Staffan Berglund

RESISTING POVERTY

— PERSPECTIVES ON PARTICIPATION AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT. THE CASE OF CRIC AND THE EASTERN RURAL REGION OF CAUCA IN COLOMBIA.
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by

Staffan Berglund


Umeå universitet
Sociologiska institutionen
RESISTING POVERTY - Perspectives on Participation and Social Development. The Case of CRIC and the Eastern Rural Region of Cauca in Colombia

Abstract

With the reproduction of severe deprivation among the campesinado in Latin America as a starting-point, the report explores the mechanisms of impoverishment in the eastern rural region of the department of Cauca in Colombia and the forms of resistance initiated by the Regional Indigenous Council of Cauca (CRIC). It is postulated that the continued existence of poverty derives its root-causes not from lacking integration of the traditional sector of the national economy into the modern sector, but from the processes through which the poor indigenous staple-food producer and agricultural worker by way of his actual participation within the capitalistic system is continuously deprived of his energy and capacity by the power elite as he himself lacks the means to realize his own developmental power. Sham-participation, referring to the dysfunctionality of systemic participation performed by the poor who lack access to the bases for accumulating social power, is a concept applied to understand these mechanisms. Participation per se does not necessarily correspond to influence and power. Rather, systemic political participation can give legitimacy to the very system and to those structural conditions oppressing the indigenous small-holders and workers and consequently contributes to the consolidation of the transfer-process of power and thereby the reproduction of deprivation. Thus the poor indigenous population in Cauca cannot expect to be given access to the fundamentals of social power. Thus the elements of real participation and the conditions for resisting deprivation are less likely to be obtained only through the creation of new institutions and channels for popular participation. In the case of the indigenous movement in Colombia, the problem is rather to revoke the repression of the indigenous organizations which have emerged from below and instead promote their spontaneous mobilization.

Key words
Colombia, Cauca, CRIC, popular participation, poverty, social development, indigenous movement, social power, peasant, mobilization, participation, anti-participation, deprivation, national integration, land invasion, resistance, cultural survival

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PARA MIS COMPañEROS INDÍGENAS EN CAUCA

Foto: Staffan Berglund & Örjan Mikaelsson
This report is the second stage in a longer multidisciplinary research effort on the topic of national integration and its complications. The title of the project reads "National Integration of Marginal Groups in Chile, Peru and Colombia referring to Political Mobilization and Social Development in the Countryside" and the first stage, realized in Chile 1972, is accounted for in my book The National Integration of Mapuche - Ethnical Minority in Chile.

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I INTRODUCTION

1 THE PROBLEM

This study is an exploration of the mechanisms of impoverishment in the eastern rural region of the Department of Cauca in Colombia and the forms of resistance initiated by the Regional Indigenous Council of Cauca (CRIC) among the indigenous population in this area.

This exploration does not follow peasant subculture theories which ascribe rural wretchedness and poverty to fatalism, lack of innovativeness or limited aspirations of the poor peasant (see Rogers 1969; Berglund 1977, p 142 ff). Implicit in this approach is also an effort to elucidate the objective legitimacy of this resistance according to universally recognized norms for human rights and democracy, as expressed for example in the UN Declaration on Human Rights and the Barbados Declaration of the World Council of Churches (1971). The question of legitimacy will of course be value-related and determined by chosen criteria. The minority situation of the indigenous peasants implies, for example, that they cannot exert any tangible influence on the decision processes determining their lives within the framework of representative democracy. The concentration of power in Colombia is thus rarely perceived as legitimate by the Indians, while the power elite of course consider their positions to be legitimate despite the fact that the number voting in, for example, the presidential and congressional elections is less than 50 % of the population (see for example UBV 1978, p 12; Roa Suarez 1973, p 190; Losada/Vélez 1979, p 149).

In this chapter we will introduce CRIC and its setting of poverty. Let us start with the setting.

1.1 The Persistence of Poverty

My starting point is the persistence of poverty among the Latin-American peasantry, as well documented and confirmed by Ernest Feder in his book The Rape of the Peasantry (1971), which has turned out to be a conventional truth during the last decade. Several years of rural development programmes and foreign aid have not brought any tangible changes in the living conditions of the poor peasants, which seems to be the rule in less developed countries as perceived by Lipton (1977, p 28):
"Hence we have an astonishing contrast: rapid growth and development, yet hardly any impact on the heartland of mass poverty. Among the steel mills and airports, and despite the independent and sometimes freely elected governments, the rural masses are as hungry and ill-housed as ever."

The campesino himself summarizes his situation in the saying: Todo sigue igual, cada día peor (everything goes on the same, worse every day).

1.1.1 Economic Growth and Poverty

For a long period of time elimination of poverty and a raised standard of living was considered to correlate positively with economic growth, and it was generally assumed that the destitution among the lower classes more or less automatically would disappear with an increased productivity (Chenery 1974).

Reality today, however, cannot confirm this assumption. Despite a rather imposing economic growth in Latin America during the last 20 years and despite intervention by the government to spread the effect of the development, the conditions of living for the poorest people have not changed appreciably. Gross national product increased with 5.2 % per year during the 50's, during the 60's it increased to 5.6 % per year during the period of 1970-77 it reached 6.1 %. Between 1960-70, the share of people below the poverty line was reduced from 51 % to 40 %, but the absolute number, 113 million below this line, remained unchanged. The poorest fifth's part of the total income decreased from 3.1 % in 1969 to 2.5 % in 1970 (Molina/Pinera 1979 a, p 6). The part of the income belonging to the richest 5 per cent of the population also decreased, from 33 % to 30 %. Apparently the middle classes constitute the main beneficiaries. But the poorest people make the biggest sacrifice proportionally to strengthen the middle class, and the gap between the richest and the poorest does not become smaller. In 1970 the richest five per cent of the population received 50 times more of the national income than the poorest fifth, compared with 43 times more in 1960 (op cit, p 28).

In Pinera's (1979 b, p 24 ff) compilation of data from six countries 1960-70 we read that all groups of society increased their income in absolute numbers but that the poorest
people profited the least and the richest people the most by economic growth. This 14.7 % of the population, indigents, who lived in extreme destitution, both at the beginning and at the end of this 10-year-period, increased their income by only 11.6 % per capita, which is an increase of the modest amount of six dollars (1970 level). The richest fifth of the population increased their income by 25.4 % per capita which means 300 dollars, or 50 times as much.

Further more, despite their rise in income, the proportion of the total income of the poorest 14.7 percentage decreased from 10.2 % in 1960 to 9.3 % in 1970. Those who were above the poverty level in 1960 and later, 51.3 % of the population in these 6 countries, increased their part of the income from 84.9 % to 85.1 %, while the richest fifth kept its part constant.

Despite the fact that everybody gets a higher income in absolute numbers, and despite the fact that the most well-situated groups of the population generally don't increase their share as such of the total income, there is cause to postulate that the gap between the rich and the poor is getting wider, all the efforts to fight against poverty not with standing. Relatively the poor become still poorer while the rich become still richer and more powerful (Ghai, Khan et al 1977, p 3).

"In the great majority of countries, not only has growth failed to bring about any tangible improvements in the living standards of the poverty groups ... but it has even often led to their absolute impoverishment." (Ghai, Khan et al 1977, p 2)

1.1.2 Inequality and Poverty in Colombia

Colombia is a republican democracy where the state of emergency with few intermissions for more than 30 years has been a necessary measure employed by the power elite to maintain stability.

A population of about 27 million share a GNP on approximately 20 million dollars, which increases about 3 % a year. Inflation keeps to about 20 %. The illiteracy rate is esti-
mated to 22% and the average length of life to 59 years. The popular discontent with "things" in Colombia has given rise to at least four well organized guerilla movements - FARC, M 19, ELN, EPL - except for the emergence of more conventional expressions of protest.

A thorough discussion of the pattern of inequality and poverty in Colombia should include a more comprehensive analysis of the Colombian economy. I do not aspire to that but confine myself to the general trends of popular deprivation in Colombia. (Concerning the Colombian economy, see for example: Parra et al 1976, 1977, 1979).

From a purely economic point of view Pinera (1979 b, 53) states that the percentage of Colombians below the poverty line decreased during the period 1964-74. From 65.6% of 17 903 100 inhabitants to 43.4% of 23 298 700. On this particular point I question if the quantitative approach of Pinera gives a true picture of deprivation of Colombia. What is evident in any case is that inequality persists. Even if those that succeeded in passing the line increased their share of the total income from 8.9% in 1964 to 13.6% in 1974 and their average income by 96 US dollars, the richest 20% of the population increased their average income by 137 US dollars, while those below the poverty line increased their income by only 45 dollars. Thus the top decile of Colombian households controlled in 1974 considerable more than 40% of the income while the bottom quintile got less than 5% (Berry/Soligo 1980, p 5). The observations by Berry/Soligo even suggest that inequality deteriorated during the 1970s. Labour's share of the net domestic income declined by 10% from 1967 to 1976. Looked upon in the light of always present inflation (25.5% in 1976 according to Parra 1977, p 85) it is appropriate to "suggest the emergence of a price-wage gap" (p 15).

To maintain an average family of 6.9 members in Bogota, Medellin, Cali or Barranquilla required in August 1976 about 6 545 pesos a month while the average income of workers and employees in these cities was 3 545 pesos a month. This should also be considered together with the fact that 85% of the economically active population earned less than 3 000 pesos a month. Consequently, to cover the costs of the household there had to be more than one member of the family who had to find a way to contribute to the mainte-
nance of the family. That is one cause behind the widespread prostitution, and that is one reason why almost half a million children younger than 15 years old are working or looking for work (Parra 1977, p 83 ff). To find work is not easy. The official rate of unemployment in the four biggest cities was around 10% in 1976; subemployment was about 15% and varied around these figures. Informal sources estimate however national unemployment to 25% (see Parra 1977, p 29 ff). Further the share of unqualified labour in the labour force has fallen and the wage gap between them and the professional industrial workers is widening (see Berry/Soligo 1980, p 15 and Parra 1977, p 81).

Hence a lot of people in Colombia does not cover their nutritional needs for proteins, vitamins or minerals. An evaluation of a seven year long nutritional program concluded in 1970 that 77% of the adult population suffered from nutritional deficiency (DNP cited in Angulo 1979, p 53).

In the countryside the uneven income distribution is reflected in and consolidated by unequal access to land. The development strategies imposed have favored large mechanized farms which have increased the average per capita agricultural income while the average wage rate of the rural worker has stagnated.

"For the decade 1965-75 as a whole, the wage data strongly suggest a worsening of the relative position of the low-wage groups, the largest being the agricultural workers." (Berry/Soligo 1980, p 16).

1.2 **CRIC Introduced**

Summarizing conventional sources, about 2% of the Colombian population are Indians, i.e. approximately half a million people.

Consejo Regional Indígena del Cauca/CRIC was formed 1971 and mobilize today a considerable part of the indigenous peasantry, 32 out of 48 resguardos, in the Department of Cauca (see p 48 and tables 1 a, b). They aim at increasing their bargaining leverage against landowners and brokers for physical and cultural survival.
"...somos indígenas porque creemos que las cosas de este mundo están hechas para todos. Por eso creemos que la tierra, como el aire, como el agua y las demás cosas que nos tienen vivos no deben ser de unos pocos. La tierra no debe tener dueños sino ser común: como el agua, como el aire. Para que todos podamos cultivarla y sacarle frutos para alimentar a los demás, y nosotros salir de la miseria y mejorar la vida." (CRIC 1973, p 5-6). 1)

Collective actions and coordinated economic cooperation are their means of resistance. The land-occupation has become one of the most important tools to make their voices heard. Through their cooperatives, formed partly to bypass the labour- and commodity markets ruled by the dominant capitalist mode of production, they try to curtail the accumulated power of those who otherwise assimilate their output. From January 1980 to March 1981, CRIC participated in 32 actions to recover Indian land (IWGIA 1981, p 61).

"...por eso no debemos creer lo que los opresores enseñan. Como quien dice: de las espinas no puede esperarse sino heridas, de los explotadores no podemos esperar sino explotación. Más vale, entonces, alejarnos de lo que enseñan los explotadores, como de las espinas." (CRIC 1973, p 32). 2)

Politically they cease to vote (see for example letter "why we do not vote", to Unidad Indígena from the Ricaurte community/CRIC 41:1980, p 3) and strive for strategic alliances with non-indigenous popular organizations and syndicates besides striving for national unity of all Indian communities in Colombia. (See CRIC 13:1976, p 2; CRIC 25:1977, p 6; CRIC 42:1980, - 2 "why we support the 2nd civic national strike" and CRIC 45,46:1980 concerning the national indigenous meeting).

CRIC collaborates for example with the following other indigenous organizations in Colombia (CRIC 1974 c, p 22):

CRIVA (Consejo Regional Indígena del Vaupés) representing 35 different groups in the south western lowlands towards the Brasilian frontier (CRIC 17:1976, p 6).
UNDICH (Unión de Indígenas del Chocó) which unites the approximately 40 Indian communities of the Emberas and Waunanas who live along the rivers and the Pacific coast in the Western lowlands of Colombia.

COIA (Congreso Indígena Arhuaco) which represents the Archuacos, and the Malayos in Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta, the mountains in the north of Colombia (CRIC 18:1976, p 4).

UNUMA working among the groups of Llanos along the Meta river and the Vichada in eastern Colombia, above all the Guahibo organization (CRIC 13:1976, p 3).

CRIT (Consejo Regional Indígena del Tolima) a recently formed association of poor peasants of indigenous descent in the Tolima regions (CRIC 41:1980, p 11).

CRIC is the most important organized defender of the indigenous cause in Colombia. No membership figure can however be given due to the organizational structure which is not based on individual membership as accounted for in Chapter 10.3. At the 6th congress, which also was the 10th anniversary of CRIC, in Toribio 1981 though, 2 000 people participated from the beginning. A number that grew every day. About 10 000 persons came to Toribio to demonstrate the last day of the congress (IWGIA 1981, p 61). Informal estimations concerning the strength of CRIC, suggest that 20-30 000 individuals form the base of the organization.

As the most important representative of the new indianism CRIC has also become an object of political violence. During 10 years of existence more than 40 leaders have been killed and today not less than 60 CRIC activists are imprisoned some subject to torture (Amnesty International 1980).
PARTICIPATION AGAINST POVERTY

2.1 What is Poverty

The face of poverty is regularly described in terms of undernourishment, insufficient education, bad dwellings, insanitary conditions, deficiency deseases and other conditions which demonstrate non-satisfaction of basic human needs; this is how poverty is expressed in so called poverty profiles. But is this really the essence of poverty or is it "just" its attributes and manifestations. Is poverty only a condition of deficiency or are there other dimensions which should be considered? More and more other, non-material, aspects of poverty are recently accentuated among social scientists. Among others the right to employment, self-realization, freedom, the possibility to influence one's own situation and other values that are found in different descriptions of life quality. This indicates a reappraisal of the concept towards the acceptance of the idea that poverty does not only mean being without, not having or not participating, but that poverty is also lack of bargaining power to influence and change one's circumstances.

Especially during the 1960's this was described through the marginality concept, where marginal means being cut off from something, i.e. not taking part in or taking part only to some extent. Vekemans/Giusti (1970, p 70) e.g. differentiate between two main aspects of participation. On the one hand passive or receptive participation, which concerns the access to food, medical care, education, and other public services and goods; and on the other hand active participation, which bears upon the contributory participation in the decision processes of the society (see Berglund 1977, p 134 ff).

Marginality as a social situation thus cuts through the poverty syndrome but doesn't coincide with it. The concept of participation though, must however as we shall see be considered in a definition of poverty. In conclusion, poverty means a comprehensive and interrelated network of deprivation, where the different elements permanently reinforce each others (see Coates/Silburn 1970, p 45 and Miliband 1974, p 183).

Pauperization (decreased access to material resources, marginalization (decreased influence on the political process), unemployment (reduced participation in the production process),
dependence (reduced influence on one's own situation), isolation (passivity and apathy) and exploitation (that others more and more appropriate the outcome of one's work) is considered by Tham (1976, p 28) to summarize the most important elements in a total picture of poverty. If you accept this as the substance of poverty you also realize that in the struggle against it, a functional definition of poverty cannot be limited to stating that poverty exists, what it looks like and how it is manifested, but must explain what it is, its causes and consequently, also why it is so difficult to do something about it. The exploitation in this case must be considered as the most central element, as it becomes a sort of motor in the continuity of poverty. The everyday endeavours of the indigenous small-holder, in his struggle against poverty is, for example, continuously counteracted by the exploitation he is subjected to by among others, well-to-do peasants, agricultural enterprises and middle-men. Issues that will be further dealt with in Part II.

2.1.1 Basic Needs and Poverty Level

Hence poverty is not only limited receptive participation referring to material consumption, health service and education, but also lack of real influence on one's own situation, that is, insufficient participation in the decision processes which determines, among other things, the economic frames for one's own life. Yet poverty is defined, almost without exceptions, statistically, quantitatively in economically and socially measurable terms. A central issue in this respect is how high a degree of privation is really tolerable. The question asked is: How poor should a man be to be called poor?

Stipulating a certain acceptable level of aggregated fundamental material needs you get an instrumental definition which facilitates the identification of the poor, at the same time as it makes easier the calculation of what is missing and must be supplied through redistribution. Pinera (1979 c, p 2 ff) emphasizes e.g. that the degree of satisfaction of non-material needs on the whole is impossible to measure. (A problem which is also discussed in Ghai et al, ILO 1977, p 22 ff). This can, however, not be accepted as an argument for basing the definition only in material needs, even if you often can except a certain satisfaction of non-material needs as a consequence of economical material progress. On the whole it is commonly understood that the eradication of poverty only through redistributory policies is a very trying undertaking (see e.g. Pinera 1979 b, p 58).
In absolute terms, according to this approach, you consider a person poor when he is below a certain normative level as to nutrition, condition of health, dwelling, sanitary conditions, clothing, supply of clean water, protection against extreme cold and warmth, education, communication and social security. Some of these elements are necessary for simple survival since extreme deprivation in one way or another leads to death. A family that cannot satisfy its minimum needs of calories, proteins and vitamins, even though they use all their income, are regarded as indigents, while a family whose allotments for buying food are insufficient, is regarded "merely" as being poor (see Pinera 1979 a, p 13; Altimir 1978, p 39; Ghai et al, op cit, p 31 ff concerning Basic-Needs Indicators).

The definition of poverty however, has also a relative aspect: a normative definition concerning basic needs always has its reference in the values that set the tone in a society at a certain time, which create the expectations and wishes that are the roots of the present needs. Its contents may vary with time, as basic needs change historically with economic development and style of life (see Altimir 1978, p 14). An extension of this reasoning may however implicate that, relatively defined, poverty is impossible to erase.

Furthermore the experience of deprivation naturally depends on subjective and individual evaluations, and in each society more or less competing interests. There is no neutral definition of poverty.

In this connection Townsend (1974, p 24 ff) points out the necessity to distinguish between objective deprivation, conventionally accepted or normative deprivation and subjective deprivation. A definition of poverty can very easily become a static reflection based on the ruling elite's perspective and convenient to the bureaucratic apparatus. Especially as far as the ethничal minorities are concerned, a national definition of the needs of the so-called marginal groups may not at all correspond with their real needs, their objective deprivation which in this case to a great extent may coincide with the subjectively experienced deprivation. According to Townsend, information must be collected about the meaning of relative deprivation on different levels at which participation of marginal groups is desirable. Their organizing must accordingly be an important part in the search for the contents and causes of poverty, since the knowledge
which is gathered among these people in this way will be more accessible.

"To be poor means to depend on others for defining how one is to live." (Friedmann 1979, p 111).

The predominant definition, however, is one which in relative terms regards deprivation in relation to average satisfaction of determined needs, which, for instance, can be expressed in a comparison between poverty level (about poverty level see also The 1975 Dag Hammarskjöld Report/Development Dialogue 1975, p 40) and income division. For example, you can place the poverty line at the income level that distinguishes the poorest fifth of the population. One can also set the limit to a certain percentage of the population's average income, which partly is a combination of the absolute and the relative approach to the matter (Pinera 1979 c, p 5). In combining the two, one can see how much of economic inequality is hidden in the absolute poverty and how removed the norms for satisfaction of basic needs turn out to be in relation to the country's "disposable resources" (Altimir 1978, p 95).

2.1.2 The Poverty Gap

The amount of resources that should be transferred to the poor is supposed to be decided by the so called "poverty gap", which represents the value difference between the poverty level and the average income per capita for people below this level. The product of this difference and the number of poor people thus makes the absolute gap and corresponds to the resources that must be permanently transferred to those below the poverty level, to make it possible for them to get out of this situation. In 1970 this amount was equivalent to 7 800 million dollars in 1979's prices to the benefit of 106 million poor people in 19 Latin American countries.

Depending on the purpose, the absolute poverty gap can be expressed as a percentage of national income - or the disposable income of the population which is not poor or as share of public sector expenditures or other alternative references. In order to close the poverty gap in the six Latin American countries analysed by Pinera in 1970 it would have seen necessary to transfer 6 % of the income of those above the poverty line to the poor, or 12 % of the income of the richest tenth, who earned almost half of the personal disposable income. In per-
centage of the national income the gap would be of 4,5-5%, while the transference would amount to 22% of the Government spending (Pinera 1979 c, p 17).

This mechanical way of calculating and discussing poverty is however not totally predominant, at least not in academical circles. It is generally accepted that the eradication of poverty is not achieved by a transference of income alone from the rich to the poor, but also need permanent change in economic and political structures as well as in distributive and redistributive systems (Pinera 1979 a, p 15).

However, this knowledge does not seem to have given rise to many attempts to define poverty in a way that operationally integrates these aspects.

It is important to note the political implications of defining poverty. An instrumental definition that mainly labore with material deprivation and its relativistic aspects in terms of basic needs, poverty levels and gaps, does not distinguish cause-effect relations and thus does not contain any demands for structural changes, i.e. does not imply any threat to the prevailing possession and power, nor to stability and the status quo.

A structural definition, on the other hand, which is based upon the lopsided "interplay" between rich and poor and uncovers the root-cause and the basic elements in the reproduction of poverty thus implies a challenge to the existing power relations and the established order.

2.1.3 The State and the Elimination of Poverty

In the shape of different development plans and programmes the Latin American governments strive for national development and improved conditions for the poor. The methods can, for instance, vary between primary distributive reforms, which among other things concern ownership and control of the means of production and accordingly the function of the economic system; or redistributive measures, which among other things through wage policies, direct or indirect taxes, price control, social allowances and so on, aim at equalizing the distribution of economic resources. Most anti-poverty programmes are based on so-called income-strategies. Although income transfers can be used as an equalizing force we must maintain that poverty is more than
unfair distribution of income. In addition incomes can be of different kinds and can be earned in many different ways, in the same way as consumption patterns and preferences may vary considerably, depending on different cultural customs. The structure of the poor population will also probably show considerable variations, depending on which elements you emphasize in a definition of poverty. Neither can we overlook the discrepancies that may develop between the poor and the measures that are formulated to eliminate poverty.

Is then the state neutral? What limitations should be observed when appraising the Latin American Governments real chances to realize effective measures to get at poverty. On one hand, public institutions and bureaucracy are composed of exactly those groups - civil servants, traditional aristocracy, landowners, industrialists etc - whose surplus should be redistributed. In legislative and executive assemblies you find the elite, whose privileges are based on precisely the ownership that in the end must be modified. Furthermore these groups are very well-organized not only politically; they belong to trade unions or other communities of interest and they share value systems, cultural and ideological background. One might expect a slow pace in the implementation of all measures that could be regarded as necessary. This seems to be a dominating pattern in Latin America today, a view which among others is shared by Fagen/Cornelius (1970, p 400). They contend for instance that the Alliance of Progress as a model for political relations in Latin America was functional to the wrong purposes. Its assumption that moderate civilian governments should be effective assurances against extension of leftist groups, and also foster considerable reforms was not in accordance with reality.

"The level of performance necessary for continued rule by the center was almost independent of the need for meaningful reforms, and in the absence of meaningful challenges from independent lower sectors, the middle groups were not about to legislate against themselves."

(op cit)

In the case of Cauca, Sevilla Casas (1976, p 104) in the same way, accentuates how the landed elite coincide with those in political power, and how they:
"...por sus vínculos institutionales con el gobierno de todos los niveles esta clase dispone de la fuerza pública que de hecho ha sido utilizada para dar solución a los problemas de la región, que se subsumen, sin mas, bajo el rubro de orden público." 3)

To stability theorists like Schumpeter (1943), Berelson (1954), Lipset (1960) and Milbrath (1965), this does not seem to be a central problem. On the contrary, they regard the apathy and non-participation in the political process, shown by large groups in society, as being necessary to maintain stability and purport that the domination of experts and elite is necessary in a democracy to make effective and rational decisions possible. This apathy, though, is not only caused by lack of uninterest or general circumstances, but is to a large extent the consequence of a well-founded awareness that participation in systematic legal political processes is not likely to bring along the fast improvements that are required (see Miliband 1974, p 182).

"Elites in power,...often seek to restrict or to reduce political participation in an effort to prevent challenges to their authority." (Huntington/Nelson 1976, p 162).

On the other hand the government may not have the economic and administrative strength to be able to execute or carry out planned development programmes. These two aspects of the Government's possibilities to do something about penury and poverty naturally interplay rather intimately.

2.1.4 Poverty and Politics

Despite obvious advantages in identifying and measuring poverty, material poverty-profiles thus have a limited value, operationally, as points of departure in formulating strategies for the struggle against poverty. The poverty syndrome also has political aspects, where ideological attitudes not only decide how to define poverty and explain its causes, but also how to formulate the strategy for the war against it.

"La definición de pobreza que se adopte responde ya sea en forma explícita o encubierta, al conjunto del esquema valorativo de quienes la formulan. ...No existe, en realidad, una definición de pobreza que sea neutral." (Altimir 1979, p 11). 4)
In other words, one cannot really define poverty without ideological bias. Friedmann (1979, p 102) asserts that poverty is purely a political phenomenon. "Each definition implies an attitude and a solution." (Friedmann, p 200). Or maybe it should be called an attitude and an anti-solution. Distribution or reallocation of resources (e.g. money, land, education) has undoubtedly political implications on which each development strategy depends.

According to Piven and Cloward (1971, 1979) the anti-poverty programme in itself represents only a secondary institution, while the social effort primarily fills a political, economic function as a strategic reaction to troublesome pressure from below. Help to the poor is thus regularly dispersed from above for a certain purpose, and is therefore not very permanent. This is a problem especially in developing countries. In less democratic nations it is often done in the form of a so called official attention, atención oficial (see Franco 1978, p 16), which aims at eliminating the explosive potential of popular dissatisfaction. Technocratic, paternalistic strategies are usually applied. Often these ways of attack are based on different aspects of the culture of poverty complex which among other things, ascribe the poor common characteristics that separate them as a group from the rest of society. Some of these qualities are said to obstruct the integration of the poor into the developing process; that the cause of their poverty to a high degree is to be found within themselves (see e.g. Rogers 1969) and its perpetuation within its own internal dynamics (McNamara 1976, p 6), and that a primary goal in the aid programme must be to develop the human resources via, e.g. education to change attitudes and to transmit essential knowledge. The increased productivity is regarded as the key, and via well-defined credit programmes the authorities try to funnel resources to what they consider strategic points.

The integrated rural development programme (see Galli 1978, p 83) sanctioned by among others, by CIDA, IBRD and IDB is a typical example of this type of techno-economical strategy. In Colombia this programme has fully replaced the Land Reform Institute's efforts to settle, among other things, land ownership. The redistribution of land is no longer even seen as a necessary complement. The land reform in Colombia, as a strategic answer to critical dissatisfaction among peasants, agricultural workers and indians, has evidently served its purpose. Instead the Government now concentrates on modernization,
credit facilities and technical improvement in order to support the poorest peasants. However it has turned out that very few of these have been entrusted as borrowers. Other problems are the short periods of amortization and high interest rates. Yet the government feels that this development programme will decrease the severest discontent and that production will be promoted without any great changes in the ownership structure. (The problem of foreign and penetration of capital into peasant agriculture and rural development schemes are also discussed by Bernstein 1979, p 433-34).

These government plans are based on poverty definitions and explanatory models which, in one way or another, maintain the illusion that poverty can be eliminated without anyone having to pay for it. This holds whether or not the plans are income division strategies, programmes aiming at creating more jobs, or capacity training to increase the productivity.

"The rich, of course, have no intention to desist from their normal endeavours to get still richer. They merely agree to the transfer, for a time, of a small part of their annual gain to make the poor - the working and deserving poor by preference - a little better off." (Friedmann 1979, p 110).

The ownership of the means of production and thus the concentration of economic and political power is an important variable in a functional definition of poverty. What is most characteristic for poverty is the lack of opportunity to exercise influence. If you are poor you have neither systemic channels nor legal instruments for influencing the government or decisions that regulate your life conditions in any decisive way. Your are not equipped to act and help yourself.

2.1.5 Poverty as unequal Access to the Bases for accumulating Social Power

Impeded influence is thus a central dilemma of poverty. The forces which determine poverty's criteria as well as poverty's causes are beyond the reach of the poor, as are the resources they need to change their situation. The underdevelopment and destitution in the Latin American countryside thus basically do not depend on fatalism, low level of aspiration or other characteristics, which, by among others Rogers (1969) ascribe the peasant
subculture (See Berglund 1977, p 143). Rather the poor are in different ways prevented from participating actively politically and respectively socially and economically, and therefore they stay below the poverty line. A definition of poverty must therefore be based on the fact that the poor have no legal resources or systemic power to change their living conditions - to be something else but poor - and that this above all is a self-evident effect of the assymetrical conditions of production and consumption and the unequal competition inherent in capitalism. Those who fight to preserve their privileges and the status quo have more resources than those who fight to free themselves from their poverty.

"...en el mundo hay siempre lucha. Los ricos luchan para quedarse con la tierra y el trabajo de los pobres; y los pobres luchamos para no dejarnos y poder mejorar nuestras vidas." (CRIC 1973, p 9). 5)

It would seem reasonable to suspect that there is a connection between poverty and class affiliation and that the direct extermination of poverty is very hard to combine with a capitalist way of production. Altimir (1978, p 7) however is not of the opinion that poverty as a social situation is theoretically articulated within marxism. The exploited and not the poor constitute the significant analytic category. He alleges, for instance, that different levels of living among the exploited are not explained by this theory. This may be true but does unfortunately not carry the discussion forward.

On the whole Altimir thinks that we have no instruments to satisfactorily explain the poverty syndrome (op cit, p 5). While Franco (1978, p 6) considers that there are no scientific criterias that can be used to define poverty, which I think is a pessimism that is too exaggerated.

Miliband (1974, p 185) states that the poor are "an integrated part of the working class - its poorest and most disadvantaged stratum". He means that those who live under the worst conditions to a high degree form an inactive part of the working class in so far as they have no part in the protective organizations that the organized working class have developed and thereby have managed to improve their negotiative position (p 188).
"Given the weakness of the poor, and their consequent inability to impose their needs upon the political culture, governments are under no great compulsion to pay close attention to these needs."

(Friedmann 1979, p 101) is close to this reasoning in his definition of poverty as an unequal access to the fundamentals for accumulation of social power. By social power, Friedmann means the power to understand and control the forces that form the conditions of life, to be socially present in a way that cannot be ignored, to formulate intentions and to achieve them. The fundamentals of this social power then include, but are not restricted to these: productive assets (e.g. land, tools, health), financial resources (e.g. income and credit reliability), social and political organizing (e.g. political parties, trade unions, co-operatives), social networks to get things done and to obtain information and knowledge, appropriate knowledge and skills, and relevant and functional information useful to promote and advance one's own life chances, one's own developing process.

With this structural definition as a basis, Friedmann moves our attention from a consumptional perspective of poverty to an approach which emphasizes the production of life and living. This definition emphasize the poor man as an active "recreator" of his situation, not as a passive receptor of charity. The main strategy for eliminating poverty, according to Friedmann (1979, p 102) lies implicit in this definition and signifies the empowerment of the poor, something which cannot be obtained without conflict and struggle. This conclusion is also brought up by Miliband (1974, p 191 ff) who, however, also points out the difficulties in mobilizing the poor, a population which is very heterogeneous, and that the general situation of deprivation in itself is not enough to keep together a national movement.

"The poor certainly need to turn themselves into a considerable nuisance vis-à-vis 'the community', rather than remain an object of virtus 'compassion'. But their best hope of doing so probably lies in local action." (op cit, p 103).

Furthermore, Miliband naturally means that these actions as far as possible should be tied to some pressure directed toward the government and national organizations, but he emphasizes the problem of private enterprise economies, whose power is based upon control of central parts in economic life and thus enables
them to counteract a government's most progressive intentions. Alford/Friedland (1975, p 432) call it "power without participation".

The conflict between competing interests is obvious, whether it is an institutionalized conflict, in accordance with Dahrendorf's (1959) model, or a revolutionary process which is enforced in certain developing countries - especially since it involves the struggle of the exploited people against the owners of the means of production. In order to eliminate poverty you need structural changes. These changes are probably not pushed forward by the groups of society that can count on continuous wellfare in a society with maintained conditions of production. Changes are, however, more probably demanded by those who have developed a consciousness about the causes of the gap between their present and potential conditions of living, which lie close but cannot yet be bridged. The reason for this gap Galtung (1969, p 68) defines as "violence". When a group or class accumulates resources and knowledge, a gap is created and the violence is institutionalized into what might be called structural violence. Conflict becomes inevitable when it comes to changes in the social structure, and in countries where every attempt at legal and semilegal changes are oppressed, a revolutionary attempts are enforced. Colombia is a good example of this. No far-reaching changes, enough to extinguish poverty, are really possible before the poor constitute themselves as a political and economical power factor, i.e. not without real popular participation.

"...what the poor need is not a Poverty Programme but a Poverty Movement..." (Miliband 1974, p 182).

2.2 Class Affiliation and Poverty

The explicatory variable through out this text is accordingly the class affiliation of these indigenous peasants, i.e. that the answers are to be looked for in the relations of production, and that the forms of political resistance performed are determined by the class relations. Although CRIC develop a socialist position in their political platform, they explicitly emphasize their special quality as cultural Indians and that they cannot accept to be embraced or assimilated by any political party, trade union or peasant organization. This might bring distinctive features to their practice of resistance as they i.a., along with the recuperation of land, also
strive for the reestablishment of traditional forms of cooperation. Still this does not alter their objective class position. While it rather might be an indicator on the coexistence of precapitalist and capitalist modes of production. Hence the indigenous peasants constitute a subculture within the social framework of the Colombian nation at the same time as they constitute an ethnic stratum of the peasant working class along with other small-holders and agricultural labourers.

"La población indígena puede caracterizarse en su mayoría, en el aspecto socio-económico, como de campesinos pobres. Esto significa que vivimos del cultivo de la tierra, que tenemos generalmente una pequeña parcela (dentro o fuera del resguardo), que no nos da el sustento necesario para nuestra familia, que tenemos que salir a jornalear cuando los ricos o campesinos más acomodados nos dan trabajo. Muchos de nosotros hemos perdido del todo nuestra parcela y tenemos que vivir del jornal, tratando de no perder el contacto con nuestra comunidad. Tenemos como enemigos principales al terrateniente que nos roba nuestras tierras y paga mal nuestro trabajo y al intermediario que nos explota tanto en lo que nos vende como en el precio infímo que paga por nuestros productos." (CRIC 1978 a, p 22). 6)

Capitalism is present and the former subsistence cultivators are now also participating as producers of cheap staple foods, as consumers of expensive industrial products and as workers in the modern commodity producing sector of the national economy. Thus precapitalist modes of production persist, functionally linked to the capitalist economic system. The common existence of semi-proletarized labour is but one indicator. Accordingly these semi-proletarians, since they to a certain extent provide for themselves, many times are more convenient to the buyers of labour, at least cheaper, than fully proletarized workers who entirely depend on their wages. In other words, irrespective of the degree of precapitalist elements in the maintenance struggle of the poor indigenous peasant he participates directly or indirectly in the capitalist market economy and belongs to the peasant labour class.

2.3 The Dynamics of Participation

In the context I believe consequently that it is important to scrutinize the dynamics of political and economical participa-
tition, not least because the participation concept is so widely and vaguely employed. Tied to the class determinant however I believe the concept gets a little tighter and can help us to understand some of the poverty-generating functions in the periphery of capitalism at the same time as it also gives legitimacy to non-systemic and anti-systemic participation.

It is important to keep in mind that the concept has only a descriptive function to illustrate the central significance of the class relations to the destitution of the indigenous peasants. Hence the universally observed absence of popular participation in developing countries cannot explain underdevelopment nor poverty but is an obvious consequence of the relations of production. To give expiatory status to the participation concept alone would be to contribute to the systemic generation of misconceptions about the causes of poverty. Nevertheless popular participation is nowadays generally perceived as something good, desirable and an indispensable factor in the struggle against poverty for development (see for example UN 1975, 1978; Pearse/Stiefel 1979). Lack of participation has accordingly come to constitute a central element in recent explanatory models concerning the factors behind poverty and the question put forward in research is: what are the structural reasons impeding the participation of poor people? An important initiative to research to find an answer to this question and formulate a strategy for the elimination of these conditions was put forward by UNRISD through Andrew Pearse and Matthias Stiefel (1978/79) in search for so called anti-participatory structures.

"Structures of antiparticipation", perpetuating existing power inequalities, prevail at all levels of socioeconomic organization - from the family, the local, regional and national to the international level where supranational centres of economic power shape trade and monetary structures and leave countries and citizens at their mercy." (Pearse/Stiefel 1979, p 25).

Increased participation does not automatically solve all the problems since participation do not necessarily correspond to influence. On the contrary systemic participation can imply the strengthening of the forces supporting poverty. On the economic level, as for example the poor semi-proletarized
peasant or agricultural worker cannot realize the value of his own labour potential, which instead is transferred to those who own the necessary means to exploit the productive capacity of the worker. In this way contributory participation in the national economy by the direct producer only strengthens the power of the rural elite. In the same way formal political participation in for example elections serves to confirm the legitimacy of the prevailing system rather than affect the ascendancy of the voters over the distribution of collective and public goods (Olson 1965, p 14, Booth 1979, p 30).

Hence I view rural poverty as a product of those mechanisms put into motion when producing people are alienated from the control of their own labour potential and the means of production by indirect or direct coercion, which gradually diminishes their access to the bases for accumulating social power (Friedmann 1979) and opens up an ever increasing gap between them and those who have seized control.

Apparently participation is a rather ambiguous concept since participation without influence can become the antibody of change meanwhile real popular participation with influence always carries antisystemic elements and thus constitute a potential driving force for disruption and social change.

The participation-concept applied in connection with development is directly related to another double-edged sword in the debate, namely the concept of national integration. The appearance of this concept stems from the modernization-paradigm (See Blomström/Hettne 1981, p 40 ff; Parsons 1961; Hoselitz/Moore 1963; Hoselitz 1965) and the traditional liberal bourgeois assumption that peripheral precapitalist formations are underdeveloped, displaying articulated poverty, because of their relative isolation from the modern commodity-producing sector; that precapitalist modes of production are not compatible with growth and that they can be "economically developed out of existence" (Kearny 1980, p 116).

This notion has set the tone in most development strategies concerning the countryside in Latin American countries, and increased participation of the traditional sectors in the national economy through modernization and increased producti-
vity - i.e. capitalist development - has been a consistently articulated aim throughout these strategies.

Accordingly I also discuss some of the principal elements in the national integration policy of Colombia and question its true aims and its consequences in reality regarding the life situations of the indigenous peasants. Obviously strategies of national integration which on the paper aim at making all tribal peoples and marginal groups share the benefits of civilization and progress, in terms of health and non-starvation etc, in practice constitute responses to capitalist expansion in the countryside and cannot be expected to automatically benefit the Indians; quite the contrary.

Participation is just another concept to describe a solution to the discrepancy between directed change from above and the needs of the marginal indigenous population concerned. The legislation in most countries with a multiethnic population usually contains a lot of progressive formulations regarding the encouragement of organizing efforts from below. Theoretically, participation and the involvement of the marginal groups in the processes of decision making concerning their own daily life and future, is very much accentuated - so also in Colombia.

The new indianism, as opposed to the traditional indianism (indigenismo) - non-indian persons, organizations and institutions preoccupied with the issues of "what to do with the indian problem; how to save the indians" - should consequently be considered as the fundament of the necessary participation from below.

