NETWORK GOVERNANCE
THE ROLE OF POWER AND TRUST IN MANDATED COLLABORATION NETWORK

Author: Acan, Ali Ramlat

Supervisor: Ulrica Nylén

Student
Umeå School of Business and Economics
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ABSTRACT
Mandated collaboration networks are an overly studied topic in the field of public administration and management, with the emphasis on these studies however focused on the failures to accomplish its collaborative aims. The role that mandated collaboration networks play today in enabling societies and governments alike, to realize insurmountable challenges through their collaborative efforts is however not being paid as much attention as it should be, yet through it, huge socio and economic benefits are derived.

This study recognizes the part mandated collaboration network plays by seeking to further investigate the role, power and trust play in influencing managers towards attaining efficiency. Data was collected from 7 managers from the public sector, with some public managers, tasked with the responsibility of playing oversight role and disbursing funds and other public managers tasked with implementing the services, all working towards achieving a regional goal within Västerbotten region. By conducting semi-structured interviews with them, the aim was to find out the daily encounters they faced in implementing their activities and achieving their goals.

In order to analyze this study adequately, theories were derived from governance, principal agency, structuration theory, Long & Sitkin integrated trust and control framework that enabled me to come up with a conceptual framework. The findings of this framework were particularly insightful in regards to how managers in mandated collaboration network can use trust in ensuring that they achieve their desired efficiency goals. The findings show both power and trust in mandated collaboration network play a coordinative and regulative role in ensuring that the goals are realized. Calculative trust alongside formal controls can be used to address challenges that managers encounter in realizing their goals. Relational trust can also be nurtured, however at an interpersonal level or with peers that perform the same activities but not at an institutional level such as the mandated collaboration network. Attaining efficiency in the mandated collaboration network is however also further compounded by contextual matters both internal and external that hamper its attainment.

Key words; Mandated collaboration network, power, trust and efficiency.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

This chapter gives a background to the research problem under study, which is further backed with previous studies that have been done in this particular subject that warrant the need for more research done. The purpose of the research is expounded on, followed by the research question that will seek to answer the questions pertaining to the research problem at hand. This chapter will then be concluded with the delimitations of the study and definition of key words.

1.1 Background

Since the late 1970s, there has been a growing trend that has acknowledged the ‘‘fragmentation of power, authority, resource and control on network decision making’’ Hanf & Scharpf (1978, cited in Klijn, 2008, p.120). The growth of this trend is increasingly being felt today than previous years because of the range of complex societal problems known as ‘‘wicked problems’’, that government, businesses and communities are grappling with. These wicked problems emerge in the form of natural hazards such as earth quakes, tsunami and even the recent financial crisis that gripped the western world and has had a ripple effect throughout the global economy. The effect thus of these problems is felt unselectively among all actors and is equally too huge a task for government, businesses or communities to deal with singlehandedly because of the costs associated with it. As a result of this, several actors have come together under the umbrella of a network with a common purpose of addressing such wicked problems (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004, p.3).

Throughout literature, the emphasis has been on the role and importance of networks in addressing these wicked problems. This is achieved by providing a governing structure, in which all actors irrespective of their background come together to achieve a common public goal (Agranoff & McGuire, 2001; Edenlenbos et al., 2011 & O’Toole, 1997). The same can be applied to an example of a construction of a regional hospital. The project is the reason that all actors come together. It provides a platform for them to make their individual contribution required for the project to be completed such as finances, required skills and exchange of information. The actors comprise of government, supranational organizations, community members and come from the two main sectors, public and private (profit and not for profit oriented) respectively and all work jointly towards realizing this goal (McGuire & Agranoff, 2011, cited in Ysa & Esteve, 2011, p.48). Since wicked problems are public in nature, the government entity uses its authority to assign the lead role to some public actors to manage the network in order to ensure that the main objective of this project is met in an efficient way. It also assigns the non-lead public actors together with the private actors the role of solely implementing this project. This study will henceforth refer to the lead public and non-lead public and private actors as public funding and implementing actors respectively.

It is these type of networks referred to as the public networks that the government uses to execute its public policies. In the case of the construction of the regional hospital, the government will take up a lead role in the implementation of the shared problem by managing the affairs of all the actors. This is referred to as Network Governance with the government’s role limited to managing the network. This specific network assigned the role of coordinating and overseeing the implementation of its public policy goals is the mandated
collaboration network (refer to keyword for definitions, page 9). With the goal being to complete the construction of a regional hospital, the public funding actor distributes tasks to the implementing actors. This is done because their tasks have already been stipulated by the government who assigned to them the duties. This also implies that the public funding actors will hold the implementing actors accountable on the performance of their activities. The nature of network governance and mandated collaboration network activities for public funding actors will include; monitoring the activities of implementing actors, distributing to them the required funds needed to facilitate the project and mobilizing more actors with appropriate skills. This will allow them to contribute to the realization of this project. Implementing actor’s activities will include writing periodical reports to the public funding actors and providing the expertise needed in the project among other activities. By each set of actors performing their activities it will lead to the successful completion of the construction of this hospital.

It is these interdependencies of shared project, resources and information existing among all the actors that networks facilitate by creating a conducive and enduring environment resulting to the actual implementation of these projects (Edenlenbos, 2011, p. 420). O’Toole (1997, p.447) further recommends that these interdependencies are used in a way that encourages the different sets of actors to commit to completing their tasks. Holding implementing actors accountable for their actions is however an indication of a limitation of this network that requires a balance of both commitment and cooperation in realizing the goal of completing the construction of the regional hospital.

1.2 Problem discussion
This section will expound more on the research problem and further justify this study’s aim for more research to be done.

The mandated collaboration network is tasked with the responsibility of coordinating the activities of all the actors in order to achieve the stated policy objectives. It is faced with challenges in attaining these objectives which does not make it an easy feat. The existence of actors from both the horizontal and vertical structures within the network has been cited as a hindrance to the attainment of its objectives (Edenlenbos & Eshuis, 2013 & Willem & Lucidarme, 2013). This challenge is seen to emanate from the structural composition of the network. Networks are composed of vertical and horizontal structures assumed by public funding and implementing actor’s respectively. The vertical structure that public funding actors adopts, is characterized with the existence of the hierarchy in which decision making is done in a top bottom approach with communication coming from them to the implementing actor (Span et al, 2011, p. 190). Since this network is formed by the government to achieve its policy objectives, the vertical structure is preferred for coordinating the activities because of its quick decision making, clear goals and reduced rate of internal wrangles compared to the bottom up approach McGuire (2006, cited in Willem & Lucidarme, 2013, p. 12). On the other hand, the horizontal structure is used by implementing actors in their own organizations. Tolbert & Hall, (2009, p.27) argue that horizontal structures are associated with actors having specific knowledge in particular fields with the expertise they possess, a basis of assigning them their roles and responsibilities. Against this background, implementing actors join the network with expectations of contributing towards achieving this goal through the expertise they possess. Their expectations is heightened more so, when
they come from a background that is highly specialized and accustomed to a more participatory and consultative approach within their own organizations that adheres to the principles of shared purpose, dispersed power and joint decision making in all their activities.

These actors end up encountering an uneasy merger within the network with confusion about their specific duties and expectations considered as a triggering factor by Willem & Lucidarme (2013, p.12). I agree with these authors citing the differences in expectation as a basis for discontentment but I also argue that the bone of contention arises from the way the public funding actors hold the implementing actors accountable in the course of performing their duties. This, I believe makes the coordination role of the mandated collaboration network a challenge. It does not; however imply that actors in the horizontal structure are not held accountable. Rather, because of the differences in an all-inclusive and participatory approach, adjusting to the vertical structure for the implementing actors is a challenge because not only is their input not considered, but also the way public funding actors exercise their duties is rather different.

