of political adaptation to the European Union? Which are the new strategies from political elites, and how do they interact with those national political balances identified by Stein Rokkan?

For any state the territorial objectives are twofold: to preserve the integrity of the territory, and to ensure the legitimacy within these boundaries through popular support for and acquiescence to its political authority.\(^\text{17}\)

Transnationalization implies, at least in theory, that the government of a nation state will find itself faced with a dilemma when trying to uphold its given role in society.\(^\text{18}\) As pointed out by Derek Urwin, the territorial-functional model is a heuristic map of a wide variety of political interests and competitive forces that any democratic government must adapt to in the long run.\(^\text{19}\) For democratic national government to uphold its legitimacy, there is a need for political strategies by which both new and recurrent initiatives from functional and territorial actors can be met. This is also what makes Rokkanian theory relevant to this thesis. As indicated, the political dimensions of the grid in Figure 1 can be expounded upon to clarify their applicability also a context where the nation state in Europe faces the challenges of transnationalization and supranational integration.\(^\text{20}\)

**Definition of the Rokkanian Analytical Categories**

The conceptual model depicted in Figure 1 suggests particular lines of social conflict and specific actor types that are the agents of political challenge to and change within the European nation states.\(^\text{21}\) In this way, the model facilitates the identification of social actors and forces that translate the abstract problematique of political integration into concrete contemporary social phenomena. Rokkan’s “double dichotomy” points out the power bases of national elites and counter-elites and produces a “two-dimensional space” within the limits of which political integration becomes real institutions and

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\(^{18}\) In Rokkanian terminology, this role is to integrate territorial and functional political forces and to balance them within the confines of the national boundaries. See also Rokkan & Urwin (1982).

\(^{19}\) Rokkan & Urwin (1983), passim.

\(^{20}\) This theme and the relationship between Rokkan’s model and union politics in Europe have been picked up by other political scientists later on. See for example Smith, Gordon (1990) *Politics in Western Europe*. Aldershot: Gower, pp. 250-308.

\(^{21}\) Flora et.al. (eds.) (1999), pp. 278-302ff.
power balances among social groups.\textsuperscript{22} Thus, the model contributes the conceptual tools for an analysis of how national strategies to meet political change in Europe. Importantly, it also builds on a long historical perspective of how the centralizing ambitions of national elites have coincided and developed in step with opposition from economic, local and regional elites.

The first analytical category derived from the Rokkanian model is \textit{European integration}. What is the strategic perspective of national elites in Sweden and Poland concerning the process of supranational integration itself and what does it do to their political power base? The issue at hand is trying to find out how the national elites from the two countries, involved as they are in preparing their countries for EU membership, think about meeting the challenge of supranationality in Europe. In concrete terms, the process of European enlargement gives both Sweden and Poland access to that part of the EU which is the supranational market structure, mostly referred to as the Single Market. The strategic issue then is that of balancing national economic demands with demands for transnational autonomy. What happens in the empirical world is that the national economic system becomes a part of a much larger economic setting, but the mandate of the national governments in Sweden and Poland is to continue to safeguard the interests of each people and the stability of the national political space. To what degree does the move in Europe toward increasing levels of transnational economic and legal standardization leave room for national elites to retain political influence? Do the national elites in Sweden and Poland see any risk of developing asymmetries between the transnational markets on the one hand and non-market areas of social interaction on the other, in which the process of European integration has evinced itself as more sluggish and conflict-ridden? The null hypothesis regarding this category is that the national elites in Sweden and Poland believe that national and European integration are separate things and that the one does not by necessity affect the other.

The second theoretical category that is hypothesized from Rokkan’s conceptual model is \textit{Trade and Industry}. This category taps into relationships along the functional political dimension in Figure 1. It builds on the assumption that economic actors themselves form a powerful potential opposition to national political elites. Economic actors, such as firms, conglomerates, banks and finance institutes may or may not have national loyalties\textsuperscript{23}, but the development of a genuinely transnational market in Europe depends upon whether or not market actors really begin to behave as if there were no

\textsuperscript{22} Ibid., p. 281.

\textsuperscript{23} There is some debate between Economists as to whether or not national origin really matters for the strategic deliberation of economic actors. See for example: Nilsson, Jan-Evert (1995) \textit{Sverige i förnyelsens Europa}. Malmö: Liber-Hermods.
national boundaries. In the debate on European integration it is often argued that the very reason for why nations should adapt to supranationality in the EU, or indeed to the idea of a transnational marketplace in Europe, is that that the economic actors have already gone ahead and transnationalized. The nation state in Europe, so the rhetorical argument goes, must then simply follow suit.24

In the perspective of Rokkan’s conceptual model, any national government should strategize asymmetries between the territorial and functional dimensions. There is nothing to say that one theoretical category, such as Trade and Industry, cannot break out of the national setting and move into other territorial and functional contexts. The question nevertheless is whether national government sees any strategic problem in such a development, for example in terms of a loss of control over resources, and whether or not there are any ideas about what must be done to meet with this challenge? Do national elites see problems related with an increasing asymmetry between a nationally defined discussion about development, social planning and change, and increasing transnationalization of goals and ideas among economic actors? It is possible that Swedish and Polish integration elites do not see this as a problem. To the extent that a national government has good relations with Trade and Industry in the country, it could be that there is no perceived need for a countervailing national strategy vis-à-vis Trade and Industry. Similarly, if a government believes that strategically important firms will always reinvest in the country for reasons of loyalty, then there is very little to worry about. In the theoretical scheme depicted in Figure 1, the integration of elites in Trade and Industry with other European elites on a transnational market could be an issue of elite competition on the national level. However, it might equally well be a political alliance from the theoretical perspective chosen here.

The third and fourth theoretical categories derived from Rokkan’s conceptual scheme belong to the territorial problematique, which is illustrated by the vertical axis in Figure 1. These two categories have to do with the relationship between center and periphery in the national system, which is also defined as a basic national dilemma in the conceptual model. The two categories will be referred to as Functional and Territorial regionalism in the following.

The starting point is that local and regional elites also form potential counter-forces to national ones in the scheme of political integration. Same as with national economic elites, peripheral elites have an option when it

comes to transnational partnerships to promote local and regional interests. Typically, the political base of Functional regionalism is people moving across national boundaries to find work. It can also be a matter of mutual, infrastructural needs on the opposite sides of a national border, or simply the event of people in a transnational regional setting finding business opportunities that they wish to develop by breaking up national regulations and differences. Conversely, the issue might be one of Territorial regionalism, in which people on opposite sides of national boundaries seek to attain cultural or other value-related goals through transnational interaction. It can also occur in ethnically or irredentist inspired form, then descriptive of a case in which an ethnic or otherwise culturally integrated group has experienced partition as a result of the expansion of the modern nation state in Europe.

In the perspective of the Rokkanian model, transnationalization through Functional or Territorial Regionalism would presuppose involvement by local and regional elites. In Rokkan’s application of the model to national politics, such elites are usually assumed to generate economic and political demands upon national elites at the center. Regions and localities are assumed to be important political actors in the development of political systems, sometimes collaborating and sometimes countervailing the centralizing strategies of national elites. The reason why this peripheral category is subdivided in this thesis is that the potential political mobilization of a national periphery can build its momentum on two, completely different transnationalizing strategies.

Functional Regionalism is about the potential for peripheral opposition to the national center when it comes to issues of developing economic and infrastructural opportunities. New partnerships are sought because elites in the local setting, for example on the level of local government, see promising opportunities for functional development in collaborating with a counterpart, most likely another local government, on the other side of the national border. This particular form of regionalism is important from the theoretical point of view of Rokkan’s analytical grid, because it is heavily related to how demands for economic and infrastructural development are generated in contemporary democracies. National governments in Europe, on the other hand, have a tendency to wave functional regionalism off as insignificant since sovereignty is always assumed to be more legitimate than relative autonomy.25 Territorial Regionalism has a heavier and more

immediate political impact, emphasizing the issue of territorial origin and historically defined homeland rights, expressing them as a direct challenge to the integrated territoriality of the nation state in Europe. It is about identity politics in which the notion of a territorially congruent regional setting is projected in competition with the nation state. In European history, particularly in its political interpretation by Stein Rokkan, the emergence of modern democracies is riddled with this particular type of center-periphery conflict. The upshot is a form of regionalism in which political demands are made for whole territorial units and all of the people inhabiting the region. As opposed to its functional variety, this form of regionalism generates demands for encompassing territorial autonomy.

Having thus identified the four analytical categories relevant to this thesis, it is possible to go back to the Rokkanian model and hypothesize about the linkage between European integration and its roots in those very political actors and forces that are intrinsic to nation states. Supranational integration, for example in the shape of a transnational market system, creates asymmetries between countries. Well-known balances between center and periphery that national governments are used to dealing with are dislocated. When the sovereign nation state loses power and influence over particular social processes and outcomes, it is likely that interest groups, political parties, central and local elites will try to forge new partnerships. Some partnerships may be confined to the national arena, but others may just as well be transnational, seeking out deals and linkages across the boundaries of the national space. It is not necessarily the case that such transnationalization of, for example, economic interest groups will lead to new partnerships on the supranational arena, at least not by default. The European Commission, the Parliament and most other political institutions on the supranational level are closed to participation from social actors and groups in Europe, most notably in the form of corporatist arrangements between particular economic interests and policy makers.

On the other hand, such new partnerships may be genuinely transnational instead. In Rokkan’s model, the threat of exit from social partners and interest groups is held out as a significant element of political life in modern European democracies. Transnational partnerships may be sought by a wide variety of social groups with an equal variation in political interest. In

Rokkan’s model, national elites will by definition be the holders of the national interest. Their political interest is centralizing and universalistic within the confines of the national political space. Transnational elites, however, can have centralizing ambitions with regard to the emergent supranational political institutions in Europe. Or, they can lean toward particularist, regionalist or irredentist interests. In this perspective, Rokkan’s analytical grid is generally applicable in Europe. Where there is a contemporary nation state, the social conflicts and elite formations described by the theory are at work. Thus, supranational integration in Europe can be interpreted as an expansion of the territorial and functional dimensions, moving the perspective beyond the boundaries of national systems.

So far, the discussion about the Rokkanian model and the categories derived from it has opened the way for empirical questions. The thesis is now grounded on theoretical categories that are viable for questions about political integration in Sweden and Poland and linkages to the process of supranational integration in Europe. Again, the broad aim of this thesis is to explore the role attributed to such categories and linkages in the strategic deliberation of national enlargement elites doing integration in the two countries.

2.2 Political Cognition: Necessity and Desirability

What is the theoretical relevance of empirical results from a systematic study of national elites in the fourth and fifth enlargement processes? How can similarities and differences between two elites in “thinking, knowing, perception, judgment, ordering and learning” be grasped when separated in time and space?27 The answer lies in the development of a coherent set of cognitive categories that can be utilized for interpretation in the empirical analysis. In this section, four such cognitive categories are described, related to the theoretical literature and operationalized for the empirical parts of the study.

The more traditional form of political theory, such as the analytical grid of Rokkan’s that has been described above, contributes to this dissertation in that it conceptualizes the structural and actor-related model thinking concerning national and transnational integration.

Political cognition theory on the other hand, helps to conceptualize the analytical instruments needed to sort out the empirical material, represented by lines of thought, ideas and notions among two national enlargement elites. The fundamental idea in political cognition research is that political action in its various observable forms, such as policy

27 Vowe (1994).
statements or particular written decisions by collective political actors, is never uniquely determined by any one particular rationale, structural influence or simple causality. Although such historical moments of singularity may occur, in theory at least, it is for the most part assumed within this theoretical subfield that collective decision making is a complex process that is vulnerable to the influence of ideas and arguments. Another important assumption in the field is that actors quite often and quite simply change their minds about political issues.

The study of political cognition represents an effort to single out the thinking aspect of political activity. The goal is to contribute to our general understanding of politics and to find linkages to other political models that try to explain political outcomes based on structures, situations or individual- and group-psychological aspects.\(^{28}\) Politics as studied from a cognitive perspective can thereby be defined as something more than simply observing the \textit{art of the possible}. In effect, cognitive approaches to politics represent an effort to link structural and systemic explanations to strategic thinking and decision making by putting more searchlight on how actors actually make sense of their situation, how they think and make judgments concerning specific political issues, processes or constraints.\(^{29}\)

Important research findings based on cognitive approaches include for example that political decision making more often than not takes place in settings where actors have completely different views of what needs to be done, why and with what effects. The fact that a political decision is taken in good democratic order does not in itself guarantee that a lasting political consensus has been reached. From the field of political cognition comes the realization that participants in political decision making often do not fully understand what they are doing, partly because there is a tendency among actors to consider \textit{either} the short-term \textit{or} the long-term effects of their activity. In other words, it is possible to say a lot about politics from the notion that actors are acting in accordance with their strategic preferences, given that the researcher has good knowledge about a particular historical setting and about the stated interests and motives of actors involved. From the perspective of political cognition, however, it would be equally important to delve more deeply into why a particular actor chooses to change position on an issue and, perhaps more importantly, what the long-term view of the expected political outcome is. Cognitive research tends to emphasize the long term, and to find that most political decision making builds in further political conflict. The reason, so political cognition research explains it, is that political

\(^{28}\) Monroe (ed.) (2002), passim.
\(^{29}\) Ibid.
actors go about their business using different frames to get by.\textsuperscript{30} Political issues, processes and outcomes are only rarely seen in the same way by actors even if they are involved in the same historical situation. What is most interesting from the perspective of political cognition is to draw out, analyze and categorize similarities and differences of view among political actors.

Cognitive categories and frames of this kind have their epistemological roots in psychological attribution theory. The methodology of attribution research actually aims the searchlight at what is called the “naïve epistemologies” of the subjects under study. In political cognition, this is a generic term for systematic patterns in how individuals and groups give properties to their environment.\textsuperscript{31} In one branch of this research orientation, the analytical interest falls upon how roles, motives and interests are attributed to other people. In another branch of attribution studies, the main interest is in how time-sequencing, causal relationships and ideas about consequences of different chains of events are attributed to particular settings and situations. Also, this kind of research involves looking at how actors put together cognitive chains of causal inference.\textsuperscript{32}

Hence, the political-cognitive perspective involves looking at how actors bring order to their perceptions, sometimes simplifying the perceived reality in order to get by. It might have to do with how an actor looks at the meaning of what other actors do, at the reasons for why certain things are done and not others, or simply the way an actor looks at a process taking place in his relevant context. Attribution, again, has to do with how actors give and order properties to their environment. Further-more, attribution theory puts the focus on thinking individuals, individually or in groups, and the starting point for any analysis is always descriptions of phenomena or processes relevant to the subject as a source to better knowledge.

The concept of attribution has been established to describe how causalities are observed in actions or events. Attribution research is about cognition, not about motive. It is about what actors think, not about what they want or what they have to do. In attribution theory an effort is made to systematize such attributions; it tries, so to say, to explain the explanation. It holds a meta-position in relation to motives, interests and calculations in that it makes the explanations themselves thematic and then goes on to ask why actors make this judgment instead of that; whether they justify their actions by the necessity of a situation, or altruistic motive or group interest; whether

\textsuperscript{30} Schön & Rein (1994); Hirschman (1967).


there are elements of contradiction or broken time frames; into what patterns of causal inference they wish to declare themselves as belonging and then use for justification (…) Because cognition is construction: perception and inference, memory and attribution – these are all mental operations through which we construct our worlds. Political cognition is neither wishful thinking nor a mirror of situations, but it is the development of thinking constructs that are validated through political interaction.\textsuperscript{33}

The political actor is focused in his role as a thinking subject, and the focus is on the way he makes configurations of such phenomena and processes that surround him.\textsuperscript{34} As indicated in the passage above, the aim of such research on the attribution patterns of political decision makers is not necessarily to uncover mistakes or misconceptions. Not even if such things are to be expected in an encompassing research material. Rather, it is an effort to improve the knowledge about how particular political actor types, for example integration elites in Europe, make coherent and meaningful descriptions of what they are doing, or how they make sense of the environment in which they are active. For example, it is meaningful in this perspective to ask actors about what they see as slow or fast processes in social change in order to gain access to their particular images. Not least the prerequisites for national adaptation to the EU, to the Internal Market and to whichever variety of political challenges that integration elites can see are interesting. Following this research route, the objective is to contrast and compare ideas and lessons from academic research and from theoretical concept-building with the “naïve epistemologies” of political actors.

Attribution theory thus contributes with a scientific motive for taking an interest in the images, descriptions and practical knowledge of political actors. Above all, attribution theory motivates why the descriptions of actors should be regarded as another, albeit separate, key to knowledge about political development. Put differently, the cognition of political actors represents real-life knowledge about political phenomena and processes and can be interpreted as valuable descriptions, as opposed to internalized, individualized thought processes. Attribution is a mechanism that contributes to the development of political cognitive patterns in political analysis.

In this perspective, political actors are regarded as interpreters of the context in which they are active. The political actor is seen a priori as hungry for information, constantly asking about what is going on.\textsuperscript{35} A political actor is


assumed to be an active participant in a relevant context, constantly comparing old information with new. The actor is also assumed to be in a continual state of interpretation and reinterpretation, when old information meets with new information and decisions are about to be made on an issue. Framing, concerning the political actor, involves the act of perceiving, but also the active structurization, categorization and evaluation of new information.\(^{36}\)

Organizational premises are involved, and these are something cognition somehow arrives at, not something cognition creates or generates. Given their understanding of what it is that is going on, individuals fit their actions to this understanding and ordinarily find that the ongoing world supports this fitting. These organizational premises – sustained both in the mind and in activity – I call the frame of activity.\(^{37}\)

Framing and attribution as mechanisms of political cognition, in sum, are not aimed at the internal, psychological aspects of individuals and groups in society. It is rather about an effort to provide coherent and meaningful images of how actors see the world, and particularly how they see that part of the world in which they operate. The object of the analysis, the frame or the attribution set, can be defined as something in between an image and a fact. Importantly, however, the analytical issue is not whether or how the brain of the individual respondent works. Some cognition researchers have tried to use the computer metaphor. To the analyst of political cognition, the research interest is focused upon the “software” of the political actor, or upon the particular application that is motivated by a certain function that the actor wants to perform.\(^{38}\) Political cognition is thought to represent both external (organizational) and internal (cognitive) aspects of the individual actor.

To understand political action one has to understand how political actors frame the situations and problems that they are faced with. Framing is about how actors think, perceive, judge, categorize, attribute causalities to and learn from their relevant contexts.\(^{39}\) Part of the frame, then, is not only the thinking but also the actions and organizational context of the actor.

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\(^{36}\) Ibid, passim.


\(^{39}\) Vowe (1994).
A research result can be expected in the form of a set of attributions that tells us how the actor thinks about the world, how he orders incoming information that he did not know about and when, where and how he chooses to go looking for new information. A frame in this sense, can be seen as a kind of cognitive filter, which can be analyzed through its interaction with theoretical categories and real world examples, processes and chains-of-events that the researcher confronts the political actor with.

**Definition of the Cognitive Categories**

For the perspective of this dissertation, one particular observation about politics is crucial. This observation is that political actors with different sets of assumptions about political reality are able to produce compromises which at a certain point in time are translated into majority rule or consensus decision. Completely different definitions of a situation among political actors, perceptions of what needs to be done and why, as well as assumptions about what a particular policy line might lead up to, might all still contribute to the making of a coherent policy. Particularly if there is a lack of time for deliberation and, moreover, the issue is framed as a simple choice between two options, yes or no.

This particular observation is of general interest to analysts in the field of political cognition, but also has particular implications for this study of political integration and integration elites. How do integration elites think? Is it really a simple matter of Yes or No to Europe for them, or do they host more complex cognitive patterns? For one, they might hold different views on what is *desirable* about this particular issue. In the public discussion, not least in the media, there is usually a strong emphasis on how actors differ with regard to the desirability of EU membership, or more generally concerning European integration. However, there could also be serious differences between actors as regards how they perceive the element of *necessity* involved in the situation. Both of these cognitive elements, *desirability* and *necessity*, could be based upon relative variation in the perception of territorial and functional losses and gains for the integrating nation state in Europe. What does it imply for the analysis of integration strategies among

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political elites in Europe if there are serious political reservations behind the collective decision to go ahead with enlargement of the EU?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Necessity</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Desirability</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Enthusiast</td>
<td>Voluntarist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>Pragmatist</td>
<td>Skeptic</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 2. Combinations of Necessity and Desirability: the four cognitive categories.43

Against the background of the cognitive categories in Figure 2, which have been developed as relevant simplifications of more complex cognitions of what needs to be done and why, it is possible to develop cognitive theory to fit national elite perceptions challenged by political integration in Europe. Assuming that the sheer possibility of joining a new organization is no longer an issue among the actors, the deliberative situation can be discussed in terms of four imaginary political actors, illustrated by the four cognitive categories in Figure 2. It is now up to these four actors to decide between themselves whether or not they want to join the new organization or not, and why. A highly politicized discussion is likely to ensue among the four actors, in the course of which they have to decide whether or not they really want to join or not (Desirability) and to combine their reasoning on that dimension with a stand on the other dimension, which involves deciding whether or not they are compelled to join (Necessity).

As illustrated in Figure 2, there are only two actors with clear positions on the issue of membership. These are the Enthusiast and the Skeptic. In combining the factors desirability and necessity, The Enthusiast assumes membership to be both desirable and necessary. Joining is something that this actor really wants but also feels compelled to do. In the view of the Skeptic, however, membership seems to be something this actor neither wants to do, nor feels compelled to do. Interestingly, these two actors are the ones possessing unambiguous political positions on the membership issue. The Enthusiast is in favor of membership, and the Skeptic is against it. Regardless of a shared perception of membership as something that is possible to achieve, these two actors have clearly polarized political positions (Yes or No) on the membership issue, for equally clearly different political reasons. Using the EU as a concrete example, it is clear that the Enthusiast sees benefits from membership in the

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longer run and therefore will argue that the country might as well enter now in order to come by the territorial and functional gains more quickly. The Skeptic, on the other hand, will turn that argument around by saying that the necessity and desirability that the Enthusiast purports to see are false.

The other two actors however, as illustrated by Figure 2, have ambiguous attitudes on the membership issue. The Voluntarist sees the issue as a plain matter of choice and as a possibility of following a conviction that the idea of membership is good in the long run, although there are no elements of necessity involved. Membership is desirable in the eyes of the Voluntarist but not necessary. The Voluntarist, therefore, might want to become a member of the new organization in the short run but is open to the argument that, although membership might be a good idea, it may not be necessary to join at this particular point in time. This ambivalence is shared by the fourth actor in Figure 2, the Pragmatist, but based on a completely different outlook. The Pragmatist does not view membership as desirable at all, at least not in the short run. In fact, membership might seem outright undesirable to the Pragmatist even in the long run. However, the Pragmatist perceives of membership in the new organization as a bare necessity. For practical reasons, the Pragmatist feels compelled to join the new organization. Again translating these two cognitive categories into European politics, the Voluntarist would emphasize the long-term benefits of EU-membership, for example in terms of social understanding and democratic development. The Pragmatist on the other hand, would be prone to emphasize various reasons to do with functional dependency and globalization. Whereas the Voluntarist would think that the country is strong enough to stay outside the EU, but would do well to pursue its ideals as a member, the Pragmatist is convinced that the EU is more or less a necessary evil.

The common decision among the four actors, if each actor is given one vote and agrees to abide by the end result, can be either yes or no to joining the new organization. Only two of the actors, the Enthusiast and the Skeptic have clear positions for or against membership. The other two actors, the Voluntarist and the Pragmatist, can be swung either way depending upon which factor they value more highly, desirability or necessity. However, the Pragmatist is likely to want to join simply because necessity might be stronger than desirability. The Voluntarist could probably be swung in the direction of a no to membership, because there is no particularly compelling reason, to join other than the desirability of political ideals.

In this thesis, the point is not to measure the relative strengths of preferences. The political contexts that are analyzed in Sweden and Poland are not parliamentary institutions or open discussion forums concerning the merits and demerits of EU membership for each country. Both the ROFE and the UKIE are support units for the executive branches of government. To the extent that the
government of each country has already in principle decided in favor of EU membership, the members of the ROFE and the UKIE are tasked with compliance. Therefore, in the abstract situation which has been described here, different outcomes of a vote on membership can be surmised. One such outcome, if the government of the country leans heavily toward Enthusiast perceptions of EU membership, is that a vote among the four categories in the model is in favor of membership by a 3-1 vote in the group. In the context of such organizations as the ROFE and the UKIE, only the Skeptic would be clear on not wanting to join. The true Skeptic would have to employ a strategy in which the discussion on possibility could somehow be reopened instead and in which the other three categories could be convinced that membership should be postponed or at least discussed in further detail before a decision is made. However, as long as the political situation concerns combinations of necessity and desirability and as long as the issue will be settled by a simple majority rule, the Skeptic is likely to remain a minority.

To shift things around, a possibility for the Skeptic is to stay within the cognitive confines of a discussion about necessity and desirability. Only the Enthusiast and the Pragmatist are convinced that membership of the new organization is guided by necessity. The Voluntarist on the other hand, in thinking that membership is desirable but not necessary, might be vulnerable to counterarguments. The Voluntarist puts his trust in the future and in the benefits that may or may not come out of membership. Therefore, if the Skeptic can show the Voluntarist that his vision is no more than a political dream, and that the hard realities, or indeed necessities, that keep the Enthusiast and the Pragmatist convinced that membership is good, are either outright wrong or undesirable in the long run, then the Voluntarist might be swayed. In such a situation, the vote might be tied 2-2.

A third policy window that might be opened up by the Skeptic, perhaps after swaying the perception of the Voluntarist and creating a fifty-fifty situation among the actors, is to focus all persuasive efforts upon the Pragmatist. Indeed, if the Pragmatist is leaning over towards the cynical in the sense that he is ready to sacrifice perceptions of necessity, he too can be swayed. The question concerning the durability of the Pragmatist’s cognitive predisposition really has to do with the weight of what is necessary and, not least, why membership is deemed to be a necessity? At the end of the day, even the Pragmatist might be swayed. What is important here is that the model suggests that only the Enthusiast and the Skeptic are Yes-sayers and No-sayers by default, convinced that membership is either both necessary and desirable (Enthusiast) or both unnecessary and undesirable (Skeptic). In a debate over the relative merits and demerits of membership, only the Enthusiast will say Yes on all counts and only the Skeptic will say no. For different reasons but nevertheless, Voluntarists and Pragmatists will be
unhappy with the political decision about membership of the new organization in the end, regardless of whether the outcome is for or against.

In the terms of political cognition research, this translates into a situation in which only the Enthusiast and the Skeptic are free of cognitive conflict\textsuperscript{44} once the membership issue has been decided upon. It is likely that the cognitive conflict is bigger for the Voluntarist, who must be very deeply convinced about the desirability of the membership project in order to join in doing something that he deep down does not think is really necessary. Even the Skeptic can probably rest more assured in his conviction of having done the right thing, since he has the opportunity of making a virtue of necessity! Furthermore, if the cognitive categories in Figure 2 are seen as collective actors, and if there are many Pragmatists and Voluntarists in the organization, there is no telling how the decision to join the new organization will play out among actors in the long run. In addition, it can be assumed that actors are making their decisions on the basis of different expectations of the future, and it is far from clear whether they understand and respect each other's reasons for voting the way they do.

This leads up to a number of interesting empirical questions. Can real political actors in the form and context of European integration elites be categorized according to the four suggestions in Figure 2? If this is possible, how are the typical arguments of the Enthusiast, the Voluntarist, the Pragmatist and the Skeptic put together? What is it that makes the Enthusiast and the Skeptic polar opposites? How does the Pragmatist make the idea that membership is undesirable go together with the desire to join? Last but not least, how does the Voluntarist think that something which is deeply unnecessary can still be desirable?

The four cognitive categories applied to the empirical material in this dissertation are developed on an initial in-depth study of the Swedish enlargement elite 1988-94 (Eklund 1999). Parts of this original study also form the backbone of the empirical chapters on Sweden in this dissertation. Therefore, in the initial stages of the Polish study, the major question was whether or not the cognitive categories as developed on the basis of cognitive empirical material from Sweden in the early 1990s would be useful also in an interpretation of similar material from Poland, that is, ten years later and in a different country.

\textsuperscript{44} For the background of this concept, see for example Rosenau, James & Holsti, Ole (1982/83) ”U.S. Leadership in a Shrinking World: The Breakdown of Consensuses and the Emergence of Conflicting Belief Systems” in *World Politics*, vol. 35, no. 3, p. 368-392. Also, Albert Hirschman (1967) calls this phenomenon “The Hiding Hand”. See also Gustafsson, Gunnel (1983) “Symbolic and Pseudo Policies as Responses to Diffusion of Power” in *Policy Sciences*, vol. 15, pp. 269-287; Parsons, (2000).
2.3 Comparison: Notes on the research material and method

The empirical material used in this dissertation is printed texts in the form of official reports and deliberations from the Swedish government, the Polish government and the European Commission. The core of the empirical material, however, is interview data from the two organizations that were tasked with practical integration work in Sweden 1988-94 (the ROFE) and Poland 1998-2004 (the UKIE). In the Swedish case, a survey was also made among the interviewees to try to determine their international contact patterns and background in similar types of work. The results from this survey in the Swedish case were somewhat discouraging in that the return rate was low and in that the information yield was thin. The reason why this survey was made in the first place was that some of the theoretical perspectives tested in the Swedish case turned out to be unfruitful. More attention was given to the development of cognitive categories instead and, at the time when the Polish study was carried out, to sharpening the comparative aspect of the qualitative, cognitive data. The survey part of the study was therefore left out in the Polish case. In general, the ensuing research design, as adhered to in the two studies and as described in this dissertation from the collection of cognitive data to analysis, interpretation and feedback to theory, follows the general principles of qualitative text and interview research.

On the whole, this dissertation represents practical research and an intellectual development that has taken place over many years. Intensive work periods for the author have alternated with more extensive periods, in which much time has been given to pondering over the political developments that have taken place in Europe between the fourth and fifth enlargements of the EU. Nevertheless, the idea that Rokkan’s macro-historical model of political integration has something to contribute to our overall understanding of political integration in Europe has been firmly entrenched in the author’s mind ever since the first ideas and hypotheses in this direction were publicized in the early 1990s. Some of the initial ideas and hypotheses that were tested on the Swedish organization in the early 1990s later led to the realization that elite interviewing was the way ahead in order to get a better understanding of what goes on when enlargement elites do their thing. Once the interest in the political cognitive aspect of integration was established, real work on the

Swedish study could begin. The results of this analytical learning and improved focus on the cognitive aspects of political integration then yielded the “Filosofie Licentiat” dissertation upon which the empirical approach and theoretically driven interest this dissertation is founded.\(^\text{49}\)

The cognitive categories that are used in the analysis in this dissertation grew out of the many efforts to combine the Rokkanian macro-model of political integration in Europe with the growing results of textual and interview research. In this work, the generally accepted principles of qualitative research design have been adhered to: an originally descriptive problematization grows into an analytical orientation towards issues of integration and enlargement in Europe, flexibility in the approach to be able to account for unforeseen research outcomes, a strife for proximity and sensitivity regarding sources and, last but not least, the utilization of validity as deciding factor in the interpretation of results.\(^\text{50}\) Thus, the structure of this dissertation and the way it has been divided up into chapters are not representative of the chronology of the research efforts or any kind of step-by-step design. Over a long period of time, the research has evolved through a set of confrontations with further reading and understanding, publication of parts of the research and the ensuing criticism and discussions at conferences and in seminars. The original problematization of European integration and national adaptation to the process has evolved, not least since the decision was made to expand upon the study to involve another European country, i.e. another enlargement elite. The original ambition, which was to develop a set of grounded cognitive categories based on a qualitative study in one country (Sweden), has evolved into a comparative approach where the goal is to try out the overall research model on one more country (Poland) and to draw conclusions on the basis of comparison. At least to some extent, this dissertation can be seen as the result of a long orientation process\(^\text{51}\) through the complex terminology and observable political outcomes of the process of EU enlargement and integration. The orientation process has been informed by a continuous study of social science literature, particularly within the field of political science, and a constant reiterative return to the interpretation of the results from interviews.

This penchant for qualitative research design is \textit{not} intended for positioning in the perpetual social science debate about qualitative \textit{versus} quantitative approaches.\(^\text{52}\) The intention here is to describe the actual steps

\(^{49}\) Eklund (1999).

\(^{50}\) Maxwell (1996); Silverman (2001).


\(^{52}\) This author would like to subscribe to the notion that drawing a line between on the one hand qualitative and on the other hand quantitative research designs have pedagogical value more than anything else. For the most part, it seems that social science research has
taken and choices made in the research process. In terms of social science method, these can best be divided into efforts at categorizing research materials on the one hand and efforts at concentrating them on the other. Generally speaking and over time, the different empirical materials in the form of texts and interviews have been scrutinized ad-hoc.\textsuperscript{53} The texts have been studied and pored over from the vantage point of a theory-driven interest aimed at categorization,\textsuperscript{54} the aim being to look for correspondence with the integration categories taken from the theory of Stein Rokkan or, conversely, divergences from the pattern suggested by theory. This part of the analysis represents a search for concrete examples and political reasoning on the part of Swedish and Polish organizations concerning transnationalization and integration. By extension, the search also develops into a comparison when the Polish material on adaptation to the EU is added.

Regarding the results from interviews in the two countries, the analysis and interpretation can best be described as following the lines of what Steinar Kvale calls the concentrating approach.\textsuperscript{55} The purpose of this approach is for the researcher to become familiar enough with the contents of the interview material to be able to discern conceptual categories, recurrent and divergent lines of thought or, quite simply, dominant cognitive patterns among the interviewees. Such patterns are then concentrated into type answers, type motivations and type lines of thought that can be divided up between the four generic cognitive categories utilized in this dissertation, i.e. Enthusiasts, Voluntarists, Pragmatists and Skeptics. The method is one in which each answers from each interviewee is boiled down to a set of core ideas regarding the aspects of political integration derived from Rokkanian theory. On the basis of those core ideas, interview answers are then sorted into one of the four cognitive categories. Thus, for example, an Enthusiast is an interviewee for whom the necessity and desirability of joining the EU to build upon results and insights from both types of approaches. More often than not, a single research undertaking is dependent upon the ability among researchers to shift rapidly and efficiently between the two methodological approaches. It seems unlikely that good research can be assumed \textit{à priori} to be built upon one approach or the other. To the contrary, the choice of approach should be based upon the situation at hand, the availability of resources and the kind of research problem at hand. If seen as separate methodologies, both qualitative and quantitative designs have their unique strengths and weaknesses facing the complexity of the real social world. The choice of research design, it seems, is just that: a choice, which more than anything else should be guided by the chosen problematization and aim of the research project. See for example: Huberman, Miles (1984) \textit{Qualitative Data Analysis}. London: Sage; Kron-Solvang, Bernt & Magne-Holme, Idar (1994) \textit{Forskningsmetodik}. Lund: Studentlitteratur; Maxwell (1996), Ibid.; Silverman (2001), Ibid.

\textsuperscript{54} Ibid. pp. 178-180.
\textsuperscript{55} Ibid. pp. 175-178.
dominates his way of looking at different aspects of integration. A concrete example of this analytical method is given in Appendix 1.

In terms of printed material, the research interest is focused upon those publications that the two organizations in Sweden and Poland use to convey to the public those ideas, problems and results that relate to their work with adaptation to EU integration. Essentially, these publications represent the way in which both Swedish and Polish officials define the problems and possibilities of their current situation. As stated, these sources are scrutinized mainly in the light of the integration categories derived from Rokkanian theory. The search of these documents is guided by the notion that they are messages to the public, intended to inform about some aspects, and not others, of how the work with political adaptation is going. The documentation is analyzed in a categorizing effort, looking at how each organization in Sweden and Poland chooses to categorize and define the integration effects of their own work. In other words, the Rokkanian categories Integration, Trade and Industry, Functional and Territorial Regionalism are tested on the official definitions and descriptions of ongoing adaptation in each of the countries concerned.

The combined analyses of texts from the Swedish and Polish organizations is conceptually driven. In Sweden, a series of publications emerged in printed form between the years 1989 and 1994 under the title *Sverige-EFTA-EG. Det västeuropeiska integrationsarbetet*. The Swedish material is interesting in that it provides a lot of detail about the activities of the Swedish government to the public from the very beginning of the adaptation process, not least in that the adaptive organization (the ROFE) is presented in an organigram and the names of all the participants and tasks of the different functional units are made public. In all, the material consists of five books in which detailed aspects of how and in which areas the Swedish government is proceeding with its adaptation to the EU. In each report, the basic tenets of the Swedish position on European integration are presented in an effort to account for why the government is doing what it is doing and

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58 The publications concern government activity between the years 1988 and 1993, but each book is published with a one-year time lag. This means that a rendering of the activities during 1988 is published in 1989, the activities in 1989 published in 1990 and so on. The real starting point of this series of publications is the so called “Grönböckerna”, or the Green books, which also emerge in 1989, covering the governments original work with the EEA-treaty. In these, there is also a description of how and why the EEA-treaty came up on the political agenda in Sweden and what the ensuing policies from the Swedish government were. These sources are labelled UDH in the list of references.
how. Particular attention is given to the general political relationship between the Swedish government and the EU. Certain areas where negotiations are proving to be more difficult than in others are openly presented and discussed, which makes it a rich and encompassing printed material. Also interesting to note is that the shift from negotiations over Swedish participation in the EEA-treaty, which is the origin of the political process, takes place without any overhaul of the message or content of this series of publications.

The Polish texts are translations to English from the original Polish done by Polish officials with a view to public use. Importantly, however, both the translation and the publication of these sources were done by the Polish organization, the UKIE, itself. The effort at informing the general public actually surpasses that of the Swedish organization ten years earlier, in that the reports were published on the Internet\(^{59}\), in English and Polish, and thus made available in their entirety also to a non-Polish speaking public. The series of publications under the title \textit{Poland and the European Union} describe and discuss the ongoing adaptive work of the Polish organization (the UKIE) much in the same way as the publication series in Sweden did ten years earlier. The first Polish report concerns the development for the years 1996 and 1997, and it is published as the first in the series. The series then moves on with a yearly publication which covers the activities of the preceding calendar year, same as in the Swedish case. The difference is that the last of the reports emerged already in the year 2003, which is also the year in which Poland managed to conclude its negotiations for membership. This is most easily explained by the fact that the year 2004 was the year of ratification among the EU 15, during which a referendum on membership was also held in Poland. In other words, the work of the UKIE concerning EU membership and Polish adaptation was all done already in 2003.

For the most part, the specific chapters of the Acquis are treated in relation to the difficulties the Polish government has had with their implementation. Overall, the focus and discussion in these reports follow the same pattern as those that were published in Sweden. The main difference is in the relative amount of attention that is given to different policy areas. Suffice it here to say that also the Polish texts are rich in their coverage of the practical problems and possibilities facing the Polish government in its efforts to adapt Poland to the EU. Another similarity is that the transformation

\footnote{\textsuperscript{59} The full texts were taken from the publication on the Internet. See \url{www.msz.gov.pl}; \url{www.ukie.gov.pl}; \url{www.europa.eu.int} (under the heading Enlargement).}
from the pre-accession process\textsuperscript{60} to the actual membership negotiations goes by equally unnoticed in the Polish material, as there was a lack of particular interest in the Swedish transformation from EEA-negotiations to membership negotiations before. This makes the comparison between the two materials from Sweden and Poland interesting, since the official publications in both countries cover five-year periods of national adaptation, in Sweden 1988-2003 and in Poland 1998-2003. The concrete text materials analyzed in this dissertation thus cover aspects of both the fourth and the fifth enlargements of the EU, ten years apart in time but given similar, comparable textual expressions.

The empirical core of this dissertation is nevertheless the results of the research interviews in Sweden and Poland, carried out with representatives of each of the two organizations under study. The questionnaire which was used in the interviews underwent several tests and revisions before data was first gathered in the Swedish study. Among other things, three pilot interviews were carried out in 1991 and 1992, involving both national, regional and private actors in Sweden in order to test the validity of the theory-driven questions and to see if there was anything missing in the eyes of politicians and practitioners who were already involved in the process of adapting Sweden to the EU. The preliminary revisions also involved a test interview with the then minister of foreign trade in Sweden, Mr. Ulf Dinkelspiel, after the conclusion of which his views on the feasibility of a study based on the same general questions but comprising the whole of the ROFE organization were also asked for. At this point, a set of core interview questions could be decided upon and these questions were later utilized both in Sweden and Poland (See Appendix 2).

From the very beginning, the intention was to work in a low-structured interview format and to try to get as close as possible to those individuals in Sweden and Poland who are leading the practical work with integration issues in each respective country.

There is nothing mysterious about using the interview as a research method: an interview is a conversation with a structure and a purpose. An interview goes beyond the spontaneous everyday exchange of opinions and becomes a way in which the interviewer can achieve thoroughly tested knowledge through carefully asked questions and equally careful listening. A research interview is not a conversation between equals, since it is the researcher who defines and controls the situation. The topic of the interview is presented by the researcher, who is also the one who critically follows up on the answers he gets to his questions.\textsuperscript{61}


In neither study were the interviews based on a questionnaire in the proper sense. The low-structured approach was chosen so that the opportunity for respondents to associate freely around the theoretically driven concepts could be maximized. The idea is for the researcher to work around his pre-determined concepts, or areas of inquiry, and to maximize the input of free association and concrete examples from the minds of the interviewees themselves by constantly using follow-up questions.

In this dissertation, the interviews are founded upon a set of core questions such as they are described in Appendix 2. The goal of each interview is to cover all of these knowledge areas and to have the interviewee react to each new theoretical concept that is introduced into the conversation, to judge and evaluate the meaning and relevance of each concept. The aim is to arrive at results from the interviews that relate to and potentially enrich the theoretical and analytical perspectives in the study. Thus, the interviews in the Swedish and Polish studies are structured around core areas of inquiry, although the wording of questions in each separate interview might be slightly different without losing overall internal validity of the line of inquiry.

The two organizations in Sweden and Poland were approached differently. In the Swedish case, a cover letter was sent out to all participants in the ROFE organization in the early spring of 1992. The potential interviewees were informed about the study at hand, about its background and aim. They were asked kindly to fill in a questionnaire with dates and hours at which they might be available for an interview and to return the information as soon as possible. The turnout was better than might be expected from such an undertaking, and the end result was 61 interviews carried out at their workplaces during the months of March and April 1992. The active interview time varied between 30 and 180 minutes in the extreme cases. Three quarters of the interviews took in between 40 and 60 minutes to carry out, not including the time required for filling out the questionnaire. Except for two interviewees who, for some reason during the interview itself decided to raise questions about the legitimacy of such a young person asking questions about such a big political topic as European integration, there were no technical or other practical problems involved in the Swedish interviews. All of these interviews were recorded on tape and later partly transcribed to paper copy. Since the interviews were carried out at the regular offices of the interviewees, disturbances were rare and in only two cases did the interview have to be suspended. In both cases, a new date was set to continue the talk in order to make the picture complete also in these individual cases.

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63 At the time of these interviews, I was a recently admitted Ph.D. Student by the age 26.
64 Eklund (1999).
In Poland, there were two overarching problems to begin with. First, the question of how to approach the organization came up. Secondly, there was the issue of language since the researcher himself does not speak Polish. In effect, the first ever contact with the UKIE in Poland came about rather inadvertently. Taking a group of Swedish students to Warsaw for a study visit in the spring of 2000, I decided to start looking for an opportunity to compare the results from my Swedish study with similar data from Poland. During this visit, telephone contact was established with one of the directors of the UKIE and a date was set for an initial discussion about the UKIE itself and its organizational characteristics. During this meeting, the approach and the results from the Swedish study were presented and the feasibility of a similar study in Poland was discussed. This initial discussion was encouraging, in that the director immediately saw where things were going and was positively inclined towards the feasibility of such a study in Warsaw. Any misgivings were basically due to the uncertain status of the UKIE itself, its lack of organizational overview, for example in such simple terms as the lack of a coherent organigram describing the layout of the organization, but the director's idea was basically that such problems could be overcome and that a study similar to that in Sweden could eventually be carried out. The director was also kind enough to draw an organigram by hand on a piece of paper during this conversation, although explicitly pointing out that no similar official document had ever existed.

Lack of time and funding put the next effort at contact off for some time. In the fall of 2002, a renewed effort could be made thanks to a change in those circumstances. An interview was made with an official at the Ministry of Transport and Infrastructure in December 2002; What would a Polish official involved in integration issues think about the questions? The outcome of this interview was also positive, as was an initial discussion with a civil servant at the Polish parliament, the Sejm. From these two interviews also emerged suggestions about whom to approach and with whom else to talk in order to set up a whole set of interviews. Direct telephone contacts with the organization also indicated that the right people to talk to had been identified. However, during the spring of 2003 war broke out in Iraq and the ensuing conflicts of national interest in Europe created a political climate of mistrust and apprehension. Open contact with foreign researchers was reduced to a very low position on the agenda of Polish officials. This meant that the gathering of data had to be postponed. It is also probable that the final stages of membership negotiations for Poland reduced the time available for Polish officials to help out with my research effort.

The approach to the UKIE was nevertheless crowned with success in the spring of 2004. During the months of June, July and September a total time of thirty days was spent in and around the offices of UKIE in Warsaw. A total of 20 interviews was achieved as a result of this effort, as well as three
focus meetings with the current directors of the UKIE, during which several modifications concerning the structure and function of the organization itself could be made and accurate information be added. Almost all of the interviewees spoke English fluently and were used to working in an international environment, since this was one of the reasons they had been given jobs in the UKIE in the first place. In one of the cases, the interview had to be carried out in German instead of English, but my knowledge of that language and sufficient time to prepare for the interview made it possible to carry it out without loss of reliability. The time for the Polish interviews ranged between 60 and 120 minutes, with the majority of them taking in the near vicinity of 90 minutes. Just as in the Swedish case, there were no technical obstacles to the interview situations themselves, and most of the subjects were sought out in their regular working environments. None of them questioned the legitimacy of the study or of the questions raised. All participants had been approached beforehand, either directly by me or by one of the aforementioned directors.

In both the Swedish and Polish interviews, the interviewees are asked to develop their thoughts about the process of European integration, what they think that this process entails for their own country in terms of benefits and losses and to reveal their judgment of the impact of the specific integration aspects derived from Rokkanian integration theory. In the following chapters, quotes from individual answers should be regarded as type answers. The focus is on how the actors themselves perceive and configure the different political phenomena and developments that are in question in this dissertation, not to what extent the individual answer can be seen as representative of a particular social group.

The difficulty relates to some of the deeper mysteries of political life. To think politically is to be able to see where there is a trend, or a break, in a pattern, be it of elections, or of a party system, or of democracy in a country. But to think politically is also to think of alternatives, not only in patterns of structures embodying various norms, but at the level of decision-making and decision processes. Some processes may be ‘incremental’; but not all are: breaks in decision patterns seem frequently to occur (…) We are never certain of what is continuous and of what is a break in our own life, in our feelings, in

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65 Again, the aim of the qualitative design that applies here is to generate results from interviews that can be used to develop understanding. The way to do that can be either by expanding upon or by delineating political concepts related to the real experiences of people working with European integration. See for example: Björkegren, Dag (1987) “Styrande syn- och tankesätts elaboreringsgrad och organisatorisk lärandeförmåga”. Forskningsrapport: Ekonomiska Forskningsinstitutet vid Handelshögskolan i Stockholm, pp. 11-12. Compare with Scarrow, Howard (1969) Komparativ Politisk Analys. En introduktion. Lund: CWK Gleerup, pp.127-155; Putnam (1976), pp. 71-105,133-164.

our behaviour patterns: those who think politically are naturally even more cautious when they come to distinguish between continuous and discrete elements in the political life of a community.\textsuperscript{57}

Yet, the problem of external validity cannot simply be brushed off in research based on texts and interviews. To what extent is it possible to make inferences about real social developments and phenomena on the basis of interviews? The work in this dissertation is based on the methodological assumption that conclusions about causal relationships and structural attributes in society itself cannot be drawn solely on the basis of how the interviewed individuals make judgments or think about them. Importantly, however, the assumption is that individuals can choose between different ways of looking at things.

