EUROPEANS ONLY?

Essays on identity politics and the European Union
Europeans only?

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Abstract

The chief preoccupation of the dissertation revolves around the European Union's project of calling forth a collective sense of "European identity" amongst people in the Union. It focuses specifically on how the European Union's identity politics plays out once the ethnic minorities with immigrant background now living in the Union are brought into view. The main purpose can be described as twofold; involving, firstly, a mapping and examination of how the EU construes and defines the identity it seeks to mobilize, and, secondly, a thorough discussion of the types of consequences or implications that stem from this endeavour.

In demonstrating the strong tendency on part of the EU to articulate a common identity for the Union in ethno-cultural terms — whereby the EU is conceived as primarily a cultural community whose members are said to share the same origin, cultural heritage, religion and history — the study goes to great length in discussing the excluding implications that an ethno-cultural identity politics gives rise to. The dissertation argues that such an ethno-cultural disposition partly must be seen in light of the European Union's gradual adjustment to a largely neoliberal order; an order which has worked restraining on the feasibility of a social and political articulation of identity and citizenship in the Union.

An introductory chapter outlines the discourse theoretical approach which guides the analyses in five essays. The essays mainly explore how the European Union's discourse on identity manifests in various policy areas — immigration, citizenship and education — all of which in one way or another address the issues of culture, the multicultural society, ethnic exclusion, racism and the situation for ethnic minorities and migrants. The complex of problems concerning ethnic, cultural and social exclusion in today's European Union thus constitutes a central theme engaged with throughout the dissertation.

Key words: European identity, European Union, European Commission, identity politics, discourse, discourse analysis, immigration, immigrants, ethnic minorities, culture, ethno-culturalism, citizenship, European citizenship, education, exclusion/inclusion, neo-liberalism.
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For my parents
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Umeå, April 2000
I am apt to suspect the negroes and in general all other species of men (for there are four or five different kinds) to be naturally inferior to the whites. There never was a civilized nation of any other complexion than white, nor even any individual eminent either in action or speculation. [...] Not to mention our colonies, there are negro slaves dispersed all over Europe, of whom none ever discovered any symptoms of ingenuity.

David Hume, 1754

Too often the history of Europe is described as a series of interminable wars and quarrels. Yet from our perspective today surely what strikes us most is our common experience. For instance, the story of how Europeans explored and colonised and — yes without apology — civilised much of the world is an extraordinary tale of talent, skill, and courage!

Margaret Thatcher, 1988

The colonial powers have taken charge the education of the backward societies of the planet. Let us be good educators and let us prepare good Europeans.

Hubert Deschamps, Colonial Governor of Senegal, 1938.

All undertakings of common advantage to the European community will be directed by the great parliament; thus, for instance, it will link the Danube to the Rhine by canals, the Rhine to the Baltic, etc. Without external activity, there is no internal tranquillity. The surest means of maintaining peace in Confederation will be to keep it constantly occupied beyond its borders, and engaged without pause in great internal enterprises. To colonize the world with the European race, superior to every other human race; to make the world accessible and habitable like Europe — such is the sort of enterprise by which the European parliament should continually keep Europe active and healthy.

Henri de Saint-Simon, 1814

We're only 9 percent of the world's population, white Europeans, and our country's going to majority non-white soon [...] Why can't European Americans be concerned with this genocide? Is that racial to say that?

Gordon Lee Brown, CEO of the Council of Conservative Citizens, 1999

Education must train and teach people in accordance with their opportunities, according to the sphere in which they live... The Bantu must be guided to serve his own community in all respects. There is no place for him in the European community above the level of certain forms of labor. Within his own community, however, all doors are open. For that reason it is of no avail for him to receive a training which has as its aim absorption in the European community while he cannot and will not be absorbed there.

Hendrick Verwoerd, South African Minister of Native Affairs, 1953
Introduction: Discourse analysis and the politics of European identity

A contradictory endeavour

Let us begin with some cultural cartography, a few boundaries, some exclusions, some inclusions and, to top it off, something on the little naughty realities of past and present. For how could a dissertation which concerns itself with the European Union’s attempt to instil a sense of "European identity" into its citizenry possibly avoid these matters? It goes without saying then, that the growing debate on Europe also incorporates a meta-debate on what really is being debated in the first place; that is to say: "What is Europe, Where is Europe?", to use Seton-Watson’s (1985) much reiterated question. Wrangles over where and how to draw the geographical and cultural borders of Europe – where the status of Russia and Turkey often looms into the foreground – have thus experienced a renaissance in recent years. Although one certainly encounters cases which point to the contrary, on the whole this debate shows that there is more to Europe than the European Union.

But I am afraid that my compliments end here. Because even though Europe is said to transgress the present boundaries of the European Union, the brunt of this debate is still carried out within very narrow confines. Put crudely, much of it revolves around the quest for a tidy geographical delimitation, which subsequently serves as a vantage-ground for an introverted gaze able to identify Europe’s hard kernel of cultural characteristics and historical roots and achievements. The ideas from classical antiquity, the Renaissance, the Enlightenment, the Industrial Revolution, Christianity, progress, reason, science, tolerance, liberty and democracy are some of the features often brought forth as the defining elements of Europe. (From Greece to peace, to cut a long story short.) All of this is construed as the pure creations of Europe, springing solely from
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its "unique creativity", which, according to historian Jean-Baptiste Duroselle (1990: 414), constitutes "Europe's most striking characteristic".

A preoccupation with distinct boundaries and pure origins can thus be said to permeate this perspective. Just to provide a small selection from the abundance of statements reflecting this perspective, former EU mediator and British Foreign secretary David Owen's (1990: 54) view on the status of Turkey serves as a poignant illustration here: "Well, we don't have to let Turkey in. You have to have clarity about where the boundaries of Europe are, and the boundaries of Europe are not on the Turkish-Iran border." Similarly, on the matter of Russia and the "Asians", we can turn to columnist Peter Millar (writing for the now discontinued newspaper The European):

It is on the eastern front that the problem becomes acute. First and foremost, there is the matter of Russia. In purely geophysical terms the only valid continent is Eurasia. The problem is that it is simply too big. Also, ethnically, there is a distinct difference between Europeans and Asians. (Millar, 1996)

Finally, concerning the quest for origins, Duroselle's extensive work Europe: A History of its Peoples — a book proudly sponsored by the European Commission and promoted as essential reading for all Europeans — merits some further attention; engrossed, as it is, in European fountain-heads: "All we know is that the original inhabitants of Western Europe were white-skinned, barely touched by the Mongol invasions — or by Asian and African immigration until after the end of World War II." (1990: 17)

In this essentialist account, Europe emerges as a self-propelled entity, perfectly "identical to itself" (Derrida, 1992 [1991]: 9), and as a civilization almost void of any historical relations with its surroundings. As such, it is also an account fraught with exclusions, omissions and an extreme loss of

1 To this Duroselle (1990: 17-18) adds:

The anthropologist Jean Poirier has distinguished three main groups, spread out broadly from north to south. In northern Europe, he believes, there was a comparatively long-headed, fair-haired group, the Nordic race; to the south of that, a central short-headed group comprising the east European race and four dark-haired races: Alpine, Dinaric, Anatolian, and Turanian; finally, a southern group, long-headed and dark-haired, made up of the Mediterranean, south-western, and Indo-Afghan races. To all these, should be added a further race, the Aino, in the easternmost part of Asia.
memory, to say the least. Not only does it omit from discussion the formidable influence that other parts of the world have had on Europe historically, but it also overlooks the fact that since at least the beginning of European colonization, so much of European history has happened elsewhere, hence effectively rendering it impossible to confine a discussion of European history to its own turf. Martin Bernal, for instance, has not merely made clear the substantial Afroasiatic influence on Ancient Greece, but also, and perhaps even more importantly, been able to show that "with the rise of a passionate and systematic racism in the early 19th century, the ancient notion that Greece was a mixed culture that had been civilized by Africans and Semites became not only abominable but unscientific" (Bernal, 1991 [1987]: 441). In an era of rampant European colonialism and world domination, where European powers justified their subjugation, enslavement and extermination of other peoples through various racist doctrines, it thus became necessary to sever all the connections between Africa and "the cradle of European civilization". The fact that 19th century images of Ancient Greece remain largely intact in current "Europe-speak" should tell us something important about how racist and Eurocentric notions continue to condition today's perceptions and knowledge of Europe.

In like manner Donald Grinde (1992) challenges the prevalent notion of Europe as the birthplace of democracy and democratic political theory. As he argues, theorists such as John Locke and Jean Jacques Rousseau obtained several of their ideas about the practical working of democracy from travellers' descriptions of some of the native Americans' governmental arrangements; democratic governments which impressed many Europeans at the time. Save for the European thinkers' fixed ideas regarding private property, Grinde argues, "the liberal ideas of the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century European philosophers were a partial reflection of Native American democratic principles" (1992: 235).

In contesting the alleged purity, originality and domesticity of everything that Europe claims for itself, we are in essence also exposing several of those acts of exclusion which have enabled the formation of past and present European identities. That is to say, the ability to construct a unified European identity has always been intimately bound up with a capacity (or power) to construct and designate non-European "others"; others who are excluded, rejected and construed as completely exterior to everything European, yet, at the same time, so internalized as contrasting
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elements that they become indispensable for the constitution of this same European identity. Indeed, without such internalized and excluded others the present endeavour to define Europe’s geo-cultural boundaries and once and for all nail down the identity markers necessary for a sense of cultural belonging in Europe, would simply fall flat. No matter how intent some of these accounts may be on sticking to the ”home-made” essence of Europe, one can be sure that somewhere in the course of the story the ”Muslims”, Africa or Asia will crop up as objects for contrasting effects. By the same token, this is also the reason why much of the debate on Europe reveals more about the participants’ gaze on the ”non-Europeans” than about anything else.

But also in matters which at a first glance seem to be straightforward and uncontroversial, these omissions and exclusions prevail. Take, for instance, the simple problem of accounting for the present formal boundaries of the European Union. Given the apparent formal and legal character of these boundaries, one would expect most of the map-drawing that flourishes in the media, in academic literature and in EU publications to follow suit. In other words, since there is a consensus regarding the fact that these boundaries are drawn up by human beings through political decision-making, and not, as many argue in the case of Europe as a whole, the result of a European essence or history’s natural course, one would anticipate less omission and exclusion when these maps are displayed. But, to be sure, even this genre proceeds through a series of eliminations.

One obvious instance of such ”weeding” is to be found in the treatment of the EU areas in South America (French Guiana), Africa (Melilla and Ceuta), the Indian Ocean (Réunion), and the Caribbean (Martinique and Guadeloupe). Although these areas form part of the European Union, this status seems to make no impression on the great majority of cartographers; particularly as it manifests in academic literature. Neither does the circumstance that the people here are ”European citizens”, and so carry EU passports and vote in European Parliament elections, exert an influence on the ways in which the European Union and others seek to define Europe and a European identity. Moreover, these areas’ full integration into the euro zone, or the

2 In addition, the three French colonies in the Pacific (New Caledonia, French Polynesia and Wallis and Futua) merit mention here. Although these territories are not fully integrated into the EU, the people here are still EU-citizens, and as such they too can influence the constitution of the European Parliament. In illustrating this, Maclellan and Chesneaux (1998: 228) note that ”the French government flew 13 tons of electoral propaganda to the Pacific for
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EMU, is also something that seems to have fallen into oblivion. Just to provide one indication pointing in this direction, we can turn to a European Commission statement from 1998: "In addition to its economic and monetary aspects, the introduction of euro notes and coins should provide hundreds of millions of Europeans with a material and concrete symbol of their common identity." (Commission of the European Communities, 1998: 13) Naturally, by this the Commission is not implying that people in French Guiana and Réunion somehow are more European than people in countries that might not join the EMU; that is, Sweden, Denmark, Great Britain and Greece. Instead, the Commission statement is simply reflective of yet another failure to remember and acknowledge that the boundaries of the European Union extend well beyond its own self-image.

Finally, this also makes the whole issue of European Union enlargement and membership criteria stand out in a completely different light. As Neumann (1998: 400) notes, when Morocco applied for membership in 1986

[...]his application was dealt with in no uncertain terms; Rabat was simply told that the organization was open only to Europeans, and that was that. There was no room for ambiguity here, only unequivocal exclusion and marking of Morocco as clearly 'non-European.'

This decision thus rested on the Treaty of Rome’s specification that only European states can be members of the EU (article 237; now article O of the Maastricht Treaty [Bainbridge, 1998: 364]). In order to "join Europe", so to speak, the country in question first has to be European. But if this is so, what are we to make of those member states that divide their location between continents; that is, those member states that are both European and African, both European and South American, and so on? Moreover, if Moroccans, according to the EU, so clearly fail to pass for Europeans, why is it that Melilla and Ceuta on the North African coast form part of the European Union? Why, in other words, is the European Flag flying in the very same region which the EU itself has defined as non-European? In commenting on the status of Morocco and the larger question of whether the 1994 European Parliament elections, so the 'European' citizens of the islands could make a clear choice."
or not a future EU should include "Islamic countries" as member states, political scientist Jan-Erik Lane (1997: 208) contributes further to this contradictory picture:

True, the Union is not a Christian Union but it is certainly not, and shall never become, Muslim. The Union cannot have members deeply involved in extra-European politics, because then it loses its core identity.

So if Lane was to have his will, unless France and Spain were to give up their "extra-European" territories soon, both of them would have to be expelled from membership in the EU. Furthermore, due to France's, to say the least, "deep involvement" in what it saw as its domestic affairs in what is now Algeria, France (as well as others) should never have qualified for membership in the first place. In fact, with its flag flying in places as far away as the Indian Ocean and South America, even the EU itself would fail to qualify for membership in the European Union. Of course, this is not at all what Lane is suggesting. Rather, what I am getting at is simply to expose some of that which has to be excluded from consideration if Lane's comment is to appear as common sense. Yet again then, we are provided with an illustration of how dependent any definition of a core identity for Europe and the European Union is on the simultaneous exclusion and designation of the non-European other.

Aims of the study

As this exposé clearly indicates, in today's attempts to articulate and propagate a European identity, the role of the European Union cannot be overstated. With its steady growing membership and competence, the EU not only constitutes one of the principal actors driving such a politics of identity, but it also provides this same politics with its greatest incentive. The chief preoccupation of this dissertation revolves around this exact issue, namely the European Unions' project of calling forth a collective sense of "European identity" amongst people in the Union. It focuses specifically on how one should analyze this project in relation to the complex of problems concerning immigration and ethnic relations in today's European Union.
Introduction

My main purpose can be described as twofold; involving, firstly, a mapping and examination of how the EU construes, defines and configures the identity it seeks to mobilize, and, secondly, a thorough discussion of the types of consequences or implications that stem from this endeavour. In five essays I explore how this identity politics emerges in various EU policies – studied at the level of discourse – all of which in one way or another deal with issues that have a bearing on the situation for ethnic minorities and immigrant communities in the Union. In this sense my discussion of the possible implications that emanate from EU identity politics focuses almost exclusively on the development and contexts within the European Union.

In more precise terms then, this study should be seen as an attempt to come to terms with the question of how the European Union’s discourse on European identity plays out once the various ethnic minorities with immigrant background now living in the Union are brought into view. Given the increasingly multi-ethnic character of the European Union, some of my initial thoughts thus centred on whether or not the discourse on identity at the level of the EU would be reflective of this condition. Would it, for instance, be open and inclusive, and so signal a readiness to articulate a trans-ethnic identity for the EU; an identity which would not be organized around exclusive notions of ethnicity, culture, religion and origin? Or would this discourse merely reproduce and reify an ethno-cultural and exclusive understanding of identity, hence fomenting the development towards ethnic fragmentation and estrangement amongst Union inhabitants? Throughout the study, the analysis of the European Union’s identity politics is thus set in the crucial context of the grave and deep-seated problems of ethnic exclusion, growing anti-immigrant sentiments and social disintegration that currently permeate societies across the Union.

Since the question of identity now surfaces in such a multitude of discussions and policy areas within the EU organization – cropping up in everything from the discussion on the designing of driving licences to the development of a "European Union foreign and security policy identity" – I have not attempted to reconstruct an all-embracing account of the European Union’s discourse on identity. Instead, I have surveyed those policy areas where I take it to play a particularly prominent part, and where it can be seen to have a direct pertinence to the ethnic relations in the Union. As a consequence, the greater part of my discussion and analysis
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will focus on critical questions closely related to the areas of immigration, culture, education and citizenship.

As already noted, this dissertation consists of a collection of essays. Since any study of the European Union and its approach to identity – save for the mere historical – must be said to be aiming at a moving target, I found this method of working to suit my purposes best. In other words, given my aim of trying to carry on a discussion in the present, dealing with current matters and developments as well as analyzing the most recent EU publications, the continuous writing and publication of completed essays immediately appeared as a fruitful way of conducting this study. Nevertheless, this method also has its drawbacks. As everyone is familiar with, papers intended for academic journals are by nature often quite short and condensed. As a result, my application of the theory and method of discourse analysis has remained rather unaccounted-for in the essays. In what follows below, therefore, I will seek to amend this by presenting a theoretical account, outlining the discourse theoretical approach which has guided the analyses in the ensuing essays. Subsequently, and before embarking on a summary of the essays, this introductory chapter will also bring up some general methodological considerations, as well as presenting my own choice of working method.

Questions of theory

Since journal articles which scrutinize empirical materials often suffer from what I would call a theoretical implicitness, I will take the opportunity here to describe and discuss the main theoretical approaches which underpin and grow out of the analyses carried out in the essays making up the dissertation. This is not to say that the essays are wanting of theoretical themes and theoretical elaborations. Indeed, the opening piece incorporates a theoretical discussion of collective identity formation, of its relational character and, therefore, of its indebtedness to "difference" – such as in cultural difference – and, as is often the case, to exclusions, as well as how the conclusions drawn from such a theoretical discussion can

3 "Essay/s" is the umbrella term that I use throughout the introductory chapter. In the actual essays I also refer to these as "papers" and "articles". As the first footnote in each essay ahead will make clear, this is due to the fact that, in this dissertation, all but one of the essays appear in their previously published versions.
be brought to bear on the analysis of the EU’s approach to the question of identity. The following four essays, although structured differently and with a much more defined empirical focus, also delve into matters of a theoretical nature. In these, and in contrast to the first and largely surveying essay, the analysis of the empirical materials walks hand in hand with a theoretical discussion concerning the EU’s views on identity and its relation to, for instance, issues of culture, citizenship, immigration, and political economy. But even though my theoretical approach to the question of collective identity is well established in the essays taken as a whole, there is another theoretical motif which has not been fully explicated; a motif which is also of crucial analytical importance for the dissertation. This first and foremost concerns my understanding and utilization of discourse theory and discourse analysis, and it is in this context that one can speak of the theoretical implicitness referred to above. Again, this is not to say that the essays are void of deliberations on discourse theory and its analytical value. Rather, it is to say that more could have been said, more of the thinking contained within the particular tradition of discourse theory which I draw from could have been exposed had only the scope of the essays so allowed.

In what follows then, I will discuss and map the stream of discourse theory which has influenced the studies included in this dissertation. Setting out from Michel Foucault’s groundbreaking work on discourse theory and analysis, I go on to survey other major contributions to the field, including, among others, those made by Ernesto Laclau, Chantal Mouffe, Stuart Hall, Margaret Wetherell and Jonathan Potter. Moreover, on the question of ”truth” – a crucial theme within discourse theory – I will utilize one of Richard Rorty’s central theses; a thinker whose work, although sharing some ground with those mentioned above, should not be seen as forming part of the tradition of discourse theory which I engage with here.

It goes without saying that the intention here is not to lay out each of these theorists’ account of discourse theory in its entirety. Instead, and apart from some general themes, I will shed light on those ingredients, aspects and insights which I have found particularly applicable to the questions and issues dealt with in the subsequent studies. Likewise, as most readers will notice, this is by no means an exhaustive list of discourse theorists, neither does it come close to a full register over those working within what we might term a post-structuralist tradition of discourse
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studies. As Wetherell and Potter (1992: 90) point out, there are many different, sometimes conflicting views on discourse and discourse analysis (see also Fairclough, 1992). This provided, what I will do below is simply to draw attention to a collection of works which have been fundamental for my own understanding of discourse analysis. These works are, of course, not homogenous and without differences between themselves. Nevertheless, I take these differences to be of an accommodating nature, as sources of mutual assistance rather than of conflict, which, in turn, is the reason why they together can serve as a theoretical framework for this dissertation.

Theorizing discourse

If we leave out of account the various theoretical applications of discourse within linguistics and certain other disciplines, much of current utilizations of the concept discourse within political and social theory are in one way or the other traceable to the seminal works of French theorist Michel Foucault, dating back to the 1960s and 1970s. In his historical examinations — or his writing of genealogies — of contemporary conceptions of madness, sexuality, medicine, economics, and of institutions such as hospitals, mental institutions and prisons, Foucault studied these objects, disciplines and institutions as intrinsically bound up with discursive practices; practices that constituted and defined objects (madness, etc.), produced and institutionalized knowledge (such as medical knowledge), and justified and enabled the establishment of institutions (prisons, insane asylums, etc.). Foucault’s conceptualization of discourse as practice, as a site where knowledge and truth are generated, and as a terrain onto which power operates, would thus radically break with what Barrett (1991: 125-26) terms the “common-sense” definitions of discourse, where — as most dictionaries have it — discourse simply refers to talk and written or spoken exchange (often of a formal character), and, in its verb form, to the act of extensive and mostly formal speaking and writing (see also Hall, 1997c: 44).

4 For an overview of the utilization of the concept of discourse and discourse analysis within linguistics, covering such directions as speech act theory and conversation analysis, see Schiffrin (1994).
Introduction

According to Foucault (in *The Archaeology of Knowledge*), the basic component of discourse is the statement, and what defines a statement is its relational character; that is, "for a statement to exist: it must be related to a whole adjacent field. [...] [O]ne cannot say a sentence, one cannot transform it into a statement, unless a collateral space is brought into operation." In other words, "there can be no statement that in one way or another does not reactualize others". In this context Foucault also speaks of the statement as always forming part of a "network" of other statements, in which statements take on various roles and lend each other support and distinctions (Foucault, 1972: 80, 97-99). This network, these correlations and connections which are forged between otherwise scattered and highly dispersed statements go to make up what Foucault terms a discursive formation (1972: 38, 107). Hence, discourse designates a group of statements which all are incorporated within the same discursive formation (1972: 107, 117).

To illustrate these points in a more concrete fashion we could turn to a "statement" made on a Swedish Public Radio newscast, that I came across a few years ago. The newscast included a brief mention of a ski lift accident in Poland, in which some 25 people had been injured. In closing, and this is where the "statement" in question appears, the report added that of these 25 injured people, 12 were Germans. To this one can pose a number of questions, such as: of what nationality were those other ones injured, and how was it possible to omit this in the report?; was there no information available, and if so, how is it that this wasn't mentioned in the newscast? Furthermore, how can we make sense of the assumption which the newscast is working under, that listeners in Sweden would be more interested in knowing about injured Germans than, let's say, about injured Poles or Byelorussians?; and could we conceive of a report of the same accident that would leave out the injured Germans and only tell us about, for instance, injured Byelorussians?

It is by asking this type of questions that we come to realize that we are dealing with a statement in the Foucauldian sense. The mention of the 12 injured Germans does not constitute an isolated piece of information or a reporting of a simple fact. Instead it needs to be analyzed as immersed in a web of other statements, that is a discourse, which supports it and bequeaths its legitimate existence, thus enabling its "sayability". In this particular case, such other statements would belong to a discourse which holds "our" compassionate capacities concerning "other" peoples to be
culturally and/or geographically determined. Thus, "we" are said to have a natural propensity to identify stronger with victims who resemble "us" and/or dwell closer to "us" than with those more culturally and/or geographically distant. Therefore, it is seen as equally natural that "Swedes" should demand more news-media coverage from a train accident in France than from one in India, and that "we" are primarily concerned about the safety of Westerners once war erupts outside of the West. In recent years this discourse has also surfaced in the debates over Sweden’s relations with the European Union and over its foreign aid policy. Here it has been argued, particularly from the right but also from other quarters, that Sweden's foreign obligations and solidarity should first and foremost be bestowed on its cultural and geographical neighbours, since, the argument continues, any other inclination would simply be unnatural.5

As displayed here, in trying to come to terms with the report on the ski lift accident we are not seeking to uncover any hidden intentions behind the report, which we then try to link to a particular individual's consciousness, to the newsroom's editorial committee, or all the way up to the board-room of Swedish Public Radio. Discourse, listening to Foucault, "is not the majestically unfolding manifestation of a thinking, knowing, speaking subject" (1972: 55; see also Foucault, 1973; 1991: 59). On this view then, the crucial task is rather to examine how a particular statement was made possible, how "one particular statement appeared rather than another", and to show "what other forms of statement it excludes" (Foucault, 1991: 59; 1972: 27, 28).

By this, however, we are not suggesting that Foucault dispensed with the individual, with her utterances, or with the speaking subject. What he argued against was the particular humanist notion of the centred, "transcendental" and "sovereign" subject and subjectivity, which held individual minds to be the source of all knowledge.6 Accordingly, discourses and the types of knowledge they produce should not be analyzed as originating within independent, detached and unified individual subjects, but we should rather grasp the speaking subject as constituted by discourse; and that it is discourse which "defines the

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5 For a penetrating analysis of Swedish right-wing discourse on foreign aid and Europe, see Westlund (1996: Ch. 7). See also Jonsson (1993: Ch. 8).

6 For a lucid account of Foucault's construing of the subject and of his critique of the humanist conception thereof, see Sawicki (1988).
possible position of speaking subjects” (Foucault, 1972: 122; see also 1972: 95-6; 1991: 58; 1980). In elucidating the discursive nature of the subject and of subjectivity, Wetherell and Potter (1992: 78) argue “that the identity and subjectivity which become instantiated in discourse at any given moment should be seen as a sedimentation of past discursive practices”. Taking as an example the expression of racist speech or so-called hate speech, Butler (1997: 34) also underscores this point:

The subject who speaks hate speech is clearly responsible for such speech, but that subject is rarely the originator of that speech. Racist speech works through the invocation of convention; it circulates, and though it requires the subject for its speaking, it neither begins nor ends with the subject who speaks or with the specific name that is used.

To further concretize this line of thought let me turn to my study of the European Commission’s Eurobarometer surveys, which appears as the fourth essay in this dissertation. As the title — "Questions from somewhere..." — of that essay seeks to indicate, the questions asked about "immigrants and out-groups", included in the Eurobarometer surveys, ought not to be studied as the unique creations of those who drew up or "authored" the questionnaire. Instead, the questions owe their existence and their intelligibility to a discourse. But as Hall (1997c: 56) emphasizes, a discourse also generates a "place for the subject [...] from which its particular knowledge and meaning most makes sense". In the case of the Eurobarometer, those formulating or authoring the questions can thus be said to occupy such a discursively produced subject position, and it is here, at this location, that they appear as speaking subjects. Likewise, and provided that the questions make sense on the receiving end, this also applies to the respondents, or those answering the Eurobarometer questions. In other words, by "subjecting" themselves to the "meanings, power, and regulation" of the discourse which permeates the Eurobarometer the respondents too attain the position of speaking subjects (Hall, 1997c: 56).

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7 See also Flax (1993) and Butler (1997) for a thorough elaboration — incorporating a discussion of Foucault's approach — on how subject positions and subjectivity can be seen as constituted in and by discourse.

8 Italics in original.
Hall has also anchored this theorizing of the subject empirically in his extensive studies on "Thatcherism" and the rise of the New Right in the 1980s (e.g. Hall, 1983a; 1983b, 1988a, 1988b). In this context Hall argued that an analysis of the ascent and leverage of Thatcherite discourse had everything to gain from a serious consideration of the types of subject positions which this discourse managed to create and build upon; that is, those subject positions from which the discourse of Thatcherism appeared reasonable. In Hall's (1988b: 49) view, the discourse of Thatcherism owed much of its coherence to "the subject addressed assuming a number of specific subject positions". To be more precise, the discourse of Thatcherism could only be received or expressed unambiguously if it was enunciated from the imaginary position of knowledge of the self-reliant, self-interested, self-sufficient taxpayer - Possessive Individual Man (\( \ddot{u} \ddot{i} \ddot{s} \)); or the "concerned patriot"; or the subject passionately attached to individual liberty and passionately opposed to the incursion of liberty that occurs through the state; or the respectable housewife; or the native Briton. (Hall, 1988b: 49)

Conversely, and as indicated by the two last markers ("housewife" and "native Briton"), Hall also analyzed the sexist and racist strands within this discourse, hence pointing to all those positions of subjectivity which the Thatcherite discourse excluded. But as we have seen, Hall's discourse analysis manages to account not only for those excluded by a particular discourse - which arguably is the most common focus for discourse analyses dealing with the different ways of constructing collective identities - but also for those who are included, or those who indeed can identify with the various subject positions postulated by any given discourse.\(^9\)

Although it is fair to say that the studies in this dissertation for the most part sort under the former (exclusion) focus, the issue of inclusion is never absent. On the contrary it surfaces throughout the dissertation, manifesting most notably whenever it delves into such questions as: To whom does the EU identity discourse really speak? To whom is it most likely to appeal? Whose concerns and interests does it cater to? And in which particular ethnic, cultural, religious and class context will its message

\(^9\) For an equally pointed discussion about the positions of subjects in discourse, including comments on Hall's studies, see Mouffe (1988).
appear to advantage? This being said, it still needs to be pointed out that
the dissertation does not—with the possible exception of the piece on the
Eurobarometer—engage in any deeper theoretical discussion concerning the
subject and its relation to discourse. It is with this in mind that I have
taken the opportunity to explicate on this theme here; displaying, in
particular, my indebtedness to Stuart Hall’s approach.

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If this concludes our discussion of the subject and subject positions within
discourse, we now need to turn our attention towards the question of the
object and of social practice and their relation to discourse. So far we have
established that discourse should not be understood as synonymous with
mere utterances, words, talk or text, but that it rather needs to be seen as a
practice which shapes and modifies the objects to which it refers (cf.
Foucault, 1972: 49). Yet, since I haven’t spelled out the full implications of
the latter thesis (about discourse as that which forms and transforms
objects) for my own treatment of the question of European identity, this
needs some further qualification. This not the least since it also calls forth
a whole range of questions pertaining to the prediscursive and the
extradiscursive; that is, to the much debated matter of where to draw the
line between what can and what cannot be accounted for in terms of
discourse. This matter reverberates in questions such as: Is everything a
product of discourse? Isn’t there a world ”out there” independent of our
organization of it into discourses? Are famines discursively induced? Is
immigration brought about by discourse?

Taking our point of departure in the position developed by Foucault,
we should start by noting with Veyne (1997: 168), that one of Foucault’s
most distinguishing moves was ”that of disqualifying the natural object”.
Accordingly, as in the case of madness, Foucault’s project did not revolve
around ”what madness itself might be”, how to establish the most
accurate and objective description thereof, or how to capture the timeless
essence of madness, its true meaning (Foucault, 1972: 32, 47). At the same
time however, Foucault did not deny the existence of a ”material for
madness (behaviour, neuromicrobiology)”. The point that Foucault
wanted to get across was instead that this ”material” was not in any sense
naturally predisposed to constitute madness. In other words, there existed
no natural link or reference between, say, a particular behaviour and
Europeans only?

madness. Rather, that link had to be made, or as Veyne (1997: 170) has it: "A man must be objectivized as a madman for the prediscursive referent to appear retrospectively as material for madness; for why consider behaviour and nerve cells rather than fingerprints?"\(^{10}\)

Once we dispense with the natural object we are thus also dispensing with the notion that the meaning of any given object is prediscursively constituted, that the object, so to speak, reveals its meaning prior to it being named and represented. As Foucault (1971: 22) puts it,

we should not imagine that the world presents us with a legible face, leaving us merely to decipher it; it does not work hand in glove with what we already know; there is no prediscursive fate disposing the word in our favour.

In this sense, we discern of the prediscursive as that which "belongs to an essential silence", where "nothing has yet been said" (Foucault, 1972: 76, 48).

In several important respects this is also an argument which one frequently encounters in the philosophical writings of Richard Rorty.\(^{11}\) In much the same way as Foucault, Rorty discards the supposition that objects can somehow compel us into grasping their true meaning — and that we so come to uncover and represent their real nature, or essence — if only they are perused with an objective gaze, a staunch method, or a language cleansed of any ambiguity. Moreover, Rorty jettisons the belief that our descriptions and understandings of objects, and the alleged exactitude thereof, are capacituated by something exterior to human conduct — be it evolution, God, or some other substructural guarantor (Rorty, 1982: 165; 1989: 4). Truth, as in people's claims to having acquired the true meaning, description and knowledge of an object or the world, is therefore not to be construed as something which subsists outside of

\(^{10}\) Italics in original. For a similar argument about the prediscursive referent, see Cabrera (1999: 82).