This coordination problem within the mandated collaboration network in so many instances has been attributed to the way public funding actors exercise power (see definition of key words in page, 9) in their quest to realize their stated goals. The genesis of these problems is argued to stem from the public funding actors who by virtue of the government positions they hold, use their legitimately obtained authority and resources at their disposal and at their own discretion to achieve their stated goal of efficiency (Agranoff & McGuire, 2001; Huxham & Vangen, 2005 & Mandell & Steelman, 2003). However, the limit of how much discretion is at their disposal in as far as executing their tasks is not stated. This is because the sole focus is on the realization of the goals ignoring the process of implementation (Feldman, 2003, p.281). Using the previous example of the construction of the regional hospital, I draw your attention to how public funding actor exercises their power. In such a project, the public funding actor takes a lead position by issuing directives, for instance an architectural plan that gives an overall direction of constructing the hospital as well as providing the money that is used to facilitate the process. The implementing actor mainly plays the role of ensuring the hospital is built using their expertise as per the directives issued by the public funding actor. The public funding actor, exercises power in a project like this by playing an oversight role over the implementing actors ensuring they complete the hospital project. However, funding for this project will only continue for as long as the implementing actors follow the directives that have been stipulated to them by the public funding actors, with any alterations, drawing cautions and threat of withdrawal of funds. Power in this instance, is used as a tool to achieve the intended outcome and it takes the form of using the threat of withdrawal of resources to ensure that the implementing actors do abide by the directives stated in order to realize the main objective (Giddens, 1984, p.25)

Despite the fact that public funding actors do attain their stated goals, using power in such cases, has been cited to cause coordination problems within the network (Huxham, & Eden, 2000, p.342). Citing the example above, by using funding resources as a persuasive and manipulative tool, the working relationship that exists between the two sets of actors, public funding and implementing is at best maintained, to realize the task at hand. However a strained relation between the public funding and implementing actors is developed, that affects the productivity and compromises on the quality of the output hampering the attainment of the mandated collaboration network efficiency objective (Lane, 2005, p.181). In a bid to counter these negative side effects that arise from the way public funding actors exercise power, social incentives a form of resource is used by public funding actors to
motivate implementing actors into fully performing their assigned tasks (Kettl, 2002, p.493). These incentives are only short term measures that seek to address the implementing actors accomplishing the stated objectives of the network. They however, do not address the problems encountered such as the strained relations between the two sets of actors in the process of implementing the project prolonging the lingering coordination problem.

Addressing the problems encountered in the process phase of the project implementation and in effect the lingering coordination problem in mandated collaboration network, calls for public funding actors to embrace a different approach in the execution of their duties. This new approach by Long & Sitkin (2006, p.90-91) calls for public funding actors to simultaneously use power and trust in the execution of their duties with the aid of the balancing process. The balancing process is defined as the optimum point public funding actor arrives at in which they choose a combination of both power and trust activities in the execution of their tasks. This process helps the public funding actor in their decision making process by considering their current circumstances and using it as a basis for making their decisions with an aim of achieving a stable and healthy relationship enjoyed by both sets of actors. Using the illustration of power in its form of control through the rules and resources as seen in the previous regional hospital construction, sets the guidelines and determines the objective that implementing actors are expected to achieve. Failure of implementing actors realizing these goals is met with penalties and sanctions that are all stipulated within the rules by the public funding actor. With this new approach, the public funding actor will use trust (see definition of key words in page, 9) as an additional form of control, social in nature in either a calculative or relational way. The balancing process at the disposal of the public funding actor is in three types; antithetical, orthogonal and synergistic processes. The antithetical balancing process, gives the public funding actor the option to use either power or trust mechanisms but not both due to avoidance of undesirable effects. In the orthogonal balancing process, it provides the public funding actors with an option of combining trust or power (control) activities that can enable them achieve their goals. The synergistic process, allows them to use multiple options such as several power and trust measures to realize the goals. This aspect of balancing process gives the public funding actors a wide range to choose from based on their own contextual needs.

Applying this Long & Sitkin (2006) framework to the previous hospital construction example gives the public funding actor an option to use the antithetical balancing process that involves the use of power or trust activities. In this example, power in the form of rules and resources was used effectively eliminating the possibility of using trust. This is because its simultaneous use would result to an undesirable outcome of strained relationship between both sets of actors hindering efficiency being attained. Alternatively, in using the orthogonal balancing process, the public funding actor would opt to use calculative trust which will not call immediately for a penalty or a sanction but would find out what has led to the cause of not following the rules. If the reason established is for instance lack of expertise in a given field, then the public funding actor will be able to recommend training for such an actor. In a similar vein, using it in a trustworthy relational way, based on the outcome of the performance assessment and the solution for the problem, the public funding actor can choose to establish a relation with the implementing actor seeking to find out the personal experiences in the implementation of their work. Whichever activity the public funding actor opts for, since power is a constant at all times, will have to commence with the calculative trust as a foundation of nurturing trust and then use the relational trust to further cement the relationship. This same combination would apply to the synergistic balancing process in which the public funding actor will seek to address the coordination problem. Trust used in
both cases, deals with the coordination problem because in these two situations, the public funding actor first assesses the situation and is able to address it based on the contextual needs. Secondly, by seeking to establish a personal relation, it eliminates the concern of having a strained relationship between both sets of actors. As argued by Kramer (1996, p.222), this is a motivating factor because subordinates feel encouraged by such show of support in their work resulting into them putting in more effort at work. The public funding actor will have then addressed the coordination problem through the use of trust by paying more attention to the implementation process. This will in turn lead to high productivity because of the good relations between the two sets of actors and efficiency as the network’s objective, thus attained.

The Long & Sitkin (2006) framework is however not the only model that advocates for a similar approach to the simultaneous use of power and trust (Bachmann, 2006 & Nooteboom, 2002). Each of these authors argue for the simultaneous use of both power (normally seen in form of control) and trust by public funding actors in order to achieve their desired goals. They also both equally give allowance to the public funding actors to balance their process. The Long and Sitkin framework (2006, p.94-96), however makes provision for the use of each of the balancing types as per the contextual needs. The balancing process in these two models does not give specific considerations to a particular context in which the public funding actors should use them. For instance as previously argued in the antithetical balancing process, the Long & Sitkin (2006, p.94-96) framework gives the public funding actor the option to either use power or trust mechanisms but not both due to avoidance of undesirable effects. In the orthogonal and synergistic balancing processes, it provides the public funding actors with an option or several options respectively of combining trust or power (control) activities that can enable them achieve their goals. This aspect of balancing process gives the public funding actors a wide range to choose from based on their own contextual needs. This however, is lacking in the models of both Bachmann (2006) & Nooteboom (2002) who argue for the simultaneous usage of power and trust. They however leave it to the public funding actors to assess for themselves how, when and which of trust or power measures to use. The specific contextualized detail guidelines in the Long & Sitkin (2006) framework is lacking in these two other models rendering them inapplicable to this study.