To the extent that individuals are working with issues of European integration and national adaptation to the process, particularly if they are in decision making positions in political organizations, then their judgments might have some bearing on what political institutions choose to do or not to do. Their thinking can, and should be, related to and evaluated against other forms of knowledge about politics and society.\textsuperscript{68} Therefore, the ways in which individuals and groups of individuals in close proximity to political decision making think are interesting politically. When political decisions are made to change the role and functions of political institutions in a society, which ideas and ideals lie behind such decisions? Even if the new ideas and practices among political elites do not correspond with the problems and possibilities that other groups in society see in a given historical setting, it does not mean that the new ideas and practices are uninteresting from an analytical point of view, particularly in a situation where political or other social theory fails to provide guidance and answers.\textsuperscript{69}

So, what in effect do the national elites in Sweden and Poland think they are doing in adapting their countries to the EU? What is European integration all about in their eyes, and where does the process take each individual country? It seems that the two groups that are analyzed in this dissertation might hold some keys to a better understanding of what actually happens when European integration is taking place. It is possible that some of their views also hold the keys to new knowledge and new insights about the nature of European integration.\textsuperscript{70}

\textsuperscript{69} Kvale, Steinar (1997), p. 58. He writes: "In other words, if the social processes by and large are contradictory, it is not sufficient to apply empirical methods aimed at eliminating contradiction when trying to expose the contradictory social reality.” (My translation)
3. Sweden: The Governmental Organization for EU Adaptation (ROFE)

Many analysts agree that significant changes in the forms and functions of central government in Sweden have taken place as a direct result of adaptation to the EU in the early 1990s. Some of them emphasize the internal changes in how the different branches of national government interact and go about organizing their work.\(^1\) Others point to the importance of external factors, for example the sea change in the international security situation in Europe 1989-91, which in practice made the Swedish neutrality doctrine redundant but with no obvious strategic alternative in sight.\(^2\) However, a lot remains to be said about how this process which begins with small and careful steps toward an EEA-treaty rapidly transforms into a dash for EU membership. As pointed out by Johansson, the bulk of Swedish adaptation to the EU is actually done under the pretext of adaptation to the EEA-treaty, and whether or not it is possible analytically to draw a distinct line between the two processes is still an open question.\(^3\)

This chapter traces the form and content of how adaptation to the EU was organized in Sweden 1988-1994. In its first section, the political context is described in terms of how the issue of European integration was conceptualized in the Swedish debate during those years. The second section goes on to describe and analyze the organizational characteristics of ROFE, focusing on the question about which actors and organizations were involved in the process and on what signifies the relationships between them. Drawing on the results from interviews with members of ROFE, the chapter then goes on to explore self-images in the organization. Some attention is given to a survey that was also performed in the Swedish case, the bulk of which is otherwise presented in Appendix 2. Policy deliberation concerning the Rokkanian integration categories (Trade and industry, Functional and Territorial regionalism) are analyzed in the penultimate section of the chapter and, in the final section, there is a summary discussion of the overall results from the organizational study in Sweden.

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When the Swedish government commenced negotiations with the European Community (EC) over a treaty to create the European Economic Area (EEA)\(^4\) in 1988, membership of the European Union (EU)\(^5\) still seemed very distant. The Swedish position was to embrace cooperation with the emergent supranational political institutions in Europe without redefining the neutrality doctrine and giving up any aspect of national sovereignty to supranational integration. There were signs that the Swedish government was beginning to rethink the role of the nation state in Europe, but essentially the official view was imbued with nation-statism.\(^6\) Consequently, the goals that the Swedish government set up for the EEA-negotiations were highly limited in terms of political integration. The idea seemed to be that an EEA-agreement could serve as a structure parallel to that of the EC without introducing too many elements of supranationality. At this point in time, the central argument of the Swedish government was simply to ensure that Swedish economic and social actors would gain access to the EC:s single market and, by extension, to be able to benefit from the four freedoms of mobility for labor, capital, goods and services.\(^7\)

\(^4\) An interesting aspect of the public debate in Sweden is the confusion concerning the terminology of European affairs and supranational integration in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The negotiations between the EFTA and the then EC were aimed at the creation of an European Economic Area (EEA) which was sometimes and particularly in Nordic sources referred to as the European Economic Space (EES). The EEA won in favour of usage as time went by, but in the Swedish debate, for example in the press, the acronym EES was favoured and used throughout the adaptation process.

\(^5\) On November 1 1993, the Maastricht treaty had been ratified by the then twelve member states of the European Community (EC), changing its name into the European Union (EU). At the time of this writing, legal rulings and documents preceding this date are still referred to as EC law. The EU is built on top legal body of the EC. During Sweden’s adaptation to the Acquis, the Swedish government at one point even suggested that reference should be made to the EC/EU. With membership the usage has changed again and stabilized. Today, at least in the public discussion, the term EU is used to cover all aspects, historical as well, of supranational institutions and affairs. See for example: SOU 1994:12 Soveröret och demokrati. Betänkande av EG-konsekvensutredningarna: Subsidiaritet, s.7. In this thesis, the acronyms EEA and EU are utilized throughout, except when sources make explicit references to the EC, the EC/EU or the EES.

\(^6\) The government bill 1987/88:66 laid the foundation for Swedish positions on European integration well into the 1990s. In Sweden, this particular government proposition is commonly referred to as the Harmonization Bill (Swedish: Harmoniseringspropsitionen).

\(^7\) An informative comparative study of the major arguments in the debates on European integration in the Nordic countries is offered in Kite, Cynthia (1996) Scandinavia Faces EU. Dissertation, Department of Political Science, Umeå University. For the formative parliamentary debate in Sweden, see particularly pp. 117-131.
Already in the year 1990, however, the Swedish government transformed its cautious EEA-strategy into a political strategy for integration with the EC. The social democratic government under Prime Minister Ingvar Carlsson made it an explicit Swedish goal to participate fully in EC integration and, for the near future, to become a full member of the emergent EU. Almost overnight, the political elite in Sweden decided on a new outlook on Europe and on making Sweden a part of the supranational integration process. No opposition was made in the Swedish parliament, Riksdagen, to the new governmental strategy and Sweden’s formal membership application was produced to the EC commission in 1991. In effect, this made the EEA-treaty redundant already by the time it was formally ratified in by the Swedish parliament. Negotiations for full membership began and were even concluded before the EEA-treaty went into force in 1994.  

In just a few years, between 1988 and 1991, the Swedish government made about face before the process of supranational integration in Europe. In effect, transnational politics in the form of supranational institutions were held out as the road ahead for Sweden. In the public debate, the transnational aspect of social and economic problems was increasingly emphasized by decision makers and other political elites. The EC, and Sweden’s potential membership of EU in the making, was depicted as the natural continuation of Swedish long-standing efforts at international cooperation and problem-solving. Interestingly, however, the changes immediately began to supersede those of political elites and strategic decision making. Academics not least were arguing that Sweden was acquiring a new role in Europe, and this argument would grow in force and importance well into the 1990s. At the same time, the rapid shift in Swedish foreign policy seemed to indicate that something had really happened to the definition and projection of the national interest.  

In the discussion about the opportunities and problems connected with EU membership, much emphasis is put on continuities in Swedish relations with the EFTA and EU-countries through the postwar era. Particularly important seems to be the discussion about cooperation in the fields of Research and Development and then mainly about different aspects of industrial development.

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8 Due to the prolonged process of ratification among the national parliaments of the EC, the EEA did not come into effect before January 1 1994.
10 Some analysts went so far as to argue that the whole EEA-process with its “enormous legal and diplomatic efforts” was kept going for the very reason that it would spill over into membership negotiations. The EEA treaty was said to be of “more than probably transitory nature”, although this idea never took root in the public debate in Sweden. See Stuyck, Jules & Looijestijn-Clearie, Anne (1994) The European Economic Area EC-EFTA. Deventer: Kluwer.
There is a tendency to regard the political adaptation in Sweden after the EEA-treaty as international cooperation down a political continuum which starts at the end of WW II. Supranational integration never enters into it, at least not in the way initiatives and processes are projected to the wide public. In fact, the Swedish government states in one of its early written publications on political adaptation to the EU that the deepening of cooperation, now in the form of open participation in the process of European integration, represents nothing new. The government also says that the foundation of such deeper cooperation was laid in the so called Luxembourg declaration of 1984. The only thing that has changed, according to the Swedish government, is that the EU has opened the door to more serious and intense scrutiny (from the Swedish point of view) of the common legal framework for economic and social relations in Europe. The EEA-treaty, according to this way of looking at it, does not represent a new phenomenon in Swedish politics and it definitely does not have anything to do with European integration. To the contrary, it is depicted as a somewhat deeper but still just a continuation of international cooperation between Sweden and a set of European partners. What is more, the Swedish government points out that the Luxembourg declaration of 1984 was preceded by the free-trade agreement between EFTA and the EC in 1972, and so on. What the government is saying, when political adaptation with a view to EU membership is already taking place, is that integration is only another word for international cooperation.

The process of integration in Western Europe will continue to move forward. Developments in foreign trade, increased direct investment, growing international capital flows and increased mobility for labor are all expressions of the same thing. But, they are at the same time the driving forces behind the process. The same can be said about business mergers across national boundaries. International cooperation may not suffice to alter the direction of this, but certainly to affect the scope and intent of the integration process. For Sweden, it can never be an issue to stay outside of all these developments. The government, therefore, is giving high priority to the issues of Western European integration.

There is a distinct pattern in how transnationalizing tendencies in economic and social life on the one hand, and efforts at political adaptation and integration on the other, are framed in the Swedish discussion. There is a notion that something new and big is about to happen. Sweden is facing a new situation in Europe and the Swedish government is actively pursuing integration with the EU. But, during the first years of the 1990s, the finer

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13 Ibid., p. 28.
points of how Swedish adaptation to the EU is conceptualized are not on the agenda, at least not for the government. By and large, the government is saying that it continues to do what is necessary for the good of the country, thereby simply continuing a process of international involvement that represents a Swedish tradition.

The studies made by the ‘State Commission on Power’ were also important to the Swedish discussion about European integration in the early 1990s. This commission involved a large number of Swedish academics, political scientists among them, in an effort to figure out who has real power in Swedish society and who does not, what are some needed reforms and which are the most relevant current changes and trends in Swedish society. Concerning European integration, the commission seized upon what it saw as an immediate need for a new political approach:

One of the major problems of democracy today is that its institutions are national whereas the social problems are changing character and becoming supranational. Internationalization is indeed not a coherent concept (…) Nevertheless, the question at hand is how democracy is affected by the general increase in and proliferation of such things as communications, transactions and organization across national boundaries. Internationalization stimulates the emergence of organizational structures comprising several countries.14

In another publication, the commission pointed out that the logic of internationalization has very little to do with the diplomatic relationships between nations, or between governments as agents of nations, in a process called “trans-sovereign regionalization”.15 To the commission, Swedish local governments appeared as highly interesting actors in the process as agents of political change. This trans-sovereign, local activity, however, was not seen as a threat to the nation state, but rather as an opportunity for a strengthening of the legitimacy and feeling of commonality within the national system:

Certain benefits could very likely be achieved if a local power, presupposing a geographically interesting position, were to be allowed to act out a trans-sovereign role. This is as long as it keeps within the goals defined by the central power and as long as the political and economic focus, which is so vital to small states, of the country is not challenged.16

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14 SOU 1990:44, p. 82.
16 Ibid., p. 337.
The public debate in Sweden at the time of the EEA-negotiations follows a similar pattern. A major part of the discussion has to do with the ongoing adaptation of legal rules in the economic sphere, but very little is ever said about the long-term or wider consequences of the Swedish economy being integrated with the Single Market. By and large, the Single Market is seen as something to which Sweden is gradually adapting through international negotiation (by the government) which is firmly rooted in national sovereignty. Put differently, the territorial state is negotiating new, common rules for economic life together with other territorial states without really giving up any of its sovereign territorial control. The dominant image is one of change taking place within the framework of already existing political institutions, and that no changes of importance will take place in a small unitary state such as Sweden.

An air of national self-confidence dominates the Swedish discussion. Transnationalizing tendencies in economic and social life are seen as part of a development that might even be exploited by the national government for the benefit of the country. The Swedish nation state, in other words, is seen as an entity that is valued highly by its citizens and trusted to do what is best for the people. Also other major institutions, such as banks and business are seen both as legitimate and loyal with the country. Again, there are some warnings issued in the international social science literature against taking such things for granted.

In the Swedish discussion, however, it is more or less taken for granted that any activities not aiming at what is best for the country, even if it is in the transnational sphere, would immediately be penetrated and taken control over by the state. The aforementioned commission inquiry into political power in Sweden, for example, chooses to refer to this development as the internationalization of society and government. In other reports, the commission stated that an effect of internationalization was that government agencies and particularly central government got more things to do and therefore would expand in the foreseeable future.

By choosing the term internationalization for the discussion, the limits of what is possible and what is not possible to argue in the debate

17 Compare with for instance Jacobsson (1997). See also Jacobsson, Kerstin (1995) "Konstruktionen av “det nödvändiga” – EU-debatten som offentligt samtal” in Häften för kritiska studier, vol. 28, pp. 55-68. Particularly in the latter analysis by Jacobsson, the construction of Necessity is seen as emanating from what political actions and rhetoric in the national media and in the parliament.


become narrow.\textsuperscript{20} There is an underlying assumption that, although the state is faced with ever more challenges, it can take care of everything in a secure and legitimate fashion. In effect, assumptions about the causes and effects of transnational phenomena and processes are left out.

In the Swedish discussion of the early 1990s, there is a tendency to look at issues of transnationalization and integration from an administrative point of view. Bureaucrats, to put it differently, will have more work to do. A vivid example of this is how the dominant views among leaders of independent national agencies in Sweden, who were surveyed by a national newspaper, stated that they saw several new aspects to their work on the horizon, particularly emanating from the process of adaptation to the EU. However, when asked about what effects they could foresee, they would point to “more bureaucracy, not less” and to “that the national administrative units will only swell and grow when the political power of the government diminishes.”\textsuperscript{21} Another example is in a report from the Swedish National Audit Office, in which all of the surveyed government offices and agencies think that “one effect of integration is that there will be more and more complex rules in every sector, which in turn will increase the demand for personnel and financial resources”. The dominant view among Swedish ministries and agencies is that “Swedish norms” and “the Swedish line of thought and perception” can be upheld in Europe, regardless of any integration effects, and that there is always a possibility to influence political decisions to fit “Swedish wishes and needs.”\textsuperscript{22}

The concept of supranationality is strangely lacking from the Swedish debate on European integration in the early 1990s. Swedish political scientist Jörgen Hermansson has pointed to the fact that there was a widespread positive attitude toward adaptation to Europe among the majority of political parties in the Swedish parliament.\textsuperscript{23} After the membership application was handed in by the Swedish government in 1991, furthermore, the most pressing issue became the political cross-pressure that the Swedish government found itself under and not the issue of integration itself. On the

\textsuperscript{20} Kaiser, Karl (1969) “Transnationale Politik. Zu einer Theorie der multinationalen Politik” in \textit{Politische Vierteljahresschrift}, vol. 10, Sonderheft 1, p. 81. The problem with the terminology is that the usage of `internationalization’ had serious implications for any political discussion. Kaiser writes: “It implies two things: first, that it has to do with politics between nation states (\textit{inter nationes}); secondly, it implies that the primary actors are nation states (\textit{inter nationes} – it is of course a well known fact that the concepts of nation and state are not interchangeable).” Author’s translation from German. Compare with Rosenau, James (1969) \textit{Linkage Politics}. New York: The Free Press; Deutsch, Karl (1972) \textit{Politik och styrelse}. Lund: Gleerup.

\textsuperscript{21} \textit{Dagens Nyheter} 1993-03-21.

\textsuperscript{22} RRV (1991), p. 11. Author’s translation.

\textsuperscript{23} Hermansson, Jörgen (1993) \textit{Politik som intressekamp}. Stockholm: C.E. Fritzes, pp. 208-211.
European level, according to Hermansson, the government was under pressure from the successes of negotiating an EEA-treaty and the Delors Commission more or less demanding that the process be taken further politically for Sweden. Second, the fall of the Berlin wall and the end of the Cold War in 1989 had left the Swedish government without a security doctrine that might overshadow all other political projects and decide the bare necessities of political survival in a partly hostile international environment, such as it had done for all Swedish governments since the Cold War began. Third, Hermansson points out that there was a widespread consensus in the Riksdag that a new approach to European affairs was necessary, particularly among the vocal right-wing and liberal parties. However, the inexorability of the European integration process which would, by nature of its economic or political logic, lead Sweden into full political membership of the European Union was kept out of the public discussion. This was the case even after the application for membership was made. Swedish governments and integration elites continued to look at European integration as a low-political variant of international economic cooperation between sovereign European states.

The Swedish public debate in the early 1990s echoes a streak in the discussion of the social sciences at the same time. A spreading notion in the literature is that transnationalizing tendencies in economic and social life are giving rise to “leakage” in the authority of national governments, ultimately lessening their “capacity to represent or control their national societies”, for example because of terrorism, irredentism or smuggling of drugs, weapons and people. In the Swedish debate, however, such things are for the most part seen as factors that will eventually serve to strengthen national unity and the legitimacy of the political system. Negative theories of transnationalization predicting that the integration of “social, economic and political elites outside of government institutions” might spell the demise of the nation state simply do not find resonance in the Swedish discussion at all.

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24 Ibid.
26 Kaiser (1969) Ibid., p. 94. Author’s translation from German.
More recent political analysis in Sweden suggests that adaptation to the EU was an elite affair all the way up to the referendum in 1994.\textsuperscript{27} Empirical studies point out that the public debate in Sweden started to heat up much later and that political issues related to EU integration and membership were only gradually “moved on to the political ‘A-list’ during the 1990s”.\textsuperscript{28} Notwithstanding the fact that public opinion played a major role in deciding the favorable outcome of the adaptation process in the referendum, and that the Swedish electorate was probably at its most enthusiastic vis-à-vis the EU at that particular point in time, the EU debate in Sweden has been staggering off the blocks well into the present day. Data suggest that there is a continuum in the efforts of Swedish political parties to frame European integration as a left-right issue and thereby to keep it within bounds of the established ideological multiparty system.\textsuperscript{29} As indicated before, there are also results from organizational studies that show how Swedish government has changed as a result of EU membership. However, to what extent mass politics in Sweden has been affected by European issues still remains an open question.

Concerning the time frame in Sweden that is relevant here, 1988-1994, it is possible to say that the public EU debate is still in its beginning stages. Adaptation to the EU is seen as a continuation of international economic cooperation within the EFTA framework. Economic and trade issues dominate the agenda and the discussion over arguments for or against European integration come to the fore only toward the very end of the period. Thus, the ensuing, rather heated Swedish debate takes off immediately after the adaptation process is over in Sweden, and therefore it falls outside the purview of this thesis. By and large, Sweden’s adaptation to the EU takes place under relative political silence and it is discussed for the most part in terms of international cooperation and adjustment.

3.2 An Outline of the ROFE Organization

When the Swedish government establishes its organization for adaptation to the EC/EU in 1988, it is with a clear aim in sight. The aim is to create a political center for all political efforts to adapt Sweden to the demands of an EEA-treaty and eventually to full membership. Initially, the idea of the then social-democratic government was to create an organization that could provide the most efficient basis for adaptation to an EEA-treaty, particularly


\textsuperscript{28} Lindahl (2000), p. 97.

\textsuperscript{29} Kite (1996).
in the fields of law and public administration.\textsuperscript{30} Although the organization came into being under rather quiet political circumstances at the time and, as has been noted above, as a continuation of the EEA-process starting in the 1980s, it is argued by political scientists today that it marks an interesting and important change in the development of modern Swedish government.\textsuperscript{31}

During its existence, the organization also survived a major ideological shift in Swedish politics. The Social-democratic government under Prime Minister Ingvar Carlsson was replaced by a center-right coalition under Prime Minister Carl Bildt in 1991. Despite this major parliamentary shift, the ROFE stayed on and continued adapting Swedish rules and regulations to the Acquis. With the exception of individual ministers and their aides being replaced as a result of the change in government, no changes were made to the structure or tasks of ROFE. In effect, the organization continued working straight through to the Swedish referendum on membership of the European Union, which was carried out in 1994. The very last report on integrations by ROFE was published in that same year, covering developments up to the end of 1993. In effect, ROFE is a key to how Sweden went through its process of adaptation to the Acquis and to what went on in the Swedish preparations for EU membership.

\textsuperscript{30} The formal structure of the organization and some of the ideas behind it can be found in the first publication in the series "Sverige-EFTA-EG" which was published between 1988 and 1993. In the Swedish debate, these publications were frequently referred to as “Grönböckerna”, which translates to English as “the green books”. Although only the first of these publications was in effect green in color, they remain an important historical source of information about Sweden’s early adaptation to the EU. See also Moberg, Axel (1991) \textit{EES-Det Europeiska Ekonomiska Samarbetet}. Stockholm: Allmänna Förlaget.

\textsuperscript{31} Petersson (2004).
Although it was clear from the very beginning that the ROFE was to play a unique and important role in the process of adaptation to the EU in Sweden, there was less clarity about its formal political mandate. For example, the organization never received any working plan from the government nor was it subjected to scrutiny by the Swedish parliament. The ROFE was never formally made part of the government apparatus, other than as a temporary, interdepartmental center for communication. For that reason, minutes from meetings were not kept and it difficult to reconstruct any of the discussions or political disputes that may have taken place inside meetings or in different working situations during the organizations seven years of activity. As stated in the first of the so called “Green books” (1988), the Swedish government established the organization in order to facilitate legal, economic and political adaptation to the EC/EU. The Swedish government also defines who should or should not be a member of the organization. What counts, according to the Swedish government, is good results in the form of the successful completion of an EEA-treaty (up to 1990) and in beneficial terms for EU membership (1990-1994).

Fortunately, data about the organization is available in the form of its yearly public reports, in which information about the organization as such and some of its changes over time are available. As illustrated by Figure 3, ROFE is
made up by five core units. The ministerial group, chaired by the Prime minister, leads the work of the organization as a whole. It is not known whether this political nerve center of the organization can also be seen as a decision making body, since there are no minutes from its meetings. It should be noted that not all ministers of the Swedish government participate in meetings. The next core unit is the State Secretary Group. This group is tasked with the day-to-day coordination of the organizations’ work. Again, not all ministries are represented here at once, but the group includes State Secretaries and Ministers and it is chaired by a state secretary from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The same person from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs also chairs the next group, which is the Preparatory Group for European Issues. This group coordinates all practical work done by the Working Groups at the bottom of the ROFE organization, and prepares the gathered information for the Ministerial group. It is also specially assigned to liaise with the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, which is depicted in the far left section of the illustration above, concerning all running negotiations with the EU concerning the different chapters of the Acquis.

All practical work is assigned to the Working groups, depicted at the bottom of Figure 3. Each working group is supervised by a senior civil servant, either a minister or a senior official from one of the Swedish national agencies, for example in the fields of education, media or public transportation. First and foremost, the task of each working group is to adapt specific Swedish rules, regulations and practices to its counterparts in the acquis, such as

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32 Unless otherwise specified, structural information about the organization in this chapter pertains to the years 1992 and 1993. The author would like to express his gratitude towards Ms. Gunilla Karlsson at the Unit for Foreign Trade at the Foreign Ministry for sharing helpful comments and insights concerning the form and function of the ROFE.

33 In 1992-3, the participating ministerial heads were from Social Affairs, Environment, Agriculture, Foreign Aid, Foreign Affairs, European and Foreign Trade, Finance and Trade and Industry. During the coalition government in the period after 1991, ministers in effect represented different political parties.

34 If need arises, state secretaries can be called in from the State Secretary Group, which seems to ensure that the organization enjoys expertise from all fields of ministerial competence. Permanent representation is reserved for the aides from the ministries of Finance, Trade and Industry, Agriculture, the State Secretary for Nordic Affairs and State Secretary for Foreign Affairs.

35 For any prospective member of the EU, the total number of negotiation chapters in the acquis may vary during the enlargement process. In the case of Sweden, it ranged between 24 and 31. Depending upon the individual government’s success in closing negotiation chapters and to avoid having chapters reopened, the number of chapter working groups will therefore also vary over time. In 1992, Sweden had successfully closed two chapters which made the total number of working groups 29. It is noteworthy, however, that the original number of working groups in the Swedish organization in 1988 was 24 because the EEA-treaty excluded a number of chapters in the acquis. More chapters were later opened as membership negotiations started.
communications, fiscal issues or market competition.\textsuperscript{36} To that end, each working group creates a network of its own by setting up informal reference groups that belong to different sectors of public administration. Reference groups are not depicted in the illustration here, since they are optional. Working groups are not required to set them up and therefore such groups do not exist in all issue areas. As a case in point, the Working group for Financial Issues Related to Integration (my translation) does not set up a reference group at any point during its existence. To the contrary, the Working group for Cultural and Information Exchange calls on several representatives from Swedish cultural life on an ad-hoc basis. Thus, the working groups are organized formally and have formal tasks to perform, whereas the reference groups are informal. Several Working groups do form networks. One example of this is the Working group for Media Issues, which regularly consults with the Swedish Film Institute, the Swedish Association for Journalists and the Swedish Broadcasting Corporation. Another example is the Working group for Research and Development which is networking regularly with the Academy of Engineering Sciences, the Royal Academy of Sciences and the Swedish Confederation of Professional Associations (SACO/SR).

Adding up the examples, it becomes clear that ROFE incorporates both formal and informal principles of public organization. Multiple channels of interaction are at hand, between the Swedish government and its independent national agencies on the one hand and large numbers of organized interests in Sweden on the other. Whom they decide to interact with depends on functional needs in issue areas, and the Working groups are free to decide whether they see a need for any Reference group, or not. In addition, only one type of organized interest is involved in more than one reference group. The organized interests with the most widespread involvement in the work of ROFE are the Swedish labor market organizations, i.e. the Swedish Trade Union Confederation (LO), the Central Organization of Salaried Employees (TCO), The Swedish Confederation of Professional Associations (SACO/SR), the Swedish Employers’ Confederation (SAF) and the Federation of Swedish Industries (Industriförbundet).\textsuperscript{37}

The European Council is a part of the ROFE that stands out from the rest. It is a joint forum for government ministers and prominent figures among the organized social and economic interests in Swedish society.

\textsuperscript{36} In our example from 1992, the other working groups are (my translation) Trade Policy, Financial Services, Economic and Monetary Cooperation, Integration Law, Trade and Energy Policy, Financial Issues of Integration, Cultural and Information Exchange, Consumer Issues, Movement of Persons, Education, Media Issues, Working Life and Work Environment, Civil Law, Health and Social Policy, Foreign Policy, Information, Foreign Aid, Regional Policy, Border Control, Sports and EURATOM.

\textsuperscript{37} In 1992-93 the total number of Working Groups that also formed Reference groups is 23 out of 29. In these reference groups, the Swedish labor market organizations are present in 20.
Participants in the Council are invited in person by the government and the Prime Minister presides at the meetings. There are CEO:s and other leading figures from Swedish industry, such as Volvo, SCA and the Johnsson industrial conglomerate. Also, there are representatives of some of the Swedish commercial banks, of the National Bank of Sweden, and of all of the aforementioned labor market organizations, joined in the Council also by the Federation of Swedish Industries and the Swedish Cooperative Union and Wholesale Society (KF). Interestingly, in 1992, the Equal Opportunities Ombudsman (JämO) joins the Council as the first representative from the Swedish parliament since the beginning of operations in 1988.

The Council does not have a formal agenda or any specific tasks to perform. In comparison with the working groups, for example, it is not limited in focus to any particular issue or policy area that it is expected to focus upon. Nevertheless, the Council is active throughout the ROFE’s existence as an organization. Regular meetings with the Swedish government have been held from 1988 on, and there have been no significant changes in membership or representation through the years. In the Council, the Swedish government as a whole has an opportunity to sit down together with other economic and social elites in Sweden. Since no minutes are kept from these meetings either, it is impossible to determine just what kind of consultation that has taken place in this part of the ROFE, whether the Council has actually had an informal agenda, or not, and to what extent the subject for discussion has been particular details in the Swedish adaptation process, or strategic issues pertaining to the process as a whole. This particular part of the ROFE organization nevertheless gives the organized social interests in Sweden an opportunity to speak directly to political power on European integration issues. It remains difficult to determine to what extent this opportunity was seized upon by interest groups, or if perhaps the Swedish government just took the opportunity to disseminate information about its ongoing work with adaptation to the EU.

The configuration of ROFE has changed only marginally over time. In 1991, some changes were made in conjunction with the shift to a

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38 There are 18 non-governmental representatives in the Council in 1992. From the Government, all representatives in the State Secretary Group are invited.

39 The points of comparison in the following are 1988-89, 1991-92 and 1992-93 for the Working groups. The composition of the Council is presented annually in the publication series “Sverige-EFTA-EG”, referred to as UDH in the following. The most detailed organization chart used in the analysis concerns the year 1992-93, and was given to the author by one of the interviewees. As a whole, the organization is reviewed by the Government for each new working year. Some of the working groups simply dissolve because their work is done, i.e. their particular chapter in the acquis is closed. Importantly, however, organizational charts have not been preserved by Government since they are considered live, or working, documents that are constantly changing in terms of what individuals are actually involved in the organization. Only the organizational structure and its leadership is constant over time.
Centre-Right coalition government. The number of government ministers in the Ministerial Group was increased, involving also the ministers for Social affairs, Environment and Agriculture. Similarly, representation was increased in the State Secretary Group, giving representation to all three coalition partners in the new Center-Right government in the core units of the ROFE organization. The added ministers were also given individual places in the European Council. The composition of the European Council looks stable over time and only a few individuals have been substituted for newcomers. No new organizations or interest groups have been added after the representative from parliament, who was mentioned above. The total number of representatives on the Council changed only in 1992, again as mentioned before, due to the ideological shift in national government. In the same year, however, the representation of labor market actors was expanded somewhat by the admission of two new representatives. One is from the Swedish Confederation of Professional Associations (SACO) and the other from the Federation of Swedish Farmers (LRF).

Inside the Working Groups more continuous change can be observed. Mainly, there is an increase in the representation of local and regional interests over time. At the very beginning, in 1988, there was limited participation from the Swedish Association of Local Authorities, from the Federation of County Councils and from certain individual representatives of local government in Sweden. At this time, representation in the Working Groups seems near-exclusive to actors from the labor market in Sweden, such as the Confederation of Trade Unions and the Employers’ Confederation. Also present are representatives of a variety of sector interests, for example particular branch interests from Swedish trade and industry such as the Federation of Swedish Industries or branch organizations in the transport sector. The first organizational chart from 1988 stipulates that the Federation of County Councils is represented in only three out of 24 Working Groups and that the Swedish Association of Local Authorities has a seat in only one of the working groups.

In 1992, however, local and regional interests became represented in 9 Working Groups out of the total 26. During the year 1992-93, the total number of Working Groups was expanded to 29 and local and regional representatives take up seats in 11 of these. It is noteworthy that local and regional interests were represented mostly by their national federations in the organizational life of ROFE, and not by genuinely local and regional actors. Representation was carried out first and foremost by the Federation of County Councils and the Association of Local Authorities. In the working groups, however, there was some increase in genuine local representation over time. For example, it is the Working Group for Regional Policy that brings together representatives of county administration agencies almost exclusively in 1988 and 1989. But in 1991 and 1992, the County Board of Stockholm acquired another seat in the Working Group for Environmental Issues, and the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce
joins the Working Group for Industrial and Energy Policy. In 1992, the University College of Växjö gets a seat in the Working Group for Education. In 1993, the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce is brought into the Working Group for Legal Integration. There are a number of these and similar changes taking place over time in ROFE Working Groups, which makes it possible to say that the representation of regional and local interests has increased over time. From a bird’s-eye view, however, labor market actors and representatives of Swedish trade and industry dominate the working groups in the organization for the main part of ROFE’s life span. Regional and local influences increase only marginally towards the end of its organizational life.

The organizational character of ROFE is not easy to define. Different things seem to be going on depending upon which part of the organization one chooses to observe. In general, ROFE is a complex organization which includes a large number of individuals from different sections of public life in Sweden. They are brought together to work with a wide range of issues that emanate from Sweden’s adaptation to the Acquis, and there is no blueprint for how this work should be done. Furthermore, High Level Negotiations to achieve Swedish EU membership are ongoing in parallel with this work. What ensues is an organization that in practice not only manages to incorporate the Acquis into different economic, social and political sectors in Sweden, but also to involve the major political interest groups in Swedish society.

### 3.3 The Self-Image of ROFE

During the research interviews, ROFE members were asked to talk about how they perceived the role and function of the organization. However, many respondents refrained from commenting on the competencies of the organization. A few of them responded, and shared their thoughts on the internal and external roles of ROFE. These respondents were also ready to share perceptions of their personal roles in the organization.  

Among those respondents who willingly entered into a discussion about the organization, there seems to be a meeting of minds. Their statements have a distinct air of being factual. Three of them chose to enter into the subject themselves, not prompted by the interviewer, since they found it a good idea to straighten out organizational issues before going into other topics. They also said that they wanted to make sure that there would be no confusion between questions that concern internal relationships in ROFE and questions about the actual work in different issue areas. One of the interviewees, then, cut straight to the chase with a statement about the European Council:

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40 Swedish case interviews 3, 12, 14, 16 and 51.
If anybody would choose to start their analysis in the Council, well, then I think somebody must have completely misunderstood its aim, its function and what it has done. The way I see it, it has been there for one reason only which is to divert political pressure – the pressure emanating from a situation in which industry and other interest groups haven’t had good channels to the government concerning EC issues. It is nothing if not one of those steam pressure valves! And as such…it is functional but with no function whatsoever over and above that. I believe that I’ve spoken once there myself. Of course, in societies like ours you need this type of channel. The official representatives of pressure groups need to be able to go back to the members of their organizations and say ‘I sat down with the government this time and that and I told them what I think’. I heard many representatives read their statements to the government only to be able to go back and say ‘I have forwarded our views’. (…) It has worked really, really well. But to think that it has in any way contributed to political decisions or that it has had any other role, that is my reaction, then the role of the Council has been completely misunderstood. (12)

Several of the interviewees followed the same line of thought as in the quote above. They tried to deemphasize the role of ROFE as an organization for political decision making. Instead, they offered the idea that ROFE can be seen as a new form of administrative apparatus in Swedish government. The organization was “cross-ministerial” (51) in its aim and character, mainly there to receive and sort out the enormous load of information that is necessary in order for Swedish government agencies to make the right decisions at the right time and, last but not least, to help incorporate EU law successfully with the Swedish judicial system. Three interviewees also concurred with the statement that the Council for European Affairs was a “debating club” devoid of any political functions or even any influence worth mentioning.

In support of this, one person characterized the quality of discussions in the Council in the following way:

The discussion about concrete issues is just embarrassingly weak! Why have members continued to go to meetings? Well, the interest groups have more or less had to go there, I suppose. There has been a good show of hands from trade and industry. I have been a frequent participant myself. But the value of all this…if you were to ask me how they all rate their returns from going to these meetings, well, then we have the reports from the government about ongoing negotiations and their results and we have the EEA-negotiations, that is, Ulf Dinkelspiel, Frank Belfrage and Micha Sohlman reporting and then the Prime Minister clarifying certain points…I guess that does provide participants with valuable information. They were regularly

41 Swedish case interviews 12, 16, 51.
updated, of course. My own feeling is that we all got a good, honest picture of what was going on and whether there was something in it for us or not. I believe this created confidence between the government and the interest groups. They trusted what the government told them. (...) But any function above that, nah! (12)

Another interviewee confirmed this view of things by making reference to his own role as a representative of an interest group.42 This person also chose to focus on the Council and to say that it has been a vehicle by which the leadership of the organization has been able to strengthen its power base internally. This would seem to confirm the notion that the Council was important above all to organized interest groups in Sweden, and much less so to government and Swedish trade and industry. Similarly, it appears that most parties to the meetings have perceived it to be of high symbolic value. By extension and according to this view, the information as such and the exchange of information at meetings have been less important to the actors.

However, respondents who take a view that is diametrically opposed to the one above can also be identified.43 To them, the Council was first and foremost a political forum. They saw the whole of ROFE, and the Council in particular, as a political forum in which open, honest and direct two-way communication about issues of interest was the rule. In the words of one of interviewee:

It is hard to be completely one-sided about this, but I think that it has been very important because it has functioned as a direct channel between leading politicians and trade and industry. In a manner of speaking they have been directly...I mean, what I’m saying is, that you can put things forward in different ways. You can do it in general terms and use a variety of official or representative channels to do it. But if an industrialist is sitting right opposite the Prime Minister giving an example of how he has lost money on a particular deal or something, how much it cost him and what it all meant to him, which rules that applied to the particular case, then it’s all so much more convincing. So really, the kind of close contact that we have experienced, although the aim has been to provide us with information of course, it has all given more influence. I’m quite sure of that although it is always hard to say exactly how much influence we’re talking about. I think it has much more to do with the power of examples. I mean, as you and I sit here and talk, I give you...I respond to your questions not in general terms but in terms related to the world I live in. It is just the same with everybody else, right? We have our stories to tell. (14)

42 Swedish case interview 16.
43 Swedish case interviews 3, 14.
When pushed, these two respondents did not want to go further into a discussion about power and influence within ROFE. Nor did they wish to contribute with any concrete example of a situation in which they had witnessed one actor exerting influence over another. They both made reference to a general feeling of having been around when comprehensive and important political information was exchanged inside the Council. In effect, they both claimed that they saw the Council as a kind of political core of the ROFE, or as an inner circle of influence over political and administrative ramifications of the Swedish adaptation process. The Council for European Affairs, they thought, had the power of deliberation and initiative within ROFE and, by extension, within the country as a whole.  

There is no public sphere without examples. Examples are very important. Everyone has his or her own personal experience and from this conjecture is made. In turn, this makes me slightly worried about the upcoming referendum since a lot of people will speak their mind about Europe but precious few of them will have any particular experience to draw on. They just think that everything is fine the way it is, because this is the span of their experiences. It is hard, then, to take a forward view and realize that we may be heading towards a Europe that is similar to the USA. (…) Everybody thinks that we’re so darn well-off here and that if we change we will get all the bad things that other peoples have, simply because we are so much influenced by what we see on TV…So, I think the Council has had influence on different levels and not only on the commercial side. Of course, it has been a heavy thing for the simple reason that this is the type of issue we’ve had to deal with. (…) we have nevertheless constantly been at the forefront of all this. (14)  

The two interviewees who expressed this later view were also convinced that discussions within the Council influenced Swedish policies vis-à-vis the EU. Both of them made reference to their belief in the power of ideas or, as in the former quote, the power of examples. They also agreed that they saw power and influence behind the simple fact that leading figures in Swedish government, organized interest groups, trade and industry had sat down together frequently to deliberate and discuss each other’s examples. In addition, they confirmed the view that communication inside the Council was a two-way affair between central government and social and economic interest groups.

45 Swedish case interviews 3, 14.
In addition to the interviews, there is also data available from a survey which was carried out in the Swedish study. One view of ROFE’s role in Swedish adaptation to the EU that stands out in the survey material is that the organization first and foremost existed in order to strike balances before negotiations and, as a fait accompli, to make the incorporation of new rules with Swedish rules and regulations run smoothly. Several respondents pointed out that their main aim was to facilitate incorporation. The means to achieve this goal was information on the one hand and negotiation on the other. This also supports the aforementioned interpretation in this dissertation, which is that the organization was a big machine for the gathering and dissemination of information. Demands, requests and positions from different sectors in Swedish society flowed upward in the direction of High Level Negotiation Groups, which involved ministers from central government and the foreign ministry. This flow of sector information gave ministers a solid footing for their positions in the negotiation process with representatives of the EU and its member countries. This interpretation is also supported by the fact that the Working groups of the ROFE were divided up under the same headings as the ministries of the Swedish government. It should be remembered that each Working group was chaired by a senior civil servant from one of the government ministries.

Taking these cognitive data into account but shifting the focus back to looking at the organization as a whole again, a few organizational observations can be made. First of all, the political predominance of the Swedish government and its ministries seems clear. It is the government that puts the whole organization together, supervises its work and collects any and all results from it. In short, the ROFE is there to improve the bargaining power of the Swedish government vis-à-vis the EU and other applicant (EFTA) states. The Ministry for Foreign Affairs, particularly its special Foreign Trade Office (UDH) is the key political actor.

The Working Groups have a mandate to collect information from below and to prepare materials and suggestions for the ministerial level. However, at the end of the day any blueprints for the negotiations or policies are prepared by and decided upon by the government. Importantly, also any coordination between Working groups or other levels of the organization is decided upon and monitored by the government through the State Secretary Group.

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46 See Appendix 1 for an example of the detailed data analysis. Results from the survey are briefly mentioned here because they contain some information relevant to the self-image of ROFE. It is important to note that this survey was not replicated in the Polish study, partly because it was not deemed feasible and partly because the results from the Swedish study strongly suggest that respondents are characterized by national professional backgrounds, networks and interests.
The empirical lesson from the Swedish survey data is clear. Members of ROFE upheld the Swedish national interest in Europe. They had their individual careers and backgrounds mainly on the national arena, in this case in Swedish government, public administration or in Swedish trade and industry. Their outlook on European integration was colored by the notion of international cooperation. Only a few of the respondents in the survey claimed that they were actively upholding the interest of the European Commission in their day-to-day work.

Bringing the quantitative and qualitative cognitive data concerning self-images together in the case of ROFE, an image appears that is far from conclusive. The interview results represent the views of six respondents who were willing to share their opinions about how they perceive of the organization. The results seem to confirm that the open political mandate and the unclear political status in combination make participants uncertain about what they were in effect doing. On the other hand, there is less uncertainty regarding the question about for whom they were doing it. There is one self-image of ROFE as an information-processing unit. There is another self-image of the organization constituting a political arena in its own right, upon which actors met to deliberate issues emanating from adaptation process and to strike deals with each other. Of particular importance to the study at hand, of course, is that both these views are alive among participants that belong to the same organization and that these views are held at the same time. Differently put, the organizational self-image of ROFE is at least dual. It is noteworthy, however, that most respondents simply claimed that they had no opinion about the organizational character of ROFE or in many cases simply refused to go into any discussion about this particular aspect of the organization.

3.4 Consensus-Building through Learning

What kind of political animal is ROFE? The notion that ROFE is an organization in which a broad spectrum of social and sector interest is represented is also present in a variety of analyses done with reference to Sweden’s adaptation to the EU. This broad spectrum is probably necessary considering the encompassing nature of the political task at hand. It could also be argued, as is done in the previous section, that adaptation to the

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47 Ibid.
EEA-treaty follows basically the same guidelines as the process leading up to full membership of the EU and that the first legs of this process gives the actors new insights into problems and possibilities. In this view, the ROFE can be interpreted as a machine for coordination, processing and dissemination of information and political and judicial inventory.

Alexander George has pointed out that political leaders do not always manage to achieve consensus around a political issue simply because they make an effort to. More importantly, not all actors think and act the same way regardless of whether they can be defined as belonging to the same historical situation or not. As George also writes, small pro-groups of decision makers tend to form around particular ideas and policies. Even within such small groups there tends to be a division of intellectual labor and plenty of room for individual role taking. Given that each member of such a small group is seen by the others as belonging to the pro-side, a situation emerges in which the individual actor finds himself endowed with a lot of discretion. Empirical research seems to support this theory and, what is important here, that even members of a pro-group many times have enough discretion to actually counteract the consensus-seeking efforts of central government.

One of the most interesting points that can be made about ROFE in organizational terms is that it had an unclear political mandate. It had no clearly stated work instruction and no formal agenda over and above that which emanated from the government’s negotiations with the EU. Generally, there seems to have been plenty of room for informal role taking and crossing of administrative boundaries within the organizational framework. Individual actors in the ROFE came from diverse backgrounds and they brought with them a wide variety of viewpoints and interests. To some extent, it might be possible to look at the organization as an extension of Swedish corporatism, i.e. as the result of a Social Democratic government in Sweden, acting in the late 1980s simply the way it was used to on the national arena. Again, this behavior from Swedish governments has its deep roots in Swedish 20th century history.

But does this mean, then, that the government was expecting its `old recipe´ to produce national consensus concerning a fateful decision about national sovereignty in the mid 1990s? Could it be that the Social Democratic government, later followed by the Center-Right coalition government, never

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50 Ibid.

trusted the old political mechanism to work? If we allow the answer to the first question to be no and the answer to the second question to be yes, a completely different possibility emerges. That is, given the knowledge about decision making in small states, the Swedish government might have anticipated differences of opinion and extensive role taking inside an organization such as ROFE. Furthermore, given the complexity and speed of the adaptation process, the government may have assumed that all interested parties on the Swedish arena would have a need for information and access to a forum in which they could try out new ideas and discard old notions. In such a light, ROFE looks more like an arena for political learning than an information machine or, for that matter, an informal extension of ministerial clout.

Evidence to support the learning hypothesis is beginning to emerge in Swedish studies. Jacob Gustavsson, for example, devotes part of his dissertation from 1998 to how the Swedish Prime Minister Ingvar Carlsson actively sought and went through a process of learning in the late 1980s. According to Gustavsson, the immediate effect of this process was that the Social Democrat radically changed his assumptions about the European context, about the ongoing supranational integration process and about the conditions for Sweden. One major source of learning for Prime Minister Carlsson were meetings and discussions with other socialist political leaders in Western European States. Another major source, according to Gustavsson, were people in the think-tank called Framtidsgruppen, or the Futures Group, which Carlsson himself founded in the early 1980s. The idea that Gustavsson tries out is that leading Swedish Social Democrats were going through a path-breaking process of learning all through the 1980s and that it is possible that some of this learning had important effects on how political adaptation to the EU was later organized. He also discusses the Council for European Affairs, emphasizing the principle of voluntary participation that guided its activities, and argues that this should also be seen as part of a ministerial and governmental learning process, not as a traditional corporatist arrangement.

It is difficult to determine the nature of contacts between decision makers, negotiators and interest groups in ROFE. It is possible to rely on analogies with the general public debate in Sweden concerning other changes in Swedish politics and policy at that time. Learning may have taken place inside the Council and other units of the organization but other

53 Ibid., pp. 153-162.
perspectives, such as corporatist theory, might be equally valid. Although more than a decade has passed since the ROFE was active, it is hard to find detailed discussions or analyses of the organization.\(^{55}\) The learning hypothesis, however, receives some support from analysts who agree post-facto that adaptation to the EU involved several challenges to core principles and traditions in central government in Sweden.\(^{56}\)

Against this organizational background, the ROFE can be seen as an unusually big set of communication channels down which information about the Swedish adaptation to the European Union was flowing in two directions. National government could lend an ear from major Swedish interest groups and deliver its suggestions and points-of-view. The same was true vice versa. All actors benefited from quick and easy access to information about negotiations with the EU on the one hand and about emergent demands and differences among social and economic actors in Swedish society. For example, if an interest group such as the Federation of Swedish Industries already possessed established links to their sector counterparts on the European arena it would be reasonable to assume that it also had access to pertinent information about developments there. The ROFE nevertheless provided them with crucial information from the Swedish arena and, perhaps more importantly, an opportunity to send straight messages to government officials currently involved in the political negotiation process. In terms of the overall aim, the ROFE was there to achieve Swedish incorporation of the Acquis. In practice, this was done through intense information sharing with a variety of social and economic sectors in Sweden and by striking balances between different interests and needs.

As a result, the work of ROFE can be characterized as both incremental and judicial. The nature of its function is also mirrored in its publication series \textit{Sverige-EFTA-EG} and in the publications of other reports, part treaties and points-of-view generally referred to as the Green Books.\(^{57}\) In sum, there are two different images of ROFE. On the one hand it looks like big, centrally governed machinery for the collection and dissemination of political information that is subdivided into legal areas and sectors. On the other hand it has the makings of an instrument by which the government achieves political consensus about what role Sweden should play in the process of European integration.

\(^{55}\) Compare with for example Johansson, Jan (1992) \textit{Det statliga kommittéväsendet}. Dissertation, Department of Political Science, Stockholm University.


\(^{57}\) In Swedish: Grönböckerna, from which material and references can be found in UDH (1988-94).
3.5 Facing Rokkanian Policy Choices

Between the years 1988 and 1993, reports on progress in the work of ROFE are collected and published annually by the Foreign Trade Section of the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs. These publications are noteworthy both for the complexity of the adaptation process that they reveal, and for the messages about what the Swedish points-of-departure are in the ongoing process of adaptation to the EU. In effect, these annual publications are an important source to any understanding of which the perceived strategic policy choices for Sweden are and, consequently, to knowledge about changes in policy that occur as the adaptation process unfolds. In this section, these reports are analyzed by utilizing the theoretical categories that were identified in Stein Rokkan’s model of political integration in the first chapter of this thesis. Which are the strategic views taken by ROFE concerning Trade and Industry, Functional and Territorial Regionalism?