\(^{11}\) As was hinted at in the introduction to this section, Rorty also espouses views and approaches that run counter to the perspective I adopt, and to those other theorists I discuss. Therefore it needs to be pointed out here that I utilize Rorty's theorizing quite selectively. I do not, for instance, share his position that Foucault is "pretty much useless when it comes to politics" (1989: 83). Neither do I sympathize with Rorty's complacent attitude towards the so-called "victims" and "oppressed", whom he sees as completely void of any "voice" and "language", and as groups solely dependent on others — for example the "liberal novelist, poet or journalist" — to speak for them (1989: 94).
human intervention. "Truth", Rorty (1989: 5) writes, "cannot be out there - cannot exist independently of the human mind - because sentences cannot so exist, or be out there. The world is out there, but descriptions of the world are not."\(^{12}\)

Important to note though, is that, in Rorty's usage, "sentences" are not understood as isolated and self-contained carriers of descriptions, but depend for their appearance upon larger "vocabularies"; a relationship sharing some important similarities with the one Foucault establishes between statements and discourses.\(^{13}\) And just as discourses are not simply out there for us to discover, the same must be said to apply for vocabularies. It is we then, as in human social activity, and not a world or reality set apart from such activity, who construct and through power struggles amongst us decide which vocabularies we are to appropriate when describing and producing truths about the world and reality. To put this point differently, we do not treat reality as something that is "represented by representations which are [...] its own, as it looks to itself, as it would describe itself if it could" (Rorty, 1982: 194; see also Said, 1978: 21).

Perhaps an even more tangible position on these matters is to be found in the discourse theory developed by Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe. Setting out by eliminating "the distinction between discursive and non-discursive practices", Laclau and Mouffe subsequently brings this to bear on their comprehension of the object, arguing "that every object is constituted as an object of discourse, insofar as no object is given outside every discursive condition of emergence" (1985: 107). Yet, such a position, they insist, is a far cry from putting into question the notion of there being a world independent of our ideas and thinking:

An earthquake or the falling of a brick is an event that certainly exists, in the sense that it occurs here and now, independently of my will. But whether their specificity as objects is constructed in terms of 'natural phenomena' or 'expressions of the wrath of God', depends upon the structuring of a discursive field. What is denied is not that such objects exist externally to thought, but the rather different

\(^{12}\) When Rorty says that "the world is out there", he simply means that "most things in space and time are the effects of causes which do not include human mental states" (Rorty, 1989: 5).

\(^{13}\) For a discussion of such similarities between Rorty's vocabularies and Foucault's discourses, see Rorty (1982: 204-5).
assertion that they could constitute themselves as objects outside any discursive condition of emergence. (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 108)

Indeed, submitted in this fashion, Laclau’s and Mouffe’s argument for relinquishing the nondiscursive effectively fends off what we, borrowing from Wetherell and Potter (1992: 65), might term the pitfall of "subjectivism" — or the view of reality and objects as simply consisting of ideas originating in human minds. As Wetherell and Potter clarify, objects are "no less real for being constituted discursively". When an airplane collides with a hill, the people who lose their lives will do so independently of how we might conceive of that particular hill. Nevertheless, once we try to account for these deaths, explain them, and sort out their cause, the way we define the hill will make all the difference: Is the hill "the product of a volcanic eruption or the solidified form of a mythical whale", or, to make use of the example above, is it simply God’s creation? (Wetherell and Potter, 1992: 65).

The crucial distinction to be made according to Laclau and Mouffe, and which underlies their argument above, is thus the one between an object’s being and its existence. That is to say, "outside of any discursive context objects do not have being; they have only existence" (Laclau and Mouffe, 1987: 85). Paraphrasing the eighteenth century philosopher Giambattista Vico, Baker (1990: 10) brings out this point even more succinctly when he writes that "[t]he nature of things derives from the manner of their coming into being". An earthquake or a hill can be understood in many different ways precisely because they exist. Yet, there is no one of these dissimilar understandings which will be determined by the sheer existence of earthquakes or hills. To put it differently, we never experience objects "as mere existential entities". Rather, what we make of the objects we encounter will depend on the particular discourse which is being employed; the particular discourse within which we (consciously or unconsciously) speak (Laclau and Mouffe, 1987: 85).

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If earthquakes and hills compose a rather simple, even simplistic, set of examples, it is now high time to apply this argument onto more complex and contested terrains. The vexed and much debated issue of immigration
in the European Union serves as a case in point here; not the least since it constitutes a crucial area of investigation in this dissertation.

As a first observation, and in keeping with what was said above, it is important to point out that while nobody denies that immigration exists, it is equally clear that the phenomenon or object of immigration never appears as such, as naked existence, void of any hints as to what it is and what it means. Consequently, whenever and wherever we come across the issue of immigration – be it in the news media, in parliamentary debates, in research, in EU policy documents, in NGO statements or during election campaigns – it will always be cloaked in one shape or the other. To be faced with the question of immigration is, thereby, also to be faced with a range of definitions, connotations and explanations of causes and effects which establish the meaning of immigration, what it is.

Scanning the debate one thus finds that immigration and immigrants can be construed, or articulated, both as an ominous problem and a promising possibility; as a spoiler of sound national homogeneity and as a reviving influence; as an exploiting force taking advantage of Western welfare systems and as a consequence of the unequal distribution of the world’s resources created by Western capitalism; both as an invasion of alien and dangerous cultural patterns and an influx of enriching cultural influences; as a destabilizing cultural-clashing threat and as a bridge to enhanced international and cultural understanding. Similarly, discrepancies flourish within research, where different schools of thought endeavour to generate the most sophisticated theories and methods for defining, explaining and figuring out the causes and consequences of immigration. To analyze immigration from a liberal rational actor perspective, for instance, will not only produce very different conceptions of immigration per se, but will also yield a radically different understanding of the larger reality or context in which immigration takes place, than had we analyzed immigration from a Marxist influenced structural and historical perspective.

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1 Drawing from Laclau and Mouffe (1985: 105), the concept of articulation here denotes a "practice establishing a relation among elements such that their identity is modified as a result of the articulatory practice". Thus, when immigration gets articulated as somehow constituting an obstacle and a threat to national cohesion in the receiving country, such an articulation does not restrict itself to the matter of immigration per se, but must be analyzed as being equally bound up with a certain perception of the nation and national identity, of those who belong and of those who should be excluded.
Given that its meaning will depend on where we look and who we listen to, immigration comes to designate a contested and politicized matter. It makes up what Laclau and Mouffe refer to as a "floating signifier"; that is, a term saturated with different meanings due to its extensive and diverging political appropriation (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 113; Laclau, 1990: 28). Analogous with other floating signifiers—such as democracy, freedom, woman, globalization—the meaning of immigration is something which a variety of forces lay claim to and struggle over, all seeking to have their particular understandings and definitions constitute the most veracious. In doing so, each discourse aims to organize and fix the meaning of immigration around itself and its own political outlook. In Laclau's and Mouffe's (1985: 112) formulation, "[a]ny discourse is constituted as an attempt to dominate the field of discursivity, to arrest the flow of differences, to construct a centre". For example, election campaigns which give salience to the question immigration can be seen as expressive of this logic in the sense that all the different parties undertake to persuade voters that their party, their specific political programme, is the one which best manages to understand and deal with the issue of immigration.

Nevertheless, the characterization of immigration as a floating signifier and a disputed object of study and knowledge, should not be seen as indicative of a state of free-floating pluralism, where all existing discourses are participating on equal terms, and with an equal amount of resources to bring to bear, when trying to influence the perceptions which guide policy-making and political decision-making. Far from it. Needless to say, not all discourses on immigration, not all the different meanings attached to the term, carry the same clout when, for instance, immigration policies are drawn up and implemented, or when reported on in the mass media. Since we are dealing with a struggle between competing discourses, this evidently also implies that discourse theory and analysis are inseparable from questions of power, power relations and hegemony. Put differently,

15 Taking the signifier "woman" as an instructive example, Laclau (1988: 254-5) argues that if this term attains its meaning in and through discourse, it is equally obvious that no one particular discourse has been able to monopolize the meaning of "woman"; hence its floating character. The situation can thus be described as one of struggle, where each contestant seeks to fix the meaning of "woman" in accordance with its particular discourse. For example, whereas conservative and right wing discourses organize the meaning of "woman" around family-duties, child-rearing, charitable occupations, etc., certain feminist discourses seek to construct the meaning of "woman" in relation to injustice, discrimination, patriarchy, and the struggle against capitalism, racism and homophobia (see also Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 141).
it is with the acknowledgement that the way in which reality and meaning are defined and construed indeed comes with some serious implications and practical consequences – establishing, as it does, what should count as truth, knowledge, objective statements, normalcy and overall common sense – that we realize why there is struggle over these matters and why any critically oriented analysis of such struggle cannot shy away from the question of power, in general, and the attempt to wield power, in particular (cf. Hall, 1992: 291-93; 1983c; Clegg, 1989: 152-3). As Hall has put it, the zealous endeavour "to fix meaning is exactly why power intervenes in discourse" (Hall, 1997a: 10). Furthermore, Carey (1992 [1989]: 87) captures this point with great clarity when he writes:

Reality is, above all, a scarce resource. Like any scarce resource it is there to be struggled over, allocated to various purposes and projects, endowed with given meanings and potentials, spent and conserved, rationalized and distributed. The fundamental form of power is the power to define, allocate, and display this resource. Once the blank canvas of the world is portrayed and featured, it is also preempted and restricted.

In this sense "the power to define" and the power over practice or outcomes must, in some crucial respects, be seen as constituting two sides of the same coin. The differences in outcomes, or practical consequences, are thus enormous between an immigration policy which is influenced (or "powered") by a discourse whereby immigration is defined as a "problem" and "burden" for the receiving society, and one which borrows from a discourse in which immigration is construed as an effect of structural injustices between the north and the south. By the same token we could inquire into which of the various discourses on abortion that finds endorsement in the laws: those which define abortion in terms of the taking of life or murder, or those defining it in terms of choice and women’s rights? From the perspective of discourse theory, investigations into matters such as these will thus always be conducted with reference to the question of discursive power. The question, in other words, does not revolve around which definitions are true in allusion to some inner essence, but rather which definitions that are "made to be true" (Hall, 1997b: 290), and the consequences thereof. Hence Scott’s (1988: 35)

16 Italics in original.
questions: "How have some meanings emerged as normative and others have been eclipsed or disappeared? What do these processes reveal about how power is constituted and operates?"

In like manner Baker (1990: 5) speaks of political authority as intrinsically bound up with discursive ascendancy in that "political functions [e.g. the operation of immigration policies] are defined and allocated within the framework of a given political discourse", and as such "their exercise takes the form of upholding authoritative definitions of the terms within that discourse". Moreover, as Carey indicated above, with the "winning" of the power to define comes not only the power to assert one set of "objective" meanings, one conception of reality, and one legitimating ground for policy, but also, and equally important, a simultaneous power to exclude and nullify all alternative versions of reality and potential practices. Laclau's (1993b: 295) distinct exposition develops and underscores this point:

If radical contingency has occupied the terrain of the ground, any social meaning will be a social construction and not an intellectual reflection of what things "in themselves" are. The consequence is that in this "war of interpretations," power, far from being merely apparitional, becomes constitutive of social objectivity.

This provided, we have already introduced the concept of hegemony into our discussion. For discourse theory the conceptualization of power, and political power in particular, in terms of hegemony stems first and foremost from Antonio Gramsci (1971) and his seminal writings from Mussolini's prison during the inter-war period. Although Gramsci (1971: 57-8) did not abandon the domination and force aspects of hegemony, it is his addition that hegemony also involves the winning of popular consent through non-coercive measures — or through "intellectual and moral leadership" — which has proved to be one of his most momentous interventions; not the least for the subsequent development of discourse theory. In the words of Hall (1982: 85):

The critical point about this conception of 'leadership' — which was Gramsci's most distinguished contribution — is that hegemony is understood as accomplished, not without the due measure of legal and legitimate compulsion, but principally by means of winning the
active consent of those classes and groups who were subordinated within it.

According to Gramsci (1971: 181-2), for a social force, or an alliance of social forces, to become hegemonic in the latter sense of the word, such a force has "to gain the upper hand" in the struggle for consent. It has "to propagate itself throughout society — bringing about not only a unison of economic and political aims, but also intellectual and moral unity, posing all the questions around which the struggle rages not on a corporate but on a 'universal' plane". Moreover, as Hartley (1994: 133) emphasizes, hegemony characterizes "a situation whereby our consent is actively sought for those ways of making sense of the world which 'happen' to fit in with the interests" of any one of those forces and accompanying political projects which participate in the struggle for hegemony.

The work to influence people's ways of making sense of the world, or our "conceptions of the world" (Gramsci, 1971: 323-5), which in turn helps establish what Gramsci referred to as a society's wider "common sense" (cf. 1971: 323-33), was thus essential for Gramsci's understanding of hegemony and the terrain upon which the struggle for hegemony is carried out. The defining features of such "common sense", Gramsci (1971: 326, fn. 5) laid out as follows:

Every philosophical current leaves behind a sedimentation of 'common sense': this is the document of its historical effectiveness. Common sense is not something rigid and immobile, but is continually transforming itself, enriching itself with scientific ideas and with philosophical opinions which have entered ordinary life. 'Common sense' is the folklore of philosophy, and is always half-way between folklore properly speaking and the philosophy, science, and economics of the specialists. Common sense creates the folklore of the future, that is a relatively rigid phase of popular knowledge at a given place and time.

From this angle, common sense constitutes "the ground which new conceptions of the world must take into account, contest and transform, if they are to shape the conceptions of the world of the masses and in that way become historically effective" (Hall, 1996 [1986]: 431). For a social force to successfully elevate its political program, its particular views of the
world and reality to a hegemonic standing, it must, consequently, also succeed in establishing its views as common sense; thereby transforming these views’ contingent, particular and political character into something natural and universally valid.

It is no coincidence then, that these and several other of Gramsci’s insights, which I do not have space to discuss here, have fallen into good ground within discourse theory and analysis (cf. Hall, 1982; 1996 [1986]; 1988b; Laclau and Mouffe, 1985; Wetherell and Potter, 1992; Fairclough, 1992; Torfing, 1999). However, Gramsci’s thoughts have also been subjected to critical scrutiny and revision, something which figures most notably in the work of Laclau and Mouffe (1985).

From here we can now go on to establish, in more precise terms, the relationship between discourse and hegemony. Setting out from Torfing’s (1999: 101) definition, hegemony denotes “the expansion of a discourse, or set of discourses, into a dominant horizon of social orientation and action”. Hegemonic are then the force or those forces whose discourses have become the primary lens through which reality is perceived and governed. Adding a third formulation, the question of hegemony can be said to centre upon “which political force [that] will decide the dominant forms of conduct and meaning in a given social context” (Howarth, 1995: 124).

As such, any discursive struggle is permeated with hegemonic practices; practices which consist of all those attempts on part of the forces involved to fix the meaning of the issue at stake in accordance with their respective outlooks and political projects (cf. Torfing, 1999: 43, 293). In more specific terms, a hegemonic practice which bears fruit is one that manages to bolster what previously might have been a contested discourse to such an extent that it assumes the status of common sense, hence crystallizing in areas and institutions where it expands, reproduces and hinders other discourses from materializing. One of the tasks of discourse analysis thus becomes a matter of trying to ascertain which of the mutually antagonistic discursive constructions of any given societal phenomenon that has gained the upper hand in the struggle for hegemony.

To turn yet again to the issue of immigration in the European Union, this dissertation has sought to demonstrate that it is indeed possible to speak of a certain set of interrelated discourses as hegemonic, in the sense that these have come to structure the dominant and institutionalized attitudes to the issue of immigration in the EU and its member states. The
now commonsensical notions that immigration is essentially a "new" phenomenon in Western Europe, that it works destabilizing, even threatens once stable and culturally homogenous countries, and that, on the whole, immigration and the "immigrants" make up a tremendous and burdensome "problem"\textsuperscript{17} for the countries in the EU, are just a small selection from all those instances where the hegemony of this discursive configuration of immigration manifests. Another commonsensical notion which is reflective of this hegemony is, of course, the fact that only some groups of people who move and settle across borders are referred to as "immigrants". In a discourse which reserves the category "immigrants" for the unwanted, the "problems" — that is non-whites, "Muslims", non-westerners, etc. — any allusion to white people as "problematic immigrants" has thus effectively been excluded (cf. Miles and Thränhardt, 1995: 8-9; Miles, 1993: 206; Tesfahuney, 1998).

I have also tried to show how this hegemonic conformation frequently groups the "problem" of immigration together with organized crime, drug trafficking and other security-related matters within the European Union. Indeed, amongst politicians and policy makers at both national and supranational levels this view of immigration barely constitutes a matter in dispute for the present. The hegemonic nature of this discursive practice thus finds numerous expressions, surfacing perhaps most notably in the various types of institutionalized police cooperation and surveillance arrangements now being set up to deal with immigration and asylum in the EU. Moreover, from the point of view of the European Commission, a determined effort by the EU to combat international crime, drug

\textsuperscript{17} A poignant illustration of how one might go about analyzing the hegemonic articulation of immigrants as constituting "problems" can be found in Ralph Grillo's (1985) much cited study of the representation of immigrants in France. In the study Grillo sets out by establishing that "[n]o researcher in France could fail to note how orally and in writing (in reports, articles, books of every description) the words 'immigrant' and 'immigration' [...] produce the word 'problem'." Given the frequency of such a connection or association, Grillo goes on to argue, it becomes necessary to pose the following question: "How and why is the situation of immigrants in France viewed as 'problematic,' and what is the role of French institutions in the 'representation of problems'?” Moreover, "if there is 'representation' of problems, there is also a problem of 'representation.'”; to which Grillo adds:

The point is this: If the situation of immigrants is "represented” as problematic — perceived, conceived, analyzed, and finally handled in terms of the "problems" that immigrants pose or are believed to experience — and these "representations" are taken into the institutional system through which policies are formulated and implemented, then we must examine who presents the "representations," that is, whose view is "represented” in a political sense, by what means, and how evaluated. (1985: 2)
smuggling, and ("illegal") immigration now constitutes one of the preconditions for a favourable popular reception of the "European citizenship".

Finally, it should be noted that when we speak of the fixation of meaning brought about by a hegemonic discourse, we are referring to what Laclau and Mouffe term a "partial fixation" (1985: 112; see also Laclau, 1993a: 435). Since meaning, as I have argued in the previous, is contingent, any meaning, definition and wider conception of the world are always potentially open to redefinition and alteration. In other words, given the view of meaning as socially constructed, it follows that meaning is possible to subvert through hegemonic practice, which, if successful, produces a new set of partially fixed meanings and new ways of making sense of reality. To use Baker's (1990: 6) phrasing, "meanings (and those who depend upon them) are always implicitly at risk". Indeed, hegemonic practice would be inconceivable if all meaning had been fixed prior to and outside of human agency. If, for example, we could imagine a state of affairs in which phenomena such as immigration and abortion in and of themselves possess the ability to impose their respective meanings on us, it would also be impossible to conceive of any movements forming which would seek to transform these meanings. In Laclau's (1993b: 283) formulation, hegemony, therefore, becomes "a theory of the decision taken in an undecidable terrain".

This concludes my discussion of discourse theory and those aspects of it which have influenced the train of thought and direction in this dissertation. Since the preceding pages already entail a good deal of synoptical passages, I will not embark on a general summary of what has been canvassed in this section. Instead, I will devote the remainder to an applied summary, briefly outlining some of the implications of a discourse theoretical approach to the question of Europe and European identity.

To begin with, we must emphasize that from the point of view of discourse theory, analyses of questions pertaining to Europe set out by discarding the notion of Europe as constituting a natural and self-explanatory entity. That is to say, the meaning of Europe is not simply out there as a settled fact of nature, traceable to some timeless yet perceptible essence. Nor does Europe comprise a unified and self-contained collective
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identity, moulded upon a bundle of self-evident values and cultural characteristics. In sharp contrast to such essentialist starting-points then, discourse theory goes on to underscore the constructed and contingent nature of Europe. As a consequence, the meaning of Europe is seen as made rather than found. More importantly, Europe is examined as something which comes into being and takes on meaning in and through discourse and discursive practice. Given this view, we cannot conceive of Europe as imbued with meaning outside of the discursive practices in which it is named, described, delimited, and set off against everything deemed as non-European. Correspondingly, our knowledge and our ability to produce accurate statements about Europe are seen as equally dependent on particular discursive practices.

Now, for something to be discerned as a discursive construction this does by no means imply that we treat it as being somehow less concrete or real, with respect to its consequences and manifestations. As was established above, insofar as the meanings, definitions, representations and knowledge generated within a discourse attain the (hegemonic) position of truth or common sense — and so have people and institutions act in accordance — discursive constructions must indeed be seen as having real and material consequences for the way in which society gets organized. Prefaced with W.I. Thomas’ classic passage that "if men define a situation as real, it is real in its consequences", Wallerstein’s (1986: 50) reasoning puts this thesis in a more concrete form: "If the core of the world-economy has been termed in shorthand as Europe, then this concept of Europe has had very real consequences, and is thereby a worthy subject of historical analysis."

Secondly, by viewing our object of study as a construction we wish to emphasize the mutable disposition of those meanings that have come to be associated with it. As several historical accounts have tried to illuminate, ever since it was first named and articulated, the meaning and definition of Europe have gone through a series of shifts and reinterpretations; each conditioned by arbitrary political decisions and conflicts rather than by "the progressive embodiment of a great unifying idea" (Delanty, 1995: 2; Hobsbawm, 1997: Ch. 17; see also Heffernan, 1998). Thus, no matter how sedimented and prevalent certain definitions and representations of Europe and of European identity may be at the present, we still approach such fixity as being of a partial and capricious character, hence possible to transform through hegemonic practice. In this
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sense the analysis of predominant discourses on Europe will not, to borrow from Foucault (1971: 27), "reveal the universality" of the meaning of Europe and European identity, but rather it "brings to light the action of imposed rarity, with a fundamental power of affirmation".

If this settles the general subject-matter of starting-points for discourse analysis on Europe, we can now sketch out some of the more specific implications that follow from the theoretical position developed above.

The question concerning the materials, or building blocks, that are put to use in the construction of Europe is crucial in this context. To recall to mind the insights advanced by Foucault and Veyne in the foregoing, our analysis here does not proceed by comparing the materials engaged in, for instance, the European Union's description of Europe with a set of a priori defined materials, construed as the core of Europe. Rather, when scrutinizing any given attempt to stipulate the meaning and contents of Europe, discourse analysis focuses on the acts whereby a material for Europe gets selected; and where such a material is seen as one amongst a range of other potential materials. Thus, in order for something to be recognized as European it first needs to be articulated as such. Put another way, any material, historical or other, that becomes a constituent element in the construction of European, can be seen as a retroactive effect of productive hegemonic practices.

It should be noted, however, that when we speak of a certain construction of Europe as inevitably caught up in acts of selection, such selection must be seen as involving not only an inclusion but also an exclusion of materials. In Heffernan's (1998: 3) blunt formulation: "The same Mediterranean peninsula gives us the European Renaissance but Italian fascism." If acts of selection produce a presence of certain materials, they simultaneously generate an absence through the exclusion of other potential materials. Indeed, the presence of some materials can often be shown to demand the absence or exclusion of others. If, for example, democracy and peace are prescribed as defining materials of post-war Europe, and the European Union as their ultimate guarantor, anti-democratic ingredients such as colonialism and wide-spread support for various dictatorships, together with the numerous wars (colonial, and others, e.g. Iraq and Yugoslavia) fought by member states, obviously have to be removed from the picture. Should, however, such features indeed be accounted for within this discourse on Europe, as is sometimes the case,

18 Italics in original.
the alternative route goes by relegating them as either justified or unfortunate anomalies, or by simply applying the logic—so often repeated in the debates on the wars in former Yugoslavia— which holds that "[g]ood things are of Europe; bad things merely happen there" (Heffernan, 1998: 3).

This also draws attention to the fact that the materials which get selected in the efforts to determine the meaning of Europe always appear within one or other frame of interpretation. As shown in this dissertation, when the European Commission seeks to define Europe through the 19th century's scientific innovations and industrial revolution—seeing these as representative of a Europe "changing the world" and as a source of pride for today's Europeans—these events are understood, or interpreted, as resulting from an exclusively European intellect and creativity; as the achievements of a "great" and self-contained civilization. Given that these events, or materials, can be interpreted in many other ways, it follows that questions about the materials that are appropriated when the EU articulates a European identity will be intrinsically interlaced with questions regarding the type of interpretations in which these same materials are cast.

Furthermore, a discussion bringing to light the consequences and implications of the interpretation of materials under scrutiny also makes up an integral part of this approach. Obviously, a discussion of such consequences for the questions of identity and processes of exclusion and inclusion in the European Union constitutes a central theme in the ensuing essays.

These are then some of the analytical approaches which are engendered by discourse theory. There are, of course, numerous other analytical implications stemming from discourse theory that could be broached in this context. A few of these already surface in the main theoretical overview above, and others will appear in the essays ahead. Thus, in order not to go any further in anticipating the discussion carried out in the essays, we now need to sort out some additional questions concerning my approach, or method. Also, the interrelated subject-matters

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19 Schierup's (1996: 7) observation regarding the prevalent representation of the wars in the former Yugoslavia captures this logic very well: "A primitive and irrational war 'in the middle of Europe', as so often said. But, at the same time, a war which most people are ready to condemn as a completely un-European phenomenon."
of the empirical material under study and the context in which my studies are located need some additional elaboration.

Questions of method

As is indeed evident from the foregoing section, my survey of discourse theory also includes a number of methodological considerations. Instead of sticking to a theoretical discussion in the abstract, I have throughout sought to weave in a variety of examples, illustrations, applications and analytical approaches to empirical questions that discourse theory gives rise to. Although a few general questions of methodology have been raised, the bulk of my discussion has focused on the approaches to the specific questions and themes in the subsequent essays, hence trying to establish how discourse theory justifies these approaches.

The reason for keeping a low profile as regards methodological generalizations stems from the fact that the brand of discourse theory that I draw from does not provide a methodological blueprint for empirical research. In other words, from the perspective of discourse theory there is no intention of stipulating a general framework of rules, a definite set of guidelines and a register of procedures to be followed when one applies discourse analysis in empirical studies (Whichever and Potter, 1992: 101; Potter, 1997: 47; Torfing, 1999: 291). In this sense I concur in Torfing's (1999: 292) scepticism towards the attempt to draw up an all-embracing methodology for the study of discourse. As Torfing argues:

Such a recipe does not exist and should not be developed. For, whereas there is a great need to develop our critical reflections on how to apply discourse theory in concrete studies, we should not aim to solve the methodological question once and for all. Discourse theorists must remain methodological bricoleurs and refrain from developing an all-purpose technique for discourse analysis. The methodology to be applied will vary from study to study, and the development of a totalizing master methodology would serve only to repress new and alternative forms of analysis. (1999: 292)

Discourse theory offers the researcher with a few tools, perspectives, starting-points and some clues as to how discourse theory might be
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applied. But when it comes to the actual utilization of these theoretical expositions in empirical research, no ready-made guidelines and answers will be available. Consequently, this task has to be left up to the individual researcher's own creativity and discretion.

Now, if discourse analysis is rather difficult to delineate and acquire, this, in turn, does not involve any limitations concerning our capacities to evaluate and scrutinize the arguments, claims and assertions that are being put forth within any given piece of discourse analysis (Potter, 1997: 148; Sahlin, 1999: 90-1). To use Potter's analogy, "if you cannot easily say precisely how someone has learned to ride a bike, you do not have so much difficulty saying whether they have fallen off or not" (1997: 148). Needless to say, discourse analysis shares with most other modes of conducting research in that it abides by the established conventions of transparency and methodicalness as regards the treatment and selection of source material, and when laying out its arguments, interpretations and claims. As such, any work which makes use of discourse analysis is open for critical assessment by others (Potter, 1997: 148; Sahlin, 1999: 90-1).

If this settles some of the more overarching questions concerning this dissertation's stance on methodology, we may now turn to the more concrete matter regarding the type of method that I have actually chosen to work with in the essays. Before I embark on this task, however, it needs to be pointed out that in terms of method the individual essays speak for themselves, and should thereby also be examined as such, on their own bases. What I do, how I do it, and what type of empirical material I analyze will thus be spelled out in a clear enough fashion in each essay. Yet, since there obviously are close points of similarity between the essays, and in order to aid in the process of examination, some further clarifications and motivations might be useful here.

Aside from the piece on the European Commission's Eurobarometer surveys – which is best described as a critique dealing exclusively with two Eurobarometer surveys and the conceptions of collective identity, immigration and racism that surface in these – the essays all build on an investigation into a large number of EU documents; including various reports and information booklets. Given the European Commission's significant "agenda power" in the European Union (Andersen and Eliassen, 1996: 46), and its role as the institution which proposes legislation and initiates policies, my analyses have chiefly focused on discourse finding expression in Commission documents. Furthermore, this
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focus derives from the fact that the Commission assumes a leading role in putting forth visions and introducing new ideas for the future development of the Union. Yet, to treat European Commission discourse as crucial for our understanding of how the question of identity is perceived at the level of the EU, this does not mean that the European Parliament and the Council are omitted in my discussion. On the contrary, and with the aim of comparing discourses — examining, for instance, whether or not one finds discourses that are at variance with Commission discourse — numerous documents drawn up by these institutions (the Parliament in particular) have also been taken into consideration.

For the most part my analyses focus on those EU documents which deal with policy discussions on identity, culture, education, immigration and citizenship. In addition, I have also — although to a lesser extent — analyzed the discourse that comes to the fore in EU documents on social and economic policy, covering, for instance, such matters as welfare, employment, the common currency, growth and taxation; an analysis which is located primarily in the final essay on the "European citizenship". Moreover, since seemingly disparate issues frequently overlap in EU documents, where apparently dry documents on the euro can include lush expositions on Europe's cultural heritage and identity and vice versa, the decision of whether or not a document would be relevant for the questions at issue in this dissertation could not rest upon the title of the document alone. Thus, in order not to miss out on something interesting as a simple consequence of having been too quick in excluding certain policy areas and issues beforehand, this, in turn, made it necessary to keep my search for documents rather open-ended. Suffice it to say that few EU documents give themselves out as being documents explicitly occupied with the question of identity; a predicament which certainly underscores the indispensability of such an open-ended approach.

To say something about demarcations in time, I have mostly concentrated on documents (and other types of EU publications) issued from the mid 1980s and onwards. Since the mid 1980s marks the launching of the People's Europe scheme and an overall re-orientation within the EC towards a heightened concern with questions of identity, culture and citizenship, I took this to be a suitable point of departure for my work. Naturally I do not consider such a demarcation to be an end in itself. For purposes of comparing and contrasting discourses, a few selected references to earlier documents are therefore also included.
As the reader undoubtedly will notice, most of the essays do not only survey a large number of EU documents, but they also make frequent use of quotations drawn from these same documents. Save for the essay on the Commission's Eurobarometer surveys, the consistent utilization of this mode of procedure was chosen with a specific purpose in mind. Firstly, there was the self-evident aim of making manifest that the arguments put forth build on a substantial body of documents. Equally important, however, the great quantity of documents and industrious citing also constituted a necessary condition if my claim that it is indeed possible to display a recurrent discursive pattern in EU documents was to carry conviction. In my view, for a discourse analysis to be convincing it has to be able to establish that the statements that go to make up the discourse which the analyst seeks to describe are not simply accidental occurrences or whims, but form part of a pattern, and can be understood against the background of a larger discursive logic.

But as the reader will notice too, the claims and arguments which I pursue are far from solely based on EU documents. In order not to convey the false impression that the discourse which is being delineated and analyzed somehow begins and ends within a neatly confined institutional space called the EU, or that it constitutes, so to speak, an independent and unique creation of the Commission (cf. Westlind, 1996: 70), I have continuously sought to weave in examples and illustrations of how the questions of Europe and European identity get articulated elsewhere. Parallel with my work on the EU, I have thus tried to keep a close eye on discourses on European identity, immigration, citizenship and the like that find expression in other institutions and amongst other actors than those of the European Union. Examples of such institutions and actors that come into view are member state governments, political parties, NATO, the Council of Europe, the media, and various politicians, pundits and voices from the academic community.

By employing such a "hybrid perspective" – a term I borrow from Said (1978: 23) – it becomes possible to situate the EU's discourse in a wider discursive context, where the relationship between the European Union and other institutions and actors can be assessed. What types of links, similarities, differences and points of convergence do we discern? Is it possible to speak of a larger and wide-ranging discourse on Europe, a consensus, which is commonly shared by a number of powerful institutions and actors, or can we interpret EU discourse as an attempt to
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break with prevalent notions of Europe, as a reaction against other discourses on Europe? These are some of the questions which this hybrid perspective renders possible; questions which, in turn, are crucial for a discussion of the wider implications of the European Union’s discourse on identity. Obviously, this also explains why I decided not to confine my analysis solely to the discourses appearing at the level of the European Union.

Although intimated in the foregoing, it is to be noted, finally, that my method of acquiring insight into the questions under investigation is founded on an analysis of elite discourse (van Dijk, 1993). As a consequence, my perspective can be characterized as hybrid only to the extent that it takes into consideration a variety of elite discourses. Yet having said this, I do not wish to imply that elite discourses compose the only valid object of study, and so the only discourses of concern for discourse analysis. To inquire into the perceptions of Europe, identity, ethnicity, citizenship, etc., which get articulated from below, at grass-roots level, and from various social movements, is thus a task of no less importance. However, since I take the questions of power and hegemony to be indispensable to any discourse analysis with a critical mission, I am equally convinced that in order for analyses of discourses from below to be fruitful, these too must set out from a clear understanding of the types of discourses which motivate and legitimate the practices at the higher echelons in the political, economic, social and cultural hierarchies. For how else could one grasp current grass-roots discourses of anti-racism, anti-Eurocentrism, anti-neoliberalism and feminism; and how else could one comprehend what these discourses are reacting to and what they are seeking to re-define and change?