However for this framework to adequately address this coordination problem in the mandated collaboration network, this study seeks to make some adjustments arguing for the simultaneous usage of power, trust, balancing process type alongside a given efficiency component. The reason for this is because efficiency is usually stated as an objective of the mandated collaboration network and is associated with its internal processes that are measured in terms of the cost, quantity and quality of the programs being implemented (Boyne, 2003; Lane, 2005 & Mintzberg, 1983). The network being goal oriented focuses much on the attainment of its objectives (Lane, 2005, p.181). The satisfaction in attaining these objectives is however not limited to the actors of the network only. The political class too, benefit from such achievements because of the political mileage they gain from the execution of their policies (Lane, 2005, p. 119). The citizens equally want transparency and accountability and with wide access to information on project completion, they are able to make their own judgments on the performance of the government. Including efficiency as an objective is thus practical because of this demand from a number of interest groups hence my inclusion. Combining efficiency and the balancing process is however based on the rationale that for each efficiency component of cost, quantity and quality the output is already predetermined. This is either indicated in the policies that public funding actors are expected
to adhere to or given discretion towards achieving the goal (Feldman, 2003, p.281). I therefore see this as an opportunity for public funding actors to use to attain the desired outcome. Linking each of these balancing components, I argue, will aid the public funding actors in the process of choosing the appropriate strategies in order to attain efficiency. It is quite common to see in our daily transactions that cost is seen as a measure, where too little, moderate or high is viewed in terms of the quality and quantity. There is usually a tradeoff seen between the quality and quantity that determines how much is actually spent. Using the same analogy, the mandated collaboration network has limits as to how much should be spent on a given activity, what processes and procedures are to be followed with a stated outcome of a successful completion looked at. My argument thus lies, in the fact that public funding actors can use the discretion at their disposal positively to realize the desired outcome. They can do this by using the expected output from each of the cost, quantity and quality components alongside the conditions set for using the balancing process. The instructions set for each balancing process vary and are of a simplistic nature for instance do not maintain close relation with implementing actors in case you want to achieve a certain target. The public funding actor will then use such an instruction based on such a situation to know when to apply exert control or lessen it and use trust. This I argue, will help public funding actors in making informed decisions and lead to the successful realization of the targets with efficiency attained.

In light of the above discussion, resolving the coordination problem in a mandated collaboration network will require a concerted effort by all actors involved in the process. Going by the words of Edenlenbos & Eshuis (2011, p.670), comparing skiing to the simultaneous use of power and trust, they state, “when skiing one continuously uses two legs, but one changes the amount of weight placed on one or the other leg to maintain balance and keep to the right direction in a continuously changing environment” . It is through the simultaneous use of power and trust that public funding actors will be able to assess within which context they should apply the measures in order to attain efficiency. Like skiing, when the weight gets excess in one aspect of the implementation process, it will call for public funding actors to pay more attention to that process by getting the right balance. This constant adjustment by the public funding actors will lead to close scrutiny of the entire implementation process, including the way they relate with the implementing actors. This I reckon will lead to a harmonious way of attaining efficiency by both sets of actors and solving the coordination conundrum.

1.3 Knowledge gap

The studies done by Bachmann (2006) & Nooteboom (2002) on the simultaneous use of power and trust by managers in mandated collaboration networks have largely ignored the need to specify within which contexts managers can balance their process and get maximum benefit. In the Bachmann (2006, p.402) model, the context within which managers should use one of two types of power or trust, interactional and institutional is highlighted with the latter best used in institutions because of their strong foundation. In the Nooteboom (2002, p.90) model, it is up to the manager to assess the situation and based on that; choose between power and trust activities. In contrast to these two models, the Long & Sitkin (2006, p.91) framework makes an elaborate provision through its balancing process, by specifying the circumstances under which any of power or trust activities can be used. It is through this provision that this study seeks to make further adjustments to this framework by testing each balancing process type against a given power or trust activity with an aim of establishing an optimum balance that the public funding actors can then use to address the coordination problem and realize efficiency within the mandated collaboration network.
Secondly, this study answers to calls for further investigation to be made;

1. By Long & Sitkin (2006, p.91) who recommends that further studies on the interplay of power and trust to be carried out in order to move away from studies that focus on managerial implications in the execution of their work to one of seeking to address managerial challenges by getting a fine balance between trust and control.

2. By Willem & Lucidarme (2013, p.24) for further studies to investigate whether their findings of trust being effective in mandated collaboration network holds true. This study however departs from effectiveness to efficiency to investigate on the role that trust alongside power will play in its attainment. The reason for this deviation is primarily because efficiency is a measure of the outcome of the internal processes through which power and trust is manifested. Studying efficiency will further intensify focusing on the internal processes of the network. This is possible through the monitoring that is done on three aspects of costs, quantity and quality to gauge the performance of the implementing actors in terms of acceptable and unacceptable terms set. The challenge in the coordination of the mandated collaboration network has been cited to arise from its structural complexities (Willem & Lucidarme, 2013, p.12). As such, addressing the coordination problem caused by accountability and in effect structural complexities can only be done by viewing it from the efficiency outcome rather than the effectiveness output hence my decision for deviation.

1.4 Research question

This study seeks to investigate the role that both power and trust play in the attainment of efficiency in the mandated collaboration network. Power, trust and efficiency are all internal processes with the first two playing a coordinative role and efficiency, an outcome of the process coordinated by the two concepts normally seen inform of a stated goal for the mandated collaboration network. To be able to meet the objective of this study, both power and trust, as coordinative processes, are investigated to examine the role they play towards the mandated collaboration network. The outcome from this investigation will then be used to ascertain if the stated goal of efficiency has been achieved or not. Hence the first research question;

1. How does power and trust play a role in mandated Collaboration network attaining efficiency?

Since the mandated collaboration network comprises of two main sets of actors, the public funding and implementing, each of them holds their own view in regards to their perception of how power and trust play a role in realizing their efficiency goal. Based on this, I further divide the main question into three sub questions;

- How does power influence the role public funding and implementing actors in mandated collaboration network play towards attaining efficiency?
- How does trust influence the role public funding and implementing actors in mandated collaboration network play towards attaining efficiency?
- How do public funding and implementing actors perceive efficiency in mandated Collaboration network?
1.5 Research purpose

The main objective of this study is to improve on the Long & Sitkin framework (2006) to make it applicable for use for both academicians and practitioners in the mandated collaboration context. By stating propositions, I seek to investigate the ideal and suitable measure of both power and trust activities within specific contexts that can lead to the realization of the mandated collaboration network efficiency goal. Efficiency is an objective that mandated collaboration network is expected to achieve and yet faced with hurdles in achieving it. In seeking to get the optimum balance of power and trust activities, the aim is to aid the public funding actors towards achieving their efficiency objective goal. Through this, the study will thus build onto existing literature and provide practical steps for use for all.

1.6 Research Contribution

This study will make theoretical contributions in the field of social sciences with specific focus on interorganizational networks since mandated collaboration as public networks fall within this context. It also contributes towards the public administration management field with the focus of the study on the coordination aspects of public networks. By using the Long & Sitkin (2006) framework, this study seeks to build on the simultaneous use of power and trust literature existing (Bachmann, 2006 & Nooteboom, 2002) by specifying a particular balancing process type and based on the contextual requirements to use this particular balancing process type I align it with another efficiency aspect. Looking at it this way, the study envisages the findings to come up with ideal and optimum activities of both power and trust that will lead to a smooth attainment of the goals and efficiency. By bringing in place each of these components in a proposition, the main contribution will be towards improving the existing literature on the coordination of mandated collaboration network that both academicians and practitioners can refer to.

On a societal and practical level, this study also seeks to inform all actors within the society about the processes involved in the delivery of public services. The emphasis on rules and resources is an indication of transparency and accountability that is maintained throughout the process with deviations discouraged. Equally so is the emphasis on fulfilling the contractual obligations. These are virtues that all in society need to borrow and apply in their daily activities because it not only informs, but also holds everyone accountable and responsible in contributing to the success of societal projects like the mandated collaboration network.

1.7 Delimitation

The Long & Sitkin (2006) framework, offers a practical approach to how managers can use power and trust in executing their duties. It elaborates on how each of the components, trust, control, balancing processes should be used and in any ideal formal setup these should suffice. However, I chose to make adjustments to it by adding an efficiency component alongside the use of power and trust in order to test if this model could be used to address efficiency. I also omitted the aspect where the impact of subordinates is felt as a result of trust and control strategies in their performance as well as conflict with their supervisors.