Swedish Trade and Industry

The Swedish Government Bill 1987/88:66, the so called Harmonization Bill, is a recurrent point of reference when issues related to trade and industry in Sweden and Europe are discussed. In its Proposition, the Swedish government lays down some of its fundamental positions on how European integration challenges Sweden. A lot of positions are grounded in economic arguments and perceptions of economic actors. At the very beginning of the text, Sweden is defined historically as belonging to a transnational cultural sphere in Europe. It is here that Sweden has its “historical and cultural roots”.

Particularly interesting is that the Swedish government chooses to make Sweden’s European identity a statement of simple historical fact. This idea is not problematized or put into perspective any further. Transnationalization and transnational phenomena, to the contrary, form the basis for further reasoning and assumption about current developments in Europe. Particularly the increasingly transnational investment and transfer patterns among Swedish firms are held up as one of the most important factors in Swedish relations with the EC/EU. This is said to be part of a Europe-wide pattern among firms. Not least as a result of modern communication technologies creating new business opportunities across national boundaries, the Single Market is seen by the Swedish government as both necessary and desirable.

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58 Swedish Government Bill 1987/88:66, p. 2ff. In terms of political institutions, the government makes reference to such networks as the ESC, ECE, OECD and EFTA. The (then) European Community is considered to be but one out of several international organizations relevant for Sweden, but also pointed out as the one most important for keeping the peace on the continent. There is no historical analysis or argumentation concerning Swedish political culture.

59 Ibid. pp.5-9.
In effect, European integration is by and large perceived as driven by market forces. Behind the Single Market initiative lies the increasing transnational interweaving of producers and consumers in the European context. According to the Swedish government, there are also ever-increasing degrees of autonomy in the markets. Swedish industry, for example, is seen as by and large autonomous vis-à-vis the state and as actively pursuing new business opportunities in the transnational sphere. Interestingly, however, the increasing transnationalization among Swedish market actors is not perceived by the government as something that might decrease national loyalties among them. The political goal is to help Swedish trade and industry develop their activity further, which is why the Swedish government is actively pursuing its policy of international cooperation with the EC/EU with a view to tying ever closer legal and political ties. The Swedish government thinks it has an obligation to protect Swedish economic interests (including transnational activity by Swedish firms) by monitoring and participating in European integration to the extent that Swedish economic actors are not excluded from the Single Market, or treated differently from any other European economic actors.

In the early reports by ROFE, published in 1988 and 1989, this particular outlook is adhered to. Of major concern are trade issues and how these relate to general international agreements that Sweden is bound by. These are still the early days of work on an EEA-treaty for Sweden, which is still an EFTA country equipped with no more than an association agreement with the EC/EU. In the first reports, therefore, the issue of EU membership is still left open and most of the attention is given to more immediate problems that relate to the relationship between EFTA and the EC/EU.

Looking at the reports from later years in the process, however, there is a clearly discernible change of perspective in the material. Transnational phenomena and activities are becoming even more autonomous in relation to state and nation. Trade and industry is still reported on under separate headings in the reports but, importantly, Swedish firms are now absent in the rendering. Toward the end of ROFE’s existence, the Swedish government seems content to take the role of political informant and coordinator in the adaptation process. What was in the first publications presented as Swedish issues concerning the development of Swedish trade and industry in Europe has now been replaced with overviews of programs and initiatives for business development on the Single Market as a whole. The government still gives particular attention to small- and medium-sized firms and their opportunities for growth. Smaller actors are still considered Swedish, but the

60 Ibid.
same is not true for bigger economic actors. The government projects an image of itself as a negotiator and as the proverbial ‘middle-man’ in creating new business and trade opportunities for market actors, but this is much less pronounced than in the early stages of the process.\textsuperscript{63}

The clearly stated political goals and priorities that are so typical of the first reports disappear. In the last reports, there are no references made to Swedish market actors specifically. To the contrary, what emerges is another way of presenting and discussing Swedish trade and industry in the European setting. In this perspective, Swedish firms become non-national and independent of any political context defined by statehood. Issues of trade and economic growth are all discussed against the backdrop of an at least seemingly emergent transnational market context in Europe. In fact, any and all problems are regarded as European rather than Swedish, and the Swedish government actively attributes its own state interests a minor role.

Over time, this change begins creeping into the source material. There is a breaking-point in the 1991 report.\textsuperscript{64} Traces of the change can be seen already in the 1990 report, but are not as obvious there. In the 1991 report, the fact that Sweden has turned in its application for full membership of the EU is a main theme. This contributes to an important shift in how trade and industry issues are perceived. Up until 1991, market issues are discussed as national issues. The amount of pages spent on such issues in the reports is also smaller before 1991 than after that year. In effect, the Single Market is seen as a distant opportunity for Swedish market actors, something that the government will try to build bridges to but which does not really present Swedish actors with any alternative to the national arena. As stated in two of the early reports, “In a strict sense, there is no industrial policy in the EC”.\textsuperscript{65} The break comes in the report from 1991, when the EC/EU emerges as an actor in its own right. The Swedish government now becomes interested in what kinds of policies are actually relevant for the Single Market and how Swedish actors may or may not be linked to this emergent setting. Furthermore, the 1991 report points out that a liberal internationalist set of ideas are the touchstone of the European Single Market and that this way of thinking will have significant effects on the future autonomy of national governments.\textsuperscript{66} The report also hints that state intervention in market activities is generally considered as bad inside EC/EU institutions,

\textsuperscript{63} Ibid., pp. 27-34.
\textsuperscript{64} The annual reports are published with a one-year time lag, which means that the report covering the work in 1991 is published in 1992. In the following, references are made to the working year covered by each report.
and that the reality of this idea must be taken seriously if it is not to have negative political and economic consequences for Sweden in the long run.

The following report for 1992 continues to talk about the EU as a political setting in which a struggle against state interventionism is taking place. The philosophy behind the Single Market, it goes on, is a liberal economic one which also comprises values that new member states must accept. Careful note is nevertheless taken of the fact that the current EU member states put a lot of money into state subsidies, particularly industrial subsidies. The report goes on to point out that 70% of all industry in Western Europe is small or medium-size, and that the Swedish position therefore should be observant and careful. Development in the small- and medium-size industrial sectors is seen as an important one for Sweden in this report, and one that the state should monitor closely. Interestingly and in line with this 1992 recommendation, the reports from the following years 1993-94 are almost completely concentrated upon small- and medium-size industry under this and similar headings. Nowhere does this perspective stand out more clearly than in the last of the reports, from the year 1994, when the reporting of big industry and European developments related to that sector of Trade and Industry has been made redundant.

In sum, over time there is a subtle yet clearly discernible change in the ROFE reports on Trade and Industry. There is a change of perspectives. In the initial stages of reporting, Swedish firms are described as national firms. The ROFE sees a major task for the Swedish government in helping these Swedish firms gain a foothold on the transnational Single Market, and to make sure that they receive economic rights and obligations equal to those of firms from other EU countries. Also in the early stages of reporting, ROFE chooses not to differentiate between big and small economic actors. To the contrary, both big and small belong to a Swedish political and economic sphere, poised on the outside of the Single Market looking in. The emphasis is on gaining access, and the road to gaining such access is political negotiation by the Swedish government.

A change occurred after the Swedish government had handed in its application for membership. The reports became richer and increased in scope, particularly since more interest was directed towards the system of rules and regulations on the Single Market. There was also a shift towards more emphasis on current trends in EC/EU regulation. The focus of ROFE:s interest also moved to the small- and medium-size Swedish industry. The closer one gets to the end of the report series in 1994, the less ROFE shows

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an interest in big Swedish industry. The perspective is shifted to issues of national and supranational infrastructural subsidiaries and to different forms of structural support for small- and medium-size firms. In conjunction with this, the reports also focus in on comparison between EC/EU regulations and the Swedish system for government subsidies. Big industry fades out of the ROFE’s picture.

Functional and Territorial Regionalism

Over time, in reporting on how regional policy in Sweden is affected by the process of adaptation to the EU, ROFE treats regional policy as a subheading to the much larger policy area of Regional Development. Also, in the reports from the period 1989-92, Regional Development is reported under the same general heading as Trade and Industry. It is only in the reports from 1993 and 1994 that these two fields are treated as separate issues under separate headings.

In the report from 1993, regional- and structural policies are given separate attention for the first time. Up until 1992, regional policy and development is treated by ROFE as an integral part of the government’s general economic policy. Concerning regional issues, the change in ROFE’s perspective is much less subtle than what it is concerning Trade and Industry. In the earliest of the reports, from the years 1989 and 1990, economic and structural support to Swedish regions is simply discussed using the generic term Swedish regional policy.69 Nevertheless, ROFE shows an interest in the EU Structural Funds from the very beginning, and this interest seems to grow.

The reports from the first two years in the series are mainly concerned with the historical growth and present structure of regional policy in the EU institutions. For example, there is a tentative discussion about the concept ‘cohesion’ and an effort made to gather loose ends in EU regional policy by utilizing this concept. In effect, ‘cohesion’ is also used by the ROFE as a generic term in trying to sort out what kind of territorial thinking is going on in Brussels and whether there is any particular set of ideas behind the current policies, or not.70 In the reports from the period 1989-1992, most of the discussion about regional issues revolves around the five-year development programs in the EC/EU and what the problems and possibilities are with the adaptation of Swedish regional policy. Consequently, the style in these reports is careful and no efforts are made to estimate possible consequences or restraints for Sweden. Swedish regional development and related problems are also kept to the side in the early reports, occasionally

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hinted at but never discussed in any forthright manner. The important finding that the ROFE emphasizes in its early reports is that regional policy is still by and large a national policy area in the EU, not a supranational one. In the 1991 report, the working group on regional issues concludes:

Changes made in the regulation of structural support\(^71\) are deemed sufficient in international perspective, which means that the current encompassing regional policy in Sweden should be sustainable regardless of adaptation to the EC. There should be no need for Swedish exceptions concerning regional policy in the current phase of EEA-negotiations.\(^72\)

Similarly, in the 1992 report, the ROFE chooses to play down any effects of EU adaptation on Swedish regional policy:

The EEA-treaty, which is intended to come into legal force on January 1 1993, means that the same rules for regional policy and support that apply in the EC also will apply in Sweden and the other EFTA countries. Swedish regional policy was reformed and new rules were introduced on July 1 1990. In this reform, special attention was given to international structures and agreements, for example agreements with the EFTA countries and how regional policy is regulated in the EC.\(^73\)

The 1992 report, however, represents a breaking point in how ROFE reports on the linkage between regional development in Sweden and the process of adaptation to the EU. Although the form is one of neutrality and simple enumeration of facts concerning the ongoing adaptation process, there is a lack of continuity in how events and processes are brought together. As illustrated by the two quotes above, the report from 1991 still talks about how no change in Swedish policy or regulation of regional policy is necessary, at least not as a result of adaptation to the EU. In the following year, however, references are made to how major changes have already been introduced not least because of preparations for the EEA-treaty and ever closer adaptation to the EU. Whereas the reports from 1989-1991 say that no change is taking place and that regional policy is as much a national political issue as it ever was before, the 1992 report simply states that the important changes made during that same period have adapted the field of regional development and policy to “how regional policy is regulated in the EC.”

In the following reports from 1993 and 1994, ROFE focuses mainly on the EU structural funds and what opportunities these funds may or may

\(^{71}\) This is expressed in reference to EC/EU regulations.

\(^{72}\) UDH (1991a), p.113.

not create for Swedish regions to partake. In the last two reports, however, the emphasis on national aspects of regional development in Sweden and the "current encompassing regional policy" is gone. Again, the breaking point is the 1992 report, the perspective and references of which makes it hard to pinpoint exactly when the new perspective on regional development began to pervade. Indeed, ROFE gives us two versions of what happened and when. The first version is that drastic adaptation took place in Sweden already at the beginning of the process, leading up to formalization in 1990 and 1991. The other version, however, is that adaptation was never drastic and that the "encompassing regional policy" in Sweden spilled over easily into a new set of rules and regulations via preparations for the EEA-treaty. The latter version also seems to imply that national differences were small and that all countries, inside the EU as well as the EFTA, by some spontaneous mechanism simply gave up regional development as a policy area of foremost national concern.

The impact of Swedish negotiation for EU membership is mentioned only in the last of the ROFE reports, which is from 1994. Again, in a brief recapitulation of the adaptation process from 1989 and on, ROFE makes an effort to emphasize the continuity between different phases in the process of coming closer to the EU. It is further emphasized, albeit in this report much more clearly than before, that `cohesion' is the key to any understanding of how regional development is seen in the EU. A particular mention is made of the fact that this concept means that the structurally weaker regions in Europe, or the least well to-do, are continually targeted as receivers of structural support under EU regulations. The way this worked is illustrated with tables of figures set in billions of ECU, and it is made clear that most Swedish regions would have been hard put to enter any of the structural support programs under the current EU ideology and regulation. Carefully, however, ROFE reports that the Swedish government is introducing fresh initiatives into the membership negotiations in order to make particular Swedish regions eligible for structural support:

Furthermore, discussions with the European Commission about Swedish national regional policy will be ongoing.

\[\text{In this report regional policy and structural funds are also given their own, separate rubrics.}\]

\[\text{The European Currency Unit (ECU) was foreseen in the Treaty of Rome as the future EU currency, once the Economic and Monetary Union had been formed between integrating nations in Europe. The Maastricht Treaty confirmed this name for the currency in 1992, but at a meeting of the European Council in 1995 it was decided to change the name of the currency into Euro. See Bainbridge (2000), pp. 160-161.}\]

\[\text{UDH (1994), pp. 135-136.}\]

\[\text{Ibid., p.136.}\]
Thus, the perspective that ROFE takes upon regional development can best be described as sliding from one end of the national-supranational continuum to the other. There is a tendency in the sources to view the linkage between national adaptation to the EU and regional development in Sweden as a positive one. Adaptive measures in Sweden, emanating from the EEA-process and also involving similar adaptation in the EFTA countries, essentially pave the way for looking at regional issues from a supra-national perspective. After the 1992 report, the emphasis on national requirements and needs simply disappears in the ROFE reports only to be replaced with a new, adaptive outlook.

In short Sweden, as regards the field of regional development, was ready for membership after the EEA-negotiations had been concluded. The scope of this change, however, is nowhere problematized in the material. It is obvious when the shift in perceptions comes about, but it is far from clear what the consequences of this new outlook might be. For example, the “encompassing regional policy” of the Swedish state that was still unproblematic and still there in 1991 has simply disappeared by 1992. The EU Structural Funds, in addition, did not present an alternative source for economic or political support to the old “encompassing” policy. In the final analysis, the Swedish government was trying to think up a new format within which Swedish regions could look for developmental support from the supranational level. This, however, is mentioned as a part of the total negotiation package brought by the Swedish government to Brussels and as a remote possibility for some Swedish regions. It is not presented as an alternative to that regional policy which, in the eyes of ROFE, simply disappeared in 1992.

Concerning regional development, the ROFE perspective clearly moves from being Stockholm-centered to being Brussels-centered. For all the clarity of this shift in perception, contradiction also looms large in the material. Regardless of how one reads the ROFE report series, looking for clues to how regional development issues are framed, the idea that stands out is that regional issues are national issues. In practice, however, the discussion and the examples used in the sources are almost invariably an echo of regional and regional-political definitions used in the EU. It is almost as if ROFE is looking for new ideas and concepts, particularly in the first two reports. In these reports, the image of Sweden is one of a closed system, self-sustaining and adapting to the surrounding world only on the margins. In the last three reports, however, Sweden is treated as a part of Europe, already cohesive and having gone through the necessary steps of adaptation to the supranational integration. Actually, according to the ROFE, there were no Swedish regions that experienced particular problems and this seemed to be particularly true when compared with other, less well to-do regions in the EU. But where are the Swedish regions?
Only in the 1992 report does ROFE embark on a search for new concepts and definitions. In this report, even the idea of transnational regionalism enters into the discussion. Somehow, Swedish regions or regional development in Sweden never enter into the discussion, however. In the 1992 report, also briefly mentioned in the 1993 and 1994 reports, examples are fetched primarily from the European Commission document “Europe 2000”. The discussion focuses exclusively on regional imbalances in the EU. Particular interest is taken in what ROFE refers to as growth regions, particularly the “triangle Paris-London-Amsterdam including the Ruhr industrial area.” Other observations, particularly concerning possible role models for Swedish regions, concern what ROFE refers to as the Sunbelt along the Western coastline of the Mediterranean Sea. Again, references are exclusively made to non-Nordic and non-Swedish regions. ROFE is content establishing that the European Commission apparently was interested in the concept of transnational regions, and that if it is interesting to the Commission it should also be of interest to the Swedish government. As far as any references to, or discussion about, Swedish regions and their possible linkages to the development of macro-regions in Europe, nothing is said.

3.6 Summary: Organizational findings in the Swedish case

The Swedish context is signified by the government’s gradual, low-key approach to European integration. Adaptation to the EU is seen as an ongoing process driven by the need to improve upon the existing free-trade network between Sweden, the EFTA and the EC/EU. In effect, when the process picked up speed in the last two years of the 1980s, the supranational institutions in Europe still went by the name of the European Community and the Single Market was still in the process of being established as a supranational legal entity. Perhaps not surprisingly, the Swedish debate about European integration was built up around the concept of internationalization, which connoted voluntary cooperation among sovereign nation states and international organizations. The public discussion about European integration and where it might eventually take Sweden did not really heat up until the actual process of adaptation was over. Presented with a ready package for Swedish EU membership, the Swedish electorate eventually got to throw votes in a referendum on the issue in 1994. The outcome was favorable, and Sweden joined the EU in 1995. The political debate preceding this momentous event in the history of the country, however, was rather bleak. Up to the year of the Swedish referendum on EU membership, which is also at the very end of the

78 UDH (1992a), pp.144-145.
period under study in this thesis, adaptation to supranational institutions in Europe was debated mainly in terms of international cooperation and voluntary national adjustment.

As argued by some Swedish analysts, political issues related to European integration moved up on the agenda during the first five years of the 1990s. But it is almost as if the actual debate in Sweden, if by debate one means heated pro-con argumentation and waves of emotion in public life, took place only within the time span of a few months previous to the 1994 referendum. Importantly, this debate did not change any arguments in terms of content. European integration was still by and large regarded as having to do with free trade, the consolidation of EFTA-EU relations and opportunities for economic growth in Sweden. The debates about other issues, such as different aspects of social and political change, seem to have taken off in Sweden only after EU membership was achieved. Based on the contextualization of Swedish adaptation made in the foregoing, it could be argued that the Swedish nation joins the EU thinking that European integration is just a matter of intensified international economic cooperation.

Looking at the ROFE organization in detail, it is clear that its main function is to coordinate different branches of Swedish government. Inside this cross-departmental unit priority seems to have been given to cooperative efforts and problem-solving. Particularly interesting in the Swedish case, is the fact that ROFE worked on a purely voluntary and experimental basis. The organization did not go beyond the regular government functions because it did not have a role formalized by law or decree. Organized interests that participated in the European Council, for example, were not required to do so. Also between ministries and other branches of government cooperation seems to have taken place on a voluntary basis, actors seeking out partners depending upon what issue was at hand. Formally, ROFE was a channel between the central government in Sweden and its various ministerial branches on the one hand and agencies, local and regional government on the other. The quasi-corporatist nature of the ROFE is noteworthy, drawing organized interests in Sweden into the process of policy deliberation both at the top and at the bottom of the organization, i.e. in the European Council and in the Working Groups.

The fact that two consecutive and ideologically opposed Swedish governments chose to keep ROFE intact testifies to the utility of the organization. It can be argued that the organization emulated the old blueprint for how Swedish governments tackle economic and political challenges from Europe and the rest of the world. An element of corporatism sneaked into the adaptation process. Political legitimacy increased when Swedish organized interests were invited to sit down with the government and make their views and opinions heard. Also in line with the Swedish blueprint for national
leadership, significant parts of the electorate were given the opportunity to feel involved in the adaptation process by proxy, or rather via their organizational representatives such as the big and politically significant labor market organizations. For elites in the organizations there was quick and easy access to new information as well as opportunities to participate in the actual deliberation of issues related to European integration. Through ROFE, the Swedish government also created opportunities for itself to test ideas early in the process and to find out what the positive or negative responses were among important groups in Swedish society to adaptive measures vis-à-vis the EU.

By Swedish standards, ROFE was very big both in terms of how many individuals and how many public and private organizations were involved in its work. Coordination and communication was a complex task in the organization. However, it is the Swedish government that leads the work in ROFE throughout its period of existence. The ministers in government assume responsibility for all negotiations, EEA and membership negotiations alike, and set up the time limits for deliberation, surveying and other work processes inside ROFE. For all the many different actors and interests that were represented in the organization, there is no sign of central government ever delegating its leading role. It was the government in Sweden that initiated the EEA-process, organized ROFE and eventually chose to keep the organization intact working toward EU-membership. There are no signs that the Swedish government ever let other actors in the organization take the lead in the adaptation process.

Concerning the self-image of ROFE, the voluntary and consensus-seeking aspects of the organization again come to the fore. Respondents say that they have not felt compelled to participate in all meetings and activities. Basically, respondents thought that they did their most important work in their own offices and that ROFE was good for the purpose of communication and learning, particularly when time was short. However, there was no feeling that the organization had replaced normal government functions in Sweden, or that it had been a particular venue for policy deliberation concerning Sweden’s adaptation to the EU. Some respondents thought that it was interesting to learn about the work and views of others in the process, but that activity inside the organization by and large did not interfere with their normal government or interest group activities.

Also based on the self-images, the role and nature of the Council in the Swedish organization stands out as difficult to determine. There is evidence from the interview material that suggests that some participants

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79 Compare with Appendix 2.
have gone to meetings in the European Council believing that they were participating in information meetings, at which Swedish government simply took the opportunity to report on its adaptation work and on the results from negotiations. On the other hand, the results from interviews also suggest that others have participated in the belief that they were actors in a corporatist setting. According to this later view, meetings in the European Council were aimed at a discussion of different issues related to the adaptation process in which the Swedish government would exchange ideas with Swedish organized interests and also take suggestions from them. Judging from the interview material, it is possible that both views are right. On the one hand, some meetings in the European Council may have been about information from the government. On the other hand, other meetings could have been corporatist in character. However, the material does not allow for any definite conclusions to be drawn concerning this aspect.

The annual reports that ROFE published between 1988 and 1994 concerned the progress of its work with adaptation. These reports represent a serious effort at stock-taking as regards the parameters of European integration at the time. Current and long-term changes in the structure and politics of the EC/EU are reported on and the specific considerations of the Swedish government are presented in conjunction with its general outlook regarding economic, political and social developments in Europe. When analyzed in the light of Rokkanian integration categories, a certain structure of ideas emerges.

Concerning the category Trade and Industry, this was seen as the pivotal integration factor for Sweden. ROFE saw this category as both the reason for, and major vehicle of, Swedish adaptation to the EC/EU. Through the early reports echoed a theory of macro-economic harmonization between sovereign nation-states via legal integration across national boundaries in Europe. This was presented as the cornerstone of ROFE:s work with the EEA-treaty, which preceded that of adaptation to the EU, and for the first three years the reports simply furthered the view that adaptation to the EEA-treaty was the same thing as adaptation to the Single Market which, in turn, was the same thing as adaptation to the EC/EU. In the initial stages, Trade and Industry was not problematized. On the contrary, the reports breathed an air of national self-confidence which is illustrated most clearly by the fact that Swedish economic actors are seen as just that – as Swedish. During this time, the perceived role of central government in Sweden is that of the guardian or the advocate, facing a transnational Single Market upon which Swedish economic interests cannot fend for themselves.

However, this rather clear point of view concerning the Trade and Industry category changed over time. Beginning in 1991, the reports focused increasingly on various programs and initiatives from the EU Commission.
The Swedish national interest suddenly disappeared from view, and it is almost as if the pivotal role of the Swedish government has disappeared in only three years. There was also a drift in focus. Whereas there was a clear interest taken in big Swedish firms in the first reports, big industry almost vanished from the reports in the later stages of the adaptation process. Instead, the interest shifted over to small- and medium size firms and in the prerequisites for economic activity on this level in the EU. Structural support received increasing attention in the later reports. Actual transnationalization, however, was not discussed in the reports. It is left up to the reader to decide whether or not there are still issues that remain concerning Swedish Trade and Industry, and whether or not the initially identified problems have been solved. At the end of the report series, Swedish government is back in a pivotal role, but now as a guardian of small Swedish firms in their plight to find adequate money support from EU institutions.

There is a similar change in how the ROFE reports discuss Functional and TerritorialRegionalism. At the beginning of the adaptation process, regional issues were discussed in what might best be described as paternalistic terms. Direct references were made to Sweden’s tradition of an “encompassing regional policy” on the national level. It was envisaged that the Swedish government would continue to play its vital historic and strategic role in regional development in Sweden. The role of national government as a guardian of regional interests was projected strongly in the early reports. Also, the first reports began to observe that the EC/EU has structural funds that might be interesting for Swedish regions in the long term. To begin with, however, the structural funds were mentioned almost in passing in the reports.

There is a tipping point in the reports between 1991 and 1992. Up until 1991, ROFE reported that adaptation to the EC/EU and the imminent EEA-treaty did not imply any change or need for revision of regional policy in Sweden. The two things, adaptation to the Single Market on the one hand and regional development on the other, were not defined as connected. ROFE initially took the view that regional policy belongs to the national arena. Therefore it did not have to be linked to the deliberation on how to adapt Swedish rules and regulations to the EU for the benefit of market actors. In the 1992 report, however, ROFE established as a fact that adaptation to the EU by default has a big impact on national regional policy in the EU countries. Therefore, it was envisaged that things would remain the same in Sweden once membership had been achieved. This new perspective on the Rokkanian category Functional and Territorial Regionalism then remains the same in the last of the ROFE reports.

Overall, the organizational study in Sweden suggests that officials in ROFE are facing the EU with confidence. The process of adaptation to the EU in the Swedish case bears the marks of learning and consensus-seeking.
The work takes place in a context which is signified by a low-key discussion about issues. For the most part, this discussion focuses on economic needs and need for change. Sweden’s adaptation to the EU is framed as a pragmatic political project aimed at improving the opportunities for Swedish economic actors. As pointed out both in the ROFE reports and in the interview material, adapting to the EC/EU in the late 1980s and early 1990s was like trying to hit a moving target. The supranational institutional framework in Europe was undergoing significant change during this time, and the continuing existence of EFTA presented an alternative framework for negotiation both about and with the EC/EU. As the Single Market is successfully created in 1992 and the EC/EU becomes the EU, however, it changes the political climate in Europe. Some traces of this can be found in the last two reports from ROFE, for example, but by that time most of the negotiation chapters of the Acquis had already been successfully closed. The road to membership was open, and there was little in the way of public resentment in Sweden that could put the adaptive work of ROFE into question.
4. Poland: The Governmental Organization for EU Adaptation (UKIE)

For Poland, the political sea change in Europe between 1989 and 1991 had immediate consequences of great importance. The dependency which was brought about by Soviet dominance in the aftermath of WWII gave way to new opportunities for international partnerships. Freedom for the Polish people involved turning heads and hopes toward the West, and the Polish government established its organization for adaptation to the EU in the midst of change in 1996. A number of historical, religious and cultural reasons with deep roots in the resistance toward Soviet dominance made the most obvious political route for Poland a ‘return to Europe’. The ensuing pre-accession process with the EU, beginning already in 1989, brought not only democratization to Poland but also economic ‘shock therapy’ and new legal and social institutions. Although it can be disputed at length whether or not the Polish approach to the EU really represents a ‘return to Europe’, as some groups in the country would say, or a more strategic move guided by national self-interest, there is no arguing against the impact of the integration process with the EU. This process has taken place in step with a quick and radical entrenchment of parliamentary democracy and a modern European public administration in Poland.

This chapter is organized in the same way as the one about the Swedish case. In the first section, the contextual aspects of the EU discussion in Poland are traced and a brief description is made of the early patterns of dialogue between Poland and the EU. The chapter then proceeds to a description of the UKIE from an organizational point of view. Third, drawing on interview results from the UKIE, an exploration is made of self-images inside the organization. In a fourth section, UKIE policy deliberations concerning the Rokkanian integration categories (Trade and Industry, Functional and Territorial Regionalism) are analyzed for the time period 1988-2003. Last, the results from the organizational analysis in Poland are summarized.


4.1 Contextualization: Touchstones of the Enlargement Debate in Poland 1998-2004

Looking at a country like Poland, one might expect more determination in the public discussion about EU membership. Poland is a country which has evolved rapidly from its confusion in the early 1990s over national independence, republicanism, democracy and the initial risk of a backlash and a return to authoritarianism. Currently, the country enjoys relative stability in systemic terms and is taking its place among the family of democratic countries in Europe. Although there is no guarantee that the present Polish government will be able to manage the mounting economic pressure from the parallel processes of economic and social reconstruction, there is abundant evidence that the political system has become entrenched in Polish society.

In 2005, the Polish republic became a member of the EU. Today, it meets with such basic democratic prerequisites as adherence to basic human rights, democratic rules of procedure in government, constitutionalism and liberal freedoms for citizens and organizations. The Polish currency has been convertible since 1990 and as a result of hard economic reform throughout the 1990s there is a functional and increasingly substantial market sector in the economic life of the nation. In GDP terms, Poland still does not reach up to more than 30% of the EU average but it is internally stable and couples this with membership in several important international organizations. The reconstruction and democratization of the Polish republic has been successful over the past ten years and Polish leaders now take self-assured positions vis-à-vis their European neighbors.

From an historical perspective, democratization and international recognition of the third Polish republic has been quick in the making. Poland has managed to modernize its economic infrastructure and the country has gone through years of hyperinflation without losing the convertibility of its currency. Poland has also managed to pay off a large foreign debt. All the while, democracy has been introduced without any resort to a “purge of the criminal elements of the Communist regime” similar to what occurred in Czechoslovakia before its break-up or before reunification in Eastern Europe.

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6 Bainbridge (2001), Ibid.

Germany. Furthermore, Poland crowned its successful transformation with NATO-membership in 1999, thus firmly establishing the young republic as a voluntary member of an international security community.

Looking at Poland-EU relations specifically, however, the decisive events and actors of the 1990s and early 2000s are more clearly discernible. Notwithstanding the first tentative contacts between Poland and the EU already in 1988 and 1989, Poland entered the 1990s with the status of most favored nation in its relations with the EU alongside Hungary and what was then still Czechoslovakia. In effect, some crucial steps toward supranational integration were being taken already at the time when Sweden and the EU were in the beginning stages of fourth enlargement. In the initial stages of the fifth enlargement process, however, the new Polish republic was working hard to find its internal democratic form in conjunction with signing treaties with the EU. In December of 1991, Poland signed its Europe Agreement with the EU, which went into full effect in early 1994 and thereby opened the political road to EU membership.

It could be argued that the Polish EU debate was colored by the need for speed. The Polish government found itself in the middle of a political dialogue with the EU Commission even before the first national elections were held in 1991. Up to 1994, this dialogue was interrupted partly by Poland’s internal formative process, not least the economic shock therapy of the Balcerowicz plan and partly by the EU Commission’s own efforts to stabilize the Single Market and to manage the fourth enlargement process. The Europe Agreement was only an interim solution and there were several problems with trade harmonization in steel, textiles, chemicals and agriculture. However, the political dialogue was never halted and the development of the

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8 Davies (2001), pp. 425-426
9 Here, as elsewhere in the dissertation, reference is made to the European Union (EU) regardless of whether the institutions of the European Community (-ies) prior to 1993 or to the new institutions after 1993 are intended. Poland thus made its first contacts, as a member of the CMEA, with the Commission of the EC. To simplify the rendition, all EU and former EC institutions are referred to as the EU. See also the notes in chapter 3 above.
11 “Article I of each of the Europe Agreements says that the aim of the Agreement is ‘to provide an appropriate framework for [the associated state’s] gradual integration into the Community’. No deadline is set. The associated state is required to ensure that future legislation is compatible with Community legislation as the major condition for integration into the Community. Complete free trade is to be established over a 10-year period.” Bainbridge (2001), pp. 167-168.
12 Ibid.
14 Ibid., pp. 49-90; Avery & Cameron (1999), pp. 44-92, 101-139.
The Europe Agreement was not directly related to a political dialogue about EU membership. It was more of a confirmation of the interim relationship between Poland and the EU and as such it dealt with functional aspects of trade and harmonization, stipulating that free trade should be established within a period of ten years. In the three years between 1993 and 1996, however, a series of events turned the dialogue between Poland and the EU Commission into a structured dialogue and a pre-accession strategy. The EU Copenhagen summit in 1993 also put the dialogue with Poland in a new context. Poland and the other applicant countries from Eastern Europe now received a concrete list of membership criteria, involving among other things monitoring by the EU Commission and a listing of which measures Poland had to take to be able to meet the demands of the Acquis Communautaire. The importance of the Copenhagen process can hardly be overstated.

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16 Other important actors in the process were NATO, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. See also Bainbridge (2001); Baun (2000), pp. 199-226.
17 Pologne, Hongrie, Assistance à la Réstructuration Economique (PHARE) is a program for channeling direct foreign aid headed by the European Commission. It went into effect in 1990, and was also expanded to cover aid to Bulgaria, Eastern Germany, the Czech and Slovak republics, Bosnia-Hercegovina, Macedonia, the Baltic states, Albania, Slovenia and Romania. PHARE is an important element in the Pre-Accession process for the applicant countries, focused upon strengthening and development in the areas of economic restructuring and privatization, aid to Small and Medium –sized firms, aid to the services sector, the development of taxes, banking and insurance and welfare systems. Part of the project is also aimed at the development of trade union organizations and independent media. For the period 2000-2006, the program has an annual budget comprising of 1.560 million Euros. See Bainbridge (2001), pp. 393-394.
18 Preston (1997); Avery & Cameron (1999); Baun (2000); Sachs (1994).
19 Bainbridge (2001), pp.463-464
20 The Copenhagen criteria have been largely discussed and referred to in the enlargement debate throughout the 1990s and well into the new millennium. For the sake of clarity, the actual wording of the European Council shall be referred to here. The criteria are “stability institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities;...a functioning market economy, as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union; [and] the ability to take on the obligations of membership, including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union. Ibid., p.93.
The Polish government handed in its formal application for EU-membership in early April 1994. In 1995 the EU Commission produced both an Opinion on Poland as an applicant country and a White Paper concerning how the Eastern applicant countries should prepare for the Single Market.\(^{21}\) In the three years between 1993 and 1996 the interim relationship between Poland and the EU, signified by long-term thinking and uncertainty for Poland, was substituted for negotiations for full EU membership.

The Polish debate on EU membership is marked by the speed and frenzy of political change in the country. Political reform and elite cooperation with the EU Commission looms in the background. The sheer scope of geopolitical and democratic change by and large determines the EU debate, and it has been argued by some analysts that the beginning of membership negotiations in 1997 is a divider.\(^{22}\) Before 1997, the public debate is signified by consensus between national elites and the majority of citizens in Poland. The time, as it has been aptly put, had come to ‘rejoin Europe’.\(^{23}\) This sentiment is mixed with a similarly widespread sense of need for economic and political reform. During the period 1989-1997, arguments in the public debate are best described as a mixture of economic, democratic and security related issues, which lasts even after membership negotiations have started.\(^{24}\) Having set out as a country looking for a completely new role and position in the world, Poland is ready to do whatever it takes to succeed. In the debate, for example, favorable arguments about the EU are mingled with a positive view of the NATO security community.\(^{25}\) It could be argued that the confusion over issues in the Polish debate at this time hides the nuts and bolts of European integration from the public eye. Anything and everything to do with economic, democratic and geopolitical change toward EU-15 and NATO are favorably encountered in the public debate.\(^{26}\)

\(^{21}\) The Commission listed a total of "899 measures in 23 sectors" that were needed before the applicant countries could be seriously considered as membership candidates. Ibid.


\(^{24}\) Rojek (2003), Ibid.

\(^{25}\) Poland joins NATO in 1999. For a discussion of the national and international discussion leading up to this event, see Dutkiewicz, Piotr & Jackson, Robert (eds.) (1998) NATO Looks East. London: Praeger.

\(^{26}\) Stadtmüller (2002), p.41. She talks about a steady 80% popular support for reforms in Poland in the early 1990s.
There is a particular type of argument in the public discussion that ties the optimism of the early period together with the burgeoning skepticism of later to current days in Poland. Typically, religious and historical arguments come to the fore.  

Throughout the Polish membership debate, important political arguments about a return to Europe are built on the cultural role of the Catholic Church in the country. There is no doubt about the strength of Polish religious convictions and the church also reminds the Poles that it was a source of resistance to Soviet dominance in the Postwar era. Adding to this westward drift in Polish cultural self-perception are also notions of historical grandeur. The Polish people is depicted as inhabitants of an Eastern outpost of European Christianity, and in the EU debate such arguments are forwarded as important reasons for why it is natural for Poland to ‘rejoin Europe’. However, this particular line of argumentation does not elucidate or even bring attention to any of the issues that emanate from Poland’s participation in the process of supranational integration in Europe. To the broad public in the country, the arguments and reasons for European integration are partly blurred by the recourse to cultural and historical arguments in the Polish debate of the 1990s.

Although it is hard to say exactly when it happens, it is clear that the mostly enthusiastic, pro-EU debate of the early years changes into a more skeptical, even anti-EU discussion as membership negotiations begin in the late 1990s. Particularly those religious and historical notions that were used in arguments for European integration in previous years are now turned around to support the notion that Poland must be independent from supranational institutions. On the brink of membership in 2003, the Polish debate has evolved into a more mainstream European format. There is an obvious cleavage between enthusiasts and skeptics in the debate. Furthermore, the discussion is now built up around concrete issues related to the integration process. For example, real issues to do with the relative political influence of the Polish government in EU institutions and its relationship with economic and legal reform in Poland are frequently discussed.

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30 Rojek (2003), passim.

31 Nalewajko (2003), Ibid. Stadtmüller (2002), pp. 40-42. Stadtmüller concludes that although there have been other arguments than enthusiasm and skepticism presented in the Polish EU debate, there will be increasing polarization in the near future since the process of EU adaptation is likely to produce viable economic results for Poland only in the long term.
In sum, the Polish membership debate is signified by a major break in the mid-1990s. The initial sense of urgency among Poles to ‘rejoin Europe’, and to embrace all things Western, is substituted for increasing skepticism toward Brussels. Concrete economic, legal and political issues come to the fore in the debate as the importance of religious, cultural and historical arguments are reduced in the public discussion about European integration.

4.2 An Outline of the UKIE Organization

When the Polish government established its Committee for European Integration (UKIE) in 1996, they did so for at least two reasons. As has been mentioned above, the first and most obvious reason was the both the Polish government and the EU Commission interpreted its experiences from the early pre-accession process in the same way. To both sides it seemed clear that the Polish government was in great need of policy coordination. Although the Polish progress towards more advanced and democratic national governance had been rapid in the first half of the 1990s, much work remained to be done before Poland could be seriously considered as ready for membership in accordance with the rules of the Acquis, the Copenhagen Criteria and the new Pillar Structure of the Amsterdam Treaty. It can also be argued that the other important reason was that Poland had chosen a gradual approach already in 1994 concerning the alignment of its national legal framework with that of the EU. A gradual approach to legal integration, the same as in the case of Sweden in the fourth enlargement process, in itself increased the need for coordination between different branches of national government. Not only was the Polish government tasked with a vertical coordination challenge, i.e. with the adaptation of old law and the integration of new EU law within different ministerial, or policy, areas. The Polish government also faced a horizontal challenge, one involving how to strike balances between different policy areas and how to make political priorities.

It has already been observed that there is no EU law or regulation which spells out exactly how applicant states should organize their vertical and horizontal coordination efforts in the EU enlargement process. This

32 The alternative, which was also discussed in Poland in 1993 and 1994, was to simply replace already existing Polish law with EU law. This alternative never gained enough political support in Poland, however, and the gradual approach won in favor. See Preston (1997); Marescau (1997).

33 In the Polish case, this poses a particular problem since there is little or no printed material available concerning the organizational principles of the organization. In the interviews, the respondents were therefore asked about their views of the organization as such in an effort to fill the gaps concerning organizational traits. Two separate interviews, a total time of 4 hours, were also wholly consecrated to a discussion about the character and function of the UKIE organization. In most of the interviews organizational aspects were also touched upon (Polish case interviews 1, 2, 3, 5, 10, 15, 20).
observation is important also in the Polish case, since the strategy of the Polish government was to secure the road to EU membership not only by political means but also to create a national legal basis for the effort. In 1996, the Polish parliament (the Sejm) voted in favor of a law establishing the UKIE as the “…supreme governmental administration body competent for programming and coordination of policy relating to Poland’s integration with the European Union…” As such, the UKIE was given statutory powers resting on law and a parliamentary decision. The governmental act provided the UKIE with the formal political power to program and coordinate integration measures nationally. Indeed, by the law of August 8 1996, the statutory power of the UKIE also included “programming and coordination of Poland’s actions adjusting Poland to European standards as well as for coordination of state administration actions in the field of foreign assistance obtained.”

Thereby the UKIE was given responsibility for all work that had been done under the Europe Agreement as well as ongoing projects belonging to that part of the process, such as the previously mentioned PHARE program. Importantly, however, it was assigned a new and powerful role in Polish politics at precisely the time when horizontal and vertical coordination was deemed most necessary for Poland to be able to go forward in its approach to the EU. The UKIE started its work in the fall of 1996 and quickly established itself as the real political center of Polish adaptation to the EU.

Figure 4: The Polish government’s organization for adaptation to the EU (UKIE).
The UKIE was thus established already in 1996 and, because it was institutionalized by national law in Poland, continued to exist after membership was achieved in May 2004. The first documentation of its work that is made available to the broad public comes in the form of the “National Strategy for Integration” in 1997 which is immediately followed by the first Regular Report in 1998. To these particular texts, this chapter will return below. At this point, however, it is probably safe to speculate that the UKIE was still being established and trying to find its format in 1996-97. Basically, the Polish government and its civil servants were coming out of the early stages of Poland-EU relations. The Europe Agreement is now in effect, but both sides want to take things further towards membership negotiations for Poland. To be able to move forward, the Polish government has to prove itself in two important ways. One is to coordinate its pre-accession strategy efficiently, i.e. to effectively monitor and control what is being done in Poland to adapt the country to EU rules and demands. The second is to alleviate the political pressure by creating efficient short cuts between government officials, negotiating teams and interest groups in Polish society. To face this dual challenge and to move its EU-relations forward the Polish government, backed by national parliament, created the Committee of European Integration and its office, which is analyzed here as the UKIE. Formally, the organization’s structure and competence has remained unchanged since the beginning. However, it is uncertain what the division of power has been internally, and what the relationship to other political bodies has been, for example, to the Sejm.

Looking first at the organization in terms of its structural composition and as indicated in Figure 4, the Committee for European Integration, the Preparatory Team and the Committee Office are the chief programming and coordinating units for Polish adaptation to the EU. The Prime Minister of the Polish government chairs the Committee and supervises the control and division of labor of the whole organization. The Minister for Foreign Affairs serves as permanent secretary of the Committee, which has a total number of

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37 Information about the current composition of the organization is available on the Internet at www.ukie.gov.pl; A fishbone structure, such as Figure 4, is to the best of this author’s knowledge not available anywhere, nor has one ever been published before. The illustration here is based in part on the information available in open sources, but more specifically on data from interviews. In some cases, respondents would kindly sketch figures and outlines by hand that are also important sources to the information in Figure 4.
14 members. Importantly, the political role of the commission and its office is governed by a separate law. According to the 1996 law that sets out the organizational guidelines for the Committee, individual membership should overlap with membership in other branches of the Polish government. For example, the Prime Minister is the chairperson by default. Concerning the other positions in the Committee, however, they should be “…ministers competent for: foreign affairs, interior and administration, economy, finance, environment, labor and social policy, agriculture and rural development, and justice.”

This gives the Committee the characteristics of a separate cabinet, which involves representatives from ten of the Polish ministries. Since 1989, the total number of ministries has varied between 15 and 25, and under those three Premiers that guided Poland into the EU (Cimoszewicz, Buzek and Miller) the number of departmental ministries has diminished from 18 to 15. It is noteworthy that, for example, those five ministers left out of the Committee under Prime Minister Miller’s government still have a position which in Figure 4 is referred to as the Prime Minister’s Office. Nevertheless, the Prime Minister’s Office lies at the top of the organization, and through this office all ministers in the Polish government are guaranteed insight into the negotiations.

The statutory competence of the Committee is to a large extent reinforced through functions. Its political role is guided by influence from a number of departmental ministries that work with issues directly related to EU accession. Thus, in areas such as national defense for example, the Committee does not play a direct role in policy making. Legally, the Committee must consist of senior ministers from those ten ministries that have already been mentioned above. This means that only 10 out of a total of 15-18 senior ministers are given the role of separate cabinet members in Poland’s adaptation to the EU.

The UKIE organization also has two wings. These are the Polish Foreign Ministry and chief negotiating team on the one hand and the Council of Ministers with adjuncts by choice on the other. The Foreign Ministry and its offices in other countries lead the process of bringing Polish and other national interests together for negotiation. The chief negotiating team can consist of different representatives depending upon the task at hand and is

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39 Ibid.
40 Ibid. p. 154.
41 Concerning the usage here, it should be noted that the terms ‘Cabinet’ and ‘Council of ministers’ as applied in Figure 4 do not denote the same thing as in the Polish Constitution. In Polish constitutional law ‘Council of Ministers’ refers to what is called ‘Prime Minister’s Office’ in Figure 4, that is the Polish government including all senior ministers. See Sanford (2002), pp. 151-155.
put together on a need-to basis. Importantly, the team is always headed by the Prime Minister and the Minister for Foreign Affairs, unless the Minister for Foreign Affairs is replaced by another senior minister from the Polish government. This is a practical working unit, guided in its activities by different needs and pressures arising from ongoing negotiations with the EU or with other national governments. This wing of the UKIE organization is the last post at which all information pertaining to the Polish negotiation positions is received from the other parts of the organization. Thus, depending upon which issues are to be negotiated, the chief negotiating team can be headed by the Prime Minister and either of his other deputy ministers in the Polish government. Over the years, most departmental ministers in the Polish government have been involved in the Chief Negotiating team at one point or other as deputies replacing the Minister for Foreign Affairs.\(^{42}\)

Overlapping positions is an organizational characteristic of the UKIE organization. This seems to be particularly true with regards to the Chief negotiating team. Since ministers and deputy ministers can be called in temporarily, or rather for specific rounds of negotiation with the EU, the ministries can influence the practical side of the negotiation process directly. It is possible for a minister who is not one of the eight permanent members of the Committee for European Integration, or his deputy, to participate in the negotiations with the EU. Since both the Committee and the Committee Office are the chief programming and coordinating units and are equipped with statutory rights that supersede those of other ministries in EU affairs, it is difficult to judge just to what extent the overlapping personal positions of ministers and deputies are important in influencing Polish negotiation positions.

The Chief negotiating team, it should be noted, does not have a legal mandate in the same way as the Committee and the Committee Office do in this organization. Rather, it is an organizational wing that grows out of practical need, i.e. over time those ministers or deputies tasked with a certain negotiation chapter will replace those that negotiated another chapter before them. There is no information available concerning how regularly the ministries outside of the permanent ten with seats in the Committee are brought in. However, as noted above, participation in the chief negotiating team has been open to adjunct ministers and also to deputies from other parts of the organization.

The Council of Ministers is another example of a non-statutory part of the organization but which is also characterized by overlapping personal positions. The Council of Ministers is actually a meeting of all ministers in the Polish government, i.e. a top governmental council meeting. Again, the Prime Minister and his Deputy (ordinarily the Minister for Foreign Affairs)

\(^{42}\) Polish case interview 20.
are the mandatory chairpersons of this organizational wing. In this part of the organization, the Prime Minister and his Deputy can coordinate issues with other members of the Polish government. The wing is strictly intended for the ministerial level of Polish government, but since it is non-statutory, there are no rules of exclusion from these meetings. Minutes and protocols from these meetings are not public. Therefore, it is not possible to know whether the Council of Ministers would invite other representatives of Polish government, such as government agencies or the like to meetings. By the same token, there is no information available concerning participation by organized social interests, such as industry, education, the media or trade unions. Similarly, to what extent political parties or other representatives of parliamentary government in Poland have had access to this wing of the UKIE organization remains unknown.