In this sense, my work proceeds from the thesis that there indeed "are centers that operate directly on the formation and constitution of discourse" (Hall, 1988b: 71). Again, by this we are not conferring a status of omnipotence onto the (elite) discourses that are put into circulation from these centers. Rather, what it amounts to is the simple notion that there is no way around them; that is, if we are to conduct research with a critical edge, these discourses have to be confronted in one way or another. In this dissertation my aim has been to provide one such way of critically confronting centred or elite discourses on Europe and identity;

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20 Italics in original.
where the European Commission, of course, constitutes the primary locus of investigation.

Outline and summary of the study

As has been said, the five essays that follow do not present an exhaustive survey of all the policy areas where the European Union's identity politics comes to the fore. However, by locating the discussion and analysis in those areas where the EU's articulation of identity emerges with particular salience, the essays, taken as a whole, still provide a comprehensive enough picture of how the question of collective identity is being perceived and dealt with at the level of the EU. After having sketched the broad contours of the problematic in the first essay, the subsequent essays thus proceed through a continuous incorporation of a set of interconnected areas and issues; a progression which culminates in the final essay's discussion of the notion of "European citizenship".

As already noted then, the opening essay has the character of a general outline. As such, it seeks to introduce some of those areas and issues which the following essays scrutinize. It provides an overview of the perceptions of identity that find expression in European Union policy discourse; particularly with respect to the areas of culture, education and citizenship. I highlight the EU's ethno-cultural understanding of identity, and then go on to discuss the excluding implications of this as regards the ethnic minorities with migrant background now living in the European Union.

As pointed out earlier, this essay also includes theoretical considerations concerning the concept of identity and its utilization in the EU context. Moreover, in arguing that the EU project of trying to establish a collective sense of identity in the Union indeed needs to be approached as a form of identity politics, some of the false starts in the current debate on identity politics are accounted for. Finally, I situate the identity politics under study in the context of the crisis of legitimacy facing the European Union. Here a few tentative suggestions are put forth as to why it is that an excluding ethno-cultural articulation of identity has come to eclipse a more inclusive trans-ethnic and social rights' based conception of collective identity in the European Union.
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In light of the first essay's general account, the following two essays delve deeper into the identity problematic in the European Union. Although both of these take their points of departure in the EU's education policies, hence expounding the ways in which the policy field of education gets appropriated for an identity politics at the EU level, they do not limit themselves to a discussion of education as such. Instead, they aim to describe and analyze EU discourses on the larger questions of European identity and culture, immigration, the situation for ethnic minorities, and other with these related matters that frequently surface in EU documents on education.

To be more precise, the second essay inquires into two education policies drawn up by the EU. These are, firstly, intercultural approaches to education, which, according to the EU, are crucial for the generation of "communication and understanding between cultures"; and, secondly, policy seeking to improve the situation in education for children of immigrant background. Ever since education became an area of Community competence in 1993 (with the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty), the Commission has been eager to emphasize the crucial role of education in the formation of a European identity. This provided, I took a policy discourse which explicitly addresses questions of cultural identity, the multicultural society, ethnicity, racism and immigration to be a crucial discourse of investigation.

The main argument that I pursue revolves around a critical scrutiny of the explicit as well as implicit culturalism in much of EU policy discourse, where problems of a socio-economic nature often get reduced to a matter of culture, as in cultural value conflicts between majorities and minorities. As part of this argument, I also try to show how such culturalism is interwoven with the EU's equally dubious outlook on immigration.

In developing on one of the themes in the second essay, the third essay aims to further explore how the EU makes use of education in its politics of identity. Here I analyze the discourse in the European Union's policy of "The European dimension of education". Setting out by locating education in the context of the neoliberal discourse on economic globalization — where the European Commission's views on the relationship between economy and cultural identity are displayed — I go on to trace the discussions of the European dimension of education historically. From there the chief part is devoted to an analysis of the discourse on culture and identity which the European dimension of
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education rests on. Herein I direct attention to the policy’s ethno-cultural and thereby excluding delineation of collective identity in the European Union. I argue that the EU’s ambition of fostering a stronger sense of community and popular cohesion in the Union in many respects promotes, even builds upon, a notion of cultural identity which, implicitly, includes only those who can relate to certain versions of European historical “roots” and cultural “heritage”. In closing, I illustrate further how such an ethno-cultural articulation of identity manifests in the European dimension’s position on the language question in the EU.

As mentioned above, the piece dealing with the European Commission’s Eurobarometer surveys on attitudes towards “immigrants and out-groups” is the odd one out in this dissertation. Compared with the others, this fourth essay is not only shorter in size but also incorporates a much smaller empirical material; basically limiting itself to an analysis of two Eurobarometer surveys (Eurobarometer 30 and Eurobarometer 39). However, since it grapples with the very same complex of problems as the other essays, it does not digress from the dissertation’s general theme. Moreover, since the Eurobarometer is one of the most widely cited surveys in the EU, and so carries some clout in political and academic circles, I also saw it as an important object of study in its own right.

The essay analyzes the wider discourse that structures the questions that are being asked in the surveys. It particularly focuses on the Eurobarometer’s tendency to divide people in the EU into racialized categories of “us and them”; whereby the ”immigrants” are simply assumed to be seen as ”problems” about whom a European ”us” should feel comfortable expressing an opinion about. In arguing that the Eurobarometer (unconsciously) reproduces a discourse in which immigrants and ethnic minorities are being stigmatized as ”others”, as not belonging and as making up a ”problem”, I discuss and problematize the survey’s underlying assumptions regarding matters of identity, ethnicity, culture, nationality and race.

The fifth and final essay sets about to map and analyze the European Union’s discourse on citizenship (or ”European citizenship”) as it has been unfolding since the early 1970s and onwards. Borrowing a formulation from Mouffe (1992: 225), this study can be said to rest on the conception that ”[t]he way we define citizenship is intimately linked to the kind of society and political community we want.” In this sense, it seemed befitting to wind up my project with a discussion of how the EU
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conceives of citizenship and all that goes into this much debated concept. In many respects, therefore, this essay also functions as a summary of the dissertation as a whole.

In the essay I argue that in conjunction with the Community’s adoption of a neoliberal-leaning agenda in the 1980s, the EU has been moving towards a de-socialized and an increasingly ethno-cultural understanding of citizenship and identity. As a result, the EU’s ”European citizenship” has mainly come to serve as an intermediate between a neoliberal economism and an exclusive ethno-culturalism. Whereas the rights dimension of EU citizenship is geared to the furtherance of market integration, hence limiting its appeal to the (well-to-do) social strata who reap the benefits thereof, the identity dimension restricts itself to those at home in a hereditary and Christian community of culture.

In pointing to yet another excluding strand within the citizenship discourse at the EU level, I go on to elucidate how the notion of ”European citizenship” has become linked up with what is referred to as the Union’s immigration and security nexus. By availing itself of an assumed apprehension towards immigration amongst the ”citizens of Europe”, the Commission seeks to disseminate an image of ”European citizenship” as a guardian of public safety and a warrant against the influx of extra-European immigrants and so-called clandestine asylum-seekers.

Over and above that, I also seek to broaden these arguments by discussing how one might analyze the EU’s conceptions of citizenship, identity and immigration once the views of other influential actors and institutions on these same issues are brought into the picture. In doing so, the final piece offers a glimpse of the wider discursive order that organizes the prevalent understanding of the matters under study.

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The work of writing this dissertation has coincided with a period during which the European Union, to say the least, has experienced some crucial transformations, several new developments and a succession of crises. Not only have we witnessed the launching of an unprecedented monetary union — preceded by several crises and very likely a source of future ones — but we have also seen important steps taken towards eastward enlargement, a common foreign and security policy and increased harmonization in the area of immigration and asylum. New members have
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joined and a new Treaty has come into force. More than that, this period has been lined with various expressions of popular discontent with the elitism, officialism and corporate bias that allegedly continues to permeate the EU project. Accentuated by the disclosures of widespread corruption and other forms of serious mismanagement within the EU organization, the debate on the lingering crisis of legitimacy, the problems stemming from the so-called democratic deficit and the overall lack of public support has thus shown no signs of being on the wane.

Common for all these developments, transformations and crises is that they incessantly keep raising the question of collective identity in the European Union. On that account, my work also spans a period which has been equally marked by a growing debate about the whole notion of European identity and its bearing on the process of integration in Europe. Indeed, as shown throughout the dissertation, for nearly two decades now, and with a growing frequency, the Commission has been voicing its conviction that in order to ensure the success of every new step on the road to a more integrated Europe, a stronger popular identification with the European Union has to be evoked. More importantly, however, I also evince the strong tendency on part of the EU to articulate such an identity in ethno-cultural terms, and thus go to great length in discussing the adverse and excluding implications that an ethno-cultural identity politics gives rise to.

Through a gradual elaboration of this discussion, the essays as a whole offer several grounds for arguing that the European Union’s identity politics constitutes a deeply problematic enterprise. For one thing, it is a politics that provides no clues as to how the development in the EU of an ever growing discrimination against ethnic minorities with migrant background could be overcome. Neither does it seek to envision how an identity and solidarity could be forged which would break out of the excluding ethno-cultural impasse, and so move beyond the current image of a European Union identity as merely inclusive of a transnational white ethnicity.

Apart from a more or less routine-like neglect of critical issues and challenges such as these, however, I also point to a number of features within EU identity politics that are not reducible to mere neglect, and which in a more direct sense must be said to abet and reify the widespread perception of minorities with immigrant background as "problems" and perpetual cultural outcasts. As has been repeatedly said, the Commission's
settled belief that a collective identity in the Union needs to be grounded in ethno-cultural attributes such as descent, cultural heritage, religion and a feeling of cultural superiority is, of course, of particular significance here. By linking the ethno-cultural strand with the Commission’s equally patent inclination to criminalize immigration and to legitimize certain anti-immigrant sentiments, I reveal a development where the discourse on identity, citizenship and immigration that radiates from the EU organization in many ways has come to harmonize with some of the more overtly excluding and anti-immigrant elite discourses that flourish today.

If this summarizes the arguments and findings that set the tone of this dissertation, there are still a few things which remain unsettled. For the most part this concerns the concluding essay’s reflections on the relationship between neoliberalism and the EU’s ethno-cultural identity politics. The reason for this stems from the fact that this discussion in some measure goes beyond the immediate scope of the study. In other words, whereas the stated purpose of the dissertation centres on a mapping and scrutiny of how the EU articulates an identity for itself, and the implications thereof, the final essay also touches on the question as to why an ethno-cultural model of community formation, rather than something else, has managed to leave such a strong mark on the European Union’s outlook on identity. Given the immense complexity of this question, however, I have been in no position to go into details here, nor have I sought to provide a comprehensive account. To do so would require a far more extensive study, incorporating, among other things, an analysis pitched at many different levels, as well as an in-depth view of the workings of the EU’s institutional machinery. In addition, the discourse analytical approach that I make use of would clearly have to be supplemented with other types of analytical frameworks.

Instead of embarking on a wide-reaching exposé, my argument confines itself to the rather straightforward thesis that the Commission’s ethno-cultural disposition partly must be seen in light of the European Union’s gradual adjustment to a largely neoliberal order. I contend that such an adjustment works to the detriment of a Union project that would germinate around a popular identification with democratic principles of justice and equality, and with social and political rights. In essence, therefore, the neoliberal trajectory must also be seen as thwarting exactly those forces and alternative identities that are capable of counteracting a retreat into ingrained and ethnocentric narratives of the hereditary and
culturally founded community. In a stronger formulation, one could even argue that the neoliberal ordinance, through its restraining impact on the feasibility of a social and political articulation of identity and citizenship in the Union, in fact has been deeply implicated in creating a breeding ground for the rise of various racist parties, the growing hostility towards ethnic minorities and an increasing propensity on part of the political establishment to treat social problems as mere outgrowths of cultural conflicts and the presence of "extra-European" immigrants.\footnote{To suggest that an economic regime which derives its dynamics from a steady growth of social insecurity and inequality indeed tends to pave the way for racist and ethnocentric reactions, is, of course, a point as old as the critique of capitalism itself. As such, my point is trivial. At the same time, however, it remains one of the best kept secrets within much of the contemporary political and economic establishment. Furthermore, since the greater part of the current discussions on identity has a tendency to overlook structural and economic aspects, a consideration of the implications of a neoliberal hegemony on identity politics in the EU.
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To some extent then, the concluding essay can be said to develop on the opening essay's depiction of the EU as an organization that catches at the cultural straw in its strife for legitimacy and popular support. Put differently, this course of action conveys the impression of a Commission that tries to invoke a sense of cultural security where its social counterpart has been relativized in favour of various market solutions; solutions that, save for the business class citizens of Europe, clearly have failed to enthuse the general public. Certainly, as I point out in the final essay, this is not to imply that issues of social exclusion and poverty go unaddressed at the EU level. The crux of the matter rather lies in the fact that measures required for the safeguarding of social cohesion are not forming part of the driving logic behind European integration, and as such they are clearly subordinate to measures which attend to the concerns of the market.

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In relation to the world situation as a whole, many of the problems addressed in this dissertation obviously cannot be seen as being peculiar to Brussels and the members of the EU. In the wake of the social decomposition that has characterized so much of the development in the world since the 1970s, and which unequivocally must be understood as largely contingent on the wealthy countries' (and their financial institutions') vigorous promotion of neoliberal policy regimes in the South and the former Eastern bloc (i.e. structural adjustment, chock therapy,
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etc.), the turn to an ethno-cultural mobilization and the quest for an ethnically pure community have to a greater or less extent come to permeate our global state of affairs. Needless to say, this development manifests itself in many different ways, and the severity of its consequences will to a large extent depend on any given country’s position in the hierarchical world system. In terms of their immediate consequences, therefore, the self-imposed convergence criteria in the EU can not outright be put on a par with the chiefly externally imposed structural adjustment programs in Africa and Latin America; or, for that matter, the shock therapy in Russia. Similarly, if a heightened sense of social anxiety, rising unemployment, urban decay and shrinking welfare provisions have gone hand in hand with a mounting xenophobia and ethnic polarization throughout the European Union, this is still a far cry from what an ethno-cultural entrenchment has been proven capable of in places where already minimal social safety nets have been further eroded, or, as in some cases, even totally annihilated. So to speak of the trend of events in the EU as forming part of a larger and global development, it is thus of utmost importance to keep in mind that even though the turn to ethnicity is global in scope, the distribution of responsibility for this predicament is clearly not, but has to be sought in the structural forces that continue to perpetuate the unequal distribution of wealth and power between as well as within the societies of the world.

At yet another level, the European Union’s approach to collective identity can also be seen as symptomatic of much of today’s globalized elite discussion of identity and citizenship; a discussion which increasingly has come to decouple social and political rights and identity, thus locating identity solely in ethnicity, culture, religion, nationality, descent and other exclusive domains. To contemplate that the struggle for social rights and a strong sense of collective identity could compose two sides of the same coin has thus largely gone out of fashion. It is just this that constitutes our present challenge then, namely to recover the link between the question of collective identity and the now so marginalized questions of social and political rights. The multinational and trans-ethnic “insurgency from below”\(^2\) that shook the WTO meeting in Seattle last year clearly indicates that various social movements around the world are beginning to take up

proved to be of particular value for this study.

\(^2\) I borrow this wording from Jeffrey St. Clair’s (1999: 96) thought-provoking piece in *New Left Review* on the WTO meeting.
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this challenge; something that the subsequent popular manifestations at the World Economic Forum in Davos and at the UNCTAD meeting in Bangkok definitely underscored. On the whole, the last few years have seen numerous protests, manifestations and strikes against the growing inequalities and disenfranchisement that arise from an economic order increasingly immune to popular influence and democratic processes. New movements for social justice, which raise the global issues of trade, foreign investment and environmental destruction, have formed in many Third World countries. Correspondingly, and as I indicate in the concluding essay, a trend of advancing social movements and public discontent with the market orthodoxy can also be spotted in the EU countries; a trend which even seems to have made some impression on parts of the political establishment in the Union, including the European Commission. In addition, the reinvigorated labour movement in the United States deserves mention here, not the least since its biggest strike in two decades – at the corporate giant United Parcel Service in 1997 – drew such a massive support from the general public. Indeed, with the multi-ethnic make-up of the picket line, the strike was even seen by many as "a victory for racial justice" (Anner, 1997).

If these movements will convert into larger and sustainable coalitions with an ability to organize concerted efforts across national and North-South boundaries, is of course an open question. However, from a more modest point of view, the recent manifestations might at least have gotten one fundamental point across, namely that there indeed are alternative ways of approaching the fragmentation and social malady that stem from a global adjustment to the dictates of the market. As such, it might also point to a gradual rediscovery of social and political rights as sources of collective identification, hence opening up new vistas for an inclusive and globally conscious politics of identity. If it seems more certain than in a long time that such an identity politics has to evolve from below, it is equally certain that it has to cross the boundaries of ethnicity, culture, religion and nationality. In short, this politics of identity has to be impure. No one has formulated the fundamental insight for such a vision better than Stuart Hall:

The future belongs to the impure. The future belongs to those who are ready to take in a bit of the other, as well as being what they themselves are. After all, it is because their history and ours is so
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deeply and profoundly and inextricably intertwined that racism exists. For otherwise, how could they keep us apart? (1997b: 299)

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Essay I
The cultural short cut, a road to exclusion? Notes on identity politics in the European Union

Introduction

Since the 1980s we have witnessed a growing debate, within both academic circles and the media, around the issue of identity politics. Almost exclusively, identity politics has come to refer to the politicization and affirmation of separate ethnic, racial, cultural, religious, sexual, and/or gender identities. It occurs mostly in the West among groups who oppose what they consider to be discriminatory state policies. Black separatism in the United States, the headscarf controversy in French schools, gay and lesbian street manifestations, and the strife for state funded Islamic schools are just a few among the countless examples where identity politics is said to be at work.

Now, as few would have failed to notice, identity politics has over the years acquired several derogatory connotations. For example, it is suggested that it: fragments society and undermines various social policies; threatens universal principles of equal treatment; preaches segregation; and is essentialist, purist, tribal, and even racist or sexist. This provided, there is thus a need to question how the concept of identity politics is being employed and, even more importantly, to question why it is that only certain groups and expressions have come to be associated with the politics of identity. One of the problems with this conception of identity politics is that it excludes other and perhaps more important cites from where this politics is also being waged. If, indeed, identity politics is about the articulation of a particular identity and not just about some (minority)

1 This essay was published in Gundara, Jagdish and Jacobs, Sidney (eds.), Intercultural Europe: Diversity and Social Policy, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000. It has also been published in MERGE Papers on Transcultural Studies, No. 1, 1998.
groups engaging in it, then other such articulatory practices which are taking place at, for instance, the level of the state must be scrutinized as constituting a type of identity politics as well.\(^2\)

By doing exactly this, but at yet another level, this paper will focus on the politics of identity that is now being pursued by the European Union. Put simply, the major research question I seek to deal with here is how the EU goes about articulating an identity for itself. This task, however, does not set out from the common understanding of identity politics as something a priori harmful and excluding. Instead, every such politics must be seen as potentially open-ended, depending on how it construes the identity it seeks to mobilize. The many different identity articulations in motion today must thus be contextualized; each being approached as having very different causes and so very different effects. Most of all, they cannot be approached as existing in isolation from each other, but have to be seen as contingent and relational. Therefore, when minorities engage in identity politics, this might well be seen as a response to the identity politics emanating from the state which in many cases has assigned identities for these groups as "others", as those who cannot belong to the national community. Harvey (1996: 30-1) makes this point succinctly:

> The demands of minority groups within larger social entities for the recognition of cultural heterogeneity tend to require a politics of identity, where culture is used as a means to an end. These are the terms in which dialogue with hegemonic groups is deemed possible, for it is only through an awareness of the ways in which one group’s cultural assumptions systematically erase the presence of others that progress can be made and change achieved.

Bearing this in mind, I will relate the identity politics at the level of the EU to the situation for ethnic minorities with migrant background now living in the Union. The intention is to investigate whether or not we can detect any attempts from within the EU institutions of articulating an alternative, less rigid and more inclusive Community or EU identity as compared to those often exclusive national ones we see being pursued within the member states. These questions will mainly be situated in the

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\(^2\) Julien and Mercer (1988: 6) have made a similar argument regarding the commonsensical utilization of ethnicity, stating: "a one-sided fixation with ethnicity as something that 'belongs' to the Other alone, thus white ethnicity is not under question and retains its 'centred' position".
context of three policy-areas central for the identity construction in the EU. These policy-areas are: culture, education and citizenship; areas crucial for the consolidation of the nation-state, but which also were given priority in the Maastricht Treaty as key areas for the creation of a cohesive "European identity".

Below I firstly outline my research approach to these matters. Secondly, I want to bring up some theoretical issues related to the politics of identity at the level of the European Union; thirdly, display some concrete examples from EU-policies on culture, education and citizenship – just to hint at the types of representations of "Europe" that the EU deems appropriate as sources of identification. Finally, I will also try to situate the identity politics under study in the context of the crisis of legitimacy facing the European Union today. Due to the limited scope of this paper my discussion will mainly focus on the work carried out by the European Commission.

Broadening the focus of research on identity in the European Union

The work to establish greater popular cohesion across national borders among the different Member State citizens – and not only among the Member States as individual political entities – in what is now the European Union has been part of the Community project since the outset. Indeed, for many of the so-called Founding Fathers and the subsequent Community engineers, federalists and visionaries, the long term goal with European Community formation has been to dissolve the nation state and its status as the primary unit of identification among people in the Community (Shore, 1995; see also Bull, 1993; and Kourvetaris and Kourvetaris, 1996).

However, it was not until 1973 that the Community put forth its first formal statement that explicitly addressed the issue of European identity (see Tindemans, 1976; and Commission of the European Communities3, 1988). In the 1973 "Declaration on the European Identity" the member countries agreed "that the time has come to draw up a document on the European Identity", which was followed by statements such as these:

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3 Hereafter abbreviated as CEC.
The diversity of cultures within the framework of common European Civilization, the attachment to common values and principles, the increasing convergence of attitudes to life, the awareness of having specific interests in common and the determination to take part in the construction of a united Europe, all give the European Identity its originality and its own dynamism. [...] The European identity will evolve as a function of the dynamic of the construction of a united Europe. In their external relations, the Nine propose progressively to undertake the definition of their identity in relation to other countries or groups of countries. They believe that in so doing they will strengthen their own cohesion and contribute to the framing of a genuinely European foreign policy. (CEC, 1973: 119, 122)

Nevertheless, it is not until the launching of the "People's Europe" concept in the mid-1980s that any real and explicit discussion of a European identity takes shape on the EEC agenda (see CEC, 1985 and CEC, 1988). This concept was developed by the ad hoc Committee on a People's Europe, chaired by Pietro Adonnino and set up by the European Council in 1984 (see CEC, 1985). The committee was asked to focus on future Community manoeuvres that would meet the "expectations of the peoples of Europe by adopting measures to strengthen and promote its identity and its image both for its citizens and for the rest of the world" (cited in CEC, 1988: 6). From here on the identity discussion has gotten firmly embedded in European Union discourse, and the initiatives and attempts to foster a strong identification with what is now the EU have been numerous. We can call this the EEC's, and subsequently the EC's, and now the EU's politics of identity.

Since roughly the end of the eighties much has been written on the issue of European identity and the different processes of identity-formation taking place inside the European Union. Within a great deal of the critically oriented part of the research on identity in the EU, emphasis has been put on the situation for migrants from the south and east, on excluding immigration and asylum policies implemented by Member States and intergovernmental groups (such as Schengen, Trevi, etc.), on citizenship, ethnicity, racism, Eurocentrism and on the "Fortress Europe" scenario (cf. Balibar and Wallerstein, 1988; Gordon, 1989; Hadjimichalis and Sadler, 1995; Miles and Thränhardt, 1995; Modood and Werbner, 1997; Rattansi and Westwood, 1994; Rex and Drury, 1994; Solomos and
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Wrench, 1993; White, 1999). Much of this work, however, deals little or to a limited extent with EU-institutions such as the Commission and the Parliament, and the views emanating here on identity in the Union. Instead, the focus has predominantly been put on individual Member States and the intergovernmental cooperation. Certainly, since these are the most influential actors and activities shaping the Union and its direction, there are important and obvious reasons for the dominance of this focus. Nevertheless, it is also important, and increasingly so, to take a closer look at the policies, recommendations and future goals that are articulated from inside the (supranational) EU-machinery itself — such as the European Commission and the European Parliament. A reason for taking on this perspective stems from the fact that the EU does not speak with one voice on issues pertaining to the situation for its migrants and non-white inhabitants. The European Parliament, for instance, has on several occasions expressed its disapproval of how the member states, the European Council and the intergovernmental groups deal with the issues of racism, immigration and asylum. And — speaking of the often adverse identities assigned to non-white minorities in the EU — the European Parliament (1990: 133) has criticized the intergovernmental groups, claiming that these

treat migration and refugee matters very much as related to policing. And this has a very negative effect on public opinion. Associating migrants and refugees with police and national security could well feed racist ideas and could be used to legitimize certain forms of racist behaviour (extra identity control of those who are or look like "foreigners").

Another important reason for taking this perspective into account has to do with the expansion of authorities and competence that the Commission, and, although to a lesser extent, the Parliament have gotten in recent years. Also, for a future of expanded supranationality, and, possibly, of more transnational political organisation through the European Parliament, it becomes important to get an in-depth knowledge of the type of Union identities that are being articulated by these EU-

4 It should be mentioned here though that this perspective has been applied by, among others, Martinicello (1995); Morley and Robins (1995); Neumann (1998); Schlesinger (1991; 1993); Shore (1995; 1996); and Shore and Black (1994).
bodies. Can one, for instance, detect any discourses that run counter to the often very exclusive, ethnocentric and indeed "EU-rocentric" ones we see at the level of the Member States and the intergovernmental EU-bodies? Is it possible to foresee any potential and productive conflicts emerge here, or will Commission and European Parliament policies merely reinforce and reproduce a hegemonic discourse installed by Member States and their intergovernmental cooperation?

Although some implicit and tentative answers to these last questions will surface when EU perspectives on culture, education and citizenship are presented and discussed, this paper will not scrutinize these questions in particular any further. They merit mention here since they form an important part, and indeed are enabled, by the research perspective that I seek to develop.

Approaching cultural difference in the European Union

Aware of the wide array of theoretical work on collective identity formation and mobilization in general, and the work on how these processes operate in Europe in particular, the unobtrusive purpose here is to think through just a few of the articulatory practices employed by the EU in its endeavour to construct a collective identity in the Union. Thus, the focus for the discussion here, is the EU’s conception of cultural difference, and how this conception is being engaged in the discourse on European identity.

Due to every identity’s relational character, difference and its application in identity construction is central to any discussion of identity (Mouffe, 1994; Connolly, 1991; Eriksen, 1993; Hall, 1991). Indeed, difference can be said to constitute identity’s partner term in that all identities are constructed through a process of differentiation between, for instance, "self" and "other", "us and them", "Swedes and immigrants", "Europeans and non-Europeans". But if these binary oppositions point to one aspect of the simultaneous politics of identity and difference – where the second term come to signify the antagonist, those who are said to threaten the stability of "our" identity, when in fact they provide the very building blocks (or the "constitutive outside" [Mouffe, 1994: 107]) for that excluding yet parasitic identity – it is far from the only one. Stated differently, the application of difference is far from always a straight
forward process, reducible to two clear-cut and antagonistic identity categories, but always something ready for amendments depending on levels and contexts.

This last point is important to keep in mind, since the issue of difference can be treated rather simplistic and without nuances in the debate and research about the European Union's approach to collective identity construction. Too often the European Union is being portrayed as mobilizing only around one line of difference, one narrow and unified definition of European culture and identity. In other words, that the EU only operates with one uncomplicated and negative conception of difference to define its identity. However, drawing from EU documents that address the issue of a European identity, one finds that difference, when referred to in the abstract, often is appropriated as something positive, as an asset that indeed is said to belong inside the Union and which therefore should be preserved, included and negotiated rather than reduced to one uniform level. As the former Commissioner Anita Gradin put it: "we are Europeans because we are so different, there we have the European identity" (cited in Lönnqvist, 1995/96a). Speaking in the same vein, the then Speaker of the European Parliament, Klaus Hänsch, once pointed out that "[t]here is no one European people or European culture, there are many" (cited in Lönnqvist, 1995/96b).

With reference to this, at a surface-level, one could argue here that this points to a potential future transformation of traditional understandings of European identity. It enables a rethinking of the notion of "European-ness" as something closely associated with (white) skin-colour, the West and other essentialist and supremacist identity markers, traceable to the colonial era. In other words, by recognizing the danger of organizing a collective identity around particularist and excluding notions of ethnicity, culture and religion, and allowing for the inclusion of differences — constructed as non-antagonistic — it becomes possible to envision the alteration of a present condition such as the one Gilroy (1990: 74) points to when he states that "the terms 'black' and 'European' remain categories which mutually exclude each other".

Aside from the mere rhetorical, however, actual EU policy construes the issue difference in much more limited terms, seeing a European identity comprising only what is said to be different national and regional

5 My translation from Swedish.
6 My translation from Swedish.
cultural identities. Differences between the recognized national and regional entities in the Union – a recognition which over the years has been increasingly emphasized in a variety of contexts – are seen as positive instances of difference, and as such they are included in the Maastricht Treaty: "The Community shall contribute to the flowering of the cultures of the Member States, while respecting their national and regional diversity and at the same time bringing the common cultural heritage to the fore" (Council of the European Communities, CEC, 1992). Hence, this articulation can be said to disassociate itself from an identity formation through a process of levelling, and instead seeks to have difference and commonality constitute two sides of the same coin:

On the one side, we see a disparate family of nations embracing many different cultures; on the other, a desire to develop a common identity, to make Europe "European" – but without succumbing to the colourless uniformity of "Europeanism" or to the temptation of blindly imitating the past (CEC, 1991: 5).

Thus, difference is far from always constructed as being of a dividing or mutually antagonistic nature. National and regional cultures, framed as bounded and essential entities but which can still be organized around a least common denominator – that is "Europe" – which provides the differentiated space with its unifying and "natural" boundaries, are also differences destined to co-exist in a pluralist harmony. A Union "we" then, is indeed said to encapsulate differences, and no identity mobilization conducted by the EU is allowed to overlook what are conceived of as distinct and homogenous national and regional cultures.

But, as mentioned in passing above, this particular conception of cultural difference is limited and says nothing about those who are today considered too culturally different to be included in the official and hegemonic versions of national and regional cultures. Thus, it can be argued that an intensified differentiation within nation-states (and its recognized regions) which excludes ethnic minorities with migrant background from cultural belonging – both symbolically and materially, as mirrored in political, social and economic marginalization – implicitly gets reproduced when the "EU-ropean" identity is being mapped out. By not addressing this issue, therefore, there might be a risk of excluding ethnic minorities with migrant background from yet another level of identity-
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negotiation (cf. Shore and Black, 1994; see also Ireland, 1996; and White, 1999).

To get a closer understanding of who those are who will be included respectively excluded from the process of European identity-negotiations today and in the future we need to inquire further into how these questions unfold in specific policy areas. The discussion below should be seen as an introduction to this project.

The turn to culture: the shaping of culture, education and citizenship policies in the EU

By the mid-1970s we can detect an emerging awareness, even uneasiness, from within the Community organization, about the fact that economic integration in itself had not, so to speak, blessed the Community institutions with enough legitimacy to make integration in other areas self-evident. The opening sentence of the Tindemans' Report to the European Council, from 1976, thus read: "Why has the European concept lost a lot of its force and initial impetus?" In order to alter this precarious state of affairs the Report went on to argue for an expansion of Community competence and activity into areas "closer" to the daily concerns of its "citizens":

No one wants to see a technocratic Europe. European Union must be experienced by the citizen in his daily life. It must make itself felt in education and culture, news and communications, it must be manifest in the youth of our countries, and in leisure time activities. (Tindemans, 1976: 12)

In some respects, the Tindemans Report – with its emphasis on a "A citizen's Europe" – can be said to have laid the foundations for the new strategies that were set in motion in the mid-1980s in order to win more popular support and thereby legitimacy for the Community project. As Newman (1996: 152) notes: "For most of its history, the EU has not talked of 'citizens' but of 'workers'. However, [...] during the 1980s, the emphasis shifted from the category of 'workers' to the category of 'citizen'". These new strategies were thus to assign much greater importance to the policy-areas of culture, education and citizenship.
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Although these policy-areas sometimes are defined as being outside the immediate economic realm, they are nevertheless, considered fundamental for this same realm since they, if successfully managed, would create the legitimacy which further economic integration needed to rest upon.