This framework also takes a trust sensitive approach that ideally should be adopted in order to establish trust in the network, since it’s a common position that several authors hold that trust cannot be imposed rather nurtured (Bachmann, 2006; Long & Sitkin, 2006 & Nooteboom, 2002). I acknowledge that trust should be nurtured and the important role it plays and as a matter of fact use it in the study. I however have not fully embraced it as the
only coordinative mechanism that can be used. Therefore my stance is that power and trust should both interact and where interaction leads to undesirable outcome, trust should be used to harmonize it.

1.8 Definition of key words

**Actors:** Refer to a person or any organization (own definition).

**Calculative Trust:** This type of trust is used in case of no prior experience or lack of information in a given relationship (Lane & Bachmann, 1998; Lewicki & Bunker, 1996 & Nooteboom, 2002). This definition is derived from all these authors definition of calculative trust.

**Efficiency:** Best outcome public managers can realize for the amount of resources they have invested in their mandated collaboration network” (Boyne, 2003; Lane, 2005 & Mintzberg, 1983). (Derived from all these authors’ definitions).

**Governance:** “Is the indirect way of the government managing by engaging with public, private and voluntary actors to get its public policies executed and implemented”. This is my own compilation of the governance definition derived from these authors (Stoker, 1998; Lane, 2005 & Armstrong & Wells, 2005).

**Mandated Collaboration Network:** A domain formed to achieve and coordinate government’s policy objective of efficiency (Benson, 1975, p.106).

**Power:** Giddens (1984; 1976) define power in two folds that is applied in this study.

1) ‘‘Capability of agents to secure outcomes where the realization of these outcomes depends upon the doings of others” (Giddens, 1976 cited in Cohen, 1989, p.150).

2) ‘‘Capacity to achieve outcomes, whether or not they are connected to sectional interests’’ (Giddens, 1984, p.25).

**Public Networks:** “structures of interdependence involving multiple organizations or parts thereof, where one unit is not merely the formal subordinate of the others in some larger hierarchical arrangement” (O’Toole, 1997, p.45)

**Resource:** structural properties that agents draw their capabilities from (Giddens, 1984, p.33).

**Relational Trust:** This type of trust is associated with psychological needs such as empathy, goodwill and kindness (Long & Sitkin, 2006, p.90).

**Rules:** Formulas that have the ability to generalize its application across a wider context (Giddens, 1984, p.20).

**Task/ Formal control:** “mechanisms that managers use to ensure that an organization’s subunits act in a coordinated and cooperative fashion so that resources will be obtained and optimally allocated in order to achieve the organizations goals’. (Long & Sitkin, 2006, p.90)

**Trust:** This study incorporates both definitions of trust, from both Giddens (1990) & Rousseau et al., (1998).


2) ‘‘ confidence in the reliability of a person or system, regarding a given set of outcomes or events, where that confidence expresses a faith in the probity or love of another, or in the correctness of abstract principles (technical knowledge)” (Giddens, 1990, p.34).
CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW

This section will discuss existing theories related to governance, mandated collaboration network, power, and trust which will be concluded with propositions for ways that both trust and power can lead to efficiency in Mandated Collaboration Networks.

2.1 Networks Overview

Organizations, governments, individuals all join networks today to realize goals that they are unable to achieve alone. In his seminal article, Neither Market nor Hierarchies, Powell (1990, p.300) argued for the recognition of networks as a governance structure in addition to the already known markets and hierarchies. Powell (1990, p.300) argued that unlike markets and hierarchies in which economic exchanges are embedded in socially constructed contexts, in networks, the exchanges were social in nature and characterized with relationships, mutual goals, informal structure of authority and reputation. The kind of networks Powell (1990) was discussing about were the voluntary formed networks, mainly found in the private sector. However, there is a new type of network, known as the public network that warrants an all-inclusive definition.

O’Toole (1997, p.45) defines networks as ‘structures of interdependence involving multiple organizations or parts thereof, where one unit is not merely the formal subordinate of the others in some larger hierarchical arrangement ’. Public networks (mandated collaboration networks) compose of formal (mandated) and informal organizations (private sector). Mandated organizations are formed by government legislation and policies and created to serve a particular interest (Span et al, 2011, p.188) whereas private sector organizations are those that have been formed either for profit or nonprofit purposes. These organizations join mandated collaboration networks primarily to meet government requirements that promote the need for such interactions and exchanges (Lane, 2005 p.93). This makes the network a rather complex one, because it brings in organizations of different sizes and structural compositions under one umbrella to achieve its goals.

The complexity of the network is further compounded by the inclusion of policy networks, though not often cited equally play an important role in enacting the government’s policies. A policy network is defined as a group of organizations that are linked to each other through their dependence on resources (Rhodes, 1997, p.37). The aim thus of these policy networks is to influence the policy formulation process of several actors in the network which leads to different networks pursuing competing interests. It has to be noted that policy implementation of government’s goals is a core purpose of the mandated collaboration network. The policy networks exist in the different sectors of the economy and contribute to the policy formulation process alongside the government, an indication of the changing roles of government management.

Combinations of all interest groups influence the role of mandated collaboration network either directly or indirectly, with the primary actors consisting of public, private and voluntary community organizations that the study refers to as public funding and implementing actors respectively. The policy networks in turn are part of the policy making team that work hand in hand with the legislators to enact policies that the mandated collaboration network are expected to implement thus they influence the policies of the network. Furthermore, the implementing actors come from different sectors of the economy and find it hard to adapt to the hierarchical structure, which is a top down communication to
the more participatory horizontal structure (O’Toole, 1997 & Willem & Lucidarme, 2013). The challenge thus created is one of coordination, where several organizations are expected to collaborate to realize the set goals. The mandated organization, despite the government’s role in creating these networks, cannot use its position out rightly to influence the outcome (O’Toole, 1997, p.45). It thus resorts to indirect means of coordinating the network in order to achieve its desired goals what Kettl (2002, p.490) refers to as Indirect Management and what is thus referred to as Network Governance, that will be expounded on next.

2.2 GOVERNANCE

Governments all over the world are faced with challenges of a complex nature, ranging from rising costs, competition and natural disasters among other concerns that have altered the way they conduct their businesses (O’Toole, 1997; Lane, 2005, Lewis, 2011 & Rhodes, 1997). The problems encountered can no longer be solved by government alone and this calls for a joint action that brings together different actors to achieve national goals. With this new kind of arrangement that is referred to as indirect management (Kettl, 2002, p.490) the government’s direct role is limited to structures like public networks that seek a more consensual approach of management among the actors (O’Toole, 1997, p.46). Through this change in mode of governance, the government is able to expand its programs indirectly through public networks. Governance is thus defined as an indirect way of the government managing by engaging with public funding and implementing actors to get its public policies executed and implemented (Stoker, 1998; Lane, 2005; Armstrong and Wells, 2005). This study uses Stoker’s (1998) 5 main propositions in explaining governance; I will however adopt two propositions that are relevant to this study.

2.2.1 Institutions and actors are drawn from but beyond government.

Today, unlike before, the changes in the management of government functions have significantly altered the way government policies are implemented. The government is now represented at central, regional and local levels all tasked with handling socio political issues at each of their levels. I will refer to the regional and local government as public funding actors-political entities for purposes of clarity and with all three levels, as public funding actors. However not all public actors can be referred to as public funding actors, with another group of actors who have been mandated by the government but do not have the mandate to carry out the funding role. These types of actors despite being publically formed play the same role of implementing the government’s activities as the actors from the private and voluntary sectors. Alongside these actors, are the private, voluntary sectors and supranational organizations that all work jointly in the implementation and provision of public goods and services (Dimitrakopoulos & Passas, 2003; Geddes, 2008; Lane, 2005; Rhodes, 1997; Halkier, 2005 & Stoker, 1998).