Whereas the 1996 law is clear about the pivotal coordinating role of the Committee and the Committee Office, it is much less so concerning what its rights and obligations are in terms of consultation with other branches of Polish government. Possibly, the Council of Ministers is another organizational wing growing out of practical necessity. It would seem reasonable to assume that the core ten ministers of the Committee need to consult with other ministers, deputies and representatives of agencies and organized social interests somewhere. It is equally probable that the government sees a practical need for a forum in which the government can discuss sensitive issues pertaining to EU-accession with other parts of the central government apparatus, such as parliament and the presidency. There is information in the interview material which suggests that the Council of Ministers would sometimes be “a hundred strong” in their meetings, indicating that the meetings were popular and well-attended.43

The Committee Office is particularly noteworthy for the role and function of the UKIE organization as a whole. In terms of coordination and information flows, it is the nerve center of the whole organization. Not only does it serve as a direct organizational link between the top wings and the Ministries and Sectoral Offices, but it also plays the role of a functional shadow to the top and bottom levels of the organization. The Committee Office is headed by a Director and his staff. In itself, the Office is divided into 15 internal departments, ranging from Human Resources to Law or Economic and Social Analyses.44 Regardless of its internal organization, the Office is tasked with information regarding all of the 29 negotiation chapters of the Acquis.45

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43 Polish case interview 10.
44 Information available at www1.ukie.gov.pl (last checked in February 2005).
45 The Polish Position Papers on the 29 chapters, as they were formulated at the beginning of membership negotiations in 1997, are available in English at www.negociacje.gov.pl (last checked in February 2005).
Finding this information and trying to work out the basis for Polish positions, the Office can draw on any expertise available in the Ministries and Sectoral Offices that it sees fit. As far as is known, the Office never keeps a staff of its own which is big enough to cover all the areas stipulated in the negotiation chapters. Rather, the Office divides up and passes on different informational tasks to other branches of Polish government. The Office’s own role in the organization is both to identify information needs and to collect, sift through and prepare the material for further deliberation in the Preparatory Team. In other words, the Committee Office is noteworthy because it plays the pivotal coordinating role in the UKIE organization, both in terms of sifting the information relevant to ongoing negotiations with the EU and in that it leads and coordinates the work of departmental ministries and agencies.

As depicted in Figure 4, the lower part of the organization is made up by Ministries and Sectoral Offices. Concerning this part of the organization, there is a lack of information about who was involved in the work on relevant negotiation chapters. It is clear that Ministries and Sectoral Offices are at liberty to link up with non-governmental organizations and agencies within their own field. There is evidence that such linkages are made while the membership negotiations are taking place, and that Ministries and Sectoral Offices are free to choose whom they want to work with. A concrete example of this is the negotiation chapter in the Acquis on environmental issues, which falls under the Polish Ministry for Environment. Information and opinions are exchanged with Polish NGO:s during the negotiations, and at different points in time, consultation also takes place with the environmental ministries of different EU-15 governments, for example the Swedish Ministry for Environment. At least one other ministry (Transport and Infrastructure) goes about its work in a similar way, exchanging information and consulting with both Polish and foreign, both governmental and non-governmental agencies. However, there is no information available concerning the longevity of such linkages. To the extent that there have been working groups, temporary or more permanent, below the level of Ministries and Sectoral offices, no public information about such arrangements has been produced or disseminated in Poland.

46 Polish case interview 15.
47 In Figure 4, there is an area shadowed grey behind the box for the Committee Office, which is intended as a symbol of the resources taken from Ministries and Sectoral offices regarding the 29 negotiation chapters of the Acquis.
48 Polish case interview 15.
49 Polish case interview 2. In Figure 4, again the shadowed grey area depicts specialized resources committed to the chapters of the Acquis, possibly numbering up to 29 but with no reliable information to support the actual number.
50 Polish case interview 2.
51 Polish case interview 1.
4.3 The Self-Image of UKIE

Some respondents are willing to go deeper into talking about their experiences from working inside the UKIE.\(^{52}\) Considering the lack of an established organizational chart, it might have been expected that the individual members of UKIE would be confused about the working principles of the organization. The Polish respondents nevertheless believe that they have a good understanding of who does what to whom and why in the UKIE. However, for the most part they wish to play down their own, individual roles and are more interested in talking about the organization as a whole. With few exceptions, the members of UKIE are proud to have taken part in the process that brings Poland inside the EU.\(^{53}\)

There is also a notion among the interviewees that the UKIE:s political role has changed over time. They point out that a major change in the role and function of UKIE came into effect in 2001. Prior to the Polish general elections of 2001, activities were in the main aimed at trying to establish benchmarks for democratic governance in the country. Prior to the Polish elections of 2001, the UKIE had a role more closely linked to ministries and central government as the chief body for coordination and negotiation with the EU Commission and EU-15 member governments. The respondent cited below thinks that UKIE almost constituted a ministry then, but that the political change in 2001 and the consequent change of seats in Polish parliament and government somehow reduced its influence over Polish adaptation to the EU:

> With new elite groups in government, there are always changes all over. (…) An organizational weakness built into the UKIE is that all ministries and the Sejm have had parallel departments and commissions monitoring the process and building up their own knowledge and agendas. Organizationally, multiple centers were created early on. The Commission of the Sejm, for example, is important since it works separately and always tries to speed things up for the making of law. (…) The initiative that created UKIE in 1996 came from the EU, and that served to put ministers of foreign affairs on top. They wanted the same organization in all applicant countries. But then I think we have the same problem in all administration here. We are still learning how to be democratic, but there is a very bad spread of information horizontally and vertically in our system. Sometimes there are double orders for information…UKIE was the first and the biggest, but now they are mostly working on statistical reports for everything Poland does.” \(^{(1)}\)

52 Polish case interviews 1,3,5,10,15 and 17.
53 There is only one respondent who is outright critical of the organization, among other things mentioning that it is a place where you are in danger of becoming “politically incorrect” if you speak your mind, and that some of the activities have been “harmful” to Polish interests. These remarks do not make reference to the adaptation process as such, however, but have their edge aimed at the EU and Brussels. Polish case interview 17.
This interviewee is also taking a critical view of the organization. The idea is that there are some general problems in the workings of Polish government that the UKIE cannot solve. On the other hand, UKIE is not seen as having played a new or different role in the political system either. In effect, this interviewee is making reference to how the UKIE had a sort of golden era of power and influence after its legal institution in 1996. The ideological shift from liberalist reformism to social democracy in the Polish parliamentary elections of 2001 is also perceived as a shift in the UKIE. More precisely, its role changed partly because the membership negotiations were stepped up in 2001-02 and this made the membership issue more of an issue for direct communication between the Polish Foreign Ministry, the Prime Ministers Office and the Polish Parliament.

Regarding the possible power position of UKIE in Polish central government, there are different views expressed in the interview material. For example, the current role and situation of the EU representation office in Warsaw is discussed by one respondent as saying something important about the political role of UKIE:

It [the Representation office] gets no attention from anybody, regardless of whether it is nationally or transnationally. Brussels was really poorly prepared for accession…I have colleagues in other accession countries and they all feel the same way I do. Obviously, it is the UKIE that appoints people even to this [EU] office in Poland. Anything and everything goes via the UKIE, but I don’t know what is going on or why. (…) Who is responsible for what? How is this established? I never get information about anything! (…) How does this work in Sweden? I would like to know, because I am getting worried that it is the same way everywhere in the EU… (5)

A dual image of UKIE emerges from the interviews. In contrast with the previously quoted respondent, the later one argues that it is still is a powerful organization when it comes to how EU issues are handled in Warsaw and Poland. The argument is that UKIE is an important institution in Polish EU affairs because the officials there hold sway over the appointment of experts and other officials working with EU-related matters. The other view of the organization is that it used to be powerful as a center for knowledge about European integration issues in the early days of Polish accession, vested with political power over who gets what, when and how in EU-related affairs in Warsaw, but that of late the organization has more or less deteriorated into a unit for information-gathering and administrative support.

However, these views are not necessarily contradictory. They might rather refer to different aspects of UKIE and, in a wider sense, to interdepartmental relations in the Polish central government. The reference to UKIE:s local
function in the national capital might say less about overall institutional power of the organization, and more about how it works as a recruitment center for higher officials in the field of EU affairs. This does not contradict statements about a relative decline in the organization’s status vis-à-vis other government institutions. Thus, there are indications that the relative influence of UKIE has changed over time.

Concerning the external role of UKIE and its development over time, one respondent says:

I think that if you want to understand the development of UKIE, and of course some changes have taken place along the way, I think it has to do with the development of EU negotiations. This really is what determines the task. You could say that something happened around the year 2000 because that was when we realized that accession had two faces... there was the EU Strategy paper that came out in 2000 that changed things. Before that it was all exchange of papers and exchange of views... now, questions, questions, questions! Suddenly everything was about proof and statistics, so we had to change our work. (...) Do you know the expression Strange Negotiations? That is what we called it. It is a reference to 1939 and what we then called the Strange War... from 2000 on we had Strange Negotiations. (15)

This interviewee points to the logic of membership negotiations with the EU and says that the internal changes and politics of the accession process itself led to changes in how UKIE had to work. Changes in government and politics in Poland are seen as important since “they [are] in any country, at least for individual officials”. Looking at the organization as such, however, this official thinks that ROFE has been more or less a task-force from the very beginning of its activities in 1996-97. The pre-accession process went rather smoothly for Poland, but the real difficulties began with the actual membership negotiations and the pressure on UKIE continued to grow in 2002 and 2003.

I have a very specific view of how things went and where the problems in accession have occurred. Let us look at the Copenhagen criteria so that you see what I mean. First, politically, there was never any trouble for Poland. We would have introduced the democratic change anyway. Second, the ability to withstand competition, well, we like to compete. Why shouldn’t we? Third, the function of the market economy is a main national objective anyway. Four, the social acquis, well... it is not that well developed by the EU anyway. Now, five, to be ready to take on the challenges of the acquis, here it gets interesting. (...). Thousands and thousands of pages, 29 chapters, and in the end we get to spend 35 million Euros over ten years for non-productive environmental technology. (...) Bill Gates gives more to charity than the EU gives to Polish regions. (...) We would have taken growth first, but we got an OK
transition period. Everything is a trade-off in politics. But you know what, it has been a huge job and we have done it pretty well, I think! (15)

There is an ensuing discussion about promoting the Polish national interest in Europe. In UKIE, most respondents think, work was guided by an intense feeling of trying to achieve the best results possible for the country. There is also a widespread feeling of participation in reform and helping out with important transformations in the country. Catchwords like 'The New Europe' and 'Democratization' really mean something for members of UKIE and motivate them in their performance. Another sense is that the EU has been, and still is, very demanding. In the adaptation process it falls upon UKIE to deliver proof of the viability of political and economic change in the country. This explains why UKIE transforms its routines in the process. According to the interviewees, this has less to do with political changes in Poland and more to do with the EU Commission stepping up its demands for information. Organizational flexibility, the respondents think, is an important principle in the face of uncertainty and it is one of the reasons why nobody has bothered to draw up an organigram for UKIE.

This view is supported by statements from a respondent who emphasizes that UKIE has had a big advantage in always being staffed with “good people with good ideas”. (10) This official confirms the notion that working for the UKIE is an important career step in Poland. It means that you are a fairly young person with academic credentials, a good CV and above all good foreign language skills. In this official’s view, the particular grouping of people with its combination of skills and personal attributes might have bred negative sentiments among people in general in Poland, possibly even anger and envy. On the other hand, this respondent points out that wages are not that high in Polish government that the real benefit of working for UKIE is visible only in peoples’ CV:s. The organization has kept a low profile:

My own feeling is that UKIE has been relatively independent. The longer the time has gone by, the more we have come to resemble a social research unit. Don’t get me wrong, we are a political structure. But nobody interferes that much if we deliver the goods, like, parliament gets a report once or twice per year and we continually update the government. (…) It is a little bit like if somebody really wants to know, he will come to us. It is not a bad position to be in. (10)

Also, according to this respondent, the word flexibility is an important key to understanding the organization:
Whenever challenges came up in the negotiations, we sat down and asked ourselves who can do this? Internally, we call it the Deer Hunt (...) Somehow, we’ve had strength in our knowledge. Why should we want to formalize that? (...) You can find us somewhere in between the Government and the Committee for European Integration…far away from the Parliament.\textsuperscript{54} It is probably good that we have been informal, more like a task-force, if you ask me. (...) It is also true that the character of the accession process has changed. This of course changed us. (10)

Opinions are divided on the political role and nature of the organization among the members of UKIE. Those who enter into a discussion about the organization as such and its relationship with the surrounding world nevertheless seem to agree that UKIE has been pivotal to the Polish efforts in the EU accession process. It is noteworthy that the organization and many of its officials remain in office after EU membership is achieved. Two important components in the self-image of UKIE are being a neutral part of Polish government on the one hand, and the sense of working for the good of the whole country on the other. This self-image grows stronger towards the end of the adaptation process, as the EU Commission puts pressure on the Polish government for quicker and more encompassing information processing.

4.4 Image-Building by a Neutral Task Force

As mentioned before, the Polish government made integration with the EU an integral part of the general restructuring and modernization of Poland during the 1990s. Immediately after the UKIE was established in 1997, the UKIE produced a document mapping its view of the state of affairs between Poland and the EU.\textsuperscript{55} The ideas and perspectives that are outlined in this document clearly spell out the strategic view of European integration while linking it to the organizational problems and possibilities that the Polish government could see in the accession process. The \textit{National Strategy for Integration} (hereafter NSI), as the document is called, is a forerunner to the so called “Regular Reports” that the UKIE then starts to publish yearly between 1998 and 2002. With its 55 pages for the English version, it is not a long document, but it gives some vital historical information concerning the two points of interest in this chapter; organizational and strategic aspects of the UKIE. It takes stock of the pre-accession process, maps the short- and medium term problems and stipulates the institutional rules of the accession game, as seen through the eyes of the Polish government:

\textsuperscript{54} This statement can be compared with Figure 4.
\textsuperscript{55} The document in its entirety is available in English on \url{http://www.ukie.gov.pl/eng.nsf/docs} (the version used here was downloaded in December 2002).
The National Strategy for Integration (NSI) outlines strategic directions of action. They constitute the directives for the work of Government ministries and agencies as well as being a road sign for all other participants in the process of integration. NSI, expressing the intentions of the Government, is designed to define the main aims of integration and to co-ordinate their implementation by the Government and a wide range of non-governmental organizations in a way that will ensure Poland’s best preparation for membership in the EU. The National Strategy for Integration is a Government document drawn up by the Office of the Committee for European Integration carrying out the Resolution of the Parliament of the Polish Republic of March 14th, 1996.  

In organizational terms, the NSI describes those actors and levels which are depicted in Figure 4 above. It mentions that regional and local authorities, central offices and Polish diplomatic missions in the EU-member countries “are charged with the implementation of the NSI”. The document also describes how the Polish parliament is an important actor in that it faces two major tasks related to integration. One is that the Sejm will have to pass a vast number of new laws or make addenda to already existing ones within the Polish legal framework. The other important task is to review the government’s work in order to make the members of parliament familiar with different issues and debates, so that membership ratification can be facilitated. The NSI also attributes an important role to the “consent and cooperation of the President of the Polish Republic and his Office”. The president, however, is mentioned specifically in his capacity as head of state. He is seen as a desirable promoter of Polish positions and interests abroad, in part also as monitoring the work of the government and the overall integration process. This implies that he is not expected to participate in working out the practical detail of the process.

Perhaps the most striking feature about the NSI from an organizational perspective is that it draws up clear boundaries between the “strategic”, “operational” and “working” levels of how the government makes preparations for Polish EU membership. The statutory rights of the UKIE are reiterated, since it is specifically tasked with the coordination of Polish integration strategy. Ministers and/or their deputies are then the ones charged with the task of making things happen, of initiating and monitoring work done inside their respective ministries. On the working level of the organization, each ministry is ordered to create its own integration

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57 Ibid., p.4
58 Ibid.
59 Ibid.
department. In other words, the NSI does not steer how each Polish ministry chooses to link up with other departments in their practical work. Working groups can be put together on an ad-hoc basis, should the heads of ministries (operational level) or indeed heads of integration departments inside each ministry (working level) choose to do so. The NSI thus makes the Committee for European Integration and the Committee Office the only genuinely inter-ministerial and inter-departmental units in the UKIE but, importantly, leaves the integration unit/task-force level of the organization open.

Over and above these two central UKIE units, the national strategy envisages a straightforward vertical organization, with ministers and deputy ministers on top. As concerns the operational and working levels of the organization, these are not specified neither in terms of organization nor tasks. Indeed, the NSI stipulates that all good forces in Polish society, governmental as well as non-governmental, are expected to share in the work and to receive relevant information about the ongoing process. A whole chapter of the NSI is dedicated to information issues. The Polish government clearly states that the Polish electorate needs to know more about the process of European integration, about its origins, goals, problems and possibilities. Nevertheless, a certain element of vertical thinking can be detected also in these parts, aimed as they are at “Extensive education – information – promotion activities.”

The half-century-long division of Europe operated on the consciousness of both sides and led to a deformed concept of societies living under different systems. These misconceptions stemmed from the inability to verify the reality through mutual contacts. Therefore, the information activities will simultaneously be directed towards the shaping in the minds of Poles of a positive image of a united Europe and the creation of a positive picture of Poland amongst our European neighbours. (Ibid. p.49)

In concrete terms, the Polish government stipulates that public learning is one of the most important aims for UKIE. Therefore the government also suggests that a permanent working group be set up to this effect. The envisaged group should consist of “specialists from those State administrative organs which are particularly involved in the information activities as well as specialists appointed by the interested non-governmental organisations.” By specialists, the government also means researchers and analysts. Interestingly, this is the only permanent working group stipulated in the NSI. The Polish government says that it is aware of the exceedingly high level of social

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60 Ibid., pp.47-50
61 Ibid., p.47
62 Ibid., p. 48
acceptance of what it has done in EU-Poland relations thus far. Again, this is in 1997 and public polls indicate that up to 75-80% of the Polish electorate are still in favor of EU membership. At this time, the people in general think that the government is doing a good job. Nevertheless, as it is leaving the early stages of the pre-accession process and entering the phase of concrete membership negotiations, the Polish government feels that it must have a coherent information strategy concerning its European affairs. Thus, a working group for public information is created within the framework of UKIE.

Why this emphasis on public information? Basically, the Polish government is saying that for all its potential setbacks, the cooperation process with the EU is going well and is heading in the right direction. However, there is also the belief that as political, legal and economic adaptation rolls on public opinion might become more negative. This will happen unless the UKIE somehow manages to “translate the prospects of membership in the Union into the interests of groups and individuals.”

Actually, the NSI puts a lot of stock in the psychological aspect of integration and quite clearly spells out that the Polish mentality, not the nuts and bolts of negotiation, is the hardest political nut to crack for the government. On the one hand, the NSI states that variables such as an increasing awareness of the EU, of its institutions, costs and benefits, probably speak in favor of positive sentiments among the electorate in the long-term. On the other hand, learning is envisaged as a slow process by the NSI document, and a number of variables speak against positive attitudes in the short- and medium-term. For example, it is mentioned that overall knowledge of the EU is still limited in Polish society. Furthermore, regional development effects may divide the electorate as may emergent cleavages between professional groups in Polish society. In the NSI, the Polish government goes so far as to talk about how the positive public attitude rests on “a shallow consensus which may waver under political conditions less stable than the current ones;.... social expectations concerning polish membership in the structures of the EU are still idealised.”

The way the NSI emphasizes public information to a large extent makes it sound like public education. Nevertheless, the Polish government goes one step further in the NSI. The permanent UKIE working group on information EU information is tasked with the dissemination of information to most actors and organizations in Polish society according to an action plan. Above all, the NSI foresees the need to coordinate and funnel information between the government and other agencies directly or indirectly involved in the adaptation process, such as

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63 Ibid.
64 Ibid.
as “government institutions, mass-media, political parties and non-
governmental organizations.” Of particular interest is that information
should also be aimed at particular target groups in Polish society. Young
people in general are targeted, but the NSI particularly points out the need to
disseminate information to the young in “small towns and rural areas.” The second strategic group is what in the NSI is called the opinion-forming
circles. This is said to equal the political elites of the country with no further qualification made concerning for instance regional or functional divisions within this elite group. A distinction is made between the political elite and two other elites, that are assumed to be vital to the formation of public opinion in Poland, namely “agricultural and business circles.” At least in this part, the NSI could be seen as a strategic threat assessment by the Polish
government concerning political groups and factions within Polish society.

Indeed, the NSI holds a summary of the chosen information strategy which gives a similar image of strategic threat perceptions. The UKIE working group on public information is expected to keep within the confines of the information strategy because, although this is not spelled out but merely hinted at, the political situation in Poland is volatile and also because the legitimacy of the membership negotiation process hinges on a favorable public perception.

First of all, the view of the government is that European integration has no intrinsic value for Poland. The expected political, social and economic changes emanating from the Polish adaptation to the legislation and practices of the EU are seen rather as something that would have to be done with or without the EU. The most important task that the Polish government has cut out for itself is to ensure the long-term freedom, stability and prosperity of the nation and, according to the NSI, the accession process should be seen as supportive of the transformation that Poland is already going through since 1989, not the other way around.

Second, the work with EU accession is a political undertaking aimed at the future. The NSI specifically warns that emotionally laden slogans and catch-phrases might be counterproductive if they evoke ideas and sentiments that relate to the historical experience of Poland, even concerning its recent history under communism. The government works for the future, building a new Poland in a new Europe, and explicitly does not want to become

65 Ibid., p.49
66 Ibid., p.48
67 The five distinct statements are: 1. Integration with the EU is good for Poland as a whole. 2. The slogan “Return to Europe” should at all times be avoided. 3. The shallow national consensus must be safeguarded. 4. The new geo-political situation must receive whole-hearted national support. 5. Poland is deeply stratified socially, economically and culturally. Ibid., p.49
entrenched in discussions of past grandeur or desolation. Third, the “shallow consensus” that exists in Poland concerning the desirability of joining the EU is regarded as a “huge capital asset”. But the NSI also admits that such an asset is frail and can disappear easily, turning popular and elite political support into opposition. Social costs are envisaged in the wake of current transformations, and the government wants to make all interested parties strategically aware of their suspicion that these social costs have as yet to be realized by the Polish people.

Popular and elite support must be “whole-hearted” for the process to be successfully completed, according to the NSI. This is why the fourth part of the strategy concerns the new geo-political situation for Poland. Even if integration with Western Europe is aimed at the future, the NSI sees a problem if not every Pole is able to comprehend and to be fully supportive of the new position of the country in European and world security. Fifth and last, the information strategy of the NSI brings up the problem of social stratification. Poland is seen as characterized by a lot of “anxieties and hopes” among its people, most of which are reinforced by social, economic and geographical stratification. The amount of readiness to embrace European integration differs widely between people from different parts of the Polish republic, from different economic strata and from different cultural and educational backgrounds.

The NSI document is divided into seven chapters, each representing a distinct policy area in which the Polish government thinks that relevant change is either ongoing or imminent. On the one hand, the document is an inventory of the specific political means and ends for accession to the EU. As such, it can be read as a list of perceived polish economic, social and political needs and shortcomings at the beginning of membership negotiations. But the document is also in large part a political statement about the strategic view of the Polish government. In addition, it serves as a political declaration of intent, in which the Polish government shares its views concerning the limits and possible setbacks of European integration.

It is noteworthy that the Polish government seems to mistrust the stereotypes and negative views of governments from other countries as well. A book aimed particularly at meeting this challenge is commissioned by UKIE in the midst of membership negotiations. See: Orlowski, Witold M. (2001) Entgegen allem Klischeeden. Die Erweiterung der Europäischen Union um Polen. Warschau: Amt des Komitees für Europäische Integration.

The first rubric concerns the “General Political Objectives” of the Polish government, which is followed by a lengthier section about the development and adaptation of Poland’s national economy, particularly to the four freedoms. Legislative adaptation also has a chapter of its own, followed by one chapter about Poland’s external relations and another chapter about “Justice and Home Affairs”. The two last chapters of the NSI deal on the one hand with educational needs and the development of human resources and on the other hand the information activities that the Polish government deem necessary vis-à-vis non-governmental organizations and the general public in Polish society.
The NSI says little about any perceived shortcomings of the pre-accession process, however, and more about how the integration elites in Warsaw look at their native country. Although the Polish government wishes to make it clear from the very first paragraph of the NSI that they see EU-membership as a natural extension of a thousand-year geographical, economic and cultural affinity between Poland and Western Europe, it also wants to draw a line.

This strategy stems from Poland’s interests of State. Our country wishes to take a place in Europe and the world which would ensure welfare and security for its citizens. In order to meet this goal, Poland’s membership in the EU is not just desirable and beneficial, but necessary. Remaining outside the EU would bring about the risk of Poland being marginalised with an overall lowering of security.\(^\text{70}\)

It seems that the Polish government somehow wants to combine enthusiasm with pragmatism in their approach. This is nowhere clearer than in the information strategy and the directives given to the UKIE concerning its work on public information. In this part, the NSI conjures up an image of a potentially deeply divided Poland. Scrape the surface and, the NSI seems to be saying, the shallow national consensus over both the desirability and the necessity of EU membership might quickly disappear. It is thus hinted that the consensus might even transform into its right opposite.

If the NSI is seen as a key to understanding UKIE, it appears that the organization is entering the pre-accession process with its eyes open. Moreover, individuals tied to the organization are encouraged to be aware of the special nature of the political task at hand. The document has a clear and open view concerning the fact that there are both costs and benefits involved for Poland and that the road to accession is not a straightforward one.

Particularly interesting is the strategic view that the pre-accession process might be threatened on two political fronts. The first and perhaps most obvious one, which also permeates those parts of the document that concern practical and functional measures in adaptation, is the EU itself. The NSI does not frame the EU as overly generous or benign. To the contrary, there is awareness inside UKIE of having entered a high-level, high-risk game in which nothing will be given for free. Success will come at a cost, and for the most part it is Poland that will have to bear the social, political and (albeit not immediate) economic costs of adaptation. Consequently, the UKIE is strategically aware of the possibility of failure from the very beginning and that the EU will judge its work not on its own merits but on EU merits.

The other perceived strategic front is perhaps even more interesting in this context. For, in effect the UKIE is saying that the country and the people, for which they are about to start negotiating EU membership, are not fully reliable. Put differently, the UKIE does not trust the “shallow” political consensus over EU-membership in Poland, nor does it trust in the favourable opinion of the peripheral areas or the less educated social strata of the country. To alleviate the perceived situation, the UKIE devises an information strategy which, given this strategic predisposition, is politically commendable. In the capacity of national center for pro-active integration work, however, the UKIE seems to consider also large parts of the Polish population as potential opponents to EU membership. The strategic view is that the UKIE will have to walk a fine line in order to succeed. Thus, the UKIE sets the stage for its pre-accession work in what can be seen as a SWOT-analysis of the situation in Poland prior to membership negotiations.

4.5 Facing Rokkanian Policy Choices

The UKIE continually reports on its work through a series of publications from the Office of the Commission for European Integration (OCEI). Although the NSI was the first of the OCEI publications, the first regular report emerges in 1998, covering the first two years of preparations and the first year of negotiations. In total, there are five yearly reports on the accession work in UKIE covering the years 1998-2003. The actual form of the reports differs slightly between the first one and the ensuing four. The report from 1998 follows the format that was outlined by the NSI in 1997. Actual membership negotiations begin on the last day of March in 1998, which makes this report slightly different in format from the rest. The reports from 1999 up to 2004 are more uniform. It is noteworthy that the all-encompassing information strategy is substituted for one in which particular accession chapters and specific areas of negotiation are given more attention. Also, the ambition to cover all legal detail and every single negotiation chapter is relaxed.

In the following, the focus is on those chapters in the Regular Reports that deal specifically with the policy areas relevant to this dissertation. As in the former Swedish case, this section seeks to answer questions about the Rokkanian integration categories. What are the strategic

71 The actual title of this and of its followers is: “Poland. Information for the European Commission’s Regular Report on the Progress Towards Accession to the European Union”. For the sake of simplicity they will be referred to as Regular Report 1-5 in the following text and in the list of references. Similar to the NSI, the reports are available to the interested reader on the web address: http://www.ukie.gov.pl/eng.nsf/docs. The report text material for this chapter was all printed out from this website partly in November-December 2002 and partly in January 2003.
observations made in the UKIE concerning Trade and Industry in Poland and what are the outlooks regarding Functional and Territorial Regionalism?

**Polish Trade and industry**

Starting with the NSI in 1997 and looking across the reports from UKIE 1998-2003, a strategic perspective runs through the material. This is the belief that Polish Trade and Industry will benefit from European integration in the long run. There is a distinct break in the report series, however, when the report from 2001 departs from the established pattern and begins to talk about the European market economy in terms of “globalization” rather than about the demands and opportunities of the EU market. In effect, the break is rather blatant when UKIE goes through the well-established lists of things to do to increase Poland’s “capacity to cope” with market integration: the work that is done in preparation for EU membership is just that, a preparation of the Polish economy as a whole. UKIE reports that the strategic perspective now needs to be “global” instead of European, and that whereas the adaptation to the Single Market of the EU has been a good learning process for Poland, it is now time to look beyond Europe for economic opportunities. UKIE also reports that the Polish parliament is considering a separate Bill of Investment Support to this end, and that it is important for Polish economic actors not to see the internal market of the EU as a limitation on what can be done to achieve more growth.

This change in view is perhaps not so much a break as a reiteration of the original stated goals of the NSI from back in 1997. As has been shown in the preceding section of this chapter, the Polish government clearly stated already at the outset that European integration is a means to an end. In terms of the manifest strategic view in the UKIE reports it is nevertheless a step away from the total focus upon EU rules and regulations that signifies the first three reports from 1998-2000.

Industrial policy guidelines approved by the government in 1993 have been implemented in consecutive programmes. Improvement of Poland’s industry competitiveness on international markets has been declared as the strategic goal of industrial policy for 1995-1997. A three-year period of the programme implementation has been assessed…

In the first three reports 1998-2000, adaptation to the rules of the EU dominates the material. The notion seems to be that the key to economic success, overall growth and thereby an equal success for Polish Trade and Industry

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72 It should be noted that the same sources are able to quote positive growth figures for the Polish economy for most of the period.
lies in the adaptation to and implementation of EU market rules. But the strategic focus on national benefits from the process is never completely lost to UKIE. Importantly, the process of adaptation to the market economic principles of the EU is dealt with in parallel with descriptions of how the Polish national economy is catching up with its Western counterparts in Europe.  

In keeping with the strategy set out in the NSI in 1997, emphasis is on the competitiveness of the Polish national economy. In the first two reports, from 1998 and 1999, the major stepping stone to a transition in the Polish economy is dealt with head-on: the heavy industry and the energy sector. Already in its 2000 report, however, UKIE has changed the whole disposition of the report. Beginning in 2000, the structure of the yearly reports follows that of the chapters in the Acquis and the restructuring of heavy industry and the energy sector in Poland are reduced to lesser parts in the reports. Overall, the UKIE reports provide us with an image of a Poland that is changing its economic self image over the span of just a few years. If the image given in the yearly UKIE reports is followed, it looks like the difficult transformation of the Polish heavy industry and energy sector become a thing of the past some time around the year 2000. In the later reports, the image is one of a regular country adapting to the specifics and minute details of the Acquis, no more, no less. In other words, UKIE is projecting an image of a Poland that has paid its dues and that is now ready to join the EU on the solid foundations of a functioning market economy.

But what does it mean, actually, that a market economy has permanent foundations? (…) The first feature is linked with the abolition of the state/statist system, which manifested itself in deep and sometimes even revolutionary changes in the ownership structure of the country’s Gross Domestic Product and in employment. In 1988, the state and cooperative sectors provided a combined 81% of GDP and accounted for 71,2% of the national labor force. In 2001, the state sector – with the cooperative sector privatized by then – accounted for 24,6% of GDP, and its share in employment was 25,2%. These changes are so profound that there is no turning back from them. The foundations of the private market economy are permanent.

The overall strategic discussion in the UKIE reports, the perspective is generally structural. Only rarely do the sources deal with the category Trade and Industry head-on, and when this is done it is mostly in terms of how the

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76 See for example CEI (1999), pp. 27-42.
77 CEI (2000), passim.
Polish system of rules and regulations concerning economic actors might be changed to adapt to the basic rules of the internal market in Europe. For example, in the 1999 report UKIE describes how Poland at this stage of the accession process is best regarded as a nation-building recipient country. The report quotes data from Eurostat, saying that Poland nevertheless has a favorable position in its race to catch up and that it has acquired the position as fourth largest third-country market for EU exports after the United States, Switzerland and Japan. The EU, similarly, is quoted as the main source of foreign direct investment in Poland at the time.\(^79\) Signaling overall success in its structural adaptation and catching-up, the UKIE also begins to mention that the intensified negotiations for membership of the EU will carry over costs to the Polish system. As a case in point, the UKIE points out that the PHARE system will go “from demand-driven to accession-driven”, meaning that Polish economic success comes at a price.\(^80\) Poland can not expect continued economic support from the EU.

To reiterate, the reports from UKIE concerning the Polish economy are almost wholly focused upon structural aspects. At the beginning of the process, the sources concentrate on the overall marketization of the Polish economy (1998-2000). Towards the end of the series, focus is more on legal adaptation and how to best make the Polish people “understand the negotiations.”\(^81\) Lifting of the outstanding trade barriers will be the most important and direct outcome of accession for the enterprise sector. Poland’s accession to the EU will be accompanied by lifting controls and formalities of administrative and customs character and technical barriers (…) Moreover costs of transport, banking and insurance services (as a result of reduced risks and savings in terms of time currently wasted during standstills at the borders) will be reduced in commodities exchange. (…) Lifting of technical barriers will bring benefits mainly to undertakings already exporting their products to the EU market. (…) The smallest businesses, wishing to export or already selling products on the EU market, see for themselves the largest benefits in lifting of technical barriers.\(^82\)

The UKIE report from the year 2000, however, holds the key to an understanding of this predominantly structural economic perspective. It also brings the Rokkanian category Trade and Industry straight into the analysis by partly explaining why Polish firms and big industry have been absent in the majority of UKIE reports. Similarly, it holds the key to an understanding

\(^{80}\) Ibid., p.12.
\(^{81}\) CEI (2001), p. 11, also 52-54.
\(^{82}\) CEI (2003), p. 8.
of why, as in the quote from an executive summary above, most of the sources make reference to the so called Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SME:s) in their renderings of Polish economic development in relation to EU integration.

Over 99% of Polish enterprises are included in the category of small and medium-sized enterprises, and the majority of them are very small companies. Small and medium-sized enterprises are responsible for 50.3% of the GDP and they employ over 62% of all the employed. About 41% of small and medium-sized enterprises are connected with the commercial sector, and 10-13% are active in the production, construction, real estate, transport and other service sectors. At the end of 1998 there were 2.8 million small and medium-sized enterprises, which constituted 99,8% of all enterprises. The participation of large enterprises in the economy amounted only to 0,2%.\(^{83}\)

For the most part, also this report discusses various other structures and sectors in the Polish economy, but it is in the section previous to the general evaluation of performance according to the Copenhagen criteria that UKIE strikes a nerve. In effect, any strategic considerations based on Trade and industry in Poland will have to consider the fact that the Polish economy is bottom-heavy. As reported in all of the UKIE reports 1998-2003, the Polish government is in an intense process of implementing structural changes in the Polish economy during the years of accession to the EU. One possible explanation for the generally structural perspective that is applied in the reports, however, might be the fact that Polish Trade and industry is a small-scale business. The major industrial heavyweights in Poland can be found in the sectors of coal and steel and in energy production. As such, they have been a long time in liberalizing and privatizing the old, state-controlled structures in these particular sectors.\(^{84}\) This is not to say that privatization has been sluggish in Post-Communist Poland, since that would be matter of opinion.\(^{85}\) However, it explains by and large why the UKIE reports are so generalizing and structural in their perspective all through the survey period.

For the Polish government the issue of transnationalization via the Trade and Industry category looks like a possibility, albeit a very uncertain one. Considering the fact that most Polish enterprises are small and medium-sized, the accession of Poland to a level playing field such as the internal market of the EU should provide private actors with new market

\(^{84}\) Ibid., passim.
\(^{85}\) Ibid., p. 41. The figures quoted say that a total number of state-owned enterprises in 1990 has been reduced to 2 456 by the year 2000.
opportunities. On the other hand, it is always more difficult for smaller enterprises to make the most of business opportunities in other countries. It is more or less generally well known that the freedom of movement across the boundaries of EU states is exploited by big economic actors who are equipped with the resources needed to make the most of this opportunity. To move the production of goods, for example, is in itself an expensive undertaking and it is more difficult for small-scale businesses to carry out such major, transnationalizing changes in their business activity. Also, and this is something that the series of UKIE publications bears witness to, for transnational economic activity to be fruitful something has to be brought back into the national economy. In the majority of UKIE reports, the issue of Foreign Direct Investment seems to be on top of the economic agenda. Small and medium-sized enterprises also for the most part cater to local and regional needs for goods and services, which is why the prospects for transnationalizing tendencies in Polish Trade and industry might look strong in regions near the national border. Such transnationalization, on the other hand, runs the risk of creating economic and social imbalances across the Polish heartland. In sum, the Rokkanian category Trade and industry acquires a special meaning in the Polish case. It is not completely beyond the scope of this thesis to speculate that the emphasis on globalization in later UKIE reports has to do with the hope for a more widespread Foreign Direct Investment than before, possibly beyond the confines of the EU:s internal market.

**Functional and Territorial Regionalism**

The Rokkanian categories Functional and Territorial Regionalism also apply to the Regular Reports from UKIE. The overarching strategic perspective with its focus on national growth and catching up with the EU-15, which was spelled out already in the NSI, is ever present in the material. Similarly, the reports between 1998 and 2003 focus very much on general aspects of democratic consolidation, social stabilization and legal adaptation to the institutional and legal frameworks as stipulated by the Acquis. Focusing on the functional and territorial regional aspects as derived from the Rokkanian model, however, some changes in the strategic perspective in the Regular Reports become visible. To begin with, the perspective that is made public in the NSI clearly takes the view that regional issues by and large need the guiding hand of the central Polish government:

86 Particularly the first three reports in the series talk about special investment zones that have been created to attract foreign capital.
The Government of the Polish Republic is aware that integration involves certain costs which must be considered not only from the point of view of their budgetary implications, but also from the point of view of their economic and social aspects. The budgetary costs stem from the cost of operating the central co-ordination structure, legal approximation, personnel training and information activities. The economic and social costs may take the form of difficult challenges facing certain sectors of the economy, regions or individual economic agents.\(^\text{87}\)

Looming behind this careful strategic formulation in the NSI are the difficult regional realities facing Poland in its adaptation to European integration. Already early in the process, the Polish government stipulates that there will be increasing differences between different territorial parts of the country, and this hinges on the overall economic success of the integration project. Regional aspects are made secondary to the overriding ambition to modernize Poland as a democratic nation and a functional market economy. In its strategic paper, the Polish government also hints at the regional aspect of the country’s economic system as it enters the accession process. As mentioned in the previous section, a lot of problematic heavy industry and energy production is regionally specialized in the Polish economy. This means that economic restructuring in either of these economic sectors immediately has adverse effects on particular parts of the country. By and large, unemployment produced by economic restructuring is the largest strategic threat that the Polish government can discern as a result of the process of EU adaptation.

In the UKIE reports over the years, there is a tendency to continue to link the general discussion about regional development in Poland to the processes of economic marketization and institutional democratization. The overbearing strategic perspective on regional issues is the functional perspective. Territorial regionalism, in the form of ethnicity or other bases for demands for homeland rights only emerges at one point in the UKIE reports. This is in the first one from 1998, in which a discussion about minority rights is introduced:

The rights of national minorities are also protected by a number of international agreements ratified by Poland, notably by those concluded bilaterally with neighbouring countries. Poland has also signed and initiated the ratification of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, and has ratified the International Convention on Liquidation of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. Recorded isolated cases of violence targeting minorities in Poland bear the hallmarks of nothing but hooliganism. The state administration has been scoring successes in preventing and combating such incidents.\(^\text{88}\)

In the first of its reports on Poland’s adaptation to the EU, in 1998, UKIE rather curtly dismisses ethnic issues as having any bearing on Polish politics. In effect, the 1998 report simply removes the issue of ethnic identity from the political agenda.\textsuperscript{89} In order to do this, the report offers a rather detailed line of reasoning which links the issue to the international arena, not the national one, and to international agreements and policies that the Polish Republic has endorsed. It is noteworthy that the Polish government gives a nod to its neighbors in the former Visegrad group\textsuperscript{90} and to the Ukraine and Belarus, emphasizing that bilateral agreements will be honored by Poland and that such agreements will form the basis of Polish policies regarding minority groups regardless of origin and historical context. UKIE also points out political representatives of minority groups in Poland, who are exempt from the political rule that they must have “at least 5 percent of the votes cast in a general election to be allocated parliamentary seats. There are also references made to “tolerance-promoting ventures...aimed at popularizing across national Polish society national and ethnic minority-related issues…. Some 120 national minority associations have been registered in Poland since 1990.”\textsuperscript{91} Most important, UKIE spells out the definition of ethnic and minority issues as under the jurisdiction of national government, mentioning particularly the responsibilities of “the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Administration, the Ministry of National Education and the Ministry of Labour and Social Policy.”\textsuperscript{92}

Thus, already in their first report on Poland’s integration with the EU, UKIE determines that ethnic and minority issues for all intents and purposes belong to the national political sphere. In general, the first report from UKIE actually makes similar references to local and regional aspects in general. Whereas UKIE seems confident that any political problem regarding ethnicity can be kept safely under the umbrella of the nation state, much the same perspective attaches itself to all issues having to do with local and regional self-determination:

\begin{quote}
At present, Poland’s legal system does not yet regulate the issue of regional policy in an uniform legal act (…) The objectives and principles of regional policy are established in medium-term documents… constituting an annex to the budgetary law (…) [assuming] a balanced development while striving to ensure equal
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{89} As a nation state, Poland is estimated to be 98% ethnically homogeneous as a result of the ethnic cleansing done by German troops during World War II and due to the ensuing economic and social isolation during the years of Communism.


\textsuperscript{91} CEI (1998), Ibid.

\textsuperscript{92} Ibid.
opportunity for the residents of all regions of the country. The reform of the state’s socio-political system is – as mentioned above – the major project implemented in Poland at present; it is being carried out according to the “European” principle of subsidiarity by way of decentralising the state’s functions while maintaining its uniform structure, by way of strengthening the territorial self-government; strengthening the communes, creating self-governing counties (powiats) and reducing the number of provinces (voivodships). This will be accompanied by modifications to the institutional and legal solutions specifying the organisation and the principles for conducting regional policy at the national level.93

In other words, at the start of Poland’s accession to the EU, the country’s institutional development had not yet gone far enough to allow any experimentation with modern regional policies and planning. In institutional and legal terms, Poland was still coming “out of the Red” and the UKIE can only report in 1998 that the political system is under revision. Interestingly, UKIE points clearly to some of the general principles for regional development and cohesion that are stipulated by the EU. At the same time, UKIE is saying that they will be watching the development closely while taking advice from the EU on how to proceed with national reform.

Among other things, UKIE makes an overview of the NUTS94 system in the EU in an effort to describe the concept of regional autonomy and to clarify some of the institutional responsibilities that go with it. All the time, UKIE is careful to point out that Polish adaptation to such new ideas and standards will have to be a long-term process. This process will most likely have to involve careful “diagnostic work” on the part of UKIE and other parts of Polish government to ensure a smooth transition to political principles that are completely new to the Polish political system. Above all, there is an emphasis on the fact that any development in this direction in Poland hinges on the stability of the public finances and the general macro-economic conditions that the national government can maintain. The process, it is envisaged, “will be implemented in stages” and is not something that can be introduced in Poland over night.95

Already in the following year the strategic perspective had changed in UKIE. References are made to how adaptation to the Acquis has led to close cooperation between the Polish government, the EU Commission and other member governments of the EU15 in drafting a proposal for a new law permitting modern regional policy in the Polish political system.

93 Ibid., p. 84.
94 NUTS (Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics) is the classification system used for EU-regions.
95 Ibid., pp. 82-84.
Since January 1, 1999, a new structure of the regional policy has been developed. The situation of the regional policy in Poland is determined, first of all, by the state administrative reform and the European integration process. The state administrative reform means the appearance, as of January 1, 1999, of a new regional policy “actor”, i.e. voivodship self-government. The existence of elective representative bodies and voivodship budget means that voivodship self-governments will shape the intra-regional policy. 96

With the help of outsiders, the Polish political system was rapidly restructured to allow regional legal subjects enjoying relative autonomy from the national center and, by extension, also fiscal rights. Moreover, the new regional units are explicitly made into the core units of planning and executing new measures for regional development, to the extent that these are initiated by EU institutions and monitored by the Polish state. In effect, from 1999 on, UKIE refers to this as a new political level in Poland. Thus, the reform modernizing regional and local politics in Poland, making adjustments to EU principles and permitting regional and local contexts to begin to influence their destiny based on their own initiative came into being very quickly.

The main concern in the ensuing reports (2000-2003) has to do with financing and technical and administrative support from the outside, mainly in the form of so called “twinning” with experts in different functional areas, from different EU countries. 97 The issue is generally how the new reforms can be implemented fast enough to ensure Poland’s compliance with the rules of the Acquis. Technical and economic aspects of regional development in Poland completely dominate the strategic perspective in the reports. Issues of institution building are coupled with long and detailed reports on how such support programs, such as PHARE, are working out. Regional aspects in some cases come up in those parts that the UKIE consecrate to issues of economic development, mainly to do with unemployment figures. Already in the report from 2000, UKIE begins a discussion of regional problems in terms of the dissemination of resources and knowledge 98, thus reducing the perspective of a Rokkanian transnational challenge from the regional sphere to a minimum.

96 CEI (1999), p. 87.
97 See CEI (2000), p. 15ff. Twinning partners for Agriculture were Germany, France, Austria and Denmark; for Environmental issues and Justice and Home Affairs France, Germany, UK (only Justice) and Holland; for the Structural funds UK, Ireland, Germany, Finland and France; for Economy and Finance Spain and the UK.
98 Ibid., p. 7-8.
Relations on the Poland’s western and southern borders head towards the model already existing on the borders between the European Union countries. (...) As a process of normalisation of relations on both the western and southern borders continues to spread, it will surely not eliminate the phenomena of social pathology for good, however, it may widely contribute to the variety of situations, such as disappearance of uncontrolled “bazaar trade”, already retreating, launch of the new border checkpoints, lessening the extent of prostitution related with stopping TIR lorries, equalisation of prices after Poland joins the European Union, and finally decrease in economic crime.

Concerning the Rokkanian categories Functional and Territorial Regionalism, it is particularly interesting to note that UKIE thinks about the threat from regions as a threat from lack of knowledge and understanding. Signs of this can be seen already in the NSI as referred to in the previous section of this chapter. The idea appears to be that the reform of local and regional government functions has solved the problems of political influence and economic redistribution in the country. Since the EU and the partner countries in the accession process are happy, there really are no more problems to be expected from this arena, except that UKIE takes the view particularly in the reports from 2002 and 2003, that there is a regional problem in the lack of knowledge about the modernization and adaptation that Poland has gone through. Adding to that, problems of unemployment as a result of economic restructuring policies are seen as potentially fanning certain tendencies towards regional discontent. Nevertheless, as far as the written reports from UKIE 1998-2003 are concerned, regional problems in Poland have been solved by modernizing political reform from the center.

4.6 Summary: Organizational findings in the Polish case

The Polish context is marked by rapid and comprehensive reconstruction of democratic rules and procedure in the political system as a whole. Adaptation to the EU began almost immediately after the end of the Cold War, even before the fall of the Berlin wall, although not in the form of outright membership negotiations. In the pre-accession process which covered most of the 1990s, Poland went through extensive economic, legal and political restructuring. This process was by and large tied in with an approach to the EU, since the EU Commission was assisting Polish governments in their efforts from the very beginning of the new republic.

Although EU membership did not become an issue for Poland until after the Copenhagen summit in 1993, the public debate on European integration lagged even further behind. To the Polish public, the concrete issues remained hidden behind the process of national reform for most of the 1990s. During this period, European integration is discussed in Poland as interwoven with adaptation to other processes of international change, mainly as an outcome of Poland’s economic and political transformation, i.e. the shift to democratic and market economic principles.

The political context changed radically in 2000-2001, when the membership negotiations picked up speed and intensity. The Polish nation now faced concrete and difficult issues of adaptation, emanating from the integration process. Consequently, the Polish debate on European integration changed. By the end of membership negotiations in 2003, the political context in Poland was reminiscent of other contexts in the EU-15. A cleavage between enthusiasts and skeptics had become evident also in Poland, and the integration elites were faced with an unprecedented political challenge. The sheer enthusiasm for European integration among Poles in the 1990s changed into more nationalistic outlooks as EU membership came closer.

