Loaded Discourse

Hegemonic Manifestations concerning Turkey’s EU membership bid
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1. Introduction

“So we come to the conclusion that even if we meet all the conditions being put to us, the real argument against our membership will still be there. The most important decision in Luxembourg, I believe, is the construction of a new Berlin wall, a cultural Berlin wall.”

Turkish Prime Minister Ahmet Mesut Yılmaz, 1997
(Bilgin, Bilgiç 2012, 117)

Relationships between Europe and Turkey are an ancient phenomenon. Before the advent of the Republic of Turkey in 1923, the Ottoman Empire had established itself at the southeast borders of Europe, eventually occupying large areas of southeast Europe until it stood at the gates of Vienna where the expansion came to a halt in 1683. At Vienna it was struck back by European alliances and gradually over the next 200 years driven back to where it came from: the area we today know as Turkey. This marked the beginning of the end of the last eastern based, Muslim empire and the establishment of what was to become unparalleled European dominance. In 1699 the Treaty of Carlowitz demonstrated that the military threat posed by the Ottomans was declining. The cultural threat of the ‘Turk’ did, however, endure (Neumann 1999, 51-52).

In Turkey, as of 1923, a new epoch had come. The Kemalist regime and reformism basically indicated a change of identity for the people of Turkey. This political and cultural hegemony asserted itself on Turkish nation building and remained dominant until the 1970s (Sayyid 1993, 150). Turkey was to align itself with Europe in terms of politics, culture and religion. The Caliphate was abolished, replaced by parliamentary democracy. The Latin substituted the Arabic alphabet and modes of dress were to be westernized. Turkey was to undergo a rapid ‘modernization’ and Islam would lose its place in politics as well as its cultural dominance in civil society. In short, the Kemalist Hegemony entailed a radical westernizing programme (Sayyid 1993, 150).
There was, however, another Hegemony at work here, namely the ever-intensifying European Hegemony. In order to appreciate the political, cultural and indeed spiritual character of this domination, one needs only to consider the famous statement made by Mustafa Kemal upon acknowledging Western dominance: “there is only one civilization”. Claiming a certain degree of superiority over others might not be a foreign phenomenon. Acknowledging another’s undisputable superiority over oneself is an entirely different matter. The conclusion is somewhat obvious: Europe has held and still holds and exerts considerable hegemony over Turkey.

Today, Turkey stands on the doorstep for full admission into the European Union. In 1987 a full membership application was submitted but the process has been paralyzed by inconsistency, and vacillations on both parts have complicated matters further.

1.1. Problem of Study

There is nothing new, indeed controversial in claiming that Europe or the European Union is hegemonic in relation to Turkey’s membership bid. As already shown, Turkey has aligned itself considerably with Europe with regards to political system, culture and secularism. In addition Ottoman heritage consists of numerous accounts of struggles for recognition from the European Society. As early as in 1693 it was made clear that the Ottoman Empire had to denounce Islam before it could be considered ‘eligible’ for inclusion in the European Society and subsequently other demands towards conformity with Europe continued to surface (Neumann 1999, 51, 58). In short, Turkey has historically struggled for recognition as a legitimate member of the International Society.

Turkey is now a secular country by constitution. Paradoxically, demands of secularism are, however, still apparent in European discourse. As of 1993 the general scheme towards conformity is the Copenhagen Criteria, which in many ways operates as an instrument of hegemony as it dictates areas of reforms that are needed. It has however been used as criteria for all membership applicants since 1993. Turkey as such is no exception. Two aspects of this matter do, however, stand out: First, Turkey has anticipated full membership for almost 27 years since its application in 1987, some 18 years longer than the average ‘waiting time’ (9.07 years) for membership applicants (Levin 2011, 2-3). Second, questions can be raised as to which extent the Copenhagen Criteria is used exclusively and indiscriminately as an objective checklist for admission requirements (Levin 2011, 176, 184). This paper will argue that there are other factors at play here.
Firstly, I would suggest that dealing with the subject of Turkey’s membership bid to the EU entails taking stock of the of the historical and present-day hegemonic position of the EU. Every year Turkey comes under scrutiny as the European Commission presents its ‘Annual Progress Report on Turkey’ to the European Parliament. What follows is hefty debate in parliament, represented by a variety of perspectives contesting or advocating further accession. There is probably no better place to look for various configurations of hegemony than within these parliamentary debates. The debates themselves constitute certain discourses, simultaneously however they are informed by previous ones.

Secondly, in order to understand how the EU deals with the specific case of Turkey we need to examine and highlight how representations of the Turkish identity are positioned in relation to the European identity. I will suggest that there are powerful meta-narratives informing this process. In order to come to terms with these representations and meta-narratives, an appreciation of the asymmetric conditions of this relationship is needed. If serious about furthering Turkey’s admission into the EU, one needs to identify what hegemonic expressions might hinder this prospect. We cannot suffice to conclude that these are mere generalizations of the Turkish ‘other’, informed by previous meta-narratives about Europe and the ‘Rest’. What we need to do is to identify how these meta-narratives are constellated in hegemonic discourse.

1.2. Purpose of Study and Research Questions

The purpose of this study is to examine how hegemonic expressions manifest themselves in European Parliamentary debates with regards to Turkey’s admission into the EU, and in what ways these expressions are represented by those opposing further admission and those in favour. In addition the purpose is to investigate the meta-narratives that inform different hegemonic positions. The following questions need to be answered:

1. How does hegemony manifest itself in European Parliamentary debates?
2. In what ways do speakers opposing further accession and those in favour of further accession acquire hegemonic positions?
3. How do meta-narratives and representations of Turkey or the Turkish people inform the hegemonic positions?
1.3. Limitations

This study limits its analysis to the period from 2004 up until this day, 2014. This choice is motivated by the fact that in 2004 the European Commission recommended an opening of accession negotiations with Turkey. The empirical material examined in this study consists of two European Parliamentary debates concerning Progress Reports on Turkey that are issued by the European Commission. The first published Progress Report was in 2007 and the debate was held in 2008. The second debate analyzed in this study takes place in 2011, on the basis of the 2010 Progress Report.

1.4. Key Concepts

There are several concepts throughout this paper that need clarification. Most of these clarifications will appear continuously throughout the study, *hegemony* for instance will be discussed and defined below. At this stage, however, two important concepts need to be clarified:

**Meta-Narrative:** Systems of knowledge and beliefs, informing people of a specific historical and cultural development and what role certain groups of people occupied in this development.

**Representation:** A collective term indicating how something can be described or signified in a certain way as an image or perception. In addition representation can entail the act of speaking on behalf of someone else.

1.5. Outline of Study

Building on this introduction, this study will proceed into chapter two in which the theoretical framework of Hegemony, Eurocentrism and Orientalism will be discussed. An application of the theoretical tools will subsequently be presented before moving on to chapter three that will deal with the method of analysis. The chapter will present the method, provide examples of how analysis has been undertaken and present the material that will be examined. In addition, critical reflections on methodology will be discussed before introducing chapter four. In this chapter a background to the study will be presented, the empirical material will be summarized and an introduction to analysis is included. Chapter five is a presentation of the analysis and conclusions will be drawn at the end of this chapter. The final chapter discusses the analytical conclusions and provides suggestions for further research.
2. Theoretical Framework

2.1. Social Constructionism and Gramsci

Social Constructionism takes a critical position with regards to knowledge that we take for granted. It objects positivism and empiricism and argues that conventional knowledge is never produced from an entirely objective and unbiased perspective, rather it is the product of what we perceive to exist and to be true. Hence, the very idea of truth has to be considered historically and culturally specific, implying that any meta-narrative claiming universalism should be countered critically (Burr 1995, 3, 4). Systems of knowledge and beliefs are constructed and sustained by historically and culturally specific social processes; therefore they can never claim universal validity. Rather, what we need to do is to understand how these systems generate certain actions and beliefs, whilst, at the same time, inactivate others (Burr 1995, 4-5). In other words, we need to appreciate what relations of power inform processes of constructing reality and representing the world. The challenge, then, becomes fundamentally ontological as we are posed with the question of what is and what is not socially constructed, and, regarding epistemology, how can we attain knowledge of these processes and where this knowledge comes from (Bergström, Boréus 2000, 21). Answering these questions is no simple matter and is indeed beyond the scope of this paper. What we can conclude so far, however, is that there are relations of power at work in processes of constructing and representing reality. Accepting this, I would suggest, makes a good starting point into an inquiry that concerns hegemonic manifestations and what meta-narratives inform these. Indeed, as Antonio Gramsci demonstrated, if reality is structured by uneven relations of power, within which the dominant forces control certain perceptions of reality, then certainly this merits a study in its own right (Hay 2002, 214).

2.2. The Concept of Hegemony

It must be made clear that there are several interpretations of Gramsci and this also goes for the definition of the concept of Hegemony. Firstly, Gramsci himself is often inconsistent in the way he uses and defines terms in his own Prison Notebooks. The editors and translators of the 1971 English translation of Selections from the Prison Notebooks show examples of this inconsistency while also raising certain problems as to how to translate central terms into
English in a satisfactory manner (Gramsci 1971, 55). The fact that Gramsci wrote most of the Prison Notebooks under heavy censorship whilst incarcerated obviously complicates matters further. Gramsci’s writings were primarily concerned with political matters of a domestic character. As such, one can wonder, how does Gramsci become relevant for studies at the level of International Relations? Or, in the case of this study why is Gramsci’s concept of hegemony relevant for understanding relations between present day EU and Turkey?

