Contents / Sommaire / Inhalt

Editors & Editorial board ................................................................................................................. 5
Contributors ..................................................................................................................................... 7

Articles / Aufsätze
Lotta M. Omma, Lars E. Holmgren & Lars H. Jacobsson, Being a Young Sami in Sweden. Living Conditions, Identity and Life Satisfaction ......................................................... 9
Jan Ragnar Hagland, Literacy and Trade in Late Medieval Norway ................................................. 29
Annegret Heitmann, „[A]lles öde und kahl, und somit echt isländisch.“ Ein Reisebericht aus dem Jahr 1846 oder die Anfänge des Island-Tourismus ............................................................. 39
Stephen Pax Leonard, Ethnolinguistic Identities and Language Revitalisation in a Small Society. The Case of the Faroe Islands ...................................................................................... 57

Miscellanea: Notes / Notizen
Researching the North at Aberdeen (Neil Price) ............................................................................. 75

Reviews/Comptes rendus/Besprechungen
Gunnar D. Hansson, Lomonosovryggen, Gråbo: Anthropos Förlag 2009 (Aant Elzinga) ................................................................................................................................. 84
Giuseppe Nencioni, The Italians in the Arctic Explorations. A Critique of the Reinterpretation of Nationalism. With an appendix containing Finn Malmgren’s diary (Northern Studies Monographs 2), Umeå: Umeå University & the Royal Skyttean Society 2010 (Aant Elzinga) .................................................................................................................. 90

Instructions to Authors .................................................................................................................... 100

This year, 2011, is the Nansen-and-Amundsen-year. Fridtjof Nansen was born 150 years ago, on 10 October 1861, to be exact. Roald Amundsen (b. 1872) and four companions were the first human beings to reach the Geographic South Pole—the date was 14 December 1911; come December 2011 it will be a century ago. Both men were remarkable polar personalities, Nansen the scientist, artist and humanitarian and Amundsen the explorer, record setter and facilitator of science. Their lives were intertwined and so were some of their ambitions.

Appropriately several Norwegian universities, major museums like the Fram, the Norwegian Film Institute in Oslo, the Norwegian Polar Institute in Tromsø, the Norwegian Academy of Science and Letters and several other institutions are cooperating to honour the two historic figures. The double anniversary is being celebrated with a series of exhibitions, lectures, school outreach programs and other events. A touring exhibition “The Nansen Heritage—Science at the End of the World” has already been shown in Bergen and will be opening in Murmansk, and thereafter successively in St. Petersburg, Berlin and Glasgow before reaching Oslo in September this year. During the entire year a total of almost 130 Amundsen-and/or-Nansen events will take place in Norway and other countries. Perhaps it is not an exaggeration to speak of a “polar fever.” Science, memory, images, symbols and material cultures are all significant ingredients in nation building, nationalism and internationalism. Since this is also a theme that lies at the heart of the book under review here it is worth situating the topic and delving into it in more detail than usual.

II

Amundsen’s life ended where his passion began, in the polar world. He disappeared over open water on 18 June 1928 together with his Norwegian pilot Leif Dietrichson, the French pilot Rene Guilbaud and three other Frenchman in a French Latham 47 seaplane a few hours after leaving Tromsø en route to Spitsbergen. Their mission was to participate in a rescue operation some time after it had become known that Umberto Nobile’s flight with the airship Italia had ended in wreckage. The dirigible had become unstable, rapidly lost altitude and crashed into jagged pack-ice ridges in the Arctic Ocean about three weeks earlier. It was on the return leg from the North Pole that the catastrophe occurred. The gondola carrying Nobile and seven others got separated from the main body of the dirigible, which for its part with several crewmembers still on board rose again into the sky and floated away with the wind.

The position of Nobile and his group of survivors was known by the time Amundsen took off but the whereabouts of the crewmembers of the Italia who were carried away in the envelope of the balloon after the moment of the crash was unknown. Likewise the location of a group of three men who had decided
to leave Nobile’s camp in order to try and reach the east coast of Spitsbergen by a difficult route over the sea-ice was also unknown. The young Swedish meteorologist Finn Malmgren was a member of this latter group. Injured and exhausted he died on the ice; the other two in his party were later rescued. At base camp Nobile (plus his pet dog) was the first to be picked up by a small plane, already on 23 June, while others in his party were only removed much later by the crew of the Soviet Russian icebreaker Krassin when it eventually reached them.