CRIC accordingly, ought to be regarded as an important tool to implement the participation program as this indigenous mobilization implies a step towards an expanded involvement of the so called marginal group in the national development process. Logically there should be a strong community of interest between the new indianism and the expressed attempts of the Colombian government to promote social economic development in the countryside, but the positions are, not surprising, antagonistic.

Ever since colonization these peasants have participated more or less directly as foodproducers and workers in the colonial,
national as well as in the international economy. Thus they have contributed to the wealth of Spanish aristocracy, Colombian bourgeois, local brokers and transnational agribusiness firms; but without power to influence the distribution of the benefits produced, i.e. without access to the fruits of their drudgery. Instead the indigenous population has continuously been deprived of their resources in land, labour and goods.

2.4 Postulations

From what has been discussed on this introductory level above, I wish to deduce the following postulations as a guide to the subsequent chapters:

1. The poor indigenous peasants are today, despite remnants of pre-capitalist modes of production, functionally integrated in the capitalist economic system and through their economic participation as i.a. day-labourers, contract-workers, producers of cheap staple-foods, petty commodities and raw-materials and consumers of expensive agricultural inputs and industrial commodities, by direct or indirect coercion continuously deprived of their resources and developmental power in terms of land, labour and goods. Due to the existing relations of production they cannot exert any decisive control over own labour-potential or their produce. The wretchedness of the poor indigenous peasant in the Eastern Rural Region of Cauca thus is primarily determined by his class position.

2. Extra-legal protest activities to affect the distribution of resources and public goods, in a social formation like Colombia, are legitimate forms of political participation necessary to the poor for gaining access to the bases for accumulating social power. Uninstitutionalized forms of political participation, as performed by the poor indigenous peasants mobilized in CRIC in the Eastern rural region of Cauca in our case, are necessary resorts to overcome the conditions of imposed deprivation. Thus these indigenous peasants are the fundamental composers of their own future. They cannot expect anyone else to release them from their experienced destitution or foster their cultural reindivication.
3 METHODOLOGICAL NOTES

3.1 On Participatory Research

The knowledge compiled in this dissertation is to a large extent gathered in close cooperation with CRIC and would have been impossible to achieve without their acceptance and collaboration.

It is obvious that the researcher occupies a rather precarious position between the ruling elite and the dominated deprived sectors of the population in a social formation like the Colombian. Knowledge about causes and effects regarding the persistence of poverty cannot be considered as neutral. In Chile for example, explanations of underdevelopment put forward by the dependency school\(^7\) was assimilated and employed by the UP-government in Chile 1970-73, but denied and immediately exchanged for an extreme monetary variant of the modernization model by the Pinochet regime, with well known consequences for the masses. Information that expounds the urgent necessity of redistributing land, input-resources and power receives very little response from the authorities: participatory activities to apply obtained knowledge is considered as subversive business from the viewpoint of the establishment.

"Samhällskritiska forskare arbetar i Latinamerika i ett hårt politiskt klimat - och det gäller i särskilt hög grad för forskare som ser sin kunskapsproduktion som ett led i ett samhälleligt förändringsarbete till förmån för och i samarbete med de resursfattiga och exploaterade folkgrupperna på den fattiga landsbygden och i storstädernas slumdistrikt." (Swedner 1979, p 8).

That this kind of research is awkward to those in power is also somewhat illustrated by the fact that I was not welcome to realize a minor study in 1977 on National Integration and Human Rights even as a Human Rights Fellow sanctioned by the UN Commission of Human Rights.

Thus far traditional informal qualitative field methods have aimed at a marked objective distance to the target population and the reality studied, obtaining a formal neutrality. This methodological orthodoxy is, however, today being scrutinized by more purpose-orientated approaches, especially in research on popular movements and social change which require a widening
of the traditional methods of sociological and anthropological field-work. The social scientist is more seldom satisfied with just describing and explaining society. He wants to contribute to societal change for equality and justice and produce applicable knowledge, tools, for this change-process. Much of the production of knowledge at the UN research institutes is characterized by these efforts, consequently policy-directed as described by Myrdal (1970, p 49).

These tendencies towards a change of the scientist's role from spectator to actor has come to be described as action-research, a topic discussed for example in Cartagena and Vittsjö 1977 (Swedner 1979). A concept introduced already in the 1940's by Kurt Lewin (1948) representing all kinds of purposeful research towards change (see Abrahamsson/Swedner 1979, p 95 ff).

"Aktionsforskaren tillhör inte publiken utan befinner sig mitt bland dem som agerar på scenen. Han producerar kunskap, som kan användas för att driva händelserna framåt, och han deltar själv i skeendet. Kunskapsproduktionen - forskningen - ingår som ett led i arbetet på att förverkliga mål, som formulérats i samarbete med dem som forskaren lilar sig med i förändringsarbetet (Swedner 1979, p 9). 9)

This new "paradigm for the production of knowledge" as Swedner expresses it, is getting close to the notion that CRIC has of science:

"La ciencia es un instrumento para comprender y transformar la realidad. ..., la ciencia social solo puede estar a favor o en contra del cambio social, esto es al servicio de los oprimidos o de los opresores." (CRIC 32:1978, p 2). 10)

Discussing this problem, Himmelstrand (1979, p 16) concludes that the knowledge from below must be considered and worked up, and that "social engineers" must be located as close as possible to the grassroots.

"I propose that more or less visionary social scientists can play a role in transforming society to build a better future only if they immerse themselves in such contexts of class or group struggle, refraining from enacting the grandiose role of architects of the future, and rather helping to critically and constructively evaluate and modify the solutions advanced from below by practitioners
participating in such struggles. This can be done, for instance, by helping to place such solutions in a larger structural context in a dialogical and collaborative research relationship with practitioners who have a taste for such dialogue."

Unfortunately these explicitly progressive ideas indicate also precisely the problem of the more or less unconscious paternalism in the social and economic sciences. In the collaboration with target populations the researchers consider themselves as the brains necessary to design strategies for development. Designs that are, however, usually ethnocentrically conditioned.

"The toe knows best where the shoe pinches - but it needs collaboration with a brain to design and to make a better shoe. If such a collaboration is not accessible or even refused, the toe may start kicking around in a most destructive manner." (Himmelstrand, p 17).

de Silva et al (1979, p 3 ff) have tried to bridge this problem by developing the methodology of conventional social science which they consider as "...unable to obtain the perceptions of those people whose life and struggle are being researched."

In their work on rural development and social transformation towards a theory of rural development they asked activists and cadres from Bhoomi Sena, a peasant movement in Maharashtra, India, to join them as partners in their research. They use on the one hand the method of dialogical research "...in which the external researcher internalizes himself to stimulate uninhibited responses, reminiscences and reflections ...In this process, the accumulated experience from their life and struggle, and their considerations of options and rationales for action, are also revealed." (op cit).

On the other hand though, they have gone a stage beyond this dialogical research. Departing from the premise that formal education and training are neither necessary nor sufficient for intellectual maturity, they use the method of participatory research in which the former dialogue is "...enriched by the conscious intellectual input of the people whose life is being researched." (op cit).
"Life is a great educator by itself, and through con­scious struggle with nature and class oppression the poorest and the formally "illiterate" can mature in intellectual capacity as well as anybody else."
(de Silva et al, p 4).

This methodology coincides to some degree with traditional methods of ethnography and anthropology but is much less ethnocentric since it builds on direct participation of the people being researched, in contrast to, for example the traditional method of participatory observation. In this way the target population directly contributes to added knowledge about the causes and effects concerning impoverishment and development strategies. Still, their influence must be considered limited, depending, among other things up on the shortcomings of formal political participation (see Himmelstrand op cit).

In conclusion. To understand the contents of deprivation and the reproductory mechanisms of poverty I believe it is necessary to come as close as possible to the level of productive contributory participation and the subjective experience of this dilemma. This cannot be done thoroughly, as far as I am concerned, from the spectator's position. Consequently I have chosen to enter the arena, fully aware of possible biases. I believe however, that these risks have been counterbalanced by the continuous confrontation and trial of this primary information against my secondary sources with explicatory approaches presented by other researchers.

3.2 Collection of Data

Underneath this approach to get at the root causes of poverty and the impact of participation - which to a large extent has been determined by the principles of dialogical and participatory research - there is not only my work in Colombia during four months in 1977 and 1979/80 but also my experiences from Chile 1972 (Berglund 1977) and Peru 1977 and 1980, during another eight months.

3.2.1 Unpublished Sources

The fundamental experiences of the reality of the indigenous peasants originate of course principally from sharing, even if very marginally and from a privileged position, the drudgery of their everyday life: on the cultivation, on the path, at the market etc.
The determinating factors of this everyday life are revealed in step with uninhibited questions, answers and reflections. To complete the picture though, it is still necessary to systematize observation and informal interviews on different levels of the administrative hierarchy within the resguardo as well as the economic organizations, the political hierarchy within CRIC and the economic hierarchy of local and regional trade. Thus I have interviewed "gobernadors", the president and other members of the executive comité of CRIC, regional representatives of CRIC, presidents of cooperatives and empresas comunitarias as well as the indigenous peasant, male, female, child, without appointed assignments. Further I have combined this knowledge with information won from some white landowners and middlemen, completed with interviews with responsible public officials regarding the Indian question within the Dirección General de Integración y Desarrollo de la Comunidad at the Ministry of Interior. I also succeeded in obtaining a shorter interview with the Minister of Interior.

In this way I have gathered information about i.a. the contents of deprivation; the impact of capitalism regarding for example the processes of proletarization and semiproletarization; the conditions of exchange on the market; The role of the middlemen and the forms and conditions of political participation.

The resguardos, cooperatives and empresas comunitarias I am acquainted with are concentrated to the municipalities of Puracé, Silvia, Paez and Inza. Puracé and Silvia representing the situation of the communities producing under cold or temperate climatic conditions as well as those geographically closer to the commercial mainstreams of Cauca. While Paez and Inza represent the conditions of Tierradentro and the warm region (see map, p 38).

3.2.2 Published Sources

Dealing with action-orientated research on poverty, participation, and indigenous peoples one must adapt to a multidisciplinary approach. Anthropology, sociology, social-psychology, political science, law and even archeology all contribute with relevant, necessary knowledge to understand the determinants of existence of the ethnic minority.

Concerning the description of social and economic conditions in the eastern rural region of Cauca my most important sour-
ces have been: the diagnostic socio-economic investigation realized by the Secretaria Tecnica de Planeacion Agropecuaria (SETPA 1979) authorized by FAO; the study of rural Cauca carried out by Londono (1979); Ortiz's monograph (1973) on the Paez peasants in Tierradentro; the anthropological investigations also in Tierradentro by Sevilla Casas (1976/78); and the CRIC publications.

But there are also legal and political aspects to be considered. On the one hand we have the view of the authorities reflected chiefly in legislation, official reports, and development policies. This material is principally produced by the Ministerio de Gobierno (Ministry of Interior). On the other hand there is the view of the indigenous peasants expressed primarily through their mouthpiece Unidad Indigena and the other publications of CRIC. The relability of the accusations put forward by CRIC against the authorities concerning violation of human rights, laws and principles protecting the rights of the aboriginal population has been examined and confirmed by, among other institutions, Amnesty International (1980) and CINEP (1979 and Controversia No 79:1978). Also the Russell Tribunal (Rotterdam 1980) condemned to the advantage of CRIC.

Hence, my concern has not been to further confirm the political repression of CRIC but to further examine the interpretation of the indigenous peasant as to the causes to their wretchedness in a search for the scientific significance of their economical and political resistance.

The dependency school with, among others (see Blomström/Hettne 1981, for a comprehensive discussion) André Gunder Frank and Samir Amin as important authorities, has yielded fundamental understanding to the root causes behind the production and reproduction of underdevelopment and poverty. One important element in their theoretical framework was the attention they called to the connection between the underdevelopment of local rural economies in Third World countries and the development of industrial countries, i.e. the transfer of economic surplus from the periphery to the center through a chain of satellite—metropolis relationships within the world capitalist system, as well as existing dependency relations between different sectors of the regional and national economy.

But, as Long (1975) points out, this approach to the study of structural dependency and internal domination does not necessarily consider "horizontal ties for sustaining depen-
dency structures" (p 278) neither does it "comprehend the sets of relationships which exist between different modes of production of either the regional or national level" (p 272). This is where the modes of production debate has been shown to contain important clues.

Contributions to the modes of production approach are available in i.a. the periodicals Journal of Peasant Studies, Latinamerican Perspectives, Estudios Rurales Latinoamericanos and New Left Review. Among other profiles there are articles by Ernesto Laclau, Aidan Foster-Carter, Alain de Janvry, Carlos Garramon, Henry Bernstein.

The theory and practice of participation is a central theme through the whole dissertation. This subject is, however, relatively unexplored regarding Latin American conditions and is dominated by research mainly on voting behavior and other forms of formal political participation. Booth and Seligson have made a pioneering contribution to save this situation. On the one hand through their own research in Costa Rica and on the other hand through editing the two volumes on Political Participation in Latin America (1979/80).

The major part of my cited sources though, concerning the participation complex derive mainly their knowledge from a North American context as for example Sidney Verba and Norman Nie; Robert Alford and Roger Friedland, Frances Piven and Richard Cloward. Thorough investigations on the mechanisms of participation that are, as far as I am concerned, non-existent in Colombia. Nevertheless I consider the generalizability of these findings to be extensive enough to give a fairly high level of validity also for Colombian conditions, which is also confirmed by the sources of Booth and Seligson.

Another pioneering work is today also developed, as already mentioned, by Pearse and Stiefel (1979) at the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, who have initiated the so called Popular Participation Programme and minted the concept of anti-participatory structures.

The Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadistica (DANE) is the heaviest source of statistical data. Due to the fact, however, that the figures produced by DANE are
too general for my purposes, not meant to reveal the substantial dimensions of either popular influence or poverty, the statistical evidence for the theses I pursue are not too overwhelming. The rural reality concerning, for example, unemployment, subemployment, proletarization, landtenure, income distribution etc have not been thoroughly investigated ever, except to some extent in the XIV Censo Nacional de Población in 1973 or Censo Nacional Agropecuario 1970-71. Hence accessible statistics have principally been used to illustrate some of the phenomena and general conditions which I discuss in this study, as for example the pattern of land and income distribution. That is also why some descriptive data is so old. The Censo Indígena del Cauca 1972 (DANE 1978) can be regarded as an exception as it presents specific data concerning the resguardos in Cauca. No investigation of the indigenous groups in Colombia has completely covered the population in question.
NOTES PART I

1) "...we are Indians because we believe that the objects of this world were made for everybody... Therefore we believe that the land, and the air, as well as the water and everything else that is necessary for our survival should not belong to just a few. The land should not have posessors but be communal: as the water, as the air. So that everybody can cultivate it and collect the fruit to nourish the others, and we could escape our penury and better our lives." (CRIC 1973, p 5-6).

2) "...therefore we shall not believe what the oppressors teach. As said: from thorns one cannot expect anything but sores, from the exploiters we cannot expect anything but exploitation. Thus it is better to keep away from what the exploiters teach as from the thorns." (CRIC 1973, p 32).

3) "...because of their institutional connections with the government on all levels, this class dispose the public force employed to solve problems in the region, subsumed under the heading of 'public order'." (Sevilla Casas 1976, p 104).

4) "The definition of poverty adopted responds, explicitely or concealed, to the value scheme of those who formulate it. ..In reality, there does not exist any neutral definition of poverty." (Altimir 1973, p 11).

5) "...in the world there is always struggle. The rich struggling to retain the land and labour of the poor; and the poor, we are struggling to not relinquish and be capable of improving our lives." (CRIC 1973, p 9).

6) "The indigenous population can to its majority, in the socioeconomic aspect, characterize themselves as poor peasants. This signifies that we live from cultivating the land, that we generally have a small plot of land (within or outside the resguardo) that does not give us food supply enough for our family, that we have to leave for daylabouring when the rich or more well to do peasants offer us work. Many of us have lost our plot of land and have to maintain ourselves through day-labour trying not to loose the contact with our community. Our principal enemies are the landowner who steal our land and pay bad for our work and the middlemen who explote us through what he sells to us as well as through the low prices he pays for our products." (CRIC 1978 a, p 22).
7) Corresponding to the currents of development theory which emphasize the relations of dependency between developed and underdeveloped formations. André Gunder Frank is one representative with his metropole-satellite theory (1969). The school had its most important domains conquered in the end of 1960 and the beginning of the 1970s. See Blomström/Hettne 1981 for a more comprehensive understanding.

8) "Social scientists, critical of society, work in Latin-America under harsch conditions — especially those researchers who regard their production of knowledge as an essential part of a work for societal change to the benefit and in cooperation with the exploited sectors of the population in rural and urban areas, lacking resources." (Swedner 1979, p 8).

9) The actions researcher does not belong to the audience but stands among the actors on the stage. He produces knowledge which can be employed to push the course of events forward, and he participates himself in this process. The production of knowledge — the research — is an integrated part of the efforts to implement goals which have been formulated in collaboration with them who the researcher ally himself with in this work for change (Swedner 1979, p 9).

10) "Science is an instrument to understand and transform the reality. ..., the social science can only be in favour of, or against the social change, which means either at the service of the oppressed or the oppressors." (CRIC No 32:1978, p 2).
II TRANSFER OF POWERS AND IMPOVERISHMENT IN THE EASTERN REGION OF CAUCA IN COLOMBIA

4 GEOGRAPHICAL AND DEMOGRAPHIC PARTICULARES

As the rest of Colombia, the Cauca Department offers a dramatic and beautiful scenery. An extremely varying landscape with high mountains and volcanos - the snowcapped Coconuco 4500 m and Puracé 4800 m - as well as steep hillsides between vast flat lands, high plateus, deep valleys, which became natural boundaries between different indigenous groups.

The climate varies considerably with altitude. Generally we can distinguish between four different temperature zones, pisos térmicos. The hot zone ranges up to 1000 meters above sea level with a mean temperature exceeding 24 centigrades.

The temperate zone between 1000 and 2000 meters above sea level with a temperature that usually does not fall below 17 centigrades. The zone from 2000 up to 3000 meters is considered to be cold with temperatures down to 12 centigrades.

Above 3000 meters there is the páramo-wilds, cold and desolate. One third, 34 % of the Cauca area (3 049 500 hectares) corresponds to the hot zone, 34 % to the temperate zone, while 21 % is cold land and 11 % páramo.

This great variety of habitat offers also a wide range of different ecological possibilities for agriculture and human settlement.

In the cold area, potatoes, ullucos and maize are the principal crops, but also onions and vetch are cultivated.

In the temperate zone additional plants can be cultivated such as beans and peanuts. Here the great variety of wild fruits also become important. Guayaba, avocado, papaya, guanabana and chirimoya are some examples.

In the hot region, sweet potatoes, bananas, beans, yuca and fruits like pineapple, papaya and custard apple are commonly utilized. This is also the area for growing coffee (Hernández de Alba 1946, p 918).

The central Cordillera was once covered with rich forests which to a great extent have yielded to agriculture and pasture grounds. Due to the lack of land, some peasants are forced to use parts
of the barren and inhospitable páramo to strive for their living, thus sometimes cultivating areas that actually are designated as national parks (as Puracé) because of their special vegetation. In poor peasants areas, the woods are nearly extinguished.

The Cauca Department is conventionally divided into eight areas (see map 1). The indigenous population is concentrated mainly to three if these, the eastern zone (El Oriente), the central zone (El Centro) and the land-up-country (Tierradentro). These zones constitute the mountainous region along the central mountain range, which is the land of the Paez, the Coconuco and the Guambiano Indians. The main part of these three zones, gathering the majority of Indian reservations, the so called resguardos of Cauca, are usually comprised under the concept of the Eastern Region which I will also adopt throughout this text. I stress, however, that there are also other important zones in Cauca with indigenous communities but which are excluded from this study.

In 1964, Cauca had 607 197 inhabitants of which 9.1 % in Oriente, 37.2 % in Centro and 4.9 % in Tierradentro. Today the population of Cauca is estimated to about 850 000. The indigenous population can however only be estimated roughly. The official figures, which originate from the Indian Census of 1972, give some 36 000 Paez, 6 000 Guambianos and about 18 000 individuals identifying themselves with the names of their reservations, resguardos (see table 1 a, appendix 1). This census was however limited to an investigation of resguardos recognized as indigenous communities by the government, and did not consider those individuals outside these resguardos who would identify themselves as Indians. Probably the number of Indians is much bigger. For Colombia as a whole, the indigenous population today can be estimated to about 500 000. Consulting table 1 b (appendix 1) we can also see that the indigenous population in Cauca is growing considerably, from about 60 000 in 1964 to nearly 100 000 in 1977. Care should be used in using these numbers since there are different ways of defining Indians.

The problem of determining criterions how to define who is Indian or not, is obvious. There are social, cultural and biological aspects to consider. It is not necessarily the biological Indian who belongs to the lower layers of society. One who consider himself as an indian does not necessarily speak
any language but Spanish. Irrespective of his own biological origin anyone can be denoted as white if he manifests a way of living different from indigenous tradition and especially if he has caused the dispossession of an Indian from his land (DANE 1978, p 28).

"...el concepto 'blanco' para el indígena, antes de ser un criterio rascista es un término peyorativo con que el indígena, identifica a aquel que se apodera de su tierra, sus productos y su trabajo llámase blanco indio o mestizo y en el - 'blanco' encarna la explotación." (Londono 1979, p 60 ff). 1)

Thus, there are not only Indians populating the resguardos. At least 4% in the resguardo population can be considered as whites or colonists (see Table 2, appendix 1). These whites are usually colonists or descendents of poor peasants who have moved to these areas and gradually have succeeded to appropriate more and more land to themselves from the resguardo. The majority of its white population is generally found in the central village of the resguardo, in positions as middlemen on different levels of trade and distribution.

The major part of the population in Cauca lives in rural areas. In 1964 there were as many as 78% living in the countryside dispersed or in smaller villages, with less than 1 500 inhabitants. Almost 60% or the Cauca population were engaged in agriculture in 1965 according to a study by Luis Felipe Suárez and Gustavo Svensson quoted by Sevilla Casas (op cit, p 95), and mainly in cultivation for their own subsistence. Still, more than 50% of the population are estimated to derive their livelihood from agriculture.

Cauca is considered to be one of the most backwards and traditional parts of Colombia. It was colonized very early in spite of considerable resistance from the Indians of the region. Popayan, which is the capital of the department was founded already in 1536, and the region can still be viewed as a locus of a traditional landowning aristocracy and surviving traditional, precapitalistic modes of production.

The predominating forms of land tenure are the latifundio, often in form of the aristocratic hacienda with an abundance of land to which different kinds of quasi-servile dependent workers are tied, and the resguardo, with its small, intensely exploited land plots. But there are also a considerable number of small-holdings, minifundios, as well as mediumsize farmers.
Ten per cent of the Cauca area is considered to be resguardo land, with 48 of the 84 resguardos that exist in Colombia.

Pan American highway is crossing the Cauca Department, passing Popayan, but generally the infrastructure is far from developed. Especially Tierradentro is lacking roads. Popayan has about 160,000 inhabitants and is the only urban center of importance. Popayan and the municipalities (see table 3, appendix 1) of Cauca are very dependent on Cali and the fertile valley of Cauca, El Valle, a few hours by bus from Popayan. Cali is the third biggest city in Colombia and an important center of economic development in Colombia, from where the processed food-stuffs, among other industrial commodities, sold in the Indian communities are derived.
5 HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

5.1 Colonization

At the time of the Spanish conquest, the region which is today Popayan and the mountainous area around it were densely populated. Most of these tribes were agriculturalists in the valleys and on the fertile hills. Lehman (1946, p 969) calls them the Moguex-Coconuco groups. (Mogue is the paez word for Guambia which is the most common denomination today). The exact location of the various indigenous groups and the boundaries between them, are hard to establish. Many languages were spoken and the Spanish chronicles do not provide uniform interpretations (Hernandez de Alba 1946, p 915 ff). Inprecisenes can be ascribed to the extensive inter-tribal fighting in these areas before, and also during the Spanish Colonization (Steward/Faron 1959, p 209).

The Paez Indians together with the Coconucos, Guambianos, Pijaos, Guanacas and Paniquitas occupied more or less the same area as the Paez today along the Central Cordillera, mainly on the east side. This territory was however located on the direct route between the colonial centres of Quito and Santa Fe (today Bogota). The Spaniards were strongly resisted mainly by the Paez and Pijao, who already were experienced warrior, but also by the Guambia. Rugged mountains and difficult terrain favoured their struggle. In spite of this resistance however, the Spaniards with their horses, firearms and hunting dogs finally succeeded in getting through.

The Pijao fought to the very end and to their own extinction, while the other tribes withdrew. Mainly the Paez continued to resist through ambushes and sudden attacks. Even Popayan is said to have been attacked by the Paez (Ortiz 1973, p 28).

With pacification the colonical regime was consolidated and different systems of exploitation introduced. At first, the Spanish conquerors were most interested in treasures of precious metals and gems which of course to a large extent decided the methods of exploitation for quite a long time. Hence, in the beginning, the Spaniards were not as interested in the land itself as in the exploitation of the Indian as producer of riches mainly through the tribute system. During the early phase of the conquest this impoverishment of
the indigenous population was rather arbitrary from the con­querors but gradually the exploitive mechanisms were forma­lized by the Spanish Crown, under the influence of the Catho­lic Church.

The Indian had to pay tax to the Crown through especially awarded colonists, the encomenderos. This tribute could be paid in for example gold, fabrics or agricultural products. The general scheme for the encomienda was that the Spanish encomendero was granted a territory occupied by Indians with the privilege of demanding day's-work, jornadas, and tribute from his subject Indians in return for the protection and christianization of these dependents. This grant did not include the land as property or any absolute authority concerning Indian labour, but in reality it was hard for the Crown to control or ignore the need for manpower, and beyond doubt the indigenous population in colonized areas became exploited to the limits of enslavement. Nor was the State uninterested in the gold reserve of the New World. The whole Paez region was not similarly affected by the encomienda system. The northern part had the most exposed position. By the end of the 19th century, though, the white immigration became very intensive also in the eastern region. The first fief in Puracé was issued in 1582, and marked the introduction of the juridical appropriation of land from the Coconucos.

In the middle of the 16th century a system of compulsory salaried work called the mita was introduced. Each indigenous settlement had to offer a certain amount of adult males for work in the mines or other public projects, receiving a minor salary, mostly in goods "and often useless things, sold at inflated values" (Steward/Faron 1959, p 152). This system of exploiting the indigenous labour force was the Spanish version of a traditional institutionalized obligation to do draft work on state projects derived from the Incas. Thus, irrespectively if belonging to an encomienda or not, the Indian could not escape the formal obligation to pay tribute or offer his labour. The indigenous population did not actually enter the European market at this stage but were subjected and indirectly integrated through coercive means, forced to supply for the Spaniards through the mita-slavery and their production of tribut. This severe exploitation brought about a profound social, economic and cultural desintegration of the indigenous communities. Many Indians died in the mines. Essential industrial, artistic and subsistence activities were given up and the in-
The indigenous population declined very quickly (See Steward/Faron 1959, p 51 ff).

The encomienda system did not allow the Spanish colonists to develop true feudalism, but established all the same the fundamentals for economic and political domination.

In spite of the unwillingness of the Spanish Crown to award land rights, they were granted to some eminent personages. These land grants were supposed to apply only to land unoccupied by Indians, but as the indigenous population mostly occupied the best land, they suffered "illegal" displacements.

Gradually the boundaries and formal differences between the encomienda and the land grants were blotted out, and also the encomenderos also due to their considerable local or regional control, seized land with or without the acknowledgement of the Crown (Fals Borda 1975, p 30). Here we can localize the origin of the big haciendas and the lopsided land distribution which is generally considered to be the main cause of the inequality and underdevelopment of today in the countryside. The private hacienda took over the extractive role of the state encomienda and continued to supply the market with food produced by servile labour without access to the fruits of their work, which were meant for the populations of Spanish origin, the indigenous workers, for example in the mines, and external markets (See Laclau, p 31).

5.2 After Independence

With independence in 1819, the state of Gran Colombia was formed, comprising the present states of Colombia, Panama, Venezuela and Ecuador. In 1830 Venezuela and Ecuador broke away leaving the union which remained between Colombia and parts of the Central American Isthmus until 1903 when the state of Panama was formed with assistance from the USA.

The political independence did, however, not change the agrarian structure, or the situation of the indigenous peasants. Gradually, with the industrial development, Colombia was more and more connected to the international markets and became a supplier of agricultural produce. Among other things, land obtained an increased value and became a profitable object of investment. It is hard to tell to what degree this affected the attempts to divide the collectively owned resguardos into indi-
dividual landholdings, and the immediate alienation of the indigenous population from their land. The 19th century legislation does not give a straightforward answer. During the 20th century the pattern, however, became a little more evident: the indigenous communal possession of land is not compatible with the capitalist development of the national agricultural economy.

Cauca was not much affected by industrialization and remained mainly an agrarian province dominated by haciendas and resguardos. The separation of the Indians from their land was not an immediate issue. Access to cheap labor was not problematic for the hacienda owners.

Nevertheless, farming in Cauca became more and more integrated in the national and international market economy and the transition process from a precapitalist production system of a servile nature to a capitalist mode of production form can be discerned, signalled by a change from the aparceria form of sharecropping (see p 61) and the terraje form of day labour (as described below) to different forms of cash tenancy agreements and paid employment.

The aparceria-system never became a dominant form of production in the areas where colonisation took a slow course as in Tierradentro where the Indian population had had sufficient land for quite some time and therefore no need of any share-cropper-relations. On the other hand, the terraje-system has been a characteristic form of production in the entire Cauca region. The terraje-system has been particularly common on the large estates which penetrated the resguardos. The white intruders who managed by devious means, all illegal, to appropriate their land on Indian territory, by for example claiming squatters rights did not generally evict the Indian families already living there when the hacienda was formed. Instead, it became normal practice to allow them to continue cultivating their plots of land in return for about 3-8 days compulsory labour per month for the self-appointed landowner on the estate, with and additional day or so for the right to graze their livestock. The work was carried out by the Indian families using their own tools and without payment. However, since 1971 when CRIC was formed and began pressing the claim no pagar terraje (not pay terraje) this system diminished in importance (SETPA 1979 b, p 35).
White penetration of the Indian resguardos is a process which started in earnest at the end of the nineteenth century and in time became generally accepted despite the fact that this land was not available on the open market according to Law 89:1890 (see chapter 6).

The growing of coffee for the international market, which began to be cultivated on a large scale basis in 1925-32, was naturally important in this development. Extensive cattle rearing by the landowning aristocracy also meant intrusions on Indian land.

Since the 1930's, another factor in the disintegration of the resguardos has been the migration to the area by los colonos, the settlers. This migration trend is particularly obvious in Tierradentro (see DANE 1978, p 164 ff).

The increasingly acute shortage of land combined with a growing consciousness on the part of the original inhabitants formed the background to a growing Indian movement. They demanded the return of their land and the right to be Indians.

5.2.1 Precursors to CRIC during the 20th century

In the beginning of the 20th century we can recognize the features of a separate indigenous movement or rebellion in Cauca. First in 1912 through the terrajero Manuel Quintín Lame, and in the 1930's by José Gonzalo Sanchez. Lame accentuated in the program of the movement, the defence of the resguardos, the cabildos and the cultural tradition of the indigenous communities, and demanded the abolishment of terraje-payment. In spite of the intensity of his agitation and the fear his movement spread among the landowners in Cauca during the 1910's (he was captured in 1917 and in jail until 1921) and in Tolima during the 1920's, CRIC considers that his godlivers, "su ideología mística", eventually became a hindrance to the struggle and that he, in the end, yet confided himself to much in the good will of the government and the legalistic way to the reindivication of the Indian (CRIC 1978a, p 9).
Without discussing the relevance of this evaluation of the role of Quintín Lame, and irrespectively the reasons for his declining authority in the 1930's, one cannot disregard the fact that many of his sayings is still alive and that his apparent unflaggingness still seems to be a source of inspiration to many indigenous militants. Further more, fact is that the current program of CRIC coincidence considerably with that of Lame.

"Que un pueblo que lucha no puede ser acabado ni por la guerra, ni por las persecuciones, ni por la explotación...." (CRIC 1974, p 15). 3)

José Gonzalo Sanchez, who initiated his struggle together with Lame, planted the analyses of the Communist party within the indigenous movement and promoted consequently the participation of organized units of Indians in the national class struggle during the 1930's - 1940's.

It seems to have remained very little of these organisational expressions by the time of the formation of CRIC. The civil war, la violencia, implied probably a decomposition of existent indigenous protest organisations. But 40 years of conscious indigenous struggle must have sown important seeds relevant to the struggle today, which has reached such an advanced level of political consciousness and organizational knowledge.

Sevilla Casas (1976, p 100 ff) suggests that the movement of Quintín Lame and CRIC respectively, both coincide with decisive structural changes in the Cauca area. He considers the insurrection of Lame to be a reaction against the expanded pressure on the accumulated riches of Cauca in land, livestock and indigenous labour potential when "Cauca Grande", once a state of its own, was subdivided in 1905 and the department of Cauca was formed. This meant that Popayan from being a center of a state with abundant sources of wealth through for example the gold-mines of Choco and the fertile lands of the Cauca valley had to manage without these territories and confine itself to become a regional capital subordinated the extractive routines and fiscal control of Bogota.

Regarding the appearance of CRIC it is evident that the penetration of capitalism has meant considerable changes in Cauca, especially the last decade. Agricultural industries have developed, modern farms have grown up and the infrastructure has
improved. The indigenous peasant is more directly confronted with the capitalist market and its exploitive forces, bots as a producer of food and petty commodities, labourer and consumer of industrial products. Further his land, the basic means for survival, physically and culturally, in accordance with this development is threatened because of landhungry, immigrating colonos and "progressive" adjoining haciendas in strive for extension of their properties. CRIC can maybe be regarded as an rational answer to these pressures.
6 SOCIOPOLITICAL STRUCTURE

6.1 Regional Administration

The Department of Cauca is divided into smaller administrative units called municipalities. (See table 3, appendix I). Their independence is limited and the mayors are appointed by the department governor in Popayan. The municipalities are recognized market centres within their regions, even if the communications today generally allow those who can afford the bus ticket, to go all the way to Popayan, or maybe even Cali, to make business (see maps p 37-38).

The municipalities in their turn are also divided in smaller units which can be of two types, resguardos and veredas, (neighbourhoods). The vereda is generally recognizing a corregidor, a sort of adjudicator as authority, many times also having the function as a link between the indigenous council, the cabildo and the municipal mayors (Ortiz 1973, p 37).

Also the resguardos are informally divided into veredas, than usually meaning a smaller cluster of residential units. They do not however have the same political contents as veredas in general (See Fals Borda 1955, p 39-44).

6.2 The Resguardo

In the very end of the 16th century the Spanish Crown started to acknowledge land titles to Indian Communities. Rather big areas, ranging between 200 and 20 000 hectares, where reserved for the indigenous population in different regions (Sevilla Casas 1978, p 16). Areas that traditionally already were populated by the indigenous population, but now demarcated and reduced.

There were of course several reasons for this step. On one hand it was a necessary measure to counteract the disastrous reduction of the Indians, to secure manpower, and the control and continuity of tribut paying; hence, functional within the framework of colonial conditions of production. On the other hand the creation of the resguardo system might also be seen as a political move from Spanish state in their powerstruggle against the colonists. At the same time, it was a way to facilitate the political and military control of the indigenous population.
This policy seems to have succeeded in inaugurating at least some limitations to the exploitation of native labour as well as the infringement of white settlers on Indian land. Gradually, however, this reservation of land for the indigenous population came more and more into conflict with the white penetration and was more or less completed after 1642 (McGreevey 1971, p 52).

Tax had to be paid though, and the haciendas that gradually made their way into the indigenous territories during the 18th and 19th centuries continually needed native labour. To some Indians the life on the hacienda became a routine and made them stay longer, and sometimes forever as serfs, servants, peons or similar. The landlord could maybe offer both a plot, and a small wage in cash. To some this could be their only way to be able to perform their tax duties.

This degeneration process, opened up vacancies on the resguardo which made it easier for whites to lease land on Indian territory which became the embryo to the progressive white penetration of the land, actually reserved for the aboriginal population.

Legally and historically non-indians had no right whatsoever to live inside the resguardo, a rule that never was very effective. Often white colonists had plots about to the resguardo from where temporary leasing contracts gradually could convert into permanent disposition and customary law. Later on, in the 1930's the Colombian government even opened up areas for white settlements inside resguardo territory (Ortiz 1973, p 32).

The land inside the resguardo is communal with usufructuary rights for families cultivating a certain area. The cabildo the indigenous council which can be considered as the representative body of all the domestic units within the resguardo, allocate and approve these contracts which finally are supposed to be confirmed by the mayor of the municipality to which the resguardo belongs. This however can be considered as an ideal picture. In reality there is a rather wide range of different forms of disposition. In some cases where the cabildo is weak, it can not carry out its regulatory function, which leads to the privatization of the rights of possession, determined by commercial mechanisms and heritage. Sevilla Casas (1978, p 14 ff) points out the correspondence
of these variations with the commercial penetration of the resguardo. That the encroachment can become so articulated that it reclaim the rupture of traditional, old-fashioned, formalism. "...es decir, reclama la desintegración formal del resguardo" (p 15). 4)

In spite of all these complications, the resguardo has nevertheless in many cases come to fulfill a cultural and economic function of defence, counteracting for example the process of total proletarization (See Sevilla Casas 1976, p 95).

"Significar una no-integración al sistema dominante" (DANE 1978, p 117). 5)

Which has given rise to continuously reiterated attempts from the Colombian authorities to abolish the resguardo system and divide the land in individual holdings. Something which the indigenous organizations regard as the end of their cultural existence as Indians as well as additionally deepened destitution among the indigenous peasants. 6)

6.3 The Cabildo

As already mentioned, the resguardos as indigenous corporate communities are internally governed and administrated by the cabildo, the indigenous council, with its origin in colonial times. The cabildo is elected once a year by all male adults considered as participating comuneros, not allowing immediate reelection. The number of elected council members can vary depending on the size of the resguardo, but can be as few as five, as in Paniquita (Corry 1976, p 77) and as many as 32, as in Silvia (Norberg 1969, p 7). The president of the cabildo is called gobernador and he has the privilege to appoint the alcaldes, the indigenous mayors. There are also other offices to be appointed, such as the alguaciles, a sort of constables, the number of which depends on the size of the resguardo, carrying out police matters, and the fiscales, prosecutors, (Hernandez de Alba 1946, p 946). The alcaldes are supposed to handle eventual conflicts in the different veredas and function as a contact between these and the gobernador. All these commissions of trust require heavy dedication. Sevilla Casas (1976, p 93) believe that 50% of their time has to be invested. The effectiveness of the cabildo and the functioning of the offices varies and depends on the community solidarity, and how well the feeling of ethnical and
cultural unity is established. There exists also lifelong authority offices, the captain and the sindico (Hernandez de Alba 1946, p 945). According to Ortiz (1977, p 39) calling them the captain mayor and the captain menor - their function is mainly advisory in liaison between the indigenous community and the white authorities. Originally the cabildo also had the function to collect the tribut, but together with the resguardo structure it has in many cases come to constitute a basic element in the reindivicatory efforts of the indigenous peasants.
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE

7.1 Land distribution and Relations of Production

As in all Latin American countries it is natural to suspect the asymmetrical relations of land distribution as a basic obstacle to economic and social development, so also in the Colombian countryside. The unequal access to land, one of the fundamentals for achieving social power, determines also the conditions for obtaining other necessary resources to make possible a fair yield. The access to technology, credit, fertilizer and other means for production as well as access to channels for distribution and marketing depends almost entirely on the credit worthiness of the landowner, his possibilities to put up collateral, and his contacts.

In fact there is no shortage of land in relation to the size of the population in Cauca and in the area covered by the resguardos once set aside by the Spanish crown for use by the Indian population. The most remarkable thing, though not in fact surprising, is that white people possess property within the resguardos, settlers of small means as well as large estates and modern agricultural enterprises. Their presence on Indian territory, which is impossible according to law 89:1890, has as a rule a complicated background, but it is the starting point for those who are today gathering themselves into organized groups. As expressed in an interview:

".... they have large farms all over the resguardos because they managed to seize land by fraudulent means.... by saying "let's be friends' by holding a child on his lap,....... then he wanted to rent some land....... and then buy, because he had nowhere to stable his horse. That's how it began, with cheating, with 'panela', with sugar and clothes. Exchange clothes for land...... Earlier we didn't understand all this....... and they took advantage of our ignorance in order to cheat us out of our land."