First, Gramsci’s prison notebooks deal considerably with the historical, political and social circumstances of ‘the subaltern social groups’ in relation to ‘ruling’ or ‘dominant’ groups. “Subaltern groups (Gramsci argues) are always subject to the activity of ruling groups” (Gramsci 1971, 55). With reference to Eurocentrism and Orientalism, discussed later in this paper, Turkey can certainly be considered a subaltern country in relation to the EU, consequently there are certain similarities to be drawn here. However, focusing on this part of Gramsci’s theories would imply this study to take up the perspective of Turkey, which is not the case. The perspective of this paper is of its hegemonic counterpart, the EU.

Secondly, Gramsci argued that the logic of fundamental social relations (within a state) also can be ascribed to an International level, i.e. that relations between states follow the logic and structures of social relations domestically. States, he argues, also participate in hegemonic international systems in which struggles for independence and sovereignty take place (Gramsci 1971, 176). Robert Cox has argued to this point that Gramsci here was referring to that which we today identify as dependency (Dependency Theory), i.e. that Gramsci understood that what happened in Italy was distinctly influenced by external factors and that ‘weaker’ states enjoyed a limited sense of sovereignty as the hegemonic powers diffused their ideological practices to the ‘periphery’ (Cox 1983, 169-170). Hence, the ‘subaltern group’ might also be coined the ‘periphery’, having its autonomy curtailed by the ‘centre’. Sharing this understanding of International Relations are critics of Orientalism and Eurocentrism, on which I will elaborate later.

Bridging the concepts of the ‘subaltern groups’ and ‘hegemony’ on the international level, one might say that Turkey takes the role of a ‘subaltern group’ and has engaged in a struggle for recognition – a struggle which is oriented towards the hegemonic Europe (recall the quote about subaltern groups always being subject to ruling groups). In order for a group to become hegemonic, Gramsci argues, it needs to be ‘leading’ and ‘dominant’. This should not merely be understood in material capacity but in broader terms. Firstly, the group (state) must exercise ‘leadership’ over its allies and secondly it must
‘dominate’ its enemies, in other words hegemony is based on ‘consent’ and ‘coercion’ (Gramsci 1971, 57, 170). Hegemony, as such, should not be understood as dictatorship but rather as leadership and dominance.

According to Gramsci, the West (Europe) has exercised dominance to such and extent that the notion of the “East” and “West” divide has become generally accepted as a categorical truth about the material world (Gramsci 1971, 447). Accompanying this divide are attributes subscribed to the subaltern groups (non-Europe) and the centre (Europe). Gramsci makes a good illustration that ridicules this idea of East and West:

“Obviously East and West are arbitrary and conventional, that is historical, constructions, since outside of real history every point on the earth is East and West at the same time.” (Gramsci 1971, 447)

Gramsci argues that it is universal hegemony on the part of the West that has enabled this notion to be accepted as true. The implication of the East and West divide is not so much geographical as it is cultural. As such, cultural differences become manifested not in geography but in history (Gramsci 1971, 447). History, mainly written by European elites, hence becomes an instrument of Western hegemony that constructs and represents the world. This final point makes the theoretical offset of this paper. It should be noted that for Gramsci, hegemony is intimately associated with hegemonic struggle between groups, revolution as well the dominant capitalist mode of production. The potential for hegemony exists by virtue of an unawareness of the processes in which power relations and social structures shape social practices. The possibility for a hegemonic condition arises when prevailing social beliefs go unchallenged even though one social group is subordinate another (Bergström & Boréus, 2012 p. 372). For the purpose of this study, however, I will focus upon and operationalize hegemony as a condition of power that has enabled, and still enables, Europe to construct and represent non-Europe in general, Turkey in particular. Instruments of this hegemony are the doctrines of Eurocentrism and Orientalism to which I will now turn.

2.3. Eurocentrism

According to James Morris Blaut, arguably one of the most influential scholars dealing with the issue, Eurocentrism is “...a label for all the beliefs that postulate past or present superiority of Europeans over non-Europeans (and over minority people of non-European descent).” (Blaut 1993, 8) Blaut argues that Eurocentrism should not merely be considered as prejudice or attitude like for example racism. Rather it is to be understood and dealt with as a
scientific and scholarly practice based on ‘empirical facts’ that usually unprejudiced and educated Europeans accept as ‘true’ (Blaut 1993, 9). Consequently, Blaut argues, the problem becomes fundamentally epistemological as renouncing Eurocentric discourse and history is to somehow reject what has been accepted as ‘empirical facts’. Blaut, calling it the “colonizer’s model of the world” argues that Eurocentrism is a unique and extremely powerful set of ideas because it intellectually and scholarly provides a rationale for European exceptionalism and indeed expansionism. As such it has been instrumental for the social sciences of the European elite (Blaut 1993, 10). Blaut argues that Eurocentrism has evolved into a structured and refined framework consisting of smaller theories of history, geography, psychology, sociology and philosophy. He calls this framework Diffusionism:

“Diffusionism is grounded, as we saw, in two axioms: (1) Most human communities are uninventive. (2) A few human communities (or places, or cultures) are inventive and thus remain the permanent centers of culture change, of progress. At the global scale, this gives us a model of a world with a single center – roughly, Greater Europe – and a single periphery; an Inside and an Outside.” (Blaut 1993, 14).

According to Blaut, Diffusionism consists of some fundamental arguments about the characteristics of ‘Center’ and ‘Periphery’ and their interaction. First, Europe is ‘historical’, that is, naturally endowed for change, progress, innovation and modernization. This is because of some intellectual or spiritual (or both) trait of the European man, mind or spirit. These characteristics lead to “…creativity, imagination, invention, innovation, rationality, and a sense of honor or ethics” (Blaut 1993, 15). Second, the periphery is ‘ahistorical’, naturally stagnant, unchanging and constrained by tradition and backwardness. The periphery’s non-progress is because of a lack or an absence of the same traits that give Europe its exceptionalism. The argument here is that rationality in the form of “proper ideas and spiritual values” are basically non-existent outside Europe. Thirdly, the most common way in which the periphery develops is through diffusion of Europe ideas, innovation and indeed European people. This clearly indicates ‘the European’ as the bearer of progress and rationality, simultaneously justifying and ‘naturalizing’ colonialism by introducing civilization. Four, exploitation of colonies and the colonized peoples is morally justified because European diffusion has introduced civilization to the colonies. As such the extraction of material wealth from non-Europe to Europe is considered nothing more than ‘fair’ payment for the gift of civilization (Blaut 1993, 16). Finally, the logic of diffusionism asserts that any ideas that diffuse into Europe from non-Europe “…must be ancient, savage, atavistic, uncivilized, evil – black magic, vampires, plagues, “the bogeyman”, and the like.” The idea is
that the farther away from Europe, the more backward and traditional societies we encounter. These societies reflect earlier periods of history, culture and development and diffusion operates like rings in the water, successively spreading outwards. Cultural evolution, diffused from Europe, hence reaches the closest areas first, before moving on to farther regions. Cultural encounters and exchange with these areas consequently entails the risk for counterdiffusion of non-European ideas and traits like the abovementioned into Europe (Blaut 1993, 16-17).

Blaut argues that Eurocentrism in the form of Diffusionism has survived as a doctrine up until the time of writing his book in 1993. He shows how classical biological racism was an essential belief in sustaining the notion of European supremacy during the first half of the 20th century. Eurocentrism did, however, not lose its potency as classical racism became increasingly unpopular. Rather, it lived on through a kind of ‘cultural racism’, partly based on the writings of Max Weber who claimed a certain uniqueness of the European mind and spirit. Central to this point was the notion of ‘European Rationality’, a general assumption that the European had always been slightly more rational than the non-European and consequently, somewhat more progressive (Blaut 1993, 64).

There have been attempts to justify Eurocentrism by arguing that it is nothing more than common ethnocentrism – in other words that there is nothing extraordinary in claiming a certain exceptionality of a cultural or/and national identity of which one is part. Indeed, there is nothing strange about ethnocentrism as such. It is quite common that ethnic groups assert themselves in comparison to other groups, attributing certain (good) characteristics to one’s own group and (worse) characteristics to the ‘other’ group. Following this reasoning, Eurocentrism can be countered by its opposite, for example “…that racism is countered by reverse-racism, orientalism is countered by occidentalism, and so on.” (Sayyid 1997, 133-134) Bobby S. Sayyid argues, however, that this kind of reasoning is based on an under appreciation of the asymmetrical relationship of power that is one of the cornerstones of Eurocentrism. For example, claiming that Eurocentrism is countered by anti-Eurocentrism is to suggest that the relationship of this interaction is symmetrical with regards to power and the formation of identity. This is to underestimate the problem, because constructing the non-European subject (recall the less rational individual) deprives this subject of autonomy as it is based on “…an inversion of the dominant subject position.” (Sayyid 1997, 134) Consequently, the non-European becomes a subordinated subject whose subjectivity is exhausted by the subaltern position. In other words, the non-European only exists by virtue of the hegemonic discourse that has created him. Thus, as a discourse, this is not merely a matter
of knowledge and generalizations about non-Europe as opposed to Europe – it is also a matter of power, of an asymmetrical relationship in which every stereotypical counter-representation of Europe by the subaltern functions as a reaffirmation of that asymmetry. Put differently, resisting European or indeed Western hegemony is to expand the articulation of that very hegemony (Sayyid 1997, 134-135). This is clearly one of Eurocentrism’s and Western imperialism’s greatest achievements: discursively represented by its champions, and sometimes its opponents, it has attained a level of universality, which enables it to consider other areas as ‘particular’, and for example from a normative point of view make judgments regarding specific cases. In the case of Turkey, or other predominately Muslim societies, the case is often made that all people should be allowed to practice their own religion without discrimination, or indeed that the state should be secular in order to ensure human rights because there is a level of incompatibility between Islam and human rights that cannot be bridged (Sayyid 1997, 138). Aligning with the West is not just a possibility and in some cases a must for development. It is also a natural historical path towards respect for human rights, rule of law and the like that everyone must take. Eurocentric universality thus also becomes a historical universality, implicating a specific path towards progress and modernization that is akin to that of Europe. This is what ‘modernization’ in general entails.