From an organizational perspective, the UKIE is tightly knit around the political center in Poland. There are signs that the organization was utilized by the Polish government to maintain consensus on issues of EU integration. However, concrete information about what was going on inside the organization is scarce, particularly concerning how the work inside evolved over time, and it is mostly available for the later stages of its existence. Relying on the written sources that do exist and adding specific information from the interview material, it is nevertheless possible to draw some preliminary conclusions about the organization.

Particularly interesting is that the Committee for European Integration and the Committee Office were instituted by separate law in Poland. As concerns the other parts of the UKIE organization, there were no laws or other statutes that prescribed them. They were put together on an ad-hoc basis by the Polish government in an effort to simplify membership negotiations with the EU Commission and EU-15 countries. The Committee and Committee Office, however, were created by a law decided by the Polish Parliament in 1996. These two parts of the organization thus continue to exist after the membership negotiations were concluded in 2003, continuing to serve as an internal task-force in EU-related issues for Poland even as a member state. In effect, Poland’s adaptation to the EU gave at least one significant change in the structure of national government, creating two new branches of government that have a superior status to others concerning the EU and related political issues.
Drawing mainly on the results from interviews, it is evident that the political role of UKIE changes in step with the overall contextual changes in Poland. What at the beginning seemed like an administrative task to the Polish elite step by step changed into a race against the clock and an effort to find relevant information concerning the state of affairs in Poland. As the political debate heated up and became more polarized towards the end of the adaptation process, the UKIE could continue its work regardless of temporary shifts in the parliamentary balance or in the public mood. Thus, the organization upheld an element of political stability in a country which was trying to do everything at once, i.e. both consolidate the new national system and integrate with the supranational EU.

Polish adaptation to the EU is almost wholly thought of as a national project in the UKIE. In the yearly reports, the organization shied away from any discussion about the transnationalizing potential of Rokkanian categories. Trade and industry was seen as a sector in need of development, and access to the Single Market for Polish firms and other economic interests was seen as an important part of national restructuring. Although it is possible to speculate about different reasons for this, one factor in particular stands out. Polish Trade and industry mostly consists of small and medium sized businesses. In effect, the UKIE discussion about transnationalizing tendencies in this area more or less became one about the possibility of foreign direct investment to support these sectors. Economically, Polish actors were seen as too small to have any major impact on the European arena. For Poland as a national economy, however, the image is the reverse. European economic integration could only be good, since it was expected to give the Polish government an opportunity to attract large-scale capital to the country. Above all, the Trade and industry category was discussed by the UKIE as a globalizing factor, not necessarily linked to the problems and opportunities of the EU Single Market.

Territorial and Functional regionalism are seen by UKIE much in the same way. Again, the emphasis on European integration as a vehicle for national development could hardly be made any clearer. An important fact that the yearly reports relied on in the discussion of regional issues, was that the Polish nation is ethnically homogeneous. Also regional development was seen as part of the process of national restructuring and democratic consolidation. Taking the view that Poland does not have a tradition of regional and local government of its own to build on, UKIE was convinced that regional restructuring is a means to an end. The regional restructuring of Poland, which culminates with the introduction of new regional units (voivodships) in the year 2000, was mainly linked to the prospect of strengthening economic and social cohesion in the country. There is a general awareness in the reports that Poland is a highly stratified and
unevenly developed nation, and that there may be ramifications for the continued economic and political restructuring in that. Nevertheless, the UKIE takes the general view that regional issues are part and parcel of the Polish government’s efforts at nation-building and restoration.

On the whole, the UKIE seems apprehensive and suspicious regarding developments both inside and outside of the Polish nation. It is hard to say, whether or not this centralistic attitude mirrors the political process in central government in Poland. It is equally plausible that it signifies a sense of responsibility vis-à-vis the EU Commission and that there is simply a reluctance to let alternative actors and perspectives in. Particularly in the major strategic document that set the Polish political agenda for adaptation to the EU 1998-2003, which has been referred to here as the NSI, there was a thorough investigation into the dangers of a political backlash. The UKIE was actually saying that the Polish people cannot be trusted to understand the necessary and desirable aspects of European integration properly. In a similar vein, the UKIE worries that the EU Commission and representatives of EU-15 governments would not be able to look behind the stereotypical images of the Polish nation. The upshot is an image of a governmental organization in which participants think that they are alone in defending the Polish national interest, possibly against both popular and international misconceptions.
5. Framing Swedish Adaptation to the EU

In the context of the Swedish EU debate 1988-94, it is argued by a writer that Swedish political and economic elites are in a mental state of Europhoria.\(^1\) The ideas and strategic evaluations that emanate from interviews with the ROFE elite, however, are not so self-assured concerning Sweden’s role in European integration. Thoughts expressed by this group are more ambivalent, particularly concerning the political project of uniting the whole of Europe. Several respondents say that they have a distinct feeling of wariness, of trying to make things happen in a very sensitive political field. Some of them even go so far as to expressing doubts that their work really will amount to much at the end of the day, seeing that the overall integration process in Europe is riddled with obstacles and uncertainties. The ROFE respondents frequently refer to their work as ‘trying to hit a moving target’. Some of them feel uneasy, saying that they would not be surprised if the EU project led to a popular ‘backlash’ (11).\(^2\)

What emerges from the interviews instead are ideas about European complexity and about how difficult it is to explain the many linkages between national and transnational politics in Europe. ROFE members themselves sometimes find it hard to keep an overview of all the details, exceptions from rules and sector-specific problems that proceed from the integration process. The members of ROFE are both proud and wary at the same time. They are happy to be on the inside working with what they perceive of as one of the most important changes in modern Swedish history, but they generally express worries about whether or not the internal complexity of the adaptation process can be appreciated by the general public in Sweden.

The relative political silence that signifies the Swedish context 1988-94\(^3\), thus, does not prevent the members of ROFE from thinking that European integration also has to do with deep and cross-cutting political conflict.

This chapter describes both the main lines and singularities of thought that emerge from the Swedish interview material. In the first section, the material is regarded as a whole. An overview is given of how the answers from ROFE can be analyzed according to cognitive category (Enthusiasts, Voluntarists, Pragmatics and Skeptics) combined with the theoretical categories (European

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\(^1\) My translation; the Swedish expression is *Eurofori*, see Elmbrant, Björn (1993) *Så föll den svenska modellen*. Stockholm: Fischer, s. 225f.

\(^2\) In this chapter, all references to interviewees are made with the help of codes. This is done according to agreement since, although none of the respondents demands complete anonymity, they do not want their names connected with any particular expression or quote.

\(^3\) This refers to the context as explored in Chapter 3 of this thesis.
integration, Trade and Industry, Functional and Territorial Regionalism). In the following four sections, the chapter goes on to make detailed descriptions of each of the cognitive categories and how the Rokkanian integration categories are perceived. These four sections are based on an analysis of the interviews and are supported by individual quotes. In the last section, the chapter finishes with a synthesis of the interview results and a summary discussion.

5.1 Principal Features of the ROFE Interviews

The ambition in this chapter is to connect the theoretical categories from Rokkanian integration theory with the empirically generated cognitive categories. As already indicated, it is assumed that the dichotomization of attitudes toward European integration (enthusiasm vs. skepticism) is problematic since it hides the complexity of adaptation to the process. How do the Swedish integration elite respond to questions about Rokkanian categories as vehicles for transnationalization? In empirical terms, this chapter illustrates how the answers from ROFE respondents separate into the four cognitive categories depending upon which Rokkanian category is under consideration.

Table 1 below depicts the principal features of the interview material when the four cognitive categories are combined with the four theoretical categories. Depending upon which theoretical category that is in question, the interviewees are divided up differently between the cognitive categories. The table here displays the overall result of the analysis of ROFE interviews and the content of all answers given. One single ROFE member can thus be an Enthusiast concerning the theoretical category European Integration, but also either a Voluntarist, Pragmatic or Skeptic on the category Trade and Industry. In other words, the table shows what effect the theoretical categories have on the cognitive categories in this study.

**Table 1:** Principal analytical features of the Swedish interviews with the theoretical and cognitive categories combined (number of respondents specified in parentheses).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theoretical</th>
<th>Cognitive</th>
<th>Enthusiast</th>
<th>Voluntarist</th>
<th>Pragmatist</th>
<th>Skeptic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>European Integration (61)</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade and industry (61)</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Functional Regionalism (56)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>22</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Territorial Regionalism (48)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>22</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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In simple terms, the interviewees have different ways of looking at the problems and possibilities in the process of Swedish adaptation to the EU depending upon which theoretical category is invoked by the interviewer. For example, an individual ROFE member may be a clear Enthusiast as regards the overall process of European integration as long as the discussion concerns international cooperation and possible integration between nation states. The same person, however, may be a total Skeptic once the discussion enters into the field of regionalism, which indicates that this person simply does not believe that actors other than national governments can contribute to the adaptation process. Consequently, an individual interviewee who is an ardent Enthusiast vis-à-vis Functional Regionalism, and who sees for instance transnational cooperation between cities and municipal governments as a vehicle in Swedish adaptation to the EU, may also be a Skeptic toward the category Integration if he believes that national governments are overbearing and too paternalistic.

Which are the principal features of the interview material? It is clear from Table 1 that Enthusiasts dominate the scene when the theoretical categories are European Union and Trade and Industry. On the other hand, there is an almost equal predominance of Skeptics when the issues are Functional and Territorial Regionalism. Another interesting phenomenon is that there are answers in all combinations of theoretical and cognitive categories with one outstanding exception. That is, the combination of theoretical category Trade and Industry with the cognitive category Skeptic. This means that there are no ROFE representatives that consider transnationalization in the field of Trade and Industry unnecessary or undesirable! On the contrary, there seems to be a general consensus in the group that transnational economic activity is both desirable and necessary in Europe. Another field in which the number of Skeptics is low is that of European Union. There are only three answers that have been categorized as skeptical (i.e. neither desirable nor necessary). Skepticism seems to dominate, on the other hand, when the issues of Functional and Territorial Regionalism are considered. In sum, the principal features of the interview material provide at least part of the answer as to how members of ROFE think about adaptation to the EU.

Before going into analytical detail, however, it might be pertinent to take another look at the principal features of the material. Are the members of ROFE mainly Enthusiasts, Skeptics or something else concerning political adaptation to the EU? Again, looking at the material from a bird’s-eye view, the image depicted in Table 1 emerges. The majority of the interviewees fall into either the cognitive category Voluntarist or Pragmatic. In effect, the two

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4 This can be compared with the results of the analysis in chapter 3 above, and comes out in stark contrast with the views presented in the ROFE reports (UDH).
cognitive categories that have so dominated the public debate on European integration in Sweden and several other countries for almost two decades now, the Euroenthusiast-Euroskeptic dichotomy, are embraced by no more than one-fourth of the ROFE members! When considering the general attitude of the interviewees toward adapting Sweden to a transnational arena, three-fourths of them wind up in the two middle categories.

What this essentially means is that the majority of ROFE members are, as indicated at the beginning of this chapter, fairly cautious and apprehensive about what they are doing. A qualified majority of them are basically inclined towards working with adaptation to further some distant, unclear goal, whether this be a United States of Europe or some other form of institutionalized cooperation between states. Importantly, however, the majority of them are inclined to do so for completely different cognitive reasons. Most of them are actually Voluntarist, which means that they see their work as guided mainly by the desirability of achieving something new. Almost as many see themselves as guided by necessity, i.e. belong to the cognitive category Pragmatist. Simply put, the main dividing line between individual members of the ROFE in how they view the necessity and desirability of their work with adaptation does not run between Enthusiasts and Skeptics. Rather, it runs between Voluntarists and Pragmatists, which are the two cognitive categories that represent the more complex sets of ideas and attitudes toward European integration.

When Voluntarists and Pragmatists emerge out of the interview material as the dominant cognitive categories the situation calls for more detailed analysis. So far, the analysis has gone below the first level of discovery, which is whether or not the simple Yes-No dichotomy can answer any questions about how Swedish integration elites think about political adaptation to the EU. Already the principal features of the material begin to show the complexity of political cognition in this particular field. Thus, at least to the members of ROFE, adaptation to Europe is not a simple question of Yes or No, of reasoning along the lines of either-or. As will be shown later in this chapter, the simple dichotomy still remains a possible construction of political reality for the integration elite. But, importantly, underneath the guise of such neat simplification very complex political realities are hidden, most of which put high intellectual demands on political actors. So, what do the cognitive patterns of Enthusiasts, Voluntarists, Pragmatists and Skeptics in the Swedish case look like?
5.2 The Swedish Enthusiast

To the Enthusiast, European integration is both desirable and necessary. Regardless of whether the Enthusiast is taking an historical or contemporary perspective, European integration is seen as the road ahead to continued peace and prosperity on the European continent. This is the core of the argument: peace and prosperity in Europe. To the eyes of the Enthusiast, there is an equal sign between integration in Europe and participation in supranational political and economic institution building. Good ideas and practices are taken mainly from the Western European experience.

We have to go back to 1945…The biggest task at hand then to figure out the what-do-we-do-now so that Europe would not return to war. (…) In Sweden, we have to try to imagine what the situation was like for them with the effect of carpet bombing, the ruins and refugees in the streets. Of course, they came up with this: We have to integrate and tear down boundaries…What was it Schumann said? We shall bring people closer together. That, for me, is the genuine idea behind integration. (13)

Integration to me is something that exists on different levels. In part it is an historical phase, and that is really the most important thing as I see it, in which it is decided from the European Coal and Steel Union and on that we’re over and done with war in Europe and are now choosing peaceful coexistence instead. On the next level, I would prefer to talk about how peaceful coexistence brings other things along, for example the need to move around freely between countries and to take away customs duties, for young people to be able to get out and study in this country and that regardless of national boundaries. (…) I suppose one might stop there. Clearly, in this light, it is all about contact between peoples and countries in Europe. (6)

Governments and other actors that are outside the boundaries of the EU are not, and cannot be, considered integrated into Europe. To the Enthusiast, supranationality is simply that which can be agreed upon between the governments of EU countries. Supranationality is, on the other hand, both necessary and desirable for the successful continuation of the overall integration process in Europe. Since the Enthusiast also sees the EU as the cornerstone of development and modernization in Europe, there are no viable political alternatives. Put differently, to the Enthusiast peace and prosperity are the two sides of a coin.

But then, we don’t always see clearly in Sweden how the national boundaries…I think this is something important that has been put to the side of the debate…that the national boundaries are artificial. It is so easy to make this thing with the market sound like some kind of mercenary ideal, but that is not the part of it that holds my respect. (13)
On the Trade and Industry dimension, the question of nationality becomes even less interesting to the Enthusiast. This argument flows from the notion of integration as an essentially organic process, in which the peoples of the European countries come closer together on all levels of social life. The question of national flag simply eventually becomes irrelevant, and this line of thought also goes for economic life and for economic actors. The typical example that the Enthusiast likes to bring up is the industrial conglomerate ASEA Brown Boveri. To the Enthusiast, this multinational firm has great symbolic value and is an example to other economic actors in real life.

Basically, the Enthusiast views producers and consumers in the European setting as bound together by a common interest. Producers want to sell their goods and services and consumers want to get away with the cheapest possible prices. Again, the Enthusiast will see this tendency as linked with other trends in society, such as life-style issues that involve people wanting to travel more and wanting to look more like their counterparts in other countries. Economic actors are seen as more transnational than social actors, but people in general are seen as coming up close behind. The Enthusiast envisions how two social arts, the art of being a Swede on the one hand and of being a European on the other, are gradually merging into one and the same. Above all, in this perspective, there are no boundaries between being a citizen and being a consumer.

Another example that the Enthusiast likes to bring up is the issue of the common currency. With this, according to the Enthusiast, Europe will become more and more similar to the United States of America, and this is a particularly strong argument for why national flags will become redundant in the future Europe. National boundaries will be naturally erased the more people get used to a common set of rules and common monies in all European countries. Nevertheless, the Enthusiast takes the view that transnationalization in economic life is the current vanguard of the development.

Well, there’s always the commercial stuff. I mean, look at the US, that is really the interesting role model, or at least I would like to think that we are heading towards a United States of Europe. There are huge differences between states in the US, you know. If you actually spend some time in one of the states there, you will actually discover that there are cultural differences as well. Still, it is the same darn McDonald’s and the same gas stations and the same store chains and so on (...) and over time the mobility across states and the whole territory has increased, needless to say.

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5 At the time of these interviews, the common currency in the EU only existed on paper in the form of the European Currency Unit, or the ECU. Palpable European money, the Euro, was not introduced before 2001, and then not in all member countries. Sweden opted out of the Euro after a referendum in the fall of 2003 and, at the time of this writing, still uses its old national currency, the Krona.
because of the labor market structure and such. But that’s the way we’re headed and I basically think that our languages and cultural differences will last over here, but pretty soon you will not know whether you’ve come to a town in Eastern or Western Europe, or whatever, because you are going to see the same commercial buildings, the same signs, and the same generic stuff all over. (14)

Along the same lines of thought, the Enthusiast interprets the driving forces behind European integration as a combination of economic forces and political will. This is why Eastern Europe is never out of the picture. Rather, the Enthusiast sees clearly how integration in the West spills over into Eastern Europe.

That was the idea of the founding fathers from the beginning, to incorporate Eastern Europe by and by. The same thing has been expressed by contemporary statesmen. It is what Kohl and others are saying now. At the same time it is obvious that it will take time to make it happen. (13)

We have to go back in European history in order to find a meaningful definition of European integration. We have to look at what the original causes of the phenomenon. Normally, I tend to work with a more narrow definition of the concept that is applicable to current cooperation in the EC. That’s how I see it, although it is possible to view it much more broadly and incorporate all of Europe. With the broader view comes an insight into the force and relevance of the idea that all wars should end and countries should stop fussing with each other. Peace and security, that is it, and tying closer knots is simply a means by which this higher goal can be achieved. That is really how I look at it, although my every-day work is strictly confined to narrow economic issues. Economic ties are a means to achieving the goal. Security and stability: if you merge the economies you also have the strongest glue. (51)

The Enthusiast views transnational regionalism with the same kind of confidence. The integration of states in Europe is actually instrumental. The nation-states are in effect busily doing away with themselves and, to the Enthusiast, this process involves peoples on different sides of current national boundaries finding new forms of cooperation and developing new identities. The Enthusiast is not completely ready to see functional, transnational regions as states in the process of becoming. However, if the new identification among people is strong and supported by economic prowess there is no telling what new forms of political representation might emerge over time. To the Enthusiast, the EU is an instrument that can be equally supportive or critical of new forms of regionalization depending upon whether national governments continue to be leaders, or not. Particularly, the Swedish Enthusiast sees particular national governments in
Europe as threatening to new regions and transnational initiatives. France is the most frequently cited example, a country that the Enthusiast regards with suspicion because he considers the centralist tradition strong there and, not least, because the French government seems to wield a lot of influence over EU institutions. In large part, the Enthusiast believes that France has great symbolic value in the discussion over and above the concrete measures that the French government might take.

Sweden, on the contrary, is held out as a country that both can and will contribute to more freedom for regions and more leeway for political actors in the EU to experiment with new ideas. The Enthusiast especially sees a major Swedish contribution in making the EU “softer”. The best example of this can be drawn from Southern Sweden and the border region with Denmark, the region of Öresund, and it should probably be used as an example to all countries in positive transnationalization. The Enthusiast has a vision of how, in about 50 years time, the Southern tip of Sweden has merged with the Danish island of Sjaelland and the Copenhagen area, perhaps even in a major European growth region which also encompasses the Norwegian capital Oslo and the German city area of Hamburg. This, from the vantage point of history, would seem no stranger to the Enthusiast than the fact that all police officers in Sweden today wear the same uniform, which was not the case some hundred and fifty to two hundred years ago. Another concrete vision for the Enthusiast is the valley of Lake Mälaren, potentially a self-sustaining city area centered on Stockholm and with strong economic and social ties to the major cities of the Baltic Sea Area, mainly Finland and the Baltic States. How, then, to figure out what the new internal and external regional-political relationships should be is an issue for the level of the Union, i.e. within the framework of a future European Union.

I believe in a federal Europe in the long run. It is, I think, a concept much misconstrued. (...) Let us bring in another concept, the principle of subsidiarity, and just imagine for a moment how very, very important that is to us. (...) The principle of subsidiarity, which is currently so much underlined and embraced in Europe, I think, is the strongest imaginable decentralizing and individual-enhancing force there is. It will bring over decision making to the little units, those that are the most self-evident ones. That is: the family, the village, the group, the team in the workplace, and so on up to the local government level. But this presupposes supranationality because there are so many questions and problems that the nation state cannot handle on its own. (13)

Even ethnic groups with transnational territorial interests are regarded in much the same light by the Enthusiast. On the one hand, functional regionalism and new market opportunities are seen as two phenomena that
might give ethnic groups a new momentum. If the enthusiast is ready to say that new commonalities might emerge from functional cooperation across boundaries, such as in the above, then he is equally ready to accept that such commonalities may also coincide with old cultural and historical ties. The Enthusiast is intent on thinking that there is a lot of positive activity in the EU that has to do with such issues, not least because he feels that Sweden still has a lot to learn from how other Europeans have made lessons from their former ethnic and national strife. The EU, to the Enthusiast, is the best forum for such issues simply because it has grown out of a history riddled with ethnic and national tension. On the other hand, the perspective of the Enthusiast also builds on the notion that ethnic problems in Europe derive historically from the establishment of nation states. A Europe without national boundaries, according to the Enthusiast, is a Europe without the root of all political evil. New freedoms that are guaranteed by the supranational political level will, so the Enthusiast will have it, be a positive and liberating experience for all peoples. Creating these new freedoms is what the EU is all about for the Enthusiast, and new freedoms will do away with the old ethnic and territorial manacles of European history.

When thinking in concrete terms about the Sami in Scandinavia, the Enthusiast tends to take a positive view. Not in the sense that their ethnic and territorial plights are about to reach their happy ending for all parties concerned. Rather, the Enthusiast views the plight of the Sami as an unimportant or even non-issue for the Nordic countries. According to the Enthusiast, the Sami draw sufficient political attention to their issues and receive adequate support and understanding from at least the Nordic governments. In terms of territorial regionalism, the Sami issue is a case in point to the Enthusiast much the same way as the Öresund region is concerning functional regionalism. What the Enthusiast is actually saying is that there is no contradiction between how regional issues are handled within the EU and how they are managed within the Nordic setting. To the contrary, the Enthusiast is saying that Sweden and the other Nordic states already have a concept that is equal to, or better even, than that which is current in the EU. In effect, the Enthusiast believes that Swedish and Nordic solutions can be exported to the EU and serve to make things better there.

The only problem that the Enthusiast can see in terms of territorial regionalism is that the territorial groups concerned, such as for instance the Sápmi, cannot have a discussion among themselves that is modern or advanced enough to fit the development of the EU. There is, according to the Enthusiast, always a risk involved. Perhaps the territorial or ethnic groups are not smart enough to see the opportunities? The risk is that such groups choose to follow old tracks and to opt out of their new economic and political opportunities. In the final analysis, however, the Enthusiast remains
convinced that the needs and wishes of territorial regionalists will be met equally with those of functional regionalists in the emergent European Union. Perhaps most important to the Enthusiast is that, overall, the EU will always be better equipped to come up with new ideas and good solutions than the nation-states ever could or would.

5.3 The Swedish Voluntarist

To the Voluntarist, European integration appears to be desirable but not necessary. Similarly as with the Enthusiast, the Voluntarist takes a starting point in the need to safeguard peace and prosperity in Europe. But to the Voluntarist, the important thing is to secure peace and prosperity for all of Europe, for all countries on the whole continent. Behind the EU-project, a Fortress Europe looms, in the eyes of the Voluntarist. If the EU can contribute to the success and further development of its member states, well, this is all well and fine. However, the Voluntarist is prone to point out that if not all countries on the whole continent are involved in the process, the problems will be dwarfed by the opportunities in the long run. In this light, the EU is seen as a positive force and a fresh new development in European history. As such, the EU also represents a historically unique opportunity to build a better future in which Europeans can stop killing each other off by the millions every fifty years. If economic prosperity follows from this core process, then it is also a good thing. To the Voluntarist, however, the important thing is that increasing prosperity will provide European governments and the EU with an opportunity to compensate such geographical or functional areas that are lagging behind. The Voluntarist sees a Europe of uneven development and economic inequalities where much needs to be done in terms of evening things out. Consequently, since the Voluntarist sees no guarantee that this historically unique political goodwill among European nations will last and because national governments are still all-powerful in the integration process, there is an imminent need for supranational constitutional rules and security mechanisms in Europe.

The cornerstone of the Voluntarist perspective is an observation of international economic competition. The observation seems to be that all countries, not least Sweden, monitor what goes on in world markets in order to pick the proverbial icing off the cake. There is no doubt in the mind of the Voluntarist that national interests exist, and it just so happens that the EC/EU is right for Sweden at the current phase of political, economic and social development. The Voluntarist likes to make reference to the rhetorical side of European integration, but is quick in pointing out that it is the same, for the most part economic, realities that pertain to how states gather around the
EU as it is in any other international setting. Political adaptation to the EU, in this perspective, is just a matter of a temporary focusing of political efforts.

Well, basically it is all about Western European integration for Sweden right now. But I am hard put to disregard all the equally important and big things that are going on in Central and Eastern Europe and in, well, the former Soviet Union, the OSCE and the Baltic States. These processes are lagging behind, obviously far behind, but I am convinced that they will all merge at a later stage to become all-European cooperation in the very long run. They are all located in our near vicinity and they are economies of extremely vast interest to Sweden politically, security-wise, financially, culturally (...) the process that our government...Well, I mean the core of it is international competition. And it is clear to me that EC-integration brings on certain formal demands, but the way we are organized in the international community and the incorporation of Central Europe also brings on demands that have to do with competition. (...) Added to all this is the ongoing internationalization within the GATT, that is to say what levels of international free-trade that we’re able to negotiate and so on and so on. (...) Is it not the third time now that the EC has decided to move ahead with a monetary union? (8)

In the eyes of the Voluntarist, a United States of Europe is desirable. What is necessary for Sweden, however, is to safeguard its long-term national security and to the extent that participation in the EU does not look safe it is also not necessary. To the Voluntarist, the development in Eastern Europe is the long and short of it. European peace is dependent upon the successful incorporation of Eastern European countries and by extension upon a successful integration of those countries. Europe is more than the EU to the Voluntarist, bigger than the sum of a number of member countries in a group. Economic and security barriers across this much larger Europe will eventually build up new threats both to the Union and to its individual member states.

The Voluntarist will see Trade and Industry as a transnationalizing force in terms of economic transactions across national boundaries. In terms of mentality however, which is an important variable to the Voluntarist, firms and other types of economic actor have a tendency to be oriented toward nations and national governments. The main reason for the Swedish government to be on the scene in Brussels is to enforce rules that will guarantee equal access and treatment for Swedish economic actors. Since nowadays, big firms especially seem to act rather independently, the Voluntarist sees an emergent commonality of interests between governments from different countries. The Voluntarist essentially sees economic actors as tough ones that are ready to go to severe lengths to get what they want in terms of profits and goodwill. Transnationalization in the form of multiple
ownerships, of hostile takeovers, downsizing threats toward particular governments all fall under what the Voluntarist sees as economic strategy. In this sense, the Voluntarist sees transnationalization as just another way to get demands across to governments and to exert as much influence as possible over the levels of taxation and the rules of the labor market rules in different countries. Hence, it appears desirable for the Voluntarist for any national government to participate in international cooperation, perhaps cooperation that leads to a common set of rules behind which the governments of several countries can pool their political power. To the Voluntarist, it is desirable, of course, but not necessary.

Convinced that all economic actors have national loyalties, the Voluntarist prefers to look to national governments as the primary movers and shakers of systems and rules. A smart national government with good connections in Trade and Industry will never come out a loser, according to the Voluntarist. Anything that the EU can come up with on the Internal Market is simply dwarfed by the fact that, at the end of the day, national governments are the ones that decide which of the common rules will be adhered to and which not. Governments and Trade and Industry exploit each other, and it is the overall global rules of the game that provide minimal standards, according to the Voluntarist.

This point of view means that the Voluntarist attaches less political weight to regional cooperation and more to global cooperation. This means that negotiations over rules and procedure in the GATT are equally if not more important for a single country than those over an EEA-treaty or access to the Internal Market. Moreover, the Voluntarist sees Swedish Trade and Industry as global, and likes to point out that the market conditions in the United States, in Brazil or in China are equally decisive for the overall performance of Swedish economic actors. It is therefore desirable to have good relationships with other governments in Europe and a good set of common rules on the European market, but it is far from necessary in the eyes of the Voluntarist.

In the concrete, the Voluntarist will agree to the fact that the European market dominates the import and export figures of the Swedish economy. But, the Voluntarist will also say that putting particularly the big Swedish firms under closer scrutiny reveals that they are much more globalized than they are Europeanized. One thing in particular that the Voluntarist misses in the Swedish political debate on economic issues is a discussion on where things are headed, as opposed to the current discussion about where the Swedish economy stands. The Voluntarist is far from convinced that the major players in the Swedish economy see their best opportunities in Europe, not even if the whole continent is included in the perspective. The globalizing tendencies and opportunity-seeking in Swedish
Trade and Industry is too strong for that. What is desirable in the EU, in the Voluntarist’s view, is the help small- and medium-size economic actors can get in becoming transnational and in achieving better growth figures. Yet again, the Voluntarist points out however, the desirable changes could just as easily be made unilaterally by the Swedish government, particularly since loyalty to the nation is so much stronger among small- to medium-size firms.

A Swedish company is a company that is active and registered as such in Sweden, because this has to do with the levy of taxes and such…but when it comes to who owns the company, this seems to be just a secondary issue. There is no inherent value in the fact that a company is Swedish. (...) In the long-term interest of any firm is to support and actively promote a positive development of the country where it has activity going on, and it is my belief that short-term profits and short-term interests can be sacrificed on this altar. In the long run, I don’t think so. It is hard to define any kind of common interest that would go beyond the interest of the individual firm, and then try to make demands on the firm accordingly. (10)

It is particularly the broad international view that marks the way in which the Voluntarist looks at European integration. Sweden participates in many different ways in different fields and in different international forums. Somehow, the Voluntarist seems to see the country as a hard core in the international community. This core is involved on different political levels and in a variety of political settings that are in a constant flux of change.

This thing about us harmonizing completely in Europe is something I look upon as nonsense. (...) What I see is how individuals, political leaders, business leaders participate in a process and it is obvious that they all share a deep sense of commonality, which is seen as beneficial, but that they all similarly see the benefits of keeping separate solutions for each state...the languages not least are very important as markers of difference. (...) As far as community goes, I think there is every reason to look more closely at the United States simply because there is no denying how efficient it is. (...) If there are for example oppositions concerning agriculture, well, you’ve just got to give the process some time. (3)

No, to the contrary, I would simply call it a fashionable expression. But then, of course, it gives the impression that something bigger than international cooperation is going on. I mean, Sweden cooperates with most states in the whole wide world but at the same time we want to stress the fact that Western Europe is something in particular. Already in the days of the Luxembourg process it was this principle of cooperating in a host of policy areas, about details

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6 For a description of this and the other negotiation processes referred to in this quote, see UDH (1989b).
and in a bunch of working groups…and then came what was called
the Delors process, or the Oslo-Brussels process…which resulted
in discussions about an EEA-treaty, which then led on to the
negotiations…well, I certainly cannot deny that the word integration
is used to cover a lot that goes on in and around the EC. (…) But I
suppose there will be more integration. We’re in the middle of
finishing a free-trade agreement with the Baltic States and with the
other East countries and that is like integration in itself, in its way.
That does not mean that things become more similar, though, I
mean, going into a free-trade arrangement is one thing. Then,
things become more and more sophisticated and further on there is
hopefully an EC-membership waiting, membership of the Customs
Union and all that goes with…it is like something constantly
ongoing with the EC, since it turned out at the beginning of the
1980s that things had not really turned out the way they were
intended to. (5)

Turning the attention to aspects of functional and territorial regionalism, it is
hard for the Voluntarist to determine whether such things are really related
to the EU, or not. Again, the Voluntarist argues for the desirability of
reaching support and good solutions in common, so why not inside the EU?
At the same time, the Voluntarist sees something inherently national about
this type of issue. Neither functional regionalism in the form of an Öresund
region, nor territorial regionalism in the form of Sami demands came about
as a result of supranational integration processes. To the Voluntarist, both
these aspects of regionalism seem to have more to do with history and old
cultural patterns. There is, for example, any number of potential functional
regions in the Nordic area alone in the historical perspective. Also currently,
there are several functional potentials that are seldom or never discussed,
according to the Voluntarist, simply because the demands from below are
not strong or articulated enough.

First thing is that this phenomenon is dependent upon so many
things. Our administrative structure in Sweden is too narrow. It
will blow up. This is the main reason why there’s so much talk
today about for instance the Mälardalen region. Myself, I work a
lot in communications, infrastructural investments…it is just
fascinating to see that so much can be done in any region if the
consensus is right, which might also mean that outlooks must
sometimes be skewed a little. We started negotiations about the
traffic situation in the Greater Stockholm Area with an inventory
of different means of transportation, bypasses, rail and so on. But
pretty soon we discovered that the relevant territorial demarcation is
not the Greater Stockholm Area but the whole valley around the
Mälaren. Toward Örebro, Västerås and further around down toward
Nyköping…this had absolutely nothing to do with Europe. The
whole current discussion about the county organization in Sweden
is an expression of the same thing. That is the situation in many
places in Europe. (12)
The Baltic Sea Area seems to the Voluntarist to be a part of the world in which both old traditions and new economic opportunities coincide, which in turn produces excellent prerequisites for transnational regionalization. The notion of an autonomous Sapmi territory, for example, is interesting because it opens up for new ideas about how to coordinate regional development and tourism. The Voluntarist discerns some interesting possibilities and, consequently, sees experimentation with territorial and functional demarcation lines for regions as desirable – desirable but far from necessary. The Voluntarist will constantly return to talking about the nation state and national traditions, particularly as concerns Sweden, because the Swedish government has a modern tradition of supporting and safeguarding regions and regional development. To the extent that regions can find new ideas and concepts by which popular and political support for regional development can be rallied, things are for the better.

Faced with the concrete example of a transnational Öresund region, however, the Voluntarist will point out that the greater city area of Copenhagen in effect is the national center of Denmark. The Voluntarist concedes that already under the auspices of different Nordic forums, there is plenty of room and opportunity for transnational regional cooperation. Transboundary cooperation in functional regions has a history in the Nordic setting, particularly in the period after WWII. Still, it seems improbable to the Voluntarist that such limited cooperation could in any way spark the development of new regional identities, be they social or political in character. Similarly, when a strong cultural or ethnic affinity is already at hand, such as in the Sapmi case, the Voluntarist immediately starts to raise questions about what the corresponding functional link might be. In other words, the Voluntarist sees functional regionalism and territorial regionalism as possibilities, but neither of them have any traits of necessity. In general, the Voluntarist sees transnational regionalization as something inherently positive, and therefore desirable. Necessary, on the other hand, they are not, and particularly not as part and parcel of the European integration process in the perspective of the foreseeable future. Beyond that, perhaps, but then the Voluntarist is talking about centuries and not decades.

5.4 The Swedish Pragmatist

To the Pragmatist, the process of European integration is one of many contemporary realities that political and economic actors alike must accept. In terms of the EU specifically, the Pragmatist simply states that it is about a real shifting of power from the level of nation states to that of supranational institutions. The pragmatist does not see this as an absolute or one-off shift
in political power. It is a shift, however, that all actors must participate in regardless of their preconceptions unless they want to be left behind. Sweden, according to the Pragmatist, participates in the process simply because it is forced to do so by necessity.

I see one historical and one economic perspective…The idea of Europe is important, the issues are interrelated, but what dominates is crass economic cooperation. (18)

Yeah, what the heck is integration? It must somehow mean cooperation, or that you link systems of rules together. In my field, it means that you link together rules for how buildings should be constructed internationally. (…) You can integrate municipalities and grade schools as well. (…) Cooperation, hmm, if I really put my mind to it there is this image of a collection of rules. It is really vague. (…) I don’t know if the EC is integrated with us at all, but we sure are integrated with them, and we’re just constantly making an effort to hook up. (2)

The Pragmatist sees a number of other possibilities other than the EU, by which states may develop good relations regardless of whether they be political, economic or both. The UN is the most obvious example to the Pragmatist, particularly since it is not confined to a European or Western European political space. In effect, the Pragmatist thinks that the EU is a non-desirable political entity for several reasons. First and foremost, the Pragmatist fears that the EU may develop into a supra-state of some kind. The Pragmatist sees political danger in the talk about federalism since it can easily transform into a tool for concentration of political power. On the other hand, the Pragmatist is hard put to find any real or politically viable alternatives to the EU. Particularly for small states, such as Sweden, it is obvious that it is hard to be independent. The country is just too small and weak to be able to make any difference on the world scene, let alone try to walk it alone. To the pragmatist, it seems that Sweden needs strong and powerful allies and particularly allies with which the country has highly developed trade links.

In the eyes of the Pragmatist, the Swedish government has simply run out of options the day it turns out that its major trade partners, close neighboring countries, friends and even potential foes are in the middle of an integration process with the EU. There is, according to the Pragmatist, no way for the Swedish government to try to integrate the rest of the world with Sweden, which is also something that greatly simplifies the analysis. In the best of worlds, Swedish sovereignty would be unshakable, which would also make any issue of economic welfare or political power in the country an exclusively national affair. To the pragmatist, however, such notions are silly and unreal. It is not so much that more national governments together make
better decisions, but rather that other governments will not let the Swedish government do what it chooses to do. To the pragmatist, European integration is something that the Swedish government has to join in because everybody else seems to be doing it.

The Pragmatist is prone to think that European integration might in the end lead to something that is much worse than international cooperation between independent governments. One example is the relationship between France and Germany, which the Pragmatist sees as a continuing problem. It is all well and fine right now, according to the Pragmatist, because France and Germany are friends and tend to see problems in much the same way. But this is temporary in the eyes of the Pragmatist, and there are worries to be had about what might happen once the European economy in reality falls under the control of Frankfurt. In essence, European integration is about political power to the Pragmatist, and it comes naturally for him to regard the process as necessary but not desirable.

In the matter of Trade and Industry, the perspective of the Pragmatist seems to have a lot in common with that of the Enthusiast. The pragmatist also likes to use the analogy of a train leaving the station. According to this view, Trade and Industry have already begun integrating across national boundaries. In the eyes of the Pragmatist, there is not a lot that any national government can do about this situation other than try to keep in step with the march of autonomous decisions and events. On the contrary, however, the Pragmatist is far less optimistic about what the possible outcomes of this process might be. The Pragmatist will see the EU by and large as a political institution to which a number of sovereign nation states have come to administer their collective death. It is also an arena upon which national politicians with old-fashioned ideas and political programs meet with representatives from different sectors of Trade and Industry, and the Pragmatist is not sure that the economic actors are not just as set in their ways as politicians a lot of the time. To the Pragmatist, it seems as if new and really important things are going on somewhere else. The Pragmatist believes that the term globalization is better suited for any understanding of the current phase of strategic development in the economic sphere. Even the EU is too small to have a say, or even to provide a meaningful political platform for economic policy making.

The Internal Market and the approach of the EFTA countries will lead to supranationality and the need for supranational political institutions. One example is how the EFTA-group takes upon itself to safeguard the legal pillars, the monitoring agencies and an EEA court. This became too much for the EU court, of course, but behind it all is political realities that push new solutions to the forefront. If we are to guarantee the new freedoms of movement for goods and
The relationship between economic and political processes in European integration is an asymmetrical one in the eyes of the Pragmatist. Important to the Pragmatist is that Sweden is also dependent upon countries and economies outside Europe. In the world of economic interests and strategies, it is far from clear to the Pragmatist that Sweden is really as heavily dependent upon its European partners as is sometimes pointed out in the Swedish political debate. Not least, the Pragmatist points to the world-leading role of the United States and the United States Government. It seems to the Pragmatist that most important, long-term economic issues depend upon the development there. Rhetorically, the Pragmatist asks himself whether or not it is possible to imagine an EU without a supportive US in the background? To the Pragmatist, it comes as no surprise that American firms are more efficient at turning profits on the Internal Market in the early 1990s than European firms are. This, however, does not mean that the Pragmatist believes that economic actors by definition have national loyalties. Rather, the Pragmatist believes in the importance of size and relative strength, and on both those counts he sees American firms as unsurpassed in the world.

The Pragmatist believes that it will take a very long time before any significant number of European economic actors can catch up with their American counterparts. Several things are involved in the American advantage, but among the vital factors that the Pragmatist points to is the ability to assimilate and exploit new legal and political rules. European firms seem more unwilling and laggard to the Pragmatist in this aspect. In effect, the Pragmatist thinks that the whole idea of national loyalty among economic actors is symbolic of a typically European mindset.

In spite of everything, I guess most civil and company law that applies is national. Granted, however, that there is now a host of legislation in the field of company law that has been issued for the sole purpose of harmonization between nation states in Europe. (...) Many people believe, now that we are harmonizing our own national legislation with EC rules pertaining to competition, that the rules for competition according to the Rome Treaty only covers trade, which belongs to the field of international relations between EC member countries. Much of what we are doing is in accordance with the rules on the EC-level, and national legislation then pretty much becomes a copy. But it is still national, in the
sense that it is about competition in Sweden and about limits to
competition in Sweden. (…) I just don’t think that companies
show any kind of loyalty toward particular states. My idea is that
they are simply in it for the profit. (5)

Transnational regionalization is a necessary evil to the Pragmatist, but it is
also part and parcel of the overall process of European integration. The
Pragmatist thinks that all political actors are aware of the potential risk of
having too much power vested in a political center. This is true to the
Pragmatist on both levels, national and supranational, and it is part of the
European experience in the postwar era. Centralization leads to institutional
rigidity and inertia, which then explains to the Pragmatist why all political
systems in Europe sooner or later choose to initiate processes of decentralization.

A concrete, Swedish example that occurs to the Pragmatist has to do
with how the road system must be cleared of snow in winter. On the one
hand, clearing away the snow is necessary for society to function normally in
winter on the one hand. On the other hand, downfall is unevenly distributed
over the geography of the country, and this leads to a situation in which local
and regional actors must have a say in when, how and how much the snow is
cleared away. It would, the Pragmatist continues, be undesirable to have
somebody in Malmö in the far South of Sweden decide upon how much
snow needs to be cleared away in Pajala in the far North. Decentralization, to
the Pragmatist, is more or less inherent in European politics regardless of
whether it is national or supranational.

Overall, the Pragmatist takes the view that transnational regionalization
in Europe is a functionally determined phenomenon. When there is a
common perception of problems on the two sides of a national border, there
arises a common need to solve the problem. If a common perception and
functional need leads to the establishment of a new, functional institution
such as an office or joint local government branch, then the Pragmatist will
actually argue that it is the national border that is the problem if and when it
hampers transnational cooperation. However, the Pragmatist sees this
basically as a low-key political activity far from having anything to do with
mass mobilization, power resources and the building of new, regional
political institutions.

To the Pragmatist, functional cooperation is one thing and political
identity another. For a transnational region to become a political entity in its
own right would take decades of successful political agitation and identity-
building. The Pragmatist also believes that the leaders of such a new region
would have to put up a lot of money, or show the people of the region some
kind of alternative profit, before any of the citizens on each side of the
border would join in and support demands for political autonomy. As a case
in point, the Pragmatist will see the Öresund region as an illustration of this main idea. Constructing a bridge for traffic across the strait is a good idea in the eyes of the Pragmatist, because it helps solve a concrete problem of transportation. In the longer run, it will probably lead to an improvement of the traffic situations on both sides of the Öresund strait, for Danes and Swedes alike. If the benefits are evenly distributed on both sides, then it seems to the Pragmatist that people in general will feel that tax money has been well spent.

The Pragmatist takes the view that a transnational, infrastructural link such as the bridge across the Öresund is a necessity for strictly functional reasons. It is necessary also because such big investments in infrastructure are a cornerstone of the open market economy and, by extension and from a global perspective, of the continued modernization of Western-type societies. To the contrary, however, the Pragmatist is ready to question the desirability of such investment projects. Not least from the perspective of political opinion building, the Pragmatist is certain that the desirability of the bridge across the Öresund will be increasingly put into question as time progresses. Any number of reasons could be cited, but the Pragmatist chooses first and foremost to give such examples as fear of the environmental impact, problems of cost or quite simply that it may in the end turn out that the Swedes and the Danes of the region would prefer not to have such a direct and efficient physical link between themselves. What if the do not get along?

Even from a wider European, albeit strictly infrastructural, perspective there are aspects that make the Pragmatist doubtful as to the desirability of the bridge. From the point of view of logistics in Northern Europe, for example, it may well turn out that the bridge is wrong. It may well be the case that other means of transportation than road and rail will be more cost-efficient, for example. In addition, in most of Denmark and in South Sweden, the sea, shipping and fishing are firmly rooted aspects of the popular culture. The Pragmatist is hard put to see how a bridge might eventually be the kind of rallying point that is necessary for a new, transnational identity to emerge or be mobilized.

I think that we are still, in comparison with other parts of Europe, a very homogeneous people. (...) I mean, I know that some people are deeply worried, particularly social-democrats and local groups in Norrbotten and that kind, but I’m not worried at all as far as facts and figures are concerned. Discussions such as these sometimes occur but they seem to build on some kind of faulty premise. (...) There are those who want to create some kind of regional parliament without understanding the error in this. The unit will be too small, almost like a larger municipality but without the same legitimacy and strength. (...) Southern and Southwestern Sweden,
the Mälardalen region and so on, well, I’m not sure that I think it is the right thing to do. In that type of situation, it is obviously the stronger regions who will want to break away. There will be a residual group left. Then it will all be about finding good solutions to the new problems but, really, I think this line of thought is faulty mostly because the proposed regions are just too darn small. (7)

An ethnic group is a phenomenon that looks more interesting to the Pragmatist. The Sami also looks like a good example for the Pragmatist, since it has managed to withstand centuries of modernization and national sovereignty without a loss of its core identity. The Pragmatist does not see any element of desirability in political and/or territorial autonomy for this or similar groups. However, to the Pragmatist, ethnic cultural identity is an intriguing element in political integration. Potentially, ethnicity is a driving force behind politics that equals any other imaginable rationale. Essentially, the Pragmatist believes that such forces must be subdued by compensation, mostly economic compensation, from modern states. Indeed, according to the Pragmatist’s way of thinking there is already a transnationalizing political force at play in any setting where a strong cultural identity is divided by national boundaries. The identity is, and always was, already there before other social, economic and political projects were initiated.

Thus, the Pragmatist sees territorial demands, if linked to a transnational identity, as a political force to be reckoned with even in the overall perspective of European integration. Particularly since the Pragmatist also sees much larger and stronger such groups in other parts of Europe, beyond the Nordic setting but still important to how the EU can and cannot deal with ethnic and territorial demands. Furthermore, ethnicity to the Pragmatist is not necessarily linked to territorial demands but must also be considered in terms of large immigrant communities. The Pragmatist is firm in his belief that ethnicity can be a destructive political force and that it is therefore undesirable to have political organizations, states or regions built solely upon that principle. No matter how the Pragmatist looks at it, however, it is necessary to deal with such political phenomena, if only to keep them at bay, and preferably in a common political arena such as the EU, that involves many nation states all at once.

5.5 The Swedish Skeptic

To the Skeptic, European integration and the EU are two different things. There is a risk in the eyes of the Skeptic that the EU somehow continues to dominates the integration process and that supranationality thereby grows as a symbol of integration. This, however, is neither desirable nor necessary for the Skeptic. For all the current talk about European integration and for all the
political and other resources that are spent on it among the countries of Europe, there is essentially nothing new under the sun, in his perspective.