When word first came that the Italia was long overdue in Kingsbay, Spitsbergen, Amundsen volunteered his services to lead a search and rescue operation. The Norwegian government asked Italy to supply two Dornier-Wal seaplanes for the purpose but Mussolini’s government blankly refused. Thereupon Amundsen managed to get hold of the smaller French seaplane and organized his own operation.

As the story is usually told Amundsen wished to rescue his arch-rival Nobile, the man with whom he had had a bitter schism two years earlier. The conflict had emerged because the Italian engineer and airship designer occupied much more space in the public limelight than Amundsen after the successful flight of the airship Norge from Spitsbergen across the North Pole and on to Alaska. The flight of the Norge we know now was the first expedition ever to reach and cross the pole (Robert Peary’s, Fredrick Cook’s and Richard Byrd’s prior claims to have reached the geographical polar point have on the basis of perusals of extant records been retrospectively invalidated).

Amundsen and the American millionaire’s son Lincoln Ellsworth were the co-leaders of the Norge expedition, while Nobile in Amundsen’s mind was “only the hired pilot.” Behind the jealous clash of personalities there also lay conflicting national interests, with the young democratic Norwegian nation represented by Amundsen, while Mussolini in Italy saw his chance to polish the image of Italian fascism by linking it to the flashy futurism of his technically schooled military man Nobile. Given this situation Amundsen was probably less interested in Nobile and more concerned to locate the runaway balloon and possible survivors on it as well as hoping to find Finn Malmgren and his group; Malmgren had after all served as meteorologist both on Amundsen’s Arctic expedition with the ship the Maud 1922–1925 (into the Bering Sea and off the shores of Siberia) and on the Norge’s flight over the pole.

III
It is remarkable how a struggle over national prestige permeated the entire aftermath of the crash of the Italia. The search and rescue operations turned into a free-for-all with several countries involved sending their own search expeditions without much attempt to cooperate or coordinate the various efforts. It seems that each wanted to be first to find the survivors and to reap honours on behalf of their own nation. Not only did the Italian government refuse to supply rescue planes to non-Italians but Mussolini and his close adviser, the 32-year-old general Italo Balbo, Minister of Aviation, one of the founders of Fascism and Nobile’s rival, also tried to divert attention away from a possible search for the missing balloon and its crewmen that had blown away with the wind. Instead the focus was on finding Nobile and then to isolate him from any contact with the media in order to minimize damage to the public Italian image; soon Nobile was blamed
for seeing to it that he was the first to be rescued and ultimately held responsible also for Malmgren’s tragic fate.

Further, when Amundsen and his companions in the small seaplane disappeared, all attention was now suddenly focused on a new search and rescue operation that continued throughout the summer and into September 1928. This further eclipsed the question of the possible fate of the lost balloon and its trapped occupants. Innumerable ships, planes and well over a thousand men were involved in the search for Amundsen, but to no avail.

In the end the *Italia* expedition had cost 17 persons their lives. Only 8 of the members of the expedition itself survived, 6 had disappeared with the balloon, 2 others (including Malmgren) died on the ice; in addition 6 persons (including Amundsen) went down with the Latham seaplane in the icy Arctic waters probably near Bear Island, and another 3 furthermore died in a plane crash by the Rhone River on their way back home to Italy.

As for Nobile he became *persona non grata* in his homeland and after a couple of years left for the Soviet Union where he participated in a Russian airship project. In 1936 he returned to Italy but still found himself obstructed in his every move to gain a new position; disappointed he immigrated to the USA in 1939 where he stayed until Mussolini and the fascist government had been overthrown. Once back in Italy again he initiated a new inquiry into the tragedy of the *Italia* expedition, earlier charges against him were lifted and he began a new career—he joined the Communist Party and became a member of Parliament.

The story of the *Italia* expedition and its fate and that of Amundsen’s mysterious disappearance have been told many times and from various points of view. Giuseppe Nencioni’s monograph affords a welcome addition to this literature. It provides both a conceptual frame and important historical background factors not easily found elsewhere. Furthermore, it contains a valuable Appendix that renders eight pages of Finn Malmgren’s unique diary more easily accessible for interested readers.