It is generally true that these establishments are illegal. But over the years, often for several generations, cases of common law and unofficial transfer documents have grown into a judicial grey zone. The land reform agency, INCORA, has despite formally correct demands for the restoration of land
from different communities refrained from being involved in the conflict between the indigenous peasants and the landowners in question. Therefore occupation of the land has become an essential way for the Indians to attain some tangible result of their demands.

In most cases such invasions take place only after a long and patient period of waiting for the intervention by INCORA. The land reform agency, after application from the Indian community, has to make a decision about possible expropriation of the land which the Indians demand to have restored to them.

Too many times, often not until the Indians have possibly emerged as the victors after the occupation of the land after a long and often bloody battle with the landowners and the police, has INCORA intervened and deeded the land to the community. Such is the story of many empresas comunitarias (community enterprises).

"El Estado cuenta con dos instrumentos legales para intervenir en el conflicto: la ley 135 de 1961, de Reforma Agraria...y la Ley 89 de 1890,...Las instituciones, en lo poco que han hecho al respecto, han terminado haciendo uso de estos instrumentos cuando ya el conflicto se ha agravado. Se entra legalizar jurídicamente posesiones ya logradas en la practica; es decir, se hace al final lo que debió hacerse al comienzo para evitar el conflicto social.......a pesar de que teóricamente se trata de una acción relativa sencilla, en la practica se ve interferida por los intereses de grandes propietarios con mucho poder del Estado." (SEPTA 1979 b, p 67). 7)

It is difficult to give any exact figures showing the range and therefore the significance of the white penetration but in table 2 (appendix I) we can see that in 1971 a good 4000 people, about every 15th person, on the resguardos were white or mestizo, and table 5 shows that 456 estates or 593 owners within virtually the same area had control over nearly 68% of the land, which means approximately 600 hectares per estate. We can safely assume that the white penetration of the resguardos is one of the major reasons for the shortage of land available for the Indian population. It is also the primary reason why today most cabildos do not have sufficient land to distribute.
to a new generation of indigenous farmers. Instead, the already small plots of land must be divided up into even smaller areas in order to give as many as possible at least a basic means of support. However, intensive cultivation of all usable land available, quickly impoverishes the soil and these miniplots lose the productive capacity to satisfy even the most modest needs within a very short space of time. Wage work becomes essential for the support of the family.

The general situation in this matter is that the traditional indigenous peasant unwillingly lets himself be hired as a day-wage worker, especially by white landowners. Despite the fact that the typical minifundio only occupies the small-holder about 180 days of the year according to a recent investigation realized by Londono (unpublished), it is not attractive to him to search for wage-work the rest of the time but when cash is badly needed. He does not want to expose himself to neither the sociocultural discrimination nor the economic exploitation which he knows he will be subjected to. Nevertheless, sometimes he has to do it. Especially on the resguardos about Puracé and Silvia where the white penetration and the extension of haciendas is considerable, the **jornaleo**, the day-wage work, has been widespread. To some extent, in some areas, with the agrarian reform process but especially with the awakening indigenous struggle in zones where land invasions have been successful, there is, however, possible to perceive a decreasing supply of labour. When wage-work is accessible though, it is cheap.

In Tierradentro the direct exploitation of the indigenous population as cheap wage-labour has been less important. The big haciendas are less common except for some coffee producing farms absorbing seasonal workers. The problem is not as often, while not uncommon though, the acute shortage of land but rather the lack of access to infrastructure, agricultural inputs like fertilizers, pesticides, insecticides and seeds, credits on terms functional to poor peasants and technology functional to the hilly environment. Thus the poor indigenous peasant in this region is more exposed to exploitation through the commercial interchange of products within the capitalist sphere of the circulation of goods. They need processed food stuffs and other industrial commodities but can only offer staple foods to sell as they lack the resources to invest in cash crop production. Hence, because of the long distances and the lack of transportation their dependence on the middlemen is extensive.
The poor indigenous peasant in this situation can neither totally enter the capitalistic arena and compete with whites, mestizos and progressive Indians (see section 8.1) on equal conditions, nor totally escape it.

7.1.1 The Minifundio

At the very bottom of the landowning hierarchy in the countryside of Cauca, which also can be considered as representative of the rest of rural Colombia, there is the small-holder with his minifundio. The minifundio does not produce enough to satisfy even the basic needs of the family. Nor does it absorb the whole productive potential of the domestic unit. The small-holder is forced to sell his manpower, on one hand because the cultivation of his own land does not occupy him full time and on the other hand because the yield of the land is not enough for survival. The productive conditions of the minifundios are of course different in separate regions, depending mainly on soil quality and the extent of erosion, but due to the lack of resources for soil improvement procedures as well as the lack of space to allow for fallow land, the gradual proletarization of the small-holder and the concentration of land is the general course of events, especially in the plain regions, which is not principally resguardo area.

Estimations made by Londono (1979, p 5 ff) show that the small-holder cultivating sugarcane, yuca banana and soya on five hectares of fairly good land on the plains parts of Cauca does not gain enough to provide for an average family of 5.5 persons. The necessary minimum income a month for five persons was estimated at 4 139 pesos by ICBF, while the average small-holder family only could reach an estimated income of 3 060 pesos. In the same way the poor peasant with no access to credit, or technology, living in more hilly areas and cultivating soil of lower quality needs ten hectares to be able to subsist on his land. With ten hectares he would be able produce a maximum income of 5 000 pesos. These estimations are based on a valuation of how much the production of the minifundio would be worth on the market, which does not give the whole picture of the subsistence level. The commercial value of the traditional crops cultivated by the small-holder is very low, while the minifundista in fact
to some extent might be able to keep his family alive with the
aliments he produces, even if the diet would be poor and one-
 sided, causing deficiency deseases. Still, he gets more and more
dependent on wage labour in step with the exhaustion of the soil
and the loss of land, which occur frequently. The land is the
only security the small-holder can give when borrowing money,
and the marginals are so small that even a minor failure in the
harvest can endanger his ability to pay back, especially since
the interest rates are high, many times over 20 %, and the time
for repayment short, sometimes only from sowing to harvest.
Hence there is very little chance for the poor peasant to
break this negative spiral within the framework of establis-
hed rules of systemic regional and national participation,
economically and politically.

According to the Geographical Institute Augustin Codazzi quo-
ted by Londono (op cit, p 14) 82 % of properties in Cauca are
minifundios smaller than 10 hectares, covering 22,5 % of the
total agricultural area, and corresponding to 285 349 hectares
(see table 4 in appendix I). This makes an average of 2.9 hec-
tares per holding, which can be compared with the average of
1.7 hectares per holding, regarding those smaller than 5 hec-
tares, for the whole country in 1966 (CIDA quoted in Guerrero
1975, p 211).

The agricultural census by the National Administrative Depart-
ment of Statistics, DANE 1972, covers only 43,7 % of Cauca
(DANE 1978, p 8). Here it is advisable to call attention to
the kind of data available. There is no rural census covering
all Cauca and the data of the geographical institute mentioned
above covers only 55 % of the Cauca department, the Pacific
coast excluded. Further, classifying the rural population has
its complications. Many individuals classified as belonging
to the urban population can be considered as peasants or at
least as living in a rural environment. Many so-called munici-
pios or urban nucleuses are not very much more than regional
markets and to some extent administrative centres, as also in-
dicated by Londono (op cit, p 15). This is an uncomfortable
situation, but we have to face the fact, that figures given
in some investigations of the rural reality in Colombia may
have a limited reliability and can often be rather affected
by the startingpoints, interests, and basic ideological va-
lues of those carrying out the investigations. Even if some
figures may be inexact, however, the general picture of the minifundio dilemma is inescapable for there exist no data at all suggesting a revision of the scheme described above.

7.1.2 The Latifundio

In the Eastern Regions, el Oriente, with the biggest proportion of the indigenous population, the land concentration is very accentuated, with 2.7% of the big landholdings controlling 67.8% of the area (see table 6 in appendix 1). Even if some of these haciendas are modernizing their production, especially in Puracé, the major part of these big landholdings, latifundios, are extensively exploited, mostly in the form of livestock farming, without any need for manpower or any interest in rational utilization of the land. Small-scale cultivation of maize, potatoes, and ulluco are also customary, and in some cases there are plantations of forest. That big areas are just lying fallow is, however, a source of great discontent among the poor indigenous peasants in the neighbourhood and these landholdings, predominantly located in Cauca and especially in the Eastern Region, are the main target for the land claims.

To the owners of these latifundios the land is principally accumulated capital, a secure investment, or just an inherited property and as such a source of status and power but not necessarily the major source of income.

The owner of a typical hacienda is seldom present, and it is run by a foreman under more or less servile conditions, although that is rapidly changing. Under law 1a:1968 it is incumbent upon the landowner to replace the aparceria and terrajerationes with paid employment and formal tenancy agreements. On the cattle haciendas, moreover, there exists a very special type of employment arrangement. The labourer, usually an Indian, receives a plot of land which he clears in order to sow maize and other food crops for his own use. Afterwards, pasture is sown on that land and the employed labourer moves on to another plot and repeats the procedure (Londono 1979, p 47, SEPTA 1979 b, p 34).

The capitalist development of agriculture has, as mentioned earlier, accelerated in recent years. Thus we must distinguish between two principal types of latifundios. In addition to the traditional hacienda, there is also the modern mechanized
estate, an example of which is the sugar-works in Puerto Te-jada and Miranda, as well as the milk producing enterprises in Purace and cattle haciendas in Patia and Silvia. The highly mechanized industries are mainly situated in northern Cauca. Especially here the aggressive appropriation of land and the process of proletarization is easy to discern. The small-hol-ders in crisis, i.e. those with 1-5 ha, make up 75,6 % of all landowners but possess only 10,3 % of the land, whereas 3,9 % of landowners possess 57,8 %. A change in the crops which are cultivated can also be noted especially here in the north—a shift from traditional foodstuffs such as bananas, vegetables, cocoa, and rice grown by the traditional peasants, towards the monoculture of primarily sugar for export.

These enterprises employ labour in accordance with modern ca-pitalist principles, paying low market-determined wages, ben-nefitting from the plentiful supply of manpower. But the tech-nology of modern agricultural industry does not require many unqualified field hands, and the modern haciendas are thus far from able to absorb even a small part of the unemployed land-less labourers available. Credit, technology, and channels for distribution and marketing are no problem for these enterprises since they control the very foundations of social and economic power that make it possible for them to exercise a decisive influence on the market and moreover gives them a monopoly of much of the infrastructure.

Between the modern capitalist enterprise and the traditional large estate can be found a transition type of hacienda which has, as yet, not got a fully developed division of labour but whose machinery and equipment is relatively modern. In central areas of Cauca these landowners have large plantations of, for instance, tomatoes, maize, beans, and potatoes. At harvest time all the day-labourers and seasonal workers who are either without land or whose land is not sufficient to support them, make for these large plantations. As a rule the wages do not exceed 100 pesos per day.

"Son los jornaleros transhumantes la personificación de descomposición del campesinado y de la transición del jornalero agrícola a proletario." (Londono 1979, p 42). 9

Small agricultural industries are beginning to develop—for instance the processing of yucca to bread and starch, in, for example, Caldono especially for the markets in Bogota, Cali,
and Armenia. Then of course panela and coffee are also produced. In Silvia cheese is produced for sale in Cali (Londono 1979, p 45).

In table 7 (appendix 1) it is possible on the one hand to follow the concentration process in the northern, central and southern parts of Cauca, and on the other hand the minifundization in the eastern region. In the northern and central regions the number of declared properties decreased by 19.2% and 27.7% respectively, while the declared number of landholdings in the East increased by 23.9%. There are probably several reasons for this increase. First there is of course the continuing subdivision of the already small landholdings in the resguardos, along with the fact that an additional number of smallholders during these years have applied for official credit and have therefore been obliged to formalize their rights of possession get their papers in order, making them thereby accessible to statistical analysis. On the other hand we also know that there is a process of subdivision of smaller estates as well as among the big haciendas, sometimes because of indigenous claims, sometimes within the family to escape expropriation by the land reform.

7.1.3 Small farmers

About 13% of the farmers corresponding to roughly 15 000 farms with between 10-20 hectares cover 20.5% of the rural area in Cauca (table 4, appendix 1). These farmers are a little better off than the minifundistas but still they are far from "take off". Also the small farmer has to concentrate on traditional subsistence crops to feed his family first of all. His opportunities to invest in innovations and commercial crops with a high return on the market are small, as he to a large extent lacks the same necessary initial resources as the smallholder, to be able to take the risk a loan entails. The average farm has access to about 17 hectares, which is not very much, if technology, fertilizer, and insecticide are scarce.

7.1.4 The Medium-sized Farm

It is hard to determine where to draw the line for this rural middle class. Londono (1979, p 13) considers those who possess more than 50 hectares to belong to the category of hacienda-owners. In that case this group constitutes only between 3 and 4% of the landowners, possessing about 11% of the area. In
other words a little more than 4,000 proprieators who control almost 141,000 hectares (table 4, appendix 1). Thus, the middle stratum in rural areas is rather small and can not be considered as an important stabilizing factor in the conflict-ridden countryside. He is rather well off however, this medium farmer, for he usually has access to the credit, the technology and necessary knowledge, the transportation facilities and the contracts to succeed. He can make a good living in harmony with existing economic laws ruling the Colombian countryside.

7.2 Conditions of Land Tenure

The relationship between the number of usufructuary partitions distributed by the cabildo, and the number of existing private titles within the resguardo can be used as an indicator of the degree of disintegration of the indigenous community.

The pressure of the indigenous population living in the traditional resguardos to induce division of the land into individual holdings has been very hard. Through legislation and economic sanctions, the national and regional authorities have tried to change the traditional system of land tenure.

When the indigenous population was segregated on their resguardos, this system was a functional necessity to the mode of production at that time. However, because of the growing participation of Colombia in the international market system, gradually reinforced by the penetration of capitalism, this policy of segregation had to be transformed into a new policy of integration was much as the resguardos system came to constitute a dysfunctional and inhibiting aspect, a draw back to the modern market economy.

The integration policy has succeeded to a certain degree, but most resguardos still maintain their structural coherence. Very few, though, have succeeded in escaping private assignments totally. Parts of almost every resguardo have privately owned settlements, mostly occupied by white immigrants. In this way through white intrusion, the resguardos have come to suffer more and more from a process of diminishing access to cultivable land. This is one of the main issues of the growing indigenous movement.
The indigenous minifundistas, together with those families totally lacking land, predominate the social economic scheme of the resguardo (table 8a, appendix 1). About 60% of all holdings are smaller than 5 hectares, which forces many Indians to complement their subsistence activities with wage labour and/or different arrangements of tenant farming (see tables 8a, 9, and 10).

There are two principal patterns of land tenure within the resguardo areas. On the one hand there is communal possession in the traditional way with distribution of usufructuary rights by the cabildo. On the other hand there is private proprietyship, comprising in part smallholdings owned individually by Indians or colonos and in part haciendas that have seized land within the resguardos.

7.2.1 Social Differentiations within the Resguardo

Examining the degree of access to land and the pattern of different relations of land tenure can be a way to discern the levels of social differentiation in the resguardo. However, it is still difficult to establish to what extent differentiation indicates a process of disintegration of the resguardo. The work of CRIC has in many cases counteracted such tendencies through sowing the seeds of ethnical identity and political solidarity, (see part III). In many places, CRIC has succeeded in regaining land, and has formed community enterprises, deeds which have retarded the process of disorganization and proletarization.

This is the case in Coconuco, for example, where 24% of the families were totally without land or possibly had access to less than 1 hectare, and 58% had only 1-5 hectares. Still more than 80% of the plot were, and still is, distributed by the cabildo, which at least suggests that tradition was maintained. Forty-one percent of the economically active population (table 10, appendix 1) were day-workers, suggesting a far reaching process of proletarization. Today, however, after ten years of hard struggle, several haciendas have been restituted to the resguardo and turned into collectively owned empresas comunitarias. Former landless peasants are suddenly employed by themselves, struggling for the progress and the reestablishment of the indigenous community.
7.3 Class structure

When studying the class structure in the countryside of Colombia, one finds that the details in the total picture will differ a little depending on how one defines and composes all the different subgroups involved. Significant for the statistical data available, illustrated by tables 10 and 11, is that the categories described do not necessarily coincide with the traditional definitions of class, but rather conceal the relationships of different groups to the means of production.

The terms employer or patron, for example, usually comprise anyone who in one way or another employs one person or more, irrespective of whether he is a medium proprietor or owns an agricultural enterprise. In the same way the category independent worker can include any poor peasant or semi-proletarian.

The almost 30,000 family helpers/workers (ayudantes familiares) in Cauca (368,000 in Colombia) is also a complex group, difficult to assign to classes, but generally consisting of those individuals who work without sizable remuneration of the property of a father or a relative. And who are the employees? The majority are probably foremen and administrators on medium or bigger estates. However, there are reasons to handle all these categories with caution.

One group which seems to disappear in the figures are the middlemen and those traders handling much of the business in the resguardo village centres and municipalities. One reason for this must be that many of them are also engaged in agriculture. Some are owners of bigger farms who sell transportation services to poor peasants without access to infrastructure and/or buy their products for a low price to appropriate themselves the profit on the market. Others belong to the group of independent workers. These are former colonizers, mostly white immigrants, who combine agriculture and trade in their roles as intermediaries between the poor indigenous population and the markets. Still others can be classified simply as businessmen and belong to the 4,653 independent workers occupied with commercial activities, as shown in table 7. Compare table 11, which reveals that there were 170 independent businessmen related to the resguardos in 1972.
Rural Subgroups

The proletariat, the rural workers, consists mainly of the daywage worker, el jornalero. He can also be a peon or a igua-zo who works more permanently on a hacienda. The jornalero can probably be considered to be the most exploited of all agricultural workers in Colombia. He disposes only over his own manpower, which he has to sell. The number of jornaleros can vary depending on which groups you assign to the category of agricultural workers. In table 13 (appendix 1) approximately 968 000 belong to the workers' group. Svensson (1976, p 122) estimates the number of jornaleros in Colombia to be more than 1 200 000. In the resguardos of Cauca less than 3000 (table 11).

In Cauca 31 061 persons are supposed to be rural workers, according to the population census 1964. They represent 23 % of the economically active agricultural workers. Still we have to be very aware of the indistinct boundaries in these investigations between true proletarians, semi-proletarians and "half-slaves" who still exist on some traditional haciendas. By combining tables 5, 6, 7 and 11 with table 13 it is possible to get an idea of the rural class structure in the resguardos and in Cauca compared with the national scheme presented in table 13.

The semi-proletariat is comprised of poor tenant farmers, sharecroppers, and small-holders.

There are two types of tenant farming, land rental and sharecropping. He who rents land, el arrendatario, from the wealthy landowner is a producer who pays a predetermined price in cash or in produced goods. The sharecropper, el aparcero, is usually the poor peasant who has no land and seldom sufficient tools to cultivate it. The landowner contributes land, but when necessary also tools, seed, and fertilizers, while the aparcero makes it produce. He has to pay the landowner a proportionate part of the production in goods or in cash. Sometimes he has to give away up to 50 % of the harvest. Often the scarcity of land also means that poor farmers have to accept land arrangements that force them to cultivate several small plots in different locations.

Information about the number of aparcerías differs. According to DANE (1974, p 28) there were about 98 000 in 1971. According to CIDA (1966, quoted in Felstehausen 1971, p 175) there were
350,000 tenants and landless families in Colombia when INCORA started its work in 1961. In the resguardos about 500 terrajeros and aparceros in 1972 (table 11).

It is appropriate in this context to distinguish between semi-proletarian servile labour and free semi-proletarians (as does Garramon/de Janvry 1977, p 209). The first category still participates in a feudal or semifeudal mode of production with usufructuary right to a plot of land as a part of the remuneration, while the latter has his subsistence patch of land outside the latifundio, sells his labour for cash, and consequently participates in the capitalist mode of production. Galli (1978, p 73) makes a similar distinction between what she calls the internal minifundista (aparceros and arrendatarios) and external minifundistas, including the Indian communities. The latter providing labour for the traditional as well capitalistic estates.

The middle peasantry have enough land to escape day-wage working, but its lower strata, the poor peasants or the small proprietors, do not necessarily have to be so much better off than the semi-proletarians or the minifundistas. They own less than 10 hectares, mostly in overpopulated areas with exhausted soil and/or in marginal areas with bad communications. To a large extent the colonist, el colono could be included in this group even if many settlers also can be a lot wealthier, with thousands of hectares.

The well-to-do farmers, los campesinos ricos, have land enough to exploit directly the manpower of day-wage workers and tenants. The same goes for the new agrarian bourgeoisie and the estate owners, who furthermore generally have employed administrators and foremen to take care of the immediate management of the farm. They develop usually a mutual understanding among themselves, and constitute a united front against all demands from below. As a rule more than an exception, they hold important positions in the economic and political spheres; they may for example, be lawyers, businessmen, and politicians in the conservative and liberal parties, where they defend and promote their interests and needs. To an increasing extent this countryside elite keeps armed men employed and hires perpetrators for special assignments to combat the activities of the organized peasantry, including indigenous demonstrations of discontent (Svensson 1976, p 125 ff). This violence is escalating through the efforts of these landowners to counteract popular mobilization. But it
seems as if these confrontations only increase the consciousness of the emerging organizations and thereby also the unity among those struggling for the same end.

Oppressed poor farmers, however, are not organized in a fight for the same end, or any end at all. They are geographically dispersed and many have to put all their strength into surviving, with the whole working to make ends meet. Their desperate situation is rewarding soil for internal strife among and in the market place. Jealousy and rivalry and ethnic suspicion are characteristic phenomena among the most exploited categories in the capitalist rural reality of Colombia. To a large extent this competition is sown and cultivated by the wealthy landowner, who knows how to favour some of his employees, thereby dividing the whole group. Svensson (1976, p 128) mentions neighbourhoods where agricultural workers do not dare to have chickens or other animals, nor to sow yucca or corn because of their distrust towards their neighbours. This phenomenon is not as manifest in the indigenous communities, even if it occurs. Especially in areas where CRIC has succeeded to recover and consolidate cultural identity and political awareness, these tendencies have been counteracted. Apparently awareness of the big gap between the actual situation and the life strived for causes discontent and unrest, which is directed against that which is closest, until the root causes of misery can be grasped more concretely. This knowledge, crystallized in the identification of the enemy, measures to be taken, and operationalized in the peasant organization, is of course not compatible with the view of the owners of the estates and the enterprises.

In step with the growing integration of third world agriculture into the world capitalist system and the penetration of capitalist enterprising in marginal rural areas we must widen our perspective on the class context of Colombian agriculture. At the top there are not only the big landowner but also the representatives of multinational agribusiness and the international banks. They promote contract farmers, often medium-sized farms and rich peasants, who produce for the food processing industry and export. In the eastern rural region of Cauca they are not very numerous. Below them we find businessmen, traders, money-lenders and other intermediaries. At the bottom there are first the stable labour force and then the day-wage workers, migratory seasonal labour and others who are subemployed or have to supplement their subsistence farming (Petras 1978, p 143).
7.4 Economy and Maintenance

As can be gathered from table 11 a majority (16 601) consider themselves independent agriculturalists working for the benefit of themselves and their families. Very few, 355 persons, identify themselves as unremunerated family workers in spite of the fact that these figures include children of nine and older; more than 2 000 of these independent workers are below 15 years of age (DANE 1978, p 120).

The numbers of journaleros, terrajeros and aparceros, 3 171 persons altogether, indicate the lack of land that makes it impossible for the indigenous population within the resguardo to subsist without supplemental wage labour. The existence of the terrajesystem, which always was totally alien to the indigenous way of living, is always evidence that the resguardo is in a process of disintegration and is, to a certain extent, invaded by whites. These figures are probably too low because of the dislike general among the Paez and the Guambianos to identify themselves entirely as day wage workers or as tenant farmers, even if these activities occupy most of their time. Mixed tenure is also rather common as we can see in table 9.

The figures describing the presence of salesmen in the resguardo also seem to me as far too low. The analysis of DANE (1978, p 124) even suggest that there are resguardos without businessmen. The data on main occupation might indicate this, but they do not disclose some important facts. Possibly the main economic activities were not unequivocal enough to allow for their statistical classification as commercial transactions in 1972, but they do exist. The middlemen disappear partly in the statistics in spite of their importance as intermediaries between subsistence-agriculturalists and the capitalist market who handle much of the business in and between the resguardo village centre and municipalities.

7.4.1 Domestic Economy

The Paez, Coconucos, and the Guambianos derive their mainly livelihood from agriculture and livestock farming. Trade and handicraft is of marginal importance, even if their share in the market system is increasing and handicraft could become a source of cash income in step with increasing tourism. How-
ever, their homemade articles are principally still for domestic use.

To a large extent the Indians have been estranged from many of their traditional craft activities because of the absolute necessity to devote most of their time to agriculture for immediate survival since the colonization. Especially the Guambianos, however, maintain some skills; for example, how to weave the typical *ruana* (poncho) and some other wool articles in beautiful colors.

The most important crops for subsistence in Silvia and Puracé, are beans, potatoes and maize, but ulluco, vetch, and kidney-beans are also commonly cultivated as well as different kinds of vegetables. Cabbage, garlic, and onions are often brought to the market. In the warmer areas, in Tierradentro, yucca and bananas also constitute important cultivations. Wheat, sugar cane, sisal, and coffee are important commercial crops, but can, to a larger extent only be cultivated by those who have access to sufficient land. The lack of access to technology, credit, skills and land are excluding the majority of Indian peasants from marketable commercial crops in a larger scale. In the communities of among others Inza and Puracé studied by Mejia (1978, p 22) 50 % of the peasants did not use any type of agroinputs.

Livestock farming consists mainly in keeping some chickens, pigs, sheep, rabbits, guinea pigs and sometimes one or a few cows and maybe one or a couple of horses for transportation.

The nuclear family is the basic producing and consuming unit. This domestic entity does not have to coincide with the residential unit. There are cases when a house contains two different families with separate landholdings, as indicated by Ortiz (1973, p 54). The residence is commonly patrilocal or neolocal. The dwelling is constructed with mud and straw, often on a skeleton of bamboo-cane, with earthen floor. Kitchen and one or two bedrooms are partitioned. Food is prepared on *open fire* without special chimney-flue. Hygienic conditions are bad and in combination with the nutrition deficency the reason for many diseases.

Still the traditional division of labour is maintained to a high degree, the man clearing, weeding, and preparing the land while the woman has the main responsibility for the household
and the vegetable garden near the house. In communal work, however, as in the domestic minga, the woman often works together with the man on the fields, if she is not needed to cook. This is a tradition that is maintained and even developed in the community enterprises (empresas communitarias) formed and run by indigenous joint holders of restituted land. Parallel with increasing ethnical and political consciousness and in step with increasing solidarity between separate domestic units in general, the woman appears to be gaining a progressively "equal" position as a comrade beside the man in their joint struggle for a livelihood. This is very much a consequence of the politization of the Indian movement but also one of necessity as the household must exploit all its manpower to their struggle against deterioration. The children are expected to be contributing with day-works of an adult from the age of about 11 to 12 years. The working-day last 8-10 hours, not including the long walk of, not seldom, a couple of hours to get to the place of work.

Besides the permanent lack of arable land, the Indian smallholder also suffers from impoverishment of the land through erosion and the limited access to fertilizers and appropriate tools and methods. The buffer production, if any, available for sale is very small. It is nevertheless very important to increase the scarce cash income of the household. Panela, margarine, salt, rice and candles are some products that the Indian farmer has to buy. If he has a cow, he tries to sell some milk. He may also sell small quantities of potatoes, ulluco, and vegetables he thinks he can spare. For more expensive purchases, for example, clothing or tools, he has to sell an animal, which is a big sacrifice. The major part, 50-80 %, of the income at the Indian household is used to bridge the food deficit (Mejia 1978, p 78).

The alimentation of the poor indigenous peasant is primarily based on carbohydrates. Adults as well as children consume mainly products like maize, potatoes, rice, yuca, bananas, kidney-beans and panela-sugar. When afforded, pieces of white bread of wheat or maize (arepa) can also be found on the table. The smallholder family is far from the proteins and vitamins they would need to escape their nutrition deficiency. They eat very seldom meat, eggs or vegetables. The degree of deprivation can for example be illustrated by the fact that indigenous child in Cauca has an average birth
weight which is 500 grams less than the child born in Bogota (Rueda Williamson et al as quoted in DNP 1980, p 110). Generally noticed is also that the Indian women in Cauca does not live long enough to give birth to the number of children she normally is expected to have. That access to land is a crucial factor is indicated by the observation in an investigation of the Coconuco resguardo where the average number of children in families with allotted land were five compared to about 3,5 in families without land to cultivate. The access to land also seem to determine the average length of life. With land the Indian can expect to become 45 years old. If not, he will barely pass the age of 30 (INCORA 1974, p 18-19). Life expectancy 1972 for the indigenous population in Cauca is 36,1 years for men and 38,7 years for women compared to the national average of 56,5 for men and 61,3 for women 1969-74 (DNP 1980, p 34).

7.4.2 Interfamily cooperation

The minga is a common institution of communal work, a working party, in the whole Andean region, and among the Paez and the Guambianos. Relatives, friends, and neighbours are invited to participate. There can be many different reasons for a minga. Often help is needed for sowing, weeding, or harvesting. Usually the hosts offer plenty of food and coffee, prepared by the wives of the participants, and rather often the day of work ends up in a little feast with a lot of "aguardiente". If the work has consisted in harvesting, the participants are sometimes offered a minor part of the produce.

Besides the domestic form of minga there occurs also a communal minga initiated by the alcalde, the indigenous mayor, who has authority to claim communal contribution for construction or repair of roads, bridges, schoolhouses or other projects that are supposed to benefit the neighbourhood or the community.

Ortiz, who gives a thorough description of the minga and its contents (1973, p 154 ff) questions whether the minga offers very much more then the opportunity to participate in a feast, since the cost for the host household sometimes is higher then it would have been if they had hired wage labour. The invited participants receive the same or a little more then they would have earned as a day labourers but not in cash (p 158). Whites, or those whom Ortiz calls progressive Indians do not consider
the minga system profitable, but rather as inefficient and expensive. The minga decreased in importance during a phase of extensive differentiation and land loss among the indigenous population until the current decade and the appearance of the new indianism. The indigenous organizations, such as CRIC, believe that the minga as well as other forms of communal work enhance solidarity inside the community, and thus encourage these activities.

Vuelta mano (exchanging hands) is another form of communal cooperation in which neighbours give each other a hand, when help is needed. This form has come fill an important function in the struggle institutionalized by CRIC as a solidarity action between families when members have been arrested or have to stay underground to escape persecution.

"En la medida en que los indígenas entran a participar en su organización gremial el CRIC, dichas relaciones tienden a reforzarse y se implementan nuevas formas asociativas para trabajar las tierras recuperadas."
(Londoño 1979, p 31). 10)

7.4.3 The middlemen

The relationship between the Indian peasant and his middlemen los acaparadores is, to say the least, many sides. As confirmed by Long (1975, p 273) regarding Perurian highland. The middlemen hold "strategic positions in the system of linkages between local rural economies and the wider regional and national structure". The Dependence of the Indian on his middlemen is severe at all levels of production, distribution, and consumption. The middleman, the broker, or the trader, is to be found on the resguardos, in the villages, and in the markets in Popayan, Purace, Silvia, Ineza, Paez, or Santander. If the Indian small farmer should devide to go to Popayan to sell potatoes and ulluco he will be accosted by eager buyers as soon as he climbs out of the bus or lorry. If he has no contacts with some established large buyer and is in a hurry to get cash for the purchases he himself plans to make during his visit to the town, he is often forced to resign himself to the small middlemen's sometimes almost aggressive, and in any case condescending, purchase of his produce. He knows he is getting a lower price than that in the market place and that those who buy from him will profit from his labour but he is mostly too unorganized and inexperienced to object and is forced to accept the price he is offered.
On or near a resguardo, or in the village, the white settlers have often established themselves as traders, sometimes with a small shop where those who wish to can sell a little of everything likely to appeal to the resguardos' inhabitants: biscuits, bread, panela, soft drinks, beer, candles, clothing, tools, rice, batteries, oil etc. More or less all the industrial commodities and processed food stuffs bought by the Indian peasants come from Cali. In general these products arrive first to a retail-wholesaler in Popayan who handles a large sortiment, maybe 50-100, of similar products. This wholesaler distributes in turn to other wholesalers, handling 1-50 products, in secondary and tertiary centres of rural distribution, such as Inza. In urban nucleos closer to Popayan as Puracé, however, we do not generally find the traditional wholesaler. The products are instead distributed directly to retailers. Usually we find 2-3 links between the factory and the indigenous consumer. The different wholesalers have as a rule a group of regular clients who are allowed credit 1-2 weeks. Many times these depts are paid with agricultural produce as coffee, ulluco or maize. Especially the retailer with land seems to tie up small-holders through credit which is paid back in standing crop. The wholesalers have a price-marginal between 6% and 15%, meanwhile these marginals fluctuates between 15% and 20% for the retailers (Mejia 1978).

The trader also buys up produce his customers have for sale and can then distribute it further to his contacts in the town. Often these middlemen are also well-to-do landowners. In addition there are the mestiz people of small means who maybe have neither land nor any permanent employment other than what they can get by acting as intermediaries for the produce and money from the Indians. In the more remote areas there are often several channels of meddlemen and the Indians, as the small-holders mostly lack both time and means to transport their produce further than to the nearest buyer. It is precisely this situation, not yet including the raising of livestock, that CRIC is trying to break up by forming their central cooperative. The middleman is, moreover, an important source of credit for the Indian. Through his contacts with the middleman the Indian also establishes a sort of necessary goodwill, a sort of insurance that is especially important to have just before the harvest when he is likely to be badly off (Ortiz 1973, p 233). In practice it is like selling a growing crop, which is extremely disadvantageous for the producer since he receives a price far lower than that which he could obtain for the products at market if he had time to wait and was not in such a dire need of ready cash.
The loans the Indian farmer can arrange through the middleman are much more easily available than an ordinary bank loan or a so-called agricultural development credit. The latter demand both guarantees and a lot of documents plus, of course, an interest rate between 14 and 22%. With the middleman, guarantees and interest are so to speak embedded in the agreement. That the land stands as security is implicatively understood, and interest is automatically charged in the form of the lower price the Indian receives for his produce. Clearly this form of credit will be dearer, but that is not obvious. Often the Indian only receives part of the loan in cash, the rest in the form of goods he needs and for which the middleman is more than well paid. Moreover, those who own land can also be repaid in the form of manual work, which the debtor has to do on the landlord's estate.

The part of the debt which the Indian peasant has to repay with his harvest produce gives the middleman ample dividends when he sells it at market at a profit that more than covers the interest he says he does not charge. Through continuous collecting of debts, the middleman can, to a great extent, monopolize his relationship with the primary producer with a fairly small risk of competition from other interested parties. The Indian becomes his source of economic security.

The middleman has a strategic bargaining position compared with the Indian small farmer because he belongs to another socio-cultural and economic network and has the knowledge of the market and contacts which the Indian lacks and needs in order to be able to challenge his long established dependence on the middleman. The Indian knows that he will be cheated at the time of purchase, whether it be through labour contracts or farm produce. He knows that the scales tip differently for whites and Indians and that prices are lower for him (see Ortiz' comparison of coffee prices p 221), but he has not the means with which to free himself and must consequently sell and buy for the amount the middleman offers and demands. Ortiz' figures are nearly 20 years old but on this point still apply today. Communications are still bad and the state has not taken any special steps to regulate the free enterprise exploitation of the Indian's subsistence economy. (See CRIC 42:1980, p 11).
In respect to non-livestock production, CRIC is now in the first stages of trying to break the agricultural middleman's hold on the Indian farmer by founding its central cooperative. But it will be some time before it is possible to develop an alternative system for livestock production, especially for contacts with the mechanized milk industry. The community enterprises, which produce milk, naturally have direct distribution channels to the dairy, but the small farmers have in most cases a production surplus of only a few litres a day and are totally dependent on the middleman for transportation. The small producer receives about 8.50 pesos/litre while the middleman gets about 11 pesos/litre. Furthermore, in Puracé the middleman were accused of adulterating the milk with water or flour so as to increase their profits. In all respects milk is a very important source of income for those fortunate enough to be able to afford a cow. Often one must be a member of a collective farm before one has that privilege. Unfortunately milk as a source of income sometimes means that the children suffer when there is a shortage of cash and the milk must be sold.

The livestock trader makes even greater profits. He can buy a heifer for 7-8000 pesos from the resguardo and sell in town for 14-1500 pesos. In the same way he can get nearly twice the 800 pesos he pays the primary producer for 100 kilos of ulluco. As a rule the small producer cannot produce such large quantities, but the proportions are the same.

A similar situation applies to the Indian as a purchaser of such essential items as fertilizer, insecticides, pesticides, seed, and groceries. The middleman buys half a kilo of rice in town for 9-10 pesos and sells it to the Indian for 12-15 pesos. If the Indian cannot carry the fertilizer from the store in town back to his home himself, then he has to pay the price charged by the local trader: about 1300 pesos for 100 kilos fertilizer. The Indian can readily compare this with the amount he receives for his potatoes: he has noticed how the price of fertilizer has gone up in relation to the price of the potatoes he produces. Depending on the quality, 100 kilos of potatoes can yield a return of between 600 and 1000 pesos. The Indian must give nearly a carga (100 kilos) of potatoes for a bulto (50 kilos) of fertilizer. Price variations for potatoes are moreover extremely evident. In 1976 prices varied from 200 to 1400 pesos and in 1977 they were between 700 and 1400 pesos. The 1979/80 price level is about the same, partly
due to increased production, while prices of items that must
be bought from outside are rising. Barbed wire, for example,
used to cost about 500-600 pesos per bulto but now costs up
to 2000 pesos. Possible increases in production and therefore
higher incomes are rapidly eaten up by inflation and price
increases. As expressed by some associated members at a in-
depth empresa comunitaria:

"...en esta manera el trabajo del indigena casi no vale
nada." 11)

7.4.4 The Market

The market is an institution introduced by white colonizers in
order to, among other things, secure easy access to foodstuffs.
Right from the start it was the Indian who was the main pro-
ducer of food and this is still the case in the Eastern region
(see SETPA 1979, p 51; Ortiz 1973, p 229). The white population
is still supported, paradoxically enough, by the Indians who
have hardly enough for their own subsistance, despite the fact
that their economy was originally, and to a certain degree still
is, a self-supporting one. From Ortiz' statistics (1973, p 214
ff) it is possible to deduce that the white immigrants, by es-
stabishing customer relationships with the Indian population,
could in the main satisfy their own foodstuff needs at a lower
cost than they themselves could produce it at. In that way they
could instead release their resources to support their own pro-
duction of more profitable products.

This withdrawal of food from the Indian community has, apart
from constituting a leakage of the indigenous labour potential,
also disrupted the Indian society's socioeconomic balance by
limiting their survival buffer - which has otherwise always
been given priority and been a natural safeguard for the poo-
rest peasants in bad times and times of crop failures. The re-
result is that nowadays they are forced to borrow money or accept
day-wage labour.

As unorganized representatives of their subsistence economy,
the Indian peasants have not the smallest chance to assert their
rights on the open market. Here the Colombian national economy
absorbs his eventual production surplus the minute he is accos-
ted by the buyers. SETPA (1979) points out in its socioeconomic
report on the eastern region that the total absence of state
regulations as a protection for the goods produced by the In-
dian means that all possible progress achieved through the
supplying of credit or technical assistance is immediately swallowed up by the middleman at the market. The result is that all incentives for a self-generating development of the indigenous economy are effectively sabotaged.

"...es precisamente el mercado el factor en que la acción del estado ha sido menos operante y mas bien contraproducente." (SETPA 1979 b, p 78). 12)

So as not to leave anything to chance, or so it seems, in the effectiveness of the plundering of the Indians' labour, there are so-called control boards for prices, weights, and measures in most of the larger marketplaces. Their composition demonstrates only too clearly the point behind their control function. There are the mayor, the chief of police, the public health inspector, and one representative each from the business community, the consumers, and the Comunal Accion Committee. With the help of the police the weight and price of the produce the peasant has with him to sell in town on market day is checked. On the orders of the mayor, prospective sellers are held on arrival and their wares kept in as limited an area as possible so as to force down the price. First and foremost the aim is to supply the local market and to prevent the produce from spreading to compete in other markets. On the other hand the price and amount of goods the farmer buys from the traders in the district is not controlled in any way (SETPA 1979 b, p 78).
IDEMA is the state authority which should fulfill that function, but it does not work like that. On the other hand, CECORA has managed to influence the distribution of certain products such as panela, aquacate, and beans (SEPTA, p 79).