Stated differently, this reorientation in terms of strategy was reflective of a widespread conviction among Community policy-makers that in order to rally more people behind the Community project, and to strengthen a sense of European identity, the stress on "common market" had partly to give way for a stress on "common culture" (Morley and Robins, 1995; Shore and Black, 1992; see also Fontaine, 1993). As the Commission has put it, it is necessary "for Community action to look beyond economic issues to the major concerns of day-to-day life", since that will "help heighten the sense of belonging to a European culture and thereby strengthen the European identity" (CEC, 1988: 7, 11); a reasoning which also appears in the following wording: "New impetus for Community measures in the cultural sector is also an economic necessity" (CEC, 1987: 1). In this sense, the development over the past fifteen years can be seen as a conscious attempt by the Community institutions to re-define the EU as also constituting a cultural community. According to a resolution issued by the European Parliament in 1988, "Europe is not only an association of economic interests but also a cultural unit, [...] and the citizens of Europe must be aware of their historical tradition in view of their common future". "[T]he integration of Europe", the Parliament goes on to argue, "must be built on the common foundations of European culture" (1988: 207).

With culture being installed as the future foundation upon which European Union integration is to be built, the discourse on culture has consequently influenced not only cultural policy per se, but it has also come to structure the articulation of several other EU policies that address the issue of collective identity (cf. CEC, 1996). Indeed, speaking of questions pertaining to identity formation and popular endorsement for the EU project, one could go as far as saying that the discourse on culture has acquired the status of a master discourse.

Probing into how this discourse manifests itself in EU cultural policy, then, and drawing from what has been said above, we can see that the Union identity in making is not appealing to a cultural homogeneity that would break with the recognized national and regional cultures. In this sense, reflecting the views of the Economic and Social Committee (1992),
there are no attempts to create an "all-embracing 'melting pot'" in the European Union. Instead, for the Commission "unity in diversity" is said to constitute the starting-point for a cultural policy in the Union. In a document titled *The Community and culture* the Commission writes:

> European culture is marked by its diversity: diversity of climate, countryside, architecture, language, beliefs, taste and artistic style. Such diversity must be protected, not diluted. It represents one of the chief sources of the wealth of our continent. But underlying this variety there is an affinity, a family likeness, a common European identity. Down the ages, the tension between the continent's cultural diversity and unity has helped to fuse ancient and modern, traditional and progressive. It is undoubtedly a source of the greatness of the best elements of our civilization. (1983: 1)

Furthermore, in the Commission guidelines of 1987 — under the heading *A fresh boost for culture in the European Community* — the following statements are made:

> [...] the Commission will be at particular pains to integrate the cultural dimension, which the Community citizen sees as being intimately linked to his (sic) feelings of identity and of belonging to the European Community. [...] [T]he creation of a larger market establishes a European area based on common cultural roots [...]. The unity of European culture as revealed by the history of regional and national cultural diversity is the keystone of the ambitious construction which aims at European Union. (1987: 3)

As these quotations clearly indicate, culture, in European Union discourse, is mainly understood as that which signifies a bounded and organic entity's shared beliefs, way of life, history, heritage and religion. It is an understanding of culture that emphasizes naturalness, rootedness and what it deems to be the inherent essence in what unproblematically are inserted under the headings of European, national and regional cultures. The numerous references in EU documents to Greece as "being the cradle of European culture and civilization" (European Parliament, 1988) is yet another example which points to this essentialist search for immaculate cultural roots. At work here, one may well argue, is an underlying
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statement which, borrowing from Bhabha (1989: 39), could be formulated as an "appeal to a pure and settled past", from which a stable and overarching "unicultural present" can be deduced. The problem then seems to be one of selection, where only a privileged and highly exclusive segment of the multitude of cultural influences, religions, experiences, narratives, histories and myths is deemed appropriate when the "European" cultural identity is being carved out. From the perspective of the EU, and particularly the Commission, European culture and its assigned national and regional cultural building blocks are thus treated as something altogether unproblematic; that is, as matters beyond dispute, negotiation and reinterpretation. Martiniello (1995: 44) refers to this view as the "traditionalist and fundamentalist option" for the future development of the European Union, where "European culture' is seen as a given, an admitted fact on the basis of which a European 'community of destiny' should be developed".

As hinted at above, this discourse on culture does not restrict itself to the realm of culture policy, but spills over into the European Union's work in the field of education and citizenship as well. Arguably, education policy as developed by the EU can in some measure be seen as a mere extension of the Union's culture policy in that it largely builds on the latter's particular understanding of culture. Hence, the EU seeks to "strengthen in pupils and students a sense of European identity" through the promotion of an education policy that is "based on the cultural heritage of the Member States" (European Parliament and Council of the EU, 1994: 52). This approach is developed in "The European dimension of education", which is the main education policy being drawn up by the EU. According to the Green Paper on the European Dimension of Education (CEC, 1993: 9-10), teachers in the member states should "learn to share and pass on the wealth of European cultures", and so "develop a European perspective alongside national and regional allegiances". Furthermore, in the more recent White Paper on Education and Training (CEC, 1995b), the Commission elaborates on the importance of improving students' knowledge about Europe's historical roots, cultural heritage and civilization:

Knowledge of history [...] is essential to everyone if they are to come to terms with their roots [...]. The penalty society pays for forgetting the past is to lose a common heritage of bearings and reference points. It is not surprising that, not knowing the history of European
civilization, that such expressions as, "being out in the wilderness", "having a cross to bear", "Eureka!", "the judgement of Solomon" or "the tower of Babel" have lost their meaning. [...] European civilization has a long history and is very complex. It is today divided between a deep thirst for research and knowledge, the legacy of a tradition which made Europe the first to bring about a technical and industrial revolution and thus change the world, and a deep-seated call for stability and collective security. [...] Being European is to have the advantage of a cultural background of unparalleled variety and depth. (CEC, 1995b: 12, 50, 51)

Education thus takes on the role of passing on an official and highly selective version of European culture, its historical roots and what it means to be a European, which in principle resembles much of the traditional role assigned to education when Western nation-states made nationals of the majority of their inhabitants (cf. Anderson, 1983). Furthermore, the discourse running through the passages cited implicitly establishes an ethno-cultural understanding of Europe and what goes to make up today's Europeans, where only those who fully embody the history, the roots, the cultural tradition, the (Christian) civilization and who take pride in the (colonial) era during which the European nation-states "changed the world" are fully included in the European identity. An education policy promoting an identity defined in such frozen and narrow cultural terms, therefore, excludes the great number of EU inhabitants who do not meet these implied ethno-cultural requirements, and risks giving further credence to the exclusionary processes already in place in the member states. Nowhere in the culture and education policies referred to here is there any real discussion of how this particular and ethno-cultural depiction of Europe squares with the situation for ethnic minorities with migrant background. As Delanty (1995: 9) notes: "The official and codified version of European culture has nothing to say to the silent Europe of minorities."

Turning finally to the issue of citizenship and the European Union, a few distinctions between culture and education, on the one hand, and citizenship, on the other, need first to be spelled out. Because, in terms of Community competence, "Citizenship of the Union" was written into the Maastricht Treaty as a legal concept, whereas Community activity in the areas of culture and education explicitly excludes any interference with the
member states' laws and regulations. Instead, and according to the Treaty, the Union institutions should seek to develop European cultural and educational perspectives alongside national and regional ones in the Member States (see, among others, Council of the European Communities, CEC, 1992; and McMahon, 1995).

Apart from equipping Union residents living outside of the member state where they hold a citizenship with the right to vote and stand in elections for the European Parliament and local office, the EU citizenship did not provide any notable additions to the rights already guaranteed by the citizenship in a member state (cf. Newman, 1996: ch. 6; and Closa, 1994). To the extent that the new rights granted by the EU citizenship alter the status of national citizenship, these alterations only affect positively the citizens of member states, and so create new hierarchies and cleavage structures. Stated differently, the EU citizenship does not replace national citizenship, but rather underlines its importance, since people residing in the Union cannot acquire EU citizenship without first having acquired its counterpart in a member state. Thereby, and as Newman (1996: 156) phrases it, "the determination of Union citizenship is solely a question for decision by MS [member states], following whatever internal systems they have for determining national citizenship". An EU citizenship regulated by the ever harsher citizenship laws in the member states can, therefore, be said to reinforce the hierarchy within the nation-state at the Union level between those with full formal citizenship and those with only residentship — the so-called denizens, to use Hammar's (1990) term (cf. O'Keeffe, 1994; and Martiniello, 1995).

Moreover, the mechanisms of exclusion associated with the EU citizenship are far from being only of a strictly legal character. The problematic also seems to stem from the fact that the articulation of the EU citizenship has been located largely within the realm of cultural identification, rather than within the realm of social, constitutional or political identification (cf. CEC, 1997). To cite the Commission (1995a: 1) yet again:

"Europe's cultural heritage has evolved over time [...] and displays certain common characteristics that transcend national or regional differences. This interplay of diversity and constancy perfectly illustrates the regional, national and European roots of Europe's citizens. Community action in the field of cultural heritage can thus
help to forge a European citizenship, based on a better understanding of both national culture and the culture of the other Union states.

There is thus a strong case here for arguing that an EU citizenship defined in terms of an ethno-cultural sense of belonging is in keeping with the legal restrictions placed on the EU citizenship, since the majority of those inhabitants excluded from formal Union citizenship coincides with those inhabitants whose presence has failed to influence the cultural definition of the EU citizen. Seeing too that this cultural configuration takes no notice of the large number of de jure EU citizens who originate outside of EU-Europe, outlines the deep problems that permeate the construction of Citizenship of the Union even more sharply.

Conclusion: cultural identity, exclusion and the problem of legitimacy

As the preceding discussion shows, the identity politics now being staged "from above" in the European Union has opted for an essentialist notion of culture as its organising principle. The Commission (1987: 1) thus writes:

The sense of being part of European culture is one of the prerequisites for that solidarity which is vital if the advent of the larger market, and the considerable changes it will bring about in living conditions within the Community, is to secure the popular support it needs.

If this poses grave concerns regarding Union residents whose background falls outside the dubious conception of European culture, it also raises some serious doubts with reference to the prospects of transnational democratization in the EU. Hence, EU identity politics says practically nothing about how transnational political, constitutional and social rights could be employed as sources of collective identification in the European Union.

Listening to Morley and Robins (1995: 181), the emphasis on cultural identity in the EU can be interpreted as an attempt to
counterpoise the absence of any real political integration and democratic legitimacy. The ethno-cultural articulation of the EU citizenship is symptomatic of this in that it precludes any vision of a post-national and trans-ethnic Union citizenship based on socio-political rights, which in turn – and as Habermas (1994) would have it – could foster a sense of constitutional patriotism and political identification that would subvert contemporary ethnic and cultural divisions. Contrary to the Habermasian ideal however, what seems to be taking place in EU policy formulation is that citizenship, construed as a set of political and social rights, increasingly gets separated from the issue of collective identity formation (Morley and Robins, 1995: 184). To quote Touraine, "[w]e now have an essentially economic vision of the state [or as in the case here: the supra-state] and an essentially cultural vision of society" (cited in Morley and Robins, 1995: 175).

In some principle meaning then, the European Union resembles the Western European nation-states prior to the expansion of voting rights and large scale popular mobilization from below, in that it seeks to disseminate a symbolic and mythical cultural identity rather than the practical tools with which a process of democratization could be initiated. Tarrow's (1994: 1) succinct reflection can be said to capture this problematic: "Europe is definitely in movement but there is little sign so far of a Europe of movements." In the midst of a drawn out crisis of legitimacy, and with bleak prospects of some type of federal solution – which seems inevitable if post-national democratization is to emerge (cf. Andersen and Eliassen, 1996) – being agreed upon in the foreseeable future, the EU seems to find no other alternative than to grasp at the cultural straw. Hence, legitimacy is sought, so to speak, by taking the cultural short cut. However, instead of creating legitimacy and popular support for the EU project, this cultural short cut runs the risk of widening even further the several roads to ethnic, political and social exclusion already paved in the member states.
The cultural short cut, a road to exclusion?

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Essay II
Education in a multicultural European Union: between intercultural visions and a realpolitik of immigration

Introduction

Despite the development of growing social and political exclusion in societies throughout the European Union, national political bodies seem unable to formulate visions and constructive policies to confront this pressing problem. In conjunction with this development and the lingering crisis for the traditional political parties, public discourse has more and more come to articulate ethnic and cultural differences, rather than political and socio-economic divisions, as constituting the major and "natural" principles of division and conflict in Western European societies. Consequently, societies are increasingly being depicted as battlegrounds made up by antagonistic and mutually exclusive cultural or ethnic groups — with the "legitimate" inhabitants on one side and the "immigrants" on the other — instead of spaces of competing but coexisting political programs and interests.

If these issues are urgent at the national level, they constitute perhaps an even greater challenge for the future development of the European Union. This paper will study some of the recent policy-documents worked out by the European Union on the issues of culture and immigration within the field of education. This policy-area merits serious scrutiny since it seeks to grapple with some of the most fundamental problems and questions facing the Union today. These include, among others, the growing racism, ethnic exclusion, and socio-cultural marginalization of immigrant populations. Accordingly, I will specifically analyse how the EU’s views and understanding of these problems manifest in the discussions about education, and what role education is said to play in the wider problematic of exclusion in today’s European Union.

The issues of immigration and culture in the context of education have been present on the European agenda since the 1970s. They have been discussed in relation to "the education of the children of migrant workers" (European Economic Community, 1976; European Parliament, 1990: 111), which included the teaching of migrant children's "mother tongue" and culture, but also since the early 1980s and onwards in the more explicit policies on intercultural education and the European dimension of education.

Despite the presence of a recognizable amount of recommendations, resolutions, and goals agreed upon by government officials within the framework of the Council of Europe – which used to be the primary European forum for discussions of questions regarding education – and the European Union, very little has happened in terms of tangible outcomes (cf. European Parliament, 1990: 111-12). As Campani writes, in general terms "no European educational system has managed to realise the goals contained in the different recommendations put forth by the Council of Europe" (1994: 44).

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2 See Bell (1991) for a good overview of the work concerning education conducted by the European Union and the Council of Europe during the 1970s and 1980s.
4 For further elaboration of this view, including analyses of this problematic in the different national contexts, see Batealan (1993: 68); Batealan and Gundara (1993: 63); Batealan and Jones (1993: 6); Broadbent (1994: 11); Campani and Gundara (1994: 24); Fase (1993: 53, 55-6); Garcia-Castaño and Pulido Moyaño (1993: 71-2, 75); Lammers (1993: 33); Liauzu (1994: 29);
the work within the Council of Europe can be reduced to pure rhetoric. A number of pilot projects and educational experiments have been carried out across Europe, where, though to a lesser extent, the European Union also has played a part.5

The absence of any substantial implementation in the past of education policies that address matters of immigration, culture, cultural difference, racism, and the like, can to a large extent be traced to the Council of Europe's lack of legislative power (cf. de Witte, 1990: 196). Furthermore, since neither the Treaty of Rome nor the Single European Act mentioned or covered questions specifically pertaining to education and culture (Broadbent, 1994: 8; Commission of the European Communities6, 1993a: 17; de Witte, 1990: 197), the European body which did possess such legislative powers could not come to the aid of the Council in its efforts to realise the goals set forth.7 But, switching from past to present tense, with the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty (or Treaty on European Union) these circumstances have now changed, and with the Articles 126 and 127 (of chapter 3) education is now officially part of the Treaty (cf. CEC, 1993a; 1993b; 1994a). Thus, and as stated by the Commission, there is now "new competence for the Community in the field of education", and "the new possibilities offered by Article 126 [...] call for a comprehensive and coherent approach to complement action taken by Member States" (1993a: 2-3); something which could also be read as having intriguing implications for matters pertaining to culture and identity in the Union. The close ties between education and cultural identity, is, for instance, emphasized by the Commission in the following statement:

Broadening out access to education and training should contribute to better social cohesion between the Member States [...] All of which contributes to building up a European culture which is forward and outward looking, to putting flesh on the bones of European identity


6 Hereafter abbreviated as CEC.

7 This does not imply, however, that the issue of education in any way was absent from the EEC agenda. For an overview of this matter see CEC (1993a: 17) Green Paper on the European Dimension of Education.
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and citizenship, particularly among young people, and is a powerful factor in rallying citizens around the construction of Europe. (1993b: 1-2)\(^8\)

Indeed, the field of culture itself has been given priority by the Maastricht Treaty, which is stipulated in Article 128 and positioned immediately after the education Articles 126 and 127. Although the Commission asserted in 1988 that "since 1977 the Commission, with the steadfast support of Parliament, has developed a 'cultural policy' which has helped to boost people's awareness of a European cultural identity", and that this policy had been formally endorsed by all the member states' governments (1988: 11), the codification of a specific approach to culture in the Treaty marks an even firmer determination from the Union to clear a space for this issue on the agenda.\(^9\)

The growing emphasis on policy-areas such as culture and education within the Union is reflective of a widespread conviction among EU policy-makers that in order to mobilize a greater amount of popular support for an expansion of transnational cooperation within the EU, and to "strengthen in young people a sense of European identity" (CEC, 1988: 13), the stress on "common market" has partly to give way for a stress on "common culture" (cf. Morley and Robins, 1995; Shore and Black, 1992; Fontaine, 1993). As the Commission has put it, it is necessary "for Community action to look beyond economic issues to the major concerns of day-to-day life", since that will "help heighten the sense of belonging to a European culture and thereby strengthen the European identity" (1988: 7, 11). And in this process of aimed after future development education is

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\(^8\) The European Parliament also endorses a stronger transnational role for policies regarding education and culture: "[...] the EC Institutions will gain valuable impetus from the Maastricht Treaty, as the changes proposed to the existing EC Treaty include, for the first time, specific articles on education and culture" (European Union, 1993b: 162).

\(^9\) This determination is echoed, among others, in a speech given in 1993 by the Commissioner for Cultural Affairs, Mr. Pinheiro, when he declared that "the entry into force of the Treaty of Maastricht will shortly mark the beginning of a new phase as regards Community action in the cultural field" (cited in European Cultural Foundation Newsletter, 1993: 5). Important to mention here though, is that in terms of legal competence Community activity explicitly excludes harmonization of member states' laws and regulations in the areas of culture and education. Instead, and according to the Treaty, the Union should seek to develop European perspectives alongside national and regional ones in the member states (see Council of the European Communities, CEC, 1992; and McMahon, 1995).
said to attain "a central role in the building of Europe" (CEC, 1988: 12). As a parentheses, this resembles some of what Jean Monnet — the so-called founding father of the EU — gave expression to towards the end of his life when he said that education and culture should have been put first. "If we were beginning the European Community all over again" (Bell, 1991: 62; CEC, 1984: 10).

Given the scope of this paper however, it is not culture and education in general that constitute the fields of scrutiny here. Instead, I will focus on two policy-areas within the greater field of education. These are, firstly, intercultural approaches to education, which, according to the EU, are crucial for the generation of "communication and understanding between cultures" (CEC, 1994a: 9); and, secondly, policy seeking to improve the situation in education for children of immigrant background. The task of this paper then, is not only to present the EU’s educational approaches per se, but foremost to discuss the reasoning behind these approaches, the type of discourse in which they are organized, their implications and the possible future consequences they may have. Among others I seek to display paradoxical and problematic understandings of "cultural diversity" within EU policy, and how this, in turn, is connected to an equally paradoxical and problematic discourse on immigration and the "immigrants".

Intercultural education: background and contemporary definitions

Although the Council of Europe is not the primary body under study here, its inclusion in parts of the discussion in this section is necessary. As referred to in the introduction, this has to do with the Council’s long-term work on education policies designated for pupils of immigrant background and the work that was initiated in the early 1980s on intercultural education (see Council of Europe, 1987; 1991: 37-40; and CEC, 1994a: 16). Also, the influence of Council recommendations on EU policies further merits this inclusion.

To engage in a brief historical overview, intercultural education within the framework of the Council of Europe and the European Union is

10 The Council of Europe has also stressed the importance of more Community cooperation in education, stating that education "must be a core element of any community relations policy" (1991: 40).
largely a product of the 1980s. Prior to that the Council "concerned itself almost exclusively with the linguistic and socio-cultural specificity of immigrant workers' children" (Perotti, 1994: 9). The Council policies, as well as those of the EEC and many European states, to a large extent set out to "maintain and strengthen the ties with one's [that is the child of the immigrant] original language and culture" (Perotti, 1994: 9); guidelines which in turn built on – as the Commission phrases it – the "uncertainties about the length of immigrants' stay in their host country" (CEC, 1994a: 16). In other words, these earlier policies partially aimed at preparing the immigrant pupils for the potential return to "their country of origin" (CEC, 1994a: 16).

Staying within the Commission's locutions, with the mid to late 70s' "recognition that most immigrants had settled permanently [...] policy drives emerged to ensure that their learning needs [...] [were] met inside the mainstream class itself" (1994a: 16). And with the 1980s the Commission – as an outcome of, among others, the work of the Council of Europe – observed a marked need for a new development taking shape, which it termed: "From the education of immigrants towards intercultural education for all" (CEC, 1994a: 16). Moreover, in the conclusion (presented in 1987) of the Council of Europe's Council for Cultural Cooperation (CDCC) Project no. 7, a general perspective on education was called for, where the provision of "equal access for each individual – whether immigrant or indigenous – to the same social, educational and cultural facilities" was formulated as the principal objective (Council of Europe, 1991: 38).

But as the title of the above cited Commission (1994a) document makes apparent – Report on the Education of Migrants' Children in the European Union – the introduction of intercultural education does not constitute a break with policies specifically tailored for migrants' children, but rather shifts their emphasis. As clarified by the Council of Europe:

It is important to distinguish here between [...] education of members of immigrant and ethnic communities and [...] education for all pupils in a multi-ethnic and multicultural society. Both are needed, but they require different approaches (1991: 38).

In short then, the rethinking of old and the creation of new education policies focusing on the issues of immigration and culture were thus
resulting from, concerning the former, the permanent settlement of large numbers of immigrants, and, concerning the latter, the demands of a multicultural society.

Moving from contextual circumstances to actual definitions, intercultural education, according to the EU, is partly perceived as a response to challenges which, if left unaddressed, will lead to increased socio-cultural exclusion and segregation, and to an upsurge of "inter-ethnic conflict and violence" (CEC, 1994a: 2). As such, intercultural education is to be conceptualized as "a set of educational practices designed to encourage mutual respect and understanding among all pupils, regardless of their cultural, linguistic, ethnic or religious background" (CEC, 1994a: 17). Furthermore, an intercultural approach endeavours to speak to all students, assisting them, through the dissemination of knowledge about different cultures, "to discover the factors that unite and differentiate humankind, to appreciate its richness and diversity, to [...] discover their own humanity in any culture", and "to gain a sympathetic and critical understanding of cultures" (CEC, 1994a: 17).

Although it is the definition appropriated by the European Union that is of primary relevance in this paper, one must keep in mind that intercultural education, in theory as well as in practice, can take on a variety of meanings more or less different from those presented in EU policy-documents (cf. Camilleri, 1992; Taboada Leonetti, 1992). Intercultural education — as are the concepts of multicultural, international, human rights and anti-racist education — is thus a contested concept, open to a number of different interpretations, and whose content largely will depend on the respective enunciators and practitioners.

**Intercultural education, immigration and the question of cultural diversity**

Against this background, intercultural education according to the European Union — leaving the Council of Europe for now — is then to be located within a general approach to education "for all schoolchildren" (European Union, 1994a: 61). And as such — which the formulation "From the education of immigrants towards intercultural education for all" makes clear — it is also an education policy focusing on the cultural problematic within the Union that is said to de-emphasize the specificity of
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immigrants as a target group for the policy. However, while this dissolution of the dichotomous relationship between "immigrant" and "indigenous" pupils is a sound and indeed necessary starting-point for the generation of intercultural understanding, once we enter the EU's discussion of the underlying causes for the intercultural approach, this dichotomy is given renewed credibility and the "immigrants" return to the centre of attention.

As the Commission phrases it, it is because "all Member States have now become immigrant countries", and because "cultural and linguistic diversity of the public of schools is becoming the norm" that "efforts to adjust their education systems to the needs of new residents, as well as to the needs of a population which as a whole is transformed by the impact of immigration" is necessary today (CEC, 1994a: 1, 18). And to respond to "[t]hese challenges generated by the development of cultural and linguistic diversity in the schools of Member States" intercultural education is seen as an indispensable instrument (CEC, 1994a: 18).

In critically assessing these causal explanations, it is crucial to clarify at the outset that there are no intentions here to downgrade the significance of post-war immigration and its impact on the development in Western Europe per se. Instead, what needs to be questioned is the Commission's implicit assumptions about the historical legacies of the member states. By framing particular categories of immigrants as the importers and indeed the sole creators of cultural diversity in the Union, we are simultaneously provided with a representation of the member states as once – that is, prior to large-scale labour and refugee immigration – the possessors of unified and homogenous national cultures (cf. Miles and Räthzel, 1993: 65-6). This representation is further problematized by Gundara:

There are historical and contemporary diversities in European societies which are being camouflaged by labelling the immigrants as

11 This distinction can be seen as formally established in the European Council's adoption of three new education, training and youth programmes in 1994. These are Socrates, Leonardo and Youth for Europe. Within Action 2 of Socrates' second Chapter "intercultural education for all school children" is presented as a distinct policy next to policies to promote education for children of migrant workers, occupational travellers, travellers and gypsies. (European Union, 1994a; Le Magazine, 1994: 13).
12 This is a term frequently used in EU documents.
13 One can interject here that the Council of Europe has a much more nuanced view on the matter, and urges other policy-makers to approach the issue of cultural diversity as "a result of many factors of which migration is only one" (1991: 38).
the only divergent group in European societies. Hence the expression that our society has recently *become* multicultural, as if to suggest that there have been no historically based diversities which continue to have contemporary societal implications. (1987: 46)

Moreover, and in direct relation to education, Gundara refers to the astonishment felt by many immigrants over the fact that it has been almost exclusively "their" presence which has triggered discussions of multiculturalism in education and diversity in society at large. Observing the already rich presence of different minority groups in Western Europe during their settlement in the fifties and sixties, these migrants did not perceive the states in Western Europe as culturally homogenous and non-segmented societies — not least when confronted by the cultural politics of class (Gundara, 1990: 97). Overall then, there is a disposition to neglect past diversities and immigration in the causal explanations provided by the Commission. For the Commission the intercultural approach is situated and deemed as essential "in a context of cultural diversity which as such is new" (CEC, 1994a: 17).

The problems revealed in the Commission's discourse should not, however, be reduced to simply a failure of recognizing historical diversities in the member states. A politics of recognition must, in consequence, be accompanied by a recognition of the politics of exclusion and inclusion which has been exercised in order to fix a notion of a homogenous national "self", through a continuous definition and re-definition of who and what "naturally" belonged, respectively did not belong to the national and European collectives. Stated differently, the Commission is not simply glossing over past cultural diversity, but it is also forgetting past struggles, identity formations, oppression and acts of exclusion, and thereby runs the risk of legitimizing the hegemonic projects that today

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14 Kofman elaborates on this:

> Even where immigration had made up a large component of population growth as far back as the 19th century, as in the case of France and Germany (see Miles and Räthzel, 1993: 709), the narrative of the construction of the nation denied the contribution of immigration [...]. In 1930 France had the highest proportion of immigrants (10 percent) of any country in the world [...]. In 1982 6.8 percent of the French population consisted of foreigners, and today a third of the French population has an immigrant grandparent. (1995: 127; see also Balibar, 1991c: 86,92).

15 For a discussion of the historical relationship between the Western European nations and the concept of the European see Gabriel (1994: ch. 7); and Morley and Robins (1995).
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have enabled us to speak unproblematically about national cultures as naturally and organically shaped, instead of characterizing them as the socially and politically constructed entities they constitute (cf. Lloyd, 1987: 162; Mohanty, 1990: 185; Morley and Robins, 1995; Shore, 1993; Wallerstein, 1974: 353; Yuval-Davis, 1991: 59). To paraphrase Geoffrey Bennington, the Commission’s portrayal of the development within the member states – from past mono-cultures to present multi-cultures – closely resembles each of these states’ own official articulation and centrally controlled version of “our” historical development (1990: 121).

The Commission’s descriptions and assumptions about the historical legacies of the member states seem to be commonplace also within these countries’ policies and discussions of intercultural education. In the Spanish case, for instance, Garcia-Castaño and Pulido Moyano argue that intercultural education is a very recent phenomenon, which was introduced on the agenda solely in response to (Third World) migrants’ increased presence in the classrooms. But since intercultural education is said to emanate from a recognition and understanding of diversity in society, they consequently have to pose the critical question that “[i]f this is what happened in Spain, we must ask ourselves why this understanding and recognition appear at this moment in time. It is clear that diversity has always been among us, that we have always been diverse, as ten to fifteen years of self-governed regions show.” (1993: 67-8) Furthermore, the special education for Gypsies in the past – “the most important ethnic group in Spain” according to the authors (1993: 67) – was never considered an issue of multicultural or intercultural education, “but only as a compensatory and/or assimilation issue” (1993: 68). Similarly, in Belgium, as Martiniello and Manço argue, despite the historical linguistic and religious diversities and often non-harmonious power-relationships between the Flemish and Walloons – which made education an area of permanent tension – intercultural education is in both regions construed as an “immigrant issue” (1993: 24).

To pursue the arguments further, Sweden may function as a particularly elucidating case in point here, since this country is often regarded as possessing perhaps the most culturally homogenous past in the entire Europe.16 Yet, the frequent insistence on the “naturalness” of this homogeneity runs into severe difficulties if one simply injects into the

16 See for example the portrayal of Sweden in the work of Centre for Educational Research and Innovation (CERI) (1989) One School, Many Cultures.
To substantiate further one should also draw attention to the over the centuries racist policies and in every aspect excluding treatment of the Saami and Gypsy minorities. Gypsy children in Sweden, just to mention one infamous fact in relation to education, were not granted schooling rights until the 1960s (Haake and Hansen, 1994; Kvist, 1994; Svanberg and Tydén, 1990; 1994; Taikon, 1963).

In principal, however, these policies were far from uniquely Swedish. Similar treatment of minority groups, theories about higher and lower races, and, not the least, the colonial discourses' global ascription of people as belonging to superior respectively inferior categories of people were all part and parcel of the building of nation-states in Western Europe. What these different practices of domination - with their continuous production of "others" - seem to demonstrate then, is that the member states' so-called past cultural and ethnic homogeneity never constituted an era of harmonious coexistence, where people perceived as significantly different were conspicuously absent. Quite the contrary, the past's conduct uncovers an almost neurotic search for those "others" who could aid the national quest for a sutured identity; a search, however, which seems to have resulted less in a certainty of who "we" were - since that might have brought the search to a halt - than in an increased knowledge of who "we" were not.

Against this background, and to follow Henry Giroux' theoretical work on emancipatory pedagogy in education, we can see that "[b]y locating differences in particular historical and social locations, it becomes possible to understand how such differences are developed within webs of hierarchies, prohibitions, and denials" (1991: 57). This may, consequently, help to make us attentive of the urge to rethink the commonsensical notion that our time constitutes a moment in history uniquely suited for an intercultural approach to education, when, in fact, such an approach was no less appropriate fifty years ago. But the argument pursued here

17 The Finnish minority requires mention here since they too have been subjected to severe exclusionary practices in Sweden. In relation to education, for instance, it was not until 1957 that the Swedish government decided to lift the ban on speaking Finnish during breaks in schools in the Torndalen school-district (Swedish-Finnish border area) (Wande, 1988: 134).
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may also avail the next task regarding the European Union’s approach to cultural differences in contemporary Union societies.

Coping with the disruptive "others", or what happened to the inter in the cultural?

The points made above do not in any way aim to discredit the Commission’s position that intercultural education is needed in contemporary EU societies. Some version of this approach is undoubtedly needed, and despite the problems described above the Commission’s understanding of this cannot simply be brushed aside. Taking a strictly pragmatic approach, one could argue that the fact alone, that the Union now acknowledges and indeed emphasises – at least in the document referred to here – the multicultural nature of the member states, could in itself contain some keys to future changes. Because no matter how uncontroversial it might sound among academics that the Commission describes the member states as "immigration countries" made up by a multitude of cultural influences, one has to keep in mind that such a description is still heavily resisted by the governments of France and Germany (cf. Breslau et al., 1992; Kofman, 1995: 127; Miles and Räthzel, 1993: 70).

Nevertheless, as critical research on multiculturalism has sought to demonstrate (cf. Anthias and Yuval-Davis, 1992; Ålund and Schierup, 1991; Vertovek, 1996), the greater part of the multicultural policies that were implemented in Western Europe during the 1970s and 1980s have been fraught with problems. Drawing on the British experience, Vertovek points to the "implicit culturalism of much multiculturalism" where multiculturalism convey a picture of society as a "mosaic" of several bounded, nameable, individually homogenous and unmeltable minority uni-cultures which are pinned on to the backdrop of a similarly characterized majority uni-culture […] On this line of thinking, "culture" and "community" represent borders which cannot and should not be crossed for the good of all concerned. (1996: 51, 56)
Aware of what it could come to embrace, pragmatism in this context must therefore be applied with great caution. Although a pragmatic approach might be applicable as a tool to appropriate the positive signs present in one of the Commission's causal justifications for why intercultural education is necessary today, this does not guarantee its usefulness wholesale.