According to Blaut, ‘Modernization’ became the new form of Eurocentric Diffusionism after the world wars in the end of the 1940s. This doctrine basically claimed that all past and present colonies had achieved social and economical progress via diffusion of modern economy, modern good governance, modern technology and infrastructure and so on, which had been provided by the colonial power. Eurocentric Diffusionism in this post world war era has largely consisted of an idea that modernization diffuses politically (Rule of Law, Good Governance Programmes), economically (Free Market economy) and intellectually (Political Theory, Development Theory) to the lesser-developed countries in order to enhance living conditions and install progress (Blaut 1993, 28-29). Blaut concludes, however, that despite obvious changes to classical Eurocentric diffusionist discourse, many basic propositions are still intact. We still believe that there is an ‘Inside’ and an ‘Outside’ with inherent characteristics. To some extent, we still attribute our European characteristics to past exceptionality with regards to rationality and spirit, inventiveness and creativity, democracy, human rights and good governance. In contrast ‘the outside’ is often represented as somewhat opposite. Obviously, we now acknowledge the impact of colonialism. But the heritage of Eurocentric discourse is still apparent.
2.4. Orientalism

The 1973 book *Orientalism* by Edward Said argues that the Western world has created a certain representation of the Orient, based on a culturally and socially formulated set of ideas. The purpose of this representation has largely been to create an image of the East as exactly opposite to the West, in addition enabling the West to dominate and restructure the Orient. This is done by attaining knowledge of the Orient and applying the knowledge in a scholarly practice dedicated to: (1) dominating the Orient, (2) restructuring it and (3) having authority over the Orient (Said 2003, 3). The ontological and epistemological foundations of Orientalism rest on a fundamental distinction drawn between the Orient and the West (Said 2003, 2).

Edward Said who has been a leading figure in framing debates regarding representations of the Orient argues that knowledge is never apolitical, thus challenging the liberal consensus regarding objective knowledge, which, he argues, ignores the fact that production of knowledge is always more or less political. The scholar, he says, is never entirely detached from social and political circumstances of life nor can he be disconnected from involvement in a certain part of society, i.e. being member of a political class, sharing a set of beliefs and holding a certain social position. Indeed if this is true, he adds, never can an American or a European study the Orient without being consciously or unconsciously informed by his own position (Said 2003, 10-11). Consequently a scholar may approach his study in a more or less objective manner, never however succeeding in complete alienation of his own political, social, cultural or religious position.

For Said, knowledge gives power and authority and consequently the Orientalist science and literature has been practiced as such. For Europe, attaining knowledge about the Orient has never merely been motivated by curiosity; rather it has been accompanied by a political agenda of governing the Orient. According to Said, the intensification and reinforcement of Orientalism as a scientific and literary practice coincided with the rapid expansion of European control and diffusion of institutions between 1815 and 1914. During this period European colonial rule increased from 35 percent to 85 percent of the world’s surface (Said 2003, 41). As an intellectual power and political practice it grew considerably during this period. Obviously some Orientalists were driven by curiosity but what Said argues is that Orientalism as a system of thought and representations was never allowed to develop entirely unchecked. Ultimately, he argues, it was a system of ideas and representations governed by
certain limitations of thought and imagination. One of the reasons was simply the fact that many Orientalists knew too little about the Orient and in some cases what they knew they were constrained from saying. Because in the end Orientalism served as a political vision of reality, its structure enhancing the incompatible difference between ‘us’ (Europe) and ‘them’ (the Orient) (Said 2003, 43).

Defining ‘them’ Orientalists used ‘us’ as the point of reference, i.e. their barbarianism or backwardness compared to our civilization and progress. In some cases the Orient was acknowledged to have had some kind of former glory in science and civilization, but to have lost it. Rhetorically, the job for the Orientalist was in this case to help the Orient reclaim its former glory. In other cases they never had a civilization at all. In this case the plight of Europe was quite obvious: They couldn’t govern themselves. They needed us (Said 2003, 79).

This ‘us’ and ‘them’ analogy is perhaps the most important component of Orientalism. According to Said, the study of Orientalism as it has been practiced has entailed a polarization of the distinction between the West and the East: “... the Oriental becomes more Oriental, the Westerner more Western – and limit the human encounter between different cultures, traditions and societies.” (Said 2003, 45-46) Intrinsic to Orientalism is European or Western supremacy in thought, science, rationality, religion and culture. In fact, defining the Orient as the very opposite of the Occident leaves the people of the Orient without any of the positive traits of European/Western civilization. This is the logical necessity of Orientalism. Indeed, if they are so different from us, they can never be ascribed the same traits as we possess. If we are liberal they must be non-liberal, if we are scientific they must be superstitious, if we are peace-loving they must be violent etc (Said 2003, 49). This has been a general condition for the Orient for a long time. As knowledge of the Orient is generated out of cultural and political strength and conditions of domination on the part of the West in relation to the Orient, this very same knowledge somehow creates the Orient, its people and its culture. Basically, Said argues, the Oriental has been “... contained and represented by dominating frameworks.” and that it is cultural domination that has enabled this (Said 2003, 40). Adding to this, he concludes that it is cultural hegemony at work that has given Orientalism as a system of knowledge and beliefs its persistency throughout history (Said 2003, 7).
2.5. Application of Theoretical Framework

As mentioned above, Hegemony will be operationalized as a condition of power that has enabled, and still enables, Europe to construct and represent non-Europe in general, Turkey in particular.

There is a strong link between discourse and hegemony. Discourse can be an instrument of hegemony or/and a product of hegemony. In this paper, the relationship works both ways. First, as an instrument of hegemony, discourse will be considered more or less effective dependant on to what degree it sustains and reproduces ideological or cultural dimensions of hegemony (Discursive Practice). According to Norman Fairclough, discourse has this sustaining and reproductive capacity when it is articulated in conventional ways (Fairclough 2010, 129). When rendering a discourse conventional, I will use Gramscis’ definition, implying that it is historically and culturally constructed (Gramsci 1971, 447). On the basis of the theoretical framework of this paper, I will then consider a discourse conventional on the basis of how it sustains and reproduces the systems of knowledge and beliefs (meta-narratives) and representations of Eurocentrism and Orientalism. Second, discourse can be considered a product of hegemony, when it represents a certain ontological/epistemological system of knowledge and belief (meta-narratives) that holds privilege to construct and represent the world (Social Practice).

For analytical purposes I have drawn a distinction between Eurocentrism and Orientalism. Certain reservations should be made on this matter, as Eurocentrism and Orientalism frequently overlap in discourse and propositions (Blaut 1993, 21). Basically, one could argue, they are part of the same system of Western Hegemony, culturally, politically as well as intellectually. Sometimes, however, when encountering propositions or claims of these meta-narratives, we fail to identify them as anything other than ‘generalizations’, ‘prejudice’ or even ‘racism’. The purpose of this study is, however, to provide a more profound understanding of how these meta-narratives actually operate, to what extent they can be distinguished from each other and how they inform hegemonic manifestations. As such, it is suitable to analyze them as separate meta-narratives.
3. Method of Analysis

3.1. What is Discourse and Discourse Analysis

Discourse can be considered as a set of written or spoken statements, occurring in a specific social context. In addition, discourse can also be the implicit or explicit rules that govern what can and cannot be said or written in the context in question (Bergström & Boréus 2000, 17). According to Ruth Wodak, discourse is also as “…a way of signifying a particular domain of social practice from a particular perspective.” (Wodak 2003, 135) Wodak adds to this that there is a dialectical relationship between discourse and the specific context (situations, institutional structure and social structures) in which it is embedded. In other words, discourse informs and influences discursive and non-discursive social and political procedures, while at the same time discourse is influenced by institutional, political and social settings (Wodak 2003, 135).

Discourse Analysis (DA) generally entails the study of language use in all its possible forms. Following the logic above about discourse influencing and being influenced, it follows that language is constituted within a social context, but language also constitutes the context as social phenomena like identity, relations and beliefs to a big extent are formed via language. Discourse in general has certain implications by recommending certain actions and practices whilst excluding others (Bergström & Boréus 2012, 378, 381).

Within DA the distinction between ‘object’ and ‘conceptions of object’ become less clear because of the dialectical nature of this relationship (Bergström, Boréus 2012, 354-355). In addition DA is interested in power relations in an emancipatory sense. It is argued that we can reproduce ‘general orders’ by acting or speaking in a certain way, or we can change ‘general orders’ by usage and application of new discursive/social practices. A focal point of basically all DA is trying to unravel a certain discourse and identifying the implications of the discourse by showing what conditions of power and social practice it entails.