Price fluctuations are another source of trouble for the Indian peasants. They have no opportunity to make an advanced analysis of the market but are forced to sell when they have a surplus and especially at harvest time when there is more competition, and prices in general are lower. They suspect swindles, and quite justifiably so, as they have continually noticed in recent years how their own products have varied greatly in price and have not gone up as much as the goods they themselves must buy in order to continue farming their increasingly impoverished strips of land. In 1978 the price of onions varied from 400 to 1800 pesos, garlic from 800 to 3000 pesos and potatoes from 600 to 1400 pesos depending on the quality (see also Mejia 1978, p 20). In many cases the
variations depended on the middleman's manipulations, in others on increased competition. The so-called tiendas comunales is an attempt by the Indian community, with the encouragement of CRIC, to ease market variations and fluctuations. In this venture they try to hold stocks of essential goods at lower prices and even act as a central buyer of certain products, forwarding them to the central cooperative. In most of this these co-op stores have no support at all from the official authorities (SEPTA 1979 b, p 79).

7.4.5 Wage Labour

When the soil fails to yield enough to support the family, then those who can must try to increase their household income by taking work wherever possible. In the 1972 census of the resguardos in Cauca, not quite 3000 declared they were day-workers of different shades while 144 declared they were workers (see table 11). Unfortunately these statistics do not reveal anything about the Indian farmers who have to take temporary employment in order to make ends meet. Neither is there any reliable data which describes the dynamics of proletarization, even if everything tends to indicate an augmentation of the number of semi-proletarians, except in areas where landrestitution has been sucessful.

By choice, the Indian farmer first of all tries to get a job with a neighbour on the reservation, even if there he only earns about 40 pesos (equivalent to 1/2 kilo of meat) plus food, for a full day's work. He prefers that working environment and as a rule gets better food there. This consideration naturally depends on how acute is his need for ready cash and how long he can be away from his own farm. On the resguardo, such manpower can be bought and sold at a low cost. Londono (p 65) further calls attention to the fact that the eastern zone including Tierradentro, where we find the majority of the resguardos, has the lowest percentage of jornaleros, slightly more than 10% probably because a major part of day-wage work is realized within the exchanging-hands system of the same community.

Even if the haciendas in the surrounding areas take advantage of this source of cheap labour, their farming methods are not labour intensive enough to give regular employment to any great number of people. Instead, seasonal migration is typical of the small farm area and wages are higher out-
outside this region. Above all, it is the younger workers who leave on a more or less temporary basis to areas with commercial agricultural enterprises with their plantations of preferably coffee or beans. These enterprises require a great deal of manual labour at harvest time. To a lesser degree, the workers also take employment in the sugar works near Cali. A more permanent emigration is occurring as a consequence of the shortage of land, which forces families to seek their future in different frontier areas open for colonization, principally towards the Western "Cordillera". Some of them move in the direction of the southwest forest regions in the lowlands of Caqueta and Putumayo (SETPA 1979 b, p 39).

Another emigration trend is that of the young women who go off to Popayan, Cali, and Bogota as domestic servants. It seems they rarely return to the rural areas and most of the household servants in Cauca and Valle are Indian women or coloured women, as indeed are the rapidly growing numbers of prostitutes.

A daily labourer usually works on a short-term contract, and often on piece work. The daily rate is usually between 80 and 150 pesos. How much the worker earns depends on with whom and where he works, on the wage applicable at the time, and the working pace he can maintain. Londño (1979, p 11) argues moreover that the Indian workers are paid even lower wages, sometimes not more than half the regular salary. Ortiz (1973) and Sevilla Casas (1978 b) make similar observations. If the foremen see that the worker earn more than is reasonable, they can lower the piece rate. On the larger, more modern haciendas there is sometimes a social insurance scheme for the employees, the cost of which is regularly deducted from their wages. But as a rule there are no social benefits at all for seasonal workers. There is rarely work for more than two months at a time and in any case they can count on being dismissed within a year, so the owner can avoid paying a form of holiday pay equivalent to one month's wage per year of employment. Organizing themselves into unions only results in difficulty in getting a job, unless, of course, the union is controlled by the landowner. The workers participation through trade-union mobilization is inhibited by several factors. A characteristic problem is the lack of conformity within the union movement, illustrated on the national level through the existence of four different confederations, CGT, CSTC, CTC and UNC.
Asociación Nacional de Usuarios Campesinos/ANUC which can be considered as the most important organizer of agricultural workers in Colombia, has not been influential in Cauca. More important is Federación Agraria Nacional/FANAL but there are also independent unions on different rural enterprises without sufficient strength to increase the bargaining power of the workers. A serious problem in this context is the corruption of the leadership. Union management implies extra income and power for the local bosses, and often the union is initiated from above and the union fee deducted from the salary by the employer without insight from the workers. (See further Wedin 1975 and LO 1979).

Wage labour is not only a leakage in that the Indian employee must sell his labour at a loss. The fact that only a small part of the earned income circulated within the Indian community also bears consequences which mean that the Indian loses resources and power in the modern capitalist sector of the national economy. His income is spent, mainly on goods produced outside the Indian economy and therefore helps most of all to stimulate the white middlemen's business by increasing his market. If he can afford it, the Indian buys tools and other inputs to maintain the efficiency of his smallholding but that does not necessarily mean that he succeeds to increase his production. All way round it is the middleman who gets the best of it.

Another result of the Indian peasant family's need to take extra jobs in order to make a living is that this labour potential, which is so desperately needed to invest in the development of the Indian community, is now instead absorbed by the white landowners and the agricultural industries.

"The draining of labour away from the community harms the internal production of the Paëz economy, and labour expenditure brings to an Indian a low reward in relation to the purchasing power of the money he earns." (Ortiz 1973, p 171 ff).
8 THE DYNAMICS OF CONTINUED DEPRIVATION

8.1 The Apprehension of Deterioration

In his investigation of intra-regional differentiation in four different resguardo-areas in Tierradentro, Sevilla Casas (1978) has succeeded in obtaining data that further elucidate some aspects of the deterioration process felt by the indigenous small-holders.

By investigating 41 domestic units in the San Andrés resguardo area (op cit, p 74 ff), by comparing productive potentials and consumption needs in urban and rural neighbourhoods, respectively, and by paying special attention to inter-ethnic differences, he shows how those who control fertile micro-niches and/or abundant land, progressively fortify their wealth and privileges at the expense of the less fortunate members of the community.

Generally it is the white population which takes advantage of the Indians, but Sevilla Casas also acknowledges a process of intra-ethnic differentiation and polarization in San Andrés mentioned by Ortiz (1973). In this case Ortiz distinguishes between so-called progressive indians and traditional indians, while Sevilla Casas considers this polarization as being no more than another manifestation of peasant differentiation. In one of his examples, the Lomalta region, four indigenous domestic units together possess 200 hectares while the others have an average of 2.9 hectares. Their standard of living differs so much though, from the rest of the community, that he found it necessary to exclude these units from the rural Indian sample. These fortunate Indians enjoy the same advantages as any white peasant, for example, access to cheap indigenous labour as well as credit facilities.

In the study of another indigenous community, Tumbichucue, Sevilla Casas (1978 b) reaches the same conclusions. Because of the assymetric market relations, with reference to products as well as labour, there is a continous advantage to the white colonists and trademen and a similar disadvantage to the indigenous producer.
...los tenderos de tolda y chucherías, los comerciantes de ganado y los compradores de fique y cera (por lo general intermediarios mayoristas de segundo grado) son los que más esquilman al indígena, desconocedor de las artes del 'negocio' y el comercio." (p 132).13)

and there is no way he can reach a higher level of social or economic well-being, no matter how much he works and tries to increase his production.

According to the Chayanov (1974) theory of peasant economics, there exists a correlation between the input level of labour intensity and the burden of provision (the quotient between the number of consumers and the productive potential in available labour), signifying that the subsistence-farmer possesses a potential of selfexploitation, a space (even if not unlimited) for increased input of work to reach a subjective balance between basic-need satisfaction and the pains of drudgery.

"...the degree of self-exploitation of labour is established by some relationship between the measure of demand satisfaction and the measure of the burden of labour." (Chayanov 1974, p 81).

The question is, to which degree this also implies a capacity of defence on the behalf of the direct producers against the impact of the dominating national economic system. To a certain degree maybe it would be possible to talk about a defence function, as the peasant subsistence production unit apparently can survive under severe economic pressure due to this non-capitalistic logic of production. But this capacity also becomes the gateway to the superexploitation of the poor peasant, where pre-capitalistic modes of production are confronted with, and subordinated to, the expanding capitalistic sector.

In the case of the Paez Indians in Tumbichucue, Sevilla Casas shows how the different determinants decide the extent of their market participation and impede all their efforts to reach even a minimum level of subsistence. They are far from close to the minimum level of consumption per capita in calories and protein estimated in 1975 by the Colombian Institute of Family Welfare, ICBF (Sevilla Casas 1978 b, p 1949).
"...la intensificación del trabajo de acuerdo a la necesidad produce resultados crecientemente negativos o deficitarios. Es dramático ver que, a medida que los productores intensifican su trabajo (autoexplotación) de acuerdo a los requisitos crecientes de su propio bienestar..., los réditos efectivos de ese esfuerzo disminuyen proporcionalmente... Se trata, por tanto, de una situación que genera déficit en proporción directa al aumento de las necesidades y del trabajo por satisfacerlas." (Sevilla Casas 1978 b, p 147).14

But they survive, in spite of this super-exploitation of their work, they should not be able to, if they were ordinary workers without land though. Therefore it can be profitable to capital to maintain this integrational structure. As Taussig (1978, p 86) notes regarding the example fo the Cauca vally:

"...the capitalist farms provide the peasants with a type of subsidy through wages. But on the other hand, the semi-proletarians, as peasant producers, are supplying the capitalist farmers with a subsidy too, and it is this subsidy which allows the capitalist farmers to extract higher rates of surplus value than would be possible were the costs of maintaining and reproducing labor totally dependent on the capitalist mode of production."

This observation should, however, not be accepted uncritically as an indicator of a continous regeneration of the small-holder structure. Even if the capitalistic economy seems to be dependent on the possibility to exploit the minifundista, I do not think that the continous deterioriation of the poor peasant economy can be effectively detained without extraordinary measures, i.e. policies that might threaten the power structure and the status quo. Land distribution is such a policy, combined with credit facilities and technical assistance. Modernization policies without structural changes in landowning structure can only temporarily delay the alienation process of the smallholder from his plot of land. Without access to land and sufficient capital to allow at least a local competition with commercial farms on the cash crop market, and to allow marginals for a high level of self-sufficiency, the minifundista cannot resist the normal strains, for example from the increasing production costs and the fluctuations of
market prices. He must have the possibility to rotate crops, to let land lie fallow, and to take other measures to improve the soil.

Feder (1979) discusses this dilemma thoroughly and concludes that the smallholders are squeezed from two sides as if by a pair of scissors: "on the level of production costs and on that of market prices" (p 20), and that they gradually and inevitably will be evicted from their plots. He does not, however, only see the gradual alienation of the peasants but also the eviction of wage workers, indicating the possible future of the rural masses (p 37).

The Indian peasant accordingly perceives his situation as becoming more and more precarious. On paper, i.e. statistically he would maybe be able to see that his annual income in pesos has steadily increased every year (see Pinera 1979 a, b), but from personal experience he knows that everything is as before, worse for every passing day. To him it is more and more difficult to keep up with the price increases. Todo sigue igual, cada día peor. This feeling of deterioration should, however, also be viewed upon in the light of the fact that the poor indigenous peasant for every day is more and more aware of what they do not have. All the public and collective goods they are not sharing in. Of course there are also peasants experiencing progress, but in those cases the Indians are usually to be found in communities where land has been restituted and brought under cultivation, as for example in community enterprises. Despite the fact that individual cash income has not increased much, there is a general agreement that they are better off regarding food supply, housing conditions, health, and general economic security. Even so, they are aware that there is a great deal left to be done and that the gulf between what they have and what they have a right to, and what they could achieve, is unjust and based on institutionalised violence, which must be fought against.

In the resguardos of Cauca the Indian peasant blames his poverty on:
- the high cost of living which means that any possible profit from the sale of different products is immediately swallowed up by the continual increases in prices (see CRIC 40:1980, p 10).
- Unemployment and lack of occupation which forces day-labourers and seasonal workers to take the work and wages offered.
Increases in price for fertilizer, insecticides, pesticides, and other inputs which the small-holder must buy in order to squeeze the essential harvest out of the increasingly impoverished soil.

- The lack of technology.

- Lack of land which prevents farming of rotation crops and which does not fully occupy the peasant or allow him to develop his holding.

- The middleman who makes vast profits from the Indian's dependence on transports to and from the market and his lack of business contacts.

He becomes more and more conscious of the reasons for, and the range of, his deprivation and lack of power. He sees how he is continually cheated and deceived. His humble "faith" in the patron, the white eloquence and authority is beginning to disappear, and more and more the Indian peasant is able to put his finger right on the conditions which are the root-cause of his wretchedness which force him to give away his labour. Thus we must consider the levels of cultural, economical, and political organization and thereby the bargaining position, as an important determinant when we discuss the future of the poor indigenous peasant.

The growing consciousness is manifested in this statement made in one of the interviews:

"...the high cost of living is the reason why we are organizing ourselves - if we don't become organized the increases will continue and we will be disorganized. If one cannot understand the urgency of, for instance, regaining our land, one ceases to fight, but if one realizes that it is vital in order that our children will not suffer later on..."

In addition to the lack of land I consider the system of commercial interchange between the indigenous small-holders and the white representatives of the dominating capitalistic sector of the national economy to be one of the most crucial factors explaining the deterioration of the life conditions of the former. The low levels and the fluctuations of the prices
on the products produced by the small-holders compared to the high and steadily increasing prices they have to pay for the articles they need to buy from the middlemen, makes it very difficult for them to increase their real income. Rather, they can sometimes be forced to further cut down on their consumption to be able to sell quantitatively more of their physiological essentialities, i.e. non-excess of aliments, to meet basic needs of products not produced by themselves. Credit eventually obtained by the Indians become rather a last resort to bridge the acute deficit of resources between the harvests than the extra input potential it should provide, for investment in their future.

To increase his income, the indigenous small-holder knows that he ought to invest more in the cultivation of cash crops but cannot do it, prevented both by tradition and lack of resources. On the one hand the indigenous peasant in Cauca first of all strive for the highest degree possible to obtain of self sufficiency. On the other hand he does not control capital enough to be able to risk initial investment and changes in the pattern of production. Further, the harvest could fail and the prices could sag. The competition from bigger and more modern commercial units of production could become fatal.

Accordingly the poor indigenous small-holder is trapped in a barren no man's land between his non-capitalistic tradition and the rules of capitalism; trying to escape without structural changes, changes which the authorities regard as subversive business.

8.2 Transfer of Power and Impoverishment

The economic participation of the Indian farmer on the international world market is an old story that was introduced with the Spanish colonization. Gradually, the most isolated regional economies of Latin America were tied to the main streams of the international market system. Frank (1969) suggests that Latin America was a part of a capitalistic system from the very beginning and that the dependent nature of its relationship to the colonizing nations is the cause of its underdevelopment. Underdevelopment, he says, is a historical product of the assymetric relationship between the satellite and the metropolis in an international capitalistic system.
These assumptions, however, are rejected by Laclau (1971) who argues that Frank forgets that capitalism is a mode of production, mainly constituted by the free labourer's sale of his labour power, showing that the dominating classes expropriated the economic surplus of the direct producers in spite of the absence of a free labour market. This surplus could be commercialized and accumulated, strengthening the power of the landed elite and a commercial class, even though it was produced through labour relationships different from those typical of capitalism. Accordingly, both the accumulation of capital and the merchant's capital in itself can be considered to be older than the capitalistic mode of production (p 26).

In his investigation of the Paez in Tumbichucue, Tierradentro, Sevilla Casas (1978 b) tells us how the indigenous population was integrated into the mercantile system already from the year 1640, under the regime of tribute, encomienda, and mita (p 132).

"Tal participación se dió por la prestación tributaria, en especie y metálico, y por la prestación en trabajo (mitas agrarias y obras) Hubo épocas, hacia 1759, en que para 'pueblos' que probablemente comprendían en Tumbichucue la prestación laboral coaccionada ascendió a más del 50% de las fuerzas transferibles." (p 158). 15

Thus, Laclau (p 31) agrees that "the modernity of one sector is a function of the backwardness of the other", provided by increased servile exploitation in the backward sector and that "development generates underdevelopment", but he bases his reasoning on the relations of production and not primarily on those of the market and the circulation as such. Consequently, he states that the traditional peasant economies were connected to the international market, but that feudal relationships of production were still prevailing in Europe at the time of the conquest and that this system was also introduced in Latin America. The Indian farmer was not directly alienated from his land, but the colonizers imposed upon him different kinds of extra-economical coercions to deprive him of his labour power and the economic surplus.

Still semi-feudal conditions of production persist, in coexistence with true capitalism. Thus, there are reasons to distinguish between capitalist mode of production and participation in a world capitalist system, a distinction that Laclau
(p 37) considers being important in order to clarify the relationship between the metropolis and the satellite. The capitalistic penetration of the countryside is, however, evident and we are facing an interaction between traditional subsistence patterns of production and a modern capitalistic sector, both on the regional and the national level. There is a functional dualism between the subsistence sector and the commodity producing sector as deJanvry/Garramon (1977, p 206) calls it. Bartra (1975, cited in Krantz/Svensson 1979, p 13), however, means that it only seemingly is a question of a dual structure. Instead he considers it to be only one system with two different modes of production, which together constitute a sub-capitalistic socio-economic formation.

Without contributing to this discussion here, I think it is important to stress the continuous existence, from the arrival of the first Spanish conquerers, of the many channels through which resources of labour and goods and thus power have been and are transferred from the direct producers to the dominating, classes.

Gradually, with the capitalistic penetration of the countryside and as the indigenous population has lost more and more of their land, their dependence on manufactured products, as for example clothing, utensils, tools, has also become more established and their integration and participation in the market economy is more and more obvious. This is not principally as consumers, however, but as workers and producers. On the one hand, glancing at Bernstein's (1979, 423 A) way of looking at the destruction of natural economy in Africa, we face the "withdrawal of labour from use-value production" and on the other hand, the "monetisation of some of the material elements of reproduction" which forced the indigenous population to produce for the market and/or sell their labour power to meet their needs for reproduction. In other words, there is an increased institutionalized economic participation in the modern sector of the national economy, which generates an increased number of channels between this sector and the marginal indigenous economy through which resources and power can be absorbed from the Indian small-holders.

"...subsistence agriculture supplies cheap labour to commercial agriculture which, in turn, supplies cheap food to the urban sector where it sustains low wages." (deJanvry/Garramon 1977, p 206).
In addition to the end semi-feudal forms of expropriation of absolute surplus value from the indigenous peasant, as for example in the terraje-system, he can nowadays also be exploited as day-wage labourer, seasonal worker, borrower, consumer of industrial merchandise, and through his participation as a producer on the free market and his dependence on the middlemen on different levels of production, distribution, marketing, and consumption.

These threads or channels constitute a network of deprivations between themselves, fortifying each other, consolidating established relations of production, as well as the asymmetry of economic and political power relations and consequently underdevelopment and poverty.

A logical consequence of this reasoning is that the explanation for the growing gap between the Indian peasantry and the dominating layers of the population in Colombia, must be hidden in the polythready connection between the traditional indigenous economy and the modern commodity producing sector of the national economy. It is not the lack of economic interaction, which to a large extent constitutes the main assumption behind the conventional liberal modernization model as the explanation of rural underdevelopment.

Prevalent development strategies, as formulated and effectuated in, for example, Colombia are hence based on the traditional dualistic idea that the national economy consists of, on the one hand, a traditional, semi-feudal, underdeveloped sector and, on the other hand, a relatively modern and well-developed market economy, the two without major interchange of utilities. Through different development programmes, the authorities primarily aim at integrating the underdeveloped sector into the market economy. Agrarian reforms and credit- and rural development programs have all had as their purpose to promote the modernization of agriculture for increased production, preferably for export, and for an increased GNP. Implicitely in these strategies you find the fatalistic assurance that the poor automatically would benefit from this economic growth, in that way escaping the incentives for rural discontent and protest emerging from the poor.

Closer to the truth is that one of the most important driving forces behind integration policies concerning marginal areas and regional indigenous economies, is the need of the capitalist system for cheap labour, cheap provisions, and cheap
raw materials. The increasing export depending of the Colom­
bian economy manifests the link to the world capitalistic sys-
tem (see table 14). The commodity producing sector of the na­
tional economy is not primarily interested in the indígen­
ous population as a market for its products, but as cheap labour
and food producers. The national economy in Colombia is mainly
focused on an increased export and there is no balance between
the internal demand and the expansion of the national capital,
which permits the price of labour to decline until it reaches
the limits of popular unrest.

"Within the larger context of imperialism and dependent
capitalist development, agricultural production is
under constant pressure to increase its surplus and
profits in order to compensate for the effects of un­
equal exchange both at the national and international
level. This is accomplished by the reduction of the
peasants' remuneration to a minimal level and decapi­
talizing them in the process". (Singelman 1978, p 58).

This is possible especially when the worker has his plot where
he, to a certain degree, can maintain a certain level of sub­
sistence. In this way the employer saves the reproduction cost
of the labour for his accumulation; and consequently, this se­
miproletarian labour is more profitable than wholly proleta­
rized labour, as "the opportunity cost of the land given in
usufruct to the worker is less than the value of production
that the worker can generate on it through use of family la­
bour." (deJanvry/Garramón, p 209).

The free semiproletarian, who has his privately owned land in
the resguardo or elsewhere is, of course, cheaper still than
those given a plot of land on the hacienda as a part of a re­
umeration agreement, due to the fact that the hacendero do
not even have to keep land for the worker.

Hence we are approaching my introductory postulations in section
2.4. Because of the systemic economic participation of the poor
indígenous peasant, and his lack of access to the bases for ac­
cumulating social power, he is continuously suffering from the
transfer process of power to the dominating sectors of the cen­
tral economy. Through the market, where he is forced to sell
cheap and buy expensive commodity extracting exploita­tion; as
a proletarian or semiproletarian, he is forced to accept what­
ever he is paid, labour power extracting exploitation.
The Indian small-holder has to super-exploit his whole family just to reach the level of elementary basic needs. That is not the same as increasing the autoexploitation of the family until the balance of demand satisfaction is reached, but plain struggle for survival. There is hardly even the question of a transfer of excess, at least not quantitatively significant, but a transfer of resources corresponding to complementary basic needs.

Consequently, what we see is the dilemma of increasing costs of production and decreasing returns of labour which Berstein (1979, p 427) calls the simple reproduction squeeze. The lack of land and the exhaustion of the soil demands a continuous extension of the input of chemical fertilizers, pesticides, and other expensive means of production external to the indigenous household. This is a trap which is further aggravated in the need for greater efforts in labour time to satisfy the demands of reproduction. Moreover, in addition to this deterioration of the terms of exchange, the poor peasant through his dependence on wage-labour also contributes to the accumulated wealth of the latifundio-owner or the capitalist farmer, who more than the smallholder benefits from the arrangement, thus indirectly, simultaneously strengthening the powers behind his deprivation.

To sum up: Important elements of the pre-capitalistic modes of production persist, but they are functionally integrated with the capitalistic mode and subordinated to the economic laws of capitalism. In other word the relationship between the poor indigenous peasants and the capital is determined by the principles of the capitalistic mode of production. Thus the indigenous peasants can be considered as wage-labour equivalents even though they are not entirely dependent on wage-labour for their reproduction and they maintain a certain degree of control over the production process. Also those indigenous agriculturalists that are not fully proletarized, produce surplus-value and contribute to the accumulation of capital outside the direct process of production. (Compare Berstein 1979, p 436. See the discussion by Boesen 1979).
Or as deJanvry/Garramon (1977, p 20) say:

"the struggle for survival induces an intense search for additional productive resources and for nontraditional factors in order to increase the productivity of labour, But this search is largely contradictory, as the very instruments of survival available to the minifundista are also factors of impoverishment."

But there is also resistance. It has never been strong enough. But as Quintín Lame, initiator of the indigenous movement more than half a century ago said:

"Que las derrotas no han acabado con la paciencia del indio, que sigue luchando. Como quien dice: mismos explotados, mismos rebeldes." (CRIC/Cartilla 1:1973, p 15).16)
NOTES PART II

1) "...the concept of the 'white man' to the Indian is, before being a racial criterion a descriptive term through which the Indian identify him who seizes his land, his produce and his work, he calls him white Indian or mestizo and - the 'white man', incarnate the exploitation." (Londono 1979, p 60)

2) Fals Borda (1975, p 25) distinguish between classical feudalism, spanish feudalism and the American dominion. He claims that the encomienda system did not allow the Spanish exploiters to develop real feudalism because of the vigilance and envy from the part of the Spanish Crown but rather a adapted régimen senorial. To a large extent the servitude was more tributarian than feudal. He considers however that the encomienda opened up the gates for a political and economic domination.

3) "That a people that struggle cannot be finished neither by the war, nor through the persecutions, nor through the exploitation..." (CRIC 1974, p 15).

4) "...i.e. claims the formal desintegration of the resguardo." (Sevilla Casas 1978 a, p 15).


6) For a more comprehensive view of the resguardo, see Friede J - El Indio en Lucha por la Tierra, Bogota 1976; Gonzales M - El Resguardo el Nuevo Reino de Granada, Bogota 1979; Fals Borda O - Indian Congregation of New Kingdom of Granada in The Americas XIII, no 4, 1957.

7) "The state has two legal instruments to intervene in the conflict: law 135 from 1961, about the agrarian reform... and law 89 from 1890, ...The institutions have not to the extent possible however made use of these instruments when the conflict has aggravated. They enter to legalize juridically possessions that have already been obtained in practise; i.e. they do finally what they should have done from the very beginning to prevent the social conflict... in spite of the fact that it theoretically is a relatively simple procedure, it interferes with the interests of the big land-owners who influence in the state in practise." (SEPTA 1979 b, p 67).
8) Even if it is principally necessary to distinguish between the private property, the minifundio, and the collectively owned resguardo as such, there are similar problems to be considered, and in most cases the small separate domestic units on the resguardo in practise experience the same economic and social conditions as the privately owned minifundio. Also the Indian family suffers from scarce land and acute lack of productive assets and financial resources (See DANE, p 106 ff, 125).

9) "They are the day-wage workers who always have to be on their way, impersonating the decomposition of the peasantry and the transition of the agricultural day-wage worker to proletarian." (Londono 1979, p 42).

10) "To the extent that the Indians come to participate in their organization CRIC, such relations tend to reinforce themselves and there are also new associative forms introduced to cultivate the recovered land." (Londono 1979, p 31).

11) "in this way the work performed by the Indian almost has no value."

12) "it's exactly the market which is the factor in the state activities that has been the least operative but rather contraproductive." (SEPTA 1979 b, p 78).

13) "The small tradesmen, shop- and boothkeepers, the businessmen in cattle and the purchasers of sisal and beeswax (generally intermediate wholesale traders of second degree) are those that most of all exploit the indian, unfamiliar of the art of commerce and bargaining." (Sevilla Casas 1978 b, p 132).

14) "... - the intensification of the work to keep up with the necessity produce results that are progressively negatives or insufficient, it's dramatic to see that, when the producers intensify their work (autoexploitation) in accordance with the growing demands of their own well-being..., the effective return of these efforts falls proportionally... Accordingly it's about a situation that generates deficit in direct proportion to the augmentation of the needs and the work necessary to satisfy these needs." (Sevilla Casas 1978 b, p 147).
15) "Such participation was attained through the fulfillment of the tribute obligation, in kind or in metals, and through labour duty (agricultural mitas). There were epochs, around 1759, when the communities in Tumbichucue had to offer maybe more than 50% of the labour force available." (Sevilla Casas 1978 b, p 158).

16) "That the defeats, have not broken the patience of the Indian, who continues his struggle. As they say: The same exploited, the same rebells." (CRIC 1973, p 15).
III THE STATE OF COLOMBIA AND THE REGIONAL INDIGENOUS COUNCIL OF CAUCA

9 THE POLITICS OF NATIONAL INTEGRATION IN COLOMBIA

As already touched upon in section 2.3, the development strategies in Colombia represent the themes developed within the modernization paradigm, favoring economic growth and accordingly, determined by the laws of international capitalism. Thus the politics of national integration primarily aim at promoting the penetration of capitalism into marginal areas. The national development plan of Colombia for the years 1975-78, entitled Para Cerrar la Brecha (Closing the Breach) expresses well-meaning efforts to fight poverty:

"Se espera reducir la brecha entre el campo y la ciudad, la brecha entre los barrios ricos y los barrios pobres, la brecha entre quienes tienen acceso a los servicios de salud y educación, y los analfabetos y desnutridos. El programa que le proponemos al países el de cambiar los objetivos de las políticas, e intentar la protección de los objetivos de las políticas, e intentar la protección de los sectores tradicionales en el campo y la ciudad y destinar la inversión pública primordialmente a obras en las ciudades intermedias y pequeñas, y en las zonas rurales donde se concentra la población más pobre." (DNP 1975, p V). 1)

The economic and political power-structure has remained intact, however, and there are no signs suggesting any tangible changes to the better, concerning the general standard of living of the poor indigenous peasant. Rather the different reform programs have seemed to favour proletarization where ever needed and to consolidate dependency relations between capital and the persistent patterns of precapitalistic modes of production though structural means of coercion towards the adaptation of the indigenous peasant to the needs of the capitalistic sector of the national economy. (See also Galli 1978 and her discussion about rural development as social control).

From an African point of view a parallel problem is discussed by Bernstein (1979, p 427) in these words:

"While the immediate organisation of the production remained in the hands of the peasant producers, it became increasingly determined by the development
of commodity relations, including the economic and polit- cal measures such as cultivation bye-laws, compulsory land-improvement schemes, and credit and extension schemes which tied the producers more closely to particular kinds of production."

9.1 Indian Legislation

Already on an introductory stage it is important to notice that there is not necessarily any congruence between the legislation as such and the actual policy in practice, as performed by the state or other institutions. Most Indian laws formulate the ambition to protect the indigenous population, but without considering the fundaments of continued existence of the aboriginal population. Most observations accordingly suggest that economic conditions are more determining than juridical ones and that subdivision and fragmentation is mostly a problem of those communities in close contact with the market economy (see McGreevy, 1971, p 125).

"La compilación de leyes republicanas sobre el indio, demuestra que no se trata de dar una solución justa, constructiva, al problema indígena, sino de adoptar una postura jurídica sobre ese problema." (Garcia 1978, p 37). 2)

Hence, existing legislation continuously lacks the constructive measures for improving the living conditions of the indigenous population as far as socio-economic development and cultural identity are concerned. Instead the assimilation of the aboriginal population seems to be the central line in this patronage, which in itself bears the negation of true protection of the Indians and their interests. This assimilation policy, when gradually transformed into a policy of integration, mainly expresses itself in the legislation in terms of division of the resguardos, which in a short period of time could mean the extinction of the cultural Indian. So far though, most resguardos in Cauca still exist in spite of the legislation. There are several reasons for this. I consider the most important to be, on the one hand, the relative political independence of Cauca, and the peripheral geographical and economic position of the resguardos in this department, at least until the beginning of the 20th century. This slowed down the change processes which meant that much of the colonial juridical tradition as well as the pre-
capitalistic relations of production to a large extent were maintained. This relative isolation was of course also determinant for the speed of the capitalistic penetration of more distant regions and the development of the land-market. On the other hand, we have seen that a total alienation of the land from the Indians must not always be functional to the landowners or the regional bourgeois regarding the maintenance of the highest possible profit quotient, as the opportunity cost generally is lower when using semiproletarians as labour force. In other words, the appropriation of Indian land has very little to do with legislation, which merely reflect more or less dominating tendencies in the economic and political power-play. The white colonists have very seldom had the law on their side when they have seized land from the Indians. Another important factor to consider in this matter is of course also the indigenous resistance.

The first time period after the war of independence is characterized by a rather confused legislation for the Indians and the lack of a clearly defined Indian policy. The laws that were issued in 1820-1890 were often mutually contradictory and reflect the different interests that were represented among those in power. One important reason for this was the geographical isolation and the diversity of interests between different regions of Colombia. This even led to a period of federalism with the Constitution of 1858 (see Torres 1975; Dane 1971 a; Caycedo et al 1973 and Garcia 1978).

Parallel to the general legislation, the Colombian Government also has agreements with the Catholic Church. In 1824 several laws were instituted that dictated the spreading of the Christian faith and civilization. In 1887 the missions in Colombia's less colonized areas were regulated, and in 1888, 1898 and 1902 a number of treaties were instituted that gradually resulted in the concordate of 29th January 1953 which still applies today (Caycedo et al 1973:263).

Law 90 from October 19th, 1859, was the first juridical act directly applying the Indigenous population in Cauca. In a way this law can be considered as being one of the most comprehensive ones in the attempts to protect the Indian communities, recognizing the communal structure as a "natural and permanent state of the resguardos in the Department of Cauca" (McGreevy 1971, p 125; see Garcia 1978, p 51). A phenomenon which partly can be explained by the same factors
is why there still exists resguardos in spite of all the laws stressing division. Of importance was, however, also the fact that some Indian Communities participated in the Mosquera revolution 1860 against the church and the big conservative hacenderos (see McGreevy 1971, p 85).

Law 89:1890 was instituted, as it states, with the aim to protect the Indian land and to formalize and define the norms for the function of the cabildo. Through mainly prohibiting the Indians all kinds of land disposals to whites it can be used as a juridical defense instrument by the indigenous population in their struggle today.

The growth of industrialism and the socio-economic development during this period of time is considered to have influenced the applicability of the law (Ministerio de Gobierno 1970, p 13). Not until 1918, however, more tangible tendencies of a division policy is taking shape (Garcia 1978, p 51).

The conflict between different interests concerning the welfare of the aboriginal population is also found in the laws and decrees that henceforth change and complete the guiding principles in the Indian policy of Colombia. In certain situations the protectionists dominate and in other cases it is the spokesmen for assimilation who want to break down the barriers that conserve the traditional Indian organization which they consider regressive (Valencia 1974, p 4). This law, however, applies only to the Indian communities that already were beginning to become civilized, i.e. where so-called resguardos existed. These are the regions of Putumayo, Narino, Cauca, Caldas, Antioquia and Cundinamarca. Otherwise the agreement with the Catholic Church applied according to the concordiate of 1888, which gave the missions the right and duty to civilize the "savages" (Law 89: 1890, art 1).

A very large part of Colombia's indigenous population was thus not concerned by the laws so far, and this is really the case still today. In other words, the possible protection that the laws after all might offer in a positive meaning, formally, does not apply to the groups inhabiting for example the Amazonas, Llanos or the Pacific coast.

Because of the concordiate in 1887 there was in practise no Indian Policy by legislation between 1890 and 1919, but only agreements with the Catholic church. The State subordinated
itself and left the assimilation process of the Indians to the ecclesiastical authorities (Garcia 1978, p 56). After the first World War, however, Colombia was rapidly incorporated into the international market system. Roads and railways were built and capitalism penetrated into more remote areas to an ever increasing extent. Not until now did the division of Indigenous Communal lands become a more accentuated issue, and the land a marketable asset.

Law 19:1927 regulates the dividing of resguardos. Special commissions are appointed with a lawyer, an engineer, and an expert of the present area, the resguardo. These were authorized to accomplish a census within the resguardo and to issue a title to the land. By the division the Indians become Colombian citizens (Caycedo et al 1973:264).

In the National budget of 1944 one million pesos were set aside for the division of land in Tierrandentro. Suddenly there was money to be used regarding resguardo affairs, despite the fact that there never was any money for education, health care or economic development inside the same resguardos (Garcia 1978, p 60. Compare DNP 1980, p 1 ff).

Law 81:1958 which deals with agriculture and the indigenous population is regarded as the first modern Indian law, in that it has been influenced by currents of indianism from Mexico and Guatemala. The law is thus used as an instrument for a planned and directed change since the necessity of giving all individuals the right to participate in the progress now was realized. In this law the seed was sown that two years later, in decree 1634:1960 became División de Asuntos Indígenas (DAI) the executive authority for the official Indian policy (Ministerio de Gobierno 1970:74).

The Land reform law 135:1961 was characteristic of the period after the Cuban revolution and the development of the Alliance for Progress. Via redistribution of land, together with technical and economic assistance, the conditions in the countryside would be changed and the integration of the Indian population made easier and accelerated. Also the colonizing of the waste land was regulated and the occupation of land inhabited by Indians was prohibited. The land reform institute, INCORA, and the Indian Bureau, DAI, co-operate to accomplish regional programmes for social and economic progress with, among other things, the aim of accelerating the division of resguardos
which they mean are so acculturated that these steps should not imply any serious consequences of social or cultural character (Ministerio de Gobierno 1970:16). Still, communally owned land is viewed upon as incompatible with economic progress.

Law 31:1967 is the answer to ILO's recommendations concerning the protection of native groups and their rights with regard to land, working conditions, education, culture, development programmes, etc.

"...todos los seres humanos tienen derecho a perseguir su bienestar material, y su desarrollo espiritual en condiciones de libertad y dignidad, en seguridad económica y en igualdad de oportunidad." (Law 31:1967).

The ministry of the interior is of the opinion that this law fulfills a maximum of aspiration towards a fulfillment of the obligations that a Government has against its indigenous population, at the same time as it facilitates the processes of cultural change (Ministerio de Gobierno 1970:33). However, there are still no concrete measures mentioned that can be taken. The interpretation and the accomplishment of the law become extremely capricious.

Valencia (1974:43) who works for the Indian Bureau, DAI, means that the legislation so far actually can take the merit for the fact that large parts of the Indian population has not been liquidated physically and culturally yet, despite the legislation's anachronistic character. By its special institutions the Government has, he thinks, promoted a policy that each day strengthens the protection of and the technical aid to these groups. Furthermore, he emphasizes the necessity of changing the antiquated structure of the resguardo. Without having to wind up the resguardo completely it is important to find a structure which is more open to modernization. By cooperative organizing and collective exploitation of the land Valencia thinks that it ought to be possible to accelerate the development of agriculture and in that way raise the standard of living for the Indian population.

This liberal view has also guided the principles of the official Indian policy and can generally be accepted as "well-meaning", but it is in due course in harmony with the established ideological currents of the time and accordingly
somewhat antagonistic to the view that the Indian himself has of his destitution and basic needs, and it is consequently not very functional regarding the possibilities to reindicate the human dignity of the Indian. A two-way communication with the marginal population concerned has to be the basis of the analysis, but it is not. In accordance with the ideology of liberal democracy nothing is mentioned about the demands which have been presented for a redistribution of land and power. Instead the discussion concentrates on the desire of protection and modernizing in general terms.

Valencia's report is guiding though if one looks at the continued legislation that shows a more and more directed change of the Indian groupings. The Indian legislation in this respect coincides to a high degree with the general agricultural policy which from the end of the 1960's, above all, emphasizes the necessity of a capitalistic development in the countryside without any accentuation on the redistributive aspects.

Decree 3159:1968 reorganizes the ministry of the interior and the División de Asuntos Indígenas becomes Division Operativa de Asuntos Indígenas. DAI's functions are principally described in terms of integration and development of the Indian population with the purpose of incorporating the Indians into the national society. It is, however, also stated that they strive for the Indians' conscious participation in this development and integration process, which is rather remarkable, if one considers the repression towards the basic Indian organization. DAI will also coordinate the work of different organizations and institutions on a local and regional level, concerning among other things technical aid (art 15).

Decree 833:1973 reorganizes the national council for Indian policy, Consejo Nacional de Política Indigenista, which was established according to decree 2122:1971. The council is the Government's designer of the national Indian policy and will also be responsible for the evaluation of both private and public programmes, carried out among Colombia's Indians. The research about Indians will also be coordinated by the council (art 1). The composition of the council can almost be said to be a compromising detail in the Indian policy, as only three of thirteen members are Indians, and besides that, they are elected by the Government (art 2). No great importance has been attached to this council as it apparently
has not had any meeting during the last few years, although it is to meet every month (Friedemann 1975, p 33).