They say that we have to become members of the EC, but I have never seen a really good argument in support of that. Some say yes, so there is an ideological side to it of course. Nobody knows for sure but there is a lot of belief and guesswork, as so often when decisions are to be made. (…) National differences cannot simply be wiped out, so I do not believe in any kind of union in that sense. I pretty sure there will be some sort of backlash here soon… I think that we may perhaps be moving in the political direction of a confederate model in the long run. (…) Somewhere along the line people will say no. That is also why I believe in confederacy. Somewhere along the line the mandate runs out. (…) There must be a sense of voluntary action in order to avoid the situation that the Soviet Union had. It is a little bit like the Roman Empire, isn’t it? They saw to it that trade flows were smooth and functional, but they didn’t get involved with religion and stuff. (2)

The Skeptic will start from the perspective of peaceful international cooperation among states. Also for Europe, this is the desirable and necessary model of interaction, i.e. between sovereign national governments that safeguard their respective national interest under a deep commitment to international peace and prosperity. To the Skeptic, it seems that many contemporary threats, challenges and problems are common for particular groups of states on the international scene. The Skeptic does not see, however, why there should be a line drawn around the states of Western, or indeed, all of Europe. In addition, the Skeptic is deeply convinced that the process of European integration does not contribute to history with anything that is new, at least not the way it currently unfolds.

There is nothing inherently new or particularly creative about supranationality in Europe, according to the Skeptic, and there seems to be precious little evidence that supranationality is any more productive than international cooperation. That is, the Skeptic prefers to talk about international cooperation in terms of voluntary, but at the same time committed, cooperation between sovereign democratic states. Against this background, the Skeptic sees a possibility that the EU might still evolve in a better direction and his skepticism toward the EU is mainly based on principle. In effect, the Skeptic thinks that European governments in general have proven themselves loath to give up sovereignty over and over again throughout history, which is why there seems to be no imminent risk of a supranational political union being formed.

Above all, the Skeptic relies on a notion of deep set and politically salient dividing lines between European countries. More than any other part of Europe, the Skeptic likes to make examples out of such countries as
belonged to the Eastern bloc in the cold war era. Nearing the end of the 20th century, the Skeptic sees how those countries are emerging as the ones in most dire need of political and economic support in Europe. At the same time, the EU shows a lot of political weakness and indecision, particularly as concerns issues of economic aid and support. It is possible, in this perspective, that the economically more successful group of EU-countries is not even interested in lending the rest of Europe a hand. To the Skeptic, the involvement of Eastern European countries is crucial to the success of the political integration project. Without it, the project is almost certainly doomed to failure in the long run.

Nevertheless, the most important divisions and political cleavages can be found in Western Europe. Not least, the Skeptic sees them among those countries who are at the center of gravity in the current phase of integration, i.e. among those states and governments who most ardently pursue supranationality. Above all, such things as cultural dispositions, political temperaments and long term political interests are important. Equally important is the way they differ between the major players on the EU arena. The Skeptic particularly likes to draw on examples from the policies of the UK, France and Germany. In this light, the outcome of European integration is important for the future of all Europe, but cannot be regarded as a decisive factor. For Sweden specifically, integration is neither desirable nor necessary against such a background.

What view the Skeptic takes on the category Trade and Industry is not entirely clear. There is a tendency in some of the answers to see the transnational strategies and activities of firms as an expression of a power shift. Some interviewees indicate that they think that national governments in Europe are losing power vis-à-vis economic actors. In some cases, there is an element of skepticism in how the shift is also blamed on the national governments themselves, i.e. that national governments actively shift political power to firms and companies by deregulation and other national political reforms. The following quote indicates some of the ambiguity among responses concerning this particular cognitive category.

The first thing is that we have a country with a high level of industrialization and a highly developed capacity for research and development. The second thing is that we will become net financial contributors to the integration process. The third, although I probably should have brought it up as the number one example, is that Sweden is a country that in every possible respect already answers up to the basic tenets of European integration – democracy and market economy. (11)

7 Compare with Appendix 1.
Functional regionalism, to the contrary, is easy to pinpoint. The Skeptic takes the view that particularly transnational functional regionalism totally lacks credibility and political support in Sweden. Furthermore, the Skeptic sees no linkage whatsoever between the process of European integration on the one hand and any aspect of regional development on the other. Generally, the Skeptic is of the opinion that transnational regionalism could never grow as a political concept in Sweden. Considering the Nordic setting, the Skeptic takes pretty much the same view and reasserts his notion that there really is no political or other support for such ideas that he knows of or can foresee. Rather, the Skeptic would make recourse to examples from the environmental sector, which he then mainly sees as a set of problems without being able to attribute any obvious or viable political solutions to them.

Environmental problems stand out to the Skeptic as something that might potentially bring for example the peoples of the Baltic Sea Area closer together. There is also a widespread, to the Skeptic almost palpable, fear of environmental degradation among the Nordic peoples. But then the Skeptic immediately points out that any real program to combat environmental problems in Northern Europe invariably must include the whole of the Baltic Sea Area, including countries on the fringe of it, such as Germany, Poland and Russia. According to the Skeptic however, two things allow national sovereignties to overshadow any attempts at regionalization of environmental issues. First, national governments have what might be called a political monopoly on such issues because there are big costs involved and, similarly, because the necessary legislative and fiscal changes must be made by national parliaments and governments. Second, in practice, national governments dominate the environmental-political agenda both nationally and internationally. The citizens of the Nordic countries expect their national governments to take care of any issues of security and survival. The Skeptic agrees that there are certain elements of cooperation between cities and municipalities in Northern Europe, not least in the field of environmental issues. However, it is hard for the Skeptic to differentiate such cooperative schemes from the merely symbolic pleasantries going on between sister-cities, local politicians making courtesy visits and laying the foundations of friendship parks, school children visiting their counterparts in a neighboring country and so on.

In general, the Skeptic does not believe in transnational regionalization regardless of whether the issue can be defined as functional or territorial:

Well, if we are talking about infrastructure, which seems to be a very topical thing these days, I am of the opinion that it is a question of means to an end, nothing more, nothing less. Then, how to use such means is pretty much up to each and every person to decide for
himself. These things are also very hard to influence. Perhaps we can provide some basics and prerequisites, and that is what I think we are supposed to do. But at the end of the day it must be up to each actor to decide for himself what he wants to do. If the right things are put into place, one can only hope that they come to good use. (45)
problems also among the countries of Western Europe, mentioning for example Great Britain, France and Spain. To the Skeptic, this is nevertheless an old problem for the national governments and one that is being increasingly managed by those concerned. Cultural issues are a potential divider of nations and a threat to the political stability of democracies. Overall, however, the Skeptic does not see ethnic or territorial issues as the big problem in Europe. The Skeptic most certainly does not see such issues as belonging to the supranational political agenda, but rather as things to be dealt with in national settings. At the top of the Skeptic’s intellectual agenda are questions of international stability and national influence in European affairs.

5.6 Summary Discussion of the ROFE Interviews

Two of the theoretical categories used in this study, European integration and Trade and Industry, come close to what has been burning topics in the Swedish public debate on EU membership. With the governments renewed political efforts at adaptation to the EU, via the EEA treaty in the late 1980s and the subsequent acquis negotiations, much of the debate has focused on what to make of transnationalizing tendencies in Trade and Industry and, furthermore, to just what extent the process of European integration makes the national political system obsolete. By and large, the public debate has been held in pro-et-contra terms, i.e. in an environment where you either say Yes or No to membership. More often than not, crucial arguments have been constructed around definitions of how to interpret transnationalizing tendencies in economic and political life. The Yes-argument has been based on the assumption that membership is both desirable and necessary, oftentimes using examples from Trade and Industry to show how economic actors are becoming transnational and European whether governments or peoples like it or not. For the No-side, the argument has been vice-versa, with an additional emphasis on how Europe is riddled with asymmetries and economic injustices. Large part of the discussion has been about how particular geographical areas and certain social groups in Sweden run the risk of becoming losers because they lack sufficient resources or skill to be able to compete in a Europe without frontiers.8

The cognitive frames that emerge from the ROFE interviews, however, have more nuances. Even the Enthusiast is careful when trying to formulate exactly what political role is emerging for national governments against the background of increasing economic transnationalization on the one hand and political supranationality on the other. A lasting impression

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8 Compare with Kite (1996); Strandbrink (1999).
from the results of the interviews is that Swedish integration elites are trying to be cautious. They are definitely not sure about where the integration project is going and, what is more, there are pretty big differences between what is seen as important from one individual to another. There are also differences in how images and arguments are constructed, particularly on the two cognitive dimensions of necessity and desirability. The fact that there is a substantial group of outright Skeptics in the ROFE added to the fact that an even bigger number of sceptical arguments are constructed, even by Enthusiasts, seems to indicate that very few individuals regard adaptation to the EU as working toward an end-state or some kind of political finality. To the contrary, respondents from ROFE are prone to talk about how national and supranational institutions and projects complement each other in the European setting.

In general, the interview material is not characterized by any kind of political naiveté concerning the potential effects of European integration or of Sweden entering the EU. It is as if the interviewees become more pragmatic and more voluntarist in their ideas the more they are allowed to go into detailed examples of their own. In short, the ROFE interviews point to at least four different stories about what political adaptation to the EU is all about. Far from all of the interviewees come across as typical Yes-voices when compared with how arguments are mostly constructed in the public debate. The first two theoretical categories, European integration and Trade and Industry, seem to give rise to Enthusiasm and Pragmatism mainly. The other theoretical categories however, Functional and Territorial Regionalism, bring out Voluntarism and Skepticism. Interestingly, when the interviewees are uncertain about what the two regionalism categories really might entail for Sweden in political terms, they will move toward looking at them as undesirable.

Generally, the members of ROFE are hard put to see integration as anything other than the highly formalized and regulated inter-governmental cooperation that they are themselves involved with. Integration, to most of them, is an intensified form of international cooperation. There are almost no negative connotations concerning the theoretical category Trade and Industry, and transnationalizing tendencies in the business world are mostly seen as good for Sweden. On the contrary, regional issues and transnational regional issues are seen first and foremost as a national, governmental policy area. There is a general attitude among the interviewees which says that the state must always be there to offset regional imbalances and to actively promote regional development. Again, in general, it is hard for the ROFE members to see how national regional policy would in any way have to change or, for that matter, be challenged by regional actors.
Table 2: Synthetic analytical features of the Swedish interviews broken down by cognitive categories.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Synthetic Attitude (61)</th>
<th>Enthusiast</th>
<th>Voluntarist</th>
<th>Pragmatist</th>
<th>Skeptic</th>
</tr>
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</table>

Synthesizing the analytical features of the interviews with ROFE members is interesting in this light. It is noteworthy that ROFE is dominated by Voluntarists and Pragmatists. The number of Voluntarists is also slightly bigger than that of Pragmatists and the number of Enthusiasts and Skeptics are both comparatively small. The dominant cognitive categories are all positively inclined toward European integration. With reference to the theoretical argument of this thesis, however, there is also evidence that these categories make completely different assumptions about what is necessary and what is desirable in the process.

The Voluntarists basically think that adaptation to the EU is a good thing because it is desirable, but they do not think that there is any necessity involved, or simply put, that Sweden has to do it for political or economic reasons. In the minds of Voluntarists, adaptation to the EU is connected with positive values and an opportunity to make Europe economically and socially better for all Europeans, even for those who do not have direct access to EU institutions or the Internal Market.

To the other dominant cognitive category, the Pragmatists, on the other hand, the whole project seems to be about dire necessity. The Pragmatist argues that adaptation to the EU is good for Sweden simply because there is no better alternative. On the same token, there are some long term economic benefits involved. In a way, the Pragmatist likes to think that he makes a virtue of necessity, although there is nothing inherently desirable about the policy choices a nation has to make in order to gain access to the expected economic and structural benefits. To the Pragmatist, there are a lot of aspects that make the adaptation process and eventually the pressures of full EU membership undesirable. At the same time, the Pragmatist cannot really see any viable option.

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9 See Table 1 in the opening of this chapter.
Thus, the cognitive patterns inside ROFE are quite different from those of the contextual discussion about European integration in Sweden 1988-94. In the contextual discussion there is much less room for complexity, caution and nuances than what has been shown in this chapter as important parts of ROFE cognition. The respondents see complexity and alternative transnational thinking as important parts of the discussion about European integration and they are apprehensive that a political discussion about simple alternatives, such as saying Yes or No to Europe, might create more problems than it solves. Whether or not the European question in Swedish politics benefits more from ideological polarization in the long run, however, than what it does from carefully constructed and reasoned consensus still remains an open question. To ROFE, polarization seems like a risk that comes with the job.

The territorial, political and economic integrity of the sovereign nation state is an open issue for the interviewees in ROFE. Despite this widespread idea, respondents are hard put to try to foresee where the integration process will eventually take Sweden. Few of the respondents believe that European integration will do away with the nation state in Europe, most certainly not if the discussion is about small and tightly knit national systems such as the Swedish one.

Many respondents have recourse to the argument that there is a coarse line that divides economic policies from social policies, and that European integration at the time of the fourth EU enlargement mostly has to do with economic harmonization.
6. Framing Polish adaptation to the EU

In the context of the Polish EU debate 1998-2004, political and economic elites are confronted with an emergent ‘naturalistic’ view of nationhood among the electorate.¹ According to this popular view, European integration poses an immediate threat to all that was gained when Poland freed itself from Soviet dominance, introduced democracy and started down the path toward integration with global economic markets in the early 1990s.

Most of the UKIE respondents think that it is difficult to work around such political arguments when trying to adapt the country to the EU. Some feel that it has been hard to direct public attention to the good aspects of European integration and they have a creeping sense that the Polish public is suspicious about things European. The members of UKIE think that it is an inspiring task to establish a good position for Poland in the new Europe, but also that important political factors are missing in Poland. These are things like the ‘historical experience of bottom-up thinking’ and ‘integration between civil society and the political system’ (12).² There is also a worry that European integration will be seen by the Polish people as forced upon them from above.

European issues in Poland are seen as more determined by national problems than with ideas and initiatives from Brussels. The process of adaptation to the EU is regarded by respondents as pivotal to the future development of the country, but they are not altogether sure that the institutionalization of democracy in Poland has had enough time to mature since 1989, and that the EU might eventually be blamed for the general state of affairs in Poland. The relative high-pitch of the debate that signifies the Polish context 1998-2004³ does not convince the UKIE respondents that Poland’s future as an EU member is doomed, but that it is hard to foresee just what kind of relative political stability the country might enjoy even in a short-term perspective.

This chapter analyzes the cognitive patterns of interviewees in the UKIE. In the first section, the interview material is regarded as a whole and an overview is given of how the answers from UKIE can be analyzed according to cognitive category (Enthusiast, Voluntarist, Pragmatist and Skeptic). Just as in the Swedish case, the Polish material is also analyzed

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² As in the previous chapter,

³ This refers to the context as explored in Chapter 4 of this thesis.
according to theoretical category (European Integration, Trade and Industry, Functional and Territorial Regionalism) to give an initial overview. In the following four sections, the chapter goes on to a detailed description of what each of the cognitive categories looks like in the case of UKIE, based on an analysis of the research interviews supported by quotes. The final fifth section provides a summary discussion of the overall results and a synthesis of the fundamental attitudes to European integration in UKIE.

6.1 Principal Features of the UKIE Interviews

Table 4 depicts the principal features of the Polish interview material when the four cognitive categories are combined with the four theoretical categories. As in the case of chapter 4 in this thesis, the interviewees are divided up differently between the cognitive categories. The table here displays the overall results of the analysis of the UKIE interviews and the content of all answers given. Again, an individual member of UKIE can be an Enthusiast concerning for example the theoretical category European integration, but also either a Voluntarist, a Pragmatist or a Skeptic as regards the theoretical category Trade and Industry. As before, this table shows what effect each theoretical category has on the cognition of the interviewees in this study.

Table 3: Principal analytical features of the Polish interviews with the theoretical and cognitive categories combined (number of respondents in parentheses).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theoretical</th>
<th>Cognitive</th>
<th>Enthusiast</th>
<th>Voluntarist</th>
<th>Pragmatist</th>
<th>Skeptic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>European integration (20)</td>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade and Industry (20)</td>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Functional Regionalism (18)</td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Territorial Regionalism (15)</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the case of UKIE, the theoretical categories spread the cognitive categories out in different patterns. Again, depending upon which category is up for discussion individuals will be more or less enthusiastic, voluntarist, pragmatic or sceptical about the linkage with EU membership. Again, an individual in the UKIE who is an Enthusiast regarding European integration may have a different view on, for example Functional Regionalism, giving support to views that lie closer to the Pragmatist. How the illustration is intended to be read has already been described in the foregoing chapter, but to recap the most important of the points made there: Table 3 represents the overall pattern, or the sum of all ideas, of the interviewees in the UKIE study.
Looking at the overall pattern of variation in Table 3, there are two things that stand out. First of all, UKIE as a group seems to be lining itself up in either of the two columns Enthusiast or Pragmatist. Voluntarist and Skeptic perceptions are scarce in the material seen as a whole. The interviewees in the UKIE divide themselves up fairly clearly between two of the cognitive categories regardless of theoretical category. Secondly, the number of Skeptics in the overall analysis is small even without entering into a premature comparison with the Swedish ROFE case. In the UKIE material, two of the theoretical categories fail to produce Skeptics altogether, as can be seen in the last column in Table 3. The theoretical categories European integration and Trade and Industry only have an effect on the other three cognitive categories. Moreover, even those two theoretical categories that produce cognitive Skeptics, i.e. Functional and Territorial Regionalism, the total number of Skeptic perceptions is comparatively small.

Going through the theoretical categories in Table 3 in turn, starting with European integration the Pragmatists dominate the picture, closely followed by the Enthusiasts. There is a complete lack of Skeptics regarding this category and only a limited number of Voluntarists. A similar perceptual pattern is repeated for the next theoretical category, which is Trade and Industry. For these two categories, all respondents have given answers (20) which give a solid pattern concerning the linkage between European integration and the situation for Polish Trade and Industry. Also on the second category, UKIE respondents express Enthusiastic and Pragmatic perceptions, albeit with a slight shift in favor of the Enthusiast perception. In all, with regard to the first two theoretical categories, the perception among the UKIE respondents is that European integration and the opportunities for Polish Trade and Industry are positively related to each other, and that there are slight differences between how aspects of necessity and desirability should be measured against each other. Nobody in the interview material is a Skeptic regarding these two categories.

In the other two theoretical categories in Table 3, however, Skeptic perceptions emerge in the interviews. Functional Regionalism is the theoretical category which produces the strongest incidence of Skeptic perceptions among the interviewees. Territorial Regionalism also has an effect although it is not very strong in neither of the two. Interestingly, the pattern is still similar to the one concerning the first two categories. Regardless of the emergent Skeptics in the material concerning the last two theoretical categories, there is still a penchant toward Enthusiast and Pragmatist perceptions in the UKIE material as a whole.

Perhaps the most striking feature in the Polish material is an absence, or at least near-absence, of Skeptic perceptions in the interview material. The members of UKIE differ in how they reason about the necessity or the
desirability of EU membership for Poland, but none of them are outright Skeptics. That is to say that none of the UKIE interviewees reject EU membership on the ground that it is neither necessary nor desirable. Before this chapter goes into the empirical detail of each of the cognitive categories in order to trace the detail of the thinking which lies behind this overall perceptual pattern in UKIE, a few words can be said about the results from the interviews that are important for an interpretation.

Taking a bird’s-eye view of the material, which are the general attitudes displayed in the Polish material? As described in Table 3 above, the majority of results from the UKIE interviews fall into the two cognitive categories labeled Voluntarist and Pragmatist. There is a slight dominance for the Pragmatists. There might be truth hidden behind numbers here—with a larger number of participants from UKIE, there might also have been Skeptics in the material. It falls beyond the task of this thesis, however, to determine whether or not the Polish interviews are representative of UKIE, or not. Again, the emphasis in this thesis lies on exploring organizational and cognitive contexts. The cognitive model works in the Polish case, and this is the major finding. Again, this is not to say that there are not, nor have there ever been, Skeptics in the UKIE since not all members have been interviewed. The results here can only be interpreted as just that: the results of interviews with 20 individuals from the organization, not with all of them.

Nevertheless, the UKIE interviewees are inclined to think about their adaptive work in different ways, applying different motivational structures in the process. It is possible also in the Polish case to question whether or not such structures are based on images of a future supranational union in Europe (which would probably demand a higher number of Enthusiasts on all theoretical categories) or based on visions of continued international cooperation between sovereign states that limit their interaction to voluntary agreements (which in turn would demand a larger number of Skeptics). Considering that the majority of respondents are grouped in the Voluntarist and Pragmatist categories, what do their ideas look like? Which are the dividing lines between their conceptions of Necessity and Desirability as their country is entering the EU?

Voluntarists and Pragmatists emerge as dominant cognitive categories also in the Polish case. Again, before moving into the detailed analysis of how the different perceptions are constructed by interviewees, it is appropriate to reiterate a major point of this thesis. The results of the Polish study also go beyond a simple Yes-No dichotomy in terms of national adaptation to the EU. The principal features of the UKIE material also show that political cognition among adaptation elites in this field are complex. The simple dichotomy retains some of its value regarding some of the issues concerned in the analysis here, but falls outside the general cognitive patterns. So, what do the cognitive patterns of Enthusiasts, Voluntarists, Pragmatists and Skeptics look like in the case of UKIE?
6.2 The Polish Enthusiast

To the Polish Enthusiast, European integration is both necessary and desirable because it brings new opportunities\(^4\) to the Polish people on all levels of social and economic life. The Enthusiast believes that European integration is the most important driving force behind positive change in Polish society, such as modernization of the legal system and the government apparatus or the improvement of economic functions and living standards. There are two major effects in Polish society, which the Enthusiast thinks makes up the visible signs of European integration.

The first significant effect of European integration is what the Enthusiast refers to as catching up. This refers to a perceived long-term process of catching up economically with the richer countries in Western Europe. The Enthusiast thinks that significant progress has already been made by the Polish national economy and that prospects are good for continuing successes in this endeavor. Above all, it relates to the complete overhaul of legal and economic standards that Poland has gone through over the past ten years. It has to do with the import of new economic and social standards to Poland, sometimes inspired by the EU Commission but more often than not both inspired and implemented by partner countries. European integration so far has entailed a transfer of legal and administrative know-how from more advanced countries to Poland, which the Enthusiast also thinks has helped Poland through a process of very rapid and encompassing reform and change. The Enthusiast doubts that it could ever have been done as quickly and successfully without the help of partner countries and the European Commission. Above all, the Enthusiast feels that the Polish government has been successful in creating new opportunities for level competition between Polish actors and actors from other EU countries. In fact, the Enthusiast thinks that the idea of creating a “level playing field” for market and social actors in Europe is the most important, visionary driving force in European integration.

It is not really a yes-no issue, the way I see it. I find myself somewhere in between most of the time, but I am definitely convinced that there are real, long-term benefits to be made from the integration process. In the short term, well, I hear all these small-town arguments, like there was this widespread fear of economic and social dumping in the referendum debate. They are partly right, I guess, because there is always a risk involved in large-scale projects such as this one. (…) But on the other hand we really need the EU for security and stability. We need the EU to back up some difficult processes that have to do with continued modernization and reform. In the final analysis, there is just a big plus in that we can profit. (7)

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\(^4\) The notion of new opportunities for Poland is also strong in the mind of the Voluntarist, although the interpretation of what these opportunities mean and what they entail for the country is different. See under rubric 6.3 in the following.
The second significant effect of European integration that the Enthusiast can see is that it contributes to a more open-minded and inquisitive social climate in Poland. To the Enthusiast it seems as if the discussion about Poland’s proper place in Europe is and always has been an emotional affair. Even in the days of the Cold War and Soviet dominance over Poland, the Enthusiast believes that the Polish people retained a sense of belonging to Europe and of having more in common with the peoples of Western and Central Europe than with those of Eastern Europe and Russia, notwithstanding the realization that to most other Europeans in the days of the Cold War, Poland was considered an Eastern European country by everybody except the Poles themselves. As an emotional factor in Polish politics, nevertheless, Europe is important to the Enthusiast because now the process of European integration allows the Polish people to feel better about themselves. In particular, the Enthusiast thinks that European integration provides opportunities for the Poles to rediscover what their country and history are really all about and to open their minds up to what they might be in the future.

At this point the Enthusiast also makes a generational distinction by adding that European integration has given new impetus to the younger generation in Poland. The Enthusiast seems to hear younger people in Poland asking questions, such as why should we be left behind? Why should we be considered as different? The Enthusiast thinks that the concept of European integration to Poles in general, and to younger people in particular, stands for an historic opportunity to do away with Poland’s excess baggage of relative deprivation. Whereas the Enthusiast is convinced that it will take a long time to reach up to even to the lowest levels of economic prosperity among the older EU countries, the intellectual and cultural catching up has already been done. Particularly young people in Poland today, so the Enthusiast argues, are already intellectually and culturally integrated with the European Union.

Generally, the Enthusiast thinks that there is almost a new political cleavage in Poland between the younger and the older generations. Even in those areas of Poland that are know to the Enthusiast as “more conservative towards the EU, which is mainly rural areas and small towns” (6) there seem to be a tendency among the young to assimilate new ideas and visions more quickly than among their older relatives. The Enthusiast exemplifies this with the will to travel abroad and to experience new and different cultures, which also brings hope for new political arenas in Poland. In this development the Enthusiast also hears a lot more talk about the current opportunities brought by European integration as well as a more future-oriented debate. Consequently, the Polish Enthusiast in convinced that a lot of the skepticism towards European integration has to do with the way older people tend to look inward and backward looking when faced with new challenges.
Sometimes, the Enthusiast muses, there is even an element of jealousy involved and goes on to explain how the older generations, used as they were to surviving and living through economically and socially unworthy conditions, simply mistrust the ease and lightness that young people in Poland display today when thinking about where they want to work and live.

When I think about it, I really don’t believe that the older generations trust anyone, not even themselves. They scoff at the very idea of international cooperation and always tend to see it as a masked form of Soviet imperialism. (…) It does not make economic sense to waste money on information for these people. They’ve had it too hard. You cannot reason with them because of their historical experience…so the modernizing force has to come from the rest of us. (3)

I think that Poles have experienced more stereotypes aimed against them than almost any other people in Europe. But I do not think that you can talk about stereotypes just like that in the case of Poland. I mean, in the 4th enlargement process things were so much different from the one we just finished, the 5th I mean. There was no wall.(…) Today, the COMECON is like a ghost…Things have changed very quickly around here. (6)

The Enthusiast believes that European integration is the key to a better life for the younger generations of Poles. Behind this image of things lies the conviction that European integration first and foremost has to do with different aspects of increased mobility in Europe. The Enthusiast believes that particularly the younger generations in Poland are ready to utilize these opportunities to the benefit of themselves and their country mainly because there are some distinct features of Polish culture that fit the visions and practices of European integration.

We are indeed a very mobile people. We always have been. This has nothing to do with power structures or formal agreements between countries. (…) There was actually a debate right after the London-Glasgow incident, back in May this year. When those guys came back, they told us that it was impossible to find a job anywhere and that it was not a very pleasant experience…there were diplomats on TV, saying don’t go there, but it was really very small-scale. As far as I know, people keep going abroad and they all have different stories to tell, some about success and some not. (3)

In effect, the Enthusiast believes that to the extent that European integration brings about ever increasing levels of mobility within and between countries, it is one if not the main aspect of integration that has almost perfect fit with Polish culture. The Enthusiast subdivides mobility into two areas, one external and one internal. The external one has good fit with Polish culture because Poles have for generations become accustomed to long journeys and long periods of seclusion from their homeland, in many cases also from their families.
Polish culture, in this perspective, has an inherent transnational dimension in which Poles are more ready than most Europeans to move around the world and explore economic and social opportunities elsewhere. The internal dimension, however, has to do with an aspect of social life in Poland.

According to the Enthusiast, it is a Polish ideal to have a small business going, “preferably a small shop, or something”. Furthermore, the Enthusiast likes to point out that an entrepreneurial economic spirit is part of the Polish cultural heritage and an integral part of the historical resistance towards foreign dominance and totalitarian government. The Enthusiast sees European integration as a liberating force that helps to boost this old, culturally based institution in Polish society. Examples are taken mainly from 20th century history, however, and the Enthusiast particularly points out that the legal right to private ownership is no more than 12 years old in Poland. Under Communism, the Enthusiast points out, there was always a sector of small businesses that somehow managed to survive in Poland and that was always very important as a symbol of resistance to what was generally perceived of as a totalitarian system imposed upon the country by the Soviet Union. This is particularly important for the Enthusiast in deciding that there is a strong cultural element in Polish entrepreneurship and small-business activity.

It used to be allowed to have a small business with no more than 3-5 employees in it, but it was all severely restricted and you were always subjected to a lot of black-market pressure and corruption in your capacity of proprietor. So, for Poles, the right to unlimited ownership has dangled the vision of profit before the eyes of the people, which is to say that most Poles are absorbed by the idea that their business, no matter how small, can expand and make even bigger profits. It is still quite new to entrepreneurs out there and the public interest is huge. (3)

The Polish Enthusiast is convinced that Poland has undergone a dramatic change in the past decade and that this change is inextricably linked to European integration. He feels that the UKIE and the teams of Polish negotiators have done their best over the years of pre-accession and accession negotiations. Specifically, the Enthusiast points out that the complexities involved in the integration project are immense and that even if EU membership does not solve all problems once and for all, it is difficult to see any viable alternative. At the core of the Enthusiast’s argument is the belief that there are three parallel processes that affect modern democracies and market economies. First and most visibly, there is the political process of European integration. Second, there is the more obscure process of globalization in terms of economic opportunities and life styles. Third, there is the evolving system of territorial disparities inside countries, or the
Concerning the topic of transnationalization in Polish Trade and Industry, however, the Polish Enthusiast wants to make an important qualification. The Enthusiast still thinks that European integration provides good opportunities, but also that Polish Trade and Industry might not have the best of starting points for the exploitation of such possibilities. It is important for the Enthusiast to describe the two main lines followed by the discussion of European integration and Trade and Industry in Poland. First, there is the issue of size. The Enthusiast believes that there is good reason for Poles to have faith in their small- and medium size economic units simply because there really is not a lot of Polish big industry to talk about in the first place. The reasons for that, the Enthusiast believes to be buried in recent history and the political and economic dominance from the Soviet Union to which Poland was subjected for so many decades, which precluded economic growth and activity spurred on by competition and free trade. It seems to the Enthusiast that most of those businesses that were small under Communism, but somehow managed to survive, are today ready to step up to the next level of activity and become medium size firms. Adding this to the opportunities of the Single Market, for example, the Enthusiast can see some really good prospects for a dynamic economic development from below in the Polish economy today.

Second, and this is what the Enthusiast holds out as the important qualification, there is the vital importance of regional border trade with the countries that surround Poland. Because of the structural traits of Polish business, economic development is heavily dependent upon territorial divisions and proximity aspects.

In a sense, I feel as if this [the discussion about transnational Trade and Industry] is more of a futures question in Poland. It has not really been debated yet, at least not that I am aware of. I have a feeling that our big firms, and there is only one I can think of that makes kitchen appliances and such, well, they are mostly very busy learning and trying to catch up with their Western counterparts. (…) But, you know, if we talk about border trade, then there are big regions that have to survive on small businesses. This is really vital from a strategic point of view. (3)
The Polish Enthusiast does not believe, however, that the nationality of the specific firm or conglomerate is what matters when it comes to big industry in Europe. This view is supported, again, by the conviction that small and medium size industry in Poland will have good opportunities to develop, prosper and contribute to raising the general standard of living in the country thanks to the opportunities provided by the process of European integration. On the contrary, the Enthusiast believes that it is unimportant for a country in the global economy to develop big transnational firms of its own. As far as the Enthusiast can see, the important thing for a country to do is to create a good climate for economic investment and to enhance good will among transnational investors.

It is hard to explain even for me, and I am supposed to be an expert in this field. I think that if we look at Poland, there are a couple of things. First, there is the investment wave of the 1990s, when many entrepreneurs were given tax exemptions and so on. We introduced the free zones and got a lot of investment flows from the EU and managed to create factor mobility. Today, with the EU membership, it is even easier to move products and to sell them, but now we can see how there is an increasing awareness of social and other costs related to economic development. If you ask me, three months after joining the EU we can see how we are beginning to lose investment that goes to China and other parts of Asia instead. (...) I always say that we are beginning to lose our happiness. (6)

As far as I know, they are all here already. As far as I can understand, the climate in Poland for transnationals should be excellent right now, at least on paper (...) corporate tax is low and the government has taken a number of steps to attract capital (...) If you take a closer look, it immediately becomes clear that there is one serious bottleneck. You need a lot of permissions to set something up. It is so bureaucratic! I really think that by international comparison it takes a very long time to set up shop in Poland. (3)

The Enthusiast does not really see any reason as to why Poland should be better or worse off because of its lack of big industrial conglomerates. Transnational capital will go to those countries or regions that offer the best investment climates, and the Enthusiast goes on to enumerate such factors as the legal system and the social and political climate. The Enthusiast is convinced that Poland has its strength in its people and in its small-business climate. As far as transnationalization in trade and industry is concerned, the Enthusiast simply points to the fact that major industrial and service capital has been established in Poland over the past decade to the extent that the initial fears of the early 1990s, those of becoming a poor and backward country on the common market in Europe, have been alleviated. The
Enthusiast believes that this is all part and parcel of what most Poles refer to as “normalization” – the economic opportunities are there and it is all a matter of catching them at the right time.

Young people in Poland today are rushing toward that which is new to them. Quite frequently, in my lectures⁵, I have to spend so much time educating them about what Poland used to be like because the young ones today simply do not know even about the 80s anymore. It is quite funny sometimes. They think I am telling them stories for children…and there is so much energy and curiosity…but there just never seem to be any barriers at all to them. It is just amazing how quickly people forget. (…) They love Poland, that much I understand, but they just cannot see why they should not be able to work and study abroad for some time, just for fun and education. (…) Dotcom is not territorial, you know! (6)

Capital is faceless, according to the Enthusiast, but it is always interested in the faces of the people who inhabit the space in which they have invested or, for that matter, are about to invest. Again, the Enthusiast thinks that the Polish people have a lot to offer. The lack of really big, transnational conglomerates with board rooms in Warsaw or Krakow is something the Enthusiast regards with a detached cool, saying that the important thing is to keep investments flowing into Europe in a globalizing economic climate.

As you have perhaps seen already, there is a lot of Asian capital here in Poland today. This is good. I do not really see that any particular group or country has taken over in their own right. Asia is big, but then, that is not a country, is it? It seems more like a global phenomenon when you see Korean cars all over in the streets, because you see this in almost every country I can think of in Europe. (4)

The Enthusiast is also content with the way European integration interacts with the economic policies and strategies of member countries, thinking that it would be so much harder for national governments to try to attract capital on their own. It is also something that the Enthusiast believes would force individual governments to make far larger and more difficult concessions to investors. This is all a discussion that the Enthusiast recognizes well from the Polish debate on Europe and on membership of the EU. Regardless of the importance of technical distinctions between small and large scale industry and their meaning for an understanding of the concrete Polish situation, the Enthusiast believes that such things do not suffice to make the

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⁵ At the beginning of this interview, the respondent points to personal experiences from keeping a part time position as lecturer in Economics at the Warsaw School of Economics and Statistics on the side of UKIE.
Polish economy in any way unique in Europe. Other countries, even among the older members, have similar problems and opportunities. The Enthusiast points out, however, that the economic restructuring in the pre-accession process led to an enormous increase in international investment in Poland. Consequently, a lot of big and medium size Polish firms went out of business in the early years of European rapprochement. What the Enthusiast really thinks speaks for Poland in the current situation is that this sometimes dire process of restructuring and reallocation of resources ran fairly smoothly. There was not much medium size industry to talk of in the first place and, equally important, some of the other firms that were weeded out were basically “fly-by-night” constructions that had been hastily put together by old political elites in Poland immediately after the fall of the Berlin wall.

When the Polish Enthusiast considers functional and territorial regionalism, there is first an element of recognition. The Enthusiast seems to recognize the arguments that have been made in the Polish debate on Europe about how growth zones and corridors might help to improve the overall economic growth in one or several countries. However, the Enthusiast is far from certain that this discussion is viable for economic systems less developed than for example those of Scandinavia, Germany or France. The Enthusiast seems to think that a certain level of development in the national economy is necessary prior to any development of such transnational, or indeed national, schemes. The Enthusiast does believe, however, that this is a discussion that will reemerge in Poland at a later stage of its economic development. Currently, however, functional and territorial regionalism is first and foremost an internal issue, one that is more closely linked to the ongoing European discussion about social cohesion. Ethnicity, by and large, does not enter into it for the Polish Enthusiast since he is aware of the fact that the country is up to approximately 98% ethnically homogeneous.

The EU is good for Poland. The changes that we go through are good for us. We do not have shortages anymore, which is fantastic. There is a lack of money, of course, but basically the structure is sound and it is all OK. (…) Of course, it depends on the region. It is good that you bring this up, particularly the image of divided Poland is important, I think. I am convinced that there are benefits for all. But transboundary trade with Germany is better than transboundary trade with Belarus…it is cheaper to buy a TV set in Berlin than it is to buy the same set in Poland. It is fantastic that we have substituted shortages for opportunities, but not everybody can see this yet. (…)

I really do not see any long-term disadvantages. (…) There are many small and medium size firms and enterprises in Poland, and I am sure that they will find ways to manage this particular market situation. (6)
European cooperation in every way is both necessary and desirable for the Enthusiast also when it comes to regional issues. Importantly, however, the Polish Enthusiast will see regions and regional schemes essentially as an instrument of economic growth and social cohesion. The Enthusiast can clearly see how both regional development and regional harmonization are inextricably linked to a continued transfer of knowledge and capital from the EU 15 to the new member states in an effort to bring the least developed regions up to a level of economic and social welfare that is at least near those that are the lowest of the EU 15. Cooperation in this field is both necessary and desirable in the eyes of the Enthusiast.

The Enthusiast also sees an element of high political gain for Poland. The Enthusiast sees it as a win-win situation for Poland regardless of whether regional cohesion is concerned, which bears the promise of economic and infrastructure improvement, or the debate about regional dimensions in Europe which, in turn, promises to give Poland an enhanced role in European politics. To the Enthusiast, it seems much more likely that the important regional concept in the future Europe will connote groups of states, perhaps also growth corridors across such territories, but regions bigger than subnational units all the same. The Northern Dimension initiative of Finland and Sweden has been followed with keen interest by the Enthusiast, who thinks that this is the regional concept of the future within the confines of the European Union.

I am supportive of the idea of regional cooperation and peace but I really do not see the state dissolving in the near future. (...) The concept of the nation state is so strongly internalized among the peoples of Europe, at least the way I see it. (...) I have nothing against the Northern Dimension, municipal cooperation and such [but] if I may be blunt, the Northern Dimension is not for us, simply not for Poland at all. We mostly think of it here as something that is between the rich Nordic countries and the Baltic States. It is easy to see why it is interesting in that context, but here? No. (...) In fact, I do not think that the Eastern Dimension has received the political attention it deserves in Europe. But it will. EU relations with Russia have dominated and continue to do so (...) I just think it is wrong to let Russia dominate...and we should do the same thing again, same as you did. Let us sit down with the peoples from the East and talk things over. (...) We cannot give you membership, but we can help making your situation better. This is necessary for Poland and it is also necessary for Brussels, if it is really social unrest and instability that is most feared. (4)

The Enthusiast believes that both the territorial and functional development of Polish regions is intertwined with Poland’s development as a whole. There is not much room for autonomous or irredentist movements in this line
of thought. Essentially, the Polish Enthusiast sees a chain of dependencies starting at the lowest political level with local and regional units in Poland. These units are dependent upon the policies and overall economic development of the Polish nation. Poland, in turn, is dependent upon the European Union because it “helps us stabilize our social and economic development. Growth alone does not produce social order. [Poland needs] rule of law, stability and standards…to learn that the world is not black or white, such as it used to be presented to us when we were kids.” (8)

Yes, and I will tell you why. In the political debate here in Poland countries like Norway and Switzerland were pointed to by the no-side. They were saying things, like look at how rich they are and look at how independent they are in the world. The yes-side tried to point out that the history of those countries is quite different from our own, that they are extremely rich by our standards and so on. (…) Another thing was that it became so obvious that if we do not join together with the Czechs and the Baltics, we will have to make alliances with Russia and the Ukraine. For me, that just is not an attractive alternative and never will be. (…) Let me say this: There is even a qualified desirability involved. Influence is always desirable. It does not mean that you have to love the EU. It does not mean that you cannot work for change and improvement, for less production of legal acts and bureaucracy for example, but it means that you are inside and have access, not outside trying to second-guess what the others are doing. (8)

In the Enthusiast’s final analysis, Poland belongs to a Central European setting and has to direct its attention toward the problems and possibilities that emanate from its pivotal place between Germany, the Ukraine and Belarus. There is safety for Poland in having joined the EU and thereby made sure that regional development is locked into a system of monitoring and negotiation, but the Enthusiast is hard put to see any spontaneous or autonomous regional development taking place outside of this framework. Regardless of which social, economic or political development that is in question for the Enthusiast, the EU is both necessary and desirable for Poland.

6.3 The Polish Voluntarist

To the Polish Voluntarist, European integration is desirable because it brings new opportunities for economic and social development in Poland. There is, however, no element of necessity involved. The Voluntarist believes that there are a lot of benefits involved in participation when it comes to the process of European integration. Above all, the Voluntarist is convinced that a lot of the political and legal work involved in adaptation to the EU in general and to the Acquis in particular, has been carried out much more
quickly than it would have been under other circumstances. For the most part, however, the Voluntarist believes that all the legal and structural changes that can be traced in the Polish system currently would have been implemented in the country sooner or later anyway, since they are part and parcel of the economic and political modernization that Poland has been undergoing since the latter half of the 1980s.

Ha! You sound like the European Commission asking these questions! Actually, in the early 1990s, experts were pouring into Poland from all over the world... offering a lot of know-how. (...) They were offering us something that we could not use. (...) There are specific problems in my own sector, like I said, but it is also a general problem in Polish governmental bodies. It is simply about finding good, competent people to hire and then to be able to keep them on as staff. (...) What I would like [integration] to be, and what I think Poland and Europe can gain from integration, is standards. On the technical side, I could talk about ships and roads, but...I am [also] talking about a happier, more relaxed and better paid society. I am not a naïve believer in the blessings of life in the West, but I think we have found a way now to introduce basic levels of Western social standards more quickly and expediently. (1)

More than anything else, the Voluntarist looks upon a combination of democracy and capitalism as the prerequisite for an easier life for the majority of a people. According to this view, the Voluntarist also thinks that the first steps in this direction were taken politically already under the old regime in Poland. The Voluntarist also thinks that European integration was a beacon of light at a time of dramatic political change in Poland. As in so many other Eastern and Central European countries, there was really no turning back the tide of millions and millions of people eager to set the historical record straight. European integration, more than anything else, gave hope and some concrete rules of the game that could be presented by political and economic elites as goals. The Voluntarist thinks that it was important for Polish elites to give people hope in the early years of the 1990s, and since the notion of being a European had for so long been a source of hope for the Polish people the idea of a return to Europe had a both pacifying and inspirational effect at the same time.

In concrete terms, however, the Voluntarist is convinced that the shift over to market economy and democracy could have been guided equally well by Japanese or American principles. There is nothing inherently European about democracy today, in the eyes of the Voluntarist, but the concept of Europe still carries a lot of weight in Polish politics because it was for so long symbolic of the alternative to communism. It is important for the Voluntarist to separate between the social, democratic and technical aspects of political adaptation. What makes European integration and an
ensuing “Europeanization” of different goals and standards so desirable for the Voluntarist is that in Europe the idea of standards also involves social cohesion. What makes the process of European integration more desirable for Poland than the possible alternatives is first and foremost that the timing is right. When Poland broke free, the EU was there with a set of rules, ideas, programs and goals and it was easy for the Polish government to simply latch on. Equally important, in the eyes of the Voluntarist, is that the process of European integration also involves social and economic cohesion as a set goal.

It would, the Voluntarist muses, have been so easy for Poland to just introduce democratic political institutions and a market economy and start looking forward to a future in which the whole country just continues to deteriorate on the fringes of European and global markets. Sooner or later democracy would have brought social justice into the picture anyway. But the really desirable part of European integration and the EU was the promise of a stable, continuing march towards a better economy and a freer social life for all Polish citizens.

At the very beginning of my work, I thought that this would all be very quick. Just go and adapt to the EU. But now I have become more moderate in terms of how quickly I believe changes should be introduced in Poland. For example, concerning my own sector, every month and every year make us better and more competitive. Speed in and of itself is not a necessity. (...) New laws and regulations are introduced in Poland all the time and the speed is comparatively high anyway. (...) I am an optimist. Being European means being free and being equal among other Europeans. My old mother should be allowed to participate in cultural life and be happy. Modern Polish women should not have the burden of being the Mother Hen. Of course some people here will be suspicious and even angry about what we are doing, but in a deeper sense we are putting international isolation and civil strife to an end. (1)

I don’t know if my work here has changed the way I look at the EU. I’m not sure that it has. There is always an element of protection of national interests. It also depends upon which national interest we are talking about. For example, French interests are always very strong. However, I think the professional education of people working in the European institutions and organizations is very good and it helps them develop an increasingly European perspective. (...) I am still positively inclined towards efforts at being genuinely European. (...) I mostly feel like an idealist. (1)

For the Polish Voluntarist, European integration is a process that helps Poland along the way to achieving goals of economic, political and social goals. The principles behind this process are highly desirable for the Voluntarist, but also other inroads towards such goals are possible. European integration therefore does not have an element of necessity in the eyes of the Voluntarist. Catching up economically with the countries of Western Europe
is one thing, and that could equally well have been done via Polish adaptation to global economic forces and partner countries in other parts of the world. The ideal of the Single Market, however, and the vision of a level economic playing field in Europe is something very important to the Voluntarist in that it seems to promise a more rapid and successful adaptation to global economic demands. In addition, European integration is a concept with positive connotations for Poland and for the Polish people. To the Voluntarist it seems more desirable to cooperate and pull together with other countries, than it would be to go it alone. The Polish Voluntarist believes that the standards that are followed in Europe and the general guidelines for common peace, security and prosperity are more desirable than those of a world in which each country fights and competes for itself.

The notion of European standards and equality of opportunities are important also for how the Polish Voluntarist looks at Trade and Industry. There is a deep-set conviction in the Voluntarist’s mind that Poland has a particular industrial tradition which makes things difficult for Polish firms on international markets. Also, the Voluntarist is convinced that most industrial actors in Poland are unhappy about having had to open up to new rules and new forms of competition. Again, the process of European integration has helped bring change about more quickly and, at least so the Voluntarist likes to speculate, more efficiently than what would have otherwise been the case.

What stands out is the Voluntarist’s worry about costs. The idea behind it is that Polish firms in general have worked very hard to catch up with their Western European counterparts. For the most part, this process has been smooth, efficient and successful, but the Voluntarist also sees how particular sectors in the Polish economy have come up against some really difficult obstacles.

It is one thing if we look at the rules and demands of the European market in terms of a set of technical rules related to sales, marketing and so on. Importantly, there are also many hidden costs particularly for Polish industry. To comply with the new rules costs a lot of money, not least due to the new international environmental standards and new standards are being introduced all the time. (…) A clear example…our energy is based on coal. That’s it. We can produce a lot of energy, which also means that we could export it. But you know it is dirty, right? There you have it! (2)

That is to say, the Voluntarist thinks that the EU has good visions and rules concerning how different industries and sectors should adapt to changes in the global economic climate. The Voluntarist also adds the positive atmosphere among EU countries to the picture, saying that it is always good to combine the relative strengths and weaknesses of different countries in an overall calculus of what to do and where to go economically. This aspect of European cooperation is highly desirable for the Voluntarist. But, the
Voluntarist also sees problems connected with this approach. For a country such as Poland, the Voluntarist thinks that there must be different time frames in which changes can be introduced and implemented. It is not always possible to negotiate the country’s way out of tight time frames which means that in some cases the Polish economy will simply have to bear very high transition costs. When thinking specifically about those industrial sectors in the Polish economy that are by nature big, inert and dirty, the Voluntarist has a feeling that better things could be done without adaptation to the more developed and advanced EU countries.

When you look at it, it seems clear that the energy sector really is the key to overall economic success. There are no definite problems for Polish firms to modernize and to explore the opportunities of European markets. But if you look at the energy sector, which is such a vital part of industry in any country, well…First, Polish firms need to hatch and start to grow somewhere and for this they need comparatively cheap energy. Second, new transnational rules and regulations concerning the environment already have adverse effects on the economic climate in Poland. At the end of the day, energy prices also affect consumers and the general level of consumption in the national economy. But the most immediate effect is visible among firms and enterprises. (…)
I believe that there is simply this breaking point somewhere, when the cost of environmental cleanliness crosses with the need for economic development. (2)

According to the Voluntarist, Poland has already come very far in terms of improvements on the environment. Even the coal plants are much cleaner today, the air is generally better to breathe and fresh water is available to citizens in most parts of the country, the Voluntarist argues. At the same time, the Voluntarist thinks, this development is beginning to clash with the freedom of Poles to maximize their potential profit. The Voluntarist continues to argue that if the forests and waters of Poland suddenly become a general European interest, then the inhabitants of those regions also will not be able to exploit what they consider to be their own natural resources, or at least not those most readily available to them. Poland has already come a long way toward cleaning up its environment, but the Voluntarist is afraid that there is a limit to how high the cost of clean air and water can rise before there is a popular outcry against lost economic opportunity.