IV

Finn Malmgren’s diary consists of a series of notes made during and after his second trip with the *Italia*, which began on 15 May 1928 and ended on 18 May after a successful flight of about three days and 4,000 km flying over the northern islands of Franz Joseph Land and arriving at Severnaya Zemlya before returning to Kingsbay on Spitsbergen. These notes Malmgren had with him on the third flight, the one that crashed. Even though they do not weigh anything he probably left them on the snow together with other things in order to save weight before he and two companions set out across the treacherous sea-icescape to try and reach the mainland (Spitsbergen).

The diary notes were collected and preserved by Frantisek Behounek, a professor from Prague University and fellow scientist (radiologist) on the expedition; eventually they ended up in the Umberto Nobile Museum at Vigna di Valle in Italy where the original handwritten version may still be viewed.

Behounek became a wellknown Czech writer whose account (in German) of the fateful expedition was soon translated into Swedish under the title *Männen på isflaket. Med “Italia” till Nordpolen* [‘The men on the ice floe. With “Italia” to the North Pole’] (1929). It gives a sympathetic picture of Malmgren’s role that
Nencioni also draws upon. He also makes use of Paul Wetterfors’ biography, *Finn Malmgren* (1928).

I mention this here for two reasons: first of all it indicates that Nencioni has a good command of his subject, and secondly, I want to draw attention to Finn Malmgren because nowadays very little is generally known about him.

Malmgren was born in 1895 and in the mid-1920s counted as the most promising of a younger generation of Swedish polar researchers. Indeed, Hans W:son Ahlmann the glaciologist (and later diplomat) who was only a few years older and became professor in Stockholm, stated in 1927 how “the only active polar researcher we have had the past couple of decades is Finn Malmgren.” When Malmgren disappeared out on the polar sea-ice it was only a couple of weeks after Otto Nordenskjöld, the veteran of a dramatic Antarctic expedition (1901–1904) had died in Gothenburg after being hit by a bus in the street near his house close by the Botanical Gardens. Swedish polar research had lost two important figures in quick succession.

In 1931 a statue of Malmgren was created by Nils Sjögren and placed in Börjeparken in Uppsala (a picture appears in Nencioni’s book). Since then Uppsala University every third year still awards a grant for research that covers fields Malmgren was interested in, “meteorology, oceanography, atmospheric electricity and glaciography, particularly in Arctic regions, Nordic alpine areas and Nordic seas.”

In Stockholm in 1980 a further—more dramatic—statue was raised depicting a dying Finn Malmgren in the arms of his two companions. It is entitled “Farewell on the Polar Ice” and was constructed by Elsie Dahlberg.

On the basis of his findings as a meteorologist already during the flight on the *Norge*, Malmgren concluded that if future traffic over the polar sea was to materialize, it would not be by dirigibles but by airplanes (Malmgren 1926: 250). This was because of the problem with strong winds and icing that created dangerously risky situations for dirigibles. It was an insight that was tragically confirmed two years later with the crash of Nobile’s *Italia*. In the long run the Zeppelin never became the research platform that was envisaged by some.

Despite the crash of the *Italia*, the vision of airships as research platforms was nevertheless taken further for a while within the network of enthusiasts organized by the Aeroarctic (1924), a society for promoting Arctic aviation (Nansen was its president and another Norwegian, Harald Ulrik Sverdrup, was also on its Board). Speaking at a symposium of polar scientists in the USA in December 1927, Nobile covered several problems attending the use of dirigibles in polar regions. He recognized the dangers of fog and ice encrustation of the airships and spoke of the need to protect against falling chunks of ice from hitting and tearing the gasbag. Further he discussed the need to protect motors and gas valves against low temperatures. Still, he held that all such problems could be solved and then went on to try and refute those who dismissed the use of dirigibles as platforms for scientific research; against them (Finn Malmberg presumably included) he argued why “the dirigible is the best means of transportation for the exploration of the Arctic zone. The airplanes and hydroplane can be used, but mainly as an auxiliary means of transportation” (in Joerg (ed.) 1928: 424).