Delving further into the Commission's reasoning, the limits of such pragmatism becomes apparent. Intercultural education is namely not merely seen as a response to the "new" multicultural condition of cultural diversity in the member states, but it is also promoted as a prophylaxis to the potential conflicts which this "new" cultural condition can produce. As explained by the Commission:

[V]irtually all schools accommodate pupils from immigrant backgrounds. Indeed, cultural and linguistic diversity of the public of schools is becoming the norm. [...] This confronts the education systems of the Member States with a series of new challenges [...] [E]ducation systems and schools are confronted with the challenge of integrating all pupils into a unified educational framework [...] while at the same time respecting their specific cultural identities. This situation holds a potential for positive change, modernisation and diversification on the one hand, and a danger of disruption on the other hand. (1994a: 1)

And further:

Contacts between persons of different cultural backgrounds involve different and sometimes conflicting world views and values. Such contacts also give rise to prejudice, fear and hostility. Education has a duty to teach — and first of all to learn — how to cope with cultural difference. (1994a: 17)

These examples are illustrative of the culturalist logic outlined by Vertovek above in that they reveal a tendency to ascribe the potential for disruption and conflict to the "new" situation of cultural difference in the member states. This is partly made possible through — as was discussed above — the omission of past cultural diversity and the different antagonisms and excluding practices related to this. Furthermore, this omission, in turn,
creates an image of the member states as once composed of societies essentially harmonious, consentient and void of conflicts.

To conclude the chain of arguments so far, we can now see how the Commission's proclamations about "mutual respect and understanding among all pupils, regardless of their cultural, linguistic, ethnic or religious background" (1994a: 17) – which were cited above in reference to its conception of intercultural education – have been replaced by an asymmetrical organisation and treatment of cultures, where the last decades' influx of certain types of cultural differences are said to carry the seeds of conflicts and disruption (cf. den Boer, 1995: 98). Thereby, in the worst of cases, the Commission's intercultural policy-formulation could unintentionally backfire, feeding into the logic of "new racism" (cf. Duffield, 1984; Sivanandan, 1988), where those discerned as culturally different – that is the immigrants – are posed as a force that dissolves and even threatens society. And since this view links culture with the nation-state, where the nation-state is said to constitutes the concrete manifestation of a people's shared culture, it follows that the exemplar nation-state or society is made up by a homogenous culture (Duffield, 1984: 29; Gilroy, 1990: 75). Consequently, for a society to function harmoniously it can only accommodate so many "culturally different" immigrants.

Before examining this any further, however, the EU's own understanding of these issues must be more thoroughly investigated. Also, linking educational approaches to culture and immigration together with the general development in EU societies of an increased socio-cultural marginalization of immigrants and a mounting racism, is altogether in line with the EU's own understanding of how matters should be pursued.

Education, immigration and racism

According to the European Union, education in general should not be treated as an isolated entity, but needs to be discussed as integrated in a wider societal context (CEC, 1993a: 3; 1994a: 2-5). Following this recommendation, and given that the European Union within its conception of social and cultural issues within education puts a great deal of emphasis on the needs and problems facing young people of "immigrant backgrounds" – especially those stemming from the obstacles
and barriers created by racism – one consequently also has to examine how the EU and its member states are discussing immigration and the problems of racism outside the realm of education. One way to estimate the value and possible outcomes of an education policy focusing on children of immigrant backgrounds, as envisioned by the European Union, would be, first, to compare and contrast it with the discourse on immigration and racism in general, and, second, to see how (if at all) the articulation of this education policy is being informed and even structured by this general discourse.

To concretize further, one could begin the analysis by posing some questions in relation to a few of the many educational objectives and tasks that have been formulated by the EU:

[The Commission will step up its efforts to stimulate cooperation between Member States, with a view to contributing to the improvement of the quality of the education of children from immigrant backgrounds, regardless of their origins. This will be part of a clear and visible message from the Union’s institutions, emphasising these children’s right to equal opportunities, highlighting the rejection of racism and xenophobia, and expressing the value which the Union’s institutions attach to the contribution which they make to diversifying and broadening the learning experience of all pupils. (CEC, 1994a: 4)

Two interrelated questions with far-reaching implications will be asked here. First, what is meant by a ”clear and visible message [...] highlighting the rejection of racism and xenophobia”, and what does it amount to?; and, second, where does the emphasis on ”the value” of immigrants’ ”contribution” belong within the otherwise often indelicate language and related policies of immigration controls and restrictions, which are universally adopted by the member states?  

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18 For a recent update on this see Fitzgerald 1995; and Bunyan 1995. Another important question that could be posed in this context, but which exceeds the frames of this article, has to do with the relationship between the educational objectives set forth by the EU and the pupils’ experiences of the workings of society outside of the school. Batelaan and Gundara clarify the significance of this approach:

The effect of educational activities is highly dependent on the experienced ”attitudes” of society, i.e. the state [and for the purposes here we could add: the EU]. If for instance in schools values such as ”solidarity” and ”equality” are taught while they are marginalized
In order to approach the first question it is important to stress at the outset that racial discrimination is not explicitly mentioned in the Treaty of Rome (now the Community Treaty) (CRE, 1994: 12-3). With the Union unable to legislate on matters concerning racial discrimination, we can then already here see why there would be enough reason to question how "clear and visible" a "message" really can be if there are no real tools available to get the "message" across – meaning through legislation against racial discrimination. However, having said this should not lead one to think that the Union’s hands are completely tied on matters relating to racism. At the European Council’s Edinburgh summit in 1992, for instance, the heads of governments and states underlined that there must be no place for racism and xenophobia, condemned the intensification of episodes of intolerance, reiterated their conviction that vigorous and effective action to combat these phenomena needs to be taken across Europe, in the fields of education and legislation. (CEC, 1994a: 4)

In Copenhagen the following year, the European Council repeated this message and also "stated its will to do its utmost to identify and root out the causes of racism and xenophobia” (CEC, 1994a: 4). Furthermore, the European Parliament and the European Commission have been active in passing resolutions and making declarations against racism and xenophobia (CEC, 1994a: 4; 1994b: 38-40; CRE, 1994; European Parliament, 1990).

Bearing in mind that this is a non-comprehensive overview covering only the past few years, it still seems fair to conclude that even though racial discrimination is not an area explicitly mentioned in the Treaty of Rome this has not made it vanish as a neglected issue within the Union’s institutions. But to repeat the follow-up question above, we must now ask what this "rejection of racism and xenophobia” amounts to.

Limiting ourselves to the most powerful office in the Union, the European Council, its measures often seems to resemble what Silverman refers to as "symbolic responses to racism” (1992: 68). A number of firm

outside the school, positive results cannot be expected. It also would be hypocritical to "teach" individuals how to behave in society if these students are not taught about the structure, the mechanisms and the effects of society and its institutions, including the nation state. (1993: 69)
commitments against racism and xenophobia are being made on a number of occasions, but rarely do these translate into practical measures. And when they indeed do, it is often in the form of fragmentary and vague legislation at the level of the member states. Symbolic responses in this context though, should not be reduced to a matter of meaningless statements or empty rhetoric. As seen in the policy-statements above by the European Commission and the Council of Ministers, it is indeed possible to detect an approximate definition of racism that these institutions subscribe to and apply in their policy-making. Along with this these bodies’ view on how racism and xenophobia manifest themselves in society are also displayed. When The Council in 1992 stressed that ”there must be no room for racism and xenophobia [...]", and [...] reiterated its determination to oppose such attitudes with renewed vigour” (CRE, 1994: 13), we are provided with definitions of racism and xenophobia as sets of attitudes which, and as seen above, manifest themselves through acts of intolerance, hostility and even violent attacks (cf. European Union, 1992: 369).

The importance of seriously analysing proclamations such as those above lies in the fact that they inform us about how the European Union conceives of racism; (i) how it defines racism (approximately as a misinformed and irrational conception of the world); (ii) how it knows when we are witnessing racism in society (that is, on those particular and verifiable occasion when racist views are being expressed in public, or when such views are being used as a way to justify violence); and (iii) how the EU characterises and thereby also fixes the limits of what it deems to be the individuals, groups, organizations and parties who practice (this type of) racism (i.e. neo-nazis, skinheads, etc.). In a recent report on

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19 The European Parliament has expressed its frustration over this:

On various occasions its [the Parliament’s] members representing all political groups (except the European Right) have expressed their concern over the absence of initiatives by the Community to curb the upsurge of racism and xenophobia in the Member States with questions to the Commission, the Council and the European political co-operation group of Foreign Ministers. In most cases, the replies were unsatisfactory and/or evasive. (1990: 112)

20 With a few exceptions, laws against racial discrimination in the individual member states are at present still rather underdeveloped (see CRE, 1994: 14), and as further pointed out by a CRE (Commission for Racial Equality) report: ”The absence of EC legislation against racial discrimination means that protection against it varies widely from country to country. [...] [In
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racism at the workplace in sixteen Western European countries, Wrench elaborates on this way of handling the issue of racism:

It is often the case that politicians and policy makers are willing to condemn racism if it is seen as the activity of unrepresentative right-wing extremists. They are less willing to undertake action which would imply that racism in both its ideological and practical manifestations forms part of the structure of their society, operating routinely in the allocation of services, housing and jobs. A number of [the national] reports identified the view that racism could be defined only as the sort of untypical behaviour exhibited by extremists. It was therefore seen as marginal problem originating from deprived youth or right-wing fringe groups. Sometimes only direct, overt violence is regarded as racism. (1996: 129)

It is, among other things, against this background that I think we should understand the uniform condemnation from within the European Union of fascist and nazi violence and these groups’ slogans about inferior races. That is to say, these condemnations reproduce an already fixed understanding of what racism is and consists of. And through this narrow perception of what racism is and how it affects people, it becomes possible to seal off and produce a racist, xenophobic and intolerant "other", which – and perhaps more importantly – will aid the production of a tolerant and non-racist national government, parliament, political establishment or European Union (cf. den Boer, 1995: 97).

Moving on to a discussion of the second question posed above – the question about where the Union’s emphasis on "the value" of immigrants’ "contribution" to "diversifying and broadening the learning experience of all pupils" should be placed within the general language and related policies of harsh immigration controls and restrictions – an appropriate context of departure is to be found within the discussion of my first question above. This has to do with the fact that in Western Europe nowadays, politicians’ proclamations calling for an end to racist violence and for the establishment of tolerance very often walk hand in hand with a blaming of the victims. Stated differently, all the Union states house a structural and institutionalized exclusion of certain categories of

the Community at large the first need is to provide a standard, uniform basis of protection for all” (1994: 28, 14).
immigrants combined with an intensified violence against these same immigrants (cf. Baimbridge et al., 1994; Huysmans, 1995; Wieviorka, 1994: 184-5). Yet, alongside this – and unanimously agreed upon – "we" all are said to have an "immigration problem", which, as the argument continues, only can be "solved" through immigration curbs and stricter asylum controls (cf. Collinson, 1993; Miles, 1993: 17; Miles and Thränhardt, 1995; The Economist, 1995).

When, for example, neo-nazis in Germany are attacking people who have been defined as "Fremder" or "Ausländer" (i.e. people who never have been accepted as Germans no matter if they were born there by parents also born in Germany (cf. Grant, 1994: 52)) chancellor Kohl and his government is on the one hand – as was shown indirectly through the EU proclamations above – condemning the violence and suggesting that tough measures should be taken to prevent it. On the other hand though, what Kohl also suggests and indeed acts on, which is of crucial importance here, is that immigrants/Ausländer do constitute an enormous problem for Germany, and that the best solution for both parts (both for "us" and for "them") is that as many "foreign" residents as possible leave the country (Castles et al., 1984; Räthzel, 1991; see also Söllner, 1989). This is by the way a goal Kohl set forth (as did the French government in 1979) already in his first announcement as chancellor in 1982, when he declared that during the 1980s the number of "foreign" residents could hopefully be cut by a million (Castles et al., 1984: 210; Tollefsen Altamirano, 1995; cf. Webber, 1991; Gabriel, 1994: 170). Similarly, President Chirac has diagnosed France as suffering from an "overdose" of immigrants (The Economist, 1993), and Tory members of parliament in Britain argued in 1988 that "mass migration" had altered the "racial content" of the body politic and so put the social cohesion of society at risk (Miles and Räthzel, 1993: 77). Moreover, the British government's response to the upsurge in support for the racist and ultra right-wing Republican party in Germany, in 1992, provides a pointed illustration of how causes and effects are being organized within what we may term the "immigrants-as-problems" discourse. In the words of the British Home Secretary, the rise of the Republican party could be traced to one singular

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21 See Allen and Macey (1990: 383).
22 John Major followed up on this view at the 1991 EC summit in Luxembourg where he demanded a more rigorous control of immigration and asylum, which should be implemented
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cause, namely "the flood of migrants and would-be asylum seekers whose continuing numbers have aroused public concern" (cited in Collinson, 1993: 11; see also den Boer, 1995: 97).

Given this picture, it is important to keep in mind that immigration issues within the European Union are mostly being dealt with by the member states and the various intergovernmental groups (Ad Hoc Group on Immigration, the Trevi Group, Schengen, etc.). Although the intergovernmental bodies have been in place for some time, the Treaty on European Union (Maastricht) formalized their status and had them form the so-called third pillar of the Treaty (den Boer, 1995: 93); working "outside the procedures of the EC's institutions, but under rules linking it to the EC", or "inside the Union, but outside the European Community", and often "cloaked in considerable secrecy" (CRE, 1994: 16, 22; d'Oliveira, 1994: 261; Fitzgerald, 1995: 17; see also European Parliament, 1990: 131-3). Besides immigration and asylum, the third pillar (which sorts under Article K. of the Treaty) also contains cooperation on police and judicial matters; including the work of "[c]ombating fraud on an international scale", "combating terrorism, unlawful drug trafficking and other serious forms of international crime" (cited in d'Oliveira, 1994: 261-2; see also Hix, 1995: 12). As d'Oliveira notes, these are all issues which are to be regarded as "'matters of common interest' to the Member States in their efforts to achieve the objectives of the Union" (1994: 261; see also CEC, 1994b).

Considering that the organization of questions regarding immigration together with police, security and judicial matters dates back to the 1970s, we are here given some crucial clues to how immigration and immigrants today – at the level of the Union and the member states – have come to be perceived and discussed as naturally related to issues concerning serious international crime, drug trafficking and terrorism. To borrow from the discourse theory worked out by Laclau and Mouffe, this mode of connecting and relating societal phenomena forms what they refer to as a

through the creation of "a strong perimeter fence around Europe" (cited in Baimbridge et al., 1994: 422).

23 As a result of this new names have been given to both the Ad Hoc Group on Immigration (installed in 1986), now Steering Committee 1, and the Trevi Group (founded in 1976), now Steering Committee 2 (CRE, 1994: 17). Schengen has kept its name but is currently in the process of expanding its membership (see Fitzgerald, 1995).
"chain of equivalence"\textsuperscript{24}, which organizes and places issues of immigration on an equal footing with drug trade, crime, and terrorism. In other words, immigration is treated as a problem of equal magnitude as international crime, etc., and is consequently discussed as such not only within the European Union, intergovernmental groups, NATO and member state parliaments, but also in society at large (especially within the media) (cf. Gabriel, 1994: 167; Huysmans, 1995; Kofman, 1995: 129).

Consequently and to complete the argument, it seems fair to concur with Ålund and Schierup that "a discriminatory programme at the borders will legitimate racism within the country"; and, we could add, within the Union as a whole (Ålund and Schierup, 1991: 9-10; see also Collinson, 1993; Miles and Thränhardt, 1995: 4). A large body of research hence suggests that the boundary between a perceived homogenous European population and its perceived negation, the non-Europeans, is drawn with, among others, the help of such discursive markers as "our people" and "us" positioned in opposition to the "immigrants", "illegal immigrants", "economic migrants" and "bogus asylum seekers" (cf. Balibar, 1991a; Bhavnani, 1993; Hall, 1991; Hansen, 1995; Kofman and Sales, 1992; Miles, 1993; Silverman, 1992).\textsuperscript{25}

A hegemonic agenda, yet more than one Union discourse on immigration

It is important in this context, however, not to disregard the fact that most of the documents on education referred to here have been produced by the European Commission, which together with the European Parliament have far less to say on matters relating to immigration and asylum than the European Council and the inter-governmental groups (Hix, 1995: 12-14). The Parliament, for instance, does not even possess the so-called right of initiative on third pillar affairs. (d'Oliveira, 1994; Overbeek, 1995: 31;

\textsuperscript{24} For further elaboration on this concept see Laclau and Mouffe (1985: ch. 3); and Laclau, (1988: 256).

\textsuperscript{25} d'Oliveira's reminder is appropriate here:

The attempts at distinguishing sharply between "genuine" asylum-seekers and "economic" refugees, between political refugees and others, must be taken for what they are: not exercises in ontology, but methods to sell restrictive measures, and to seal off the external borders of the EC territories. (1994: 265)
Twomey, 1994: 125). Given this, it should be stressed that the Parliament in particular, but also the Commission — although to a lesser extent — have taken some steps which point to certain important differences in opinion on matters relating to immigration and asylum between these two institutions and the European Council and the inter-governmental groups. The Parliament has for instance expressed its disapproval of some of the initiatives taken by the intergovernmental groups, claiming that these

treat migration and refugee matters very much as related to policing. And this has a very negative effect on public opinion. Associating migrants and refugees with police and national security could well feed racist ideas and could be used to legitimate certain forms of racist behaviour (extra identity control of those who are or look like "foreigners"). (1990: 133)

Moreover, the Commission and Parliament have called jointly "for improved protection for asylum-seekers who do not fall within the terms of the Geneva Convention" (CRE, 1994: 23-4); and the Parliament has also argued for the rights to freedom of movement for "children of citizens of third countries legally resident in the Community" (European Union, 1993a: 188).

Despite these differences however, the critical finding here has been that the author of the educational documents under study — namely the European Commission — shares many of the problematic elements which structure the overarching and hegemonic immigrants-as-problems discourse. This can, among others, be seen in the Commission's three pronged strategy on immigration, which calls for: (i) "Taking action on migration pressure"; (ii) "Controlling migration flows"; and (iii) "Strengthening integration policies for the benefit of legal immigrants" (1994b: 11; see also CRE, 1994: 23). One central implicit message in this strategy is building on the common and now "canonised" postulate that, as Gilroy and Lawrence phrase it, "without limitation, integration is impossible" (1988: 133; see also Skellington with Morris, 1992: 50-2). To

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26 The connection between the lack of power and positive initiatives is underlined by Twomey: "It is regrettable that the European Parliament, which of all the Community institutions has been most progressive in the field of human rights, is restricted to a consultative role in respect of justice and home affairs." (1994: 125)
use the Commission's own formulation: "Society's readiness to accept the inflow of new migrant groups depends on how it perceives government to be in control of the phenomenon." (1994b: 32) As pointed out above then, what the Commission fails to recognise is that once immigration is identified as a problem – which the Union ought to guard itself against – and immigrants are staged as "flows" and "pressures" who\(^2\) if they enter cause serious quandaries, burdens and disruptions, this will not in any way aid integration and decrease the difficulties for those already "inside" who have been stigmatised as immigrants. The Commission also – and contrary to the Parliament – perceives the location of asylum and immigration policies within a larger framework of police and security policies as something that will generate positive results (1994b: 5, 14, 28).

Of even more significance is that the strategy on immigration is not only articulated outside the context of education policies but gets assimilated with these as well. In the earlier referred to Report on the Education of Migrants' Children in the European Union (1994a) the Commission – immediately after having spelled out the "clear and visible message from the Union's institutions [...] highlighting the rejection of racism and xenophobia" (1994a: 4) – elaborates on its strategy:

> With a view to the wider issue of immigration policies, the Commission has drawn up its proposals for action based on three main considerations which combine realism and solidarity: "acting on migration pressure, controlling migration flows and strengthening integration policies for the benefit of legal immigrants" (1994a: 5; see also CEC, 1994b).

Moreover, the EU's Fourth Framework programme – which focuses on socio-economic research in the Union in which "research on education

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\(^2\) Although grammatically incorrect, "who" instead the "that" is intentionally inserted here to point to the dehumanising character of metaphors such as flows, floods, and other common ones such as hordes and waves of immigrants, immigration pressure, etc. (cf. Husbands, 1994: 200). In reference to how these metaphors are being utilized in the German context, Söllner argues that

> [the latently Nazi metaphor of the "excessive foreignization" (Überfremdung) of the German Volk is redeployed when people speak of a "flood of asylum-seekers" (Asylantenenschwemme), while the denunciatory concept of the "asylum-seeker" (Asylant) has now returned to popular usage after having acquired a distinctly pejorative connotation (1989: 148-9, see also 150-2).
and training” and ”research into social integration and social exclusion in Europe” constitute two of the three main areas – requires mention here, since it provides yet another example of a Union education agenda which operates within the immigrants-as-problems discourse. Under the heading ”Migration” the following affirmations are made:

The growing flood of immigrants from less developed countries outside Europe and from Central and Eastern Europe must be taken into account […] in order to assess the possible implications in terms of potential social conflicts, destabilization of labour markets and legal restrictions on the rights of entry and asylum. (European Union, 1994b: 15)

Returning to the European Union’s education policy and its emphasis on ”the value” which it attributes to ”the contribution” which immigrants make ”to diversifying and broadening the learning experience of all pupils”, it is thus possible to make visible a ”paradox”, which – put very simply – reads as follows: On the one hand the Commission and the European Council proclaim that they value immigrants and commit themselves to the elimination of racism and xenophobia, but on the other hand they problematize immigration and migrants, which then seems to aid the process of exclusion. The ”paradox” should however be kept inside quotation marks, because what is indeed a paradox for the researcher can logically be ruled out by the policy maker. The (European Union) discourse analysed in this section manages – through its view of what racism is and what constitutes the manifestations thereof – to locate both a pure and sealed-off racist ”other” (i.e. the neo-nazis, etc.) and an equally pure and self-contained tolerant ”self” (i.e. the EU). Hence, statements made by the Union on immigration and immigrants that are not explicitly coded in accordance with the rhetoric appropriated by right-wing factions (i.e. the racists) become unproblematic per definition. Such statements are at worst utopian and thereby unrealistic, and at best they are realistic, as argued by the Commission.
**Rearranging immigration and culture within education: some concluding comments**

As has been argued throughout this paper, a problematic discourse on immigration and the immigrants is visible in the education policies under study here. Rather than following the declared objective of combating the excluding tendencies so apparent in today's member states, the EU through its reproduction of this discourse continues to problematize exactly those people who are being excluded. And although it would be premature to stage these problems alone as determinants of what the Union's entire program of education could amount to in the future, they definitely point to some severe difficulties in establishing a uniform approach to education in the European Union where everybody would be included. Since the EU claims to be influenced by the long tradition of work and research on education, immigration, and ethnic and cultural relations carried out by the Council of Europe, one could hope that the Union would seriously consider a Council-principle such as the following: "Migrants should not [...] be considered as a separate and problematic group but rather as an integral part of society as a whole" (Council of Europe, 1991: i).  

Besides this, the problems addressed in reference to the European Union's understanding of intercultural education and its role in contemporary member states can be said to hinge much on the understanding of culture, and the related matters of cultural difference, cultural diversity and the formation and re-formation of cultural identities. Especially two points deserve emphasis here. First, the Commission's implicit definition of culture as something self-contained and detached from questions of power and historical change makes it difficult for this version of intercultural education to address issues of agency, transformation and – perhaps most importantly – the issue of how cultural identities are shaped, contested, negotiated and supplied with

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28 Listening to de Witte (1990), however, this might very well be a wish made in vain. Contrary to the claims made by the EU about its fruitful cooperation with the Council of Europe, de Witte argues that:

Relations between the European Community and the Council of Europe in the cultural sector have evolved from mutual ignorance and duplication of efforts to a situation of diffuse rivalry [...]. [R]eality shows [...] a constant tendency for the stronger organization – the European Community – to invade the territory of the weaker [...]. The Council's role in education has already been marginalized. (1990: 203)
meaning. Hence, and second, an intercultural approach resting on these foundations easily reduces itself to what Mohanty describes as an "additive approach" (1990: 201). This means, as in the case of the European Union, that diversity is simply being "added" on to what is perceived as previously homogenous and undifferentiated bodies; that is the member states (cf. Rattansi, 1992: 67). This in turn, namely the privilege attributed to cultural difference as the major problematic, can function to downplay, and even ignore, the problems of subordination, marginalization and social exclusion along lines of class and gender (cf. Anthias and Yuval-Davis, 1992; Gorelick, 1989; Ålund and Schierup, 1991).

Thus, intercultural education, as well as education policy for children of immigrant background, need to be rearticulated as constituting integrated parts of the necessary future democratization of the European Union, and not, as presently, as something that – although unintentionally – separates pupils and problematizes certain cultures. Only through such a rearticulation can the Commission's pronounced goal of a future intercultural education "for all" be realized.

Lastly however, and to pick up on the pragmatic vein referred to earlier, as one analyses other and even more problematic EU policies – such as "The European Dimension of Education" where singular and solid national cultures form the basis for "EUropean" education29 – it is fundamental in this context to keep in mind the Commission's proclamations that the Union and the member states are multicultural. Hence, and despite all the problems pointed to in this paper, one should not rule out the potential future openings and strategical appropriations that such a recognition in itself could carry.

29 See for example CEC (1993a); and European Union (1994a).
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Essay III
Schooling a European identity: ethnocultural exclusion and nationalist resonance within the EU policy of "The European dimension of education"¹

Introduction

In their attempts to infuse new life into lethargic election campaigns, politicians in the West are increasingly seeking refuge in lofty commitments to education. Where George Bush made a pledge to become the "education president" in 1988, the centre-right government in Sweden promised to create the "best school in Europe", three years later. More recently, Bill Clinton and his new Democrats said they would launch a "crusade for education", so as to make American education the "best in the world"; while Tony Blair and new Labour promised to make education their top priority – or as the campaign sound-bite had it: "education, education, education".

In conjunction with the dismantling of the remaining welfare policies in the United States and the downsizing of the welfare states in Western Europe, these commitments to education have – viewed at a surface level – come to stand out as some of the last promises still carrying a social ring during elections. But as Green (1997: 30) has pointed out, with the discourse in which the role of education is being articulated undergoing change, education's social appeal is wearing off:

In almost all countries politicians and others accord education and training an important role in economic development, and this has become increasingly evident as globalization has heightened international economic competition. However, there is now much less confidence in the ability of education systems to perform other

¹ This essay was published in European Journal of Intercultural Studies, Vol. 9, No. 1, 1998. It has also been published in MERGE Papers on Transcultural Studies, No. 1, 1998.
developmental functions such as the cultivation of social solidarity, democratic citizenship and national identity.

On this view the economic survival of the nation-state in the global market-place is increasingly perceived as a function of the quality of its education system. Consequently, a gradual shift in national education systems is taking place where, as Green (1997: 4) has shown, "[c]itizen formation has given way to skills formation, nation-building to national economic competitiveness".

If the economy-education nexus has caused much anxiety within the nation-state, it has proven to be an even more stressful development for the European Union. As pundits and scores of economic reports keep insisting on how the European Union continues to lag behind its main Asian and North American rivals in economic competitiveness, patent production, educational software development and enrolments in higher education (cf. Commission of the European Communities\(^2\), 1991; Cresson, 1996; Friedman, 1997; Ipsen, 1997), pressure is building on the EU to integrate its education systems and so put education on a par with the overall economic integration (Sultana, 1995: 126). As set forth by the European Commission: "adaptation to the digital age and the challenges of the Information Society, employment and, ultimately, economic competitiveness all depend on the success of our policies for education and training" (CEC, 1997). Hence, the Commission is intent on generating more support for its understanding that "to a greater extent than before, promoting the European dimension in education and training has become a necessity for efficiency in the face of internationalisation" (CEC, 1995b: 29).

As much as the EU discussion on education is penetrated by the mantras of neo-liberal economism and its requisitions of a tighter fit between school curriculum and the demands of a Euro-global business sector\(^3\) (eager to create a "flexible" labour market for a "multi-skilled" and

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\(^2\) Hereafter abbreviatiated as CEC.

\(^3\) To illustrate the neo-liberal influence on the EU's views on education by way of example, the following quotes constitute just a small selection:

Higher education has a vital role to play in providing a supply-led boost for economic development and in equipping all members of the labor force and young people with the new skills needed to meet the rapidly changing demands of European enterprises. (CEC, 1991: 4)
Schooling a European identity

transnationally "mobile" work-force (cf. Kairamo, 1989)), the Commission has been fast to point out that its argument for greater educational convergence is not premised on economic considerations alone. Unlike the Western European nation-states, arguably, the European Union has also been hard at work to carve out a cultural role for education in the Community. Answering the alleged criticism against the Commission's White Paper on Education and Training (1995) "for putting too much emphasis on purely economic issues" (CEC, 1996: 6), the Commissioner in charge of education, Edith Cresson, thus contends that the issue of education at the EU level "is as much cultural as industrial. Not only must Europe defend its interests, it also has an identity to preserve. [...] 'Europe is a cultural ideal which should be promoted,' [...] That is the real issue" (Cresson, 1996: 3).

As I will come back to at a later stage, Cresson's statement is indicative of a conviction – gaining in momentum within the EU since the early 1980s – which holds that in order to create public consent and legitimacy for the Community project the EU cannot continue to define itself in primarily economic terms; as an organization of economic interests and consumers. Instead, the European Union must be reimagined as constituting a cultural unit as well, where a sense of shared identity and citizenship can thrive (CEC, 1985; 1987; 1988a; 1995b; European Parliament, 1988). In this process of cultural Community and European identity formation – where "Community measures in the cultural sector is also an economic necessity" (CEC, 1987: 1) – the argument continues, education has a pivotal role to play. Indeed, as the White Paper on Education and Training puts it: "Education and training provide the reference points needed to affirm collective identity" (CEC, 1995: 51).

Bridges are being built between school and the business sector. These show that the ideological and cultural barriers which separated education and enterprise are breaking down, benefiting both. (CEC, 1995b: 22)

In its White Paper on Education and Training, the Commission addresses the task – which is also the subtitle of the White Paper – of "Teaching and Learning Towards the Learning Society" in the following fashion:

The first challenge is economic. The EU, as the world's leading exporter, has quite logically opted to open up to the international economy. This means it has to continually strengthen its economic competitiveness as the route to achieving the "sustainable and non-inflationary growth [...]" (CEC, 1995b: 26 [italics in original]).
My objective in this paper then, is to study how this role of education as an aide in the process of identity formation is being articulated in the Community policy of "The European dimension of education". So far this task, in particular, but also the task of studying the EU and education in general, have failed to attract any substantial interest among researchers (Sultana, 1995). Also, to use Sultana's (1995: 116) wording, "most of the literature that addresses the subject has been marked by an uncritical acceptance of the goals and processes of European unification". One obvious reason for this meagre research interest can be attributed to the fact that the EU still lacks any real formal harmonizing powers in the field of education. As it is stated in the Treaty, the Community role in education is limited to the enhancement of "cooperation between Member States" and to "supporting and supplementing their action, while fully respecting the responsibility of the Member States for the content of teaching and the organization of education systems" (Council of the European Communities, CEC, 1992: 47).

Yet, in spite of this formal "exclusion of any possibility of harmonisation" (CEC, 1993a: 9) Sultana argues that the non-legally binding resolutions and recommendations have, nevertheless, been effective in [...] extending the Commission's influence. [...] [I]creasingly European ministers of education meet to discuss the same situations and preoccupations, aim at the same goals, follow similar directions, and adopt similar policies (Sultana, 1995: 129).5

One concrete case in point that lends support to Sultana's thesis is, of course, the development of the Commission's ERASMUS programme, which despite the lack of formal EU competence in education has been able to grow remarkably over the years - both in terms of reach and funding (O'Leary, 1995: 168; Sultana, 1995: 127). To illustrate this further, one could also mention that the Community - again, without any explicit competence to do so - has funded a significant enlargement of secondary and higher education in Portugal (Butt Philip, 1994: 136).

4 Besides Sultana (1995), for critically oriented discussions on EU and the issue of education, see also Coulby and Jones (1995); and Slater (1995).
5 For a similar argument, see Müller and Wright (1994: 6).
Given this there is thus a strong case for engaging seriously into a discussion about the collective identity that the European Union aspires to form in and through education. In what follows I will focus specifically on the "European dimension of education"; beginning the paper by tracing EU discussions of this policy historically. In the second and major part of the paper I deliberate on the particular understanding of European culture and identity which the European dimension of education endeavours to advance and build on. Herein I develop a critique of what is discerned as the policy's excluding delineation of collective identity in the EU; a delineation which is reminiscent of a particular nationalist discourse founded on notions of ethno-cultural identification. Owing to a view of cultural identity which, in effect, includes only those who impersonate certain versions of European cultural "heritage" and "civilization", it is argued, the European dimension of education thwarts a constructive discussion of how an inclusive trans-ethnic identity formation could be envisioned in the European Union of today. Towards the end of the paper, a scrutiny of the European dimension's perception of the so-called language diversity in the EU seeks to elicit this problematic further.