Resolution 626:1973 is an interesting creation where the ministry of education and the Colombian Cultural Institute regulates foreign research activities of anthropologic character in Colombia, to defend, protect, conserve, reestablish, and promote the Colombian nation's cultural inheritance.

Decree 1741:1973 settles norms for developing activities of associations and institutions connected with Indians communities. Above all, DAI's duties are described, which aim at performing the programme of the ministry of the interior on a local and regional level (art 2).

- Protect the land and its use in areas with resguardos or small units with Indian population.
- Instruct in the protection and the correct use of the natural resources.
- Instruct in advanced agricultural techniques.
- Support art, handicraft, and other small industry.
- Social assistance.
- Hygiene-campaigns and environment cleanups.
- Support co-operativism and other association activities.
- Create driving forces for social development of health, co-operativism, and communal action.
- Maintenance of infra-structure.

This decree can very well be regarded as a representative formulation of the Colombian integration policy in general, as it summarizes different promises, aims, and oppositions that are found in the Indian legislation.

In the first paragraph, integration in the national development under the equal conditions and with respect for the Indian's cultural autonomy, is promised:
"La política indigenista del estado colombiano se orienta a enseñar a las comunidades indígenas las técnicas avanzadas de explotación económica, y posibilitar su integración al desarrollo nacional en igualdad de condiciones, con respecto de su autonomía cultural." (art 1). 4

Already in the 3rd article they contradict themselves though, by handing over the responsibility for the education of the Indians to the ministry of the interior, i.e. without influence from the ministry of education or the Indians, although respect for the cultural autonomy is settled in the last article.

The legislation consequently contains contradictions mainly on two levels. In the first place we find the opposition between the Indian population's obvious needs and expressed demands and the paternalistic starting-point of the legislation, which mainly serve short-term economic interests or maybe more correctly, is dependent on economic decisions made out of reach for the indigenous peasant. In the second place we have the contradictions within the legislation itself, which make the paragraphs cancel each other and in that way eliminate the applicability of the law. A space is thus created where the indigenous population can defend their interests, but at the same time the base for accomplishment is withdrawn by giving its enemies, e.g. the landowners, the agents, the traders, and the industry magnates, free hands and the market forces free scope.

In a public correspondence between Unidad Indígena's editor, Trino Morales, and the Director of DAI, Julian N Hernandez, CRIC emphasizes the fact that the Government's involvement in the affairs of the Indian communities cannot be judged by the civil servants' good or bad intentions or by the purposes that the Government institutions is said to strive for, but that they must look at the consequences of the Government's work, a practice that actually in many cases is in contrast to the pronounced motives and aims (CRIC NO 18:1977, p 3).

With decree 659:1974 DAI gets the name Division de Integracion Indígena.

The proposition to law 49:1979 is the most recent juridical attempt to solve the problems related to the indigenous population. This is another attempt to regulate the lives of the aboriginal population without consulting the indigenous councils or the organizations representing this population.
This law creates the Administrative Department of Comunal Development and Indigenous Affairs, Departamento Administrativo de Desarrollo de la Comunidad y Asuntos Indígenas. Consequently it combines two very different aspects of social reality and development in Colombia, namely the Comunal Action Program and the Indian Policy. It is a combination which the indigenous population consistently condemn. As participants in a historical, social, and economic process, and as bearers of a great variety of cultural traits and expressions, they consider the Indian question far too complicated to be dismissed as a communal development problem. This government directed community organization has furthermore come to functions as an administrative body of political co-option and corruption (compare Erlick 1980, p 34).

In a letter to President Turbay on July 30th, 1979 (Comité de Solidaridad 1979, p 53), representatives for several indigenous communities in Colombia claimed that every item referring to the indigenous population shall be removed from the legislative text and that the problems and needs of these people should be studied and investigated further.

Also, they considered it necessary to revise and evaluate the functions of different government institutions working with these problems in order to make it possible to formulate a policy concretely beneficial for the indigenous communities. They are of the opinion that if their problems are placed on the level of communal action matters, this then implicates the negation of their existence as cultural groupings, with some values and needs different from the national society in general (see also CRIC correspondence with DAI in CRIC 38: 1979, p 3).

Another source of discontent with this law is the fact that it does not give any concrete tools to the indigenous to defend and promote their own interest. It is true that they enjoy the so-called special protection of the state, which is responsible for furthering the preservation of their culture, as well as the development of their communities, giving the material resources for their individual and collective well-being (art 7). They are also given the legal right to preserve and practise their own dialects, as well as their religions
An interesting question in this respect is if every individual in Colombia needs the acknowledgement by the government to speak his own language. Despite these general aspects of basic human rights, there is nothing in the law which gives the indigenous organizations a platform from where they can exercise their land claims.

On the contrary, this law maintains the guardianship of the state over the Indians (art 10). Every contract concerning land has to be approved by the government and in article 11, concerning the Indian territorial reserves, the indigenous communities only have the status of presumed owners. Furthermore, the state through this legislative act reserves for itself a so-called special rule, régimen especial, regarding most matters of juridical, administrative, and fiscal kind in the indigenous communities. The government only has the authority to allow, suspend or prohibit individuals, organizations, associations, etc to develop activities related to the indigenous population (art 3). In other words, in this law the government is legalizing their total control over the indigenous communities and their resguardos. At the same time as the government offers their special protection of the Indians, with guarantees concerning their cultural survival, the state, thorough the Administrative Department mentioned above, is the authority to certify the existence of every community, as well as recognizing its status as juridical person. Accordingly, each Indian group would have to apply for these "incorporation papers" as any club or organization, and could easily be denied existence legally for vague political reasons. In the same way the indigenous community would have to ask for permission by the Communal Action regional leader to be able to join any economic or political organization on the national or international level (Erlick 1980, p 34). In that way the government decides the conditions for how the indigenous population is supposed to exert influence towards the national authority, but also has the power to certify the body of traditional authority inside the indigenous community, representing its population. A rather serious contradiction (art 9, 12).

Accordingly, from the indigenous point of view there is nothing in this legislative proposition which support their work for better living conditions. Rather, they regard this law as another attempt for their enemies to extinguish them as Indians. Law No 89:1890 at least gives a little protection to their land and is therefore a significant legal juridical instrument for them to use in their efforts to have land restituted (CRIC No 43:1980, p 3).
To sum up, we can thus notice the following. The exertions for division and disintegration of the resguardos has been a common feature of the national policy towards the indigenous population the whole time from the first years of independence. The resguardos in the southern part of Colombia were less affected by these activities. In Cauca 28 resguardos were dissolved during the 20th century until 1960. Many of these are today trying to reestablish their rights and claim their recognition as Indigenous communities (Jimeno/Triana 1978, p 67).

Isolated attempts to protect the Indian appear in the legislation, but are expressed in very general terms and are without major importance in practice. Especially after 1960 the state has increased its interference in indigenous affairs with articulated respect towards the distinctive cultural features of the Indian. These clauses have, however, not prevented the negative economic integration of the Indian and the consolidation of their political and cultural subordination within the Colombian nation.

"...lo que predomina no es la política especializada (reservas, créditos a resguardos, servicios especiales, etc) sino que ésta se supedita a las actividades y programas indiferenciados que obligan al indígena a someterse a ellos, sin tener en cuenta para nada sus características y reivindicaciones. Obsérvese los diversos programas de crédito, asistencia técnica, escolaridad, salud, fomento agropecuario, organización communal, etc, etc, para no mencionar el desfase evidente entre leyes protecciónistas y la aplicación permanente de la legislación penal, civil, etc, a los indígenas." (Jimeno/Triana 1978, p 69).

The Indian legislation has consequently promoted neither increased resources for the Indian to influence governmental decisions through active participation, nor his receptive participation in the outcome of the general socio-economic progress of Colombia.

"We don't want a law of control,... We want basic means for survival. If we have rights as human beings, why are we kept illiterate? If there are human rights, why don't they give us land? If a father gives to only one or two of his children, the others scream, don't they?"
The Indian Law is aimed at ridiculing us." (Gregorio Palechor, Board member of CRIC as cited by Erlick 1980 p 34. See also CRIC view on justice in Colombia in Cric 43:1980, p 11).

9.2 Indian Affairs in the Ministry of Interior

Thus, the official idea of the Colombian Government is that the economical and cultural integration of the indigenous population in the modern society is a desirable and indispensable process, and that the Government and the nation will do everything that is in their power to carry this integration to an end; with a minimum of tensions for the members in these cultures and with a maximum of respect for their traditions and patterns of life. Furthermore, the Government strives to preserve the fundamental cultural patterns of the Indians and to make the incorporation of these societies into national life to a conscious and planned process. (Daza Daza 1973, p 222).

A number of different institutions and organizations are involved in this process. Some of them are public, but there are also many religious and private organizations that declare a special interest in the Indian's well-being and therefore perform different kinds of programmes in indigenous areas (see Berglund 1978). Here I will, however, only deal with the most important entities of the Ministry of Interior in this case which are to be found in the Dirección General de Integración y Desarrollo de la Comunidad (Department of Communal Integration and Development). On the one hand, there is the Indian bureau, DAI, and on the other, the Communal Action Programme.

9.2.1 DAI

The Indian bureau, DAI (División Operativa de Asuntos Indígenas) executes the Government programme for the integration of the indigenous population and coordinates different contributions of private and public character on local and regional levels. The policy of the Government is formulated in the so-called Plan Nacional Indigenista and DAI shall execute the programme through twelve regional commissions (Cordoba/Ortiz 1974, p 47).
As we have seen in the outline of the legislation, DAI is requested not only to confine themselves to different aspects of cultural integration and development, but also to take an interest in the protection of the people, their land, and well-being. Furthermore, in their opinion the only way to carry out most of the formulated programmes is through collaboration with independent institutions on jointly agreed measures and above all in agreement with the Indian communities themselves.

The Indian policy, consequently, is meant to promote the popular participation, and the methods and aims of communal development are considered to be the means to accelerate the cultural integration and to attain suitable relations between the indigenous population and other citizens in society (op cit, p 48).

In the laws we can also see that DAI controls most of the dealings with the Indian population. Not only concerning the general coordination of public and private actions of integration, for example, education, medical care, credits, land, and infra-structure, but also the activities within the indigenous groups themselves. Formally seen DAI thus constitutes the claw of national paternalism. In reality DAI's influence, however, is not that thorough, and for better or for worse you can say that DAI is unable to function very well. Stephen Corry (1976, p 6) reports that it is only the office in Sierra Nevada de Santa Maria that has had any activity with apparent consequences and these consequences are above all a study of embezzlement, sabotage, and intrigues. The Arhuaco Indians who live in this area have apparently received nothing positive from DAI's work, but a deeper consciousness of the necessity and starting-points of a united struggle (see Bonilla 1973, p 84; Elsass 1977, p 103 ff; Corry 1976, p 33).

CRIC indicates several occasions when DAI in its activities only has promoted the interests of the large landowners and, among other things, contributed to the division of resguardos and a continued loss of land to white immigrants (see Corry 1976, p 54; CRIC's conclusions from the 4th congress in 1975 in Antropologia vol IV, No 14/1975, p 130).

One of the flagships in the activities performed by DAI has been the creation of educational centres, Centros de Capacitación. The starting point for these centres was the idea nourished by the authorities that the low level of education
among the Indians obstructed their development and their possibilities to participate in the national life on equal terms with Colombians in general.

"Es necesario, pues, capacitar a los indígenas para que puedan actuar con éxito en sus relaciones con la sociedad nacional y con su propio medio, para que logren mejorar sus condiciones de vida, considerando su propia organización socio-económica y cultural." (Cordoba/Ortiz 1974, p 48)

Therefore, what the authorities want to do is to raise the level of education of the indigenous population technically, administratively and commercially in order to promote their integration into national life and with the aim of their being able to "...work for their improvement and integration" (op cit, p 49). This unfortunately never reached the Indians who unceasingly wonder why there are no schools for their children. They are at the same time, however, conscious of the school as being an authoritative form of acculturation.

The education of, among others, entrepreneurs and opinion leaders from the communities in question was mentioned, as instruments in this directed process of change. The government hoped these would induce effect, and direct different innovations to their communities. Furthermore, they wanted to start courses in agricultural techniques, health care, administration, economy, small industry, etc (Daza Daza 1973, p 223).

This project, however, has failed and in several regions the houses have stood empty for long periods of time and one can not really perceive any consolidation of these capacitación centres in the Indian communities. In Mitú in the Vaupés district the Indian organization CRIVA has though, after persistent pressure, been given the use of the building for a radio station of their own. As in Siminorua, in the land of Arhuacos, where they started a cooperative shop, these initiatives of the Indians themselves are, however, looked upon with disapproval by the authorities.

Thus, there are many contradictions between fundamental aims, the starting points for the strategy of integration, and its practical accomplishment. The paternalistic approach dominates
on all levels. The participation of the indigenous population is not promoted on any level of decision making.

9.3 Communal Action

The Communal Action Program was initiated in 1958 with law 19, articles 23, 24 and Decree 1761: 1959, legalizing local initiatives to provide their own communal public service. With this program the authorities gave their approval to cooperative activities between neighbours to provide for basic needs concerning, for example, health centers, schools, infrastructure, recreation, and cultural activities.

"Organizan la Acción Communal como una 'cooperación' de vecinos de cada Municipio, cooperación que tiene bajo este régimen precisos objetivos proyectados a realizar obras de infraestructura y fomento de actividades económicas, culturales y de recreación. Además se prevé que los Consejos Municipales, las Asambleas y el Gobierno Nacional puedan dar a las Juntas de Acción Communal el control y vigilancia de servicios públicos o cierta intervención en el manejo de los mismos." (Ministerio de Gobierno, 1:1973, p 8). 7

Everything must be done though in accordance with the norms and ideas of the communal, municipal, and provincial authorities.

"...que se organizen de acuerdo con las normas que expidan los respectivos Consejos, y a otras entidades locales, funciones de control y vigilancia..." (Law 19: 1958, art 22). 8

In a speech at the Communal Action 2nd National Congress, President Pastrana stated that after the first 12 years there were 17 000 Communal Action Committees, gathering 4 million Colombian compatriots, who had dedicated their lives to changing the Colombian fate (Min de Gobierno 1973, p 72). But have these committees really had any influence on the decisions governing their lives? Among other functions the committees were supposed to:

"Organizar los diferentes sectores de la comunidad para que tomen conciencia de sus derechos, deberes y recursos, la manera de satisfacer sus aspiraciones de mejoramiento y resolver sus necesidades." (Ministerio de Gobierno, op cit, p 9) 9)
The policy of the Communal Action program was supposed to unite and utilize the social energy of the popular organization, to incorporate the marginal masses in the economic development and, to make them participate in the decisions concerning them. Through the capacitation and education of the main resource and the fundamental base of the community development program, the human being, the problem was expected to be solved.

"El cambio social no es el cambio de los hombres, es el cambio de las actitudes, del escenario en el cual nos movemos o nos queremos mover para realizarnos. El verdadero cambio social está en el cambio de las estructuras mentales por medio de una adecuada capacitación." (op cit, p 55) 10

"... que la organización popular en el país es el instrumento más eficaz para lograr el desarrollo integral del hombro colombiano, a través de una constante, reflexiva, pacífica y firme acción que violente las estructuras económicas y sociales cuando quiera que ellas contribuyan a mantener las desigualdades existentes." (op cit, p 11) 11

In twenty years the Communal Action Program should have come somewhere, but the effects are very scanty. Why? As in the case of the Agrarian Reform there are of course a great variety of interrelated causes of economic, technical, and administrative character, but principally one must question whether the Communal Action Programme was ever meant to be a driving force of popular mobilization. Maybe the program had to be effectuated to canalize the potential discontent and the extrainsitutional activities into controllable and less conflictive doings, thus corrupting the leaders.

"Action Comunal, a government directed community organization that has largely degenerated into community funnels for vote-buying and political clientelismo." (Erlick 1978, p 34).

In itself the leadership embodied in the Communal Action Committees is usually just the prolongation of the traditional authority pyramid, but, nevertheless, also Havens/Flinn (1970, p 103) consider the representativity of these members as well as the democracy of the decision making, to be highly limited.
Sometimes the inherent contradiction and the true function of the official participation programme can be discerned, as in this passage from the formulated objectives of the Cali-conference 8-9 December, 1971 (Ministerio de Gobierno, op cit p 70).

"Que estamos convencidos que con el fortalecimiento que se le dé a la Acción Comunal los enemigos del sistema no tendrán oportunidad de causar dano que desean en contra de las instituciones democráticas de Colombia." 12)

The ambiguity can also be traced when comparing this quotation with the one below from the first Communal Action congress in Bogota 1970 (op cit, p 11):

"...crear las facilidades técnicas y operativas indispensables para prestar un más eficaz apoyo al movimiento y, finalmente, idear los causas legales tendientes a perfeccionar y obtener una más efectiva, participación de las Juntas de Acción Comunal en los centros de decisiones." 13)

The Communal Action Programme seems to be an answer to popular discontent and unrest in Colombia made up of those accessible instruments that can possibly be supplied inside the framework of liberal ideological tradition to eliminate this kind of threat against status quo, without using direct violence. Structural changes should implicate ruptures in the present social order with possible openings for revolutionary sprouts. Participation programmes inside a given structural space, with the conditions formulated and controlled by those in power aim at eliminating such forces. That is also why the authorities are so anxious to transform the indigenous question to a communal development affair, as formulated in the proposition to law 49:1979.

Hence we are confronting a paradox concerning the significance of communal participation, especially when initiated from above. Namely that this participation may serve to legitimate and bolster repressive regimes and indirectly support the continued inequitable distribution of public goods.
"Communal participation, by helping alleviate some of the more acute manifestations of poverty for individuals and increasing economic development independently of the state, may by these very acts help perpetuate regimes responsible for the gross inequities between rich and poor in Latin America. (Booth/Seligson 1979, p 7)

9.4 The Politics of Economic Integration

Many different institutions - such as INCORA fostering agrarian reform, ICA giving technical assistance, INDERENA working for the protection and development of natural resources, CECORA supporting cooperative establishments, and Caja Agraria (the agricultural bank) giving credits - participate in the process of rural development in Cauca. The efforts aim at increasing the income of the rural population and their standard of living on the one hand, and stimulating national economic growth on the other. The strategy of integrating so-called traditional sectors into the modern commodity-producing market economy has as discussed in section 2.3 its roots in the assumption that marginal indigenous economies are undeveloped because of their relative isolation from the industrialized sector, that the indigenous way is not compatible with growth and that the deprivation of the poor indigenous peasants can be economically developed out of existence.

The success of integration is, however, not very comprehensive especially not regarding the living-conditions of the poor peasants and the rural workers. As in the case of the green revolution (see for example: Burbach/Flynn 1980; Tuckman 1976; Jacoby 1978/79; De Vylder 1979; Byres 1980; Feder 1978/77) the increase of production can be considerable, but it is above all the capitalistic farms, the haciendas or the emerging agribusiness firms that benefit from the resources offered by different rural development programs.

One of the more important causes behind this state of being seems to be the lack of coordination between different government institutions and their formal tasks, as well as the desired and contemplated effects of the applied strategies within and between the levels of production, distribution, and consumption.

Hence, there is no balance between increased productivity and the regulating measures to accomplish that eventual increments
of income, constituting incitaments for a self-generating development, are truly assimilated by the rural poor. Instead, this capital leaks out again through different channels to those possessing the assets of extractive power, among others, the brokers. Furthermore, the real income of the poor peasants and the rural labour force will continuously fall with the increasing prices on industrial products, along with the price-cycles of international trade, irrespectively of eventual nominal increases of income. (The relations between international and local markets are discussed by among others: Amin 1977; Frank 1969; Burbach/Flynn 1980; Feder 1977).

There seems, accordingly, to prevail a discrepancy between, on the one hand, national economic interests and policy - that strive primarily for fast economic growth and an increasing exports income, which is considered to more or less automatically benefit peasants, as well as urban and rural workers - and on the other hand, the need for a strategy of socio-economic development based on the existent social, political, and cultural conditions of the actual region; for example, the fact that most producers in the Eastern Region are poor peasants that primarily have been and still are food producers for subsistence and the local market, and that the existing landownings structure does not offer the conditions needed for an overall development.

Leaving more global reasons for the impoverishment of the indigenous population in Cauca out of consideration, let us conclude the impeding factors of public activeness as follows:

Physically - Geographically, considering mainly the extremely rugged terrain, long distances, lack of roads, and communications.

Economically, because of the lack of resources, which are at the disposal of the government institutions, as well as the rural poor, while the cost of necessary inputs continually increases.

Culturally, because many of the economic experts and technical advisers travelling in the countryside lack fundamental knowledge about the values, traditions, and languages of the indigenous peasants. Instead extensive prejudice exist, regarding the Indian's presumed resistance to change and his assumed preference for the bottle. Moreover, the consciousness and knowledge about the composition of social, economic, and cultural problems and their causes is very limited. Concerning the indigenous popula-
tion we have to consider the extensive analfabetism as a limiting factor for progress, but far from determining, if we study, for example, the activities of CRIC which manifest considerable success, in spite of the many Indians that cannot read or write. Furthermore there exists, of course, both religious and political groupings that impede cooperation and constructive interaction in communal projects. The well-founded mistrust among the indigenous poor towards the white intruders after generations of oppression, is also worth mentioning.

Institutionally, there is a lack of resources, as well as of knowledge about the social, cultural, and political conditions in the areas where development programmes are applied. The coordination between institutions, tasks, functions, and resources is very poor and the institutions involved are not free from corruption and uninterest, which heavily restrains good intentions, which also exists (SETPA 1979 b, p 64 ff).

9.4.1 The Agrarian Reform

The Agrarian Reform is one of the most debated instruments in the battery of rural development strategies. Above all, the agrarian reform is an answer to the demands of capitalism in agriculture for measures to increase the effectiveness of production. Mechanization, access to credits, and general modernization are the main economic ingredients in the technical-reformist types of agrarian reform (see Berglund 1977, p 131), together with attempts to break the dominance of the traditional latifundiosystem through certain redistribution of land. Hence, agrarian reform has come to serve as an instrument to integrate precapitalistic sectors into the modern commodity-producing economy, by adapting the relations of production to the demands of the central national economy as conceived by the industrial and commercial elite and the transnational firms.

The claim for agrarian reform expressed by the bourgeois in Latin America during the sixties thus coincided to a great extent with the demands pushed forward by the left regarding redistribution of land and power in the countryside, which facilitated the accomplishment of certain structural changes in some Latin American countries. But the agrarian reform has also served as a political instrument for the ruling elite to encounter popular discontent and unrest. Among other things it has served as a strategic concession to eliminate the stimulating effects of the Cuban revolution on the Latin American pea-
sancty. On the other hand, however, the agrarian reform can also bring such far-reaching structural changes that the ruptures in the rural power structure gives space to revolutionary initiatives. In Chile we could study how the agrarian reform process in 1967-73, together with progressive reforms in labour legislation, lifted the lid of the pot boiling with human energy.

Consequently, agrarian reform to the ruling classes in Latin America is—or maybe more correctly was, as it has lost importance—a critical balance between the economic needs of capitalism and the scope of possible political consequences in the shape of militant peasant movements.

In Colombia the Agrarian Reform Institute, INCORA, was created by the law 135:1961 (art 2), the juridical instrument of which was later completed by the laws 1:1968 and 45:1973. The tasks of INCORA were:

- To reform the socio-agrarian structure by trying to prevent the exaggerated concentration of land and the division of land into uneconomic units; to reconstruct adequate units where to plots are too small (minifundios); and to redistribute land to those who do not have any, above all, to those who intend to cultivate the land themselves.

- To promote, in accordance with rational programmes, suitable cultivation of land that has not been used correctly.

- To increase the volume of the agricultural production in harmony with the development of other sectors in the economy, via applicable techniques and the correct use of different types of land.

- To create conditions under which poor peasants and sharecroppers can get better guarantees and together with agricultural workers get access to land.

- To raise the standard of living of the population in the countryside as a result of the means mentioned above, as well as the coordination and the development of service in the form of credits, housing, marketing organizations, health services and social security, storage, and the establishing of cooperatives.

- To preserve, protect, improve, and use the natural resources correctly.
To promote, support, and coordinate organizations, the aim of which is to improve economic, social, and cultural conditions in the countryside.

The effects of the land reform so far though do not seem to really have been very beneficial except to a minority of wealthy landowners that have been able to canalize the economic and technical resources to themselves and to already well-to-do farmers. The coefficients for the concentration of land has shown a variation of 0.024, which means that the activities of INCORA, concerning structural change in the countryside have been almost non-existent (Tamayo Betancur 1971, p 165; see DANE 1975, p 25-28). What has really happened is that the system of large estates actually has consolidated its position, while poverty in general has deepened among the masses in the countryside. The unequal distribution of land has even extended to new settlement regions. The majority of all titles granted by INCORA, 95.9 % in 1961-69, are given to colonizers, and a fair conclusion from available data for 1968 is that a few get much while the many get a little. Sixty-four applicants were granted holdings of 200 hectares and more, while 7 037 applicants received less than 10 hectares each (Festehehausen 1971, p 169, 173).

Another interesting estimation is made by Oscar Delgado (cited by Roa Suarez, 1973, p 156), who states that with this rhythm of granting titles, 600 per year, it will take at least 300 years before the 1 800 000 peasants who need land to be able to survive on it would be satisfied.

The number of small holdings with less than 5 hectares have decreased with 7.4 % (756 606 - 700 225) during the period of 1960 to 1970/71 and the area with 0.5 % from 1 238 976 - 1 145 795 hectares.

The number of large estates with between 500 and 1 000 hectares have increased with 19 % and the area with 18.3 %. The estates of more than 2 500 hectares have increased from 786 to 1 104 (40.5 %) and the area from 5 513 000 - 6 030 868 hectares (9.4 %) (DANE 1975).

The redistributive and social aspects of the land reform have thus been effectively eliminated by the powers that have seen the capitalistic development in the countryside as their main purpose. In law 4:1973 these priorities are also institutionalized to a large extent (see Vallejo Mejía 1974:IV).
The same goes for law 5:1973 where the importance of capitalizing the agricultural sector is definitely stressed and also "...the rational use of the human potential within the rural sector" (art 1:3).

This change in the way things are seen coincides logically with the extended penetration of the capitalistic enterprising in the Colombian countryside.

The agrarian reform as an instrument to foster growth through the reorganizing of traditional forms of production has lost its economic function. Rather the main need today is access to the cheapest possible wage labour to make possible competition on the world market. Therefore, both to the direct landowners, the new agro-bourgeoisie, the state, and the multi-national agribusiness firms, the maintenance of subsistence holdings, i.e. the access to semiproletarian labour is more functional than the redivision of land, which would only undermine the development of the productive forces, as for example, the division of labour (Petras 1978, p 139). Besides these economic reasons there are naturally also political ones as, for example, the fact that structural changes of landowning also affects the distribution of power, which indirectly might threaten status quo.

National integration in this context becomes a purely technical and economic concept through which the human potential in the countryside is regarded as any productive resource which can be invested in the process of capitalistic development, without considering the need for a conscious economic and political participation of these people. Rather they have been excluded from planning, decision making, and management which apparently, in combination with the advanced and expensive technology which was introduced in the projects, have had severe negative effects on the result within the reformed units. The heavy dependency which was created between agency functionaries and the beneficiaries made the farmers perceive themselves more as employed workers than landowners (Galli 1978, p 77).

In spite of the limited effects of the Agrarian Reform on the structural conditions in the Colombian countryside, INCORA has been a crucial institution to the indigenous peasants. INCORA has administrated their land claims and issued the titles to restituted areas. INCORA has also been the authority behind the empresas comunitarias (community enterprises introduced
1969, see p 131) and the release of credits as well as the technical assistance to these enterprises. The involvement of INCORA in the management of these collective units has, however, given rise to a principal conflict between the agency and the Indian communities concerned. The indigenous peasants that have succeeded in taking back land do not generally accept to become the intended cogs in the capitalistic development of the countryside on the conditions imposed on them from above. They need credits and technical assistance to be successful in their efforts to meet the consumption needs of the community, but they refuse to submit to the conditions set by INCORA and Caja Agraria.

Granted credits are as a rule connected to different conditions that tie the Indian community to the planned changes, which are directed from above, in the matter of what to cultivate, how to cultivate, how to provide capital for it, how to commercialize the products, etc. It is then difficult for the Indians to get credits without pledging their independence and self-esteem, nor is there any guarantee for maintained security. If they cannot fulfill their duties towards the credit institute in question, they run the risk to have to pay back with their land (CRIC:s conclusions from the 4th Congress in Antropologia 1975, p 129; Arhuaco document to the ANUC Congress 1974, in Corry, p 49).

In their conclusions from the 4th congress, CRIC even warns for different economic institutions which, they say, usually are initiated by the Government to dominate and shatter the Indian community.

The warning is still there in the conclusion from their 5th congress in March 1978, where they state that the dependence on credits is very dangerous as it might transform into another method for expelling the Indian from his land (CRIC No 29: 1978, p 8).

When comparing the hesitance of CRIC towards the INCORA authority and control with recent evaluations of the outcome of its policy, it is possible to detect that the suspiciousness of CRIC corresponds fairly well with reality. Especially the indebtedness due to rapid capitalization seems to be a problem. Concerning the collective farming strategy through the constitution of empresas comunitarias which were introduced to meet the problem of the small project farms that could not bear the costs of the new technology, Galli (1978, p 79) summarizes:
"The cost structure of the collective farms - both in terms of land and modern technology - has meant indebtedness to INCORA for the collective farmers. In this respect the state has become a substitute for the private landlord. The empresa farmers still did not own their land, nor did they control the productive process, strictly managed by INCORA. Members of the collective received an anticipo (a kind of salary) and a share in the profits of common production: they are, in effect, state workers."

9.4.2 Credit

I have already touched upon the credit problems in the section about the middlemen. The indigenous peasant's has a need of credits because of his unequivocal, involuntary, and unprofitable integration in the national market economy.

Subsistence production, and traditional exchange of goods and labour exists side by side with the hiring and selling of labour for wages and the production of goods for the market. Thus, it is possible to trace the penetration process of capitalism, even if there is not an unambiguous pattern. Precapitalistic forms prevail, though mixed with capitalistic elements, and the poor indigenous peasant participates in the capitalistic sector of the national economy, both as a direct producer of food and as a wage worker. The coexistence of capitalistic and precapitalistic models of production is also manifest in the functioning of the community enterprises in connection to adjacent resguardos.

The production aims primarily at fulfilling the immediate needs for subsistence. Each family has its own plot for personal horticulture, along with the collective cultivation of the common land from which then have equal rights to the produce as members of the enterprise. They grow mainly staple crops and/or herd cattle for the market, but provide first of all for the participating families. But this communal unit of production is also a commercial enterprise with the associates remunerated in cash and with the possibility to hire labour if such should be needed in times of excess work at the enterprise (Estatuto Juridico de las empresas comunitarias, decreto 2073 de 1973, as cited in Londono 1979, p 66). The salary which is withdrawn from the income of the empresa is comparatively low in relation to what low-paid agricultural workers receive in general, sel-
dom more than 60 pesos a day, as most of the resources have to be desposited for investments as well as amortization payments and interests. In spite of their consciousness concerning the obvious risks with credits they are generally tied to at least some loans which they are forced to apply for, to make the empresa work at all. Therefore they are also forced to produce for the market to obtain cash to pay the interest. As far as possible, CRIC avoids though to accomplish in practice all the other commitments to INCORA/Caja Agraria (see p133) which mostly follow with the credits granted. This deviation from the rules imposed from above leads, of course, to conflicts which limit the possibilities for further loans. This is also one of the reasons for the continous aspiration of CRIC to foster the independence of the empresas. The formation of a central cooperative is one step towards this liberation from capitalistic coercion. Still they can not totally escape the dependency upon those controlling the manufacturing and distribution of farm inputs nor the powers controlling the stages of processing and marketing who "...can extract the surplus without the risks of weather or the problems of labour or politics at the point of production" (Petras 1978, p 139).

As the Indians of the empresa comunitaria have access to land, credits might have positive effects though as initial investments, despite the high interests. For the individual poor peasants, however, on his private plot, usufructuary or not, the possibilities to utilize credits as an investment for progress are highly limited. His loans are generally the last resort for survival in times of crisis, for example, just before the harvest. Or they constitute small scale aspirations, optimistic efforts to reach for the level of "take off". In both cases the brokers are those who benefit the most from these exertions.

As already discussed, the indigenous peasant seems to prefer private loans. They are easier to obtain and he does not consciously suffer from the interest. To a large extent, the Indian is forced to search for private loans as the authorities formally do not grant credits to the agriculturalist that do not possess a private title of the land. Usufructuary cultivators consequently have to accept the conditions of private credits whether they like or not. It is very difficult to obtain information about the proportions of private credits compared to official ones. There are simply no clear-cut figures that are worthwhile to account for (compare Londono 1979, p 66 and DANE 1978, p 138 ff).
The agricultural bank, Caja Agraria, is the most important official creditor. Except for the credits financed by this bank itself for agriculture, it administers financial agreements with the secretariat of Agriculture and CVC for investments in cultivation, INCORA for stockraising and land purchase, INDERENA for afforestation, SENA for cooperative projects and DRI for the development program for small and middle-sized farmers (SEPTA 1979 b, p 76).

The biggest problem with these official credits to the Indians is all the bureaucracy before the handling of the matter is completed and the interest, of course, that seldom falls below 18%. Furthermore, it takes time to get an answer, often more than four months. Still, it is far from certain that the applicant is granted the loan. In 1978 only 2.4% of the 800 000 pesos that were programmed for the Eastern Region was granted (SEPTA 1979 b, p 77).

The Integrated Rural Development Program, DRI, aims at supporting the smaller producers. The conditions are, however, not much more favourable that those of conventional loans. There are examples of smaller credits to poor peasants that carry interests at 14%, but otherwise the interest rate is at the level of 16-22%. To the indigenous peasant, DRI and Caja Agraria represent more or less the same and they do not have fair access to either one of the these resources. Another important factor in this context is the limited time for repayment. Sometimes the credit is valid for not more than one year, occasionally less, and the cultivator hardly has time to invest in his sowing before he has to start paying back again, after harvest. There is not enough time for his increasing income to accumulate enough to even exceed the costs for the loan. That is also why CRIC exhorts to abstinence regarding external loans and that they as far as possible must try to solve the credit problems within their own economic organizations (CRIC 1979).

The purpose of the DRI program is, however, not to separate the beneficiaries from their land, but to tie them to continued peasant farming by supporting them through credits to increase their production of cheap staple-foods for the local and regional markets, as also understood by Galli (1978, p 85):

"DRI symbolized the inaccessibility to poor farmers of the one factor of production that could have made a difference, that could make the extra investment in technology economically rational, that could signify the chance to change their status: LAND."
As far as I am concerned, the DRI program seems only to have come to fulfill a retardation function regarding the process of proletarization towards subemployment and poverty.

9.4.3 Technical Assistance

The indigenous technology mainly derive its origin from precolonial times, it is adapted to the hilly environment, it uses slash and burn cultivation and access to enough land for fallow fields and rotation of crops. (For a survey of traditional agriculture see Hernandez de Alba 1946 and SETPA 1979 b). Traditional tools and techniques of cultivation can still be functional, but the gradual loss of land in quantity as well as in quality, and the reduced productivity of the soil available, respectively, however, makes it everyday more difficult for the poor Indian peasant to provide for his family in step with the increasing need to industrial commodities and increasing prices of these goods (See Cortes 1980, p 4). Of course, modern technology and productive means can not solve the problem why struggle for the land has become the most basic step towards a change of the conditions obstructing the possibilities to progress. However, new technology is still needed, though well adapted and functional. This is not necessarily the case with innovations brought from the industrial countries, as their origin does not correspond with the conditions of the rural environment in Cauca. The search for a synthesis of traditional experience and knowledge, and modern technology would be desirable. Unfortunately though, the rural poor lack the resources in either case to realize even elementary changes.

The institutions that provide technical and productive aid in Cauca are, as mentioned above, ICA, SENA, INCORA, CVC, INDERENA, and the Secretariat of Agriculture. Their contributions are generally linked to projects financed by credits from Caja Agraria and, consequently, subject to the general scheme of economic growth and capitalistic national development. Loans are as a rule only granted under the condition that at least one of the above mentioned organs has approved and continuously supervises the actual project applied for (SEPTA 1979 b, p 69). This is a typical patron-ship or paternalism that the empresas comunitarias not want to submit to. They are open to technical and administrative assistance and aid, but not to directives from above. They wish to run the enterprises according to their traditional qualifications as Indians and they mean that the interference by the government shivers and sa-
botages their economic and cultural reindivication (resurrection). They do not want to become state-employed labour, which only would signify that their present economic exploitation changes its outward attribute and receives a nicer face.
10.1 The formation of CRIC

The late 1960's was a period of peasant mobilization in Colombia. Participation was to some extent even sanctioned from above, as in the case of Asociación Nacional de Usuarios Campesinos/ANUC which was formed by the Government in 1967 to facilitate the extension of rural development programs. (See Bagley/Botero 1978). Soon enough, however, this movement developed out of control of the authorities and became more militant than expected.

In the northern part of Cauca the Frente Social Agrario/FRESAGRO, was formed in 1970 - led by Gustavo Mejía who today is honoured as the founder of CRIC. He was murdered in the 1st of March 1974 in Corinto, and he is remembered on this date every year through a demonstration. In February 1971 FRESAGRO took the initiative to a big Indian meeting in Toribio at which about 2000 indigenous peasants were present. This meeting became in at natural way the first Indian Congress, CRIC was formed, and a preliminary sketch for a program was formulated. Then at a second congress in La Susana on the 6th of September in the same year, the 7-point program was established (CRIC 1973, p 28 ff):

- To regain the land of the resguardos (Recuperar las tierras de los resguardos).
- To enlarge the resguardos (Ampliar los resguardos).
- To strengthen the Cabildo (Fortalecer los Cabildos Indígenas).
- To cease payment of terraje-tenancy (No pagar terrajes).
- To make the Indian legislation known and to claim correct applications of the laws (Hacer conocer las leyes sobre indígenas y exigir su justa aplicación).
- To defend the history, the language, and the customs of the indigenous population (Defender la historia, la lengua y las costumbres indígenas).
- To form and train indigenous teachers for an education, in accordance with the present situation of the indigenous population, and in the own language. (Formar profesores indígenas para educar de acuerdo con la situación de los indígenas y en su respectiva lengua).

CRIC started to organize meetings all over the indigenous areas of CAUCA. Continously they gather the neighbourhoods of the communities in reuniones veredales to study and discuss local problems.
These experiences are then followed up by bigger assemblies to consolidate acquired knowledge; to foster the consciousness concerning the necessity, conditions, and aims of the Indian struggle. These meetings and the concrete actions such as land occupations and the forming of cooperative units in connection with the indigenous communities have come to be the most important tools in the formation process of indigenous resistance (CRIC 1978, p 17).

CRIC has concentrated itself on basic local discontent directed towards big landowners, brokers, the catholic church, and the authorities channeling spontaneous protests against land plunder, lack of schools and access to education, health care, communications, etc. The wealthy and powerful politician and landowner Victor Mosquera Chaux and the archebishop Monsenor Arce Vivas, the representative of the land possessions of the church, became concrete symbols for the economic, cultural, and ideological oppression of the indigenous population. By unmasking these power-holders and regaining land from them, CRIC also succeeded in eliminating some of the fear and respect of two of the pillars in the institutionalized repression, namely the political bullying and hell (CRIC 1978b, p 19).

After identifying the immediate and evident enemies it became possible to continue a little further and to learn how to recognize the main-enemy and by degree, with other oppressed non-indigenous sectors of the Colombian population, approach the lesson about the community of interest. A growing political consciousness manifested itself through among other things, the Indian participation in oppositional activities such as the general strike in September 1977; the forums for Human Rights implemented since 1978 and especially in 1979 in protest against the repressive politics carried out by President Turbay Aylas, (through, for example, the National Security Act).