In an overly optimistic tone Nobile outlined a futuristic scenario where larger dirigibles might be used to transport entire laboratories for use in Polar...
regions. History proved him wrong; in 1952 Arthur Koestler who had participated in the scientific expedition of the Graf Zeppelin in 1931 (see more below) summarized:

Just as the dinosaur represented the end product of an atrophied branch of development, it [the dirigible] was too clumpy, vulnerable and slow. But regarded as a monster it had a sublime beauty and was an idol and a fetish for a people who had an aptitude for adoring gods... The silver glitter of the smooth aluminium envelope meant that at a distance the airship looked like a living animal, a good natured Moby Dick that calmly swam amongst the clouds instead of in the sea (Koestler 1953: 302–302).

The failed futuristic vision was an important part of an episode wherein both Nansen and Amundsen had an important role in their different ways as men of action.

V

Nencioni’s short account of Nobile and the airship Italia forms the seventh section of the second part of his three-part book. The First Part of the monograph consists of an Introduction. It takes up nationalism as a dynamic driving factor behind a whole series of Arctic polar expeditions. Particular attention is paid to the roots of Italian nationalism and its conceptualization as an ideological trope in the writings of Giuseppe Mazzinni (1805–1872) and his followers, especially Cristoforo Negri (1809–1896), who six years after the creation of Italy as a nation state was instrumental in founding the Italian Geographical Society (1867). Like its sister organizations in other countries this became a body that sought to stimulate exploration and research and incorporated the usual essential tension that existed during the late nineteenth century (and into the twentieth) between popular geography and scientific geography in an amalgam of adventure, idealism, patriotism and science. As young nation Italy did not pursue many polar expeditions of its own but Italians could be found in the expeditions of several other nations.

Part Two of the monograph takes up seven expeditions in which Italians participated. In each of these Nencioni’s focus is in part on interactions between persons of different nationalities, how language difficulties were handled and the Italian participants’ comments on national rituals, for example, finding that Swedes had an exaggerated manner of celebrating the birthday of their monarch.

After briefly describing each expedition, its background, purpose and main personalities as well as different national traits, in Part Three of the book some of the threads are drawn together to discuss what the author calls the “core of nationalism.” Some conclusions are drawn regarding international cooperation and whether or not that which drove Italians to participate in polar ventures differed from institutional and personal motivations rooted in the cultures of other nations.

The first expedition described is the Austro-Hungarian one of 1872–1874 led by Weyprecht and Payer to Franz Joseph Land. The second is A. E. Nordenskiöld’s expedition to Spitsbergen, followed by Nordenskiöld’s famous Vega expedition. The fourth is the Danish explorer Andreas Peter Hovgaard’s expedition on the
Dymphna that ended up assisting the men of the Dutch International Polar Year (1882–1883) expedition ship Varna to overwinter in the ice on the Kara Sea (the Varna later sank). Thereafter we are given an account of the Duke of Abruzzi’s attempt to reach the North Pole on the Stella Polare in the year 1900. Finally expeditions number six and seven are the ones with the airships, firstly the Norge led jointly by Amundsen and Lincoln Ellsworth in 1926 and secondly the flight of the Italia organized and led by Nobile in 1928.

Since the author’s object is to discuss the motivations, position and roles of Italians in each of these expeditions, the reader is provided with some novel angles and insights, among them interesting reflections on the ability of expedition members to rise above national differences and collaborate towards a common goal despite the fact that the sponsoring nation often invested much nationalist symbolism into such exploits and even used them for propagandistic purposes in overarching political agendas. “Belonging to different nations was not an impediment to living and working together,” at least not for the most part (p. 40). As a rule it appears to have been more important that there were differences in social rank between officers and researchers on the one hand and ordinary seamen or crew members on the other. Fraternization between the Danes and the Dutch on the ice of the Kara Sea appears to have been a positive exception to this rule, since it seems they also bridged differences in rank.

The account of the Stella Polare expedition is pertinent for the light it throws on the life and role of Umberto Cagni, who was second in command on the ship (formerly the Norwegian whaleboat Jason of Antarctic fame) and his acquaintance with Fridtjof Nansen whose “furthest north—86° 14’—they reached and exceeded by 20’ latitude; it was “a blend of admiration for the Norwegians on the one hand and pride to be Italian on the other” (p. 81).