The European dimension in education: the development of a Community policy

In attempting to trace the European dimension in education historically, one point of departure is to be found in the work conducted by the Council of Europe. Although the Council falls outside the scope of this paper, it merits mention here because of the long duration of cooperation in the field of education between the Council of Europe and what is now the European Union (cf. European Economic Community, 1976; Shennan, 1991). According to the Council, the discussion of the European dimension in education was initiated in the early 1950s (Stobart, 1991: xiii; cf. Ryba, 1992: 11). Whether this holds true for the European Union as well, is more difficult to determine. Considering, on the one hand, the immense sensitivity that surrounded the topic of education within the EEC discussion during the 1950s and 1960s (McMahon, 1995: 3-4), it

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6 Hereafter abbreviated as EEC.
7 Unless discussed in a context that specifically refers to the time prior to the Treaty on European Union, the name European Union or EU will be used throughout this paper.
seems rather unlikely that this should be the case. On the other hand, when digging further into the EU documents there are indications provided that Council of Europe activities concerning the European Dimension actually had spilled over into EEC discussion already during this "sensitive" era. Also, on at least one occasion this does not stop short of indications but gets spelled out in a clear statement. Speaking on behalf of the Commission in 1988, Commissioner Marin made the following affirmation: "The Commission has been stressing the importance of the European and Community dimension in education since 1959. Since that time it has worked with organizations at national and European level to promote better treatment of that dimension." (European Community, 1988b: 6)

Another route to trace the origins of the European dimension in education would go by the so-called European schools; the first ones being established during the late 1950s and early 1960s. These were schools set up to cater "for children from families that were professionally mobile" across Community countries - such as those working for the Commission (Neave, 1984: 131). Although I have not found any explicit mention of these schools accommodating a European dimension until 1976, it still seems safe to say that from the outset the curriculum in the European schools contained several elements that would fit the later definition of the European dimension of education (cf. Neave, 1984: 131-2).

Speaking in more clear-cut policy terms however, the birth of the European dimension in education within the EEC should most probably be dated back to the early 1970s when attitudes towards education, both within Community institutions and the member states, slowly began to loosen up. Prior to this, as was mentioned above, education loomed as a delicate subject within the Community (Neave, 1984: 6). Indeed, without any mention of education in the Treaty of Rome - and consequently no supranational Community competence in the area - and due to education's intrinsic links to the vigorously defended notion of national sovereignty, no real Community initiatives had been pursued in the area up to the beginning of the 1970s (Ryba, 1992: 11; McMahon, 1995: 3-4).

Therefore, when the ministers of education met within the Council for the first time ever in 1971, this signified a breakthrough for education in the Community. Put differently, the implications of this meeting can be seen as momentous since it made clear that education now constituted a
field in its own capacity, and that it qualified to be treated as such within
the Community institutions (McMahon, 1995: 4).

Shortly thereafter the Commission asked the former Belgian minister
of education professor Henri Janne to draw up the primary goals for a
future policy of education at the EEC level. In 1973 this resulted in the
Janne Report (For a Community Policy on Education). Although the Janne
Report did not gain status as an official EEC statement, it proved very
influential for the development of a Community policy in certain areas;
whereof the European dimension of education constituted an important
one. "It is in this area that the impact of the recommendations of the
Janne Report are most obvious." (McMahon, 1995: 7)

Out of this emerged the first contours of the European dimension of
education as an area of specific interest for the Community. In a
communication from the Commission drawn up in 1974 (Neave, 1984: 8)
four areas were identified as constituting the backbone of the policy: (i)
furtherance of foreign language teaching; (ii) promotion of the study of
Europe as part of the ordinary curriculum; (iii) cooperation between
bodies of higher education across the Community; and (iv) expanded
support for the European schools (McMahon, 1995: 7; Neave, 1984: 8-9).
One should keep in mind here however, that education still figured as a
sensitive area, and when the ministers of education met within the Council
later that year they specifically ruled out a development towards
harmonization of the diverse education systems in the member states
(Neave, 1984: 9-10). Hence, as argued by McMahon (1995: 4), "[t]he goal
of the Community action in the area of education was to be co-operation
rather than harmonization of existing policies and systems”.

The next stage in the development of the European dimension in
education is brought about by the 1976 resolution of the Council
"comprising an action programme in the field of education" (EEC, 1976).
With its expanded interpretation of the European dimension, the
resolution has been characterized as a notable achievement. This, also,
since it elevated the wider subject of education on the Community agenda
(Shennan, 1991: 19; cf. McMahon, 1995: 11). More than this, the
European dimension is now reflective of the new official perception – yet
an old idea – of the Community as an entity that should consist of the
cultural, social and political areas, as well as being an organ for economic
cooperation (McLean, 1990: 5; Neave, 1984: 123). As such, education is
now considered "central to the full and healthy development of the Community" (EEC, 1976).

In the resolution the European dimension is given a more detailed and extended content. Now, for instance, primary and secondary education are emphasized alongside higher education. Also, foreign language teaching is specified as the teaching of "the languages of the Community". Furthermore, the resolution states that

In order to give a European dimension to the experience of teachers and pupils [...] in the Community, member states will promote and organize: [...] mobility and interchange of pupils and teachers within the Community [...] contacts between the authorities of establishments concerned with teacher training [and] educational activities with a European content. (EEC, 1976)

Notwithstanding the 1976 "action programme in the field of education", the European dimension, as Mulcahy (1994: 85) phrases it, "remained vague for at least another decade, its implementation was haphazard, and it encountered strong opposition" (cf. McLean, 1990: 4, 6; Ryba, 1992: 12). As pointed out by Commissioner Richard, speaking on behalf of the Commission in 1984: "the resources available for the promotion of a European dimension in school curricula are very small, and have been considerably reduced in recent years" (EEC, 1984: 16).

Also worthy of notice here is that even though the European dimension sought to be reflective of a Community that aspired to define itself in cultural, social and political terms – and not merely in economical – this reflectiveness continued to appear vague and at most implicit. In the 1976 "action programme" there is no reference to education's role in promoting a "European cultural awareness" or in fostering a "European identity". Actually, the words culture and identity did not figure at all in the resolution on education. Conversely, there was neither any mention of education in the 1973 Community "Declaration on European identity" (CEC, 1973). Taken as a whole this points to a marked difference in the European Union's articulation of education in general, and of the European dimension in particular, between the mid-1970s and the present, where, as will be shown in the next section, firm discursive links have been established between education, culture and identity.
Culture and identity: redefining the role of education

During the second half of the 1980s major changes occurred at the Community level that would spur the articulation of, if not an altogether new, then at least a considerably more defined role for education. Animated by the push towards the adoption of the Single European Act and the objectives behind the launching of "A people's Europe", the field of education experienced a renewed and increased activity. Thus, "pressures began to build for a reinvigoration of the Commission's European Dimension in Education Program" (Ryba, 1992: 12-13).

According to McMahon (1995: 14-16) this, what he calls, "turning point" in the Community's perception of education, should largely be attributed to the work of the ad hoc Committee on a People's Europe, chaired by Pietro Adonnino. This committee had been set up by the European Council in 1984, and was asked to focus on future Community manoeuvres that would meet the "expectations of the peoples of Europe by adopting measures to strengthen and promote its identity and its image both for its citizens and for the rest of the world" (cited in CEC, 1988a: 6). In its second Adonnino report the committee included proposals for action in the fields of education and culture that would help promote a European identity (CEC, 1985). The committee's proposals were subsequently approved by the European Council in 1985, and resounded less than four months later in the Conclusions of the Council "on the enhanced treatment of the European dimension in education". In the Council Conclusions a summary of statements were being made which pointed to the first substantial steps taken towards the articulation of education in the context of culture and identity (see Council of the European Communities, 1987: 143-4).

The conclusions of the Council were developed further in the 1988 Resolution of the Council "on the European dimension in education" (European Community, 1988a). As Mulcahy (1994: 85) notes, "the resolution of 1988 provided, especially in its statement of objectives, important clarifications that was hitherto lacking". Indeed, according to the Council the explicit purpose of the European dimension had now become to help "strengthen in young people a sense of European identity and make clear to them the value of European civilization and of the foundations on which the European peoples intend to base their development today" (European Community, 1988a). Moreover, with
particular reference to the Council decision on "A people's Europe", "the image of Europe in education" should be reinforced by, among others, such measures as:

the promotion of school initiatives and extra-curricular activities such as school twinning and the formation of "European clubs" [...] the participation of schools in activities organized as part of the Europe Day [...] the participation of schools in the European schools' competition [...] increased cooperation between the member states in the area of school sports. (European Community, 1988a)

On the whole the 1988 Resolution breathes of more decisiveness than its predecessors. A wide array of new measures – including symbolic ones, as was proposed by the ad hoc Committee (CEC, 1985)⁸ – are incorporated while old measures are elaborated in greater detail than before. Of more significance for the discussion here though, is that the People's Europe initiative and the 1988 Resolution combined, testify to the fact that education, in general, and the European dimension of education, in particular, now are explicitly linked to questions pertaining to culture and identity in the Community. Further illustration of this is provided by a Commission communication, also published in 1988, entitled "A people's Europe". Here the reasoning behind the increased weight the Community has assigned to the field of culture, and the accompanying undertaking to locate education more firmly in this field, are being spelled out:

The main aim in the fields of culture and communication is to emphasize the essential elements of the European identity and the Community image [...] European integration will not and cannot be a success unless our young people are interested and involved as well. Hence the value of education, foreign language teaching, exchanges and sport, and the need for Community action to look beyond economic issues to the major concerns of day-to-day life. (CEC, 1988a: 7)

⁸ In reference to symbolic measures, the European Parliament – in its 1987 "Resolution on the European dimension in schools" – stressed that "young Europeans should be made aware that they are part of one community", and called for "the European anthem to be taught in all schools in the Community" (European Parliament, 1987). See also CEC (1988a: 7-11), under the subheadings "Symbols" and "Consciousness-raising".
Schooling a European identity

As the 1980s draws to a close we see how culture increasingly is being framed as constituting the future foundation upon which Community integration is to be built. Citing the Commission again, it is action in this field that will "help heighten the sense of belonging to a European culture and thereby strengthen the European identity" (CEC, 1988a: 11). Hence, as the Commission's reasoning above makes clear, the economic argument or stress on "common market" is now deemphasized in favour of a stress on "common culture" (cf. Laffan, 1996; Morley and Robins, 1995; Shore, 1993; Shore and Black, 1992).

Cultural essentialism and the essentials of culture

During the 1990s the efforts to create a Community identity based on a sense of belonging to a European culture has been intensified, making the European dimension a central point of reference in Brussels' endeavour to rally popular support behind the EU project. The Maastricht Treaty (or Treaty on European Union) testified to this by giving the European dimension in education specific mention under the Treaty's first Article (126) of education ever (Council of the European Communities, CEC, 1992). In 1993, as a direct result of the inclusion of education into the Treaty’s legal framework, the Commission presented the Green Paper on the European Dimension of Education.9 Although the Green Paper does not add much in terms of actual content, it is undoubtedly the most substantial articulation so far of the purposes behind the policy.

According to the Green Paper, the European dimension's primary objective is to stimulate an awareness of what it conceives of as a common European culture and heritage, so as to make students more prone to identify as Europeans: "Introducing this [European] dimension requires teachers: [...] to learn to share and pass on the wealth of European cultures; to develop a European perspective alongside national and regional allegiances; to make use of the shared cultural heritage [...]" (CEC, 1993b: 10). But as the quote clearly indicates, the furtherance of a European perspective in schools across the Union is not intended to

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9 As stated by the Commission (1993b: 2, 13): "For the first time, a legal framework exists which allows the Community to propose cooperative actions in the area of education [...]", and "this Green Paper is intended to stimulate discussions on the possibilities offered by Article 126 of the Treaty".
oblitrate or dissolve the national and regional cultural identities. Instead, these three cultural attachments are said to harmonize and should be given equal treatment.

The effort to establish a discourse where the relationship between the European and the national comes across as a non-conflictual one has been visible in EU discussions on education since the outset in the early 1970s, and can be seen as part of a Commission strategy of assuring the member states that the EU has no intentions of infringing on national sovereignty in the field of education. This comes across with great clarity in the Commission (1988b) document Enhanced Treatment of the European Dimension in Education:

This European cultural model is [...] distinguished by the fact that it is not designed to supersede or replace national cultures. [...] In the relationship between European culture and national cultures there is no substitution, no transcendence, no conflict or even compromise, simply reciprocal enrichment and cross-fertilization. (CEC, 1988b: 5, 6)

With the Maastricht Treaty a (third) regional cultural dimension was included to form part of this non-conflictual cultural relationship; arguably a result of the regional lobby groups’ rapid expansion in Brussels (cf. Laffan, 1996; Marks, et al., 1996). As stated in the Treaty’s Article 128 on Culture, the Community is intent on "respecting" its "national and regional diversity and at the same time bringing the common cultural heritage to the fore" (Council of the European Communities, CEC, 1992).

To sum up the thrust of the argument put forth by the Green paper, the main purpose behind the European dimension of education is then to generate a greater sense of identification with European culture, which – as we gather from the statements above – gets construed as something palpable, seemingly fixed, exemplary and simply "out there" for people to discover and add on to their similarly construed national and regional cultural identities. To borrow from Shore (1993: 792), "the Commission’s representations of 'European identity' seem to reflect an essentialist model of identity as [...] something organic, fundamental, historically given and bounded". These, he adds, "are the ideological underpinnings which

resonate throughout the Commission’s category of 'European cultural heritage’.

As we move closer to the present the emphasis on this particular understanding of culture, and its inherent conjoiners heritage and civilization, has become even more marked. In 1994 the Parliament and the Council asserted that the European dimension in education is a theme "concerned with cultural heritage", "based on the cultural heritage of the Member States”, which "should contribute to strengthening in pupils and students a sense of European identity" (European Union, 1994: 61, 52). Moreover, in the ensuing White Paper on Education and Training, the Commission, as it explains why knowledge and admiration of European culture, heritage and civilization are essential for today’s students, also embarks on a discussion concerning the actual content, or the characteristics, of this culture:

Knowledge of history [...] is essential to everyone if they are to come to terms with their roots [...]. The penalty society pays for forgetting the past is to lose a common heritage of bearings and reference points. It is not surprising that, not knowing the history of European civilization, that such expressions as, "being out in the wilderness", "having a cross to bear", "Eureka!", "the judgement of Solomon" or "the tower of Babel" have lost their meaning. [...] European civilization has a long history and is very complex. [...] the legacy of a tradition which made Europe the first to bring about a technical and industrial revolution and thus change the world [...]. Being European is to have the advantage of a cultural background of unparalleled variety and depth. (CEC, 1995: 12, 50, 51)

Towards an ethno-cultural model of community formation?

This provided, it is not far-fetched to argue that embedded in the insistence on safeguarding a national and regional cultural diversity whenever the question of a common European identity is being raised – often expressed as the principle of "unity in diversity" in EU rhetoric – there seems to be a conscious attempt on part of the EU to dissociate its conception of education from the homogenizing role that was given to education during the consolidation of the European nation-states. As
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maintained by the Commission, a European Union identity must be developed "without succumbing to the colourless uniformity of 'Europeanism' or to the temptation of blindly imitating the past" (CEC, 1991: 5). Yet, as I will argue below, despite the attempt to foster an identity through education that — and contrary to how most nation-states tried to "school" national identities in the nineteenth century — would seek to embrace cultural difference and multiple identifications, the EU, through its comprehension and application of culture, still adheres to some of the key components of the nationalist discourse it seeks to evade.

Given the difficulty in speaking about nationalism, and other practices utilized to form cohesive communities, as appropriating only one un-compounded and unitary discourse (cf. Parekh, 1994), I will here refer to the EU education discourse as resonating with one particular nationalist discourse among other possible ones; rather than with a vague notion of nationalism writ large. Taking this a little further, Habermas' (1996) discussion of the different and often contradictory principles around which the nation-state and national identity can be structured and mobilized offers guidance here.

According to Habermas the nation-state is fraught with an inherent "tension between the universalism of an egalitarian legal community and the particularism of a cultural community joined by origin and fate" (1996: 131). In short, this tension can be formulated as one between an inclusive and an exclusive model of community formation: the former seeking integration and cohesion by means of constitutional and socio-political rights; the latter by means of invoking a sense of hereditary or ethno-cultural identification with an organic and pre-politically constituted community. It must be emphasized here though, that these two models are always more or less instituted and articulated simultaneously, and therefore no nation-state can be said to be founded solely on one of the two models. And as noted earlier, Habermas speaks of a tension within the nation-state between these two models. This granted, Habermas argues that in order for a community formation to be inclusive of ethnically, culturally and religiously dissimilar groups — or to be equipped with a foundation which at least harbours such a potential — mobilization around constitutional rights and a sense of "shared political culture" has to gain the upper hand over an identity mobilization on ethno-cultural grounds.11

11 For a similar argument pertaining more specifically to the EU, see Habermas (1994).
Schooling a European identity

Leaning partly on Habermas' reasoning then, the discussion in what follows attempts to trace and examine more closely the model of community formation that the EU advances in its discourse on education.

A "grand old" heritage for a new ethno-cultural identity

If education, as it was instituted in the evolving nation-state, became one of the primary devices used by the state to transmit a glorified and highly selective depiction of the national culture, traditions and history, that were under construction (cf. Green, 1997; Hobsbawm, 1983; 1990; Heather, 1990), we can now begin to see why this seems to square quite well with how the European Union understands the function of education today. Hence, drawing from the White Paper cited above, the Commission contends that in order to successfully build up a European identity, students must learn to take pride in what gets outlined as Europe's civilization, cultural heritage and historical achievements. Looking once more at the White Paper — this time citing an "eminent European historian" — helps elucidate this further:

The Europe of the Middle Ages and post-medieval times had to face up to the Byzantine world, the Arab world and the Ottoman Empire. The struggle today is fortunately set in a more pacific context. Nevertheless, the existence of protagonists in history gigantic by their size or by their economic strength, or indeed both, means Europe has to achieve a comparable scale if to exist, progress and retain its identity. [...] Fortunately, Europe has the weight of its civilization and its common heritage behind it. Over 25 centuries European civilization has, in successive stages, been creative; and even today, as one slogan goes, Europe's main raw material is unquestionably its grey matter. (CEC, 1995: 50)

Seeing too that the European Union, as did the nation-state, seeks to form a cohesive community by appealing to a taken for granted notion of organic culture, the fact that this European culture is said to build on multiple (national and regional) cultural sources — as opposed to the nation-state's claim to a singular cultural source — does not make the EU identity discourse logically different from this particular nationalist
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discourse. Stated differently, a European cultural identity comprises cultural diversity exactly because the elements representing this diversity, that is the national and regional cultures, are described as sharing a common historical heritage, a common origin. The EU discourse and the specific nationalist discourse referred to here are thus modelled on a similar ethno-cultural comprehension of what constitutes a community's identity. According to the Commission then – and while holding forth on the importance of raising young people's awareness of the common European identity through education – the "European identity is the result of centuries of shared history and common cultural and fundamental values" (CEC, 1988a: 7; see also European Parliament, 1988: 207).

Likewise, in its "Opinion on the Citizens' Europe", where the issue of education was discussed at some length, the Economic and Social Committee held that, among other things, "The key to a citizens' Europe is [...] its Christian heritage" (Economic and Social Committee, 1992: 34).

As a natural consequence, the European Union's particular, and indeed lofty articulation of "our common culture" also bears likeness to the nation-state's in the sense that it unavoidably (not necessarily intentionally though) comes to masquerade as class neutral, as just an upright expression of what "we" have in common, and therefore something which seemingly should enthuse and be equally meaningful among school children and students from dissimilar social backgrounds.

However, once we turn to the issue of ethnicity and the European dimension of education, the articulation of culture gives the impression of being less prone – whether knowingly or unknowingly – to masquerade as ethnically neutral and inclusive. Looking, again, at the earlier cited White Paper on Education and Training (CEC, 1995), the Commission shows no signs of trying to hide the fact that it defines contemporary "Europeanness" as an inherited identity and quality. In other words, the ability to trace one's roots to an illustrious European past seems to become a prerequisite for a sense of belonging to the European culture of today. Thus, and as I have argued elsewhere (Hansen, 1998), the European in the European dimension of education takes on an ethno-cultural meaning, which leaves out of view the presence of particularly those (non-white) pupils who, per definition, do not impersonate the required historical roots, the cultural tradition, the (Christian) civilization, and who cannot become part of "the legacy of a tradition which made Europe the
first to bring about a technical and industrial revolution and thus change the world” (CEC, 1995: 12, 50).

In his work *Teaching History in the New Europe* (1995), Slater develops a similar argument against having such a conception of European culture form the basis of today’s teaching about Europe. Culture, he argues,

is essentially *exclusive* [...] it can be, and has often been, a self-fulfilling concept, and that is not only unhistorical but terribly dangerous. ”Culture” becomes a form of qualification, an entrée, a testimonial. Those who do not share it are not, or not quite, ”one of us”, not wholly ”European”. (Slater, 1995: 10 [italics in original])

In relation to this Slater holds the concepts of European heritage and civilization to be equally problematic as educational guides, seeing the former as mainly constituting ”a rag-bag of hygienic and comfortable past, [...] demanding our respect and uncritical loyalty”; and the latter as ”altogether too smug and complacent, racist even, with its implicit undertones of superiority” (Slater, 1995: 8).

Furthermore, the perspective entertained in the European dimension of education closely resembles what Coulby and Jones (1995) have termed a ”traditionalist view” of European culture and history, which, rather than entering into a critical relationship with these matters, seeks to celebrate them as containers of a unique civilization’s achievements. As such, they point to the traditionalist view of European culture as ”ethnocentric in its core and formation. The voices which it excludes are actually those which offer it any possibility of greater depth” (Coulby and Jones, 1995: 100). As an alternative to this traditionalist perspective on Europe, Coulby and Jones suggest an approach to education in the European Union that instead would include and seek to stimulate a critical discussion of such subject-matters as ”the history of non-dominant groups and regions, women’s history, oral history, [and] the records of resistance to European colonisation and exploitation” (1995: 137-8). Their suggestion ends on negative note though: ”Whether the incorporation of the European dimension will encourage this approach remains to be seen but the past record does not give too many grounds for optimism.” (Coulby and Jones, 1995: 138)

Before extending the analysis further – by looking at the question of language and education in the EU – a conclusion to be drawn already at
this juncture is then that the EU education discourse can be said to prioritize what was referred to above, with Habermas (1996), as the exclusive or ethno-cultural model of community formation.

**Multilingualism with restrictions**

Integrated in the European Union’s discussion of education and its role in nourishing a European cultural identity is, of course, also the issue of language. The importance ascribed to this issue was reflected in a Common Position adopted by the Council in 1994, where the Council and Parliament placed the learning of the Union languages at the heart of the European dimension of education, stating: ”The promotion of language skills is a key factor in establishing an open area for cooperation in education and for strengthening understanding and solidarity between the peoples of the European Union without sacrificing any of their linguistic and cultural diversity” (European Union, 1994: 63).

What this means — and which the line about ”linguistic and cultural diversity” is a direct reference to — is that apart from the teaching of the Union’s official or majority languages, the European dimension should also, and especially so, promote the teaching of the so-called regional, minority, autochthonous or least widely used languages that are spoken in the member states. One of the strongest supporters in the European Parliament for the recognition of these languages, Mark Killiea, motivated the decision as follows: ”After having experienced discrimination, marginalization and alienation, in many cases for centuries, the speakers of Europe’s regional and minority languages are finding their rightful place in the shaping of a Europe of peoples — of all its peoples” (cited in Contact Bulletin, 1994: 2). However, as a Commission Communication from 1994 entitled Lesser Used Languages of the European Union clearly indicates, ”[t]he European dimension to minority languages” does not embrace all languages spoken by minorities in the EU. Instead, only those minority languages — such as Frisian, Breton, Sorbian, etc. — which are deemed ”indigenous to the European Union” (CEC, 1994a: 9) are included. A year later, in a call for proposals concerning ”action to support regional or minority languages and cultures”, the Commission made this division explicit, stating: ”The languages intended to benefit from under this heading are the autochthonous languages traditionally spoken by a part of
the population of any Member State of the European Union. They do not include the languages of immigrants or artificially created languages.” (CEC, 1995a: 18)

Reid and Reich (1995: 4-5) have criticized this separation made by the EU between indigenous minority languages and immigrant minority languages, seeing it, among others, as reflective of the lack of a serious discussion of how to construct a language policy in the European Union that would be ready to acknowledge and deal with the present-day reality where languages such as Turkish and Arabic now have more speakers in the EU than several of the recognized ”autochthonous” minority languages.

Moreover, the fact that only a portion of the multitude of minority languages in the EU is construed as ”a key element in the Union’s cultural wealth” (European Parliament, 1994), substantiates the argument developed above about how European culture gets delineated in the European dimension of education. As such, the view of language forms part of what we now might speak of as a larger discourse which informs much of the formulation of the European dimension in education. In this discourse we discern how certain Union inhabitants and what are seen as their cultures and affiliated languages are identified as ”European” and so included in the process of defining the future EU identity, whereas certain other inhabitants – meaning those who can neither be grouped as majority ”nationals” nor as minority ”regionals” – are left out of this definition of the European and what a future Union identity could embrace.

This is not, however, to imply that the EU in any way denies the presence of other minority languages in the Union – what the Commission refers to above as the ”languages of immigrants” – or that it has not taken initiatives to promote these languages (cf. CEC, 1994b). The crucial point argued here is instead that despite these ”other” minority languages’ audible presence in today’s EU the policy discourse of the European dimension of education fails to see them as part of the Union’s contemporary European culture. Having said this, one may well argue here that the European Union, rather than breaking with the legacy of the discriminatory principles of language selection that permeated the formation of European nation-state and its education systems (cf. Hobsbwm, 1990; Heater, 1990; Weber, 1976), it is actually in some important respect working in compliance with these same principles. Because, although the EU and its European dimension of education have
opted in favour of language pluralism — "[m]ultilingualism is part and parcel of both European identity/citizenship and the learning society" (CEC, 1995b: 44) — as opposed to most nation-states’ insistence in the 19th century on having just one out of the many spoken languages constitute the only accepted national language, the EU is still involved in a selection process where some languages, such as Frisian and Breton, are considered European whereas such commonly used languages as Persian and Kurdish are not.

Finally, it is thus important to keep in mind that when references are being made to minorities, minority cultures, even ethnic minorities, within the EU’s discussion of the European dimension of education, these are not necessarily all-inclusive categories. Instead, and especially when language and culture are on the agenda, they more than often only refer to those particular groups of minorities which are seen as European, or as the European Parliament (1994) has formulated it, as those ”minority languages and cultures” which form ”an integral part of the Union’s culture and European heritage”.

Conclusion

What I have tried to show here is that the articulation of the European dimension of education has been moving in an ethno-cultural direction, where, accordingly, the main purpose of education becomes to convey a collective identity which bases itself on a transnational dissemination of excluding, uncritical and historically dubious versions of European traditions, heritage and civilization.

Taken as a whole, the cultural configuration of the Union space made manifest in the European dimension of education can be seen as indicative of an incapacity, if not disinclination, on part of the EU to expose traditional and indeed debarring meanings of Europe, and their ties to a Union identity, to a redefinition and renegotiation that would take into consideration the entirety of the Union’s present-day inhabitants, instead of merely complying with old notions of trans-European white ethnicity. As a consequence, the common cultural identity sought by the EU — through the increased cooperation in the field of education — fails to pertain and appeal universally to those living in the European Union. In some principle meaning then, Hobsbawm’s (1990: 93) argument about late
nineteenth century nationalism and the attempts to legitimate the newly consolidated national communities, may very well be put to use in the context of late twentieth century efforts to secure legitimacy for a supranational community, in that in both cases the project of identity formation refers "not to the 'country' [i.e. all nation-state residents, respectively all EU residents], but only to its particular version of that country: to an ideological construct".

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Schooling a European identity


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Questions from somewhere: who’s who in attitude research about ”immigrants”

Introduction

Following the current debate about the situation in Europe can at times give associations to pathology. In short, it is almost as if Europe is diagnosed as suffering both from a severe hangover and an increasing schizophrenia. Europe is hangovered from the wall-party of eighty-nine, a hang-over that actually seems to worsen the more obvious it gets to people that the kitschy CNN-imagery of people ”coming together” in Eastern Europe is not materialising, even when given some five years to work with. The argument about schizophrenia, which I find more interesting, gets its fuel from the fact that Europe does not appear capable of uniting. ”We”, the argument goes, cannot want a union and at the same time cling to a petty romanticization of the nation-state. ”We” have to stop dividing over details – stop behaving as ”we and them” within the Union – and emphasise all the valuable things we have in common: culture, religion, democracy, lifestyle, etc. Of course, within this discourse statements about Europe are not directly statements about Albania, Bulgaria or Russia. Instead, the label ”Europe” is here reserved for the European Union, and those countries now considered for membership in the Club.

But given the EU infighting and persistent ”we and them” divisions within the Community, another ”we and them” division – superimposed on the first one – is gaining in importance. This division, however, works unifying rather than dividing among those occupying the centres of Western Europe. Stuart Hall (1992) has named the latter ”we and them” division ”the West and the Rest”, where those screened from the West by

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no means are geographically set. In other words, within this view of the world a Somali is no less "rest" in Stuttgart than in Mogadishu.

Having said this brings to mind the issue of immigration, a matter deeply embedded in the discourse of the "West and the Rest". One thing that it does not, in general, appear difficult for Western Europeans to agree on is that immigration is a "big problem" – sometimes even the big problem. It might be wearisome to come to terms with how a Union citizen should be culturally defined, in other words, how to answer the question: what is a European? But to grasp what is not a European appears unproblematic: it is not a Muslim, not a Turk with a Belgian passport, not a gypsy, not a second or third generation Algerian with a French passport, not a Kosovo-Albanian, etc. Listening to French, Swedish, Italian or German politicians talking about their countries' so-called immigration problem one realises very soon that whatever there were of "we and them" relationships between the Western European countries now tend to dissolve, leaving in their place a singular "we and them" division of Europeans and "others".

Given the consequences of stigmatising people as "others", as not belonging and as making up a problem, it is of crucial importance how researchers, politicians and policy-makers are addressing this issue. This is the basic premise of this paper. In it I concentrate particularly on research dealing with public opinion or attitudes towards "immigrants" in the European Union, problematizing common ways of dealing with matters such as (ethnic) identity, culture, nationality, and "race". The focus is on the ethnocentric tendency to get caught in what Suleri so accurately calls "the devastating rhetoric of 'us and them' that beleaguer issues of identity formation today" (1992: 756). I discuss specifically one example of such research – the one carried out in the framework of the European Commission's Eurobarometer 30: Immigrants and Out-Groups in Western Europe and Eurobarometer 39 (conducted in the fall of 1988, respectively spring of 1993). I have chosen the Eurobarometer due to its size, covering the entire Community, which makes it one of the most widely cited and thereby one of the most influential sources amongst those academics, policy-makers and politicians, who are interested in how people in the European Union are said to think and feel about those labelled as "non-Europeans".

My critique focuses particularly on the Eurobarometer's interview-questions and predetermined answer-alternatives. I do not, however, aim at refining interview questions; or better, my purpose is not to run the
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questions in the *Eurobarometer* through some test to determine if they really measure what they set out to measure, and then suggest more appropriate ways of constructing the questions. The problem I want to address is instead how such and such questions became possible in the first place. Which are – for example – the hidden assumptions, what is the conception of the world, and, perhaps most important, how has the implied respondent, or research object, been constructed in the set-up of the study? I treat the *Eurobarometer* as the text or narrative it impersonates. All the survey questions attain their social meaning through a positioning within a larger discourse or narrative structure, and as such, listening to Kerby, they have to be studied "within a developing network of further acts if their broader significance is to be grasped" (1991: 5-6).

The *Eurobarometer* is an immense survey – both in terms of respondents and questions – and in what follows I will not give a comprehensive critique of every individual question. Instead, I shall discuss in more general terms the type of questions included in the *Eurobarometer*, their implications and presuppositions. How do they construct not only those talked about (the "immigrants") but also those talked to (the respondents). As I move on, incorporating examples of specific questions, the discourse in which the *Eurobarometer* operates will be displayed.

"Immigrants" and "Out-Groups": constructing the generalized "other"

When first confronted with the subtitle of *Eurobarometer 30*, which reads *Immigrants and Out-Groups in Western Europe*, a few questions arose. First, would the survey make a clear distinction between "immigrants" and "out-groups", and if so how would this distinction be made? In other words, who are the people that are lumped together in these two categories? Would it, for instance, be possible to be an immigrant without as well having to be defined as a member of an out-group, and thereby at least be given the chance to avoid double stigmatisation? Reading the "Study Description" for *Eurobarometer 30* helped to clarify things. Here immigrants and out-groups are defined as "people of another nationality, race, religion, culture, or social class" (1988: iv), and one realises immediately that the only reason for keeping the conjunction "and" in the subtitle
"Immigrants and Out-Groups [...]" is that the category "another [...]" social class" could contain people with not "another" but the same "nationality", "race", "religion", and "culture". Stated differently, the only category which is not exclusively reserved for immigrants is social class since this category, as opposed to the categories "another" "race", "another" "nationality", "another" "religion", and "another" "culture", could contain individuals perceived as non-immigrants by the Eurobarometer. That there is no prospect for a person already classified as immigrant to avoid being moved even further out in the margin by simultaneously being referred to as an out-group member is further confirmed as one continues to read the "Study Description". Here I shall quote in length:

The inquiry into out-groups asked respondents to identify groups that came to mind when they thought of people of another nationality, race, religion, culture, or social class. Respondents were asked if they counted any out-group members among their friends and if any of these persons worked at their place of employment or lived in their neighbourhoods. Additional questions asked respondents if they were disturbed by the presence of these out-groups and if they thought that these groups exploited social welfare benefits, increased unemployment, caused delinquency and violence, affected property prices, or reduced the level of education in schools. (1988: iv)

Thus, within the logic of the Eurobarometer a person perceived as an immigrant is necessarily also a member of the out-group. Gathering from the quote, distinctions are blurred and everybody considered as another is also seen as belonging to an out-group. There is, however, nothing inconsistent about this packaging of people into categories since the central purpose of the Eurobarometer appears to be to enable a "we" to talk about, or answer questions about a "them". What those responsible for the Eurobarometer seems to be doing then – unconsciously we have to assume – is to reproduce an ethnocentric and stigmatising discourse without actually recognising that this constitutes a problem. The study legitimises the lumping together of everybody not perceived as Western or European into a homogenous mass of silenced others (the excluded) of whom "we Europeans" (the included) should feel free to talk and have opinions about. Thus, people are excluded and included depending on
which side of the racialized boundary they are positioned. As Silverman would have it, racialisation here points to ”the process by which social relations are conceived as structured according to common biological and/or cultural absolutist characteristics” (1992:8). In the *Eurobarometer* the signifiers race, culture, and nationality, among others, are set up to encapsulate such ”absolutist characteristics” through which ”the boundary is to be constructed between those who can and those who cannot belong to a particular construction of a collectivity or population” (Anthias and Yuval-Davis, 1992: 2).