3.2. Critical Discourse Analysis

According to Norman Fairclough discourse operates as representing the world, signifying the world and constituting and constructing the world in terms of meaning. Three different
aspects make out the constructive effects of discourse: First, discourse contributes to the construction of ‘social identities’, ‘subjects’ and various types of ‘selves’. Second, discourse is part of the construction of social relationships between people and thirdly, discourse is part of constructing systems of knowledge and beliefs (meta-narratives). Fairclough argues that these effects correspond to what he calls the ‘identity’, ‘relational’ and ‘ideational’ functions of language. These functions are defined as follows:

“The identity function relates to the ways in which social identities are set up in discourse, the relational function to how social relationships between discourse participants are enacted and negotiated, the ideational function to ways in which texts signify the world and its processes, entities and relations.” (Fairclough 1992, 64)

For doing discourse analysis Fairclough uses a three-dimensional model based on the levels of Discursive Practice, Text and Social Practice. Discursive Practice on the one hand contributes to reproduce social identities, relationships and systems of knowledge and beliefs, while on the other hand it may contribute to transform these factors (Fairclough 1992, 65). This depends on whether or not the discursive practice at hand is ‘inventive’ or ‘reproductive’ that is, using discourse in a new way or conventional (historically and culturally constructed) way. Politically, the most common discursive practice does however reproduce and naturalize power relations and ideologies conventionally. Central to the discursive practice are inquiries into how texts/discourses are produced, distributed and consumed (Fairclough 1992, 67, 78). However, when analyzing on the level of discursive practice Fairclough usually starts of from a linguistic starting point in texts, focusing on what other discourses the text draws upon (interdiscursivity) and how the texts draw on other texts (intertextuality). According to Fairclough, a high level of interdiscursivity (the text draws significantly on other discourses) is associated with change, while a low level of interdiscursivity usually reproduces the established order (Jørgensen, Phillips 2002, 82). That, which somehow binds different elements of discursive practice together, is ideology. Fairclough argues firstly that ideologies are ways of signifying and constructing reality, the physical world, social relations and identities and secondly, that ideologies are built into conventions of beliefs and knowledge in more or less naturalized and automatized ways. This has two consequences: First and obviously, discourse and practice are often ideological. Secondly, however, people are often unaware of the ideological dimensions and implications of their own practice. Fairclough adds to this point that ideologies embedded in discursive practice become most efficient when they are considered ‘common sense’, or reversely (drawing on Gramsci) ‘common sense’
naturalizes and automatizes ideology (Fairclough 1992, 90, 87, 92). In the case of this study, statements will be considered as more or less ideological practice and interdiscursivity can be considered a part of that practice.

On the textual level Fairclough emphasizes on a range of aspects that are important for analysis. Text analysis can, according to Fairclough, be structured around four main aspects of analysis. These are vocabulary, grammar, cohesion and text structure (Fairclough 1992, 75). Fairclough argues that texts have multidimensional functions. The main unit of grammar, for example, is clause, which holds “...a combination of ideational, interpersonal (identity and relational), and textual meanings.” (Fairclough 1992, 76) In effect, this means that the choices made on how to design and structure a certain statement also include choices on how to signify and construct social identities, social relationships, knowledge and beliefs (Fairclough 1992, 76). As such, the micro aspects of texts have certain implications for the macro level construction and understanding of the world. Without going in to further detail (see below) I will use the grammatical tool of modality for analysis in this study.

The final stage of analysis is at the level of the Social Practice. Here we look at the context of which the Text and Discursive Practice are part. Fairclough is not clear on how to proceed with analysis on this level but he makes clear that the objective is to specify the characteristics of the social practice to which the discursive practice belongs. This provides ground for explaining the nature of the discursive practice, and reversely the influence of the discursive practice on the social practice (Fairclough 1992, 237). If we consider the social practice to consist of a network of discourses, then we can investigate as to what kind of network the discursive practice belongs (Jørgensen, Phillips 2002, 86). In the case of this study, considering political statements on Turkey from the level of social practice, we then need to ask where these statements come from, i.e. to what network of discourses they belong, as well as what structures, identities, beliefs, ideologies and representations inform the statements. Hence, the aim of analysis at this level is to identify the discursive and non-discursive structures and socio-cultural relations that constitute the broader context of the discourse (Jørgensen, Phillips 2002, 86). In other words, the aim is to appreciate the hegemonic relations and structures that exist as foundations for discussing Turkey’s accession into the EU.
3.3. Application of Critical Discourse Analysis

In this study Norman Fairclough’s three-dimensional model of analysis will be applied. Fairclough has himself suggested a rather liberal approach to his own model (Fairclough 1992, 231-232; Jørgensen, Phillips 2002, 76), i.e. that the application should be adapted in a way that is relevant for the specific purpose of the study. The research questions of this study inquire in to manifestations of hegemony, how and by whom these are expressed and what representations or meta-narratives inform them. All three dimensions of Fairclough’s model will be used for analysis. Starting out on the level of Social Practice, the discourse will be embedded within the theoretical framework, in other words I start out by analyzing the text on the basis of hegemony, Eurocentrism and Orientalism. Subsequently, following Fairclough’s suggested structure, analysis of the material will proceed in steps as follows:

3.3.1. Analysis of textual level: Modality

Modality takes part in constructing social relations and represents the interpersonal function of language. As such it can take the form of an objective or subjective statement on a certain issue or with regards to proposition (Fairclough 1992, 158). When subjective, modality signifies that the speaker expresses affinity to what he is saying, i.e. he or she shows that it is his perspective that is being expressed. Using objective modality, on the other hand, makes us wonder whether the speaker is expressing his own perspective or a universal perspective. Objective modality as such often implies a certain position of power, and modality can be considered a way of signifying the world and social relations (Fairclough 1992, 159, 160). Modality entails many features but for the purpose of this paper I find it sufficient to focus upon how the occurrence of modality enables the speaker to control “representations of reality.” (Fairclough 1992, 236) Using Faircloughs checklist the following questions need to be asked:

• What kinds of modalities are most common in the text? For example: “Truth”, “Categorical”, “Facts”
• Are the modalities mostly objective or subjective?
3.3.2.  *Analysis of the Discursive Practice: Interdiscursivity*

Analysis on the level of Discursive Practice might entail a long range of features. I will however focus upon interdiscursivity as I consider it most relevant for questions concerning hegemony and how it might be reproduced. This will entail inquiry as to what kind of discourse(s) the statement refers to and draws upon as well as whether or not it does this in a relatively conventional or innovative manner (Fairclough 1992, 232). Specifically I will examine if and how the statements draw upon the discourses of Eurocentrism and Orientalism.

3.3.3.  *Analysis of the Social Practice*

At this level we need to draw upon other non-discursive aspects of the context to which the statements belong. This means integrating the analysis with the theoretical framework of Hegemony, Eurocentrism and Orientalism. According to Fairclough it is vital to focus upon aspects of ideological and hegemonic effects. In practice, this will be done by identifying:

1. “Systems of knowledge and beliefs” (meta-narratives)
2. “Social relations”
3. “Social identities (‘selves’)”

(Fairclough 1992, 237-238)

3.3.4.  *Analytical Procedure: Examples*

In analysing the debates I start out on the Social Practice level. This means on the basis of the theoretical framework presented above, I begin my analysis by identifying statements that I consider to be informed by either Eurocentric or Orientalist discourse. I have chosen to call these meta-narratives by which I mean systems of knowledge and beliefs that inform the speaker. Afterwards I follow the steps of analysis as illustrated below:

Extract 1: 2007 Progress Report on Turkey (Debate held 21 May 2008):

“Of course, there are forces in Turkey wanting destabilisation, whereas some Turkish citizens hope for a more democratic, progressive, developed, environmentally conscious, socially aware, peace-loving and Europe-oriented Turkey. These citizens
need to be given the message that their struggles are not in vain, and this is what Mrs Oomen-Ruijten’s report achieves, as does the discussion we are holding here today.”

Giorgos Dimitrakopoulos (PDDE-DE Group)
(European Parliament 2008)

Text: Modality
The speaker here uses objective modality when beginning to demonstrate his point by saying “Of course, there are forces in Turkey wanting destabilisation” rather than saying ‘in my opinion’, ‘I think’, ‘I suspect’ etc. As such, he presents his point as a fact or truth of matter rather than an as expression of a subjective proposition. The speaker attains a certain position of power by the use of objective modality as he becomes able to control representations of reality.

Discursive Practice: Interdiscursivity
This extract clearly shows some moderate influences from Eurocentric as well as Orientalist discourse. Building on the objective modality, we can see that the speaker connects “peace-loving” and “Europe-oriented” to each other. Clearly this echoes Orientalist discourse in ascribing Europe to be “peace-loving” in comparison to others. Eurocentric discourse is also apparent here when considering the significations and adjectives that are used for describing what a “Europe-oriented Turkey” would be like.

Social Practice:
We can see that the discursive practice is fairly conventional in its nature, drawing upon established discourses of Eurocentrism and Orientalism. As such, these make out the social context in which this discourse unfolds and the propositions become structured by already existing hegemonic relations and structures.

Extract 2: 2010 Progress Report on Turkey (Debate held 8 March 2011):

“Mr Erdogan’s agenda is that of an Islamic party and, on that point too, the balance would shift if Turkey joined the EU. We would have to deal with millions of people who, unfortunately, are not familiar with the Judeo-Christian fundamentals of Europe and who would want to change them.”

Peter Van Dalen (ECR)
(European Parliament 2011)
Text: Modality
Similar to extract 1 the speaker in this extract uses objective modality when asserting that the agenda of Erdoğan is Islamic. He presents this as a categorical truth, which consequently has serious implications for Europe because of the objective fact that these people are not familiar with “Judeo-Christian fundamentals”. This is described as a threat in arguing that the people of Turkey would try to change these fundamentals of Europe. The logical implication is that there is no compatibility between people and traditions of Europe and those of Turkey.