What is not mentioned is how Cagni as scientist and polar leader was later to cooperate with Otto Nordenskjöld in trying to promote the short-lived International Polar Commission (IPC) created in 1908 and formalized at the World Geographical Congress in Rome 1913 before it fell victim to the raging nationalism of World War I. Internationally minded scientists like Nordenskjöld, Henryk Arctowski, William Speers Bruce and Jean Charcot all tried to counter shortsighted polar populism and promote multi-national cooperation based on an internationally coordinated scientific agenda. As it turned out they were about fifty years ahead of their time. And, ironically, when the International Geophysical Year (1957/58) did come with a strong focus on Antarctica, it was successful because it involved a formula whereby science became the continuation of politics by other means—in other words politics was not set aside but rather masterfully sublimated in scientific rivalry and cooperation between participating nations. Hence high quality research activities in Antarctica have since then—under the Antarctic Treaty—had a double function, the advancement of knowledge on the one hand, and a politically significant manifestation of a nation’s presence on the icy continent on the other.

VI

The Norge expedition of 1926 is portrayed by Nencioni as proceeding without any friction on board between the leading personalities involved and experiencing no particular technical problems. This is to simplify the situation and glosses
over the concerns that were uppermost in Finn Malmgren’s mind as expedition meteorologist. In Malmgren’s (1926) account it is clear that both flying in a foggy sky and ice encrustment on the body of the dirigible presented very dangerous risks that led him to especially warn against the icing problem if future expeditions were to be planned.

In his discussion of what happened after the Norge expedition, Nencioni does refer to the schism between Nobile and Amundsen but without really explaining the reason for it—the conflict gets personalized. Reliance on a large number of Nobile’s writings in Italian (eleven titles dated between 1928 and 1987) is both a strength and a weakness. It is a strength because the average reader is not aware of these sources, but it is a weakness because these same sources are largely treated at face value without sufficient contextualization using source critical methods. It is apparent that Nobile at times in retrospect presented mutually inconsistent memories of past events. Nobile is mainly given the blame for the conflict with Amundsen while it is blandly stated that Amundsen also could be a difficult character who during preparations for the Norge flight had according to Nobile expressed “acrid, malevolent and unfounded criticisms” of the Italian (p. 89). Nencioni’s references here are two publications by Nobile from 1928 and 1969 (without any exact designation as to the page(s) where one may find the pertinent Nobile quotation).

What is worse is that Nencioni is oblivious of the important fact that Amundsen’s own autobiography came out already on 23 September 1927; prior to that it had appeared in serialized form in the American monthly magazine World’s Work. A large portion of Amundsen’s autobiography actually consists of a broadside attack on Nobile as well as on several other personalities including his own brother Leon Amundsen and money hungry capitalists behind the Oslo-based Airclub of Norway that had collected a lot of the funds to support the Norge expedition. Amundsen broke his contract with the Airclub because he found it had supported the dashing colonel Nobile’s tour of lectures—among others in the USA—in its hopes of recouping capital “investments” (Amundsen 1927a). Note that the first UK edition of the autobiography, entitled My Life as an Explorer, contains an Appendix entitled “Refutation of Various Points in Nobile’s Lectures in America” (cf. Amundsen 1927b).

Thus it turns out that Nobile’s critique of the Norwegian polar hero’s acrimoniousness maybe was justified and can just as well be seen as a case of self-defence against the character assassination the equally vain and fame-lusting Italian himself was experiencing.

Remarkably Amundsen’s autobiography is not referred to by our author; nor does he refer to either T. Bowmann-Larsen’s (1995) well researched two-volume Amundsen biography or to what Susan Barr has more recently written about the famous Norwegian explorer in his role as Norwegian national hero and icon (Barr 2005 contains some tell-tale excerpts from the self-revealing autobiography of an increasingly paranoiac, bitter and isolated man who despite much outward bravado always lived with a feeling of deep-seated uncertainty inside himself).

Bowmann-Larsen in particular gives us quite a different picture compared to Nencioni’s regarding several important points. He calls Amundsen’s autobiography an instance of “intellectual suicide” and notes how during the course of the Norge expedition its leader Amundsen sat passively in silent rage. He sullenly
observed how Nobile dropped an Italian flag much larger than Amundsen’s and Oscar Wisting’s Norwegian flag out of the gondola window when the airship flew directly above the geographic North Pole; additionally Nobile managed to drop a couple of other Italian symbols plus a fascist flag onto the top of the world. Further along in the journey when past the pole, radio contact with the outside world was suddenly broken. Nobile suspected that this was due to sabotage committed by Amundsen. So everything was not as frictionless and cozy as Nencioni leads us to believe.