These changes have been attributed to rising costs, regional disparities, and a more informed citizenry that seeks accountability and in a bid to address these issues; it has seen the government delegate its responsibilities to these different sets of actors (Halkier, 2005; Kettl, 2002 & Lane, 2005). Using the example of addressing rising costs of producing and implementing public goods and services, the government subcontracts these responsibilities to the private sector that comprises of both profit and nonprofit making actors as well as the public non-funding actors together known as implementing actors. The private sector, especially the profit aligned sector has always been considered to be efficient because of its free enterprise element such as tendering and bidding process, enabling all actors to have a
leveled playing field (Lane, 2005, p.183-185). With the government contracting its services to the implementing actors, it opens up room for more actors to partake in it, leading to a competitive process where the best actors are selected through the bidding and tendering process based on their credentials as well as the least cost aspect. By subcontracting its responsibilities to the implementing actors, the government is able to address both the rising costs and accountability of the tax payers money through the assessment of the actor’s performance that is measured based on how much has been invested and in turn produced, resulting to transparency (Greiling, 2006, p.452). Of course not everything can be measured, but at least the investments made can point to returns for instance the number of jobs created in a given month. This implies that the government despite subcontracting its roles still monitors and ensures that the services produced are commensurate to the resources spent. To this end, the implementing actors address the challenges faced by the government by providing public quality goods and services in an efficient way.

In addition to the public funding and implementing actors, are other actors belonging to the public funding category who work alongside the central government in the implementation of public goods and services and they are referred to as the supranational organizations (Dimitrakopoulos & Passas, 2003, p.440). Supranational organizations are actors whose jurisdiction is independent of the national and regional levels and yet have a mandate that focuses on the same national goals as the locally based actors and are equally able to influence the outcomes. I will refer to them as public funding actors-national agencies. An example of the supranational organization is the European Union (EU). The EU for instance through its Community Empowerment policy initiated the structural program that sought to address the disparities that exist at the regional level of its member states by allocating resources targeting social and economic disparities (Armstrong & Wells, 2005, p.40). They are able to execute and implement their policies by working closely with both sets of actors in the member states with a common goal of reducing regional disparities. All these actors are referred to as public funding and implementing actors respectively, with the former comprising of the regional, local governments, national and supranational actors and the latter, the public non-funding, private (profit oriented) and voluntary (nonprofit oriented) actors.

![Figure 1: Different Institutions and actors in a mandated collaboration network](image-url)
The above mentioned actors all work hand in hand to achieve a common goal, one that the government would not have been singlehandedly capable of performing in an effective way. By delegating its service delivery and implementation responsibilities to the implementing actors, they are able to account better and offer more efficient services to the regions where they serve. The public funding actors-political entities is further able to work hand in hand with the implementing actors at the regional and local levels in which they play their role through funding and creating an investor friendly environment. The public funding actors-national agencies further support the efforts of these two actors, by contributing funds towards the regional projects enabling regions tackle the challenges they are grappled with more effectively. In this way all actors would have been able to join hands to address a problem common to all, thus a further justification for governance.

2.2.2 Blurring of boundaries and responsibilities of tackling social and economic issues

As discussed previously, the different institutions and actors, come together to address a problem, common to them all. Using the example of building a regional hospital, in governance, the government will be one of many stakeholders involved in the process of building this hospital. The other stakeholders will include other public and private entities such as private businesses or even universities who will want to have an ongoing collaboration with this hospital project but contribute to it for instance by jointly producing a drug that will require expertise from the university and a market for it from the businesses that will all lead to the completion of the hospital and its subsequent use. The question that arises out of this collaboration is the unclear demarcation of each actor’s roles, with Stoker (1998, p.22) arguing that this unclear demarcation of responsibilities is a cause of confusion rather than a solution because it will not be easy to hold any actor accountable incase the community hospital project is not implemented. I however disagree with Stoker’s (1998) view by citing examples of the privatization of formerly owned government institutions such as airline companies or joint ventures between government and private sector especially in the health sector whose management have taken full responsibility for all their business trading thus the possibility of an actor evading responsibility is less likely. There can be no doubt however, that challenges do arise due to overlapping concerns but these challenges are not insurmountable and can be addressed by clearly stating each actor’s role towards the implementation of the project. Despite these challenges, the benefits that arise out of this collaborative effort from all the stakeholders cannot be ignored because of the socio-economic impact in the areas such projects are undertaken (O’Toole, 1997, p.448).

In sum, governance is a reduced government role through which it still plays its oversight role of making sure that its policies are implemented. By delegating its roles and responsibilities to both public funding and implementing actors, the government is able to address the wicked challenges it faces by bringing in the right public funding and implementing actors with the right skills to meet their goals. The outcome is however dependent on the management structure that it uses. In the case of my study, the focus is on mandated collaboration network, that I will next expound more on and we will then be able to discover whether or not the government realizes its effort in its minimized role of the mandated collaboration network.

2.3 MANDATED COLLABORATION NETWORK

The new governance role played by governments, calls for a new approach of management, one that is centered on, ”arranging networks rather than managing organizations” (Milward & Provan, 2003, p.3). As discussed earlier, mandated collaboration networks are government
created structures formed to implement public policies (Benson, 1975, p.106). These networks come into existence through a government legislation or in some cases join networks voluntarily, to access funding opportunities that can only be obtained by being part of the network (Span et al (2011, p.188). The funding is thus used as an incentive to get implementing actors joining the network (Lane, 2005, p.52). Irrespective of how it is formed, it is managed and overseen by the designated public funding actors.

In its reduced role, the public funding actors takes the lead position of coordinating the activities of the network to ensure that its policy objectives are met. It will also occasionally intervene in the implementation process and use incentives to influence actors all with an aim of accomplishing its stated goals (Stoker, 1998, p.24). Despite retaining most of its administrative functions through the oversight role that it plays in networks and even with networks being recommended as the ideal structure of governance by Milward & Provan (2003, p.3), challenges are encountered in its management. Willem & Lucidarme (2013, p.11) & Edenlenbos & Eshuis (2013, p.650-651) both cite structural problems arising from such collaborative efforts with public funding actors associated with the vertical structure and the implementing actors with the horizontal structure. The implementing actors originate from a background where consensus rule is the mode of governance and are confronted with adjustment concerns with the government hierarchical structure that involves taking of directives. The challenge with this is the confusion that arises in the mode of communication where the implementing actor is expected to make a transition from a consensual practice to one of taking directives, and with it comes the fear of the implementing actor getting confused of the expectations required of them. The task thus for the public funding actors is to explicitly state what objectives it expects the implementing actors to meet because the implementing actor’s role makes up one part of the effort towards accomplishing the overall network’s goals. It is for reasons such as this, when achieving the government policy objectives is under threat, that the government puts emphasis on the management of such networks. The management thus of this network is done in a contractual form between the public funding and implementing actors, with the former taking the lead in the coordination of this interaction details.

2.3.1 Competitive contracting in mandated collaboration network

In a mandated collaboration network, the interactions that take place between the public funding and implementing actors as they pursue the common goal of implementing the policy objectives are, contractual in nature. A contract is defined as a pact between or among actors that state the intended purpose of their interactions, within the confines of the law that will allow for legal redress in the event of a dispute (Ring, 2008, p.503).