Discursive Practice: Interdiscursivity
The speaker clearly draws on classic Orientalist discourse when he argues that the Turkish people “…unfortunately, are not familiar with the Judeo-Christian fundamentals of Europe”. This can be interpreted in two ways: One: The speaker believes that it is unfortunate that the Turkish people never received the enlightenment of Judeo-Christian tradition. Two: The speaker finds it unfortunate that Turkish people never had the privilege to ‘escape’ their Oriental and Muslim heritage. In whatever case, the usage of conventional Orientalist discourse is apparent.

Social Practice:
The discourse is conventional with regards to Orientalism, reproducing some of its fundamental propositions. We could say that Orientalism works as the basis for the speakers’ system of knowledge and beliefs (meta-narrative), and with regards to social relations he draws an incompatibility between the people of Turkey and European citizens. He constructs the subjects (social identities) in opposition to each other and he takes up a hegemonic position in representing Turkish people in this manner.
3.4. Research Design

The research design of this paper is that of a case study. The purpose of this study is obviously motivated by the fact that the accession process of Turkey into the EU is a unique case, when considering how other accession processes have developed (see Introduction). In addition, however, this study is also interesting with regards to the ‘theoretical population’ of this study. Some examples might be fitting: Depending on one’s ontological standpoint, Turkey can be considered an Asian, Middle-Eastern or European country. The EU on the other hand can be perceived of as an international community of states or a European supranational entity. Likewise regarding identity, Turkey can be considered a secular country or a country with a predominately Muslim population whilst the EU might be secular, Christian (Catholic or Protestant) and even Muslim. As mentioned earlier, the case of Turkey’s accession process is not representative with regards to similar cases. It diverges most obviously with regards to the length of the process, but also because of the uncertainty as to whether Turkey is geographically a part of Europe or not. As such, the results of this study cannot be replicated to other cases.

3.5. Empirical Material

The empirical material of this study consists of two plenary debates from the European Parliament (EP). The subject of these debates is ‘Turkey’s Annual Progress Report’, which as of 2007 has been submitted on behalf of the European Foreign Affairs Committee annually, with the exception of 2011 (European Parliament 2014). The debate on the 2007 Progress Report comes as a natural starting point as it is the first of its kind. The other debate of this study is that on the 2010 Progress Report. Preferably I would have used the newest progress report (2013) but it has not yet been translated into English (European Parliament 2014). The same goes for the 2012 Progress Report and 2011 is one of the exceptions in which no progress report was written (European Parliament 2014). Hence, the EP debates on the 2007 and 2010 Progress Reports make out the empirical material of this research. The debates are held the following year after the submitted report:

- “Turkey’s 2007 progress report (debate)”
  

(European Parliament 2008)
The empirical material consists of primary sources and as such its reliability is as good as it gets. One problem, however, is the fact that it has been translated into English but this is a precondition for me being able to analyze the material. Meeting the criteria of external reliability is difficult in qualitative research because it is quite impossible to replicate a study that has an interpretative approach based on specific circumstances at the time of conducting the research (Bryman 2012, 390). In this case, however, finding the same empirical material should not pose problems as it can be collected at the European Parliament webpage and the material itself is as reliable as possible as it consists of statements made on behalf of different party coalitions by representatives. With regards to validity, the material should be relevant for the purpose of this study as it should represent all perspectives of Parliament members and, assumingly, the statements are sincere. One consideration is merited regarding validity, however, and that is the fact that I am not able to use the newest debate, as it is not yet translated into English. Obviously, if this were possible the present-day validity of the study would be enhanced.

3.6. Critical Reflections on Methodology

In general, assessing reliability and validity is more problematic in qualitative research than in quantitative. When considering reliability the central issue is to what extent my method of analysis can be considered reliable (Flick 2011, 200). One first point that needs to be mentioned is the fact that I have no opportunity for providing full reference (page number) when analyzing and quoting the debates. This is quite simply because of the fact that there are no page numbers or other ways of specifying exactly from where a statement is taken. This obviously leaves the reader in a position where she is not able to trace the source, other than by reference to name, party coalition and year.

As I have shown, Fairclough’s three-dimensional model has been somewhat tailored in order to meet the purpose of this study and because of the limited scope of this paper I have also chosen not to use the model in its full scale, which would be impossible. Questions regarding my own subjectivity also need to be considered, especially when considering the mix of inductive and deductive approach to this study. When analyzing the debates I have tried to
apply an inductive approach, reading through the material and trying to identify common features and aspects. The study as a whole builds, however, on the preconceived point of view that EU holds and exerts hegemony, that Eurocentric and Orientalist discourse exist and are being practiced somewhere and that the case of Turkey is a unique case when considering other EU candidates’ accession process. As such, the study is deductively organized and therefore the influence of my subjectivity is obviously present.

Regarding the validity of the results, this must be assessed on the basis of my theoretical application of hegemony, Eurocentrism and Orientalism. I have tried to be clear on how I define and apply these aspects but if the reader has another definition then the validity of the results is at stake. Claiming objectivity would be nonsense in the case of this study, as its results are heavily based on interpretation. Rather I have tried to be absolutely clear on how I have proceeded with analysis and how the theory has been applied, for example, as common in CDA, by using many quotes from the material (Bergström, Boréus 2000, 261). In addition I have presented two full examples on how I have analyzed the material in order to enhance transparency. In general, one could say that I have tried to achieve as high a level of transparency as possible, bearing in mind the problems concerning subjectivity.

It is also important to bear in mind that I have used my own application of both theory and method. Gramsci’s concept of hegemony has been applied more thinly, than what it actually entails, namely a more comprehensive theory of hegemonic struggle. To meet the purpose of this study, I have only found it necessary to apply this term as I have described it earlier. Obviously, some might object to such an application of Gramsci. Fairclough’s method also applies Gramsci in the terms of hegemonic struggle and Fairclough focuses considerably on Social Change. As such I have also deviated from this application. The purpose of this study is, however, not investigating hegemonic struggle or social change. Hence, the application of the method can be motivated accordingly.

Concerning the final criteria for assessing this study, generalization, the abovementioned application of hegemony and method ought to imply caution. Overall, qualitative research has difficulties claiming generalizability beyond the specific context. Indeed, it may be argued, the results lose their validity if they are extracted from this context (Flick 2011, 210-211).

Concerning the choice of method a critical point should be made. One fundamental problem in Fairclough’s model is how to differentiate the discursive from the non-discursive and consequently, how the researcher can analyze that which is outside the discourse (Jørgensen, Phillips 2002, 90). In my view, the only way of dealing with this issue is to produce a
comprehensive understanding of the theoretical framework and how it is being applied. This enables, partially at least, the reader to understand how analysis occurs outside of the merely discursive field.

Overall, there are shortcomings in the method and the only way to compensate for these is by being as transparent as possible when presenting the analysis.
4. Results

4.1. Background

Relations between the European Community and Turkey have been characterized by inconsistency ever since the 1963 Ankara Agreement. The agreement realized the establishment of a partnership with an intention of agreeing on a customs union and was followed in 1970 by the signing of the Additional Protocol. In 1978, however, Turkey demanded the right to temporarily suspend its obligations from the Protocol as a result of changes within the EEC as well as domestic political unrest. Nine years later, in 1987, Turkey nevertheless submitted a full membership application, which was followed by a signing of the Customs Union Agreement in 1995. Two years later the EU rejected Turkey’s candidacy and Turkey reacted by suspending political dialogue. In 1999 the EU recognized Turkey for candidacy, and in 2004 the EU Commissions recommended an opening of accession negotiations (Bilgin, Bilgiç 2012, 113).

4.2. Previous Research

Why does Turkey’s EU membership bid encounter so many difficulties in comparison to other states’ membership application and how can we explain this in terms of dominant meta-narratives? Engaging with these issues, scholars have applied a variety of different approaches. Among others Paul T. Levin’s study has been that of representations, more specifically as the book title also indicates Christian and Secular Images of Islam and how these can be said to influence today’s discourses on the subject within the EU parliament. Levin pays considerable attention to earlier meta-narratives informing present day representations of Turkey and Muslims. As such, Levin provides a thorough historical account and examines in what way this is relevant for understanding present day representations of Turkey and Turkish people (Levin 2011). Pinar Bilgin and Ali Bilgiç on the other hand are interested in vacillations on the part of Turkish policy makers regarding EU membership, and how political discourse in Turkey periodically has alternated between representing the EU as a source of inspiration and a source of anxiety (Bilgin, Bilgiç 2012). Another scholar, Iver B. Neumann, has shown how the formation of “A variety of others have been and are instrumental in the process of forging European identity.” (Neumann 1999, 39)
According to Neuman, the most important ‘other’ in the history of European identity is ‘the Turk’ and he shows how the history of this representation has influenced and is influencing contemporary attitudes vis-à-vis Turkey and debates on the Turkish membership bid. In addition Neumann draws attention to the Ottoman legacy, in which the Ottomans found themselves struggling for recognition from the European Society (Neuman 1999). Finally, Selcen Öner adds to Neumann’s study a suggestion that European identity has been constructed in relation to many different ‘others’ under different periods and, consequently, defining the EU identity can only be done with specific reference to a specific period in history. Over the last few years, Öner argues, there has been an elitist political discourse on Turkey’s membership bid within the EU, a discourse that has based itself on cultural perceptions of European identity, which has increased Euroscepticism in Turkey (Öner 2011, 189, 193).