The Polish Voluntarist is basically convinced that the EU is good for Polish Trade and industry in the long run. The basically transnational perspective upon production and consumption that the EU member countries try to adhere to should be a positive thing in the long run. In the short run, however, the Voluntarist can see a problem arise concerning the level of necessity involved in complying with a transnational set of rules.
We invest enormous amounts but it is very difficult to make large scale changes and be able to consider all the new demands that are pushed forward by representatives of countries that have totally different structures. The EU is good because it sets up transnational standards…In the long run this will be positive for Polish industry as well, since the ideas that rule in Brussels are basically the same as those of any normal country with an interest in the benefit of its citizens and future generations. (…) What the EU is doing is desirable for any country, I think, but there is always the cost to consider. The access to cheap energy is vital to the kind of market economy we all live in today…(2)

For the Polish Voluntarist, the sets of rules that are made up for industrial and consumer competition and protection are desirable. Necessary, however, they are not simply because they threaten growth and profit levels in the Polish economy while it is still in a period of transition and change. In a wider perspective, the Voluntarist is convinced that firms for the most part can fend for themselves on the global market. It is no concern to the Voluntarist to think about whether a firm that goes bankrupt is Polish or English. What is important to the Voluntarist is the overall effect on the Polish economy, and this is also why the idea of transnational rules, regulations and policies seem so desirable. There is, according to the Polish Voluntarist, no way of turning the clock back to the large-scale, dirty and inefficient industrial production of the communist era. There are, however, other opportunities on the global market that might be interesting to explore at the cost of some increase in local pollution.

In terms of necessity, the Voluntarist believes that there is a paradox involved in the process of integration and that this paradox is particularly visible in a country such as Poland. The Voluntarist thinks that the main industrial benefits for the Polish economy can be made via the continued development of the Polish infrastructure. The most vital part of this infrastructure, however, is the availability of cheap energy.

…big, long-term structural investments…cannot simply be changed overnight. In Poland, there are several, huge long-term loans running between the state and the energy sector. Even privatized firms take loans from the government, or have other agreements running over periods of 15-25 years. In order to change more rapidly, the industry would need to take up even bigger loans, but such loans clash with the rules against state aid in the EU! This is a paradox. (…) Poles know this, and they do not like it. Poland could speed ahead and clean up the environment even more rapidly, but then that would lead to a state budget deficit that the EU would frown upon. (…) There is, of course, the program now in effect, which will lead us up to the year 2015, but after that anything can probably happen…Things are constantly changing. (2)
For the Voluntarist more positive linkages between different policy areas are desirable both within and between countries in Europe. Drawing on examples from some of the negative linkages that can be observed between for example the environmental and industrial sectors in Poland, however, the Voluntarist fails to see any forces of necessity involved. In effect, the Voluntarist sometimes wishes that more forceful rules of implementation would apply in the EU, but that never seems to be the case. As things stand today, the Voluntarist is convinced that cost is what will dominate the future political agenda. It is more a matter of patience from this perspective, and the Voluntarist fears that the patience of the Polish people will run out before Trade and industry in Poland has caught up enough with its Western counterparts to ensure relative affluence.

For the Polish Voluntarist, the situation appears to be similar with regional issues. First of all, the Voluntarist fails to see how transnational functional regionalism could in any way be positively linked with European integration, unless the conversation is about the regional funds and transnational investment programs funded via the EU budget. Uppermost in the minds of Polish political and economic elites are territorial security issues, according to the Voluntarist, and these leave precious little room for functional aspects in the foreseeable future.

Our problem is Kaliningrad, relations with the Baltic States and with Belarus. By extension, they all involve the relationship with Russia. Do you know about the situation in Kaliningrad? It is awful, and it is more a matter of security for us than anything else. But...these days we refer to the Eastern Dimension. It also fits in with the EU:s New Neighborhood Policy. (...) Poland is an Eastern frontier country for the EU, which gives us particular tasks and priorities (...) We have good contact with Lithuania. We try to keep good contacts with researchers and others in Belarus...We definitely do not want to put up a wall against them. (...) Probably the most interesting country is Ukraine. I mean, people in Warsaw drink water from the river Bug. (...) There are also matters of preservation...on the boundary with Ukraine. (2)

The Voluntarist believes that such concepts as the Northern Dimension and the Eastern Dimension are familiar to Polish elites in general. Moreover, they seem to receive a lot of attention and time for discussion. The Voluntarist adds that the reasons for why functional regionalism seems so remote to Polish elites have to do with this current discussion. For Polish elites, geographical and security issues are at the top of the agenda, and the Voluntarist is hard put to see how, no matter how desirable it would be, this discussion might be changed by ideas of soft regionalism and low-political transnational networking. The Voluntarist thinks that some of the discussions about functional regions and city-area integration, etc. have already found their way into the discussion
about regional development in Poland proper. Again, the Voluntarist would wish for more positive linkages between regional issues in Poland and the debates about Cohesion and Regional Development in Europe at large.

Yes, I recognize the discussion about the old divisions from the 18th century. They are important for an understanding of modern day Poland. East is East and West is West, that much is true. The South of Poland is heavily industrialized with all the particular problems that come with that. But looking at it as some kind of autonomous regional affair I think will put us off the mark. I think the East is the key because a lot more effort is needed there. It is where we have our really huge problems. (2)

To the Voluntarist, there seem to be a lot of negative linkages between what the EU demands, what the Polish government does or does not do, and what ordinary citizens want. This seems to be particularly true concerning the Eastern part of Poland. The Voluntarist talks about how the general level of unemployment is currently circa 20% in Poland as a whole. In some Polish regions, however, the rates are soaring and in some parts of the East you can find unemployment figures almost twice as large. The Voluntarist thinks that there is a classical pattern of relative deprivation in Poland that is most visible and obvious on the regional level. In the East is where most of the untouched natural resources are located, and the people of that region want to “use what God gave them”. However, the Voluntarist has seen the rise of preservation and sustainability issues to the top of the political agenda in Warsaw over the past 5-10 years, which has exacerbated the regional conflict inside the country. Eastern needs for development and Western/Southern notions of preservation clash. The Voluntarist also makes reference to an increasing number of reports in Polish newspapers of how forest and water preservation guards have sometimes had violent clashes with locals in trying to uphold the new rules of environmental preservation. Somehow, the Voluntarist speculates, it would be very nice to have the kind of discussion about regional development that is common among the EU15 countries also in Poland. In the final analysis, however, the Polish Voluntarist sees regional development issues as being closely intertwined with the national level of economic and political development in Poland in the near future.

6.4 The Polish Pragmatist

To the Pragmatist, European integration seems necessary but not desirable. There are two pillars upon which the Pragmatist rests his whole line of reasoning. First, there is economic necessity. If it were up to the Pragmatist, Poland would go it alone in the world and rapidly become the richest and
most successful country in the world, although the Pragmatist is quick to add that such day-dreaming does not normally consume a lot of his working-day. On a more serious note, the Pragmatist is convinced that Poland needs to be integrated with the EU in order to receive help to develop, mature and find its economic role in the global economy. The days of national autarky and national economic wonders are over, according to the Pragmatist, and the trick in today’s world is to find a good position in a group of countries that watch each others backs in the competition with other economic growth areas in the world.

For me it is simple. European integration is about changes for entrepreneurs and customers, nothing more nothing less. People always complain about the low wages around here and everybody wants to be like Germany. Well, in order to get there you have to do some hard work. Basically, integration is about creating new and better opportunities for such work to be done. Of course, it gets more complicated than that, but if you are asking me as a representative from my field, that’s pretty much it. (6)

Secondly, the Pragmatist makes the assumption that national governments are becoming increasingly dependent upon each other in their search for political legitimacy. Considering the scope of political and economic changes in Central and Eastern Europe over the past decade, the Polish pragmatist is convinced that it could not have been done without the outside help of the EU Commission and gradual support from EU15 governments. The Pragmatist believes that most decisions made in Polish politics, same as with other new member countries in Central Europe, are highly unpopular among the masses of citizens. In effect, the Pragmatist makes an image of the Polish government almost dragging people, kicking and screaming, into a new social order. There are many benefits to be had from this for people in general, but the Pragmatist is still convinced that those benefits could not have been convincingly presented to the Polish people without good examples and outside help.

By the same token, the Pragmatist believes that the heyday of European integration is over in Central Europe and that the difficult elite-mass interplay that will ensue in the next five to ten years will decide the fate of the whole process in Europe.

European integration as an issue has been tossed back and forth in Poland between three potent institutions in our society. First, there are the political and institutional elites. Second, there is the people and public opinion. Third, that is us, the UKIE. We define our role here as working for the other two. To the extent that you can talk about European integration in Poland, it has taken place somewhere in between these three. (…) Now, if you talk about the
results of the elections to the European Parliament… I would say that it was all a no-confidence vote directed against the political elites in Poland. (…) It really did not have much to do with Europe at all. (4)

European integration is first and foremost about economic opportunities and living standards for the Pragmatist. From this angle, integration can be seen as a set of technicalities and intergovernmental negotiation over standards and exceptions from standards which can easily be reduced to a matter of “to-do lists” that any government may check off at particular points in time. The Pragmatist does not see European integration as a process by which the European Commission tells everybody else what to do, but rather as a process in which governments sit down together and agree on certain minimal standards and rules of the game that all actors should abide by. The Pragmatist also thinks that the notion, sometimes occurring in the media in Europe, that Central European governments have been forced to commit to economic and legal changes that they do not want is not only grossly exaggerated but actually completely untrue. The Polish government has joined the process of European integration because it wants the benefits that can be reaped from it.

The Pragmatist adds, however, that what from an economic or legal point of view seems like a simple process of addition and subtraction by a clear set of rules becomes outright confusing when it meets with the ebb and flow of popular political demands. Asymmetry is part of the normal European integration process, according to the Pragmatist. Asymmetries exist in all EU countries with few exceptions, and the Pragmatist gives as example the constant debates over education, employment, living standards and infrastructure that seem to pervade political life in all countries regardless of whether the country is comparatively rich or poor.

I know the discussion you had in Sweden about immigration from Poland just before accession. This is what I mean by political. What are Scandinavians, Austrians and Germans afraid of? Where are those masses of workers that might invade? I think there is a tendency among you people to overestimate how attractive your countries are to live in. I mean, if you cannot get unemployed Poles to move even 80 kilometers from Radom to Warsaw to get a job, how are you going to make them come over to Sweden? They do not want to! (…) The EU is a challenge for Poland… it represents a whole set of possibilities but there is no automatic mechanism involved. (…) People now have the same standards all over, the same language almost if you are an English speaker, and the culture is becoming more global. Still, the people from Radom do not move to Warsaw if they can help it. The people in Poland do not move to other countries unless they are desperate. That is what integration is up against. (6)
In the eyes of the Pragmatist, European is about doing away with asymmetries. This is not something that will happen overnight, the Pragmatist goes on, but the road to get there is to work with the rules for economic and social behavior so that asymmetries diminish over time. The Pragmatist thinks it unfortunate that this vital aspect of European integration seems to be lost in the many national political debates about the EU. The Pragmatist thinks that it is too easy for populists to go forward and challenge European and national elites simply by saying that not enough is happening this week, or that the effects of integration must be visible from day to day if they are to be believed. This is why the Pragmatist is convinced that institutions and rules on the European level are necessary. Also, to the Pragmatist anti-integration populism comes across as a discomforting echo from the old days. The Pragmatist finds it surprising that not more people in Poland remember what it was like to live with an official revolutionary rhetoric laden with catch phrases about quick and irreversible economic change. The Pragmatist also expresses a feeling of disappointment, since the relative openness and transparency of the current policies in Poland have not been met with appreciation among the voters in general.

At this juncture, the Polish Pragmatist expresses how interesting it is to be working in an organization such as the UKIE. This is because it has given the Pragmatist a feeling of having the status both of being an actor and an observer. It has also brought new insights into the political aspects of European integration. The Pragmatist is convinced, from talking to international friends and colleagues, that this feeling is shared by most if not all people in the same position in the new member countries of the EU, certainly with respect to the other countries in Central Europe.

I see European integration as a function of Polish politics...in the literature there is the idea of domestic politics and international politics, isn’t there? Well, I think in Poland domestic politics influences international positions. International relations affecting domestic positions, I don’t think so! (...) Ministers have not been keen on European affairs...simply because they have other priorities; not against but there is also no drive forward (...) I think it was fortunate that European affairs became so technical at the time they did. Complexity more or less saved integration for Poland. The man in the street was quick to accept complexity and this was something that contributed to stability. (...) Of course, we were surprised by some of the extremism that came out in the debate...just the language that they use...but voters tend to favor politicians who have not been in office before. We saw the EU-elections of 2004 coming with some apprehension, but then the extremists were just as disappointed as we were because there was no total backlash or sea change. (4)
On the topic of European integration, the Pragmatist believes that such political events as the June 2004 elections to the European Parliament, in which the Polish electorate participated for the first time, are illustrative of what and where the limits of the process really are. The Pragmatist believes that there was a widespread fear among Polish and European elites that the membership negotiations in their final stages might have been overthrown by public unrest in Poland. This is because he also believes that the Polish political system is volatile on particular domestic issues, such as unemployment, and also because he feels that there is a general lack of trust between the rulers and the ruled in the country. At least in Poland, the Pragmatist thinks, the electorate is prone to use their votes to punish or reward governing elites and it is always easy for such parties that are new to holding government office to become popular and trusted simply because they do not have a tainted government record. In this perspective there are particularly two things that the Pragmatist finds difficult in Poland. One is that people forget very quickly, and the Pragmatist mentions that some of the anti-European political figures that made a scene in the EP elections have a murky historical background in the communist system. Such things, however, the Pragmatist thinks, people seem to be ready to forgive and forget. The other Polish peculiarity that the Pragmatist worries about is the lack of patience and trust in low-key, gradualist policies. The lack of patience is something that the Pragmatist believes augurs badly for the integration project in Poland in the future.

As it stands, the Pragmatist believes that it is far too easy to get votes in Poland by shouting radical slogans in the media. There is, according to the Pragmatist, a false belief among the electorate that they can simply vote anybody in and out of government as they please. If they are not happy with the leadership of the country, they will simply vote for other people. This is a misunderstanding, according to the Pragmatist, but a popular one that seems to have influenced the entire Polish people. Things like damage control, long-term responsibility and stability factors do not enter into it, and the Pragmatist worries that the whole concept of democracy has been skewed in the minds of the Polish electorate. Political voting is rapidly becoming a popularity contest and nothing more, or more profound, than that. This is why the Pragmatist is convinced that demands from the EU are necessary to keep the Polish situation stable.

We had great support from the EU. It was not about manipulation, mind you, but they really knew what was going on in Poland. To deputy ministers and experts they simply gave big help. The EU Commission and its officials would be very careful and patient. They would prefer to wait in the light of complexities. (…) Not that they were not tough when it came to negotiations, but they
were flexible in the build-up...They were tough when an issue was left hanging too long, but still a lot of flexibility. (...) They were the ones who would keep in touch, asking how things were going and if there was anything they could do to help out and, well, it is something that you never get from other states or the Council of Ministers. Quite frankly, although this is not in any way a political statement, but I simply do not think that Poland would have been in the EU right now if it had not been for the EU Commission being a good friend...yes, I think friend is a good word for it. A friend can be tough, but still helpful. (4)

The Pragmatist feels that it is easy to exploit general sentiments of dissatisfaction in Poland for political purposes. This is particularly true for the Pragmatist when European integration is concerned, since he also believes that very large groups in Poland actually thought that joining the EU would mean becoming rich very quickly. The Pragmatist has a hunch that the situation might be the same in other countries, even in countries that have already been EU members for many years. The Pragmatist is nevertheless convinced that the continued success of European integration hinges on the factor of political management. Even if elites are smart they may still be up against populism, and in the eyes of the Pragmatist it is not desirable to have to spend time on political slogans and image-building. To the Pragmatist, the legal-technical work in the EU is something that has to be done anyway.

Regarding Trade and Industry, the Pragmatist is of the opinion that the loyalty of economic actors is a perpetual question. It really does not matter to the Pragmatist whether the discussion is about transnational conglomerates, industrial sectors or groups of workers. The loyalty argument, the Pragmatist feels, was by and large worn out in the Polish debate already in the years before 2000, but it is something that keeps coming back on the public agenda, sometimes in a reasonable context and sometimes not. The pragmatist has a distinct feeling that the man on the street would not know much about the positive and negative flows of the investment patterns in his country anyway, and that what counts most for him is whether or not he has consumer goods to buy and money to buy the goods with. Aside from that basic assumption, however, the Pragmatist also points out that there is a lot of difference between perceived loyalty and real loyalty. The real loyalties of the political, economic and social worlds are probably only known in very small groups. When the issue is one of contact between politicians and economic actors, the Pragmatist has a feeling that neither side feels that it can depend upon the other to be true.

In Poland the discussion has mostly been about Foreign Direct Investment. I have not seen much talk about the national loyalty of any particular company. It is perhaps not an issue right now because the timing is not right. It will come, perhaps, but the
The Pragmatist argues that the lack of a debate about transnationalizing tendencies in Trade and Industry in Poland has been compensated for by the debate on Foreign Direct Investment. He goes on to say that both the yes- and no-sides in the EU debates have made use of it for their own purposes. The no-side would simply point to the current positive growth figures and say that any country is better off on its own. The yes-side would argue that there would be no such growth figures unless Poland had made such a great effort to comply with EU rules and demands for stability. In the eyes of the Pragmatist, however, both sides seem to have made moot points since it is always American firms, conglomerates and banks that dominate the world markets and, by extension, that dominate Europe. The Pragmatist thinks that American firms are really the epitome of transnational economic activity, since they both invest a lot of money abroad and bring a lot of investment back into the United States. The Pragmatist does not really see why this, in modern times, should have anything to do with loyalty towards particular countries and governments. Every country, even the United States, wants investments and to get those investments they must try to be attractive to transnational capital.

It is all to do with legality and territoriality. If a firm has activity on Polish soil, employs people here, pays taxes, which I think all firms should do by the way, it is Polish in my eyes. (…) Ownership? Polish or not Polish, I don’t care about the nationality of the owner. For me it is important that companies are functioning well, that they are economically viable, that they contribute to employment here and that they pay their taxes. (…) I suppose that, now that I think about it, you would probably prefer national ownership for strictly emotional reasons, wouldn’t you? I know the discussion you are referring to, and it is highly relevant to the situation in Europe. On the other hand, I cannot see why economic actors should be loyal to anyone. So, would the fact that a company is Polish make it more loyal to Poland? Noo! Particularly not the Polish firms! I cannot see them as loyal for any reason. (4)

The Pragmatist believes that the EU is necessary for Poland in order to modernize the country and make it interesting for foreign capital in the long term. Added to this is the notion that the dirty, dangerous and underpaid industrial jobs is not the way forward for the Polish work force, the way the
Pragmatist sees it, and therefore it is necessary to continue integrating with the EU. Not all of the demands made on Poland to achieve this end seem desirable to the Pragmatist, but it is the only way he can see to achieve high stability and a high pace of reform. The Polish Pragmatist believes that this is why most European countries are in the game together anyway, and that nobody wants to be left outside the emergent growth and prosperity pacts in Europe. Again, it would be desirable for the Pragmatist if Poland could simply go it alone, but he is convinced that such a route would by definition and because of the functions of the modern world economy lead to stagnation and continued relative deprivation for Poland. The Pragmatist makes a definite statement about Trade and industry drawing pictures on a pad, saying:

Look at our steel mills, for example. I can give you an example from that field, but I will not mention any names of specifics. Look, here’s the Polish steel mill, and we get the information that there is an international bid out on the mill. Now, the international bidder is a huge company from India. Should we be worried about that? No, simply because the bid does not really come from India at all. I am not even sure that the owner, whoever that is, really knows that there is a bid out! Why? See here, the office of the Indian company making a bid for our Polish steel mill is in London. It is all like a big circle and it is money looking for a place to go to work. You might say that it is the British buying us up, because I am convinced that the British representation office of the Indian firm is staffed and run by British people simply because they know the European market. Is that part of the firm British? Maybe, but I do not really see why that should be important. (4)

Regional integration aspects are seen by the Polish Pragmatist in a similar light. It is necessary for Poland to get the help and expertise from the EU that can guarantee the stability and sustainability of legal, political and economic change. More often than not, the Pragmatist talks about this change the process of modernization in Poland. Necessity, however, is guided by hard realities and the Pragmatist does not see the process as desirable, probably not for any country, but particularly not for Poland. The general view in Poland, the Pragmatist says, is that the EU and some of the richer countries in the group should just give Poland money. The reason for this, according to the Pragmatist, is to be found in the pre-accession process as are the reasons for a lot of the ensuing costs for the Polish people, such as high and rising levels of unemployment. The Pragmatist has a feeling that Poles in general are expecting payoffs now, which makes the macroeconomic logic of regional development and cohesion in Europe a very difficult pedagogical task. Whereas the Pragmatist is convinced that macroeconomic stability is all that counts for Poland in the long run, and that the continued reform of local
and regional government is solely dependent upon this economic variable, he is also quick to point out that many of the short-term, highly undesirable economic effects will be particularly visible on the regional level. For the most part, the change that the Pragmatist regards as beneficial for Polish regions has already taken place. The problem is that Polish citizens, particularly in certain regions, do not appear to see the benefits from that change.

People cannot see it, whereas real money and investments you can see. It is so easy to raise political support for increased spending that it just is not funny! (...) There is a split inside our political parties, I think, and it is probably here to stay. It is a bit similar to the situation you have in the Social Democratic party in Sweden, no? There is this constant infighting between fiscal stabilizers and deficit riders. You know this? I think it approximates the situation in Poland very well too. You can see this split in the established political parties, but also in the more populist groups as well. It seems as if all politicos are split on this issue. (8)

The Pragmatist believes that there are important links between the parallel processes of European integration and globalization on the one hand and the territorial differences between regions inside countries on the other. There is nothing new or revealing about this to the Pragmatist. To the contrary, this is probably the reason why governments sit down together and negotiate in the first place, and it is an illustration of how countries cannot simply be regarded as boxes that you arrange neatly together. To the Pragmatist, such simplification seems like simple rhetoric which is utilized in order to whip up public opinion for or against certain stages of development in a democratic system. The Pragmatist is convinced that what seems good for a country, or for a group of countries, really depends on where you stand when you make your statement. Concerning the accession negotiations, the Pragmatist is convinced that the Polish team did a good job and managed to squeeze as many transition periods and exceptions from the general framework as possible out of each situation. The Pragmatist thinks that the reason for this is the lack of territorial cohesion inside Poland.

The tripartite map of regional Poland is related to how Poles think politically. In the East, people are very poor and populist. They are Euroskeptic but at the same time ready to jump at anything that seems to promise investments and money. In the West, people are basically OK from an economic viewpoint and Europositive, basically well prepared for the opportunities of European integration. In the South, people are poorer than in the West but richer than in the East. They seem to have split perceptions about the EU, but there is also more regional self-reliance there... (....) My roots are in the East, Lubielski Vojvodship, poorest in the EU now! Still, people are conservative.
It is as if they shy away from the opportunities that the EU can give them. The structural funds are an enormous help, or could be. Sometimes it is as if people do not even want to improve their situation, but rather dream about what might have been in another life, another history. (7)

Summing up thoughts about territorial and functional regionalism in Poland, the Pragmatist believes that although a lot of positive change already has taken place, a lot more is necessary. The viability and sustainability of this development depends heavily upon the continuing support of the EU and other national governments. Above all, the Pragmatist sees a need for positive role models in Poland, partly because of the lack of experience in the relatively new democratic system but also, perhaps more importantly, because of the inherent conservatism of backward areas. The Pragmatist actually believes that such backward areas must be subjected to change regardless of what the popular opinion there might be, or the political conservatism there will bode ill for democratic reform in the whole country. This is necessary, so the Pragmatist thinks, but far from desirable and the relative distribution of wealth and education between regions in Poland might well hold the key to the future of Polish reform and Poland’s potential success as an EU member country.

6.5 The Polish Skeptic

The Skeptic thinks that Poles in general are very much aware of what goes on in Europe today, what the opportunities and difficulties are in the new integrated situation. It is not for lack of information or understanding of particular technical aspects that the country sometimes tries to turn counter-clockwise to the general trend in the EU. There are some real, comprehensive changes taking place in Polish society, one of them being the very rapid adaptation to consumerism and commerce as a life style. Importantly, however, the Skeptic basically thinks that there are both European integration and Trade and Industry have their desirable and necessary aspects. What would make them both unnecessary and undesirable is a contamination from some of the new political cleavages that the Skeptic can see in Poland and other European nations.

Concerning the younger generation, the ones who are growing up now without any notion of what communism and the old European situation were like, I think we have lost some things or at least that we are beginning to lose them now. We are lost in material things and material thinking these days. At the same time, there is this image of our history, of a great Polish past that needs to be restored in the present day. Particularly young people do not really care if others decide for them in social questions. There is this element of consumerism and dreaming about a past greatness that I find problematic. (2)
However, the Skeptic does not see such problems as related to European integration. Nor are they inherently related to transnational markets or to the activities of transnational Trade and Industry. The Skeptic can see most, if not all, EU countries and peoples undergoing this type of change for the worse. Both elites and masses in Europe know what is going on and where this process might take Europe, which makes the Skeptic think that it is all part of some kind of perverse game. The Skeptic thinks that it is clear what the EU is good for in the same way as it is clear why there is such a thing as national government. European leaders and masses alike, however, seem reluctant to take good care of the opportunities available to them. The real problem, according to the Skeptic, is materialism and a decline in civic values, which can probably be felt by everybody but which fail to produce reasonable and well-measured reactions from social and political organizations.

There is this big-city globalization on the one hand and a set of difficult transitions on the other. (…) There are little dots of advanced integration and globalization, which is mostly in the cities. And then there is the rest. (…) …it involves a paradox: In Poland, it is obvious already that people in agriculture will benefit more from integration than anybody else. They can feel it in their pockets already! But they are the skeptics, and a lot of them say that it is because they are uncertain…you can see some signs of this changing in Poland right now, and I believe it will change even more in the future, but right now it is almost as if uncertainty breeds conservatism. I think it is a paradox that those who benefit most are the most skeptical. (8)

Therefore, the Skeptic thinks that value problems come from people and countries themselves, not from the EU or the process of European integration. The Skeptic prefers to thinks about this in anti-political terms. For example, the Skeptic can see how the gradual import of new standards is a major benefit from EU membership and how this part of European integration leaves enough room to express national symbolism and self-determination. However, the Skeptic thinks that politicians today fail to present such standards and their potential benefits to people in a straightforward way. There is also a tendency among politicians to be circumspect as well as egotistical when debating the issues. Similarly, the Skeptic thinks that there is a tendency among voters to reward such behavior.

Before enlargement people were interested, but now they don’t care anymore. They need to earn money, they don’t have time. (…) Where there is high unemployment, there is radicalization. In Poland we now have second generation unemployed, and our self-image is changing. (…) Stereotypes have changed particularly among farmers. During the next election they will become even more self-serving, I think. (…) Generally, politics in Poland is becoming radicalized, worse than at the beginning of the 1990s. But, there is this populist wave all over Europe now, you know. (13)
Although the means and ends of European integration are all out in the open and for the most part well known to the Polish people, according to the Skeptic, people just do not seem interested. To the Skeptic, however, this has nothing to do with the EU or any particular aspect of the process of European integration. To the contrary, the Skeptic thinks that this has to do with the way modern Europeans are beginning lose touch with civility and the notion of a common good.

The Polish Skeptic is mostly skeptical about Functional and Territorial regionalism. In effect, the Skeptic is reluctant to see European integration in any other light than national adaptation to supranational conventions and regulations that are funneled into the country by national government. The Skeptic thinks that Poland’s biggest problems have to do with a lack of investment funds and that any discussion about a Europe of the Regions sounds suspiciously like an initiative from countries with high levels of economic development and good economic and social cohesion.

We desire the things that you have in the West. Is it necessary for us to join programs and schemes? Of course! No country in Europe will ever be left out in the cold again. The basic idea is to help those that are worst-off in every area. (…) When I hear Westerners bring up the topic of sustainability, for example, I want to scream ‘Yes of course we will be interested in that, once we have the same kind of roads in our regions as they do in Germany!’ Then we will discuss sustainability. Now we want to discuss cohesion. (1)

Social cohesion in Europe is something that the Skeptic believes must be achieved by national initiatives and programs. Regions are basically seen as instrumental to overall economic development plans. To the Skeptic, regions are interesting on the conceptual level because they are manageable units for public administrators to work with. They are, however, no more than instrumental in the implementation of Polish and European development plans. The Skeptic is hard put to see any deeper social or cultural cleavages at play on the regional level in Poland, not least as a result of the homogenization and partial isolation of the country under communism. Therefore, regional issues are more interesting in terms of what goes on within groups of countries that have territorial affinity within the EU. In the eyes of the Skeptic, the EU is there to guarantee that no state or group of states runs too far ahead, or conversely, that no group lags too far behind. The Skeptic perceives of regional issues as bound together with the process of national development and integration, and the supranational level is interesting only to the extent that it can ascertain standards of social and political cohesion.
Poland is not a Baltic country and never will be. It is a big country, so therefore everybody treats it with caution. (...) We do not always see eye to eye [with Germany] but that hardly comes as a surprise, particularly not to historians… Poland, no, it is a country and a people firmly rooted in Central Europe. The Baltic Sea just is not interesting enough to receive any attention from us, and I do not believe there is much of a good tradition to hang on to either. (4)

In terms of functional transnational regionalism, the Skeptic feels that competition gets the upper hand on soft cooperation schemes and good will. Above all, the Skeptic is convinced that transnational regional cooperation begins and ends with a nod from national government. The Skeptic does not see how linguistic and other cultural and social barriers can be overcome without deep and economically viable commitment from national governments. Since Poland is lagging behind economically and still has a lot of work to do before its new political system is firmly entrenched in Polish society, the Skeptic also believes that regionalism is out of the question in the country. There are some historical prerequisites for it, the Skeptic admits, but that quaint historical experience and sense of territorial belonging is superseded by the need for investments, work and money for consumption.

Yes, I know the tripartite theory. It is very popular among particular groups in Poland and certainly academics around here will talk about the different traditions of East, West and South. But what comes to my mind is rather what we went through in the accession negotiations about the free flow of capital in Europe, particularly about the free purchase of land in Poland. This is a very sensitive political issue and we had to negotiate for periods of transition. (...) Eventually we got the transitions and they were different for different parts of the country. You could say that there is something in that theory then, because we got longer transition periods in the West and shorter in the East because in the East people need all the money they can get. In the West, people are scared by German tourists. I’m not sure I think it is important, though. (8)

In sum, the Skeptic sees issues of transnationalization as questions of national adaptation to global circumstances under the umbrella of EU expertise and legal consultation. After the wall came down in Europe, the Skeptic thinks that the whole country was gagging for foreign investment. To some extent, the Skeptic also believes that Poland still is. The old political elites, however, were not able to provide the overall stability and creativity that the Polish economy needed. At the end of the day, for most Poles it seemed uninteresting who owned the capital that was flowing in and after the old elites had been rooted out of the business sector, it was more a question of moving on with the process and expanding it into other political, social and economic spheres. The Skeptic sees this process as still ongoing.
in Poland and is not sure that it bears any resemblance to the history of other European countries. The Skeptic is convinced that adaptation to the EU contributes to the stability and international viability of social reconstruction in Poland, but is equally strongly convinced that functional and territorial regionalism is part of the political experimentation in other, richer countries.

6.6 Summary Discussion of the UKIE Interviews

The theoretical categories used in this thesis are applicable also in the case of Polish adaptation to the EU. What signifies the interaction between political context and cognitive patterns in UKIE, however, is the importance of national freedom on one hand and of nation-building and modernization on the other. As shown in previous chapters, Poland’s approach to the EU begins already with its first steps toward democracy and national independence in the early 1990s. During the pre-accession process, however, the political debate about European integration is mostly focused on the comparative riches of the EU12 (and later EU15) countries. Even at the end of the 1990s, the positive relationship between Polish government and the EU Commission is fueled by the Eurooptimism of the Polish electorate. The EU represents modernization, democratization and successful adaptation to the global market economy and for the members of UKIE the early days of adaptation are also the easy days of work.

Public skepticism toward the European integration project, however, looms on the political horizon. As pre-accession negotiations become accession negotiations and accelerated after the year 2000, things heated up fast between the Yes- and No-sides in Polish politics. Transnationalizing tendencies in economic and social life were regarded with more suspicion by the Polish people at about the same time as the UKIE was beginning to receive difficult questions from the EU Commission about the viability of political, legal and economic reform in Poland. Some of the UKIE respondents believe that the real domestic conflict over Poland’s role in European integration was still in its opening stages even as the country successfully joined the EU in 2004.

The way in which UKIE members frame European integration bears some traces of uneasiness and apprehension. The Enthusiast is convinced that the future success of Polish Trade and Industry is intertwined with the supranational regulation and management of the EU. The same can be said for the stability of subnational governance in the country and for social cohesion. There is no doubt in the Enthusiast’s mind that the national and the supranational are two sides of the same coin. However, the Polish Enthusiast is also careful in pointing out that supranational integration in Europe is bound by the continuing existence and successful management of nation
states. European integration is both desirable and necessary, according to this view, but there are limits to just how far the supranational integration project can develop. To the enthusiast, the Yes-No debate about European integration seems almost ridiculous and, more than anything else, based on a lack of knowledge concerning the realities of the process. When push comes to shove, however, the Enthusiast does not foresee any supranational development that goes beyond the nation state other than within the framework of limited functional sectors. The main driving force behind European integration is economic needs and opportunities, and in order to explore such things in a peaceful and orderly fashion the nation-states in Europe need each other.

The Enthusiast receives support for this core view also from the other cognitive categories in the Polish case. Particularly interesting to note is that the theoretical category Trade and Industry has the biggest impact on all of them. Voluntarists and Pragmatists take different views concerning what elements of desirability and necessity are involved. Also in the Polish case, the Voluntarist sees common rules and regulations in Europe mainly as desirable, whereas the Pragmatist takes a darker view of autonomous economic actors and sees them as necessary. The Pragmatist also believes that supranational integration is a means to an end, in the sense that it limits the competition between nation states over economic resources and infrastructural investment. Even the Skeptic takes the view that supranational coordination between nations is good to some extent. The argument that the EU has the right scope and leverage to produce this element of control, however, does not convince the Skeptic. In effect, there is no genuine Skeptic in the Polish case concerning supranational integration and transnationalizing tendencies in economic life.

The Skeptic really only emerges in conjunction with the theoretical categories Functional and Territorial Regionalism. It is only concerning these two theoretical categories that the Polish interview material contains the view that phenomena are neither necessary nor desirable. In the UKIE material, it is hard to find any expressions of the idea that autonomous regional actors might affect the process or the outcomes of the integration project. Mostly, the view that ‘regionalism is not for Poland’ is supported by economic and nation-building arguments. Generally, respondents take the view that regionalism hinges on both economic success and a cultural base. Respondents cannot see either of these in Poland. Although a populous nation, Poland is not culturally diverse in the eyes of UKIE interviewees, and although they believe that the economic and social differences between the three historical Polish macro-regions (East, West and South) probably mean something politically, they fail to see any linkage to the process of European integration. Actually, Territorial and Functional regionalism are the only two theoretical categories that produce a Skeptic in the Polish case.

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Concerning the regionalism categories, the Skeptic becomes adamant in saying that such things, national or transnational in type, have no place in the Polish setting. The argument of the Skeptic is that nation-building, democratic consolidation and a sheer lack of sufficient funds makes regionalism in Poland redundant. Above all, the Skeptic is convinced that regionalism is a national affair and very remote from efforts at supranational coordination and integration in Europe, and that there is very little in the way of cultural, ethnic or other potential bases for regionalism to occur in Poland. To the contrary, the Skeptic believes that for example functional regionalism across boundaries in Europe is something that can only occur between countries once a certain level of economic prosperity has been reached.

Table 4 depicts the synthetic analytical features of the UKIE interviews. Voluntarists and Pragmatists dominate the results with a slight overweight for the Pragmatists. The number of Enthusiasts is approximately only half of that of Voluntarists and Pragmatists. In synthesis, the Skeptics disappear altogether from the material, visible only in arguments concerning the role of regions in the Polish case. From a bird’s eye view of the whole material, the positive inclination toward European integration is the dominant feature.

The Voluntarists believe that adaptation to the EU is linked with opportunities to make Europe a better place for everybody. The idea is strong that nations have come together to form a supranational political entity by free will, and that participation can only improve the situation for Poland as well. In effect, the Voluntarists are convinced that the lack of necessity is an important aspect of what makes European integration so desirable for democratic nations. Poland, in other words, could probably equally well fend for itself in a global market economy, but by pooling its sovereignty with other neighbors there are bigger gains to be had.

The Pragmatists on the other hand think that Poland’s political and economic future is linked to European integration by necessity. There are
several aspects that actually make the process undesirable for Poland, not least to do with its recent past under state-socialism at which time economic and social development in the country took off in the wrong direction and built up heavy and problematic structures that will take decades to get rid of. To the Pragmatists, it is obvious that Poland needs help in catching up with its neighbors in Western and Northern Europe. The process of adaptation to the EU, according to this way of thinking, has intensified their sense of necessity since it has done two important things. First, the process has stabilized a very rapid process of economic and political transition in the country. Second, it has unveiled the extent of Polish backwardness and provided a road map out of this condition.

The notion of national and supranational development completing each other is strong in the Polish material. Albeit for different reasons, Enthusiasts, Voluntarists and Pragmatists alike are convinced that both national and supranational politics are good for Europe. By extension, what is good for Europe is good for Poland, and none of the respondents believes that European integration will do away with the sovereignty of nation states in Europe. Sovereignty, however, is undergoing change and there is an undertone of cultural confidence among the UKIE respondents. They believe that Poland is facing a future in which transnationalizing tendencies in economic and political life will continue to make national cultural cohesion a strong base for successful adaptation.
7. Comparative Organizational and Cognitive Patterns

The overarching aim of this thesis is to enhance understanding of the European integration process by exploring and comparing how national elites in Sweden and Poland organize and think about European integration as they are in the process of entering the EU. Do they perceive ‘black-and-white’ or more complex policy alternatives and results? The analysis begins with a puzzle over the emergent intractability of European integration in the political life of many European nations. If European integration is defined as a dichotomy and as something in the face of which Europeans must be either enthusiastic or skeptical, there is a risk that the project becomes a source of political antagonism rather than an integrative force. In order to shed some light on the possibility of such risks, it is important to know what is it that national elites foresee when they integrate their countries with the EU. Are their views predominantly more complicated that those of more polar EU enthusiasts and skeptics?

In the coming text, the dominant organizational and cognitive patterns among Swedish and Polish integration elites are compared. The discussion is structured around the conceptual components of the research problem as defined in the introduction. In the first section of this final chapter, similarities and differences between the organizational patterns in Sweden and Poland are reviewed. Secondly, the cognitive patterns generated in the Swedish and Polish cases (Enthusiast, Voluntarist, Pragmatist and Skeptic) are compared. Finally an attempt is made to establish theoretical and empirical links between the Rokkanian model and the cognitive approach to issues of European integration.

7.1 Adaptive Organizations Compared

In their practical work with integration issues, the elites in Sweden and Poland have similar tasks to perform in relation to the EU. Each government is free to choose how to organize its work as long as the organization meets with the functional demands of the Acquis. This implies a political approach in which the national government involves economic and social interest groups either directly or indirectly in the process. Non-governmental actors can enter the process as individual experts in particular policy areas or as organizations to which ideas and suggestions are put forth for deliberation and comment. National government nevertheless leads the process and the negotiations for EU membership. To what extent non-governmental actors and interests are involved in processes of gathering information and deliberation
is up to each national government. Thus, there is no rule or guideline from the EU with regard to which actors should be involved on the national scene during preparations for membership. Between the Swedish organization 1988-1994 and the Polish organization 1998-2004 there are both similarities and differences that are mapped in the chapters of this thesis.

Looking at the organizations as spreadsheets and functional subunits to national government, the two national arrangements ROFE and UKIE appear rather similar at first glance. There is a straightforward principle of central government leading and coordinating the work. In both countries there is a functional division of labor, in which the foreign ministry has a central role to play in political communication and membership negotiation. Both Sweden and Poland also have separate units in their respective organizations, the so called Councils, which to varying degrees constitute a platform or forum where the central government can meet with national economic and social partners to talk about ongoing adaptation. Vertically beneath the central government, supplying practical information and fleshing out details, are the nodes of the different branches and sectors of national government, each according to specialization. In neither of the countries is parliament visibly involved as a primary political actor.

A closer look at the two organizations, however, brings some interesting differences to the fore. To begin with, although parliament does not present itself as a primary actor in either of the two countries, parliamentary insight and influence is much greater in Poland than in Sweden. ROFE was both decided upon and set up by the government. In Poland, the UKIE had a governmental precursor during the pre-accession process in the early to mid-1990s. However, the organization such as it is studied in the foregoing was decided upon by the Polish Parliament and it was instituted by decree of national law in 1996. This way, the Polish parliament did two things that set the Polish organization well apart from the Swedish in a comparative perspective. Firstly, the Sejm guaranteed itself insight into the flow of information inside the UKIE from the very beginning of the adaptation process. By law, the Polish organization is obligated to report to the Sejm on its activities at least twice yearly. Secondly, the Polish parliament firmly asserted its political influence over the process of adapting Poland to the EU by signaling to the governmental bodies that adaptation to the EU comes second to the power and voice of parliament. In the Swedish case, there were occasional complaints from parliament about the lack of information pertaining to the preparations for EU membership. The Swedish parliament was also not included when adaptation to EU membership was processed.
It is notable that the Polish organization is built up around the Committee for European Integration. This group can almost be seen as a kind of shadow government. By comparison, the Swedish organization has a group of junior ministers at its core, representing different ministerial fields while doing the coordination and preparation of information for the senior level of government. Importantly, the Swedish organization is based on voluntary inter-ministerial cooperation, not on law. In the Polish organization, a group of senior ministers have two seats, one in government and one on the Committee also serving as a link to parliament. It might be that the Polish organization reflects a fear of governmental instability, particularly against the background of political instability in Poland during the 1990s. In comparison, the Swedish organization signifies a belief in the stability and legitimacy of established government structures and, possibly, a division of labor between their executive and parliamentary branches.

Another distinguishing feature is a relatively high degree of specialization in the Swedish case. From the first day of activity names of officials and specific tasks are attributed to different parts of the organization. This information is also made public already at the end of the 1980s. Well-established principles of Swedish government are at work, and the Swedish respondents refer to these as based on the idea that everybody will do their best if trusted to do their own thing according to ministerial specialization. The ROFE respondents also say that there is nothing in this adaptive organization that changes or curtails the traditional power of the ministries for finance and for foreign affairs in the Swedish system of government. In the Polish organization, on the other hand, interviewees perceive internal relationships as flexible. One Polish respondent uses the analogy of a ‘deer hunt’ to describe the degrees of informality and flexibility surrounding the work. The analogy is that when something comes along it is always the person standing the closest who gets to take a shot. Whenever new challenges arise in the Polish organization, members ask among themselves who can do the job, as opposed to assigning it through formal channels.

Over the years, the Polish organization underwent two major reorganizations, one in 1997 and one in 2001. Throughout, there were also waves of politicization as new parliaments and governments came and went. It can be argued that the relative instability of the young Polish republic affects the way that its adaptive organization functions over time. By comparison, the Swedish organization was undisturbed by a major ideological shift in the country and a new government taking up office in Sweden in the early 1990s.

After the adaptation process was finished in Sweden in 1994, the ROFE ceased to exist. As Poland became a member of the EU in 2004, the UKIE remained. This major difference between the two organizations should
be viewed against the background of the Polish organization’s legal status as a permanent government office. It was originally set up for the same intents and purposes as the ROFE was in Sweden, that is, as a task force there to assist the national government in its preparations for EU membership. Since it is created by national law and voted through in the Sejm, however, the UKIE will continue to be a part of Polish government until parliament changes this. It is not a Polish government office in the same sense as a ministry and it does not have any specified jurisdiction of its own. Nevertheless, the fact that it remains means that the Polish government continues to have access to a centrally placed unit that can analyze and manage problems emanating from the process of European integration.

A major difference between the two cases is that in Poland experienced people remain in office, close to the central government handling EU issues. The organization is in a position where it can continue to make the best of its expertise and vast network of contacts regarding European issues. By comparison, it is interesting to note that one emerging complaint of the central government in Sweden concerns the lack of a similar organization, a sort of nerve center for European affairs in the country staffed with people who can own the integration issues.

Concerning the adaptive organizations in both countries it is hard to determine exactly what the internal relationships look like in terms of who has power over whom, who wields the most political influence in the process and whether or not there have been any significant changes to the working agenda over time. In both countries, the organizations represent cross-departmental governmental units. Work inside both organizations gives priority to cooperative problem solving and coordination. In the Swedish case, the central government, ministries, agencies and interest groups are involved in the organization on a voluntary basis. In the Polish case, legal principles form the basis for activities, but there too participants are fairly independent of each other. In neither country are organized interests immediately involved in policy making or government decision making.

Also, both organizations are political communication channels. All the important strategic actors are there, going to meetings at which important issues emanating from the adaptation process are deliberated before negotiations. In both countries, the organizations contribute to the overall legitimacy of European integration on the national arena, adapting Sweden and Poland to the EU and striking balances between new and old systemic rules.

The fact that ideologically different governments in both countries chose to keep the organizations intact throughout their periods of preparation for EU membership testifies to two things. One is the political utility of the organizations and their ability to manage complex issues related to European integration. Another is that the organizations are more or less forced upon
the two countries by the demands of the Acquis although there are no specific EU guidelines for such organization. It can be argued in the case of Sweden that the government takes a national-corporatist approach to economic and political challenges from Europe. Two consecutive and ideologically opposed Swedish governments choose to follow the Swedish model and to introduce elements of corporatism into the adaptation process. Political legitimacy for European integration is achieved when significant parts of the Swedish electorate feel that they have been involved in the preparations for EU-membership by proxy, via their organizational representatives. In the Polish case, by comparison, there is no sign of political information being shared among actors according to corporatist patterns. It is possible that the Polish government too uses the organization to test ideas early and to see what the negative and positive reactions among important national interest groups might be, but there is no conclusive evidence to support this. Remembering the involvement by the Polish parliament, however, it is harder to see any corporatist blueprint at work in the Polish case. On the contrary, the UKIE seems to be an instrument for central government in a more straightforward way.

It is interesting to note that so much of the adaptation process in Sweden is carried out by the central government without any involvement of the Swedish parliament. The adaptation process between 1988 and 1991 formally concerns Swedish adaptation to the EEA-treaty, i.e. to the Internal Market not involving the issue of EU membership per se. The early process is nevertheless the cornerstone of the 1991 decision to apply for Swedish membership. It is only in 1992 that a parliamentary committee on EEA-affairs was created in the Riksdag, which did not develop into a committee on EU-affairs until after membership was achieved for Sweden. As testified to by respondents in the Polish organization, demands on their work were made from three different directions through the whole adaptation process. Above the questions and demand flowing from the EU Commission and from senior ministers in central government, as in the Swedish case, the Polish organization also had to answer to parliament. It is probably safe to assume that the political cross-pressure was stronger in the Polish organization.

Both the Polish and the Swedish governments arranged forums as part of their adaptive organizations. By way of these forums, nongovernmental interest groups were given some access to the adaptation process. In Sweden the forum was called the Council for European Affairs and in Poland it was called the Council of Ministers. But in neither country are there any official protocols, notes or minutes left behind to give some insight into what kind of adaptive work was done there. It is hard to judge what role these Councils play in the two organizations. Similarly, it is impossible to say what kind of information or what, if any, kind of influence
that flowed from the Councils to other parts of the organizations. Looking at which actors and interests were actually represented in the Swedish case, there are traces of the Swedish corporatist and consensus-seeking tradition in national policymaking. This is also supported by information from some of the Swedish respondents, who talk about their reasons for going to Council meetings. Some of the participants in the Swedish case have participated in meetings under the assumption that they were acting in a corporatist setting. At least partially, the Polish Council can be interpreted in the same way, although information is scarce also in this case. According to Polish respondents, meetings in the Council would sometimes gather almost a hundred persons or more. The difference from the Swedish case is that in Poland also junior ministers and members of parliament would participate.