This competitive type of contracting is used as the basis of interaction between the public funding and implementing actors in mandated collaboration network. This type of contract incorporates market features such as open bidding and tendering thus enabling more implementing actors to engage in the process of competing for the implementation of the public good or service (Lane, 2005, p.183). Tendering and bidding process involves the public funding actor expressing interest to the potential implementing actors on available opportunities in the implementation of public goods and services. There is no limit on the number of implementing actors vying for this project but they are assessed on the cost associated with the projects and whether the proposed outcome is commensurate to the cost stated. Applying these market mechanisms in the interaction between the public funding and implementing actor gives the former a wide range of options to choose from, because with
competition, the cost that a implementing actor would set for implementing its services, will considerably reduce. The public funding actor is then in position to choose the implementing actor that meets the criteria set. The principal agent framework states that interaction between the public funding and implementing actor is characterized with information scarcity as a result of the implementing actor’s rational interests. During the process of selection, the public funding actor relies on information the implementing actor avails such as academic background, past working experiences to base the decisions of selection on because it is the only means it can assess their competence since the actual knowledge of the implementing actor’s ability is unknown to anyone except themselves (Knott & Hammond, 2003, p.141).

The public funding actor will thus award the contract to the implementing actor based on the information presented with the expectation that the latter would perform the duties to the best of their ability. A challenge however arises in the form of hidden knowledge which involves the implementing actor possessing superior knowledge over the public funding actor and uses that knowledge to suit their own vested interests (Greiling, 2006, p.454). In the course of implementing the assigned duties, the implementing actor refrains from giving the public funding actor all the information needed and this could relate to a case for instance of the implementing actor concealing the price incurred in the procurement of an item that is not allowed and chooses to conceal this information from the public funding actor in order to avoid penalty. The public funding actor is in no position to enforce the implementing actor to provide the information that is only known to the implementing actor. Hidden knowledge is thus as a result of the information insufficiency caused by the implementing actor’s actions. To address this, the public funding actor will devise a monitoring mechanism that they will then use to attain information either (in) directly from the implementing actor without relying exclusively on them.

### 2.3.2 Performance measurement of competitive contracting in mandated collaboration network

With competitive contracting focused on the outcomes of the network, public funding actors usually use indicators that they can infer from in their assessment of implementing actor’s tasks. Poister (2003, p.3) defines performance measurement as, “objective, quantitative indicators of various aspects of the performance of public programs or agencies”. The public funding actor measures the performance of the network against the stated objective. Citing the example of this study, the overall objective of the mandated collaboration network is efficiency, which is associated with the internal production of the network in terms of how much the network has realized from the activities of the implementing actors in relation to how much the public funding actor invested at the beginning of the contractual arrangement with them. In assessing the outcome, the costs incurred is usually stated and used as a standard measure of ascertaining the value obtained from the investment (Boyne et al., 2003, p.17). For the public funding actor to assess efficiency in the network, they derive information from the implementing actors during the different input, process and output periods of performing their activities as shown in the figure 2. Huemer (1998, p.58-59) highlights two main ways that the public funding actor can use to obtain information for its assessment purpose, either; through investing on information and reporting systems like budgeting that will inform the public funding actor of the implementing actors behavior or through outcome based funding.

In budgeting, the public funding actor monitors the implementing actor’s behavior by tracking the way they utilize the money that has been allocated to them for implementation of the public services. This is usually done during the budgeting process with budgeting divided
into budgeting ex ante and budgeting ex post (Lane, 2005, p.66). Budgeting ex ante involves the process of the public funding actor negotiating the contract with the implementing actor based on expected output, workload and cost as the central elements of the contract. During this phase, the public funding actor explicitly states to the implementing actor the stated goals, how they should achieve it using the procedures given to them including the allowable and unallowable expenses within a given time frame. In the budgeting ex post process the public funding actor verifies the extent to which the implementing actors have met the stated goals. They do this by obtaining information from the reports sent to them by the implementing actors detailing their expenses incurred against each activity and the time it was undertaken (Hilton & Joyce, 2003, p.402-406). The public funding actor is thus able to assess how efficient the network is; based on this information it obtained throughout the different phases of implementation.

In the process of assessing the performance of the implementing actors, the public funding actors also consider the quality of the outcome as a requirement that should be met. However, the assessment of quality is often linked with intangible outcome that is considered hard to measure (Heinrich, 2003 & Poister, 2003). For this reason, Boyne et al., (2003, p.17) argues for a redefinition of efficiency because quality measures is not specified, and recommend that there should be a standard way of measuring quality in the deficiency of efficiency. Nevertheless, if the public funding actor notices that the implementing actors have not realized the expected output, they either choose to assume all the risks associated in producing the service or share the risks with them. The assumption of all risks is however an outdated approach by the government with emphasis more today on holding the implementing actor accountable thus ends up sharing the risks (Lane, 2005, p.66). With the public funding actor using this type of performance measurement, the accomplishment of the network goals are more than certain because the information problem has been solved.

The performance measurement used to assess efficiency in the mandated collaboration network has however received intense criticism by a number of authors. Milward & Provan (2003, p.9-10) argue that this kind of contracting is in stark contrast to the very principles of collaboration. Rather than all the resources being pooled together to achieve a common goal, it seeks to use competition, that opens up room for more implementing actors to participate in the process thus bringing down the cost that implementing actors would have demanded for implementing their services. This implies that the focus of this type of contracting in the

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Input</th>
<th>Process</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
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<tr>
<td>Implementing actor recruitment</td>
<td>Implementing actor's effort,Quantity</td>
<td>Quality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Funds invested</td>
<td>Accuracy</td>
<td>Value</td>
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**Figure 2: Types of Information obtained from the budgeting process**
mandated collaboration network deviates from the core purpose of the network that sees different actor’s pool resources to achieve a common goal. Instead of utilizing the joint resources in a way that is beneficial to all actors, the public funding actors use this type of contracts to cut down on costs that they would have ideally incurred if there were not many implementing actors competing for these projects. The focus thus is on the ‘more for less principle’ in which governments programs are measured. This consequently, leads to a compromise on the quality of the output of the agent’s outcome as they seek to meet quantifiable targets at the expense of the quality. Greiling (2006, p.453) further adds, that the performance measurement used to assess the private actors progress is limited to measuring quantifiable outputs thus not addressing the intangible benefits that arise from the implementation of their services. The discrepancies that arise from using this type of performance measurement in the competitive contracting further sheds light on the intent of the public actor, which as Rhodes (1997, p.97) argues is an indirect way of the government controlling the private actors by stressing on what should be supplied and at what rate, leaving them with no room for maneuver. Poister (2003, p.19) also argues that the objectives of the mandated collaboration network is enacted in form of policies by policy makers, who have different ideological interests that dictates their decision for a given motive. Therefore instead of focusing on the goal that brings beneficial returns to the nation, they trade it off for their ideological position.

In response to these views from the various authors, I agree with Milward & Provan (2003, p.9-10) opinions in terms of the whole concept of collaboration being lost in the guise of looking for less costly services but the alternatives are limited. Every business expects returns and even when we acknowledge that the mandated collaboration network is not a typical business associated with profits, it is still held accountable by the electorate that expects them to use resources reasonably well. This includes comparing costs to the detriment of quality but in the end a public good or service has been implemented. The decision the government makes is in the interest of the nation, so even if it’s viewed to be playing a subtle manipulative role, it is still expected to deliver on the provision of services which in the bigger scheme of things is all that matters. Viewing it this way, I argue that even though the budgeting used is expected to increase efficiency by controlling the conduct of the implementing actor, there is no certainty of what outcome to be expected.

Despite its critics, competitive contracting has registered some positives notably providing the citizen with a wide range of innovative services they can choose from that would not have been possible without the importation of the market mechanisms of competition within the public sector (Lane, 2005; Greiling, 2006 & Poister, 2003). Poister (2003, p.17) remarks that performance measurement is an ideal tool that a public funding actor can use to gauge the performance of the implementing actor with resultant effects of goal alignment among all actors in the network, ensuring transparency and increased productivity. For this to be realized, I argue that the public funding actor not only needs to clearly state what the objectives are and how it intends to achieve these objectives to the implementing actor but also exercise flexibility in executing it.