Rather than re(-)presenting attitudes and opinions which the attitude researcher claims to find ”out there” in the public, he or she will run the risk of reiterating a stigmatising and racializing language. To paraphrase Molina and Tesfahuney (1994a) it is not far-fetched to argue that the attitude studies about immigrants, which now have flourished for some decades, actually have helped – through their often non-problematizing view of how people are being categorised and stereotyped – to shape, spread, institutionalise, and legitimise a racializing discourse. Continuing this line of argument, since ”language (discourse) has real effects in practice: the description becomes ‘true’” (Hall, 1992: 293) (i.e. a self-fulfilling prophecy), the way people get positioned in public discourse must be kept under constant surveillance.

Instead of approaching the socially constructed identities and categories of people as the constructions they constitute, and thereby problematizing them, attitude researchers many times perceive these same identities and categories as being natural and objectively given. What much of attitude research fails to take into consideration then, is the fact that the implied notions about social categories and identities, which this type of research treats as non-political starting points or as an uncontested ontology (such as in the *Eurobarometer* where the survey is based on the implicit notion that certain fixed, self-contained, and essential social categories and identities are naturally pre-given to us as researchers), can actually be seen as stemming from a certain political force’s endeavour to have identities constructed in a particular fashion. In other words, attitude research seldom opts for the possibility that – to borrow from Norval – ”social identities […] are subject to political contestation and construction” (1994: 120).

Besides presenting its research object (”immigrants”/”out-groups”) before those constructed as ”we” (the respondents), the *Eurobarometer* also
risks presenting the object before itself. Since the sample is made up by citizens in European Union countries, and since many such formal citizens in fact fall into the out-group category – in Britain, for example, most blacks are British citizens – we know that a black person descending from the Ivory Coast but currently with a French citizenship could be faced with a question such as: "And what about people of another race living in our country: Are there too many, a lot but not too many or not many?" (Eurobarometer 30, Q. 169/172 (B)) Hence, certain questions arise: Who is of "another race" in this context? Of what "race" is the interviewer? Who is belonging to "our country"? The absurdities speak for themselves and there is no need to dwell any further on this particular example. But the chances for similar situations, which not only are absurd but also insulting, are numerous in the Eurobarometer.

On one occasion, however, out-groups/immigrants are sorted out from those categorised as "not of foreign origin" and those of "other foreign origin" through the question: "Is anyone in your immediate family, including yourself, of foreign national origins?" (Eurobarometer 30, Q 334). This is due to a set of follow-up questions which were not intended to be asked to out-groups/immigrants. What we learn here then, is that groupings are not always binary on the surface level, but, as in the case above, people can be "not of foreign origin", of "other foreign origin", and lastly, of "out-group" or "immigrant" foreign origin. But what we also learn however, is that the Eurobarometer distinguishes between, so to speak, foreigners and foreigners, and where some people are considered more foreign than others. This type of categorisation can be seen as following the general trend in Western Europe of constructing national boundaries more on the basis of "race" or skin colour than on an individual’s country of origin. We see an example of the working of this in England, where, as Anthias and Yuval-Davis show, the official statistics and the census have come to put an increasing emphasis on the categories "White and non-Whites" (1992: 51). Some categories of people disappear from the official discourse while others are installed (or invented). Although the immigration from other EEC countries into England is growing, such immigration does not figure in any of the official immigration statistics. And as Anthias and Yuval-Davis point out "These are the same statistics which have been used in the past to point to the possibility of being 'swamped' by waves of immigration" (1992: 50-2).
One could then say, in the words of Etienne Balibar, that

the word "immigrant" is a catch-all category, combining ethnic and class criteria [here the "out-group"], into which foreigners are dumped indiscriminately, though not all foreigners and not only foreigners. In fact it is a category which precisely makes it possible to split up the apparently "neutral" set of foreigners, though not without some ambiguities. A Portuguese, for example, will be more of an "immigrant" than a Spaniard (in Paris), though less than an Arab or a Black; a Briton or a German certainly will not be an "immigrant", though a Greek may perhaps be [...]. (1991: 221)

It is however, as reflected in the Eurobarometer, rather unclear how this categorisation is actually carried out more precisely. Does, for instance, a Dutch citizen born in Holland but with Indonesian grandparents have any choice to locate herself outside the out-group? That is, if she feels Dutch will the Eurobarometer allow her to continue to do so? Moreover, since those classified as belonging to an out-group are not altogether excluded from the survey – they are only left out from a set of follow-up questions – we are faced with yet another seemingly insoluble problem. How can that which has been defined as object ever attain the position of subject? How can somebody who has even been informed about his or her status as objects, as belonging to an out-group, ever come to act as a speaking subject?

We are we, because we are not others: constructing the respondent

Having problematized how those talked about have been fabricated in the Eurobarometer, we may now turn to the equally important task of investigating how those talked to, or those asked to respond, have been constructed. Although the respondents too are objects under investigation in the Eurobarometer, their status as such, as objects of inquiry, is hidden, and through the phrasing of the questions they appear as speaking subjects, "I's", and a "we". One could argue that attitude studies designed as the Eurobarometer build on the assumption that the narrative sets out from the answer of the respondent. It emanates from an object entering into the role of a speaking subject, somebody with an opinion, or
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somebody who wants to express what she thinks and feels as a self. This in turn builds on a commonsensical viewpoint that questions such as those in the Eurobarometer are just more or less accurate or well refined reproductions of questions that are already "out there" in the public. What we do as social scientists – the commonsensical argument appears to go – is to poll the opinions on these questions; we simply try as adequately and precisely as possible to mirror the attitudes and opinions we detect among people. To borrow from the Chicago Cultural Studies Group, the attitude researcher can be portrayed as being equipped with a "dissociated" "view from nowhere" (1992: 549-552).

But questions do not, as such, come from nowhere. They do not, in and by themselves, constitute fixed points of departure, but are shaped in narratives and discourses that give them meaning. In the passage on "race", which was dealt with earlier on ("And what about people of another race living in our country [...]"

we are provided with one such instance where we can see how a whole set of presuppositions about the world lie embedded in one single question. Here the notion of "race" is presented to the respondent as something unproblematic, natural, even factual, and thereby the question also presupposes – as Miles puts it – "an acceptance of the existence of biological differences between human beings, differences which express the existence of distinct, self-reproducing groups" (1993: 2). By simply answering the question then, the respondent agrees to a whole range of implied opinions about how the world is structured. Adding to the picture some further "world-shaping" questions require mention in this context:

[...] how do you feel about the number of people of another nationality, living in our country: Are there too many [...] (Eurobarometer 30, Q. 169/172 (A))

And what about people of another religion living in our country: Are there too many [...] (Eurobarometer 30, Q. 169/172 (C))

And what about people with another culture living in our country: Are there too many [...] (Eurobarometer 30, Q. 169/172 (D))

Rather than being the narrator the respondent now emerges as the narratee, the one who is already narrated by the survey she participates in.
This is, however, not to be read as implying that we ever do attain the position of the solid, centred, and prelinguistically given narrator, or "I". But since the Eurobarometer does seem to subscribe to such an essentialist view, it is important to show how this view is intertwined with another view, namely that the survey questions indeed are outside the political realm. But what if we can show that in order to participate in the survey one has to agree – consciously or unconsciously – with a whole range of politically contested positions; such as the essentialist conception where cultures, "races", and nationalities are treated as self-contained and sealed off entities; secondly, that it is completely unproblematic that "I" or the "we-community", in which the respondent has been put, has been constructed with the right to talk about people as a silenced lump; and thirdly, that the respondents have been constructed so as to view some people as making up a problem? It is when we imagine ourselves disputing or politicising these positions, which the Eurobarometer attempts to naturalise, that we will come to view the respondent in the Eurobarometer not as outside all narratives, but instead as somebody written as a holder of certain political beliefs, or world view. To truly become the implied respondent then, one has to subscribe – and again, consciously or unconsciously – to the implied assumptions carried by the questions. Consequently, numerous views and thereby also a large number of people have been excluded and are not allowed to feel at home in the survey's implied subject. For such homeless people only one alternative seems to remain: to avoid participating.

Another common approach to the respondents in the Eurobarometer is the interviewer's tendency to position himself on common ground with his object. The interviewer becomes "we" with the respondent. This is displayed in the frequent inclusion of the possessive pronoun "our" in the questions: "[...] living in our country [...]" (see the questions exemplified above). Also, the recurrent use of words and phrases such as "their", "them", "another", "these people" when referring to out-groups/immigrants helps create a sense of sameness and potentially shortens the distance between interviewer (narrator) and respondent (narratee). Good examples of this method are found in these two questions:

Talking about these people living in (country) who are neither (nationality) nor citizens of the European Community, which of
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these ways would you prefer to define their status? (Eurobarometer 30, Q. 271)

Still talking about them, do you think that their presence here is a good thing, good to some extent, bad to some extent or a bad thing for the future of our country? (Eurobarometer 30, Q. 273)

But what does this approach really tell us about the interviewer? Since the Eurobarometer simultaneously with its construction of the interviewer as "we" with those interviewed, assumes an ethnocentric respondent, should we then conclude that the interviewer too is ethnocentric, that he or she too finds it unproblematic to treat and talk about people the way the respondents are supposed to do? I certainly do not think we are supposed to draw such a conclusion. What I would like to suggest then is that we in the method applied by those in charge of the Eurobarometer are detecting yet another "we and them" relationship; this time between those asking and those answering. By creating a fictitious "we"-relationship with the respondent the interviewer creates a space in which he or she can avoid being perceived as a representative for a detached elite who is just "out there" among the "common people" to poll their ethnocentric attitudes (while the interviewer himself passes as being beyond the questions he asks). Thus, in the Eurobarometer the one asking and the one answering are written as being on the same "team". But as shown, all one has to do to uncover the non-existence of such a team is to present the absurdity in having the survey designers wanting us to approach them in the same manner they have approached the respondents. Hence, it becomes difficult for people to participate in the survey without being compelled to reproduce and subscribe to an essentialist, exclusive, and ethnocentric discourse.

A self-sealed room, or the hegemony of the question

The excluding practices embodied in the Eurobarometer are twofold. They comprise a silencing of both those constituting the topic of the survey and those unwilling to take the role of the implied subject. One must ask then what the question-constructors are hoping to find out or achieve with their work. At the outset some people are defined as out-groups whereas
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others are asked to reproduce and supply that definition with content. Speaking in a Baudrillardian tongue, one could claim that what the Eurobarometer is really involved in is not the mirroring of opinions, but instead the reproduction of opinions (Baudrillard, 1983: 126). On some occasions the Eurobarometer makes this reproductive function explicit:

On the following card (show card) are listed a number of things that many people feel are important sources of similarities and differences among groups of people. For each one would you please tell me how different or similar do you think (out-group) living here are to other (nationality) people like yourself. Would you say very different, somewhat different, somewhat similar or very similar? (Eurobarometer 30, Q. 359/364)

The "things" that "many people feel are important" presented before the respondent are the following: "The values that they teach their children" (Q. 359); "Their religious beliefs or practices" (Q. 360); "Their physical features like their skin colours, nose, eyes, hair, and lips" (Q. 361); "Their sexual values or sexual practices" (Q. 362); "How honest they are" (Q. 363); and "The language they speak" (Q. 364).

Since "many people" are said to "feel" that these "things" are "important", the respondents are presumed to think of them as important too. The choice consists of determining whether the respondent thinks, for example, that lips or the level of honesty are different or similar among out-groups as compared to the collectivity in which he or she has been located. Thus, what we are faced with here as well, is a good example of how the reproduction of prefabricated opinions operates on different levels – from the general to the particular – where the reproduction of one level legitimises the reproduction of the other. By first narrating the world as being populated by different self-contained "races", nationalities, cultures, and religions, these units can later on be filled with their particular content. To cite Miles again,

The ideas of "race" and "nation" are categories of simultaneous inclusion and exclusion. They identify socially constructed boundaries which separate the world’s population into discrete groups which are commonly (although not exclusively) alleged to be naturally distinct. [...] Concerning the idea of "race", the object of
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signification is biological [...]. In the case of the idea of "nation", the criterion is usually cultural in character (e.g. language, "way of life"). In practice, it is often difficult to sustain this distinction because "cultural" characteristics can be represented as "natural" and therefore biological endowments [...] (1993: 56)

Furthermore, the Eurobarometer also runs the risk of adding a hierarchical edge. In other words, by expecting the respondent to have a clear opinion about the out-groups' possible difference or sameness in terms of honesty, sexual practices, noses, etc., a quality rating of groups of people is almost unavoidably invoked. Thus, the survey risks aiding a process of racialisation through which "an Other" is being constructed "that is so different from Us that They should either 'belong' elsewhere or should be denied resources or rights available to the majority" (Miles, 1993: 13). It is not a matter of whether it is of any relevance or, for that matter, if it is morally responsible to enable the respondents to think about people in these terms; the choice does not lie here. That people prior to being perceived as black or as being more or less honest first have to be constructed that way cannot receive any recognition in the Eurobarometer (cf. Wittig, 1981: 48). Given this, the survey will always be able to verify its claims: All participants in the Eurobarometer will necessarily fall into the category "many people", and in search for evidence that many people feel that some "things" are "important sources of similarities and differences", the survey can cite itself. But where, we must ask, do we find the original "many people" who thought of those sources selected by the Eurobarometer as important? As discussed before, one of the inherent problems with all attitude research designed as the Eurobarometer, is that it converts socially and politically produced markers of difference (such as physical characteristics) between the social categories it employs – which in turn also are socially and politically produced – into something a priori given (cf. Molina and Tesfahuney, 1994b: 35).

What emerges is a sealed discourse, both in terms of its form and content. Questions are in full control of the possible answers; the answers are "design-ated in advance" (Baudrillard, 1983: 117). To borrow further from Baudrillard we are in the Eurobarometer encountering a research in which "social exchange is reduced to obtaining an answer" (1983: 124). Consequently, the next question must be: An answer for whom?
Conclusion: who wants to know?

When first contemplating this question the risk of appearing conspiratorial immediately came to mind. However, reading a Eurobarometer report written about Eurobarometer 39, which contains a follow-up survey on Eurobarometer 30, all such fears quickly disappeared. Here things are stated with great clarity:

The problem of immigration from non-European Community countries is of great concern to Community politicians. Traditional immigration from southern Europe or North Africa, and the more recent immigration from Central and Eastern Europe, as well as the large number of people seeking political asylum and looking for refuge in Western Europe, all create reception problems for the EC, which is already very badly affected by the economic crisis and growing unemployment. (Eurobarometer, 1993: 87)

Gathering from the quote, immigration in itself is being looked upon as a problem by the Eurobarometer, and, as a consequence, Community politicians are concerned. Furthermore, the highly dubious connection between immigration and economic burden is spelled out as constituting common knowledge (cf. Balibar, 1991). What we also learn from the report is that the survey concerning "public opinion [...] regarding resident immigrants or those coming to Europe" included in Eurobarometer 39 was suggested by the European Parliament (Eurobarometer, 1993: 85).

Since we in the case of the Eurobarometer are dealing with commissioned work, we have to take into account that the political applicability of the survey results will be at the centre of attention (cf. Molina and Tesfahuney, 1994a: 7). Bearing in mind the exclusionary practices inherent in the Eurobarometer, the potential danger of any political practice taking the Eurobarometer as its starting point could not be emphasised enough. Moreover, since the European Commission's Eurobarometer shares the view with most governments in Western Europe that immigration itself (and thereby the individual immigrant as well) is what constitutes the problem, this makes the matter all the more serious. And perhaps we are here confronted with the most fatal aberration within all attitude studies on immigration similar to the one carried out in the Eurobarometer, namely that those who are exposed to exclusion,
stigmatisation, and racism are the ones who get problematized; they become the "problem". As a result, attitude research as we come across it in the Eurobarometer and the like is partaking in the general Western European move towards "culturalizing the 'problematic' rather than problematizing the structural restraints" (Ålund and Schierup, 1991: 11).

By problematizing the "other" instead of recognising that it is our ability to speak about an "other" as "out-group" in the first place which should constitute the problem, the Eurobarometer establishes yet another space in which a stereotypical and debasing language of "we and them" becomes the norm. When researchers are not even reflecting over how it became possible to talk and ask questions about people as a silent lump or as out-groups – in other words: when one avoids the question of what it is in society that makes such discourse unproblematic – a critique of their research obviously cannot aim at refining their questions. In a way things are actually more elementary than that, because simply by not asking the kind of questions we see in the Eurobarometer something is already gained.

References


Essay V
"European citizenship", or where neoliberalism meets ethno-culturalism: analyzing the European Union's citizenship discourse

"'We've always had a healthy inferiority complex here about tall, blond people,' said Luigi Spaventa, a former Budget Minister [of Italy]. For us, it's the euro or Africa.""  

Introduction

When French strikers and protesters took to the streets in the winter of 1995-96 this in some respects set a new tone for political and social agency in the European Union. Since then different forms of popular manifestations against what Pierre Bourdieu (1998: 129) calls the "social costs of economic violence" have become commonplace in several member states. New and challenging debates on the social consequences of globalization have come to the fore, together with new types of social movements, such as the organizing amongst the unemployed (Bourdieu, Lebaron and Mauger, 1998; Singer, 1998b).

Taken as a whole this demonstrates something that is often neglected in contemporary debates, namely that social rights, or the social dimension of citizenship, still can be a strong mobilizing force in the formation of inclusive collective identities. Moreover, as the imagery of French processions of demonstrators has shown for some years now, identifying with social rights always involves the possibility of cutting across ethnic and cultural divides. Indeed, at a time when public manifestations by an ethnically diverse crowd are most often associated with some type of multiculturalism, bringing the issue of "difference" to the forefront, the

1 An abridged version of this essay will be published in European Societies: The official journal of the European Sociological Association, Vol. 2, No. 2, 2000.
French manifestations might very well constitute a 1990s novelty in Europe in the sense that they take place without giving rise to questions of cultural and ethnic disparities. The white, brown and black faces of strikers and protesters in France and elsewhere in the EU affirm that people, who are unequally placed in today’s increasingly ethno-culturally defined social hierarchy, are indeed still able to share a common citizenship identity – an idea that so many have come to view as antiquated, even utopian. In France this worries Le Pen and the Front National, who came out publicly denouncing the strikes. An obvious reason for this is that the Front has been working hard and certainly quite successfully to prevent a strong common social identity to form across particular ethnic, cultural and religious differences. Hence, we may come to see a new kind of development, in France and possibly in Europe at large. It runs against the commonly held view that the socially deprived and the economically anxious middle class have a “natural” inclination to turn towards the racist right for explanations, if they belong ethnically to national majorities, and towards separatist strategies or ”fundamentalism”, if they are minority ”ethnics”.

Alongside the racist right there are other political actors who have gotten their feet cold. Uneasiness has built up among policy-makers in Brussels facing three years of recurrent and market-inhibiting strikes across the Union. The European Commission, for instance, has voiced an increasing irritation, stressing the urgent need to curtail strikes that impede the free movement on goods within the EU; hence showing its promptitude to infringe on such basic civil rights as the right to strike for the sake of safeguarding the free movement goods (Aftonbladet, 2 January, 1998; Marfleet, 1999: 96). This kind of reaction, facing obstructions to ”the free market”, appears worrying for those who have put their faith in the EU rhetoric promising a strengthened democracy and social justice in a ”citizens’ Europe”.

In expanding the analysis of this problematic, this article seeks to map the European Union’s discourse of ”European citizenship” as it has evolved since the early 1970s. More precisely the purpose is to investigate how this discourse on citizenship unfolds in the matters of social citizenship rights, ethnic relations, immigration, and the interrelated EU

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3 In broad terms this article leans on Marshall’s (1950/1992: 8) definition of social citizenship as that which includes ”the whole range from the right to a modicum of economic welfare and security to the right to share to the full in the social heritage and to live the life of a civilized
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project of forming a "European identity". Through an examination of mainly European Commission documents, the article develops a critical perspective of those core ingredients, definitions and meanings which the EU attaches to the "European citizenship". It is my contention that discourses on citizenship merit close scrutiny since they form part of those "'machineries' and regimes of representation" (Hall, 1988: 27) which articulate, legitimate and thereby construct a community's boundaries of inclusion and exclusion. Although there is a growing body of research focusing on the various legal restraints built-in to the EU citizenship and how these work excluding towards third country nationals4, the task set forth here of going beyond the legal domain to analyze the wider excluding implications of the EU's citizenship discourse has remained rather unexplored in the scholarly debate.

It hardly needs mentioning that citizenship has become a prestige word, even a buzz-word, within EU policy-making. In recent years the references to a "Citizens' Europe", "European citizenship", "Community citizens" and the like have been growing at an exponential rate. In EU publications these terms now surface in a number of different contexts, spanning, among others, discussions on architectural heritage restoration, European identity formation, immigration and asylum, tourism, crime, currency policy, language policy and media policy. Indeed, within the new European Commission there are now even plans to create a "Citizens' Europe" Directorate-General, with the aim to "help associate the EU in the public mind with 'people-friendly' activities" (European Voice, 10-16 June, 1999). Yet, as this article will ponder, borrowing from Kofman (1995: 122), "does this mean that the extension of and debate about the renewal of citizenship in Europe will bring advantages to those groups that have been marginalized or excluded from it until now?"

Given the fact that a discussion of citizenship in the affirmative - a campaign to be more precise - at the EU-level has been able to thrive in the midst of a growing social exclusion in the Union, this in and of itself being according to the standards prevailing in the society". Faist (1995: 16), in his development and reworking of Marshall's central thesis, refers to social citizenship as encapsulating "the material conditions of the existence of membership and recognition", and as imbued with those rights "required for a decent standard of living".

4 At present there are between twelve and thirteen million permanently resident third country nationals in the Union. The reason why they are excluded from EU citizenship derives from the fact that, legally speaking, only member state nationals are granted EU citizenship. For a critical discussion of this problematic see, among others, Hansen, Randall (1998); and d'Oliveira (1995).
may indicate that the EU’s current definition of citizenship can do without a strong social element, that the meaning of citizenship as a social medium has been transformed. To put it differently, while large numbers of people in the EU have been thrown into unemployment and social marginalization, these same people have also, and simultaneously with this process, been told that they should take pride in their newly attained status as “European citizens”.

I will argue that the EU’s adoption of a neoliberal agenda – put in place in the 1980s – and the restraints it has imposed on a social vision for the EU project has both forced and enabled EU policy-makers to tap into other sources than those harbouring the traditional social citizenship provisions in order to formulate and envision a citizenship idea for the European Union. Besides neoliberal ideals of the individualized market or consumer citizenship then, the EU also articulates an ethno-culturally defined citizenship, founded on the claim that what amalgamates a citizenry is a shared sense of belonging to a historic community endowed with a common civilization, culture and religion. This paper contends that such an ethno-cultural notion of citizenship and identity is bound up with a number of excluding implications for the Union’s non-white and non-Christian inhabitants; a problematic which recurs in my subsequent analysis of EU citizenship discourse and its bearing on the questions of immigration and asylum.

The formation of a discourse on Citizenship at the level of the European Union

Although ”Citizenship of the Union”\(^5\), or a formal EU citizenship, was not to become part of the Treaty until 1993 – with the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty – the idea of creating such a citizenship for the EEC and subsequently the EC had been discussed off and on for many years (Wiener, 1997: 537-8). References to ”the citizens of Europe”,

\(^5\) According to the EC Treaty (Part Two, Article 8(1)) ”Every person holding the nationality of a Member State shall be a citizen of the Union”. The rights provided by the ”Citizenship of the Union” (listed in Articles 8a-8e) include, among others, ”the right to move and reside within the territory of the Member States”; ”the right to vote and to stand as a candidate” at municipal and European Parliament elections for residents in a member state other than the one where they are nationals; expanded diplomatic and consular protection; and ”the right to petition the European Parliament” and to ”apply to the Ombudsman” (Council of the European
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"Community citizens" and "a Citizens' Europe" were thus frequent long before the legal category "citizen of the Union" had been established.\(^6\)

The first tangible initiatives towards the creation of the present EU citizenship were taken at the Paris summit between the Community's Heads of State in 1974, where a working group was set up for the purpose of studying what was referred to as "special rights" for member states' citizens (Commission of the European Communities\(^7\), 1993d: 1; see also CEC, 1996a: 5). Prior to the 1974 summit the Copenhagen foreign ministers' meeting in 1973 had put forth a "Declaration on European identity" which (although it did not bring up the concept of a Community citizenship in the explicit) incorporated a discourse that to some extent would fit subsequent articulations of "European citizenship". Among other things, the "Declaration on European identity" spoke of the urgent need to focus on the shared "heritage" and "to ensure the survival of the civilization" which the Community countries and the potential new members were said to have in common (CEC, 1973). In 1976 the Tindemans Report to the European Council would develop and expand on these arguments and link them directly to the idea of "A citizen's Europe". Under this heading the Tindemans Report argued that in order for the Community to "be close to its citizens" the "values which are their common heritage" had to be safeguarded (Tindemans, 1976: 26). It also explicated that "we", the peoples of the European Community, "must build a type of society which is ours alone and which reflects the values which are the heritage and the common creation of our peoples"; a society "which respects the basic values of our civilization" (Tindemans, 1976: 12).

But the grounding of a "European citizenship" in these self-assured and essentialist views on culture and civilization was only part of the story. Described by many as favourably inclined towards social reform during these years (Hoskyns, 1996: 78-83; Hantrais, 1995: 1, 5; Williams, 1994: Ch. 7), the Community also included social and economic issues in its discussion of citizenship. In the 1976 Tindemans report, for instance, the goal of full employment together with ideas of economic and industrial democracy were discussed as part of the agenda (cf. Hoskyns, 1996: 78-__

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6 See for example Tindemans (1976); and CEC (1984).
7 Hereafter abbreviated as CEC.
As the powers over economic policy gradually moved to transnational arenas, it was argued, "this problem should be solved at the European level by increasing worker participation in the management, control or profits of business" (Tindemans, 1976: 25). The "security of the workforce, [...] and their participation in company decisions and company profits" were seen by the Report as policy objectives to be managed at the "European level" in order to "restore to us at Union level that element of protection and control of our society which is progressively slipping from the grasp of State authority due to the nature of the problems and the internationalization of social life" (1976: 24, 28). "Economic and social rights", as citizens' rights, were thus seen as matters which should be managed by empowered Community institutions. As a consequence, intergovernmental arrangements were ruled out as unable to deal with "our collective needs" and the future social dilemmas arising from economic and corporate transnationalization (1976: 26, 29).

Even though the European Parliament pushed for the ideas behind the concept of a "Citizen's Europe" from the mid-1970s and onwards, it did not spur much further action; this was partly due to an unwillingness on the part of the European Council (CEC, 1993d: 5; Hoskyns, 1996: 83). Yet, what had been shown with some force was that many Community policy-makers, member state politicians and, in particular, members of the European Parliament were convinced that if the Community project of further market integration were to progress it had to be able to enthuse the general public and so find a new and strong mobilizing argument outside the realm purely concerned with market integration. This what we may call the legitimacy argument for "European citizenship" has reverberated with increasing force ever since.

After the initiatives in the 1970s it should take almost another decade before the time proved ripe again for the question of "European citizenship" to be seriously prioritized on the Community agenda (cf. CEC, 1993d). What set it off was the European Council meeting at Fontainebleau in 1984, "which stressed the importance of creating a People's Europe" and for this purpose appointed what was to become the influential ad hoc Committee on A People's Europe, led by Pietro Adonnino (CEC, 1988: 22).

8 Similar statements reflecting such a reform-minded agenda are found in the "Council Resolution of 21 January 1974 concerning a social action programme" (Council of the European Communities, 1974).
If we compare Community perceptions of "European citizenship" as they were articulated in the 1970s with those put forth from the mid-1980s and onwards there are at least two developments that need to be examined. Firstly, during the 1980s the grounding of "European citizenship" in an essentialist discourse of European civilization, culture and heritage got more firmly established – a development that I will come back to at a later stage. Secondly, whereas in the 1970s the Community held the door open to a federalism for social citizenship and was prone to emphasize collective social needs, greater workers' participation in economic decision-making and other ideas of economic democracy, the 1980s would be practically void of such currents. As stated by the Commission in 1988:

In a Europe without frontiers, where increased competitiveness and cooperation will go hand in hand, the individual and his actions will carry far more weight, both economically and socially [...]. At the same time, awareness of a Community based on common values and cultures will be boosted and will gradually reinforce the idea of European citizenship. (CEC, 1988: 22)

Hence, within Community discourse on citizenship in the 1980s "collective needs" came to refer less to the social domain and more to the domain of culture and identity. More than that, the professionally mobile individual and the "Community citizen as consumer" appear in the limelight (CEC, 1985: 11). The Commission writes that "[t]he goal should be an easing of rules and practices which cause irritation to Community citizens" (CEC, 1985: 9), and then points to architects, engineers, lawyers, accountants and tax consultants as groups that need certain obstacles removed when they seek jobs outside their countries (CEC, 1985: 13).

The 1980s should therefore prove disappointing for those who had hoped that the reborn integration process would nurture the federalist social citizenship goals of the 1970s. As Pierson and Leibfried have argued (1995: 450) "the reinvigoration of European integration depended precisely on the emergence of an anti-social democratic consensus on economic policy within the major member states". With the Single European Act then, the assertion from the 1970s that popular legitimacy for further integration was to be achieved through the creation of a strong redistributive welfare regime at the supranational level was discarded as a

**A de-socialized citizenship**

Contrary to what is often invoked then, these changes in perception on part of the Community – from a citizenship based on social collective needs to one based on individual market opportunity – show the extent to which the European integration was bound up with the ideological restructuring that took place in the 1980s (cf. O'Leary, 1995: 180). Rather than being immune to particular ideological and political leanings, the EC in the 1980s came to constitute both an arena offering new opportunities for ideological restructuring and an organ which itself took advantage of the new neoliberal climate (cf. Goodman, 1997: 173, 195). This could be seen, among others, in the expanding lobbying efforts by a corporate community increasingly gravitating towards Brussels. Also, the Delors Commission's close collaboration with the European Roundtable of Industrialists serves as an illustration of this (Hines, 1997). And as Pierson and Leibfried (1995: 453) contend "[t]he growth of business power [at the expense of labour] in Europe" has been "one of the most significant political developments of the past two decades." (see also Goodman, 1997: 195).

To contextualize further, it is of crucial importance to note that constitutive of the ideological battle waged from the New Right in the late 1970s and 1980s was the attempt to gain control over and thereby change the meanings tied to the concept of citizenship. As Moore (1992: vi) emphasizes: "if there has been one central target for the New Right it has been the idea of citizenship". In evaluating the outcome of this attempt, it is unquestionably the case that neoconservative and neoliberal forces have gained the upper hand, consequently generating an increasingly individualized and market-oriented perception of citizenship, where private interests are seen as better equipped to manage public assets and
services, and where notions of "active citizenship"\(^9\), volunteerism, and charity are replacing commitments to universal and collectively sustained citizenship entitlements (Smith, 1995: 191-2; see also Smith, 1989; Bottomore, 1992: 70-1; Mouffe, 1988; Rose, 1996; Kymlicka and Norman, 1994). This is also a point stressed by Yuval-Davis (1997: 16-17) who argues that due to the past decades' appropriation of the vocabulary of citizenship by forces on the right, "[t]he balance of citizenship rights has shifted away from social rights of welfare towards civil rights of an economic kind"; or as one representative of the Swedish business elite put it: "the citizens’ new influence will not stem from their roles as voters, wage earners or members of an organized interest. Their power will be based on their significance as consumers"\(^10\) (Nachemson, 1998).

Part of the neoliberal attack on the welfare state consensus in the 1970s and 1980s has thus consisted of a concerted effort to change the understanding of citizenship as never fully realized without a strong redistributive social component. Consequently, the primary target for the New Right has been the institution of the welfare state and the discourse justifying social rights.