Even in the case of a later much more well-prepared scientific expedition with a multinational group on board, the Graf Zeppelin flight over the Soviet Union in 1931, Arthur Koestler (1953), the only in-house journalist present, reported how there was a lot of friction between that expedition’s entrepreneurial and scientific leadership. Furthermore, in preparation for his own task as media man when reading through the annals of great geographic discoveries, Koestler says he was “amazed by the simplicity, greediness, vanity and nastiness [he] found manifested in the behaviour of hardened Arctic heroes” (Koestler 1953: 298). He gives some humorous insights into how men of the pole could jealously exploit symbols and symbolic actions on behalf of their own nations while directing poisonous barbs at their competitors.

After the airship Norge landed in Alaska and the expedition members reached Seattle by steamer, Amundsen was further embittered to see Nobile together with two fellow Italians steal the show by descending the gangplank to the dock in spotless military attire, while the Norwegians stood aghast in their rather rough “Alaska costumes” before a cheering crowd and many newspaper reporters who immortalized the world event in pictures and words (Bowmann-Larsen 1995: 468).

Some Norwegians found Amundsen’s attacks on Nobile and other personalities distasteful and embarrassing (e.g. Zappfe 1935). In his usual diplomatic style Nansen backed Amundsen, but in his speech at the festivities in Oslo on 16 July 1926 to officially celebrate the expedition members’ return to the capital, he exploited the occasion to promote both a domestic nation-building and an internationalist Norwegian agenda that lay more in line with his own humanitarian actions and contributions towards fostering a more viable post-war peace, efforts for which he had received the Nobel Peace Prize in that same city four years earlier. The date of the festivities by the way was nicely orchestrated to coincide with Amundsen’s birthday.

As for the Italia expedition, the book under review here gives a brief but fairly reliable account. But here again a close reading of some of the works just mentioned above could have thrown additional light on several aspects of the drama (see also Arnesen & Lundborg 1928). Remarkably, Arne Remgård’s book Expedition Italia (1984, in Swedish) has not been consulted either. That is a pity because Remgård has produced a very readable detailed reconstruction of the various events relating to the Italia catastrophe, the plight of the various groups and the roles of their rescuers, as well as that of Mussolini and the politically dictated verdict of the Italian Commission of Inquiry that definitely condemned Nobile, who was then duly stripped of his many honours and marginalized.
What I also miss in Nencioni’s analysis of the role of nationalism in polar exploration and research is an elucidation of the dialectical character of the duality of the pursuit of exploration and research as knowledge in an internationalist spirit on the one hand and the parallel expression of nationalist politics on the other, which also appears to have been at work in important respects in the Arctic. Some such notion is implicitly there in his text but it needs to be articulated more clearly.

It was not only—as he suggests—a matter of nationalism creating an atmosphere of collaboration and solidarity because explorers were nationalists or patriots. It was also the other way around, science lent greater credibility to patriotic agendas while contributions to an international body of knowledge helped generate greater national prestige and geopolitically established a stronger presence of a young nation in a changing world.

In spite of its shortcomings Nencioni’s book provides a novel window on the history of polar exploration in the Arctic. It raises many interesting issues and homes in on a central question, that of the multiple roles of nationalism and patriotism in the context at hand. Also we get thought-provoking illustrations of how in some respects the personal contains the political.

When trying to relate nationalism and internationalism, however, I suggest that more incisive analysis requires a further articulation of the several nested dimensions involved, for example the personal, the institutional, the country specific, the cultural, and the geopolitical.

During the current Nansen-and-Amundsen year and the “polar fever” it is generating, scholars in Northern Studies are particularly challenged to continue honing reflexive intellectual tools when coming to grips with and critically reinterpreting the recurring themes of nationalism and internationalism and the entangled nature of these and other dimensions.

NOTES

1 It should be noted that the title and date of H. U. Sverdrup’s series of reports on the scientific results of the Maud Expedition 1918–1925 as it appears in Nencioni’s reference list—where it is simply called “Scientific Results (1933)”—is incomplete and hence confusing (cf. in my list, Sverdrup 1928–1933).

REFERENCES


* Aant Elzinga
  Department of Philosophy, Linguistics and Theory of Science
  University of Gothenburg
  Sweden
  aant.elzinga@theorysc.gu.se