2.4 POWER CONCEPT

This section will give an overview of the concept of power, followed by the definition and finally the bases of power that will depict in what form power exists and how it is exercised in mandated collaboration network.
Power in the mandated collaboration context both, coordinates and regulates the activities of the implementing actors. This dual role is aligned to sectional and non-sectional interests with the former linked with a regulating role and the latter a coordinative one Luke (1978, cited in Scott, 1994). Sectional interests involve power holders using the resources to influence the outcome in order to achieve their desired goals and do not refrain from the use of sanctions to get subordinates to comply with their demands. These interests are normally enshrined in the policies that guide the entire conduct of the actors Luke (1978, cited in Scott, 1994). Non-sectional interests on the other hand, focus on the internal processes that are embedded in the structure of the network and rather than influence the outcomes, influence the very process that leads to the outcome Luke (1974 cited in Scott, 1994). Its interests are usually addressed as issues of general concern but not inscribed in policies and to ensure that outcomes are achieved, it applies the societal norms and values to guide the process. Despite power being classified in sectional and non-sectional terms, it has often been associated with being sectional and conflict prone (Dahl, 1954, cited in Scott, J, 1994, commentary section). Power however, is also used in non-sectional ways to serve multiple purposes like stabilizing a relationship between two sets of actors and empowering public funding actors at the regional and Kommun levels to ensure the overall mandated collaboration network goals are met (Huxham & Vangen, 2005, p.175-176).

Irrespective of power being sectional or non-sectional, the emphasis is on realizing the stated goal of the network and whether this entails the use of policies or norms to influence the outcome, it certainly leads to the public funding actors achieving their objectives.

2.4.1 Power Definition

Power in mandated collaboration network is relational in nature because it is exercised through the dialectic of control. Giddens (1984, p.374) defines the dialectic of control as “the two-way character of the distributive aspect of power (power as control); how the less powerful manage resources in such a way as to exert control over the more powerful in established power relationships”. In the context of this network, both sets of actors contribute towards each other’s tasks therefore making them dependent on each other for their survival. Power is thus exercised in the network through the medium of control, with the emphasis being on the task allocated to implementing actors to undertake hence referred to as Task control. The type of power that will be defined and which thus study adopts is Task control by Long & Sitkin (2006, p.90).

**TASK CONTROL**

Long & Sitkin (2006, p.90) define organizational control hereby referred to as task control as ‘‘mechanisms that managers use to ensure that an organization’s subunits act in a coordinated and cooperative fashion so that resources will be obtained and optimally allocated in order to achieve the organizations goals’’. The task control is a primary goal for public funding actors to ensure that the implementing actors accomplish the network goals assigned to them because they are equally evaluated on the realization of this goal. Public funding actors do this by communicating to implementing actors the required rules of what is expected of them in order for the network goals to be realized. The rules the public funding actor stipulates to the implementing actors focus on the conduct and on the eventual outcome of the network (Ouchi, 1979 & Scott, 1993). To ensure that implementing actors abide by these assigned tasks, public funding actors monitor the task activities that are assigned to them and they do this through close supervision of the implementing actor’s entire process and how they conduct themselves in the course of undertaking these activities. Ouchi (1979, p.839) opines that even though it is not possible to fully attain all the information required from this intense
scrutiny of implementing actors by public funding actors, it at least solves the information problem partially enabling the public funding actors to use it in their decision making and allows them to make necessary amendments (Heinrich, 2003, p.26). The task controls discussed below are divided into formal and informal modes, with formal control involved with input, process and output controls and informal task controls involved with the social norms, values and beliefs (Long & Sitkin, 2006, p.90).

2.4.2 Bases of Power

In mandated collaboration network, power is exercised by the public funding actor, who is seen as possessing the ability to change the outcome of events as per the networks desires. The public funding actors derives the mandate of this position from the appointing authority that tasks them with the responsibility of playing an oversight role over the implementing actors in order to ensure the mandated collaboration networks objectives are met (Lane, 2005, p.51). The public funding actor uses the resources within their disposal to effect the changes which leaves the public funding actor in a more powerful position than the implementing actor. The implementing actor however, is not powerless, because the public funding actor’s performing their role is entirely dependent on the actions of the implementing actors. The implementing actors therefore can opt not to perform the work or to perform it unsatisfactorily to the disadvantage of the public funding actor. This symbiotic interaction between the public funding and implementing actor is not entirely a balanced relation with the public funding actor possessing more leverage than the actor by virtue of the position they hold and the resources they have within their reach. Cohen (1989, p.152) argues that dialectic of control over time in a stable environment, leads to the uneven allocation of resources. This does not imply that unstable environments do not have uneven allocation of resources; it rather means that the means used to produce this unevenness in resources is continuously built on with every execution the public funding actors make but can be equally changed if the political situation dictates so, with implementing actors also within a chance of obtain resources and dictating the rules. What this essentially means, is that the public funding actor is not beyond reproach, the implementing actor can equally hold them to task in the course of implementing their activities. The means thus used by the public funding actors to effect changes so as to get the desired outcome are the formal and informal modes of control.

**FORMAL CONTROL**

Formal control refers to the mechanisms that public funding actors use to assess the progress of implementing actor’s tasks. This is exercised by public funding actors through the evaluations of the input, process and output task activities of the implementing actors that are discussed below.

**INPUT CONTROLS**

Long & Sitkin (2006, p.90) points out that during this control phase, public funding actors should set out the criteria that they will use in the recruitment, induction and orientation process of implementing actors. These processes serve as the base through which power is exercised during the implementation of these activities in the mandated collaboration network. In all these three processes, the public funding actor stipulates through rules the criteria that implementing actors should abide by in the application of the projects. A rule is defined as a formula if used in the right way, has the ability to generalize its application across a wider context (Giddens, 1984, p. 20). The rules are thus essentially a medium of instruction that is used by the public funding actors to guide the actions of the implementing actors in regards to how they spend the resources and how each activity is to be performed. In undertaking their duties, the public funding actor states the objectives clearly to the implementing actors and the public funding actors normally disseminate it to them verbally.
and through print. Since the mode of interaction between both sets of actors is contractual in nature, these rules clearly stipulate in the contracts the implementing actor’s duties and within which time frame they are expected to submit it in.

Not all rules within the mandated collaboration network are written, with norms playing an equally important role as the written rules. Feldman (2003, p.279) refers to norms in public settings as the “standards, principles, policies and rules” that have the ability to shape the direction of the mandated collaboration network goals and could hinder or even enable the implementation of the overall goals by the implementing actors. Based on this, the implementing actors are expected to abide by both the written and unwritten rules; with the latter manifesting itself later on as the implementing actors familiarize themselves with their environment. It is these normative rules that guide, constrain and evaluate the behaviors of implementing actors in the network. An example of a normative rule is the culture of the network, whereby all actors are expected to conform to that culture failure of which will lead to the actor being excluded from social gatherings in the network. In this regard, these normative rules clearly stipulate acceptable and unacceptable conduct of the implementing actors and the implementing actors are expected to share the same beliefs and behavior with the public funding actors in the mandated collaboration network. The rules thus serve as a framework for implementing actors to refer to in the course of implementing their activities. Power is thus exercised through the rules in the mandated collaboration network by stating clearly the right from the wrong and the penalties associated with not adhering to it. Through the selection, induction and orientation process of the implementing actors, the public funding actor is able to control their conduct and instill in the right values right from the beginning. With a monitoring system as such in place, the public funding actors will have access to information that will help in the planning and execution process all with an aim of ensuring that the network goals are realized.