4.3. Introduction to Analysis

What this study aims to do is firstly to examine in what way hegemonic expressions are manifested in European Parliamentary (EP) debates. This will be done by firstly identifying various ways in which a speaker occupies a hegemonic position. Secondly, I will show how hegemonic positions are represented by speakers positive to further accession, and speakers who have a more restrictive position. I have found that these positions are preferably identified by showing what meta-narratives and representations of the ‘other’ inform these positions. As such, I will start the analysis at the Social Practice level, by presenting examples of what I consider Eurocentric discourse and how hegemonic positions are represented within this discourse (Text level). Following the same pattern I will illustrate how this works within Orientalist discourse. Finally, I will discuss the findings with regards to the Discursive Practice (Interdiscursivity), discussing to what extent the discourses reproduce conventional (historically and culturally constructed) order. This means bringing the analysis back to the level of the Social Practice.

Below I will present the European Parliamentary (EP) debates that I have analyzed before presenting my analytical findings.
4.4. European Parliamentary Debates

The empirical framework that is examined in this paper consists of two European Parliamentary (EP) debates, both of which discuss present and future issues regarding Turkey’s accession to the European Union (EU). The debates are held respectively in the light of a progress report on Turkey, which has been published the year before by the EU Foreign Affairs Committee. The procedures of these debates are initiated with comments made by the at-the-time presidency, a representative of the EU Commission and the rapporteur on Turkey who presents the report. Subsequently the floor is taken by various party coalitions to make comments on the report before the debate is closed by comments from the Presidency, the Commission and the rapporteur. Added to the debates are written statements made by party coalition representatives not present at the time.

4.4.1. 2007 Progress Report on Turkey (Debate held 21 May 2008):

Groups represented in European Parliament in 2008: (European Parliament 2014)

PPE-DE: Group of the European People’s Party (Christian Democrats) and European Democrats
PSE: Group of the Party of European Socialists
ALDE: Group of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe
Verts/ALE: Group of the Greens/European Free Alliance
UEN: Union for Europe of the Nations Group
GUE-NGL: Confederal Group of the European United Left/Nordic Green Left
IND/DEM: Independence/Democracy Group
NI: Non-attached/affiliated

Overall the debate raises questions about the mixed picture presented in the progress report and with regards to Turkey’s progress in general. It becomes clear that some party coalitions show an awareness of the difficulties faced by Turkish authorities with regards to implementation of reforms and fulfilling the Copenhagen Political Criteria. Especially issues concerning democracy, gender equality, secularism and human rights are being raised. The Kurdish issue as well as the situation in Cyprus are also represented in the debate. With a few exceptions, there is a consensus that Turkey is making certain progress but that it is not
sufficient. The concluding remarks by the Presidency state clearly that progress has been made in the judiciary as well as with regards to the status of women, but that the Cyprus issue raises a profound challenge that needs to be dealt with. The EU Commission representative summarizes the debate with three major conclusions. First, that the reforms required to meet the EU Copenhagen Criteria need to be implemented in full scale in order to enhance fundamental freedoms of Turkish citizens and further accession into the Union. Secondly, and in response to the excessive use of force by Turkish police against demonstrators at the 1st May Day rally, the freedom of association needs to be respected as it represents a fundamental right under the European Convention of Human Rights. Third, the case in the Constitutional Court for closing down the AKP (Justice and Development Party) is condemned by the EU.

In remarks on behalf of the party coalitions representatives take various positions with regards the issues of this debate. The PPE-DE Group highlight four stages that Turkey needs to proceed through in order to enter into the EU. One, Turkey needs to strengthen reforms in all sectors and structures. Two, respect for human rights and the rights of minorities must under no circumstances be violated. Three, Turkey must withdraw its troops from Cyprus and contribute comprehensive and lasting resolution of the issue. Fourthly and finally, Turkey must ensure and maintain good and friendly neighbourly relations with all its neighbours, Greece in particular.

One the other hand the PSE Group state clearly that despite the fact that the accession process of Turkey is an open-ended process the ultimate goal of this process is full membership and that both parts should do their utmost in mutual transparency to achieve this goal. The problem raised by the PSE Group is the threatened ban of the ruling AKP (Justice and Development Party) and the Kurdish DTP (Democratic Society Party). It is emphasized that the prospect of banning these parties is not in line with European practice and democratic values.

The ALDE Group holds that Turkey must speed up its reforms and that some of the reforms are unsatisfactory. The efficiency of the constitutional reform process, it is argued, has been limited because of debates regarding the usage of headscarves and the Penal Code includes too many restrictions on freedom of speech. In addition Turkey needs to show greater interest and a positive attitude towards European Security and Defence Policy missions within the NATO framework.

Like others the Verts/ALE Group expresses grave concerns about the potential banning of the AKP and DTP as well as the usage of excessive force against demonstrators by police on the
1st of May. The Verts/ALE Group encourages the European Parliament to continue to emphasize the importance of genuine reforms and to criticise the Turkish government and opposition in a clear and explicit manner.

The UEN Group takes a more cautious position with regards to further accession. They suggest an alternative in the form of a partnership between the EU and Turkey that would suit both parts better.

The Kurdish issue is raised profoundly on behalf of the GUE/NGL Group and they advocate a stronger stand on the part of EU to this regard. Unilaterally and without ambivalence the Turkish Government must be told to engage in dialogue with the Kurdish region and the DTP. The IND/DEM Group raise questions as to the reformative capacity of Turkey. Historically, they argue, Turkey has attempted reforms for hundreds of years without success. As an accession candidate Turkey must follow Europe’s example.

Finally, Philip Clayes (NI) calls into the question the importance of the changes made to the Turkish Penal Code. He argues that these changes are mere cosmetic, that there still exists heavy restrictions on freedom of speech and the EU should acknowledge this fact. The credibility of the EU is at stake and the Union needs to stop negotiations if Turkey does not abolish legal provisions that infringe freedom of expression and fundamental democratic rights.

4.4.2. 2010 Progress Report on Turkey (Debate held 8 March 2011):

Groups represented in European Parliament in 2011: (European Parliament 2014)

**EPP:** Group of the European People's Party (Christian Democrats) and European Democrats  
**S&D:** Group of the Party of European Socialists and Democrats  
**ALDE:** Group of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe  
**Verts/ALE:** Group of the Greens/European Free Alliance  
**ECR:** European Conservatives and Reformists Group  
**GUE-NGL:** Confederal Group of the European United Left/Nordic Green Left  
**EFD:** Europe of Freedom and Democracy Group  
**NI:** Non-attached/affiliated


In this debate there are a number of similar issues being raised as in the 2008 debate. The Cyprus problem does, however, become more apparent in this debate and there are calls for a comprehensive settlement. In addition the issue of good neighbourhood relations is raised in the light of Turkey pursuing a more independent and assertive foreign policy. The reforms initiated in 2008 are discussed, some speakers claiming that considerable progress has been made while others consider the progress modest. There is, however, still a strong agreement that the reform process is proceeding to slowly and some problems are being raised more profoundly; Lack of freedom of the press is a big problem according to many speakers, the situation of women is still not satisfactory and the operation of the judiciary is heavily criticized. Another issue introduced in this debate is the situation of Christian minorities in Turkey and some argue to this regard, more passionately than others, that the rights of all religious minorities, specifically Christians, must be enhanced and guaranteed before progress can be made to further accession. A general discussion whether to open more accession chapters is also introduced to this debate with some party coalitions arguing that it would contribute to ‘unlock’ the stalemate nature of the accession process whilst others reserve themselves to a more reluctant position.

The S&D Group holds that there is a continued consolidation of democracy and respect for human rights in Turkey in the midst of political turmoil in the Middle East. The group calls for the EP to welcome and encourage the renewed momentum in the Turkish reform process as well as for opening additional chapters on fundamental rights and judiciary and on the common foreign and security policy in order to further accession.

The ALDE Group highlights that Turkey has become a role model for many countries in North Africa fighting for democracy and fundamental rights. In contrast to the S&D Group the ALDE Group advocates an approach of caution with regards to opening of new chapters and, in addition, freedom of religion is stressed as a big problem. Consolidating democracy in the constitutional reform is identified as a vital point.

The Verst/ALE Group questions the productivity of closing chapters of accession when some of these chapters are exactly what is needed for making improvements in areas such as freedom of speech and press, independence of the judiciary and constitutional reform. Like the S&D Group they advocate engagement in discussions regarding opening certain chapters and re-opening some of those that have been closed by the Council. According to the Verst/ALE Group the EU would be in a better negotiation position were it to re-open certain chapters and Turkey would be better able to enact upon its position as a role model for other countries in the region.
The *ECR Group* holds that it is vital to send a positive signal to Turkey, especially considering the increasing Islamist terrorism in North Africa and the Middle East. They warn for not ‘loosing Turkey’ as its economy is growing rapidly and they appeal to the Greek Cypriots and Greece to contribute without reservations in finding a lasting solution to the Cyprus issue.

According to the *GUE/NGL Group* a real political solution to the Kurdish question is needed and Turkey needs to continue towards establishing rule of law in the country. In addition, it is argued, a recognition of the Armenian Genocide is in place and a resolution with Greece is needed. Finally, Turkey needs to withdraw its troops from northern Cyprus and resolve the problem once and for all. In general, the Group ensures, they are in favour of Turkey’s accession if it is in line with the wishes of the Turkish people and provided it meets all the necessary accession criteria.

The *EFD Group* calls into question the honesty and engagement shown on the Turkish part. The Group describes Turkey’s behaviour as being contradictory in that it demonstrates good neighbourly intentions in general but then in a second instance it violates international law by passing through Greek land and air borders. The Group argues that the EU respects Turkey and that Turkey should do the same with regards to its neighbours and the EU.