"Mediante las mobilizaciones los indígenas experimentamos la sensación de respaldo de la masa, de 'nuestra gente', en momentos en que el proceso de descomposición nos tiene desperdigados. Comprendemos la posibilidad de poder triunfar sobre los enemigos. Incluso llegamos en algunos casos, a una posición triunfalista que la represión se encarga de moderar. La expresión de nuestra rebeldía frente a los enemigos y el empleo público de nuestra lengua contribuyene al rescate de una personalidad por mucho tiempo negada." (CRIC 1978b, p 19). 14)
The answer to this mobilization of the indigenous peasants has been two-folded. On the one hand, some of their demands are met by concession due to their determination, the underlying, sub-conceived legitimacy of their claims, and the fact that they do not threat vital capitalistic interests, but traditional pre-capitalistic oppressive structures; on the other hand, today they are also facing an increased, better organized repression against their organization. The resistance from the oppressed layers of the Colombian population against political and economic repression and increased impoverishment is displayed in, among other political activities, the escalated guerilla actions. As an indigenous peasant-workers' organization with a socialist signature, CRIC is by the government informally regarded as a part of the subversive forces or the forbidden opposition and consequently persecuted. These circumstances, of course, determine the working-methods of CRIC. To avoid any reasons whatsoever for the government to criminalize the organization, CRIC uses all the legal ways available, though apparently permanently balancing on the border of semi-legality.

"El deseo expresado por la clase dominante de acabar con nuestra organización a medida que nos desarrollamos hace necesario que tratemos de utilizar al máximo las condiciones legales evitando perderlas por la presentación de una imagen extremista, inflada o triunfalista que los enemigos son los primeros interesados en crear." (CRIC 1978b, p 21). 15

10.2 The Political Analysis of CRIC

The staring-point for CRIC in their political declaration is the pronounced ascertainment that the indigenous population are descendents of the first inhabitants of the American continent, that they still conserve important cultural elements of their identity, and that they intend to fight for their right to be Indians.

"...es perfectamente legítimo que en la nueva sociedad que queremos ayudar a construir contemos con un grado razonable de autonomía y plenas garantías para una vida llena y creativa en los económico, político y cultural." (CRIC 1978a, p 6). 16)
The second basic statement is that the indigenous populations as poor agriculturalists have a community of interest with the rest of the exploited, the non-indigenous, peasantry against the mutual enemies such as the big landowners, middlemen, pawn-brokers, moneylenders and other economic exploiters.

"Nuestros enemigos fundamentales, el imperialismo, la burguesía y los terratenientes, son pues los mismos que los de los demás explotados y oprimidos, y al lado de éstos tenemos que dar la lucha por la liberación nacional y la construcción de una sociedad socialista." (CRIC 1978a, p 7).

Consequently, they consider that their liberation and the freedom to keep their traditions and beliefs, their language, music, dances, and other cultural traits, is a utopia without a united anti-capitalistic struggle.

Accordingly, CRIC establishes that the pure racial struggle against the white man, does not further the indigenous matter. Thus CRIC means that even the colono, the poor white settler, can be considered as an allied under certain circumstances, despite the fact that these immigrants to a large extent are guilty of the shrinking Indian land-holdings (see CRIC 45:1980, p 6). At the resquardo of Puracé they summarize the situation as:

"...tiene que haber indígenas y tiene que haber colonos." 18)

This conscious political opening towards another exploited and oppressed sector in the margin of the Colombian society naturally makes the Indian movement even more irritating to the established authorities, since it eliminates a constructed and forced antagonism, in favour of a united fight against the principal enemy. The inter-ethnic gap is thus bridged politically. CRIC time after time emphasizes that not only Indians live in great indigence, but all the poor people. In this context they also blame the efforts of different authorities for splitting the united agricultural movement, by saying that the Indian struggle is directed against all those who are not Indians, while CRIC stresses that only the organizing and united struggle of all the oppressed people can give all Colombians equal rights (CRIC No 19:1977, p 5).
"Nuestra aspiración es contribuir al proceso de liberación del pueblo colombiano, luchando hombro a hombro con campesinos, obreros y demás explotados, de acuerdo con sus legítimas organizaciones de clase." (ANUC/CRIC 1974, p 3 ff). 19)

CRIC, however, also makes it clear that this does not signify that they can accept that political organizations or trade unions impose their organization or management on the indígenous population, which, for example, ANUC tried to do.

"Participamos al lado de los demás explotados y oprimidos en la lucha por una nueva sociedad ya que nuestros problemas no tienen solución dentro del sistema capitalista, pero al mismo tiempo buscamos desarrollar nuestras características propias, tanto en la actual etapa de lucha como en la construcción de la futura sociedad socialista." (CRIC 1978a, p 13). 20)

Nevertheless, CRIC stresses the great importance of a united front among the oppressed sectors of the Colombian people and a coordination of the activities of different political and revolutionary groups to a united position in the struggle against the principal enemies. The internal contradictions between different popular organizations must be subordinated to the main struggle.

"El sectarismo ha frenado por mucho tiempo el avance popular en nuestro país. Para comenzar a superarlo, tenemos que promover constantemente el acercamiento de las organizaciones populares, a nivel que ello sea posible, de unidad de acción, de alianzas tácticas o estratégicas, de fusión orgánica." (CRIC 1978a, p 29). 21)

10.3 The Organizational Structure of CRIC

The supreme power in CRIC is exercised by la junta directiva, a type of congress composed of two representatives from each cabildo. Presently, 32 of 48 cabildos support CRIC. The main reasons why some cabildos do not stand behind the work of CRIC is that they to a great extent are tied to either political authorities of the dominant society as, for example, liberal or conservative party-functionaries in power at some resguardos, or ecclesiastical personalities who similarly condemn the work of CRIC as being communistic and subversive. Sometimes hesitation
to participate in the indigenous movement also depends on well-founded fear of becoming a victim of the violence performed by henchmen of the landowners, the military, and the police. In some resguardos there are individuals in favor of the cabildo's participation in CRIC, but they do not possess enough authority within the resguardo to have their way. The whole thing depends very much on the will of the gobernador and the cabildo. Then there are also certain resguardos that to a great extent are divided into private properties and where the cabildo is no more than a symbolic remnant of administration, composed of progressive Indians (as conceived by Ortiz 1973 and criticized by Sevilla Casas 1978a).

The congress elects the comité ejecutivo, which has five members. To this assembly representatives from different regions are, however, often called in as additional members. Beneath the executive committee there is an intermediate level made up of the regional leaders who are responsible for the practices of CRIC in that area. Meetings are to be arranged in the different communities, CRIC's paper, Unidad Indígena, has to be distributed, and these leaders are expected to stimulate the communication between the households of the resguardo and the existing cooperative as well as the contacts between the different resguardos, the cooperatives and indigenous enterprises in the region.

10.3.1 The Office

CRIC keeps its office in a rented garage in Popayan. As a rule there is always someone here to deal with the administrative routines and to receive visiting Indians from different resguardos. At the office it is possible to get help with the framing of letters, applications, and complaints. Every now and then peasants come to discuss how to deal with the local landowner, their land claims, their own plans for seizing the land, and other economic problems. To the office one can also go to receive help with medicine or medical assistance. CRIC tries to find someone practicing medicine, a nurse or a doctor, who they know will help if they can. Concerning juridical aid, CRIC has no resources to pay such in step with the increasing need. They do, however, have contacts with benevolent lawyers that do a tremendous work. Generally, they are unfortunately always busy though with the handling of all the fates of arrested Indians. The office is also a center of information to which the activities in different regions are reported. Here the CRIC publications are also in stock. One can find every issue of Unidad Indígena and remaining
copies of different booklets about the history, the economic organizations, and the political platform of CRIC. Furthermore there is a booklet containing testimonies by arrested leaders called CRIC Denuncia (CRIC Denounce) and three publications aimed at waking up slumbering consciousness: Las Luchas de Ayer y de Hoy (The struggle yesterday and today), 1973, Como Nos Organizamos (How we organize) 1974, and Nuestra Lucha es tu Lucha (Our struggle is your struggle) 1974.

10.3.2 Indigenous Unity

Unidad Indígena is the name of the voice of CRIC which has come to be the mouthpiece of the collected indigenous movement in Colombia. The intention was to issue the paper monthly, which turned out to be impossible, especially during the last three years because of the repression which, among other forms of violence, has involved raids and vandalization of the office. Fifty-two issues have been published from 1975 to 1980-81. In Unidad Indígena the communities can make their voices heard and here experiences of the struggle, its examples of success and failure, are told and discussed. Except for this kind of information there are also articles about: the history, geography, and culture of Cauca and its resguardos; the work of the economic organizations of CRIC; national economy and politics; the struggle in urban areas and even news about the struggle of indigenous groups in other countries such as Chile or Guatemala or the reality of Nicaragua and Salvador. The editorials contain political analyses that every leftist group would benefit from studying. The whole paper has as a rule 16 pages.

10.3.3 Capacitation

Except for these publications and the continuously recurring gatherings in the neighbourhoods and regions, CRIC also organizes courses to diffuse the knowledge they need to achieve progress, but do not receive from the authorities. Healthcare (in which they try to obtain a functional integration between modern medicine and traditional), nutrition and practical economy are some examples; the courses in alfabetization are frequent, especially in connection with the emergence of the economic organizations of CRIC. They lack resources, however, to be able to realize all the educational activities that they know are needed. These educational efforts have in addition been curtailed during the last ten years in step with the increased repression, as many of the most prepared and well-educated leaders have been arrested.
away from the field in the jails, which has enforced a disallocation of available resources.

10.4 The Economic Resistance

To try to stop at least some of the leakages of resources from the Indian economy, CRIC tries to initiate different forms of communal economic organizations, through the revival and consolidation of traditional collective forms of communal cooperation. These efforts aim, on the one hand, at breaking the dependence of the individual Indian poor peasant on the brokers and, on the other hand, at raising the bargaining level of the indigenous producers in their interaction with the free market-mechanisms. These economic organizations are hence an important part of the total indigenous movement (see for example CRIC 13:1976, p 4).

There are mainly two types of communal economic organizations. First, those collective forms that are directly connected to the administration of regained land. To legalize these holdings of land, empresas comunitarias (communal enterprises) are established, thus attaining juridical person status in accordance with official directive. The founding of empresas comunitarias was introduced by the Colombian government in 1969 as an experiment within the scope of the agrarian reform, in search of a suitable form of production in the minifundio districts to foster capitalistic modernizations. These units did not become truly legalized until 1973 though through article 121 in law 4a, and they were then described as follows:

"Empresa comunitaria es la forma asociativa de producción agropecuaria por la cual los campesinos de escasos recursos estipulan aportar su trabajo, industria, servicios y otros bienes en común, con la finalidad primordial de explotar uno o más predios rústicos, industrializar y comercializar sus productos a bien de cumplir una de estas dos finalidades a más de la primera enumerada, para repartirse entre sí las ganancias o pérdidas que resultaren, en forma proporcional a sus aportes." 22)

In 1979 there were 73 empresas comunitarias in Cauca covering an area of 19 605 hectares, benefitting 759 families (Londono 1979, p 36). Of these, at least 22 were connected to CRIC (Cortes 1980, p 13; CRIC 1978b, p 25). In 1979 there were altogether 46 empresas and lotes comunitarios with 11 124 hectares according to Londono
To the Indians that among other ways, through occupations succeeded in regaining land, this organization of production became acceptable as it harmonized with their collective tradition, restoring, for example, the minga.

Further, in the cases when the land formally belong to a resguardo, CRIC tries to create *grupos de trabajo comunitario* (communal workgroups) for the purpose of raising impeding factors of *minifundismo* on production. These groups can also leasehold land or take care of land that individually or through the cabildo has been left in trust for collective administration.

Secondly there are the cooperatives found in most communities, embodied in the so called *tiendas comunales*, a type of communal stores with the most essential commodities that might be needed by the individual peasants, candles, batteries, makaroni, maizena, sugar, salt, soap, matches, etc. The store functions as the center of the cooperative within the community.

None of the tiendas, which number more than 50, had when they were formed any economic support from the government or the official advisory bureau of cooperativism. One of the problems was that these indigenous cooperatives lacked the juridical person status, they also refused to submit, and could therefore not apply for any credits. By degrees some have surrendered, to be able to finance their activities, but the general trend is still that cooperatives, as well as other communal production units, strive to develop and maintain their independence towards the authorities. Their most important aim is to strengthen the indigenous consciousness and the solidarity, economically and politically, in the struggle for structural change of the dominant economic and political system (CRIC 1979, p 11; see further CRIC No 22:1977, p 6; CRIC No 23:1977, p 8; CRIC No 47:1981, p 11).

"Se trata de que la economía esté al servicio de la lucha y de la Organización, que nos ayude a promover al cambio que todos estamos buscando y no se convierta en freno de nuestras demás actividades, en elemento de enriquecimiento individual y integración al mismo sistema capitalista que estamos combatiendo." (CRIC No 15:1975, p 2). 23

The utilities and the eventual surplus of the cooperative can not be allocated individually, but collectively for the benefit of the whole community to, among other things, further education and capacitiation of children and adults, and finance the travelling of
community-representatives to gatherings, conferences, and other missions. The repression against CRIC has, however, as mentioned, required a lot from the cooperative funds. Occasionally people must hide and the juridical defense of comrades in jail must be paid.

To strengthen the economy of the cooperative, the resguardo is recommended to organize working parties to cultivate a plot of land supplied by the cabildo. The tienda is supposed to finance the project through the contribution of, for example, seeds and food to the party. At harvest the working party invests the surplus in the cooperative after prior division among the participants. In 1978 there were 25 such lotes comunitarios (CRIC 1978b, p 25).

One of the biggest problem for the cooperatives and the tiendas has been the need of personal loans from individuals in the neighbourhood, for example, when the harvest has failed. Instead of contacting the broker which earlier was the most common alternative, the poor peasant today often prefers the cooperative. In some instances the main part of the funds have been loaned out which has implied great difficulties for the tienda to fulfill its function. Most credits are small and for a short time, but many borrowers do not pay back on time. Sometimes because of unconsciousness or lack of knowledge, often because the same borrower is in a state of destitution and simply can not pay back.

The empresas comunitarias are mainly composed of those - especially agricultural workers, terrajeros, and other comuneros, tenants, who live in immediate connection to haciendas with appropriated resguardo land - who directly have participated in the struggle for regaining the land. As already mentioned, the independence from white neighbours, middlemen, businessmen, and government institutions is the guiding principle. Severe hardships have been put down in political, economical, and cultural capacitation. in their relations to INCORA, they face a complicated dilemma in their efforts to balance their needs of credits and technical assistance, which implies extensive dependency, with the knowledge that this relationship is incompatible in the long run with their economic liberation and cultural reindivication.

"Debemos lograr que los functionarios del INCORA sean colaboradores de la comunidad y de la empresa y no je­fes que vengan a mandar..." (CRIC 1979, p 24). 24)
The empresas comunitarias voluntarily participate in the CRIC and take part in work, discussions, and decisions. They aim at maintaining contact and interaction with cabildos and existing economic organizations within the resguardos. In the long run the purpose is that a major part of the marketing of the enterprises shall be effected through the tiendas via the developing central cooperative.

The difficulties within the empresas are complicated. On the one hand, the tendency of some members to give priority to private production and consumption implies a lack of responsibility to communal cultivations. Even more serious though is the lack of means of production; economic resources such as machines, tools, seed, pesticides, fertilizer, and land still in many cases, especially fertile soil land. The land which is restituted has often been the abandoned parts of bigger haciendas or mismanaged properties, which have required much work and trouble. The production has as a rule been low in the beginning, despite great sacrifices on the part of all participants and hence it has become rather discouraging and demoralizing. Gradually, however, the continuous efforts of education and the political training have given yields in the form of more and more developed solidarity and responsibility. It has been, and still is, a difficult and delicate balance between, on the one hand, the politization of the empresas and, on the other hand, the economic consolidation, which to a large extent implies involuntary adoptions to capitalistic conditions. CRIC considers, as discussed above, that the empresas comunitarias must be independent indigenous units on socialist fundamentals in the purpose of strengthening the indigenous collective economically and politically, in the struggle for a better society and a better life, while it obviously is difficult to ignore the necessity to satisfy at least some of the basic material needs strived for, as soon as possible, after victory. Which can not be done without extensive concessions to the capitalistic rules. CRIC accordingly, fears that these concessions to the demands and conditions of the capitalistic sector would counteract their aims and instead contribute to the consolidation of the capitastic system and accordingly, continued oppression (CRIC 1979, p 28 ff). As a concrete example of this problem we have the conflict between the different aims of CRIC and INCORA, respectively, as INCORA wants to turn the empresas comunitarias into modern capitalistic enterprises as effectively and as soon as possible.
This would, however, mean that the functionaries of INCORA in practice would take over the whole administration of the empresa, as the majority of the indigenous peasants lack education in business economics, as well as deeper knowledge about multi-level cooperativism and marketing. The production of the empresa comunitaria would in this way directly become integrated in the modern capitalistic sector of the national economy and according to CRIC in the long run rather counteract than contribute to the continued existence, reindivication, and development of the indigenous society. Hence, CRIC is more interested in a gradual development of the productive capacity which runs parallel to an increased technical, administrative knowledge and as political, cultural, and social consciousness, in order to fortify the indigenous resistance (see also Londono 1979, p 74 ff).

The central cooperative that CRIC now has formed to co-ordinate the activities of the different empresas, tiendas, and cooperatives is a step further towards the liberation from the dependence upon the market and the middlemen. Through this cooperative central increased interaction and collaboration shall be developed between the resguardos of different regions and the different economic organizations which are specialized in the production of different crops. One important aim is, for example, an institutionalized interchange of ulluco, potatoes, maize, and other products, that advantageously are cultivated in colder climatic zones against for example yucca and bananas which can only be cultivated in warmer areas. This project is recently born so it is difficult to tell whether it will work. Another purpose with the central cooperative is that a central stock in Popayan shall supply tiendas and local cooperatives with agricultural inputs and necessities not produced within the communities to better prices and further be able to buy directly from the producers, offering better prices and better quality than the middlemen. The central cooperative shall also develop a capacity to grant credits (see CRIC 36:1979, p 9; 37, p 2).

When one studies the strength and determination of this indigenous organization closely it is noteworthy that the authorities concerned, expressing interest in the alfabetization, health, housing, and nutrition of the marginalized population in the countryside have not succeeded in co-opting the movement for the diffusion of information, knowledge, education, and further resources that unquestionably are needed to fight the poverty syndrome in this economic periphery.
Take education as an example, CRIC and individual indigenous peasants are well aware of the fact that schools also are sources of acculturation, but still they want access to education. Not in one case where I made interviews though, was the school, if existing functioning without special initiatives from the cabildo or the cooperative. Public funds do not cover the real costs or simply do not exist. Additional funds always have to be raised, through for example the arrangement of festivities by the Centro de Padres (the parents center), also the local cooperative or the empresa contribute.

"Nosotros los campesinos ya no podemos educar a nuestros hijos, porque ho hay como... si no tomamos aguardiente, no nos pagan los profesores..." 25)

The economic organizations in this case of CRIC become platforms where the former terrajerios and minifundistas find space for the realization of their own labour potential and extended resources to create and distribute collective and public goods, gradually winning access to the bases for accumulating social power. But are there no limits to what CRIC and the poor indigenous peasants can achieve?

I do not find any doubts about the fact that the efforts initiated and led by CRIC are essential steps towards the reindivification of the Paez, Coconuco, and Guambiano peasants and that they are vital to support. By claiming land, occupying haciendas and organizing economically, they can to a certain extent resist the consequences of expanding capitalism and maintain, and even to some degree broaden, their occupation of some niches in the region. All their acts though are in the end conditioned by the requirements of the capitalistic mode. Can the collective units and the cooperatives of CRIC become indigenous, socialist enclaves in the Colombian national economy or will they be competing capitalistic enterprises and will the associates become a stabilizing rural middle class buffer between an indigenous semiproletarized elastic labour-force and the white bourgeois? Are we witnessing an Indian peasant differentiation process which in a near future will separate the economically and politically organized indigenous elite from the majority of poor peasants on the resguardos, which will continue to subsidy the well-fare of a few, despite the ideological framework planted by CRIC, which consciously aims at counteracting such a development? Or are we studying an initial phase of a national labour movement which will lead to structural changes and a distribution of power? These questions cannot be satisfactory answered yet. Obviously the Indians concerned cannot escape
the capitalistic rules and they are willing, if allowed in practice, to adopt necessary technical-administrative knowledge and to take up the competition with established capitalistic units of production; although the Indians lack the technology and capital required to be successful so far in this competition. To a certain degree the lack of technology may bring about a redistribution of the resources of the empresa to nonassociates within the resguardo as they are employed now and then when extra labour is needed. Even if they are less paid in cash on the empresa than they would be on a modern non-indian enterprise they prefer to work within their own community. Thus the proletarization process on the one land seem to be impeded in areas where land has been recovered. Very few recognize themselves as day-wage workers. In the same time, nevertheless, the objective conditions are created through which the main beneficiaries of land restitution can extract power from comuneros with less land. A limiting factor in this context is, however, the remnants of indígenous tradition which first of all favour community maintenance, thus at least to a certain extent preventing the emergence of the most aggressive elements of capitalist exploitations.

10.5 CRIC in national political life

Via their organization the indígenous peoples of Cauca have thus begun to take part in the national political life, actively participating to try to improve their lives, something that maybe the Government ought to regard as a positive answer to their aims at fostering participation, according to Decree 3159:1968:

"Estimular y apoyar la organización de las comunidades para su participación consciente y permanente en su propio desarrollo." (art 14:b) 26)

"Apoyar, estimular y asesorar a la población indígena para que se organice adecuadamente y pueda incorporarse conscientemente al proceso nacional de integración y desarrollo." (art 15:b) 27)

But instead of opening up channels and a direct open line of communication with CRIC concerning the rural development question in the indígenous parts of Cauca, the authorities intensify the control and place different repressive tools at the disposal of the large landowners.
"...los terratenientes han utilizado todos los medios que les ofrece el Gobierno para reprimirnos, como son: los alcaldes y jueces, la policía, el ejército, las amenazas y encarcelamientos." (Alternativa No 20/1974, Supplement) 28)

Significative for the attitude of the authorities were the sabotages against CRIC's 3rd meeting in 1973, which, according to the plans, should take place in Tierradentro in Cauca, since the majority of the Indian population lives in this territory. As a result of the poor means of communication in these parts of the country, the influx of people entirely depends on where the meeting is hold. When the authorities became aware of what was going on, they staged a far-reaching militarized raid of the area with the aim of stopping so-called subversive activities. As a consequence CRIC had to transfer the meeting to Silvia, far away in another part of Cauca. Here 4000 Indians participated, but very few from Tierradentro had succeeded in getting there as this area actually had been blocked. However, some persons had been able to cross the mountains on foot, which means a walk for about 15 hours (University of Quindio 1974). The control of CRIC's activities has gradually been rendered more effective and the repression against its militants is an everyday occurrence (Unidad Indígena current issues; Alternativa No 102, 1976, p 22; Amnesty International 1980).

In some areas the Indian population is in majority, but they have yet no influence on the so-called democratic process. Even if the National Council of Indian Policy (formed by decree 833:1973), which shall recommend measures to the Government concerning the progress of the indigenous population, only three out of thirteen members are of Indian descent from the indigenous regions, and besides that these are nominated and appointed by the Government.

If an Indian does not actively participate in the party politics of the two dominating parties, the conservatives or the liberals, and maybe not even then, he does not have any influence whatsoever on the decision processes that rule the conditions of everyday life. The communication between the indigenous community and those in political power has traditionally consisted of orders and decrees imposed upon the Indians from above through the cabildo and the collecting of votes before the elections. As they explained to me at one resguardo:
"They come here before the elections, to gain themselves their votes. Cheating the people with candy, a bon bon — that they will arrange roads, schools, aqueducts, that there will be health..."

Hence, despite the officially formulated aims of integrating the indigenous population into the national mainstreams of social and political life, the political activities of CRIC are regarded as a problem of social order. Some scientists explain this matter by saying that political activity is a strange element in the Indian tradition and that the Indians therefore are manipulated by subversive powers from the outside.

"En cuanto a la politización indígena, sea en movimientos contra el Gobierno o contra la iglesia, es una iniciativa que hay que escudriñar lo mas cuidadosamente. La mayoría de los indígenas no se han metido en política blanca y es posible que por eso también estos grupos han sobrevivido. No creo que los indígenas que se dice organizan reuniones con otras tribus conozcan todas las implicaciones y consecuencias de la política en la cual están metiéndose."(Hooykaas 1975, p 206). 29)

Hooykaas perceives the engagement of Indians in national politics as a danger to the indigenous society. She calls attention to all the Indians that are in prison and means that it is those who are called communists that are to blame for this situation and the misery, since this designation gives a pretext to the authorities for persecuting and killing Indians.

The Indian and Protestant theologian Alfredo Torres P. (1975, p 114) says about CRIC:

"Este parece ser el primer esfuerzo netamente dirigido, — visiblemente — por los indígenas mismos. Claro está que en ningun organización falta el manipuleo a la sombra." 30)

Obviously, the participatory activities initiated by CRIC are regarded as undermining or subversive to the present system; that the participation performed by CRIC is directed against, i.e. "contra", the established social, economical and political order. As the Minister of Interior in Colombia explained to me in January 1980:
A natural question in this context is why the Indians do not join in the revolutionary forces as active guerilleros. Actually, I think the answer is rather simple. Individual younger men - who have become tired of the hopeless toil for immediate survival, without even coming near a decent standard of living and because of their Indian-political activities or engagements continually must be the passive targets of the violence directed against especially known CRIC activists by the big landowners - are no doubt motivated or predisposed for breaking up and organizing themselves in the guerilla warfare, but this does not seem to be the general aspiration of the poor indigenous peasantry. Firstly, they are bound to the annual routine of their agriculture for both traditional and economic reasons. Secondly, they are relatively few, living within a rather well-defined area despite the dramatic topography and their settlements would in an acute revolutionary situation be easily accessible targets for bombings and military interventions, the latter already a well-known experience among the residents in some communities. Infrastructure and military techniques have as is generally known, improved considerably since the Spanish colonization. In sum, they would in a short time risk total extinction as ethnic groups. In addition to these more objective and strategic arguments against a revolutionary insurrection today, there are, of course, also factors to consider that are subjectively and culturally conditioned. The continuous economic, political and cultural repression directed against the indigenous population for generations has, of course, planted poor self-confidence and fear in many. The concept of culture of repression (Holmberg 1959; Huizer 1973; see Berglund 1977, p 159) is indeed central in this context, and has further extended its contents in step with the penetration of capitalism.

Another factor to consider might be the seeds of hope that have been sown through the progress which CRIC has accomplished in several areas, which both nourishes consciousness concerning the necessity of the struggle and thoughtfulness regarding costs and rewards in relation to what is achieved. In that sense consequently, the concessions from the authorities to the pressures performed by CRIC also have a stabilizing effect, at least in preventing potential desperate eruptions.
On the whole, these indigenous peasants though, do not seem to apprehend violence as a resort to overcome their destitution, which to me seems to indicate a marked consciousness of their disadvantageous position in relation to dominant interests. Likewise Petras/Zemelman (1972, p 23) do not see the peasant farmer as a revolutionary, but consider an organized and land hungry peasantry to be a revolutionary force within society (see Wolf 1981).

The supposition I want to plant in this context is that the economic and political repression realized by the landowners and the ruling administrative and commercial elite really create the conditions for a potential revolutionary situation. The consequences however, are counteracted by participatory policies which are institutionalized through, for example, different development programs (see Galli 1978) and through the space which is left open at the disposal of certain unconventional forms of participation which can channalize discontent and efforts of active resistance into economic and political scopes which are not determinant vital to the dominant economic system.

But on the whole we have to face the fact that the popular mobilization in Colombia is severely restricted and controlled and that the poor indigenous peasants as little as rural and urban workers, maybe less, can realize their demands for a fair share of the national economic progress (see Portes/Canak 1981, p 234).

To a certain degree though, as we have learnt from the case of CRIC, organized resistance from below culturally, economically, and politically can counteract the deterioration of the indigenous economy. The regaining of land and the revitalization of communal forms of ownership and cooperation reduces uncertainly and forms a buffer between the individual indigenous producer and the unwholesome powers of the capitalistic mode of production.
NOTES PART III

1) "We expect to reduce the breach between the countryside and the city, between the rich and the poor districts, between those who have access to health care and education and those who do not have this. The program that we propose to the country aims at changing the objectives of the policy and makes preparation for the protection of the traditional sectors in the countryside and destines public investments primarily to works in medium sized and small towns, and in the rural zones where the poorest population is concentrated." (DNP 1975, p V).

2) "The compilation of republican laws concerning the Indian, shows that it is not a question of giving a just and constructive solution to the indigenous problem, but to adopt a juridical posture towards this problem." (Garcia 1978, p 37).

3) "...all human beings have the right to persevere in their material wellbeing, and their spiritual development in conditions of freedom and dignity, in economic security and in equality of opportunity." (Law 31:1967).

4) "The Indian policy of the Colombian state aims at teaching the indigenous communities advanced technology of economic exploitation and making possible their integration into national development on equal conditions, with regard to their cultural autonomy." (Decree 1741:1973, art 1).

5) "...what predominates is not the specialized policy (reserves, credits to resguardos, special service, etc) but this is subordinated to indifferent activities and programs that obligate the indigenous population to subjection, without considering their special characteristics and reindivifications. We only have to look at the different programs of credits, technical assistance, education, health, agricultural support, communal organization, etc, etc, not to mention the evident discrepancy between the protective legislation and the permanent application of penal and civil legislation against the Indians." (Jimeno/Triana 1978, p 69).

6) "It is necessary to educate the Indians so that they can act with success in their relations with the national society and with their own means, so that they can succeed in better-
6) "Forts ring their living conditions, with consideration to their own social economic and cultural organization." (Cordoba/Ortiz 1974, p 48).

7) "Communal action is organized as 'cooperation' between neighbours in every municipality, it is as cooperation that under this regiment has precise objectives that are projected to realize infrastructural works and to support economical, cultural, and recreational activities. Moreover, it is anticipated that the municipality councils, the assemblies, and the national government can grant the communal action committees the control and supervision of public services or a certain intervention in the management of these. (Ministry of Interior 1:1973, p 8).

8) "...that they organize in accordance with the norms dictated by the respective councils and other local agencies of control and supervision..." (Law 19:1958, art 22).

9) "Organize the different sectors of the community to make them conscious of their rights, duties, and resources, show them how to satisfy their aspirations of betterment, and settle their needs." (Ministry of Interior op cit, p 9).

10) "Social change is not the change of man, it is the change of attitudes, of the scenario in which we move or wish to move to realize ourselves. The true social change is in the change of mental structures through an adequate education." (op cit, p 55).

11) "..., that the popular organization in the country is the most efficient instrument to achieve the integral development of the Colombian citizen, through a constant reflexive, peaceful, and determined action which changes the economic and social structures when they contribute to the maintenance of existing inequalities. (op cit, p 11).

12) "That we are convinced that through the fortification of the communal action, the enemies of the system will not have the possibilities of causing the damage that they wish against the democratic institutions of Colombia." (Ministerio de Gobierno 1973, p 70).
13) "...create the technical and operational facilities that are indispensable for a more efficient support to the movement and finally invent the legal instruments aimed at obtaining and perfecting a more effective participation of the Communal Action committees in the centres of decisions. (Min de Gobierno 1973, p 11).

14) "Through the mobilizations, we the indigenous population, experience the sensation of the support of the masses, of "our people", in moments when the process of decomposition keeps us dispersed. We comprehend the possibility to triumph over the enemy. Moreover, in some cases, we reach a exultant position which the repression aims at keeping back. The expression of our obstinacy against the enemy and the public employment of our language, contribute to the rescuing of a personage which for a very long time has been denied us." (CRIC 1978b, p 19).

15) "The desire expressed by the dominant class to exterminate our organization as we develop, makes it necessary for us, as far as possible, to try to use legal instruments, to prevent that we loose these because of the extremist picture of us which the enemies are the most interested in creating." (CRIC 1978b, p 21).

16) "...it is perfectly legitimate that we, in the new society which we want to help to build, can count on a reasonable degree of autonomy and total guarantees for a complete and creative life economically, politically, and culturally." (CRIC 1978a, p 6).

17) "Our fundamental enemies, the imperialist, the bourgeois, and the landowners, are also the fundamental enemies of the other exploited and oppressed, and together we must struggle for national liberation and the construction of a socialistic society." (CRIC 1978a, p 7).

18) "...there must be indigenous people and there must be colonos."

19) "Our aspiration is to contribute to the liberation process of the Colombian people, fighting side by side with peasants, workers, and the remaining exploited, in accordance with their legitimate class organizations." (ANUC/CRIC 1974, p 3 ff).
20) "We participate along with the other exploited and oppressed in the struggle for a new society as our problems can not be solved within the capitalistic system, but at the same time we seek to develop our own characteristics, in the actual stage of struggle, as well as in the construction of the future socialistic society." (CRIC 1978a, p 13).

21) "Sectarianism has for a long time hindered the popular advancement in our country. To begin to overcome this problem, we must continously promote the approach of the popular organizations, on every possible level, in united action, in tactical alliances or strategies, in organic fusion." (CRIC 1978a, p 29).

22) "The empresa comunitaria is the associative form of agricultural production through which peasants with scarce resources stipulate to contribute with their labour, industry, service, and other assets in common, with the primary end to exploit one or several rural domains, industrialize, and commercialize their products, to complete one of these aims except for the first enumerated, to divide between themselves the profits or the losses, proportionally to their contributions." (Law 4a:1973, art 121).

23) "It is about the fact that the economy shall be of service to the struggle and the organization, that it shall help us to promote the change that we all are seeking and that it will not convert into a hinderance of our other activities, an element of individual profit and integration into the very capitalistic system which we are combating." (CRIC No 15:1975, p 2).

24) "We should achieve to make the functionaries of INCORA into collaborators of the community and the empresa and not bosses that come to direct..." (CRIC 1979, p 24).

25) "We, the peasants, cannot educate our children, as there are no resources... if we do not drink aguardiente, they do not pay the teachers..." (refering to the notion that the tax income from the selling of liquor pays the salaries of the teachers).
26) "Stimulate and support the organization of the communities to promote their conscious and permanent participation in their own development." (art 14:b of Decree 3159:1968).

27) "Support, stimulate, and advise the indigenous population to make them organize adequately so that they can incorporate themselves consciously in the national process of integration and development." (art 15:b of Decree 3159:1968).

28) "...the landowners have used all the means of repression that the government offers them in order to repress us, this includes: the alcalde and the judges, the police, the army, menaces and arrests." (Alternativa No 20/1974, Supplement).

29) "Regarding the politicization of the Indian, in movements against the government or the church, this is an initiative which must be scrutinized very carefully. The majority of the indigenous population have not embarked upon white politics and it is possible that this is the reason why these groups have survived. I do not think that the Indians that are said to organize meetings with other tribes know all the implications and consequences of the politics into which they are entering." (Hooykaas 1975, p 206).

30) "This seems to be the first force purely directed - as far as can be seen - by the indigenous population themselves. It is clear that in no organization is the manipulation in the dark missing." (Torres 1975, p 114).

31) "...CRIC is an organization of a communistic type, which wants to act...as all the organizations of the communistic type act concerning the minorities in order to connect them with the communist party...they are communistic political intentions."
IV ON THE AMBIGUITY OF PARTICIPATION

11 AIMS AND LIMITS OF POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

Usually the concept of participation is conceived from its political point of view and it is commonly understood and/or interpreted as an influence on the decision-making processes at different levels of societal life; and in this way, to a high degree considered to be "at the heart of democratic theory".

"Through participation the goals of the society are set in a way that is assumed to maximize the allocation of benefits in a society to match the needs and desires of the populace." (Verba/Nie 1972, p 3-4).

Accordingly, an important presumption in this context must be that participation is vital and functional to human community and is evident in the processes of social and cultural evolution. (See Scaff/Williams 1978 and their defence of participatory politics as the correct developmental strategy).

Every person participates in political life, but with different intensity. Passively all citizens to a major or minor degree try to obey laws, pay taxes, etc, and the mere indulgence towards the governing regime implies a kind of political support and a political attitude and behavior. Milbrath (1965, p 9) distinguishes between this passive form of participation and the inactive counterparts to political action: nonvoting versus voting, nonattending versus attending, etc.

The traditional way of viewing participation accordingly principally deals with the right and the duty of the ordinary citizen to be interested in, informed about, and active in politics.

"Those legal activities by private citizens that are more or less directly aimed at influencing the selection of governmental personnel and/or the actions they take." (Verba/Nie/Kim 1978, p 46).

Different possible degrees of individual participation to influence the political system is described by Milbrath (op cit, p 18) in a hierarchy of political involvement, ranging from
s spectator activities signifying, for example, merely exposing oneself to political stimuli or wearing a button, via transitional activities containing, for example, the initiative to contacting a political leader or attending a political meeting, to gladiator activities which imply concrete action, from becoming an active member in a political party to holding a public and party office. (There are of course various schemes of classification regarding forms and levels of participations to consider. See for example Huntington/Nelson 1976, p 12).

Referring to this view, democracy through formal voting seems to be the central concern of political participation, implying faith in and reliance on politicians and bureaucratic authorities. There is however, an inherent paradox in voting participation observed by Tingsten already in 1937: a high level of participation seems to be neither sufficient nor desirable for a successful democracy. Rather it may signal instability and conflict.

"...the kind of issue that stimulates widespread participation in politics is also the kind of issue likely to create wide cleavages in society., (Milbrath 1965, p 143 ff).

To ensure responsiveness of officials, however, it is essential that a sizable percentage of citizens participate in the electoral processes. For the same reason, an open communications system is required to guarantee final control of the political system by the public. But high participation levels, according to Milbrath, would even be detrimental to society if they tended to politicize a large part of the social relationships.

"...there is doubt that the society as a whole would benefit if intense interest and active involvement became widespread throughout the population." (Milbrath op cit, p 147).

Milbrath/Goel (1977, p 98) even put forward that participation is a sort of luxury which cannot be afforded by those who are struggling to fulfill their subsistence needs. This statement is to a large extent disproved by Seligson (1978) and it does not conform to what I have learned in Colombia. Consequently, on the one hand, participation in community planning, decision-making for development, legislation, as well as the increasing influence of the individual on his own life, on the whole, is more and more
being considered to be a necessary condition for generating social economic development, and dimishing the gap between the rich and the poor. But sanctioned participation is also one of several concessions which are necessary from the establishment to legitimate the existing political system and to manage latent conflicts. On the other hand though, too much participation might lead to a widening of cleavages and to augmented tensions and conflicts. (See the benefit-cost discussion concerning popular participation in UN 1975 and Chaffee 1979, p 21 ff).

In reality the economic and social cleavages are always there but they get politilized concurrently with increasing consciousness. An augmented participation both presupposes and generates an increasing consciousness, which increases the call for participation in a complementary and interdependent, interacting process, implying a politization of otherwise tidily packaged and reformulated socio-economic contradictions.

Accordingly, there is among those in power a fear of the very consciousness that actually is considered as a necessary element in the war on underdevelopment; which, however, also is unacceptable and feared, as it is precarious.

In the case of Colombia the starting-point of a study concerning the practice of participation is to certify the limited possibilities of the individual to choose, elect or influence. This conclusion is valid on all levels of administration, the national, as well as the municipal.

What among other things for a long time has limited the alternatives of choice, was the National Front agreement between the Conservative and the Liberal parties from 1957 (ending the bloody violencia, the civil war, that took the lives of at least 200 000 Colombians) stating that the two parties were to be equally represented in all legislative, juridical, and executive assemblies and that until 1974 they were to alternate at the presidency every forth year (see also Booth 1979).

All the opposition has in this way been forced to express itself as fractions through one of these parties. The difference between the Conservatives and the Liberals has gradually diminished and a mutual understanding concerning the unwillingness to structural changes has become established instead. Accordingly, they maintain a joint front against the growing popular unrest, in spite of the fact that the agreement has run out.
The feeling of powerlessness and inability to influence within the system, that is political inefficacy, shows itself in among other ways, through the decreasing voter participation. Which is in a way confirmed by Milbrath/Goel (1977, p 12) when they find voting to be "more an act by which the citizen affirms his loyalty to the system rather than an act by which he makes demands on the political system"!

During 12 years of the Frente Nacional government, from 1958 to 1970, the number of votes in the president elections decreased about 15%, from 60% to 45% (Roa Suarez 1973, p 190; compare Havens/Flinn 1970, p 109); and in the congressional elections 1978 almost 70% of the population did not vote (UBV 1978, p 12), in spite of the fact that there were possibilities also to vote on three different blocks of leftist parties. It should be mentioned though, that the electioneering was somewhat disturbed and limited by the different regulations caused by the almost constant state of emergency in Colombia, this especially falling upon the parties in the opposition and their functionaries.