If this redefinition of citizenship along neoliberal and neoconservative lines unquestionably has impacted the American understanding of citizenship the most\(^11\), the development since the eighties gives at hand that there are signs of this becoming the orthodoxy in the EU and its member states as well. The then Swedish Conservative leader Carl Bildt, for example, upon return from his 1995 (EU discussion) visit to the United States, acclaimed the Republican party platform "Contract with America". Evidently not taking notice of its exclusive construction of the model American citizen, its overt racism, sexism, Christian fundamentalism and contemptuousness of the poor (Cockburn, 1995; Derber, 1995), Bildt praised the "Contract" for its commitment to cuts in social spending and its moral message to the delinquents and the "teen-age girls" with children born out of wedlock (Bildt, 1995a; 1995b). Similarly, Tony Blair has commended the 1996 Clinton-Gingrich "welfare reform"

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\(^9\) For a critical account of the notion of "active citizenship" as put forth by the British New Right, see, among others, Oliver (1991).

\(^10\) My translation from Swedish.

\(^11\) For a good overview of how and the extent to which right-wing and neoliberal lobbying and think tanks have managed to influence the social policy-agenda in the United States and so redefine perceptions of citizenship, see Covington (1998). See also Piven (1998: 76-77).
Europeans only?

(Thayer, 1997: 10)\textsuperscript{12}, a "reform" presently doing away with the last remnants of Roosevelt's New Deal and Johnson's Great Society, and which is in the process of establishing "a virtually indentured labor force of welfare recipients" (Piven, 1998: 72); forced to compete with the already working poor, and coerced into jobs earning less than minimum wage, which in turn has led to massive layoffs and replacements of (often unionized) workers with cheaper welfare labour (Cooper, 1997). More recently — and apparently disregarding the highly dubious claims about unemployment being markedly lower in the US than in the EU (Gans, 1995; Thurow, 1994; Wronka, 1998)\textsuperscript{13} — France's socialist prime minister Lionel Jospin and the then chairman of Germany's social democrats, Oskar Lafontaine, extolled American employment policies, the former declaring that Europe has a lot to learn from the United States "in the area of jobs", while the latter depicted the US "as a model of successful macro-economic thinking" (Vinocur, 1998). By and large, these "Americanized" views on labour-market policy and unemployment also find an outlet in policy proposals from the European Commission (see, for example, CEC, 1994a: 9).

Thus, with the "American solution to globalization" (Greider, 1997: 369, 373) gaining momentum in EU-Europe, the analysis of how neoliberal and right-wing discourses are appropriating new definitions of citizenship to justify the relegation of large segments of the inhabitants to de facto serfdom — by, among others, turning workfare into a virtuous citizenship duty — becomes less exclusively US-specific (Jordan, 1998). The so-called working poor (or those also referred to as suffering from income poverty) — counting approximately 30 million working Americans who do not make a living wage, are stripped of health insurance, vacation, paid sick-leave, and in most cases the right to form labour-unions (Newman, 1996) — is just one phenomenon which can be said to be getting its EU

\textsuperscript{12} For a discussion of Blair's and New Labour's ("neo-Thatcherite") views on the concept of welfare and of what they incidentally have termed Britain's "welfare reform", see Marqusee (1997).

\textsuperscript{13} Unlike their EU-European counterparts, American official unemployment figures very rarely draw any criticism concerning their accuracy. This plight — which is due both to an uncritical acceptance and an intentional black-out — has generated a very potent ideological weapon in the hands of those who argue that the only way to come to terms with the unemployment problem in the EU is to adopt the American formula. Yet, as Gans (1995) and others have shown, American unemployment statistics suffer from an extreme arbitrariness. Speaking of the US unemployment figures for 1994, for instance, Gans (1995: 107) argues — drawing from Thunow's (1994) and others' work — that "while the official rate was then 6.4 percent, the actual figure was 15 percent".
equivalent (Singer, 1998a). According to a French report released in 1997, the proportion of those in France on low wages increased by almost 50 percent between 1983 and 1997, presently making up more than 15 percent of the workers. This development was altogether attributed to a doubling of those earning "very low pay". The report also pointed to a sharply increased discrepancy between those earning the most and those earning the least in France (Singer, 1998a). A similar trend of mounting income poverty and of increased wage differences between the rich and the poor has been detected across the European Union (Coates, 1998; Greider, 1997).

A market citizenship

Taking our discussion of the EU and its discourse on citizenship to the present decade — where the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty has formally established "citizenship of the Union" — it is important to keep in mind that the EU still entertains a vocabulary which signals that its institutions have not bought the neoliberal concept wholesale. In EU policy discourse it is occasionally adduced that the Union needs to find a middle course or a "compromise" between the "extremes" of neoliberalism and the tradition of welfare state policies (CEC, 1996a: 2; see also CEC, 1994a). The adoption of the Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights — or the "social dimension" — in 1989 together with the Maastricht Treaty's Agreement on Social Policy are put forth as evidence of this. In this context the Commission stresses the need to come to terms with social exclusion by means of a strengthened social dimension for the EU-project, and that this also should be seen as an important aspect of "European citizenship" (cf. CEC, 1993b; CEC, 1994a). Moreover, the new Amsterdam Treaty is said to "place employment and citizens' rights at the heart of the Union" (CEC, 1997a: 1) through the promotion of "a high level of employment and of social protection" (Council of the European Union, 1997a: 54).

Yet, as Hantrais (1995: 15) writes, "[a]lthough a number of policy statements have been made over the years about the importance of the social dimension of the Community, [...] there is little concrete evidence that European social policy is perceived by the Council as other than a handmaiden to economic objectives". Thus, those who had been in hopes
that the 1990s, starting with the Maastricht Treaty, would break with the neoliberal pattern established in the 1980s and embrace a serious attempt to make economic objectives compatible with the tradition of social citizenship quickly had their optimism put to rest (Ebbinghaus and Visser 1997: 198). Here the adoption of the convergence criteria tied to the EMU project proved to be a major source of disappointment, since these severely limited the scope of social citizenship provisions in the member states, including measures against unemployment (Meulders and Plasman, 1997; Coates, 1998; Woollacott, 1996). Indeed, looking at the brunt of the EU policy discourse in the 1990s one soon finds that the commitments to social measures mostly are modelled on and so subordinate to the imperatives of inflation control and other market demands.

The Commission’s White Paper on ”Growth, competitiveness, employment” (CEC, 1993a) serves as a poignant illustration of this. Because, while the White Paper is not wanting in statements supportive of ”[a]n economy characterized by solidarity”, ”the fight against social exclusion” and poverty (CEC, 1993a: 15-16), it also firmly establishes that these social aims in no way complicate the White Paper’s overarching neoliberal declaration. Prepared in close collaboration with the European Roundtable of Industrialists (Hines, 1997), the White Paper comprises of calls for a flexible labour market, a set of ”more enterprise-friendly” regulations, reduced labour costs and unemployment benefits, lower taxes, cut-backs in the welfare systems and overall public expenditures, and increased privatization (CEC, 1993a; see also Leibfried and Pierson, 1995: 49-50). This asymmetrical relationship between what we may term the rhetorical commitments to social citizenship and the concrete commitments to neoliberal economism also finds expression in the Commission’s subsequent White Paper on social policy (CEC, 1994a). In sum, and to borrow from Singer’s (1998a) characterization of the French prime minister Lionel Jospin, it seems as if the Commission ”wants capitalism, but not its logical consequences”. In other words, the Commission fails to explain how its social dimension objectives can be brought into line with the neoliberal agenda and the EMU project.

In more recent statements from the Commission the neoliberal message has become even more pronounced. In a document entitled Commission’s Recommendation for the Broad Guidelines of the Economic Policies of the Member States and the Community, the Commission argues energetically for ”a
reduction in the overall tax burden [...] in most Member States”14, seeing that “[h]igh taxes hamper economic efficiency, growth and, eventually, job creation” (CEC, 1998b: 8, 18). The document speaks in favour of privatization of public corporations and of increased wage differentials in order to ”promote the employability and the adaptability of the labour force” (CEC, 1998b: 12). It also argues for a ”Welfare reform” by way of ”tightening eligibility criteria, job search requirements and, in some cases, revising the time profile of benefits” (CEC, 1998b: 18, 19; see also CEC, 1998c; CEC, 1998d: 11-12). Similar opinions have been expressed by individual members of the European Commission. ”The Problem with welfare”, said Stefano Micossi, the then Director-General of DG III's Industrial Affairs,

is that it impairs market economy. It annuls the relationship between cost and utility. The unemployed does not have to seek work. The medical system neglects its duty, to cure the sick, because people with non-existent aches and pains lay claim on doctors’ time and attention free of charge (cited in Lundqvist, 1996; my translation from Swedish).

In yet another document — on the promotion of entrepreneurship in the EU — the Commission urges the member states to ”include knowledge about entrepreneurship in the curricula”, and that they ”should encourage universities and research institutions to remove barriers which prevent the commercialisation of research results” (CEC, 1998a: 4, 9). Again, the mantras of ”[m]aking taxation systems more business friendly”, together with calls to invest in ”an enterprise culture” reverberate throughout this document. (CEC, 1998a: 7, 5). Even measures which resonate of propaganda are included, such as when the Commission goads the member states to ”involve the media in order to give entrepreneurship a more prominent and positive role in society” (CEC, 1998a: 4).

A fragmenting force? A Union citizenship for the few

In order to analyze in more precise terms how the discourse on citizenship in the EU coalesces with the neoliberal agenda described above, we need

14 Note that in neoliberal discourse taxes are always seen as ”burdens".
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to take a closer look at the strong emphasis which the EU places on the relationship between Union citizenship and labour mobility. This was touched upon earlier when referring to Commission proposals to have certain legal barriers removed to enable lawyers, accountants, engineers and other professionals to obtain work in a member state other than their own. Here d'Oliveira (1995: 63) notes that:

the core and origin of Union citizenship is the right to free movement. Mobility is the central element, around which other rights crystallize. [...] This is not normally considered to be a political right linked up with democratic systems of government, but forms part of the fundamental economic freedoms of the European market: the mobility of economically active persons has now been elevated to the core of European citizenship.15

This is also a point that Lehning (1997: 179-80, 195) stresses when arguing that the social and political dimensions of the EU citizenship have lost out to an "economic citizenship" impersonated by the "market citizen"; a development which is structurally linked to the fact that the Union project primarily is built on market integration and efforts to implement the free movement of capital, services, goods and persons.

This economicist understanding of citizenship finds expression in numerous EU-documents. As set forth by the Commission, "[t]he first and foremost of the rights conferred on Union citizens is the right to travel and reside wherever they wish in any of the 12 Member States"; to which it subsequently adds: "If there are 340 million Community citizens, that means 340 million consumers free to choose from the broadest range of goods and services available anywhere in the world" (CEC, 1993c: 15, 29). Furthermore, in 1994 the Commission specified that "[p]erhaps the most important innovation is the free movement of persons: Union citizens are entitled to travel, reside, study and work wherever they want in the European Union" (CEC, 1994b: 57). As of late, "European citizenship" has also been (symbolically) coupled with the monetary union and the euro, giving rise to statements such as the following:

15 See also O'Keeffe (1994: 93-4).
Thanks to the complete elimination of foreign-exchange transaction costs, it will lead to savings and simplifications in the lives of European citizens. The general public must be prepared now for this change so as to pre-empt any fears it might arouse. In addition to its economic and monetary aspects, the introduction of euro notes and coins should provide hundreds of millions of Europeans with a material and concrete symbol of their common identity. (CEC, 1998d: 13)

More than that, the Commission is urging the member states to have their schools campaign for the euro. As the Commission contends, the EMU-project "offers a unique opportunity for the development of European citizenship". "Teaching the euro in schools is a 'formidable opportunity to anchor the idea of European citizenship' [...] showing its importance as a symbol of peace and economic well-being" (CEC, 1998e: 5).

Articulated in this fashion one may very well argue that the EU citizenship mostly caters for those roughly five million EU-citizens (out of a total EU population of some 370 million), who live and work in an EU country where they are not national citizens (Dubiel, 1998: 371; Naudin, 1994). As such, the EU citizenship represents a rather extreme form of particularism, where only a fraction of the population qualifies for any real sense of inclusion into the new EU-European space of rights and membership. Therefore, the frequent characterization in Community documents of the EU citizenship as not altering or replacing the status and modes of national citizenships, but as simply "complementing" and adding "extra rights" for "all" national citizens, needs some important restating. Examined in the context of retracting and socially de-universalized national citizenships, the EU citizenship might be better designated as a force possibly amplifying the social fragmentation in the Union. Kofman's (1995: 135) cautionary remark can thus be brought to bear on this problematic:

Multiplying the sites of citizenship may seem [...] attractive, but we must be wary of producing a two-tiered system of citizenship: one for the 'poor', who are locked into restricted spaces with second-class rights, the other cosmopolitan and encompassing all of the levels for the dominant groups in Europe.
The EU citizenship should therefore not, as is common, be written off as an empty concept not creating new rights and opportunities for people in the Union. Instead we should problematize the fact that these new rights and opportunities mostly speak to certain elite groups and not to a larger whole. As Wiener and Della Sala (1997: 605) argue, we are confronted with "a fragmented citizenship policy establishing special rights, not for Europeans as a people, but for special groups of Europeans in the process". This provided, we can then talk about the EU citizenship as granting new privileges for those who have been affluent enough to, in some sense, opt out of crumbling public welfare provisions and so depend less and less on a national social citizenship, while this same citizenship says practically nothing to those who cannot but continue to depend on a sharply devaluated national social citizenship.

Stretching the argument further, Holman and Pijl (1996) hold that instead of conceptualizing Western European integration as a process of state integration – which is the dominating approach – we could see it as a process of transnational class integration. The EU project, they argue, "has created a space in which the bourgeoisies of the different countries have been able to develop toward a common position irrespective of the various national settings" (Holman and Pijl, 1996: 56). The EU's articulation of "European citizenship" in terms of rights and access to high street shopping, leisure travelling, and working and studying abroad can indeed be said to underscore this point.

Finally, in discussing the social restraints and the limited popular appeal characteristic of the EU citizenship, Streeck (1995) sees this as a natural, even a functionally necessary consequence of the current workings of the European Union:

A free European market, if this is all that it is to be, does not 'require' a 'Europe of the citizen'; in fact, citizenship makes markets less 'free.' As far as the completion of the internal market is concerned, it does not matter that European citizenship [...] has remained limited to freedom of movement and contract within the integrated market. (Streeck, 1995: 413)

Nevertheless, in the light of the recent global financial turbulence, and with labour, socialist and social-democratic parties in leading positions in all but a few EU countries’ governments, there are also signs of a
neoliberalism in crisis. The strikes, protests and other forms of popular manifestations against the dismantlement of the social state, which were alluded to in the introduction of this paper, are other occurrences testifying to this destabilization of neoliberal discourse. Antagonisms and controversies around what constitutes "sound" economic policy and its bearings on the social are thus slowly re-emerging.\textsuperscript{16} Or as one commentator has put it: "A spectre is haunting Europe — the spectre of John Maynard Keynes"\textsuperscript{17} (Hedström, 1998). Thus, even if the mantra of budget austerity, price stability, tax cuts, privatization and flexibility still looms large at the EU level, one must, given the recent developments, caution against making hasty conclusions about the stability of the neoliberal trajectory surveyed here.

A crucial addition: citizenship and the ethno-cultural dimension

Although Streeck and others have a strong case for contending that the logic inherent to EU integration as we know it can do without a redistributive social citizenship at the EU level, it would be a premature conclusion to view citizenship policy in the Union as solely pinned to the type of market citizenship outlined above. Much research only emphasizes the dynamic between these two ways of construing citizenship in the EU, and when concluding, correctly, that the social dimension gets marginalized, it also tends to conclude, incorrectly, that the entire notion of "European citizenship" is reducible to market citizenship.

An analysis of the statements, policy-documents and the range of information-campaigns addressing the issue of "European citizenship" — which have been pouring out of Brussels since the mid-1980s — clearly suggests that the EU has been urgently seeking a citizenship formula which would supplement the individualized market citizenship. In other words, the EU is clear about that market integration and the participation in market relations across borders cannot constitute the only manifestations of "European citizenship". As expressed by the European Parliament: "The European message must concern Europeans both in their professional dimension, in terms of new opportunities and better

\textsuperscript{16} For a thought-provoking account of the growing criticisms and challenges currently facing neoliberalism, see Likić (1999).

\textsuperscript{17} My translation from Swedish.
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living standards, but also in their historical and cultural dimension, in terms of values, outlook and a commonly shared identity.” (European Parliament, 1993: 10) Time and again Community policy documents spell out the need ”to assure citizens that 'Europe' is not about economics alone”, that the Union ”depends for its very legitimacy on its citizens” (CEC, 1993c: 15); and that ”[p]enalty for failure [to make EU citizenship felt] is that citizenship of the Union may appear to be a distant concept for citizens engendering confusion as to its means and objectives even fuelling anti-EU feelings” (CEC, 1997b: 1). Thus, as these passages indicate, even market integration cannot do without some type of popular legitimacy if it is to progress smoothly. As the turbulence preceding the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty demonstrated, the EU seems aware of the fact that there is a limit to how much popular obstruction and scepticism the EU project can muster; or as Jacques Delors once said: ”You don't fall in love with a common market; you need something else” (cited in Naudin, 1994).

It is therefore of utmost importance to take cognizance of the fact that there is within EU policy also a strong collectivist articulation of ”European citizenship”; an articulation which appeals to a popular sense of rootedness in a shared culture, heritage, religion and civilization. Instead of locating the quest for legitimacy in a discourse organized around the question of social citizenship and a new transnational welfare regime, the EU has come to put its faith in an essentialist ethno-cultural citizenship discourse in which membership hinges upon descent and ties to a historical community (cf. Martiniello, 1995; Shore, 1993; Kofman, 1995: 128).

According to the previous Commission President Jacques Santer, the ”sources” of the European ”common cultural heritage – the heritage of the Western mind and tradition” – are ”Greek, Latin and Judeo-Christian” (cited in Lundgren, 1998: 136-7). Similarly, the European Parliament (1991: 13) has outlined present-day European culture as derived from ”classical culture and Christianity”. These sentiments are also fundamental to the vision laid out by the current Commission President Romano Prodi. In a speech delivered before the European Parliament, Prodi maintained that Christianity constitutes the common consciousness upon which European integration is founded (Prodi, 1999b). Other often invoked cultural characteristics and historical ”achievements” which ”European citizens” are said to identify with and celebrate as part of their common cultural heritage are those of the Renaissance, the Enlightenment, modern
science, the Industrial Revolution, and the worldwide dissemination of European currents during the 19th century (CEC, 1994b; 1995b; see also Prodi, 1999b).

Convinced that "culture and citizenship go hand in hand" (CEC, 1997c), the Commission has repeatedly called attention to the need of creating a stronger sense of cultural awareness amongst the citizens, and to have "culture" constitute "a privileged field of action" (CEC, 1996b: V, 3):

The inclusion of culture in the Treaty on European Union signals the importance which it assumes in the construction of Europe, at a moment when the emergence of a common citizenship seems one of the cornerstones of the ever-closer integration of our peoples. (CEC, 1997c)

According to the Commission, special measures should be taken in order to "improve access to heritage and the supply of information on it for the public at large so as to contribute to the affirmation of a European citizenship through greater knowledge of heritage" (CEC, 1995a: 13). "[C]ultural heritage", the Commission goes on to say, plays an important role in augmenting "the feeling of European citizenship" (CEC, 1996b: part II, 17).

Essential to this ethno-cultural configuration of citizenship is not only the conception of culture and the community it denotes as something self-contained and objectively given. Engrafted upon the "European" citizenry there is also an assumption of cultural superiority. In the Commission booklet A Citizen's Europe, for instance, Europe is portrayed as "the cradle of critical reasoning" and "cultural creativity", thus making today's "European citizens" the beneficiaries of "the intellectual resources they have inherited from a cultural tradition going back 2000 years or more" (CEC, 1993c: 45, 32). This in turn, it is argued, makes Europe better equipped to ward off a decline similar to that of history's other "great civilizations" (CEC, 1993c: 31). Furthermore, as part of its suggested strategy of explaining "European citizenship [...] in acceptable, motivating terms", the De Clercq Report to the European Parliament in 1993 claimed that Europeans are "the envied focus of culture, civilization, intellectual life and savoir-vivre in the world" (European Parliament, 1993: 27, 40). According to the Report, "We are Europeans, and are proud of it. What is happening is that we are realizing our identity. In asserting our position in
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the world, we assert the richness of our culture” (European Parliament, 1993: 33). More recently, Romano Prodi has embraced this theme as part of his programme, arguing “that Europe in the course of its history has had a great heritage to live up to, a heritage which still forms the richest store of culture and knowledge amassed by mankind” (Prodi, 1999a).

Premised, as it is, on ties to a European ancestral estate, Christianity, and other ethnico-cultural markers, the definition of “European citizenship” that comes to light in this discourse turns out to be a highly exclusive construct. To put it differently, it promotes, by default, an understanding of membership of a Union citizenry as something reserved for white populations, hence ostracizing the millions of EU inhabitants who cannot lay claim to the ethnico-cultural heritage in question (cf. Martiniello, 1995; Painter and Philo, 1995: 112-3; Kofman, 1995: 128-9; Hansen, 1998). Indeed, as Shore (1996: 487) points to, numerous EU statements pertaining to this issue resound of old-time anthropology, thus perpetuating ”the idea of a distinctive, bounded region set apart from others by race, religion, language and habitat”.

If this excluding tendency within EU citizenship discourse is disquieting in and of itself, it appears even more so once we situate it in the context of the last decade’s resurgence of a reductive culturalism combined with the self-fulfilling prophecies of Huntingtonian clashes of civilizations, that now permeates so much of political discourse in the West (cf. Delanty, 1995; Patterson, 1997). Speaking as the authority he is, Huntington addresses leaders and policy-makers directly, calling on them to exhort Western populations to acknowledge and act on the ”fact” that they ”have far more in common with each other than they have with Asian, Middle Eastern, or African peoples”. In other words, ”[t]he peoples of the West […] must hang together” (Huntington, 1996: 44). Moreover, since ”civilizations are not only real; they are basic”, the mixing of peoples from different civilizations is, on this view, bound to create enmities and instability, which in turn explains why it is inevitable that ”North African immigration to France generates hostility among Frenchmen” (Huntington, 1993: 25, 26). Huntington also stresses that ”The European Community rests on the shared foundation of European culture and Western Christianity”; and that ”cultural commonality is a prerequisite for economic integration” (1993: 27, 28). But to reinforce and maintain this order it is, according to Huntington, crucial that the West – both internally and externally – defines, defends and demarcates its culture. Accordingly,
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"controlling immigration from non-Western societies" should be a top priority (Huntington, 1996: 45).

Similar opinions which lend support to animosities and discrimination towards the non-white and non-Christian populations in Western Europe have been expressed by scores of political leaders, various institutions and media pundits during recent years. We recognize it from the Pope's repeated appeals to people in Europe to unite as Christians, since, as he has phrased it, "Christianity is at the very roots of European culture" (cited in Kettle, 1990). Along the same lines Dutch foreign minister, Hans van Mierlo, recently voiced his fear of an alien religious intrusion into the European Union, stating: "A large Muslim state would pose a problem. Do we really want such a state in Europe?" (cited in Jönsson, 1998). The exploitation of Islam as constituting Europe's ultimate "other", even enemy (cf. Haddad, 1993; Rees, 1997), also found an outlet in the former NATO secretary-general Willy Claes, who professed that so-called militant Islam had succeeded the role of the former Soviet Union in posing "the gravest threat to Western security" (cited in Rees, 1997: 32). It is worth noticing too that the conservative party group in the European Parliament, EPP, justified its opposition to Turkish membership of the EU by claiming that Turkey does not belong to the "European cultural community" (cited in Boqvist, 1997; see also Kinzer, 1997).

Current discussions of the future role of NATO, in particular, and of strategies on how to preserve Western security and prosperity, in general, are especially fraught with defensive references to European culture and civilization, calling forth an image of Europe and the West as threatened by foreign values, religions and life-styles rather than by foreign troops. A few years ago, for instance, the then prime minister of France, Edouard Balladur - addressing a Washington crowd - stated that the "question now is how to organize to protect ourselves from countries whose different values enable them to undercut us" (cited in Mahbubani, 1993: 13-14). Likewise, in dealing with the new challenges facing NATO after the fall of the Berlin Wall, president of the International Institute for Strategic Studies at Yale University, Michael Howard, argued that the Soviet Union would pose less of a threat to Europe and be easier to deal with were it to "shed its Asian dependencies and [...] return to its European roots" (Howard, 1990). More recently, A. M. Rosenthal of The New York Times,

18 My translation from Swedish.
19 My translation from Swedish.
has identified the safeguarding of "Western civilization in Europe" as one of NATO's chief objectives (Rosenthal, 1997); as has Czech president Vaclav Havel when hailing NATO as the guardian of "a particular human culture and civilization", as incarnating "the spirit of a desire to jointly defend our common cultural prosperity" (Havel, 1998).

In immediate reference to the EU's ethno-cultural delineation of Europe, Neumann (1998) argues that this discourse has helped set the stage for a veritable cultural tug of war between those countries aspiring to "join Europe", where each applicant country is trying to exclude another by portraying itself as more "European" than thou. Sifting the "applicant rhetoric", Neumann displays how, for instance, the Czech Republic endeavours to assert its status as a truly "European" nation by assigning Asian qualities to Slovakia; as does Ukraine in relation to Russia. In the same vein Slovenian parlance seeks to secure Europeanness for Slovenia by stigmatizing Croatia and Serbia as "Balkan", whereas Croatian discourse, for its part, situates "Orthodox" Serbia as outside of Europe. In like manner, Serbia - together with a plethora of other voices, one should add - can point to Bosnia's Muslim heritage as not belonging to Europe (Neumann, 1998: 406).

This is certainly not to suggest that the EU institutions necessarily have any intentions of fuelling present hostilities towards people born outside of the ethno-culturally defined European "stock". Rather, the gravity of the matter lies in the fact that the EU embraces the same basic categories, definitions, concepts and general outlook on "Europe" and what should constitute its "natural" citizenry as those institutions and voices who do not stop short of defining the included - as is mostly the case with the EU - but who also explicitly designate those who should be excluded. Where the former fails to acknowledge the excluding consequences of an ethno-cultural framing of Union citizenship, the latter both acknowledge and endorse them.

"European citizenship" and the immigration and security nexus

Besides its pronounced references to economy and culture, EU citizenship policy is also bound up with a discourse on security. In this context "European citizenship" seeks to gain legitimacy by offering its members a

20 My translation from Swedish.
high degree of protection from various external as well as internal threats. As set forth in the Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union, the Union should provide for its citizens "an area of freedom, security and justice, in which the free movement of persons is assured in conjunction with appropriate measures with respect to external border controls, asylum, immigration and the prevention and combating of crime" (Council of the European Union, 1997b: Title I, Art. 2). Prior to this, at its Florence meeting in 1996, the European Council stated that in order to "bring the Union closer to its citizens" the EU had to succeed in "meeting their need for security, which implies improving substantially the means and the instruments against terrorism, organized crime and drug trafficking, as well as the policies on all aspects of asylum, visas and immigration" (cited in European Parliament, 1997: 3).

However, the explicit coupling of citizenship with the immigration and security nexus is by no means a recent appearance. Rather, it should be analyzed as part of a larger development, spanning at least the two last decades, in which international crime and immigration increasingly have been framed as signifying "threats" and security problems of equal magnitude; and consequently something which the "citizens" have to be protected from (Tesfahuney, 1998; den Boer, 1995; Huysmans, 1995). We recognize this from Margaret Thatcher's Bruges speech at the College of Europe in 1988, where she warned the EC "that we cannot totally abolish frontier controls if we are also to protect our citizens from crime and stop the movement of drugs, of terrorists and of illegal immigrants" (cited in Gordon, 1989: 8). Another case in point is of course the virtual panic that broke out in the EU during the winter of 1998 – triggering a succession of crisis meetings in Brussels and elsewhere – following the disembarkation of some 1,200 Kurdish refugees in Italy. Here the then German Interior Minister Manfred Kanther declared that "[i]n view of this threatening situation, Western Europe must view itself as a security community" (cited in International Herald Tribune, 1998). Kanther also referred to the Kurdish refugees as representing a "criminal wave of migration" (cited in Schmid, 1998).

The way in which the articulation of "European citizenship" unfolds in relation to immigration and asylum thereby discloses another exclusionary strand within EU citizenship discourse. Here the underlying assumption conveys that the EU citizenry, in order to consolidate, needs to be assured that immigration and asylum, together with other matters
brought forth as assertively related to public safety, are effectively checked at the external borders. To cite the Commission again: "The problems of immigration and asylum, drug trafficking and other aspects of international crime are matters of increasing concern to the citizens of Europe" (CEC, 1995c: 62). Likewise, in an information booklet, which specifically addresses the "European citizen" and the issue of citizenship in the EU, the Commission points out that since many "are concerned about immigration, especially illegal immigration, thinking that this could increase once internal border controls have been fully swept away", the problem of immigration must be solved in a way that satisfies everyone (CEC, 1996c: 13-14). A related concern amongst EU citizens, according to the booklet, finds the following formulation: "Will the eventual dismantling of all internal borders lead to an increase in levels of immigration to my country, both from inside and outside the Community?"; to which the Commission can give a calming answer: "No, it should not. The fundamental point about dismantling the Community's internal borders is that this process must be accompanied by the synchronized tightening of all external borders" (CEC, 1996c: 15). To further reassure the "European citizens", the Commission declares that

[a]sylum-seekers must also be considered, and need to be stopped from shopping around among different Member States. A uniform EU visa format, a common list of third countries whose nationals need a visa and the exact details on the sharing of information on criminals also need to be agreed (1996c: 16).

It goes without saying that the promotion of "European citizenship" as a bulwark against extra-European or non-Western immigrants and asylum seekers risks to legitimize and so aggravate discriminatory perceptions and practices towards people with migrant background already residing in the EU. This not the least since we have seen that those held up as ill-suited for admission into the EU, upon entry would fall into the same domestic category presently screened from ethno-cultural membership in the "European" citizenry.
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Conclusion

The general thrust of the argument developed here has been that "European citizenship", as it emerges from EU discourse, mainly has come to serve as an intermedium between a neoliberal economism and an exclusive ethno-culturalism. In its current articulation, therefore, the EU citizenship can be said to comprise, firstly, a rights’ dimension which largely, although not completely, is tailored to the demands of the single market, and which de facto confines its appeal to the stratum of resourceful inhabitants for whom the freedom of movement (and therewith attached rights) proffers real and ramifying opportunities; often by-passing constricted national outlooks. Secondly, the EU citizenship incorporates an identity dimension of an almost purely ethno-cultural kind, which crystallizes around ingrained narratives on Europe’s allegedly unitary and undefiled historical legacy and cultural heritage. Herein citizenship and descent community are conflated, hence delimiting the EU citizenship to be inclusive only of those with primordial ties to a prescribed historical, cultural and religious community. Adding to these excluding tendencies, we have also seen how the EU citizenship discourse gets enmeshed in the immigration and security nexus, where certain categories of immigrants and asylum seekers often are staged as potential security threats. By alluding to a presumed fear of external "others" and internal "illegals", citizenship of the Union gets promoted as a ticket to an increased sense of security and stability in the EU.

Rather than offering a context for an urgently needed discussion of how a trans-ethnic and trans-cultural identity and solidarity could be forged in the Union, the EU’s articulation of ”European citizenship” has in certain crucial respects come to tally with various excluding discourses currently targeting the millions of ”cultural misfits” in the EU; be they ”immigrants”, ”Muslims”, or non-white people in general.

Finally, this way of construing citizenship also indicates that the identity aspect of citizenship has gotten absorbed by the ethno-cultural, that identity, in other words, can only be thought of in ethno-cultural terms, consequently severing the relationship between social rights and collective identity. This, I have argued, can be seen as contingent on a particular logic in which issues pertaining to social justice and redistribution – both at national and EU levels – are effectively removed from the agenda with reference to economic necessities, hence fomenting
a climate where the building of popular legitimacy, cohesion and identity has to find other means for its realization. In the case of the EU, such "other means" have increasingly been located in the ethno-cultural realm. And as demonstrated here, this endeavour has come to impact the understanding of citizenship and its role in identity formation in a highly excluding and discriminatory direction, thus posing a grave problem for future ethnic relations in the European Union.

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Europeans Only? examines the European Union's project of calling forth a collective sense of "European identity" amongst people in the member states. It focuses specifically on how the European Union's identity politics plays out once the ethnic minorities with immigrant background now living in the Union are brought into view. Through an investigation of EU policy discourse in such areas as immigration, citizenship and education, the study maps and explores how the EU construes and defines the identity it seeks to mobilize; and from there engages in a critical discussion of the types of consequences, or implications, that stem from this endeavour.

In demonstrating the strong tendency on part of the EU to articulate a common identity for the Union in ethno-cultural terms — whereby the EU is conceived primarily as a cultural community whose members are said to share the same origin, cultural heritage, religion and history — the author goes to great length in discussing the excluding implications that an ethno-cultural identity politics gives rise to. The study argues that such an ethno-cultural disposition partly must be seen in light of the European Union's gradual adjustment to a largely neoliberal order; an order which has worked restraining on the feasibility of an alternative social and political articulation of identity and citizenship in the Union.

Overall, Europeans Only? locates its analysis of the European Union's identity politics in the crucial context of the grave and deep-seated problems of ethnic exclusion, growing anti-immigrant sentiments and social disintegration that currently permeate societies across the Union.