Finally, *Barry Madlener (NI)* argues that Turkey has no place in the EU and that Turkey itself has fixed its scope on the Arabic/Islamic world. He argues that the people of Europe do not want Turkey nor Islam and that the debate on this issue should have been closed long ago.
5. Analysis

5.1. Eurocentric Discourse and Universal Aspirations

This section presents various statements from MEPs that I consider draw on Eurocentric propositions. As the analysis will show, party groups represent these perspectives broadly. I will try to show examples that are representative of a broader range of this particular perspective, also, however, showing examples that illustrate my findings. The party groups and speakers represented are: Member of Commission, PPE-DE and ECR.

There are obviously many instances in the debates in which speakers, when assessing Turkey’s (lack of) progress, discuss this on the basis of what they consider to be fundamental European standards, norms, principles and values. The following statement by Commission Member Štefan Füle, regarding Turkey as a role model for others in the Arab Spring, illustrates to this point, how achieving what is identified as European ‘values’ and ‘standards’ is considered a universal aspiration for non-European countries:

“Citizens in these countries look at Turkey, as they look at the European Union, as examples to follow. They watch Turkey advocating standards and values that they are now fighting for themselves and that are associated with Europe.” (European Parliament 2011)

Recalling the discussion on Eurocentrism in the theoretical framework section, this statement clearly shows similarities with basic propositions of this meta-narrative. It is assumed that historical development occurs in orientation to Europe, that Europe represents the standards and values for others to emulate and that Turkey becomes a bridge and an inspiration for non-European countries. Furthermore Štefan Füle argues for improving the possibilities for Turkish businessmen and students to travel to Europe so that they can “…familiarise themselves with European standards” (European Parliament 2011).

References to ‘European standards’ and ‘values’ are frequent throughout the debates, often indicating, like in this example, that there are certain ‘standards’ and ‘values’ in the EU, which are not similar elsewhere. Indeed, if there is a thing like ‘European standards’ then certainly there is a non-European equivalent that is subordinate to the European.
Another Member of Parliament (MEP) Gunnar Hökmark (PPE-DE) adds to this point that the EU should keep pressure on furthering reforms in Turkey and keep Turkey in its scope because there is a risk that Turkey “...will maybe lean in the future more to other parts of the world, to other values” (European Parliament 2008). This statement indicates a sense of insecurity with regards to the path that Turkey might take were it not incorporated into the values of the EU. The MEP clearly indicates the importance of diffusing European values to Turkey in order to make sure that Turkey doesn’t become subject to ‘other’ values. This idea of somewhat preferable values represented and diffused by Europe also holds similarities to Eurocentric diffusionism (Blaut 1993, 16).

Central to EP discussions on Turkey’s progress are definitions of what constitutes EU values and principles. In general, there is widespread consensus among MEP’s regarding this matter. Member of the Commission Olli Rehn summarizes these as follows: “The very existence of our Union rests on the basic values of democracy, the rule of law and human rights that we share among ourselves.” (European Parliament 2008) Rehn argues to this point, that these basic values are the essence of the Negotiating Framework regarding Turkey’s accession and that the EU Commission functions in this matter as “ ‘the friend who tells the truth’ ”. This perspective indicates an assumption that the EU represents ‘the truth’, the truth is told to Turkey and, as an implicit consequence, Turkey must act accordingly. Certain similarities can be drawn to the supposed ‘rationality’ of Europeans in Eurocentric discourse (Blaut 19923, 64).

Finally, some arguments circle around the idea that Turkey is under tutelage by the EU. Though not explicitly stated, arguments of this kind appear frequently in the debates. MEP Evžen Tošenovský (ECR) argues for instance: “If we have an open and principled dialogue with Turkey, however, this can lead to an improved understanding of democratic rules.” (European Parliament 2011) This statement indicates that Turkey, by engaging in dialogue with the EU, can improve its understanding of democracy. Bearing resemblance to post world war II Eurocentric discourse about democracy being diffused as modernization from Europe (Blaut 1993, 28-29), this statement also indicates an understanding of the EU’s role as somewhat paternalistic. The asymmetry of this relationship becomes apparent and the speaker occupies a somewhat hegemonic position. As such, it is fruitful to move on and analyse how hegemonic positions are being occupied in Eurocentric discourse.
5.2. Eurocentric Paternalism

Represented in this section are mostly speakers that are relatively positive to further accession of Turkey into the EU. I will present the statements that I find most illustrative and representative, many of which occupy a paternalist position when assessing Turkey’s progress and future challenges. The represented party groups are: PPE-DE, PSE and PPE.

When presenting the 2007 progress report the rapporteur Ria Oomen-Ruijten (PPE-DE) argues that the Turkish government should start implementing vital recommended reforms:

“The government now has to use the substantial parliamentary majority to set about reforms with determination; reforms that are vital if Turkey is to be turned into a modern and prosperous democracy based on a secular state and a pluralistic society and reform that is first and foremost in the best interests of the Turkish people themselves.” (European Parliament 2008)

Firstly, we see here that the MEP is using objective modality when asserting what the Turkish government needs to do and secondly, she is representing the Turkish people when stating that the reforms are in their ‘best interests’. This is stated as a categorical truth, hence not leaving opportunity for discussion on this matter. Producing reality in this sense, she somewhat manages to construct and represent the preferences of the Turkish people, occupying a hegemonic position of paternalism as she suggests that Turkey’s ‘best interest’ lies in aligning itself with the EU.

Another MEP, Jacques Toubon (PPE-DE), slightly ambiguous about furthering accession negotiations adds to this point however, that change seems difficult to accomplish in Turkey:

“The report, however, forms part of a genre that I feel is becoming increasingly unreal. Parliament and many other institutions are carrying on with their pretences, as though our tireless teachings can change Turkey.” (European Parliament 2008)

Arguing here by, subjective modality, how hopeless and tiresome the process of ‘teaching’ Turkey, the MEP compares the relationship between EU and Turkey to a relationship between a dedicated teacher (‘tireless teachings’) and a hopeless/reluctant student. In other words, for this speaker, the EU’s dedication has proven unfruitful, as Turkey is reluctant to change.

Bearing resemblance to this idea of Turkey as a reluctant student are a range of statements concerning Turkey’s ‘democratic’ or ‘political maturity’. One MEP (PSE) argues that Turkey would show “political maturity” were it to acknowledge the Armenian genocide whilst
another MEP (PPE-DE) asserts that Turkey shows lack of “democratic maturity” because of the suggested ban on the AKP (European Parliament 2008). A third MEP (PPE) firstly adds to this point that “The problematic areas are always the same...”, secondly: “...and they still fall long way short of European standards, despite the efforts that have been made.” (European Parliament 2011)

In general, there seems to be broad tendency of characterizing the dealings with Turkey as dealings with someone who does not learn and does not mature, at least not fast enough and despite all the efforts that have been made on both parts. In this last quote, we see objective modality at work, claiming that the situation is somewhat hopeless; furthermore asserting that Turkey is still far from meeting the higher standards of Europe. The tendency towards Eurocentric paternalism is apparent.

5.3. Orientalist Representations

This section will mostly present speakers that have a relatively reluctant position to further accession of Turkey into the EU. Statements will be presented that I find most illustrative to the point. However, as this section deals with Orientalist discourse it should be no surprise that these speakers do not represent a majority of the EP. I will, however, try to present statements that are representative of this particular view and show how MEPs occupy a position from which they construct and represent Turkey. The represented party groups are: NI, PPE, EFD, IND/DEM and UEN.

When assessing Turkey’s progress some MEPs find it ridiculous to even debate on this matter. One of these, Barry Madlener (NI), argues that Turkey is oriented towards “...the Islamic world.” and that “Europe does not want Turkey and Europe does not want Islam.” (European Parliament 2011) The MEP clearly paraphrases Turkey in the form of Islam and uses objective modality when stating that Europe does not want this. The logic of this seems to be that Turkey represents Islam and vice versa, Islam represents Turkey. As such, the MEP constructs the identity of Turkey as fundamentally Islamic before he continues: “However, a backward Islamic culture has no place in Europe.” (European Parliament 2011) It becomes clear that the MEP draws a line of incompatibility between the culture of Europe and that of Turkey. Here he also draws on Orientalist discourse and representation of the world when asserting that Islam is “backward”, implicitly leaving us to assume that Europe is the opposite given suggested incompatibility (Said 2003, 49).
Another MEP (PPE) aligns herself with this critique because of “…the pronounced Islamic nature of the country…” and furthermore Lorenzo Fontana (EFD) adds: “...we would like to highlight the issue of religious tolerance, which unfortunately, does not exist in Turkey”. In addition Andreas Mölzer (NI) reminds us that: “Despite claiming the opposite, the Erdoğan government is pushing forward with the process of Islamification.” (European Parliament 2011)

In general, among these sceptical MEPs, there seems to be a sense of insecurity regarding the “Islamic nature” of Turkey. Another MEP (NI) adds to this point that even though Turkey has a history within the European territory “…it is not, in cultural terms, a European country.” (European Parliament 2008) This can be translated into representing Turkey as a cultural threat, a notion that has been persistent throughout Orientalist discourse (Neumann 1999, 51-52).