According to DANE (1971b, No 242, p 82) which based its conclusions on a preelectoral investigation in Cali 1970, discontent with the situation and expressed lack of interest in politics were the main reasons for not voting, 76.3% and 71.2%, respectively. But several answers indicated that lack of interest did not always correspond to satisfaction with the situation. Only 1.1% expressed that their satisfaction was the reason for not voting. In some of the open questions it was also possible to understand the non-voting as a function of discontent with the very political system as such and the candidates.

In spite of the low voter participation, however, there is also a chain of indicators pointing to a clear tendency towards a polarization in the voting, between those in economic and political power and those less well to do (op cit, p 87), and that the latter are less inclined to vote (Roa Suarez 1973, p 191).

It is frequently observed that people among the lower socio-economic strata are less interested in voting, which to a large extent seems to depend on the feeling that their engagement will not influence their situation. This was especially expressed among my indigenous informants in Cauca. None of them voted in the national elections anymore. As one respondent expressed:
"...me parece que en estos momentos a la gente ya organizada ya no nos conviene por ejemplo las votaciones. Aquí en Colombia hay votaciones de conservadores y liberales, dos partidos tradicionales, y otros grupitos de políticos así la gente cada día comprometen por ejemplo que van a rebajar los artículos, todas las necesidades...pero no, al contrario, sube más...la política tradicional siempre nos engañaban vamos a rebajar esto, vamos a hacer reforma agraria, vamos a dar los indígenas tierra, ya hemos bastante experiencia..." 1)

On the other hand, it seems to be equally obvious that those individuals who feel that they can influence the decision-making process which affects their own situation are more likely to vote, as well as those who are regularly employed and feel secure in the existing system (confirmed also by Losada/Velez 1979). In the same way, high voter participants, politically efficacious, do not generally desire changes in the political system, while low voter participants, politically inefficacious, are more interested in drastic changes. Very few, however, want a revolution (Havens/Flinn 1970, p 123, Huntington/Nelson 1976, p 2).

This phenomenon is also discussed by Nie et al (1969, p 361) who report strong relationships between aggregate socio-economic measures and aggregate measures of political participation, meaning that social status, income, and education strongly affect the likelihood of engagement in systemic (my interpretation) political activities; that economic development is associated with increases in the general level of political participation.

"...that persons who fell confident of success in influencing decisions are more likely to be political participants, and that middle class persons are more likely to feel confident." (p 372)

In a study of factors related to voter participation among the urban lower class; adding church attendance, employment status, size of birth place, and political efficacy to Lipset's income, literacy, level of occupationally skills, age, length of residence, and organizational membership, Havens/Flinn (1970, p 112 ff) conclude that members of voluntary organizations, church participants, regularly employed workers and the politically efficacious are positively associated with voting, and political efficacy, education, income and employment status the
best predictors of voter behaviour (p 124). Nevertheless, low status in terms of formal education, income, and employment does not have to correspond to political unconsciousness or lack of knowledge about the systemic society. As can be concluded from the sources summarized and quoted in Alford/Friedland (1975, p 465 ff), those individuals most likely to participate in protests and so called extralegal violence or rebellion are high status people with considerable political information and knowledge. Participants were less likely to be found among the alienated, but generally they seem to support the activities of political violence (Compare de Silva et al, p 3 ff).

In the Colombian countryside the squatters and the day labourers are the least efficacious peasants according to Mathiason/Powell (1972, p 312), while the small landowner (probably more correctly interpreted as middle peasantry) seems to show political efficacy. They lack data to explain this finding adequately, but argue that the proprietor is somehow insulated from the sense of powerlessness and resignation because he is relatively more independent of the landlord compared with the proletarians and the semiproletarians, "...better able to resist being drawn into the clientele system with its attendant exactions...". Because of their higher status they also tend to "...identify with and emulate the political attitudes of the landlord." (op cit).

It is rather important to stress the importance of the wealthy landowner on the local level. Based on the conditions of the traditional patron-client relationship, the choice of party and candidates is also an integrated part in the system of mutual obligations and services. The landlord expect his workers, sharecroppers, and peons to vote on his party and a victory may even benefit the community dominated by the landlord, in the form of jobs, roads, and maybe credit, depending on the good connections of the patron. This symbolic form of political participation though, does not better the living conditions of the poor peasants, but they are forced to this accommodation because of their dependence without alternatives.

These mechanisms must, of course, be analyzed inside the framework of the culture of repression (see p 140).

Another form of political behavior in this context is the activity of resistance to the patron and his domination. If this resistance is not successful, however, the consequences frequent-
ly consists of local, regional rural to rural or rural to urban migration (Mathiason/Powell 1972, p 309, 310).

"Participation in Colombia, at best, ties the individual closer to his traditional liege lord, at worst, involves him in anomic, fratricidal violence. It certainly does not equip him to deal with national government." (op cit, p 327).

The correlation between social class and political participation is heavily accentuated by Alford/Friedland (1975, p 434 ff) who concludes that "...the importance of political participation as an instrument of power for citizens is still not shown". They mean that the findings summarized to a great deal indicate that participation also can function as a mechanism of social control over the electorate, reinforcing class advantages (p 439, 436).

Accordingly, they are questioning whether participation really leads to power and if power really requires participation.

On the basis of the definition by Verba/Nie, connected to the reality of USA, Alford/Friedland (p 430) define political participation as:

"...those present or past activities by private citizens and private or public organizations and groups, that are more or less directly aimed at influencing the selection of governmental structures and personnel, and the actions they take or do not take." (op cit, p 430).

Alford/Friedland show that some individuals and groups can have considerable power without participating in the traditional meaning, while other individuals, groups or organizations really are participating without being able to influence, even in cases where there are no information or knowledge gaps.

It is not especially uncommon that those in power try to keep political life and reality separated from its economic underpinnings, and in that way try to manifest the neutrality of the state. Considering, however, that political decisions are very much dependent on the economic prerequisites and consequences, it is obvious that the economically powerful groups can have considerable influence on the political course of events without really participating in the traditional meaning. This is also called systemic power (op cit, p 431).
"The fiscal relationship between state and economy is an aspect of state structure that maximizes the systemic power of dominant economic interests. As long as state revenues depend on taxes, the autonomy of the state is limited by the necessity to avoid any policies that impinge upon capital accumulation and growth." (op cit, p 448).

This systemic power is in a way very apparent in Latin American countries due to their dependency on foreign capital. At the same time, however, looking at the internal power structure of Colombia, for example, the political elite consists of the very same persons as the economic elite, which can be called a concentration of power (compare Piven/Cloward 1979, p 1 ff, see Silva Colmenares 1977).

The wealthy landowners do not only have access to an abundance of land. They also control the market of agricultural products and the prices on necessary input factors, that is, the necessary means for cultivation, as well as the export and import markets. Distinguishing between the landowner bourgeois, the commercial bourgeois, the financial bourgeois, and the industrial bourgeois, Svensson (1976, p 135) estimates that about 40 000 families, not more than half a million people (out of 26 millions), possess the economic power. But these families, as a rule participating in either the liberal or conservative party, also hold the offices and assemblies which exercise the political power, which in line with the ideas of Alford/Friedland should be interpreted as a consequence, not a cause of their power. Through the bureaucratic structure the dominant groups continuously reinforce their political power, basing their influence on, i.e. their possibilities to shape issues and constrain policy by economically determining the conditions of function for the nominally representative state apparatus (Alford/Friedland, p 450).

Hence, as conventionally proved, economic strength can be the source of political power, which in turn consolidates this economic advantage through, among other things, the development and reinforcement of antiparticipatory structures and repressive means (see also Varela 1979 regarding power structures as a crucial element).

"Mass publics can participate only at those points of political production where the power of dominant interests is not located." (Alford/Friedland, p 455).
Even if there are quite a few examples of the formal political participation of non-dominant groups on all levels of society it is evident that their impact on the established power structure is very limited. This is partly illustrated by the observations made by Verba/Nie (1972), who found that the lower-status citizens in the highest participation category received only half the concurrence from the authorities compared with the upper-status individuals at the same participation level. This was even less concurrence than the less active lower-status citizens (p 337). They explain this mainly by the higher number of upper-status participants and that the participating individuals from the lower socio-economic groups are so comparatively few.

As another possible explanation in this context, however, one should also discuss the possibility that the claims demanded by the lower-class participants contrast too much from what can be accepted by established interests, compared with those expressed by the upper status citizens. There is more of a community interest between the latter and the governing elite. This assumption is not inconsistent with the fact that the upper-class activists are "less likely to be faced with severe personal welfare problems, less likely to perceive such problems as the major issue in the community, and less likely to think that the government should intervene to deal with such problems" (p 338).

"Hence, only on the rarest occasions are the poor involved in national-level agenda setting, and consequently the major issues of system structure, control, and value orientation remain beyond the influence of the poor." (Booth/Seligson 1979, p 6).

The growing importance of alternative "tactics" outside the system, could in turn explain the fact that the concurrence received by the high-participating lower-class citizens is so low. This is also mentioned by Verba/Nie (op cit, p 3) and partly backed up by their assumption that the absence of class-based ideologies, as well as explicit class-based appeal by political parties in the US, contribute to this participation disparity between upper- and lower-status citizens (p 340). We must also note of one of their general conclusions:
"Participation remains a powerful social force for increasing or decreasing inequality. It depends on who takes advantage of it." (p 342).

We can profitably link this point of view to the Alford/Friedland discussion about participation without power (p 443). They are especially concerned about the co-optation processes: the separation of the political leadership from its movements into ineffective channels (see also Piven/Cloward 1978; Hobsbawn 1979 and Källtorp 1979); and the dependence of many participatory institutions on financial support from sources controlled by traditionally conservative forces (p 960). They mean that political action in this way can be channelized into system-functional participation towards symbolic ends. This participation is encouraged on points in the political system where the essential policy making does not take place, thus limiting the potential effects of systemic participation.

"Participation of this kind functions to produce political quiescence while societal institutions continue to reproduce inequality and injustice." (p 464).

We may even raise the question whether formal participation by lower-class citizens within the system under certain circumstances in fact can strengthen, reinforce, and fortify those forces that counteract their possibilities to influence, i.e. take advantage of participation; that systemic participation may obstruct true participation, influence, and change.

In any case there are institutional limits to what can be gained by "legalminded" participants from the lower class. We are coming back to the paradox of participation. Participation contributes to social harmony and stability, at the same time as it bears in itself a latent conflict for change and development (see Rousseau 1962 and Pateman 1970).

The main contradiction of participation is another aspect of class conflict and the evident contradiction between the exploited and his exploiter. CRIC expresses this as follows:

"Los ricos luchan para quedarse con la tierra y el trabajo de los pobres; y los pobres luchamos para no dejarnos y poder mejorar nuestras vidas." (1973, p 9). 2)
The accumulated advantages of the power elite are not necessarily possible to eradicate by popular participation. The degree of influence resulting from participation is consistently determined by its location in the class structure (as suggested by Piven/Cloward 1979, p 3).

The continued accumulation of capital is the central mission of the capitalist state, while always seeking to maintain its own legitimacy as a class-neutral power (Miller 1979, p 12). Nevertheless, it implies a continuous resistance against popular initiatives from below towards true participation for change benefitting the poor. In the same way as economic advantages are class-based, some are the possibilities for access to influence.

"This realm of privilege rests on the backs of the people in the lower circuit. And the power accumulating at the top is systematically applied to prevent the poor from building up a power base of their own."(Friedmann 1979, p 105).

From here on we shall distinguish between legal systemic political behaviour, in accordance with those generally recognized and established channels at disposal for the popular influence within the system, and those political activities that are performed beyond these limits. Miller (1979, p 3) denotes this as the difference between political participation and political action. He means that participation in traditional usage (the act of partaking of or sharing in) implies acceptance of the rules from above governing these activities, while political action includes modes of action which goes beyond these limits of legal political behavior (see also Verba/Nie/Kim 1978, p 1-2). Widely recognized is also the distinction between conventional and unconventional forms of participation (see for example Booth/Seligson 1978, p 9).

Political action, however, is another dimension or phase of political participation and not necessarily less legitimate than institutionalized systemic participation. Often though, it is directed against established systemic routines and thus more or less anti-systemic and therefore looked upon as subversion by the ruling elite.

"Consequently we see that an individual frequently engages in both forms of political participation, suggesting that mistrust of government may play a critical role in moti-
vating unconventional participation among Latin Americans who normally are quite active in conventional modes of behaviour." (Booth/Seligson 1978, p 11).

As we have seen, the electoral channels are open to the indigenous population to participate systemically in the national political life of Colombia.

"Ordinarily defiance is first expressed in the voting booth simply because, whether defiant or not, people have been socialized within a political culture that defines voting as the mechanism through which political change can and should properly occur." (Piven/Cloward 1979, p 15).

What we also have observed is the almost non-existent responsiveness from the authorities, regarding the demands expressed by the Indians. The politicians are well aware of the needs of the marginal indigenous peasantry, as formulated in speeches and promises at the times of election and described in terms of education, health, land, roads, etc. Promises that, however, are almost never fulfilled as the indigenous peasants lack the power to lay pressure on those finally elected and seizing the power. The Indians simply, can not make their voices heard through these channels. Rather, their participation serves to tidy up the face of Colombian democracy, through the higher level of voter participation, thus legitimating the established order. Therefore the Indians more and more also abandon this form of political participation. But, as already touched upon and accentuated by Booth/Seligsson (1978/79), that:

"Simply because the poor do not take part in national political institutions as intensely as do wealthier citizens does not mean that the poor do not participate at all." (1979, p 5).

and further that:

"Participation among the Latin American poor far exceeds in intensity and continuity levels conventionally expected, is multidimensional, has a clearly differentiated structure, and follows rational patterns." (op cit).

These forms of participation described by Booth/Seligson are principally concentrated to the community level. But as we have already concluded there are severe limits to the participatory influence of the less well-to-do (see Varela 1979, p 147 ff).
These conclusion that low-status citizens have highly limited possibilities of changing the main-streams of power and wealth through the electoral-representative system is, however, nowadays more or less regarded as a question of common sense and the unconventional, semilegal, and even extralegal forms of protest are gradually accepted, "at least to some of us" as Piven/Cloward (p 3) expresses it, to be unavoidable expressions of discontent.

Through the protest, the poor and those lacking access to the necessary power to influence, try to create the conditions for a bargaining situation (Wilson 1961, 1973; Lipsky 1968; Eisinger 1973; Piven/Cloward 1979, see also Gidlund 1978).

Lipsky (p 1145) accentuates the activation of third parties as the problem of the powerless to enter the bargaining arena, while Eisinger more explicitly discusses the strategy of confrontation. He also distinguishes protest as such from what he calls political violence, i.e. the implicit threat of violence from explicit intentions. To Eisinger legality and legitimacy is also linked to the eventual performance of violence, meaning that once the threat is openly employed, the way is opened for the authorities to suppress the protest movement (p 14).

Wilson in his later exposé (1973) balances both these approaches of Lipsky and Eisinger, respectively, defining protest as:

"...a process where one party seeks by public display or disruptive acts to raise the cost to another party of confining a given course of action." (p 282).

Piven/Cloward (1979) consider it as important in the context not to equate protest movements with movement organizations. All protests do not necessarily have a leader, a programme or a banner, and the equation can be to "divert attention from many forms of political unrest to consign them by definition to the more shadowy realms of social problems and deviant behavior" (p 5), meaning that protest tactics defying political norms, to the poor can be their only recourse, whether organized or not. Hence the social movement concept of Piven/Cloward denotes a primary protest by the so-called heterogeneous body of poor people, not the working class, not excluding, however, the organized protest.
The protest movement implies considerable changes in consciousness. Also the poor become to some extent affected by the increased flow of information and knowledge resulting from the economic development and the technological progress. The communication between the poor is facilitated as a side-effect of the communicative means, and hence their consciousness and knowledge about the gap between the actual and the potential; the cause of which is conceived as violence by Galtung (1969, p 168):

"...people have been influenced so that their actual physical and mental achievement falls short of their potential in a situation where such a disparity could have been avoided."

In the same way Tullis (1970, p 223) speaks of the gap between capacity and opportunity, structural discrepancies, which means "that access to information and capacity to use it increases, but actual possibilities of benefitting from it economically, politically and socially does not". (Berglund 1977, p 157; compare Gurr 1970, p 13).

"As capacity continues to increase but opportunity does not, at some point a threshold stage of discrepancy is reached in which the peasantry has become ripe for catalytic intervention, and an intense solidarity movement may suddenly be set off." (Tullis 1970, p 225).

Accordingly, the systemic norms of political behavior for influence loses legitimacy and the poor "begin to assert 'rights' that imply demands for change" as described by Piven/Cloward (1979, p 4).

"For a protest movement to arise out of these traumas of daily life, people have to perceive the deprivation and disorganization they experience as both wrong, and subject to redress." (p 12).

What we have learned so far is that poor peasants are not poor because of fatalistic attitudes, unwillingness to change, apathy, traditionalism or because they do not want to participate or do not have enough education to participate (see also Landsberger/Gierisch 1979).
"The rural poor, supposedly condemned by poverty and tradition to political inaction, seem in many cases far from passive. (Booth/Seligson 1978, p 5).

Rather that they do want to change their situation, they do participate politically and economically, and they do manifest a substantial political capacity (op cit, p 8). But their efforts and successes are continuously circumscribed by structured conditions, as for example, the landholding system, i.e. the class position of the poor indigenous peasants.

The sources of Booth/Seligson also confirm that the participatory efforts of poor campesinos to change are at first peaceful, and that unconventional forms of participation are rather rational answers to hostile landlords and unsympathetic governments. In other words, it is not non-participation which is the problem of the rural poor as they do participate, but rather the concurrence of their participation for influence. Non-systemic and anti-systemic forms of participation to influence the distribution of collective and public goods are consequently to be regarded as rational acts when the participants believe they will obtain and benefit from their formulated aims. Accordingly, Gurr (1970) did not find much support for "the view that political violence is primarily a resource of vicious, criminal, deviant, ignorant or undersocialized people" (p 357).

11.1 The Legitimacy of Protest

The protest, whether violent or not, is often a form of collective participation, when poor people use their last resort to influence the distribution of those benefits of society to which they have contributed through their economic participation as producers and workers, and to which they conceive themselves entitled. (See Chaffee 1979, p 20 and his discussion concerning the motivation of the individual to organize for the supply of collective goods).

The protest in this way becomes an action of defence, counteracting the violence directed against the poor, by the very maintenance of the gap between the actual and the potential.

A wide range of means of protest is in theory at the disposal of the protest activists. Not so many, however, are always
available in practice, depending upon the cost in relation to what is to be gained, i.e. the answer on the part of the authorities measured on a scale of concession and repression. The type of political system and its established norms determine the degree of systemic tolerance, which gives the outer limits for what is legal or not. These limits are, of course, to some extent elastic, depending upon where the protest movement is located in the national socio-economic structure. The disruptive impact on given institutions determines the contents of the political reverberations, as discussed by Piven/Cloward (1979, p 24). This phenomenon has to be analyzed from two aspects. On the one hand, central institutional localization can mean fast and extensive concession to the protesters, if the regulation through suppression of withdrawn collaboration by the authorities is conceived as too risky and costly. On the other hand, the activists in question run the risk of severe repression.

Consequently, the opportunity, the form, and the success of conventional protest, as well as extra-legal protest, depend very much on structural factors.

"Constitutional structures, regime types, elite interactions, and institutional configurations determine the opportunity, channel for, and costs of participation, thereby influencing the levels, structure, strategy, tactics and policy influence of political activity." (Booth 1979, p 39).

"The occasions when protest is possible among the poor, the forms that it must take, and the impact it can have are all delimited by the social structure in ways which usually diminish its extent and diminish its force." (Piven/Cloward 1979, p 3).

Demonstrations, strikes - mostly in collaboration with different non-indigenous political organizations, as for example FIRMES (CRIC 38:1979, p 2) and syndicates such as ANUC (CRIC 1974b, p 39) - and active participation in mobilisatory meetings such as the Foros por los Derechos Humanos 3) (CRIC 35:1979, p 3/44:1980, p 4) have been the most important legal/semilegal means of political expression practised by CRIC. Through these activities they aim at, on the one hand, to obtain the attention of third parties, reference publics in general, as well as potential sympathizers to the united
popular struggle against exploiters and injustice. On the other hand, they want to increase the consciousness of the participants, conform rising feelings of efficiency, and consolidate the organization. Hence the political behavior of CRIC has its roots in the deprivation felt by the indigenous population, but is not the expression of a frustrated desperation, rather a conscious political strategy to change the conditions of their lives, through the influence of the distribution of the means of production and public goods.

CRIC does not possess enough power to risk more violent means. The land-occupation can be considered to be the outermost action. This behavior is non-systemic, i.e. not legal, but nevertheless it is considered as "fairly" legitimate by a large reference public, excluding though, among others, the land-owning aristocracy. The lack of land among Indians and poor peasants, and the destitution of the neglected marginals of the countryside is a well-known truth. Further, there is a vague, unexpressed notion, that even if the occupation as an act is not legal, the indigenous right to their land is legitimate and implicitly legal in the law of Agrarian Reform which is not applied, in the same way as other human rights of participation are expressed in legislation, but not experienced in practice. The land claims of the indigenous population are furthermore located at a considerable distance from the heart of the national economy, their extra-legal acts are thus instrumental to their needs to an acceptable cost according to their judgement. The costs can not be considered as being especially low though. A never-ceasing repetition of imprisonment and maltreatment is the general price. The CRIC sympathizers are generally accused for conspiracy (asociación para delinquir), rebellion or invasion.

Thus, confrontation has its definite limits in the case of CRIC as a political instrument to provide the Indians with bargaining leverage in the political process. Instead of raising the cost of the opponent, CRIC would be the part to pay. The political participation of the Indians in Colombia is consequently a constant balancing, but nevertheless necessary to obtain at least a certain degree of responsiveness to their needs. To the government a more efficient organization of indigenous population implies a continued protest, pressures for more extensive changes, and the shaking of the fundaments of status quo. Such a spontaneous popular participation is not possible to combine with stability and economic growth. Through, for example, the new Indian law, the authorities
try to institutionalize the activities of the indigenous peasants' CRIC into controlled forms of symbolic participation by way of, for example, the Communal Action Programme, combined with the imprisonment of the CRIC leaders.

Parallel to the political acts of protest CRIC, as we have seen, also develops economic forms of protest or more correctly, resistance. As a means of the indigenous producers to influence the distribution and the control of the means of production and the fruits of their long days of drudgery via either systemic or non-systemic political participation they withdraw parts of their economical contributions to the national economy. Instead of selling and buying on the market directly and individually in competition, they form cooperatives on the different levels of production, distribution, and consumption. In this way they also seek to exclude the middlemen from the assimilation of the benefits of their work. Through the development of intergroup barter, regarding among other things provisions and credits, they are also to some extent spared the asymmetric conditions of trade they experience on the official market, which constitutes one of the most important leakages in the indigenous economy.

Another form of resistance is the development of courses in alfabetization and courses in economy, technology, nutrition, and health. Due to the lack of resources these courses are rather scarce though. They assimilate functional knowledge adapted to their specific needs and traditions, raising the participant's institutional and contra-institutional capacity as well as efficiency, escaping to some extent the impact of systematic socialization and conformation imposed by the dominating society.

As they apparently do not benefit from formal participation in national political and economic life, but on the contrary, due to the antiparticipatory structures of the capitalist society which obstructs their true partaking, contribute to their own destitution and destruction as an ethnic group and human beings through this participation. The above mentioned activities can be perceived as different forms of economic and political contraparticipation which opposes the ruling order, and in most cases promotes socio-economic development among the participants.
From the previous discussion we can conclude that participation implies contribution, sharing, partaking, and influencing. In this way participation is also an educational process, which made Verba/Nie (1972, p 5) note that participation can be an end in itself, having more than instrumental value.

The participant contributes to community and society with his knowledge, experience, and labour potential, and is entitled to share in the benefits of these efforts and to influence its distribution. Likewise there are three basic ways to view popular participation in development as accounted for by UN (1975, p 4): "mass sharing of the benefits of development; mass contribution to the development effort; and decision making in development". Thus, participation can be considered as vital and functional to human community and is evident in the processes of social and cultural evolution.

But participation has never been free of choice. As we have seen, structural and/or other more or less violent means of coercion determine the conditions of participation on all levels of societal life, either according to the general rules of group dynamics, as institutional restrictions and/or as imposed exploitative compulsion. Further more participation in the national arena in Latin America "has been characterized by the manipulation of the participation of the poor in the interest of elites and by exclusion of the poor from the equitable distribution of public goods" (Seligson/Booth 1979, p 5).

Economic participation implies both the active contributory efforts realized by the participants as producers and workers and the social receptive act, the sharing in the fruits of the work put in.

Political participation then, is the political behavior aimed at influencing on the one hand, the distribution of the means of production and the bases for accumulating social power, which determine the conditions of political participation, and on the other hand, the direct distribution of the goods actually produced and contributed.
Hence we can talk about three interrelated levels of participation: economic, social receptive, and political. Economic participation is broadly defined as the individual contribution of manpower and other means of production (i.e., resources) to the production and the distribution of collective and public goods, which means, for example, that the economic activities performed by the indigenous peasants as proletarians, semi-proletarians, and direct producers for the general market, linked to the central economy in a national and international context, is to be considered as economic participation.

Collective goods consist of those material and economic resources and products that if supplied to and consumed by any person in a group, "it cannot feasibly be withheld from the others in that group" (Olson 1965, p 14) i.e., "denied to others in this society" (Booth 1979, p 30). Public goods then, are those "special kinds of collective goods supplied by governments or by communities through their collective expenditures", such as roads, education, health care, etc. (Booth op cit; Chaffee 1979, p 19).

Social receptive participation, is the degree of access to, and sharing in, the fruits of work and productive contribution, i.e., those collective and public goods described above.

Under these circumstances the definitions of political participation suggested by Verba/Nie (op cit) and Alford/Friedland (op cit) are not feasible. On the one hand, because they do not account for those cases of participation which do not principally aim at influencing government decision making, i.e., those situations when, for example, poor people collectively create resources to meet or counteract their deprivation, which is discussed by Seligson/Booth (1979, p 4 ff).

"For the poor, for whom the state often fails to provide any resources, the creation of their own public goods through collective effort and expenditure becomes imperative for the enhancement of life chances." (p 6)

On the other hand, because they do not explicitly account for non-legal political activities.

Defining political participation as "behaviour influencing or attempting to influence the distribution of public goods", Booth (1979; see also Booth/Seligson 1978/79) agrees that
"political participation need not be conventional"; further stating that "action of any kind, legal or illegal – aimed at influencing the distribution of public goods entails political participation." (p 31).

But political participation further aims at influencing the distribution of the means of production and the bases for accumulating social power, the access to which also determines the conditions of participation and the limits of its success. Without access to these fundaments of power, the poor also lack necessary control, which is the starting point for Pearse/Stiefel (1979, p 8) in their proposal to a definition of participation in a research approach to the UNRISD Popular Participation Programme:

"the organized efforts to increase control over resources and regulative institutions in given social situations, on the part or groups and movements of those hitherto excluded from such control."

A definition of political participation accordingly, must consider both the distribution of goods, the fruits of production and progress, and the distribution of the bases for social power; implying both systemic and nonsystemic forms of political activities. The distribution of public goods in this case is probably a great deal less conflictive than the allocation of social power, which to a larger extent implies structural changes.

In the resistance against the negative consequences of general economic participation there are also non-systemic elements to consider. As in the case of CRIC, one of the most important aims is to obtain relative independence from the capitalist sector. In trying to keep labour and goods from the brokers and the landowners, thereby stopping up some leakages, they want to withdraw through, for example, the cooperatives, as much as possible of their economic contribution, to hold it outside the dominant mode of production. Under prevalent circumstances this seems to be their only way to resist the penetrating forces that alienate them from their lands, maintain the assymmetric access to the bases for accumulating social power and continously sabotage their aspirations for better living conditions.

Amin (1972, p 35) stresses in this context that what often can be perceived as traditional remnants of social and economic organization as, for example, communal forms of cooperation and as such regarded as obstacles to modernization and development,
instead represent "means for survival under the dramatic conditions of marginality", i.e., means of resistance in my interpretation.

Thus, systemic or non-systemic, participation should be perceived as the collected host of contributory, partaking, sharing, and influencing economic and political activities performed by all members of a given society.

But we have so far not even mentioned the socio-cultural aspects of participation. To participate is also to be a bearer of culture, to have an identity and a security in a cultural context, and to have a history. Accordingly CRIC fights for their right to reindivicate and maintain their culture and to resist national integration on the conditions imposed on the indigenous population through different means of coercion since the conquest and lately through the penetration of capitalism.

The basic elements of participation lay inherent as necessary ingredients for development and serve the individual, as well as the society. The fact is that, for example, the autochthonous cultural history of Colombia in music, dances, food, and other essential traits has its roots in the countryside, through the collected peasantry as discussed by Fals Borda (1978).

"La patria viene a ser producto y esencia del pueblo que trabaja y crea: es el pueblo mismo. Por eso es explicable y justificada la resistencia del CRIC, porque su lucha no es solamente por su propia supervivencia, sino tambien por la supervivencia de la patria." (p 26). 4)

The aspirations of the poor indigenous peasants towards better lives through their political and economical organizing evince the existence of a strong human force for development within the indigenous society. Despite the repressions, which impede this potential to bloom fully, the outcome from the resistance given, shows how critically needed collective and public goods are created and distributed (as also observed by Booth/Seligson 1978, p 14). Accordingly the participants of empresas and cooperatives experience progress, which seems to be an effect of their increased access to the means of using their capacities, i.e., the possibilities to realize what PacPherson (1973, p 60) calls development power. As far as I am concerned, the average individual poor indigenous peasant does not share this sensation.
From this follows, what I consider as a logical succession, that the participatory activities like those performed by CRIC are important ingredients for a process of rural development. What is generally considered by the ruling elite as subversion, can rather scientifically be regarded as a necessary condition for all thorough social and economic changes, in accordance with the marxist notion that contradictions internal to class society constitute the motor of development. Thus Fals Borda (1969, p 9; 1970) also suggests that subversion relieved from "its traditional immoral ingredient" would be "to provide a scientifically productive concept".

Hence, if means of popular participation is not provided within the system, the oppressed seemingly will participate anyway, unconventionally challenging the prevailing order.

According to Gurr (p X):

"The public order is most effectively maintained - it can only be maintained - when means are provided within it for men to work towards the attainment of their aspirations. This is not an ethical judgment, or rather not just an ethical judgment. It approaches the status of a scientific law of social organization."

But even if institutionalized, there is the latent conflict determined by the forces and relations of production.

Irrespective if popular participation is encouraged or repressed, the very act of participation implies the production of consciousness and the possible politization of discontent, potentially threatening the status quo. One could suspect, however, that efforts to institutionalize the conflict through an extension of channels for popular participation would, at least, detain revolutionary attempts.
In the traditional indigenous society everybody participated in accordance to their ability and ascribed role within the community. Both as an individual producer on the family plot to which there was an usufructuary right and as a participant in the communal workparties, the mingas. The same contributory participant also was entitled to share in the fruits of the work and had the right to speak up and influence the economic and political decisions.

Since the time of colonization the subjugated indigenous subsistence agriculturalist has, however, also to a minor or major extent been participating in the international economy. Gradually in step with the degree of capitalistic penetration of the periphery, the labour potential of the food and small commodity producing Indian peasant has been appropriated and absorbed by the dominant society through different means of coercion. A logic conclusion, consequently, is that the underdevelopment and the destitution of the poor indigenous peasant is not a consequence of isolation of regional pre-capitalistic sectors from the modern market sector, but the outcome of the functional integration of center and periphery, characterized by asymmetric power relations, economic and political. From this follows that the indigenous peasants through their participation within this system as staple food producers, consumers of industrial commodities and agricultural inputs, borrowers and interest-payers, workers, etc continuously transfer their energy, working-potential, i.e. power (MacPherson 1973), to the dominating elite, the owners of the means of production, those who control the gates to the bases for accumulating social power (Friedmann 1979). These subordinated forms of participation, accordingly, fortifies the dominating structures, which appropriate these resources for accumulation, furthering the consolidation of the forces behind the process of impoverishment. Hence the poor peasant counteracts his own liberation through this participation, which is forced forward and institutionalized ideologically from above. From here we derive the concept of systemic participation, which beyond its ideals of representative democracy, human rights, and social justice, also bears in itself the reproductive seeds of the fundaments of political and economic coercion and repression, i.e. the reproduction of the unequal access to the bases for the accumulation of social power.

In a way this phenomenon can also be approached in terms of the institutionalization of security systems of the society, which
aims at maintaining stability, status quo, and existing power relations - security systems composed of a network of anti-participatory structures.

"...most societies develop a complex battery of defences against popular participation and even those institutions established for ensuring and realizing the participation of the many are liable to turn into instruments on manipulation operated by the few." (Pearse/Stiefel 1979, p 25).

When Pearse/Stiefel (1978, 1979) apply the concept of anti-participation and anti-participatory structures, however, they principally refer to those structural conditions of society that work against an increased popular participation, which emanates from the traditionally positive connotation of participation. On the other hand, they seem to overlook the possibility that systemic participation in itself can counteract real participation, and hence influence, i.e. be dysfunctional to the possibilities of the poor indigenous peasant to affect his own life situation. Class structure, economic inequality, bureaucracy, institutional inefficiency, and mass communication structure constitute some obstacles to the political participation of many and causes a non-participation or maybe more correctly, a participation without influence, as participation and influence do not have to correspond and as formal participation does occur in accordance with established democratic routines, but is regulated and restrained by the invisible violence institutionalized in the prevalent social structure. Hence systemic participation to the powerless not only implies limited possibilities to influence, but even legitimates and fortifies in addition status quo, which in practice means that the poor who participate formally within the system not only lack the power to influence, but rather counteract actively their own interests, as they contribute to the consolidation of the very antiparticipatory structures they objectively want to abolish. These inherent contradictions of participation make the concept into a double-edged sword in the context of development, as participation without influence can become the antibody of change.

Sham-participation is a concept which, in this context, helps to get closer to the dynamics of the reproduction of deprivation. Sham-participation refers to the dysfunctionality of
systemic participation regarding those participants who lack access to the basis for accumulating social power, the poor, to whom formal participation not only is fundamentally meaningless concerning the possibilities to influence, but in addition counteracts their efforts to gain influence and change. Their participation sooner generates poverty as their energy and labour capacity continuously is assimilated by the power elite, the owners of the means of production who possess extractive power and who consequently can consolidate their predominance and coercive power.

Accordingly the concept of sham-participation touches the problem of being economically integrated in the national and international capitalistic economic system, that is, economically participating as producers and labourers, without being socially or economically sharing the benefits of development and to participate politically within the system without being able to exert any political influence. In this way the poor peasants and the agricultural workers in Colombia, on the one hand, are contributing their hard work and production to the progress of rural Colombia, and hence also with resources to the repressive instruments of the state, while they, on the other hand, however, do not get any share in the increasing welfare. The outcome of their work is absorbed and monopolized by the middlemen and the owners of the means of production, contributing to the increasing wealth of the already dominating elite, while the workers and producers themselves are getting even more deprived. In this way the economic participation of the lower strata in the countryside reproduces the economic inequality and the very conditions of their lack of political power. (Compare Alford/Friedland 1975, p 474; discussing participation as a means of reproducing the absence of political power).

MacPherson (1973, p 64) discusses this economic aspect of sham-participation in terms of transfer of powers, which means that he who owns, for instance, land and capital has the necessary means to use/exploite the productive capacity of the worker, the non-owner, during the time for which he is employed. The owner has then bought this productive capacity and he owns not only the product, but he also controls its value. The productive working capacity, the possession of the work itself, and consequently, the value of the work, have thus been transferred to the owner of the means of production.
This process is also illustrated by Marx's theory of economic and political alienation, according to which, the division of labour is one of the social conditions behind the economic alienation. As a consequence of this, the individual is no longer in control of his capacity and is obstructed from using his ability to his own advantage. Production and consumption is each unequally distributed between different individuals and social strata. The work and the process of objectification, which otherwise, according to Marx, is an expression for man's life activity, a self-realizing and creating social production process, becomes only a means for immediate survival.

"Den enda förbindelse de (arbetarna) ännu har med produktivkrafterna och sin egen existens, arbetet, har för dem förlorat varje likhet med personlig aktivitet och upprätthåller bara deras liv för att utarma det." (Mega I,5, s 57; quoted in Israel 1977, p 66). 5)

Transfer of power from those who do not own, including the small-holders, to those who own, is also done effectively through the free market. The work and its value by the small producers, as well as the agricultural workers, is assimilated by the large producers and the middlemen. Those who own and control the means of production and the infrastructure (land, money, credit, machinery, vehicles, contacts, knowledge, etc) also have the qualifications for the accumulation of power.

"...the generation of poverty is a function of the concentration of power and the monopolization of resources, which puts the cheap and obedient labour of the poor at the disposal of the monopolizers, thereby increasing their power." (Pearse/Stiefel 1979, p 5).

The repeated transfer of power becomes a motor which maintains status quo and poverty. The poor man lacks access to the necessary means for using his capacity.

"...as soon as one thinks of a man's power in the ethical sense it becomes apparent that his power must include his access to the means of using his capacities, and that his power is diminished, and some of it transferred to others, by lack of such access, ..." (MacPherson 1973, p 40).
In this way the economic deprivation also becomes a source of decreased political influence, or of political deprivation, which in turn confirms and maintains the economic deprivation, as expressed by Miliband (1974, p 183). To MacPherson (1973) political power is the capital owners' way of strengthening their extractive power towards the poor, "the ability to extract benefits from others" (p 42).

CRIC (1973, p 3) expresses the problem of extracted power in the following words:

"...no tenemos escuelas suficientes, niuestos de salud, ni caminos ni tierra donde trabajar. O las parcelas que tenemos son muy chiquitas para dar de comer a los hijos. En cambio los ricos para quienes trabajamos tienen todo eso, y mucho más. Ellos tienen porque viven de nuestro trabajo." 6)

In this paradoxical situation where contributory economic participation counteract real political participation and thereby the possibility to influence the distribution of collective goods, we find the nucleus of anti-participation. The kinetic energy of which is generated by systemic sham-participation. An anti-participatory process where the actual participation undermines the fundamentals of real participation and in that way opens the door for the reproduction of deprivation. Real popular participation in itself carry inequality-regulating qualities and is therefore incompatible with advanced capital accumulation, which requires and produces inequality.

Thus the poor in Colombia cannot expect to be served access to the fundamentals of social power. The sanctioned participation can carry the anti-bodies of change and progress. Thus the elements of real participation and the conditions for resisting deprivation are less likely to be obtained only through the creation of new institutions for popular participation. In the case of the indigenous movement, the problem is rather to revoke the oppression of the organizations emerged from below and to promote this spontaneous mobilization.
NOTES PART IV

1) "...it seems to me in these moments, that, for example, to those presently organized the elections are not convenient. Here in Colombia there are elections of conservatives and liberals, the two traditional parties, and other small political groups. Thus, they promise every day, for example, that they will reduce the prices of the articles, all the necessities...but, no, on the contrary, the prices increase more...the traditional politics always deceive us; we will reduce this, we will do the agrarian reform, we will give the indigenous population land, now we have a lot of experience..."

2) "The rich fight to stay with the land and the labour of the poor; and the poor, we fight, in order not to relinquish and to be able to improve our lives." (1973, p 9).

3) Forums for Human Rights.

4) "The fatherland come to be the product and the essence of the people who work and create: it is the nation itself. Therefore the resistance of CRIC is explicable and justified, as their struggle is not only for their own survival but also for the survival of the fatherland." (Fals Borda 1978, p 26).

5) "The only connection they (the workers) still have with the productive forces and their own existence, the work, have for them lost every similarity with personal activity and maintain their lives only to pauperize them." (Mega I,5, p 57 quoted in Israel 1977, p 66).

6) "...we do not have a sufficient number of schools, nor health care, nor roads nor land to work. The land plots that we have are too small to feed the children. Instead the rich, they that we work for, have all this, and much more. They have this because they live on our work." (CRIC 1973, p 3).
V SUMMARY

From certifying the need for a reappraisal of the traditional assumptions regarding the processes of economic development expressed by Portes/Canak (1981, p 244).

"The range of social relations of production in Latin American agrarian social structure encourages few hopes for social justice, economic security, and adequate sustenance for the mass of the population. This underlying reality, the enormous concentration of land tenure throughout Latin America, continues to define the opportunities and limits confronting the mass of the rural population."