Both organizations published annual reports on the progress of adaptation. In Sweden, these reports occurred between 1988 and 1994 and in Poland between 1998 and 2004. When the two organizations took stock of the parameters of European integration and long-term changes in the structure and politics of the EU, similarities between them dominate the picture. In this thesis, the reports are seen as strategic policy documents and are analyzed in the light of Rokkanian integration categories. From this analysis, a distinct structure of ideas emerges.

The category Trade and Industry stands out as the vital integrative factor for both governments. In effect, ROFE and UKIE alike see Trade and Industry as both the reason for and major vehicle of European integration. In both countries there reverberates the original theory of macro-economic harmonization via legal integration across national boundaries in Europe, which is also the cornerstone of the EU transnational market. Regardless of the decade that passes between the two adaptation processes, the reports make it clear that adaptation to the EU is fundamentally perceived of as being equivalent to adaptation to the Single Market. This does not mean that the Swedish and Polish governments problematise the category Trade and Industry. To the contrary, there is an air of self-evidence in the reports which is illustrated most clearly by the way both Swedish and Polish market actors are seen as just that – as Swedish or Polish. The role of central government in both countries is expressed as that of the guardian or the advocate of national economic interests, facing some legal challenges on a transnational market where economic actors will need help from government to fend for themselves.

There is one major difference between the Swedish and Polish views concerning the category Trade and Industry. In Sweden, there is a change in perspective over time; beginning in 1991, the reports focus increasingly on various supranational programs and initiatives. The Swedish national interest suddenly disappears after three years and there is a drift in focus. Whereas
there is a clear focus on the interests of big Swedish firms in the first reports, big industry almost vanishes from the horizon in the reports from later stages of the adaptation process. Instead, an interest is taken in small- and mid-size firms and in the prerequisites for economic activity on this level among the EU countries.

In the Polish reports, structural support receives a lot of attention. The possible problems, prospects and effects of transnationalization are not discussed per se by the Polish government, however, and it is up to the reader to decide what are the real problems concerning Polish Trade and Industry. The first Polish reports 1998-2000 mainly focus on nation-building and the transfer of know-how from EU15. In the later reports, the Polish government comes forward more clearly as a guardian of small-and mid-size Polish firms in their plight to find adequate support money from EU institutions. The careful reader of these reports can find an explanation for this in the structural data that are presented all through the report series. Structural needs are big in Poland and the government is conscious that the country has a lot of catching up to do. Importantly, the reports show how the private industrial and business sectors in the Polish economy are dominated by small and medium size actors. Transnationalization of big industry and capital, from a Polish perspective, is more a matter of acquiring foreign direct investment from transnationals than worrying about Polish firms going abroad. Regardless of this major difference between the Swedish and Polish reports, the similarity in how the role of national government is presented as self-evident vis-à-vis market actors is striking.

The analysis of the two categories Functional and Territorial Regionalism produces some differences in outlook between the two governments. In both cases, there are also changes in perception over time. In the Swedish reports regional issues are discussed in what might be called authoritative terms at the beginning of the series. The Swedish government believes that it can retain its ‘comprehensive regional policy’ regardless of European integration. ROFE also says that the Swedish government envisages a continuation in its vital historic and strategic role for regional development in Sweden. In the Polish case, however, the role of central government as a guardian is projected even more strongly to begin with. A major difference between the two cases is that regional issues are mentioned almost in passing in the first of the UKIE reports. It is more or less defined a non-issue for Poland and is thereafter ignored. When regional issues are discussed in the early Polish reports, however, the EU structural funds immediately appear. As opposed to regional issues in the national perspective, the EU structural funds and their possible impact on Poland become more strongly emphasized in the reports over time.
In the Swedish material, there is a breaking-point in 1992, however. Up until then, the Swedish government withheld that adaptation to the EC/EU and the transnational Single Market did not imply any change in or need for revision of Swedish regional policy. The two things, adaptation to the transnational market on the one hand and regional development on the other, are simply not seen as connected by the Swedish government. The view is that regional policy is the sole property of national governments, and therefore needs no discussion or linkage with the deliberation on how to adapt Swedish rules and regulations to the EC/EU. From 1992 on, however, the Swedish view is that adaptation to the EU does have a big impact on national regional policy, and that Sweden must adapt also to this general trend among European countries. The Polish reports, by comparison, are quiet on this subject. Over and above the continued discussion about opportunities for Poland in the EU regional funds, neither Functional nor Territorial Regionalism are considered important for the development of the country. The regional discussion in the Polish reports is hidden behind the stated need for modernization of local and regional government. In sum, the adaptive organizations in Sweden and Poland show both similarities and differences.

7.2 Understanding Europe: Enthusiasts, Voluntarists, Pragmatists, Skeptics

The cognitive structures of Swedish and Polish elites are made comparable on the dimensions of necessity and desirability regarding European integration. In both countries, the dominant perceptions among the elites converge in the Voluntarist and Pragmatist categories. In the Swedish case more than 75% of respondents answer to either of these two categories. In the Polish case 80% do. When the cognitive model was first generated in the Swedish study, it was expected that Enthusiast cognition would dominate and that, possibly, Skeptic perceptions would also occur in the material. Results, however, made the development of a more encompassing cognitive scheme necessary to facilitate interpretation of the results from interviews. This study shows that the cognitive model formulated against the background of Swedish empirical data also works in the Polish case.

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1 Chapter 2 of this thesis describes how the combination of necessity and desirability renders four cognitive categories in a two-by-two. Briefly, the Enthusiast represents a category saying that European integration is both necessary and desirable, whereas the Skeptic says the right opposite, that it is neither necessary nor desirable. The middle categories have mixed perceptions. To the Voluntarist integration is desirable, but not necessary. The Pragmatist believes that it is necessary, but basically undesirable. See also Appendix 1.
Table 5: Dominant cognitive patterns in the Swedish and Polish cases.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Enthusiast</th>
<th>Voluntarist</th>
<th>Pragmatist</th>
<th>Skeptic</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Swedish (61)</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Polish (20)</td>
<td>4</td>
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As shown in Table 5, Enthusiasts do not reach above 20% in either case, and Skeptics are below 5% in the Swedish case, whereas in the Polish case this category is redundant. The qualitative aspects of elite reasoning behind the four cognitive categories are dealt with at length and summarized in chapters 5 and 6 of this thesis. Looking at the detailed analysis in chapters 5 and 6, however, it is clear that the mixed influences from Enthusiast and Skeptic cognitions are influential regarding particular integration categories as derived from Rokkanian integration theory. Thus, traces of both skepticism and enthusiasm also exist among Voluntarists and Pragmatists when some of the newly mentioned categories are commented upon. This is the case in both Sweden and Poland. Below, an attempt is made to compare the synthetic patterns in Swedish and Polish cognition.

Overall, the dominant cognitive patterns are similar in the two cases. There are however, some slight differences between how the two elites arrive at this, which has consequences for interpretation. Before dealing with the differences in relation to the Rokkanian integration categories in the final section of this thesis, however, this penultimate section compares and contrasts the dominant cognitive patterns generated by the Swedish and Polish studies.

**Enthusiasts**

For the Enthusiasts, supranationality stands for a possibility. This possibility is unique in that it can help solve common problems in Europe and at the same time give stability to the economic and social development of nations. In the Polish case, EU membership is seen as a vital national interest regardless of whether the integration process is understood as something built on an altruistic or on a mercenary ideal. According to Enthusiasts in both cases, there are two important driving forces behind European integration. On the one hand there are the narrowly defined sectoral economic and social interests and on the other hand there is the need for stability and peace.
between countries. Enthusiasts see these driving forces as pointing the process of European integration, i.e. the governments of all countries, in the same direction. Partial policies having to do with sectoral economic or social interests are means to an end for Enthusiasts, and the overarching goal is peace and prosperity for all. Enthusiasts also believe that the history of Europe teaches us to make an effort to really tie the two aspects of integration together. The formula is basically that the more people are intertwined economically and socially, the stronger their bonds will be.

Transnationalizing tendencies in Trade and Industry initially seem like a straightforward issue to Polish Enthusiasts. In general, transnationalization in economic life can be seen as a component of the process of European integration, for example in the form of cross-ownership between firms. Big firms and other economic actors are at the forefront of the development, and this is seen by the Polish Enthusiasts as both desirable and necessary. What is more, political integration is not seen as independent of economic trends and processes, and Polish Enthusiasts believe that a free market, in order to be free, presupposes the existence of strong government, law and administration. Polish Enthusiasts are very enthusiastic about the Single Market in Europe and it seems to them that it is both necessary and desirable for Polish Trade and Industry and, in the widest possible sense, for the Polish economy. Polish Enthusiasts also speak of how it is good for the Polish government to let big foreign financial groups buy things up, since money and investment is what the country really needs. The only difference between Swedish and Polish Enthusiasts is that the Swedish elite see an opportunity for expansion of Swedish economic interests in Europe via Trade and Industry.

When it comes to Trade and Industry, there is almost perfect correspondence between the views of Enthusiasts in both cases. The Swedish elite also believes that the market economy, involving the freedom for market actors to move freely across national boundaries, is desirable and necessary. In neither of the two enlargement elites are there any skeptical views concerning the theoretical categories European Integration or Trade and Industry. The Swedish elite is also quick to expand upon examples incorporating phenomena and processes that have to do with Europe as a whole, not confining them to the Single Market but rather saying that these things contribute positively to economic and social development also in non-member countries in the world. Thus, Enthusiasts in both cases have cognitions based on a positive linkage between economic development and political stability in Europe.
Voluntarists

In the two cases, Voluntarists see two different aspects of the integration process. Integration is defined as functional ties between countries in Europe, but it is also about a deeper understanding between the peoples of Europe and, above all, a chance to make a clean break with history. Voluntarists think that differences between Eastern and Western Europe in terms of economic and political development are a crunch question. Limited supranationality and the four freedoms of the Single Market are basically desirable, although not necessary, and they are also important for the continued economic and social improvement of European societies. Voluntarists also emphasize that the current ideal behind the integration process has deep historical roots and that transnationalization among economic actors is a positive aspect of rich and poor countries coming closer to convergence in Europe. Both Swedish and Polish Voluntarists see something highly desirable in how successful firms from EU15 countries move into the transforming Eastern economies and contribute to a more speedy process of change. Voluntarists in both cases will refer to this development as desirable but not necessary.

The Swedish elite see new ideas about market-oriented solutions as genuinely desirable also outside of the EU. The important question is how to finance public goods. To the Swedish elite, this also touches upon the issue of what role culture and identity should play in the political relationship between governments and Trade and Industry. Swedishness, or indeed any other national identity, is seen as emanating from deeply rooted structures in different countries, but Swedish Voluntarists do not see any contradiction between market freedoms and cultural freedoms. On the contrary, these are regarded as compatible and equally desirable. It is also desirable, although not necessary, to seek new linkages between the two spheres, new forms of cooperation and joint projects, and the possibility to seek new solutions to old problems. For the same reason, transnationalization in the form of Functional Regionalism is desirable to the Swedish Voluntarists if the boundaries of the new regions coincide with those of historical and cultural regions in Europe. Voluntary cooperation between actors across national boundaries is thereby linked with the overall process of European integration, because with the introduction of the four freedoms on the Single Market new ideas and projects will develop. European integration in this Voluntarist interpretation might make former enemies able to forgive and forget, possibly also to forge new alliances and to be able to meet the future in partnership.
Among the Polish Voluntarists, there is a heavier emphasis on national social structures. Polish Voluntarists think that national governments can actively promote and help new commonalities, political as well as social and economic. Importantly, to Polish Voluntarists it seems that regions in countries where there is already good fit between the national boundaries and the old historical and cultural heritage will find it hard to develop anything that goes beyond strictly international cooperation in the transnational sphere. They do not see any element of necessity as far as the linkage between European integration and Functional Regionalism is concerned.

There is also a major difference between how Voluntarists in the two cases look at the connection between ethnicity and regionalism. Both phenomena are desirable because culture and territorial identity are the stepping stones of politics for Voluntarists. But, for all the desirability of territorial regionalism, it still lacks an element of necessity. Swedish and Polish Voluntarists alike can see how Territorial Regionalism in Europe might even be negatively affected by European integration. In this light, European integration is thought of as a large-scale project, and territorial interest groups will also see opportunities lost in the process. Also, to the Voluntarists it seems that most channels for influence, programs for cooperation and development and so on are focused on national governments. In practice, therefore, they also think that national governments are the best partners to talk to when for example ethnic groups want something to be done about a particular situation. Voluntarists in Sweden and Poland think that cooperation between the state and ethnic groups can take place for the benefit of both sides in Europe, and that Territorial Regionalism has some desirable aspects. There is, however, no necessity involved in their eyes.

**Pragmatists**

To Pragmatists, supranationality in terms of political union in Europe would be historically unique and is therefore unlikely. Both Swedish and Polish pragmatists agree about the uniqueness of the current European experience and about the recent experiences of the peoples of Eastern Europe serves as a reminder of the fact that a union based on coercion cannot last for long. What Pragmatists see, however, is a strong element of necessity in how democratically generated national interests converge on security issues and cooperation in the economic sphere today. Participation in the process or European integration can therefore be defined as a vital national interest for both countries concerned, without adding any particular expectations of power and influence to the vision of a future European Union. Supranationality simply means to the Pragmatists that changes in the balance
of power between national governments and the actors of other political levels become necessary as a result of cooperation between nations. National governments will then sometimes have to support decisions that go against their own interests, according to both Swedish and Polish Pragmatists. This might sometimes even make it necessary for national governments to go against what their voters consider to be in their own (national) interest, mostly because central government is unable to explain the bare necessities of a particular situation to the people. Pragmatists also think that there are huge potential pitfalls in political compromise, but that this is a necessary condition for European integration.

Polish Pragmatists express more certainty about Trade and Industry than the Swedish ones do. There is no doubt in the Polish case as to whether there are genuinely Polish companies, for example. Polish Pragmatists will go on to make qualifications, however, in saying that any criterion for national belonging, or identity, will by necessity seem rather weak, but that there are some rock-bottom definitions in terms of where companies are registered for activity and corporate law. Also, Polish Pragmatists are convinced that the principle of domicile means that a company is Polish if it has its main office in the country.

Polish Pragmatists also emphasize that they think policymakers and legal institutions alike are equally interested in protecting their relevant markets in Europe. If Polish consumers are somehow affected badly by market actors, Pragmatists see it as natural for national legal and political actions to follow.

Pragmatists share the view that national political institutions have a given role in protecting freedoms of the market, regardless of whether market actors are transnational or not. Swedish Pragmatists agree, by throwing in examples of how they see linkages between regional interests and markets. The main problem for Pragmatists is that Europe is divided into economic spheres that are unequal. Particularly in the eastern parts of Europe, it is difficult for Pragmatists to find good examples of transnationalizing social and economic tendencies. In effect, Swedish Pragmatists can see a problem with regionalization in this light. Original economic and social differences between different parts of Europe are vital to the problem, and the lack of stable transnational partnerships is equally problematic.

Swedish and Polish Pragmatists alike see the emergence of functional regions in Europe as a necessary thing, not least to facilitate market expansion. There is a potential shift of political power involved as well, but national government is always somehow involved as financer and regulator of real or potential transnational projects in this perspective. The regional lobby in Brussels is seen as a real force, possibly an interest to
which national government might eventually have to yield some of its
sovereign political power to. Political competition between functional
regions, however, is a complicating factor. It is hard for Pragmatists to see
how any single national government would be able to draw the exact lines
around it in political terms and, therefore, also why it should be regarded as
a political force in its own right. To Pragmatists, national government in
Europe has two very important tasks in monitoring and supervising social
and economic development.

Polish Pragmatists are particularly suspicious of territorial and cultural
linkages. The distinction between culture as symbols on the one hand, and
vital, or necessary, social and political institutions is very important to them,
and they maintain that the problem of ethnicity coupled with regional
political opposition is more difficult for other countries than it is for Poland.
Potentially, it is a big problem for the overall success of European integration,
but not for Poland. On this topic, the national perspective comes easier to
Polish Pragmatists than to most Europeans since they firmly believe that
European integration first and foremost has to do with adaptation to the
Single Market. Polish enthusiasm over ethnicity stops with symbols such as
costume, folk dancing and cultural festivals. If any such symbols are exploited
for the purpose of political opposition, then, they are simply undesirable.

Particularly, Polish Pragmatists see the framework of political
institutions in the EU as a set of safeguards and security arrangements. At
the heart of this reasoning lies the assumption that territorial regionalism
overlaps with functional regionalism. What decides the outcome of any
political initiative or process in Europe is what the governments of nation
states say and do. National interests and the combined interests of several,
sovereign states is both the beginning and the end of European politics.
Swedish Pragmatists agree that those relations between national governments
and ethnic groups that have already been established in different national
systems will also be the ones we will see in the future. It is not that Swedish
Pragmatists in any way want to diminish the importance of ethnicity in the
political development of Europe, but rather simply to decide that ethnic
relations have a dark and sinister side that democratic governments should
do their best to keep at bay.

Swedish Pragmatists also see how there is an immense potential for
political conflict looming behind rising ethnoterritorial demands in Europe,
and how the small element of desirability involve might quickly transform
into a danger for democracy. All ethnic groups carry the seed of irredentism
and such seeds of political conflict are dangerous, potentially violent in this
perspective. In general, Swedish and Polish Pragmatists agree about the
necessity of the historically defined sovereignty the nation state. It is
therefore hard for them to see any real potential for change in countries like
Sweden and Poland, where central government is so actively reforming and balancing the national political system. Government activity has given rise to particular attitudes and behavior that cannot easily be changed, according to Pragmatists, at least not in the short run. Ethnicity has had to give way to the modernizing ambitions of governments. To Pragmatists, status quo in terms of national sovereignty is the only viable political recipe for Europe because other visions might make it hard to deal politically with all those things that people perceive of as necessary in their everyday lives.

**Skeptics**

Skeptics are few and far between in the Swedish and Polish interviews. Skeptics see a definite limit to how far beyond national sovereignty the cooperation between national governments ought to go. International cooperation, when deeply committed, and harmonization of systemic rules concerning the market economy is necessary and desirable, but to take things further and perhaps even create a political union is neither. Skeptics interpret the principle of subsidiarity as an important restriction on the process of European integration. There is, according to Skeptics, no need to follow up on the expansion of the transnational market with an expansion of supranational political institutions in Europe.

To Skeptics, the nation state is a prerequisite for democracy. Skeptics in the Swedish and Polish cases also see nations and nation states as the primary markers of identity in the European context. Moreover, nationally demarcated cultures are seen as the cornerstone of European integration. Nations and national symbols might be challenged by transnationalization and European integration, but then only to a limited degree. European integration is therefore not seen by Skeptics as a viable alternative to national integration. Swedish Skeptics denounce European integration particularly when it comes to political identity. Examples are taken from the Swedish public debate about EU membership, in which the potential in which the potential Swedish contribution to Europe, according to Skeptics, has been discussed in terms of a Swedish tradition of pragmatism, problem-solving capacity, consensus orientation and being good at negotiation. Swedish Skeptics find this an interesting reflection of Swedish political identity, and there is a sense among them that the Swedish nation is almost in a state of denial when it comes to political culture.

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2 In the Polish case, the material does not add up to a synthetic cognitive category in its own right, but exists only as an analytical category. Here, comparison is made with reference to analytical categories in the Polish case.
On some of the Rokkanian integration categories, Swedish Skeptics are joined by their Polish counterparts. When push comes to shove, no Skeptics in either elite see transnational functional regionalism as desirable or necessary. Regions with deep historical roots are seen as potentially dangerous in that they can focus political attention in the wrong direction. Economic cleavages and environmental problems tend to be hidden behind such political rhetoric, according to Skeptics in both Sweden and Poland.

Skeptics in both cases focus on Functional Regionalism, saying that it might breed ideas and notions that are potentially harmful to the real and big political problems that need attention in contemporary Europe. By and large, Skeptics think that functional regions are showcases and that they carry little real political weight. Skeptics also see national governments in Europe as egoistic, acting in accordance with what they perceive of as their national interest. To the extent that functional regions, particularly transnational regions, are well aligned with the territorial interests of national governments, Swedish and Polish Skeptics can see them evolving successfully. At the end of the day, however, Skeptics think that functional regions and market opportunities alike are completely overshadowed by the interests of national governments and by international agreements. To Skeptics, this development is neither necessary nor desirable, and requires more than anything else a rethinking of the role of the European state. In the perspective of Skeptics, this cannot be done within the framework of European integration as it is.

7.3 Rokkanian Perspectives on European Integration

The theoretical point of departure for this thesis is the model of European integration created by Stein Rokkan, which builds on the assumption that all nation-states in Europe grow out of balances between the same forces of political integration and disintegration. Concerning these forces as interpreted and related in this thesis, the result of the comparison between Swedish and Polish elites is clear. They have a similar understanding of European integration in that they do not foresee any withering away of their respective nation-states, either indicated by organizational or cognitive patterns. There are differences, however, between how they emphasize problems and opportunities, particularly when the analysis goes into the more detailed aspects of the Rokkanian integration concepts. Nevertheless, the overall result is that European integration is not seen by the Swedish and Polish elites as a process which substitutes national sovereignty for supranational political union. Instead, European integration is seen as a
complement to national politics and a way to influence the near political space in which nations are localized.

In answer to the crunch question about European integration as a supranational project, both Swedes and Poles report that they do not see such a development emerging in the short run. The overall pattern is that neither of the two national enlargement elites believe that they are participating in the construction of a new super-state in Europe. To the contrary, the predominant image of the kind of political Europe that they are building is that of a safer, more prosperous global region in which a minimum of economic and social rules are upheld by the members of the European Union. In effect, most of them are speaking of a status-quo situation in which national ideas and practices become embedded in a more predictable and stable international environment than before. On the same token, they do not envisage national sovereignty as broken or replaced by any movement from below.

In a Rokkanian perspective, what the Swedish and Polish interviewees are in effect witnessing, and what is also reflected in the two national ways of organizing (ROFE and UKIE), is that national adaptation to the supranational political system in Europe is happening as a result of segmentation, as categorized in Figure 3 below. Entering the EU represents a political shift. This shift, however, does not involve all the national actors and interests that have been crucial to the formation of the modern nation-state in Europe. Returning to the Rokkanian theory about functional and territorial integration in Europe, it is possible to illustrate this cognitive shift in more precise terms. In Figure 3 it is shown how the predominant organizational and cognitive patterns, which have been empirically explored in this thesis, interact with Rokkanian integration theory.

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3 Note: “Historically documented cleavages rarely fall at the poles of the two axes: a concrete conflict is rarely exclusively territorial or exclusively functional but will feed on strains in both directions. The model essentially serves as a grid in the comparative analysis of political systems.” Flora et.al. (1999), p. 283.
Thusly, utilizing Rokkanian integration theory, the dominant cognitive categories and patterns of organization in the Swedish and Polish cases can be interpreted in a way that sheds new light on what is happening in contemporary Europe. My conclusion is that European integration is about solving national problems related to economic growth and political reform. Thus, transnationalizing market tendencies in Europe are either embraced as a set of desirable opportunities (Voluntarists) or accepted as part of the dire necessities of modern life in Europe (Pragmatists). Regardless of their more detailed arguments for accepting this particular transnationalizing force and their readiness to transform it into political integration on the supranational level, this is the area in which Swedish and Polish integration elites see important change taking place. Segmented integration as seen by Swedish and Polish elites has to do with mediated adaptation in the upper left quadrant of the Rokkanian grid. As illustrated in Figure 3, the starting points are different between the Swedish (1) and Polish (2) elites. Therefore their
cognitive approaches, in terms of what they perceive of as the major problems and opportunities for their respective countries, are different. Ideas about where they are going, however, are similar (3) both in terms of the direction of integration and the belief that segmented integration is necessary and desirable.

The Swedish elite (1) are motivated by slightly more Voluntarist ideas than the Polish. According to them, there is basically nothing wrong with the historical model for the achievement of growth and prosperity in Sweden, and there is a strong belief that the national system has a sound capacity to reproduce and alleviate political conflict. The Swedish elite also think that the political system has firm historical roots in political cleavages in the lower left segment of the model in Figure 3. Adapting Sweden to the EU, they perceive of their role primarily as that of centralizing and deliberating the consequences of European integration for those groups in Swedish society that have emerged from historical conflict between economic and peripheral interests. The influences of organized interests and local and regional government are seen as legitimate. In the Swedish elite cognition, however, this does not mean that there is competition between the national center on the one hand, and different economic interest groups and functional peripheries on the other. To the contrary, in the eyes of the Swedish elite, there are vital opportunities for Swedish interest groups and functional regional actors on the European arena. By careful segmented adaptation to the EU, the Swedish elite believe that they can improve upon such mainly economic opportunities.

The Polish elite (2) are motivated by slightly more Pragmatic ideas than the Swedish. There is an element of uncertainty concerning the recent political history of Poland among them, however, particularly concerning what possible effects rapid economic and legal restructuring might have on the patience and general mind set of the average voter in Poland. There is no doubt in the minds of the Polish elite, the country needs support from the outside to safeguard and stabilize the parallel processes of modernization, consolidation and adaptation. They think, nevertheless, that the political system is coming out of the top right segment of the model in Figure 3. Considering Poland’s recent authoritarian past, the Polish elite are convinced that central government is the key actor in any kind of national development. This lack of a bottom-up tradition to point to, however, does not mean that the Polish elite want for important structural influences on the adaptation process. The centralizing role of the Polish elite is colored by deep ideological conflict in the young republic and by the strong influence that the Roman Catholic Church has on the identity of the Polish people. In the eyes of the Polish elite, there are transnational economic opportunities for Polish actors too. But it is not so much the economic and interest-driven side of
politics that motivates them, as it is the need for political stability and an ideologically neutral role for the state. For the Polish elite, segmented adaptation to the EU is the key to stable and successful transformation.

The dominant organizational patterns mirror the cognitive ones in both cases. The Swedish organization is an expression of how central government seeks regional and corporatist legitimacy in the national setting when deliberating adaptation to the EU. As far as the actors involved are concerned, they are assigned specific roles in the organization which tie in with traditional role-taking in the Swedish government tradition. On the whole, the issue of European integration is handled as a marginal addition to normal politics in Swedish government. In Figure 3, this is indicated by the Swedish arrow pointing from the lower left to the top left quadrant (1).

The Polish organization, on the other hand, is indicative of a central government still in search of stable forms of national governance. The actors involved are flexible and careful not to get stuck in administrative patterns, all the time wary of the fact that anything and everything can become politicized almost overnight. The Polish organizing principle also indicates that European integration is a sensitive issue, involving deliberation of how to best use the hard-won Polish sovereignty, which is why the organization is open to influences from parliament. EU adaptation is the last part of a process in which central government in Poland has been the key actor in moving the country from authoritarianism to democracy and into a place in the EU. This is indicated in Figure 3 by the Polish arrow pointing from the upper right to the upper left quadrant (2).

Both national elites share a belief in segmented European integration (3). They think about the role of the state in Europe as functional. Adaptation to supranational integration is regarded as most strongly attached to political cleavages in the upper left quadrant of Figure 3. Although the cognitive starting points differ between the Swedish and Polish elites, they end up with similar conclusions as to the logic of European integration. The first important assumption that emerges from the empirical material is that European integration can be both delimited and managed by central government activity in the upper left quadrant of Figure 3. The second, equally important, assumption shared by the two elites is that the lower right quadrant of the Rokkanian integration model is insignificant in European integration. Thus, in neither of the two cases is European integration seen as driven by ideological or peripheral political forces (lower right quadrant of Figure 3). This manifests itself in strong notions about the role of identities, territorial belonging and religious convictions in the European setting. From a Rokkanian perspective, it can be argued that the two integration elites take a rationalizing approach to their political tasks when they omit particular quadrants from policy deliberation. Considering the vital historical
importance of ideological and center-periphery cleavages in the development of European politics, it is noteworthy that the Swedish and Polish elites do not see them as relevant to the future development of the EU. The notion of manageable segmented integration makes political cleavages, defined along the ideological dimension or as a result of peripheral positioning, national issues by default. While neither of the two elites excludes the possibility of political resistance to European integration based on local territorial identity in general, they are hard put to see how it would in any way affect their respective countries. Above all, they fail to see how such identity politics could in any way be related to transnational relations in Europe or, particularly, to the supranational arena. It is clear that the Swedish and Polish integration elites think about political adaptation to the EU as centralized mediation of economic interests and policies aimed at the preservation of national democratic stability.

A last note, what in the Swedish language is called a Brasklapp⁴, might be pertinent ultimately to save Rokkanian theory from the particularities and vagaries of the results of this study. Although Rokkanian theory is generated on the basis of historical and empirical evidence for all modern states in Europe, this thesis is concerned with only two, with Sweden and Poland. Although the theoretical language and more generally the terminology used in this thesis is generalizing, it is merely stating the obvious to say that the inferences which can be made from two countries alone are limited. On the same note, it should be pointed out that the two countries under scrutiny in this thesis are both representative of peripheral states in present-day Europe, Sweden located in the high North and Poland in the East. Although these countries share the shores of the Baltic Sea, their self-perceived territorial belongings are different. Looking beyond the results presented here, it would seem a reasonable priority to try to apply the chosen line of inquiry to some of the core nations of Europe. Germany and France seem to be interesting cases for comparison, in their well established roles as core members of EU12, EU15 and EU25. One thing that speaks heavily for Germany as a potential case in further comparison is the fact that it has a federal political system, whereas both Sweden and Poland are unitary states. By comparison, the German case might fill other segments of the Rokkanian model with interesting ways of organizing and cognizing integration.

⁴ In Swedish lexica, it is generally held that the bishop Hans Brask (1464-1538) added a hidden note to his seal on a document, by which the Swedish aristocracy forced archbishop Hans Trolle to resign in 1517. Historically, those were the days of fierce struggle between Catholicism and Protestantism in Sweden. In the note, bishop Brask wrote his famous words ‘härtill är jag nödd och tvungen’, which in my own translation to English reads ‘necessity compels me to do this’. Because of this note, the bishop’s life was spared when Danish king Kristian II later invaded Stockholm and mass-executed Swedish nobility.
This thesis begins and ends also with a particular interest in Sweden. A lot has happened in Sweden politically since data were collected. Even a cursory look at the contemporary Swedish debate shows how peripheral and ideological forces have combined to challenge the segmented integration model as perceived by integration elites during adaptation in the early period. In reality, Swedish actors and interests in the lower left quadrant of Figure 3 are currently moving toward the lower right quadrant, reflecting a sustainable ideological tension among Swedish citizens and giving voice to local and regional dissent.

This indicates that Rokkan was right in his assumption that there must be a balance between all four quadrants for a national system to remain well-integrated and, by extension, that segmented integration in one area (economic interest mediation at the center) threatens the political stability unless balanced off with integrative measures in the other three areas (economic interest mediation in peripheries; ideological mediation at the center and ideological mediation in peripheries). As it is illustrated in Figure 3, segmented integration works well for some in Sweden. But at the same time it gives rise to organizing and voice among peripheral and ideological groups, whose perceptions of necessity and desirability do not find expression in the evolving process of national adaptation to European integration. Since Sweden became an EU member in 1995, such counter-mobilization has become increasingly active in Swedish society. Against this background, a replication of the empirical study in Sweden probably would not be amiss as a first step in further research.
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Inga-Britt Ahlenius
Gun-Britt Asplund
Carl Asplund
Severin Blomstrand
Richard Bouveng
Gunnar Björk
Gunnar Brodin
Hans Corell
Christian Danielsson
Mats Denninger
Bengt Dennis
Ulf Dinkelspiel
Bo Dockered
Peter Egardt
Torbjörn Ek
Göte Ekström
Johan Enegren
Christer Fallenius
Carin Fischer
Lennart Göransson
Kurt Hedman
Tom Hedelius
Staffan Herrström
Jörgen Holgersson
Ruth Jacoby
Per-Egon Johansson
Bertil Jonsson
Bjarne Kirsebom
Krister Kumlin
Kaarlo Laakso
Göran Lannegren

Ingrid Laréen-Marklund
Ulf Larsson
Bo Leander
Leif Lewin
Hans Ling
Pernilla Lindh
Stefan de Maré
Axel Moberg
Christer Måhl
Lars-Åke Nilsson
Ann-Christin Nykvist
Anders Olander
Jan Palmstierna
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Sven-Gunnar Persson
Håkan Martin Rahm
Lennart Rhodin
Mikael Sahlin
Johan Salsbäck
Folke Schippel
Agneta Söderman
Stefan Strömberg
Alf Svensson
Christer Thelin
Jerker Torngren
Jörgen Ullenhag
Axel Wallén
Per Westerberg
Ragne Wiberg
Tom Wiman
Interviewees in Poland

(1999)
Ewa Synowiec

(2002)
Jolanta Jastrzebska
Hanna Zelichowska (x2)

(2004)
Adam Ambroziak
Justyna Andrzzejewicz
Maegorzata Brennek
Tomasz Ciszak
Adam Dudziek
Elzbieta Kawecka-Wyrzykowska
Krzystof Kopytko
Grazyna Niesyto
Robert Rybicki
Agnieszka Suska-Bulawa
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APPENDIX 1
Two Examples of Cognitive Data Processing and Interpretation

Qualitative analysis of interview data is highly dependent on the perspective and intentions of the analyst. The theoretical and empirical aims of this thesis have been described at length in the chapters of this thesis. The empirical chapters regarding the cognitive patterns of respondents in ROFE and UKIE have been supported with quotes throughout, which is intended to clarify the different elements involved in the analysis. In terms of method and related choices of research design, all of the sources referred to in chapters 1 and 2 have been of equal importance to how the results from interviews have been achieved.

However, one source in particular brings together the diverse methodological concepts that apply to a study of this kind. This is the book Den Kvalitativa Forskningsintervjun by Steinar Kvale from 1997, as referred to in foregoing chapters. Although there are never any absolute or distinct lines that make one form of qualitative analysis and interpretation positively different from another, there is an abundance of concepts available for grappling with complexity. Kvale uses three methodological concepts that approximate the many lengthy and arduous processes of analysis, synthesis and interpretation that lie behind the presentation of interview data in this thesis. Of particular interest are the concepts categorization and concentration as tools for an ad-hoc analysis. These have all been used as guidelines for the empirical qualitative work in this study at different points in time.

Ad-hoc analysis, according to Kvale, builds on the assumption that different techniques and perspectives can be combined when working on a particular empirical material, such as research interviews. Normally, an analysis begins with a categorizing approach in which the researcher looks for patterns in the empirical material, some of which will fit with assumptions and theoretical concepts, and some of which will not. After those parts of the empirical material that has good fit is sorted out and analyzed separately from the rest, a series of repetitive analyses is done. What do the other parts of the material say and in what ways can these parts inform the overall interpretation? Thus, both texts and interview materials are approached in several waves of analysis aimed at sorting out which parts can be understood

in the light of, for example, Rokkanian integration theory and which parts can not. In the original Swedish study, several such waves of analysis gave the idea that cognitive patterns beyond the Rokkanian theoretical scheme were hidden in the interviews. This realization subsequently led to the development of the four cognitive categories, as described in a previous chapter.

For the cognitive categories to be defined, the interview material was also analyzed in a concentrating approach. This has to do with the element of definition involved when new categories are developed on the basis of a rich qualitative material, such as it is done in this thesis. Below, two examples are given of how such concentrating analysis of answers to interview questions is done. The method is based generally on the methodological literature cited in previous chapters but particularly on the ideas and recommendations of Kvale.

Two examples of the concentrating approach as applied to the cognitive category Enthusiast

Research question: Which are the actors’ views of Necessity and Desirability in relation to the integration categories derived from Rokkanian theory?

Thematic analysis: How does this particular respondent think about Necessity and Desirability in relation to supranational integration?

1a) Respondent’s statement
Normally, I think of this concept more narrowly, that is to say within the framework of European cooperation. That is how it is for me, although you can also look at it as something to do with the whole of Europe. If you do that, then you also find the force behind the concept and you understand the most important dimension, which is that countries want to stop being at war with each other once and for all. Peace and security, that is, and the fact that countries create ever closer ties between them should probably be regarded as a means to reach this higher end. That is how I look at it, even if I normally work with limited economic issues. Economic ties between nations are all a means to an end. Security and stability-if you join the economies you have the strongest glue there is. Eastern Europe, for example, they were forced to integrate before but that never works. Voluntary participation is important. Counter-forces to this type of voluntary integration that we have can of course be seen everywhere, particularly among nationalist groups that want to see a different kind of development. They might even see it as a threat, and this kind of subversive nationalism is really dangerous. You should always ask yourself whether this LePen in France really stands for something that has to do with parliamentary politics, or if he is heading in some other direction? There is always a risk, in this case that even France is
subjected to a regime which cannot see the benefits of European integration but want to achieve something completely different.

1b) Concentrating interpretation

Supranational integration is desirable. Economic ties between countries is a means to achieve a higher goal (peace, security, stability). European integration is following the better path toward this, out of two possible ones. One is integration among nations by free will and the other is forced integration. Nationalism is a threatening and undesirable counter-force.

2a) Respondent’s statement

In an overall perspective, EC-membership is a Swedish national interest in and by itself. This is the same in an egoistic economic perspective. On top of things, there will be new opportunities for the country to have an influence on Europe, and that just seems too good to pass up, which means we shouldn’t stay outside. Purely economically, the difference probably will not be that great anyway, I mean, if we are able to join the Internal Market anyway, but in a deeper sense there is a world of difference. A United States of Europe has been there all along as an idea, both among federalists and confederalists. Federalism in general seems to have held good solutions for the problems felt in the history of the United States of America, for example. Things are different in Europe, of course, and I am not sure that federalism is a good solution for Europe. It is quite possible that the other variant, the one we are currently achieving in Europe, is better. The system we have today I interpret as rather unique. We do not have historical precedents or examples, but it is exciting to watch and find out just how far we can take this thing in Europe. It is really not bad this thing that we have built up. I agree that there are different kinds of federalism, and this subsidiarity thing does speak in favor of us trying to build in safeguards at different points. Supranationality is necessary, I think, and this is based on my own experiences from working in this field.

2b) Concentrating interpretation

Supranational integration is necessary. It can be defined as a national interest for Sweden, since it contributes with both economic opportunities and political influence. Integration in Europe and its possibilities are historically unique. The linkage between the principle of subsidiarity and European integration also makes supranationality necessary.
APPENDIX 2

Networking Patterns in the Swedish Organization

In the Swedish study, ROFE members were surveyed with written questions concerning their professional backgrounds, which political interest they prioritized in their work with adaptation and what their individual networking patterns looked like. The aim was to find out if ROFE members saw themselves primarily as defenders of the Swedish national interest in European integration, or if any other political or organizational interests were regarded as more important in their work.

In the original Swedish study, part of the research interest was based on a hypothesis about different kinds of transnational networks being a driving force behind European integration. Then, the study was part of a much bigger research project, in which some of the first steps toward what was much later to become this thesis were taken. Against this background, the Swedish study also included a survey of individual networking patterns in ROFE.

The survey was not repeated in the Polish case for two reasons. Firstly, the returning rate was low in the original Swedish case and it took much extra effort even to get back even less than half of the total number of surveys sent out. Secondly, respondents in the first Polish interviews were asked about the possibility of doing a survey in the Polish organization. They generally discouraged such an effort because of a strict media policy in Polish government institutions with regard to current EU issues. This policy, according to some of the Polish interviewees, was also backed up with an administrative culture that favors personal contact with researchers on the basis of recommendations.

The interest in personal networking patterns among respondents in the Polish case was subsequently dropped for practical reasons. The results of the Swedish study nevertheless give some insights into this particular aspect of organization and cognition in ROFE. Consequently, the results of the Swedish survey are presented in this appendix.

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A total number of 61 surveys were handed out to the respondents and 35 of these were filled out and sent back. An overview of the results from this survey is presented in Table A1.

Concerning the question about professional background, most of the ROFE respondents (71%) had achieved their merits and individual careers on the national arena. To many of them, the position in one of the ROFE groups represented their first close encounter with non-national issues. 29% of the respondents referred to having a background in work related to foreign aid, United Nations institutions or inside the Nordic Council of Ministers. None of the respondents claimed to have worked with issues related to the EC/EU or, indeed, inside any organizational framework related to supranational European institutions.

Table 6: Networking patterns for ROFE respondents (N= 35).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Professional Interest Guiding the Work with Adaptation Most Important Partners</th>
<th>National Arena</th>
<th>International Arena</th>
<th>EC/EU Arena</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Professional</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest Guiding the Work with Adaptation</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Most Important Partners</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

At the point of dissemination of the survey, Sweden was not yet an EU member state and only high-level negotiators from Sweden had access to European institutions. Therefore, it is not surprising to see that none of the Swedish respondents had a background working for supranational institutions. Perhaps more surprisingly, neither did any of them have any experience from lobbying in the EC/EU. It is possible that individuals with such experiences could have been found among those respondents who chose not to participate in the survey. Again, the returning rate was low in the survey and the majority of non-respondents in ROFE (43%) represent such fields as trade, industry and labor unions.

29% of respondents claimed having a career background in international institutions, such as EFTA, the European Free Trade Association. 14% said that they had “relevant experiences” from EFTA work, although none of them claimed to have actually been employed by the organization.
Nevertheless, they considered EFTA experiences important for what they were doing in ROFE. Also, this group considered this particular merit one of the main reasons for why they were appointed to work in ROFE in the first place.

Concerning the question about which political interest respondents saw as most important in their work, the response pattern was very clear-cut. 89% saw themselves as acting first and foremost in the interest of the nation-state. This means that less than one percent, in real figures two individual respondents, saw an international or supranational interest as guiding them in their work. What these two respondents were saying, however, was that their work ultimately benefited “global economic growth” in one case, and in the other that the ultimate political interest was “global peace”. Thus, one percent of the respondents were simply saying that they saw no opposition between the national, international or supranational interests. Put differently, these two respondents expressed that they thought of themselves as serving the interests of global peace and global economic growth better by also serving the national interest. In total, the national interest completely dominated the picture.

In most individual cases (74%) the national interest was exemplified by mentions of “Sweden”, “the Government” or “the Country”. ROFE was seen as an organization in which everybody pulled together to achieve the best possible results for the nation. None of the respondents claimed that they saw any opposition between the national and the supranational interests. Many said that they were serving the common good by doing the best work possible their respective ministry, agency or other organization. Two respondents even went so far as to define the national and the supranational interests as one and the same, thus blending the national interest with that of the EC/EU in their own cognition. All respondents saw services rendered to the ROFE as similar services rendered to the Swedish nation. Again, 74% were explicit in saying that they served the national interest first and foremost.

Concerning the survey question about networking patterns, responses were more divided. The majority of respondents considered their networks with EC/EU-partners most important (49%). Approximately half of the respondents stated that they took active part in exchanging information and points-of-view with their EC/EU counterparts and other actors inside European institutions. Some respondents claimed that they currently were, or formerly had been members of specific negotiation teams and had been travelling to meetings within their specific sphere of interest. Other respondents pointed out that they would liaise with their counterparts in other applicant countries in the fourth Enlargement process, such as Finland, Norway and Austria. By extension, almost half of the respondents were actively involved in European networks and considered these vitally important to the fulfillment of their individual tasks inside ROFE.
In this context, the number of respondents that declare either national (17%) or international (34%) partners their vital contacts is perhaps somewhat more surprising. Among those respondents who claimed national partners as most important to their work, statements were also supported by claims of involvement in liaison or information activities on the national arena. Specific sector adaptation, mainly incorporation of specific chapters of the *acquis*, took up most of their time. Respondents were apt to point out that there was a vital distinction between two types of negotiation inside the organization. On the one hand, there were the High Level Negotiations, or HLNG:s, which involved only high-ranking officials, decision makers and their advisers. Some of the respondents in this group particularly pointed out that they were never participants in HLNG:s. Others pointed out that they were mainly involved the incorporation of new rules and regulations in Sweden, which made it natural for them to have purely national networks. Most of their time was devoted to negotiations with actors and interest groups on the internal Swedish arena.

71% of respondents in the survey testified to having neither international nor supranational contacts that were important to their work, somehow indicative of a horizontal flow of information and impulses across national and organizational boundaries. But this horizontal flow obviously did not belong to the EC/EU arena. Statements indicate that the ROFE actors did not see themselves as transnational or, indeed, as agents of ideas, initiatives and policies imported from outside the nation. While there are some indications of a horizontal, transnational diffusion of ideas, there seems to be more firm evidence still suggesting that national interests and ideas dominated inside ROFE.

**Questionnaire for the ROFE survey**

1. Which is Your current function in the ROFE organization?

2. Why do You think that You have been appointed?

3. How would You describe Your previous experience from work with European issues in a few words?

4. What previous experiences do You have from working abroad?

5. Whose/Which interest have You been serving in your work in ROFE?
6. If You were to mention the most important contribution to Sweden’s adaptation to the EU that You have made as an individual, or that Your organization has made, what would this be?

7. Have You, since Your work with EC/EU issues started, changed Your mind about any particular issue related to European integration? If so, which one?

8. Do You think that the interests that you represent have received enough attention in Sweden’s adaptation to the EC/EU?

9. Are international contacts important in Your work? (Please feel free to draw an image of organizations and relationships here!) Have such contacts been decisive in any way?

10. Which are the most important Swedish contacts for You outside ROFE?
APPENDIX 3
Examples of interview questions

European integration
a) In Your own words, how would you describe this thing called integration in Europe? What is it all about? Is it a necessary thing? Is it desirable?
b) Against this background, what is Your view of supranationality? Would You like to see a United States of Europe?
c) Is democracy a necessary aspect of this development?
d) Disregarding the EU for a while, what is it that makes a European just that, a European? Which common denominators do you see among the peoples of Europe? Does this also mean that there is a commonality in Europe that goes beyond international agreement and politics?
e) Would you define EU membership as a vital national interest for your country? Why?
f) Has there at any point in the accession process been an option for Sweden/Poland not to go ahead with integration? Are You happy with the way things have turned out?

Trade and Industry
a) What does the Single Market mean for Sweden/Poland? Is it necessary for Your country? Is it desirable?
b) In Your eyes, are there firms and companies that are genuinely Swedish/Polish? What is it that gives them this label?
c) Are Swedish/Polish firms loyal to their country, the way You see it? Can You think of any other countries in the EU where You see this kind of loyalty at play?
d) If we talk about major infrastructural investments/fiscal issues/takeovers/other example that You mention, do You believe that political influence from democratic political institutions is necessary? Desirable?
e) What, in Your view, is the most important factor in the development of the Swedish/Polish economy up to the year 2010/2020?
f) Which are the main opportunities that You can see for Sweden/Poland on the Single Market?
Functional Regionalism

a) Do You recognize the discussion about a ‘Europe of the Regions’? What do You think this discussion is all about? Does it involve shifts in sovereignty/political power in any way? Are the things that You foresee in this area necessary? Are they desirable?

b) Are there any regional growth centers/poles/nodes that You can think of in Your country? In Your eyes, how do these coincide with patterns of regional identity?

c) What is Your reaction to the political effects of regionalization inside Your country/across boundaries between countries in Europe? Which role does the state have in this development?

d) What do You think about regionalization across national boundaries? Can You think of any concrete examples of successful initiatives/failures? Why do You think this initiative was successful/a failure?

e) What is Your view of the tension between on the one hand the need for national coordination in the accession process and on the other hand the need for regions to be competitive? What is the role of Your government in all this?

f) What is Your view of the current discussion about the ‘New Hanseatic League’ around the Baltic Sea/the ‘Vysegrad Group’ versus the ‘Eastern Dimension’? What difference does the EU make in all this?

Territorial regionalism

a) What is Your view of the plight of the Sami in Sweden/Would You say that there are strong regional identities anywhere in Poland? Are such identities necessary? Are they desirable?

b) Do You think that this kind of mobilization around a particular identity is a challenge to Sweden/Poland? Is it a necessary thing? Is it desirable?

c) Do You see linkages between this kind of regionalizing force and the functional type, which we have already discussed? To what extent do You see a linkage with transnationalization in Europe?

d) In a future reorganization of Sweden’s regional structure, what role would You attribute to regional identities/In the recent reorganization of Poland’s regional structure, what role do You think was attributed to regional identities? Why? Do You think that all aspects of the problem will be/were considered by the government?

e) Do You think that regional identities benefit from European integration and if so, how? If not, why?