There are a number of perspectives in the debates that follow the logic of these previous statements. Georgios Georgiou (IND/DEM) argues somewhat similarly, however not highlighting Islam as a major signifier but rather factors concerning geography and legacy: “Developments in Turkey are preventing us from seeing what kind of future will emerge for that country with its inherent Asiatic traits.” (European Parliament 2008)

Here we can see how the MEP distinguishes Turkey as inherently Asian, attributing certain “traits” to Turkey because of its heritage. Part of these traits apparently include an inability to carry out reforms as he highlights:

“This is not the past, it has tried in the past to carry out reforms. Let us not forget the Tanzimat reforms or the reforms of Abdul Hamit and Hatt-i Hümayun. Reforms have been attempted for hundreds of years without success.” (European Parliament 2008)

The MEP uses objective modality and asserts it as a categorical fact that Turkey is inherently Asian. As such he constructs the relationship between Turkey and EU as one of fundamental difference. Consequently this enables the speaker to ascribe to Turkey a fundamental inability to carry out reforms, as this has been proven by history. Hence, the argument can logically conclude that because of Asian heritage, Turkey is not able to carry out reforms. This kind of reasoning bears resemblance to two parts of Orientalist discourse; One, the statement indicates that Turkey has tried to reform itself for “hundreds of years without success”, a claim that certainly resembles an Orientalist myth if we recall how, for example, Turkey upon its establishment implemented fundamental reforms (see introduction). Two, the argument...
holds similarities to basic propositions about Oriental Despotism, in other words that the Orient cannot rule itself properly (Said 2003, 79).

Returning to how Turkey is represented as a cultural threat, Mario Borghezio (UEN) speculates in what manner this threat might materialize and have consequences for everyday cultural life in Europe:

“Moreover, on becoming a member of Europe, the rules of this Islamic country which strictly forbids the use of alcohol will also be imposed on our peoples” (European Parliament 2008).

It is difficult not to also render this statement a modern Orientalist myth, as there is no such legislation in Turkey that forbids the use of alcohol. On the contrast, this rather shows how lack of knowledge still is instrumental in creating the Orient and how this position of dominance can be used to this end.

Finally, it is worth paying attention to a statement concerning values and identity. Mogens Camre (UEN) demonstrates on this matter:

“Madam President, Turkey is too large and too different to become a member of the EU. If Turkey really wanted to live by Kemal Atatürk’s famous words: ‘There is only one civilization’, we would not be standing here year after year stating that Turkey is most certainly not willing to comply with the EU’s demands concerning the adoption of European values and give up Ottoman values.” (European Parliament 2008)

Firstly, by objective modality the MEP concludes that Turkey is too different and this difference persists because of the country’s Ottoman legacy. As such, he indicates that Turkey has never really escaped its history and that it is still Ottoman by nature, not Turkish. Furthermore, the speaker regrets that Turkey has not lived by Mustafa Kemal’s words about there only being one civilization. The consequence of this, he argues, is that Turkey does not want to adapt to European values. If they would have done this, there would be no need for debate. The logical conclusion of this reasoning is that Turkey should accept that there is indeed only civilization in the world, the European one and if they want to be part of that civilization they need to align their values accordingly. This clearly resonates Orientalist propositions of a need to restructure and reshape the Orient and the speaker occupies a dominant position that enables him to make these claims (Said 2003, 2-3).
5.4. Interdiscursivity – signs of change?

It is difficult to quantify the usage of interdiscursivity. The intensive reference to conventional Eurocentric and Orientalist discourse certainly do not initiate change, especially considering how it is used both by those positive to further accession and those who oppose. Many speakers expressing themselves positively on further accession draw on Eurocentric propositions, while their opposing counterparts draw considerably on Orientalist discourse. Rather than introducing new perspective, this contributes to reproduce the general order and intensify the differences drawn between Turkey and the EU. On the basis of this material there are, however, some instances in which discourse is used in an inventive manner, many of which use somewhat emancipatory discourse. One of these, Zbigniew Zaleski (PPE-DE), despite the fact that he is sceptic with regards to further accession, does however make an interesting point when presents the question: “Are we entitled to lecture the Turks and tell them what they should do?” and in subsequently: “Are we to impose well-being on the nation by force, changing its identity, tradition and culture?” (European Parliament, 2008)

Unbelievable as it is, this is actually one of a few cases in which these kinds of questions are lifted. In contrast to most other statements presented in this analysis, this MEP actually ascribes an independent agency to Turkey, countering statements that occupy hegemonic positions in representing Turkey. Another MEP (ALDE) adds to this point that “…there is clearly a great prejudice against Turkey inside this Parliament.” and furthermore, Michael Cashman (S&D) reminds us that:

“It is worthwhile recalling that Turkey is a modern, secular country and that in Turkey, women got the vote long before women got the vote in some parts of the EU”  
(European Parliament, 2008).

These statements reflect a more reflexive discourse in which questions and accusations are turned inwards, toward the EP and the EU. Overall, I have found this kind of self-examination and critique to be quite rare in EP debates. Introducing new inputs to the debate, like in this case, might challenge the persistency of conventional discourse, make it more balanced and decrease the frequency of hegemonic statements.
5.5. Conclusions

Unfortunately, the final statements presented above that challenge conventional Eurocentric and Orientalist discourse are an exception to the rule. Besides comments that I have considered too technical to serve the purpose of this study, and which I therefore have not presented, basic propositions of Eurocentrism and Orientalism are persistent throughout the debates. The analysis has shown that hegemony manifests itself in a variety of ways within these meta-narratives, and MEPs in favour of further accession as well as those against occupy hegemonic positions.

Firstly, the analysis can conclude that on the basis of Eurocentric propositions, speakers occupy hegemonic positions that bear resemblance to paternalism. Turkey is frequently described as politically and democratically immature, in need of guidance and the EU’s role is considered assisting Turkey accordingly. In addition, there is a general tendency among MEPs positive to further accession to evaluate Turkey’s progress on the basis of what they consider to be fundamental standards, principles and values of the EU. Some instances have illustrated to this point, that there is a tendency to universalize European standards, principles and values as something all others should emulate and that these should be diffused from Europe. The influence from Eurocentrism is obvious.

To some extent, however, I would argue that the Eurocentric discourse is less obvious and more sophisticated than the Orientalist discourse. As paternalism in some cases disguises the hegemonic positions of Eurocentric discourse by appealing to the benevolent role of the EU, this form of hegemonic manifestation becomes less obvious than that of Orientalism; Turkey is not bad, Europe is just better. Turkey is not backward, it merely needs guidance and so on. This kind of reasoning is apparent in the debates and represents a potent manifestation of hegemony as it can come across as benevolence.

Secondly, the study has found that Orientalist propositions in many cases works as a foundation upon which many MEPs obstructing further accession build their arguments. The analysis has shown examples of this in the form of arguments concerning the inherent Asiatic nature of Turkey, the incompatibility between Europe and Islam and the backwardness of Turkey. Many of these arguments are based on an idea that the cultural difference between Turkey and the EU is too big and cannot be bridged. In addition, modern Orientalist myths appear in the debates. The analysis has shown that speakers drawing on Orientalism in most
cases occupy a hegemonic position that consists of constructing and representing Turkey, Turkish culture or the Turkish people.

The conclusion is that hegemony manifests itself in two ways in European Parliamentary debates: Firstly, speakers positive to further accession occupy hegemonic positions informed by Eurocentric paternalism. Secondly, speakers opposing further accession are in many cases informed by Orientalist beliefs and representations of Turkey, and these acquire hegemonic positions by allowing themselves to construct and represent Turkey on the basis of this meta-narrative.

6. Discussion

The analytical conclusions show clearly that MEPs in favour of further accession as well as those opposing occupy hegemonic positions. The findings suggest a way of structuring these positions along the lines of Eurocentric and Orientalist propositions and discourse, the former by appeal to paternalism and universalizing EU values, and the latter by appeal to difference and unflattering representations of Turkey. What both of these perspectives have in common is that they enable the speaker to acquire a position from which she has the possibility to construct and represent Turkey, thereby constraining Turkish agency and subjectivity. The similarities to Gramsci’s definition of the subaltern group that is “subject to the activities of the ruling group” (Gramsci 1971, 55) is striking.

That being said, we are faced with the question of how this paper is any different. In analyzing this case I have tried to work from a critical point of view; Critical to the way in which the world is represented, critical to the narratives that might hinder clear sight and critical to the manner in which I myself represent and construct reality. Obviously, I didn’t fully succeed. The study itself can be rendered critical regarding its purpose of revealing hegemonic manifestations. It does, however, also have critical shortcomings.

On the basis of the study’s conclusions, we can see that there are indeed many misrepresentations and generally Eurocentric and Orientalist discourses at play in the European Parliament, all of which contribute to reproduce hegemonic manifestations. One fundamental shortcoming in this study was, however, not being able to examine and illustrate how a broader hegemonic struggle of meaning takes place within the EP. Using Gramsci’s concept of hegemony and Fairclough’s model more comprehensively, this would be an
important study in the future. Such a study might present more profound and solid indications regarding the conditions for change in EP discourse on Turkey and in general. Even though this was not essentially the purpose of this study, it represents a methodological shortcoming of this study that should be researched on further.

In addition, however, it is worth mentioning the crux to the issue of Turkey’s membership bid. As recent Eurobarometer surveys have suggested, there seems to be a redefinition of preferences on both parts. Surveys have indicated that the levels of optimism and trust have decreased considerably since the start of the millennium (Levin 2011, 176-178 and Bilgin, Bilgiç 2012, 120). Indeed, if this is the case, maybe the process has been too long, characterized by unmet anticipations and hopeless demands. As such, one might argue that the subject of research is exhausted. Like some MEPs suggested, that Turkey and Europe are happy as they are and that the accession negotiations are just theatrics. Or, on the other hand, we can claim that there needs to be a redefinition of the European project. Indeed, as one Member of Commission argued, that the EU needs to initiate a fundamental debate about inclusion within the European Parliament. These are all issues that could be studied further.

What this paper might have produced to this end is a revitalization of Eurocentrism and Orientalism as analytical tools for doing critical research on subjects such as this one. I have demonstrated to this point that they still can be considered valuable for doing this kind of research.
7. References