I argue that my observations confirm that the wretchedness of the poor indigenous peasants does not derive its root-causes neither from lacking integration of the traditional sector of the national economy into the modern commodity producing sector nor does it depend on hindrances internal to the indigenous society such as fatalism, lack of innovativeness or other factors constituting a peasant subculture which is supposed to limit the progressive potential of the Indian.

Rather, as postulated, their dependent, subordinated economic participation is determined by the laws of the dominating mode of production, capitalism, and produces and reproduces the experienced network of economic, political and social deprivation. Hence, as by coercion, deprived of their access to the means - among which land should be considered as the most fundamental - necessary for realizing their own labour potential, they are continuously forced to transfer their energy, capacity and power to the dominating layers controlling the means of production and, consequently, the gateways to the bases for accumulating social power. This in turn means that the forces behind this depletion of resources from the bulk of indigenous campesinos at the same time also is continuously enforced and consolidated, in step with the succeeded accumulation of economic and political resources among the ruling elite.

Probably cultural factors per se, as for example, those tied to remaining subsistence patterns, can be antagonistic to the planned capitalistic development, but this does not mean that the explanation of the deprivation of the poor peasant therefore is to seek in their unwillingness to submit to whatever
changes and suggested programmes are initiated from above. Rather this suspiciousness and the resulting inertia must be perceived as a conscious resistance against precisely those mechanisms which generate poverty and threaten the physical and cultural existence of the Indian society.

When poor peasants raise objections to government policies of agrarian reform, for example, they do not oppose land distribution, but the intervention of state technocrats and bureaucrats, and the increased dependence upon capitalistic institutions; trying to escape the exploitive mechanisms of economic force over which they do not exert any control.

What we see accordingly, is the coexistence of pre-capitalistic and capitalistic modes of production. The non-capitalistic logic of subsistence production, evincing a certain potential of auto-exploitation, and remaining semi-feudal relations are embraced by the expanding capitalistic sector with the power to utilize the capability of these peasants to satisfy large parts of their reproductive needs themselves on their plots of land; allowing wages and prices on food stuffs and petty commodities produced by the Indians to be kept way below subsistence level.

The difficult thing in this context is the determination of the scope of semiproletarization as an aspect of the evident proletarization process. Reliable statistics are hard to find, but unquestionably few indigenous households are selfsupporting on their own plots of land, i.e. non-dependent on wage-work. Furthermore their need for cash to meet the necessities of industrial commodities forces these poor peasants to produce food and petty commodities for the market although the prices are very low compared with the prices they have to pay for processed goods as, for example, chemical fertilizers and pesticides, which are needed to counteract the exhaustion of the soil. Trapped in this simple reproduction squeeze (Bernstein 1979, p 427), evoked by the capitalistic integration of remaining pre-capitalistic subsistence production patterns the poor indigenous producers accordingly, although not fully proletarized, contribute to the accumulation of capital within the centers of economic and political power beyond the direct influence or control of the producers which suggests that these peasants all the same should be considered as wage-labour equivalents.
Thus I conclude that the poor indigenous peasants, despite their distinctive ethnic character, are subjected to the same exploitive powers as the rest of Colombian working class; that poverty is dependent on class-affiliation and prevalent capitalistic relations of production, and that their struggle for cultural reindivication must be combined with the class struggle in Colombia against the capitalistic mode of production, which implicitly also includes the elimination of precapitalistic modes as they are intimately associated with the exploitative potential of capitalism. Furthermore, class-affiliation determines the target, contents-options, and limits of participation.

We have seen that the poor indigenous peasants do participate both economically and politically, though the political participation is not always along conventionally established, so-called democratic routines. The basic problem detected is the discrepancy between the economic contributory participation of these peasants and their receptive participation, that they in their capacity as workers and direct producers economically contribute to the economic growth and the general progress of Colombia, but do not share in the fruits of these improvements; i.e. their receptive participation does not follow the pace of their contributions in labourtime, input costs, sweat, and drudgery, as they have no control and cannot influence the distribution of the collective and public goods, the production of which they have combined to.

Regarding their political participation, they are formally entitled to vote in elections and to join officially sanctioned participation programmes as, for example, Communal Action, but they are also very aware of the limitations of such activities to change their living conditions. Hence, the crux is not principally to promote and extend the systemic participation of the poor, but to promote their bargaining power. This is, however, something much more conflictive than the provision of means for formal institutionalized political participation as it implies the reallocation of vital resources towards the access of the bases for accumulating social power.

Thus the indigenous peasants explicitly consciently choose systemic participation, non-participation or counter-systemic participation considering the potential options, calculating the costs and the rewards in their search for means to counteract the destructive effects of the exploitation they are sub-
ject to. The way I interpret my data, however, is that these means for real participation are not something which will be given to the poor peasant voluntarily. They have to fight for it, which implicitly suggests that mobilization even if not always necessarily initiated from below, must be anchored as close to the practice of direct production and deprivation as possible to foster rural development (compare SIDA 1981, p 27 ff).

So far accordingly, everything they have obtained in terms of restitution of land and formation of cooperatives, as well as distribution of collective and public goods, as for example, health and education, which is urgently needed, they have attained only through their own obstinacy, mixing systemic instruments with less conventional tools of persuasion and expedition, as land occupations and demonstrations to call attention to acute evils and ill-treatments.

In line with this reasoning it is only in situations where these victories have been won, as expressed by the formations of empresas comunitarias and cooperatives, where we find explicit sources of faith in the future and feelings of progress. The sensation of experiencing the realization of one's own developmental power seems to be a very important incentive of inspiration to rise. This is an observation which I interpret to be another fundamental indicator of the significance of stimulating mobilization from below to promote rural development as an eradicative means against poverty.

Fully aware of the limited degrees of freedom caused by the unescapable economical and political determinants I finally venture to the following recommendations.

Popular participation is a key-factor to consider in the process of social and economic development. The target population must be able to exercise influence on the different levels of necessity formulation, planning, execution, and supervision. Which, as in the case of CRIC, implicates that autoinitiated mobilization and organization from below should be encouraged and supported instead of repressed, above all, because repression of organized efforts to overcome wretchedness and destitution disregards the developmental power of the human potential and hence impedes progress and instead contributes to the reproduction of poverty.
In the process of rural development, conditions must be created which makes it attractive (read profitable) to the small-holders to invest in change, that he benefits from his own work and is allocated resources which can be invested in his own future for his own well-being. Without sufficient access to for example land, new technology and credit constitute more of a risky trap than the means for a better future. In other words, the peasants need access to the bases for accumulating social power.

Measures to be taken in this direction in rural Cauca is, for example to:

- promote restitution and distribution of land through the effectuation of the agrarian reform, law 135, and the application of the protective principles of law 89: 1890 concerning the land of the resguardos.

- promote collective forms of production and the development of communal and intra-communal means of cooperation towards independence from brokers and intermediaries. This can be done, for example, through the supporting of empresas comunitarias, tiendas comunales, and other cooperatives on the different levels of production, distribution, commercialization, and consumption, in dialogue with the peasants.

- promote research on adjusted technology for the rugged terrain of the resguardos and the economic possibilities of the poor indigenous peasant.

- promote a low rate credit system for the small-holders which is flexible concerning the time periods of amortization payments and voluntarity tied to program of technical and educational assistance.

In other words, the mission is not so much a question of creating new bodies and channels for participation, as just letting the germinating indigenous mobilization live and act.
SAMMANFATTNING

I Inledning

Den extrema försakelsens fortbestånd bland latinamerikans fattigbönder är utgångspunkten för denna studie. Min avsikt är att blottlägga de fattigdomsgenererande mekanismerna i departementet Caucas indianska områden och undersöka formerna och förutsättningarna för det ekonomiska och politiska motstånd som indianorganisationen CRIC (Departementet Caucas Regionala Indianråd) initierat i området; underförstått att jag inte ansluter mig till de subkulturteorier om bönder som tillskriver dessa fatalism, bristande framåtanda och initiativförmåga och andra specifika egenskaper som "bromsande" faktorer i landsbygdsutvecklingen.

Fattigdom i det här sammanhanget är mer än relativ försakelse av fundamentala basbehov som uttrycker sig i termer av undernäring, brist på sjukdomar, undermåliga bostäder, analfabetism etc, dvs fattigdomens attribut. Fattigdomens centrala dilemma består snarare av den indirekta och direkta tvångsalieneringen av de indianska jordbrukarna från produktionsmedlen och därmed förutsättningarna att realisera den egna arbetskraftspotentialen. På detta sätt minskar successivt deras tillgång till fundamenten för ackumulation av social makt och därmed de legala resurserna för utövandet av inflytande över den egna situationen och möjligheten att påverka denna inom etablerade ramar och rutiner för demokratiskt deltagande.

Klasstillhörigheten är central som förklarande variabel. Fortfarande består olika rester av förkapitalistiska produktionsätt i form av bl a traditionella självförsörjningsjordbruk och semi-feodala produktionsenheter, men dessa samexisterar med penetrerande kapitalistiska produktionsformer och är underkastade kapitalismens lagar. De indianska fattigbönderna i Cauca konstituerar en subkultur inom den colombianska nationen samtidigt som de utgör ett etniskt stratum av arbetarklassens på landsbygden tillsammans med andra fattigbönder och jordbruksarbetare.

Ett vidgat folkligt deltagande uppfattas allmänt, mer eller mindre uttalat, som en oundgänglig ingrediens i den sociala och ekonomiska utvecklingsprocessen, och som ett nödvändigt medel i kampen mot fattigdomen (se t ex UN 1975, 1978: Miliband 1974). Detta innebär dock inte att de indianska fattigbönderna i Cauca är isolerade från det nationella samhällslivet i enlig-
het med moderniseringsparadigmens ansats som förklarar misär-
ren på landsbygden som bristfällig integration av det tradi-
tionella Colombia i det moderna. Utgångspunkten i detta arbete
är snarare att fattigdomens reproduktion är avhängigt just
det faktum att den indianska befolkningen är integrerad i den
nationella ekonomin och deltar bl a ekonomiskt som t ex pri-
märproducenter av livsmedel och som arbetare på större jord-
bruks, boskapsfarmer och i förädlingsindustrier. Formellt har de
även rätt att som rösterättiga deltaga politiskt i kommu-
na- la och nationella val, en rättighet som de alltmer sällan nytt-
jar, då de inte anser sig kunna påverka sina villkor den vägen
som förhållandena nu är i Colombia. De saknar förhandlingsre-
surser för att kunna utöva inflytande på fördelningen av kol-
lektiva och officiella varor och tjänster och får inte del av
det nationella framåtskridandets frukter som de bidragit till
genom sitt arbete. Det är med andra ord en klyfta mellan de
indianska fattigböndernas kontributiva respektive receptiva
deltagande, vars vidmakthållande genom direkt och institutiona-
liserat våld tvingar fram ett indianskt motstånd, ett mer eller
mindre antisystemiskt politiskt deltagande i riktning mot re-
ellt inflytande över allokeringen av produktionsmedel och kol-
lektiva och officiella varor och tjänster. Detta motstånd är
också riktat mot de antiparticipationsstrukturer (Pearse/Stiefel
1979) i samhället som motverkar reellt folktligt deltagande och
inflytande, t ex klasstruktur och byråkrati. Sålunda behöver
ett klyfta formellt politiskt deltagande inte betyda ett ökat
inflytande över centrala beslutsprocesser utan tvärtom kanske
innebära ett legitimierande av status quo.

Participationsbegreppet är användbart för att i ekonomiska och
politiska termer åskådliggöra både mekanismerna bakom försakel-
sens forstånd och det indianska motståndets signifikans i
den sociala förändringsprocessen.

För framställningen gäller följande centrala antaganden:

1. Trots kvadröjande element av förkapitalistiska produktions-
former är de indianska fattigbönderna funktionellt intregre-
rade i det kapitalistiska systemet och berövas genom sitt
ekonomiska kontributiva deltagande tillgång till fundamen-
ten för ackumulation av social makt. Den indianske fattig-
bondens elände i östra Cauca bestäms av hans position i
klasstrukturen som proletär eller semi-proletär.
2. Dessa indianers extra-legala, icke institutionaliserade, protestaktiviteter för att påverka fördelningen av kollektiva och offentliga varor och tjänster är att betrakta som legitima och nödvändiga former av politiskt deltagande för att övervinna den akuta försakelsen.

Mitt arbetet har metodiskt till stor del bestämts av dialogens och det direkta deltagandets principer som bl a utvecklats av de Silva mfl(1979). Dessa data har kompletterats med intervjuer och deltagande observation samt omfattande studier av publicerat material som behandlat bland annat de indianska fattigbönernas situation i Colombia och det ekonomiska respektive politiska deltagandets problematik i olika sammanhang.

II Överföring av Makt och Utarmning i Caucas Östra Landsbygdsregion

Cauca anses allmänt vara ett av Colombias mest traditionella och outvecklade departement (motsvarande provins). Fortfarande försörjer sig drygt 50 % av befolkningen på någon form av jordbruk. Med utvecklad infrastruktur och närhet till den snabbt växande jordbruksindustrin i Cauca kan man emellertid idag klart sköna den kapitalistiska penetrationsen av förkapitalistiska strukturer. Traditionella former av share-cropping aren­den och dagsverkeskontrakt ersätts t ex av kontantavtal och lö­neanställningar.

Ungefär 12 % av Cauca befolkning är indianer som med få undan­tag lever inom sina resguardos, jordområden som ursprungligen spanjorerna reserverade för den indianska befolkningen. Syftet var emellertid inte i första hand att garantera urbefolkningen jord och försörjning utan snarare att försäkra sig om den indianska arbetskraftens överlevnad samt att förenkla den administrativa kontrollen över indianerna och därigenom underlätta skatteindrivningen.

Redan under kolonisationen lades grunden till den indianska befolkningens fattigdom som den manifesteras idag. De spanska erövrarnas krav på tribut (skatt) och mitatjänstgöring på jordbruk och i gruvor berövade indianerna den överlevnadsbuffert de traditionellt producerade inom kommunen. Detta medförde en disintegration av det indianska samhället ekonomiskt, kulturellt och socialt.

Följden av detta har blivit att majoriteten av resguardos saknar tillräckligt med jord för att försörja sin befolkning. Cabildot, resguardots indianråd, har inga brukningsrätter att fördela till nya generationer av indianska jordbrukare. Det medför att de redan otillräckliga åkerlapparna delas upp i än mindre jordlappar. Minifundiostrukturen är med andra ord typisk för de indianska områdena i Cauca. Cirka 60 % av ägorna inom resguardos är mindre än 5 ha (tabell 8 a) och speciellt tydligt kan man ur skulla proletariseringens och semiproletariseringens tendenser i resguardos i närmare kontakt med civilisationens allfarsvägar.

De indianska fattigböndernas brist på odlingsbar jord tvingar många att komplettera familjens inkomst med dagsverken eller genom att erbjuda sin arbetskraft till någon med mer jord i form av ett share-cropping kontrakt. Undersysselsättningen, de låga lönerna och de för den jordfattige oftast mycket ofördelaktiga arrendevillkoren innebär att indianen genom sitt arbete i högre grad bidrar till arbetsgivarens än sin egen levnadsförbättring. Jordägaren behöver inte betala mer för den tillfälliga arbetskraften än vad skillnaden är mellan den anställdes nödvändiga behov för familjens reproduktion och vad denne med hjälp av familjen redan producerar för sin försörjning på sin jordlott. Detta pris är betydligt lägre än den totala reproduktionskostnaden för en helt proletariserad arbetarfamilj.

I allmänhet gäller dock att bristen på jord förhindrar den indianska befolkningen att investera sin arbetskraft i det egna samhället för sitt eget framåtskridande. Ersättningen för den försålda arbetskraftspotentialen är låg om man ser till köpkraften i de förtjänade slantar och tjänar endast till att hjälpligt överleva. Överhuvudtaget går 50-80 % av de indianska småbrukarnas inkomster till livsmedel och ju mindre mat man kan odla själv ju mindre pengar får man över till kläder och andra nödvändigheter (Mejia 1980, s 24 ff).


Den indianske småbrukaren saknar generellt resurser för att ta sig ur den enkla reproduktionens knipa (Bernstein 1979, s 427). De varor han kan producera betingar låga och fluktuerande priser på marknaden som han saknar möjlighet att själv kontrollera. Samtidigt medför bristen på jord och dess vikande produktiva förmåga, p g a den intensiva odlingen, krav på ökade insatser av dyra kemiska jordförbättringsmedel och insektsbekämpningsmedel, för att hålla avkastningen på en acceptabel nivå. Ökade produktionskostnader å ena sidan och minskad utdelning på det egna arbetet å andra sidan är indianbondens verklighet. Själv kan han inte realisera sin produktiva kapacitet, vars utvecklande kraft istället assimileras av kapitalägare och mellanhänder.
Colombianska Staten och CRIC

Den nationella integreringens politik i Colombia gentemot den indianska befolkningen går framförallt ut på att befordra den kapitalistiska utvecklingen i perifera områden för att minska klyftan mellan det traditionella och det moderna Colombia. På så sätt hoppas man kunna reducera fattigdomen bland de indianska fattigbönderna samtidsamt som man utvecklar den nationella ekonomin.

Premisserna för den här politiken, enligt ständigt återkommande formuleringar i t ex indianlagstiftningen, är respekten för urbefolkningens kulturella särart, samt beskyddet av jord och kultur och befrämjandet av urbefolkningens ekonomiska utveckling och sociala välfärd. Vidare vill man officiellt också gynna det folkliga deltagandet, och då t ex det indianska inflytandet genom ett nationellt råd för urbefolkningspolitik (Consejo Nacional de Política Indigenista).


Överensstämmelsen mellan de officiella målsättningarna, såsom de uptrycks i lagtexter och olika utvecklingsprogram, och indianpolitikens praktik är nära nog obefintlig. I botten ligger storsamhällets paternalistiska utgångspunkter. Dess intresse för de etniska minoriternas assimilering. Detta tar sig bl a uttryck i paragrafer som förordar uppdelning av resguardos i privatägda småbruk enligt kapitalistiskt produktionsmönster.

En mängd olika institutioner är verksamma i den ekonomiska integreringen av de indianska producenterna, tillika konsumenterna. Med olika medel som t ex kooperativa program (CECORA), teknisk assistans (ICA och INCORA) och krediter (Caja Agraria och INCORA) försöker man anpassa de indianska produktionsrutinerna till den nationella ekonominens behov. De

Departementet Caucas Regionala Indianråd (CRIC), är den viktigaste indianska organisationen i Colombia. CRIC är genom sin tidning Unidad Indígena (Indiansk Enighet) ett språkrör för den samlade indianska rörelsen i Colombia.

CRIC bildades 1971 med ett 7-punkts program som betonar kravet på jord och rätten att aktivt försvara och återupprätta sin kulturella existens. Medvetna om den indianska minoritetsställningen uttrycker de i sin politiska strategi nödvändigheten av en gemensam kamp med andra förtryckta och exploaterade sektorer av den colombianska befolkningen på socialistisk grund. Detta har föranlett myndigheterna att informellt betrakta CRIC som en del av den förbjuda oppositionen med politisk förföljelse av CRIC-ledare som omedelbar konsekvens.

CRIC prioriterar utvecklingen av det ekonomiska motståndet mot de negativa konsekvenserna av kapitalismens penetration. Genom att bilda lokala småkooperativa och kommunala handelsbodar för konsumtion och distribution sammanbundna av ett centralkooperativt i Popayan försöker de bl a eliminerar mellanhändernas möjligheter att sko sig på de indianska fattigböndernars arbete; Genom att organisera kollektiva brukningsenheter på restituerade jordområden avser de att funktionellt integrera den indianska traditionens värden och samarbetsmönster med de produktiva kraven för att avancera ekonomiskt och socialt. Dessa ansträngningar att stå emot de fria marknadsstrukturernas destruktiva konsekvenser för den indianska ekonomin kompletteras dessutom av alfabetiseringskurser och kurser i praktisk ekonomi, sjukvård och näringslära så långt nu resurserna och de frivilliga insatserna av utbildade medhjälpare räcker till.

IV Deltagandets Tvetydighet

Befolkningens politiska deltagande i ett land anses allmänt som önskvärd i en fungerande demokrati och avser generellt medborgarens rätt och skyldighet att påverka valet av representanter till politiska församlingar samt kontrollera deras ställningstaganden i beslutsprocesserna.
Ett omfattande aktivt politiskt deltagande behöver dock inte nödvändigtvis innebära stabilitet. Snarare menar flera statsvetare att en hög participationsnivå implicerar instabilitet och konflikt i samhället genom politiseringen av sociala förhållanden (Tingsten 1937; Milbrath 1965).

Samtidigt uppfattas idag folkligt deltagande som en nödvändig förutsättning i t ex utvecklingsländer för att klyftan mellan rika och fattiga ska kunna minska. Ett som kanske rättare sagt, för att de fattiga ska kunna minska klyftan till de rika. Sanktionerat deltagande uppifrån kan emellertid också vara strategiska eftergifter från makteliten i syfte att skänka legitimitet till det aktuella politiska systemet och status quo.


I linje med detta resonemang gäller i Colombia att röstdeltagandet är mycket lågt, i kongressvalen 1978 röstatade bara ca 30 % av de röstberättigade (UBV 1978). Missnöje med systemet, känsla av maktlöshet och oförmåga att påverka är tre viktiga anledningar till att indianerna avstår från att rösta. Deltagande i val betraktas som betydelselöst för att få till stånd förändringar. Snarare legitimerar deras röster det system och de förhållanden som undertrycker deras kamp för jord och kultur.

Graden av framgång genom systemiskt deltagande är beroende av ens position i klasstrukturen, vilket gör det svårt att rucka på maktelitens ackumulerade fördelar enbart genom folkligt systematiskt deltagande (Piven/Cloward 1979, p 3). Att fattiga befolkninggrupper inte deltar lika intensivt i de nationella politiska institutionerna enligt etablerade demokratiska rutiner, som de av systemet mer gynnade, är inte liktydigt med att de förra inte deltar alls. Men de söker sig andra mindre konventionella, semi-legala och även extra-legala vägar, för att försöka påverka sina villkor, och förbättra sina förhandlingspositioner. Protesten för att aktivera tredje part kan vara en väg för maklösa att förbättra sin förhandlings-
villkor (Lipsky 1968, p 1145). Protesten, ibland våldsam, är ofta en form av kollektivt deltagande då maktlösa människor söker en sista utväg för att påverka fördelningen av samhällets resurser. Resurser som de har bidragit till genom sitt kontributiva ekonomiska deltagande som arbetare och producenter av bl a livsmedel.

För CRIC:s vidkommande är jordockupationen en viktig form av politiskt deltagande för att påverka levnadsförhållanden. Ingenting av vad de uppnått idag t ex i form av restituerad jord, kollektiva brukningsenheter och kooperativ och därmed bl a förbättrad livsmedelsförsörjning och resurser till utbildning har de erhållit gratis utan bara genom sina aktioner, sitt autoinitierade deltagande under 10 år, vars pris varit högt i form av åtskilliga dödade och fängslade ledare.

Vi kan tala om tre interrelaterade nivåer av deltagande. För det första ekonomiskt deltagande som avser individens kontributiva insatser av arbetskraft och andra disponibla produktiva resurser. Socialt receptivt deltagande för det andra avser graden av tillgång till frukterna av det kontributiva deltagandet. Och för det tredje politiskt deltagande som utgörs av medborgarens både systemiska och extra-legala aktiviteter som påverkar eller avser att påverka fördelningen av kollektiva och offentliga varor (Olson 1965, p 14; Booth 1979, p 30) tillika med allokeringen av produktionsmedlen och fundamenten för ackumulation av social makt.

Genom sitt kontributiva ekonomiska deltagande överför de indianska primärproducenterna och arbetarna sin energi och produktiva kapacitet, d v s makt (MacPherson 1973), till makteliten, de som äger produktionsmedlen och därmed kontrollerar grindarna till fundamenten för ackumulerandet av social makt (Friedmann 1979). Genom denna överföringsprocess bidrar de indianska fattigbönderna mot sina egna intressen till att förstärka de krafter som ligger bakom deras utarmning.

På samma sätt kan systemiskt politiskt deltagande bidra till att konsolidera den här maktöverföringsprocessen och därmed fattigdomens reproduktion bland den indianska befolkningen. Systemiskt deltagande för den maktlöse innebär således inte endast begränsad möjlighet att påverka utan t o m motverka förändringar p g a att detta deltagandet legitimerar och befäster de strukturella förhållanden som producerar den maktlöses försakelser.
Begreppet sken-deltagande är härvidlag användbart för att närma sig dynamiken i fattigdomens reproduktion. Skendeltagande är att deltaga politiskt utan att kunna påverka, att deltaga produktivt utan att vara delaktig i arbetets frukter och att med sin produktiva möda i praktiken motverka realiserandet av den egna kapaciteten och utvecklingspotentialen genom att ens kraft assimileras och ackumuleras av dem med extraktiv makt.

I den här paradoxala situationen där kontributivt ekonomiskt deltagande motverkar reellt politiskt deltagande och därmed möjligheten att påverka och utöva inflytande över de kollektiva varornas distribution hittar vi anti-deltagandets kärna vars rörelseenergi genereras av det systemiska skendeltagandet. En anti-participatorisk process där det faktiska deltagandet underminerar det reella deltagandets fundament och på så sätt öppnar vägen för försakelsens reproduktion. Reellt folkligt deltagande bär i sig ojämlighetsregulerande kvaliteter och är därför oförenlig med avancerad kapitalackumulation som kräver och producerar ojämlighet.

### Table 1a Population in the Resguardos of Cauca, according to ethnic groups and zones (Census of resguardos in Cauca 1972, DANE 1978, p 20).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Zones</th>
<th>Paez 1</th>
<th>Guambiano 2</th>
<th>Name of Resguardo 3</th>
<th>Total 1-2-3</th>
<th>Total population*</th>
<th>Indigenous Population in %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Norte</td>
<td>473</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>481</td>
<td>565</td>
<td>85.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oriente</td>
<td>19 394</td>
<td>5 751</td>
<td>2 362</td>
<td>27 507</td>
<td>29 520</td>
<td>93.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tierradentro</td>
<td>13 441</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>13 706</td>
<td>15 192</td>
<td>90.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centro</td>
<td>2 407</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>10 841</td>
<td>13 410</td>
<td>14 922</td>
<td>89.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macizo</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4 666</td>
<td>4 684</td>
<td>5 005</td>
<td>93.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Cauca censado</td>
<td>35 724</td>
<td>6 072</td>
<td>17 992</td>
<td>59 788</td>
<td>65 204</td>
<td>91.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Includes person without information


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic Group</th>
<th>1964</th>
<th>1977</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Guambiano</td>
<td>8 811</td>
<td>9 106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paez</td>
<td>37 332</td>
<td>62 129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>13 352</td>
<td>26 797</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>59 495</td>
<td>98 034</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Percentage (%) of total indigenous population in Colombia: 22.1, 24.0
Table 2  Non-indigenous population in the resguardos (Census of resguardos in Cauca 1972, DANE 1973, p 27).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic Group</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mestizos</td>
<td>1760</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White or colorist</td>
<td>2524</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>385</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Without ethnic group</td>
<td>378</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Without information</td>
<td>362</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>5409</td>
<td>8.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3  Population in the Eastern Region of Cauca, according to municipalities and percentage of population in resguardos (SEPTA 1979 b, p 25).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Municipality</th>
<th>Total population in municipalities</th>
<th>Total population in resguardos</th>
<th>Population in resguardos in %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Paez</td>
<td>25 555</td>
<td>23 000</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inza</td>
<td>18 102</td>
<td>8 152</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toribio</td>
<td>18 000</td>
<td>16 633</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caldono</td>
<td>25 927</td>
<td>9 190</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jambulo</td>
<td>6 224</td>
<td>6 122</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Silvia</td>
<td>21 296</td>
<td>18 354</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totoro</td>
<td>9 229</td>
<td>3 854</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purace</td>
<td>8 968</td>
<td>4 922</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sotara</td>
<td>12 936</td>
<td>5 827</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>146 231</td>
<td>96 054</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4  Distribution of agricultural property in the Department of Cauca (Instituto Geografico Augustin Codazzi, quoted in Londono 1979, p 14).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Area in hectares</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>No Properties</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>No Proprietors</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Average in hectares</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Minifundio</td>
<td>285 349</td>
<td>22.45</td>
<td>97 981</td>
<td>82.02</td>
<td>98 496</td>
<td>81.02</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small farm</td>
<td>260 541</td>
<td>20.50</td>
<td>15 343</td>
<td>12.86</td>
<td>16 223</td>
<td>13.35</td>
<td>16.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle Farm</td>
<td>140 818</td>
<td>11.08</td>
<td>4 025</td>
<td>3.37</td>
<td>4 240</td>
<td>3.52</td>
<td>34.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latifundio</td>
<td>584 150</td>
<td>45.97</td>
<td>2 029</td>
<td>1.69</td>
<td>2 573</td>
<td>2.11</td>
<td>287.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1 270 858</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>119 375</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>121 582</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 5  Number and area of agricultural properties in Cauca according to size of holdings (Agricultural Census 1960-1970, quoted in DAHE 1978, p 107).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- 1</td>
<td>15 229</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>16 348</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>8 260</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>8 895</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>13.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 - 3</td>
<td>20 562</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>22 926</td>
<td>27.3</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>38 196</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>40 010</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 - 5</td>
<td>10 738</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>12 350</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>26.8</td>
<td>41 019</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>46 310</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>12.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 - 10</td>
<td>12 108</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>13 828</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>84 608</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>90 439</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>6.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 - 30</td>
<td>10 159</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>12 497</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>36.2</td>
<td>167 347</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>90 951</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>14.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 - 50</td>
<td>2 127</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>2 600</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>56.2</td>
<td>80 119</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>97 283</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>21.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50 - 100</td>
<td>1 543</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>1 952</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>27.0</td>
<td>103 667</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>125 719</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>21.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100 - 500</td>
<td>1 093</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1 304</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>32.8</td>
<td>212 083</td>
<td>22.1</td>
<td>237 526</td>
<td>21.7</td>
<td>12.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>500 -</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>248</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>90.1</td>
<td>223 782</td>
<td>23.3</td>
<td>255 455</td>
<td>23.4</td>
<td>14.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>73 753</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>84 058</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>959 081</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1 092 588</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>13.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 6  Distribution of agricultural property in the Eastern Region of Cauca (Instituto Geografico A, Codazzi 1978, quoted in Londono 1979, p 22).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area in hectares</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Properties</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Proprietors</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Minifundio</td>
<td>35 847 4902</td>
<td>8.90</td>
<td>12 701</td>
<td>74.67</td>
<td>12 792</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small Farm</td>
<td>64 582 8267</td>
<td>16.03</td>
<td>3 420</td>
<td>20.11</td>
<td>3 424</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium Farm</td>
<td>29 474 9125</td>
<td>7.32</td>
<td>432</td>
<td>2.54</td>
<td>480</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latifundio</td>
<td>272 959 7730</td>
<td>67.75</td>
<td>456</td>
<td>2.68</td>
<td>593</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>402 863 0024</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>17 009</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>17 289</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7  Variation of the number of properties 1963-1978 and variation of total area (DAIE, Agricultural Census 1973 and Instituto Geografico A. Codazzi 1978, quoted in Londono 1979, p 25).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>No of hectares recorded</th>
<th>Increase</th>
<th>No of declared properties</th>
<th>Increase</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1960</td>
<td>1978</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>1963</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern</td>
<td>138 760</td>
<td>184 972</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>25 618</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central</td>
<td>174 214</td>
<td>318 873</td>
<td>83.03</td>
<td>28 266</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern</td>
<td>214 801</td>
<td>364 148</td>
<td>69.52</td>
<td>56 696</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern</td>
<td>226 466</td>
<td>402 863</td>
<td>77.89</td>
<td>13 728</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8  Distribution of land in resguardo areas of Cauca, according to size of holdings (Census of resguardos 1972, DAIE 1978, p 129).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Families without land or less than 1 plaza (1)</th>
<th>1-5 plazas (2)</th>
<th>Total (1-2)</th>
<th>Plazas 5-30</th>
<th>30-50</th>
<th>50-</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>North</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>54.4</td>
<td>63.4</td>
<td>31.2</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centre</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>50.5</td>
<td>65.9</td>
<td>32.4</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>37.6</td>
<td>58.2</td>
<td>35.7</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macizo</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>56.9</td>
<td>66.3</td>
<td>32.1</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tierradentro</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>41.6</td>
<td>55.7</td>
<td>40.5</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 8b  Distribution of families in investigated areas according to size of land holdings
(Census of Pesuaredos in Cauca 1972, DANE 1978, p 110).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Municipality and resguardo</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Without land</th>
<th>Families with land according to size of holdings</th>
<th>Size of holdings</th>
<th>50 - 100 plazas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purace</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coconuco</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purace</td>
<td>359</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Silvia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guambía</td>
<td>1060</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>537</td>
<td>197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paez</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Topoima</td>
<td>209</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inza</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Andrés</td>
<td>206</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 9 Distribution of families in investigated areas according to form of land tenure
(Census of Resguardos, Cauca 1972, DANE 1978, p 126).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Municipality and Resguardo</th>
<th>Number of families</th>
<th>Families with land</th>
<th>Mixed</th>
<th>Distributed by the Cabildo</th>
<th>Private Ownership</th>
<th>Aparcería within Resguardo</th>
<th>Tenency within Resguardo</th>
<th>Tenency outside Resguardo</th>
<th>Aparcería outside Resguardo</th>
<th>Other colonization form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Puracé</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conconuco</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purace</td>
<td>359</td>
<td>346</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>320</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Silvia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guambía</td>
<td>1,060</td>
<td>959</td>
<td>378</td>
<td>556</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paez</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tumocoima</td>
<td>209</td>
<td>199</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inza</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| San Andrés                 | 206                | 184                | 7     | 133                       | 16                | 4                        | 11                       | 4                         | 1                          | 7                      | 1
Table 10 Agricultural Workers in investigated areas according to occupational positions (Census of Resguardos 1972, DANE 1978, p 145).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Municipality and Resguardo</th>
<th>Total Workers</th>
<th>Independent Workers</th>
<th>Day-wage Workers (Jornaleros)</th>
<th>Terrajeros and Aparcberos</th>
<th>Employed Workers</th>
<th>Non-paid family member</th>
<th>Others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Puracé</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conconuco</td>
<td>315</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>129</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purace</td>
<td>477</td>
<td>344</td>
<td>95</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Puracé</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Silvia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guambia</td>
<td>2 064</td>
<td>1 731</td>
<td>252</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paez</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inza</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Andrés</td>
<td>293</td>
<td>205</td>
<td>63</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The table presents the number of agricultural workers in different municipalities and Resguardos, classified by occupational positions.
Table II  Economic Active population in Resguardos according to principal occupational group and position (Census of Resguardos 1972, DANE 1978, p 119).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total Workers</th>
<th>Agricultural Workers</th>
<th>Employed and Professionals (1)</th>
<th>Workers in art and handicraft</th>
<th>Businessmen and salesmen</th>
<th>Service (2)</th>
<th>Extractive Workers</th>
<th>Others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Independent workers</td>
<td>17 248</td>
<td>16 601</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>242</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-paid family members</td>
<td>365</td>
<td>355</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Day-workers (Jornaleros)</td>
<td>2 920</td>
<td>2 663</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrajeros/Aparceros (3)</td>
<td>515</td>
<td>508</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>414</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>199</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worker</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Without information</td>
<td>848</td>
<td>547</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
<td>258</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>22 536</td>
<td>20 801</td>
<td>498</td>
<td>357</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>295</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>343</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1) Include public administration, teachers and technicians.
2) Include cooks, servants, caretakers, guides, policemen, canteen-keepers.
3) Aparceros and Terrajeros brought together because of the limited number.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation Group</th>
<th>Total number of active population</th>
<th>Extracted workers</th>
<th>Businessmen and professionals</th>
<th>Service men and women</th>
<th>Children</th>
<th>Students</th>
<th>Others</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pucaré</td>
<td>713</td>
<td>713</td>
<td>544</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conconuco</td>
<td>1,464</td>
<td>1,464</td>
<td>1,138</td>
<td>477</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1,261</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pucaré</td>
<td>2,931</td>
<td>2,931</td>
<td>2,471</td>
<td>2,064</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3,334</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Silvia</td>
<td>3,931</td>
<td>3,931</td>
<td>3,471</td>
<td>2,064</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4,522</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guantía</td>
<td>1,721</td>
<td>1,721</td>
<td>1,620</td>
<td>1,083</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3,064</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tungoima</td>
<td>1,721</td>
<td>1,721</td>
<td>1,620</td>
<td>1,083</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3,064</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inca</td>
<td>780</td>
<td>780</td>
<td>609</td>
<td>293</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2,775</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Andrés</td>
<td>780</td>
<td>780</td>
<td>609</td>
<td>293</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2,775</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 13  Class structure in Rural Colombia 1964 (Teoria y Practica No 8; 1976, p 94)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Social category</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>% in relation to proletarians</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Semiproletarians</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(- 3 Hectáreas)</td>
<td>411.181</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>40.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poor peasants</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campesinos pobres (3 a - 10 Hectáreas)</td>
<td>295.468</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>29.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium Farmers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campesinos medios (10 a - 30 Hectáreas)</td>
<td>182.130</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>18.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wealthy Farmers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campesinos ricos (JO a - 100 Hectáreas)</td>
<td>82.730</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>8.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agrarian Bourgeois</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gran Burguesia Agraria (100 a - 200 Hectáreas)</td>
<td>22.317</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terratenientes (+ de 200 Hectáreas)</td>
<td>20.595</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subtotal</td>
<td>1.014.421</td>
<td>42.1</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family workers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trabajadores Familiares</td>
<td>367.761</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>48.081</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workers</td>
<td>967.826</td>
<td>40.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (1)</td>
<td>2.398.089</td>
<td>99.7</td>
<td>(2)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1) Without considering the group: without informations.
   Se elimina el Grupo: Sin información.

2) Percentage not summing up due to approximations.
   Los totales no coinciden debido a las aproximaciones.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Export</th>
<th>Import</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>86,3</td>
<td>94,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1947</td>
<td>254,9</td>
<td>363,2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>513,0</td>
<td>547,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>704,0</td>
<td>688,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>3 300,0</td>
<td>2 100,0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## APPENDIX 2

### ABBREVIATIONS AND FOREIGN WORDS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ANUC</td>
<td>Asociación Nacional de Usuarios Campesinas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aparcería</td>
<td>Share-cropper agreement (p 44)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CGT</td>
<td>Confederación Nacional del Trabajo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIDA</td>
<td>Canadian International Development Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRIC</td>
<td>Consejo Regional Indígena del Cauca</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSTC</td>
<td>Confederación Sindical de Trabajadores de Colombia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTC</td>
<td>Confederación de Trabajadores de Colombia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CVC</td>
<td>Corporación Autónoma Regional del Valle del Cauca</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DANE</td>
<td>Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DAI</td>
<td>División de Asuntos Indígenas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department</td>
<td>Administrative province</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DNP</td>
<td>Departamento Nacional de Planificación</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRI</td>
<td>Desarrollo Rural Integrado</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Empresa</td>
<td>Community enterprise (p 131)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comunitaria</td>
<td>Community enterprise (p 131)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FANAL</td>
<td>Federación Agraria Nacional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IBRD</td>
<td>International Bank for Reconstruction and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICA</td>
<td>Instituto Agropecuario Colombiano</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICBF</td>
<td>Instituto Colombiano de Bienestar Familiar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDB</td>
<td>Inter-American Development Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDEMA</td>
<td>Instituto de Mercadeo de Agropecuario</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INCORA</td>
<td>Instituto Colombiano de la Reforma Agraria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INDERENA</td>
<td>Instituto de Desarrollo de Recursos Naturales Renovables</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jornalero</td>
<td>Day-labourer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panela</td>
<td>Sugar-cane product not fully refined</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Term</td>
<td>Definition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pesos</td>
<td>Colombian currency. In 1980 1 US dollar corresponded to about 40 pesos.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plaza</td>
<td>$6,400 \text{ m}^2$ ($80 \times 80 \text{ m}$)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reindivication</td>
<td>Re-establishment, restoration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SENA</td>
<td>Servicio Nacional de Aprendizaje</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SETPA</td>
<td>Secretaria Tecnica de Planeación Agropecuario</td>
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<td>Terraje</td>
<td>Semi-servile form of tenancy payment (p 44)</td>
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<td>UTC</td>
<td>Union de Trabajadores de Colombia</td>
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