**PROCESS CONTROLS**

In the process phase the public funding actor exercises their power by monitoring the activities of the implementing actors as they performing it, to ensure that they execute their duties as stated and expected (Long & Sitkin, 2006, p.90). Cohen (1989, p.166) argues that special emphasis is put in obtaining information pertaining to administrative matters and transforming this information to a useable format. Obtaining information is of utmost priority in this phase because the implementing actors as earlier mentioned are closely monitored by the public funding actors through their conduct and actions as a way of exercising control over them (Ouchi, 1979; Giddens, 1984 & Lane, 2005). They do this by performing their oversight role over the implementing actors focusing on administrative matters, through which they are able to generate information from easily. Through the rules, they specify to the implementing actors the task they expect them to finalize within a specific time frame using a specified channel. The public funding actor obtains it in the form of financial and activity report that they will then have to deduce the conduct and progress of the implementing actor. The activity report details the activities the implementing actor has undertaken within the stipulated period and the financial report, the amount incurred performing these activities. The public funding actor is thus expected to infer from these reports if due process has been observed in terms of procuring items and within acceptable cost specified in the budget that is expected to facilitate the activities. The public funding actor in assessing the progress of the implementing actor does compare the results obtained to the preset indicators and is then able to tell whether there is need for more resources needed to achieve the mandated collaboration network desired goal of efficiency or not. Depending on the performance of the implementing actor, the public funding actor also has the
opportunity to correct the implementing actors while they are in action and influence the outcome by their mere presence. The public funding actor however acknowledges that to attain the desired outcome more cooperation will be needed from the implementing actors.

**OUTPUT CONTROLS**

These are mechanisms that public funding actors use to assess whether implementing actors have met the goals assigned to them or not (Long & Sitkin, 2006, p.91). They do this by referring to the terms that were stated in the contract between themselves and the implementing actors with the latter expected to have accomplished the set targets by the end of contract. The public funding actors can either do this during the budgeting process, where budget ex post and budget ex ante are compared to verify to what extent the contract has been met (Lane, 2005, p.66). Alternatively, the output can also be accessed through outcome based funding, where public funding actors will expect the implementing actor to explain to them how the funds allocated was spent against an activity (Kettl, 2002 & Huemer, 1998). They do it by ensuring that the current resources that they have in form of ongoing programs are being implemented well and targets met, to warrant further funding. Funding is therefore hinged on the satisfactory performance of the desired output. By enforcing such control measures public funding actors are able to assess the performance of the implementing actors work in accordance with the set goals thus exercising power.

In the event that the output isn’t satisfactory, the public funding actor can also use social incentives to motivate the implementing actors in performing their routine activities so that the ultimate network goal is met. By using money and social incentives, public funding actors aim to still control as well as influence the conduct and decision making process of the implementing actors. If the implementing actors obtain these resources, they will then be required to account to the public funding actors on how they used it. Power in this case is exercised by public funding actors using resources such as funding as a way of making implementing actors give them information about the activities they are pursuing. Implementing actors getting these resources is thus hinged on their compliance on the conditions stipulated to them by the public funding actors and their failure to comply, leaves them open to being penalized. Huxham & Vangen (2005, p.86) agree with the public funding actors role of using resources to influence, and argue that any contrary position from the implementing actors, is seen as an act of defiance leaving the future funding prospects of the implementing actors in jeopardy.

Giddens (1985, cited in Cohen, 1989, p.175-177) also highlights “‘policing violence ‘as means through which public funding actors can exercise power depending on how they use it to get implementing actors to comply to the rules failure of which, they face sanctions. Through the mandate obtained from the policy makers, public funding actors play their oversight role. These policies also stipulate the mandate of the implementing actors that public funding actors later stipulate to them. Both the public funding and implementing actors are thus compelled to follow these policies, failure of which they are faced with consequences. Unlike the public funding actors who are held accountable by the policy makers in terms of achieving efficiency in the mandated collaboration network, how they go about performing their oversight role is left to their discretion which gives them leverage to devise means of accomplishing their tasks (Feldman, 2003, p.281). This discretion is however limited to the public funding actors with the implementing actors being held accountable by the former and duly expect them to comply with the rules stipulated to them or else they face sanctions. They therefore do not have the same leverage that public funding actors have, because of the terms stated in each contract. The public funding actor’s terms state that they
should meet the efficiency criteria for the mandated collaboration network; however, meeting this efficiency criterion is dependent on the implementing actors performing their assigned duties. The fact that neither actor can alter the terms of the power, is a manifestation of power that is exercised by policy makers through their policies. This further illustrates how power is exercised in mandated collaboration network right from the inception of the network.

The formal means of control used by public funding actors serve the purpose of achieving the objectives of the network set earlier on as well as ensuring accountability and transparency of the implementing actors’ activities through the intense scrutiny undertaken by the public funding actor on the entirety of the project lifecycle. However, Greiling (2006, p.452) questions the control strategies used by public funding actors in the process phase of the formal controls, citing fears of a potential decrease in the monitoring. The author argues that when mechanisms from the hierarchy and the market in the form of rules and the open competitive bidding are both used it will lead to undesired result which would not have been the case with the hierarchical government structures. I agree with Greiling’s (2006, p.452) concerns in regards to the combination of different mechanisms used from different governance structures and it has been cited as one of the challenges faced in collaboration efforts between public and implementing actors (Willem & Lucidarme, 2013, p.12 & Edenlenbos & Eshuis ,2013, p.650-651)). However, the challenges Greiling (2006, p.452) mentions mainly pertains to the horizontal collaborations done and not mandated collaboration network where the government takes the lead in ensuring that implementing actors abide by all its rules throughout its project lifecycle in order to accomplish the desired network goal. The implementing actors do not have the discretion to change the process as they desire, rather they are mandated to follow through with what has been stipulated to them by the public funding actors and that way the credibility and authenticity of the outcome of the network is maintained.

In sum, the roles of rules and resources can be considered to be both an enabling and constraining element of mandated collaboration networks attaining efficiency. Rules and resources are enabling in the sense that implementing actors are able to accomplish their assigned tasks, through the coordination of the public funding actor’s activities. By controlling the time and movements, as well as reviewing the periodic reports of implementing actors, public funding actors have ensured that implementing actors comply with the rules stipulated to them. Giddens (1979, cited in Cohen, 1989, p.193) argues this compliance is as a result of the ideology of the institution that expects all actors to abide by the rules stipulated to them. Acts of obedience is thus considered as a norm, which if not followed by the implementing actor is seen as a means of defiance that calls for sanctions. To this end, rules and resources enable the accomplishment of mandated collaboration network goals of attaining efficiency because the implementing actors are able to fully execute their assigned activities through the coordinative and oversight role done by the public funding actors.

This however is not in all instances, with the stipulation of rules and resources seen as a hindrance rather than an enabler in attaining efficiency. Public funding actors assess the progress of implementing actors and using the “administrative surveillance” mentioned by Giddens (1981, cited in Cohen, 1989, p.166) as means of deriving their information, falls short in addressing the concerns that implementing actors face in the course of executing their activities. This administrative surveillance commonly referred to as performance measurement, is generally used as a monitoring tool by public funding actors (Greiling, 2006, p.449). In using these tools, public funding actors base their emphasis on the information they
have derived from the reports that show how implementing actors are progressing and equally spending the resources. Efficiency being viewed as how much has been invested vis-à-vis the returns realized, is only met as far as the costs are concerned. It therefore gives a wrong picture about efficiency in general being attained rather one component of efficiency, the costs minimizing being attained. These performance measurements is used by the public funding actors to obtain information that they can then assess and see how they can realize the mandated collaboration networks goals.

2.5 TRUST

The numerous studies done on trust are usually approached from different author’s disciplines making it hard to easily conceptualize it (Lewicki & Bunker, 1996, p.114). Giddens (1990, p.34) defines trust as the, “confidence in the reliability of a person or system, regarding a given set of outcomes or events, where that confidence expresses a faith in the probity or love of another, or in the correctness of abstract principles (technical knowledge).” In addition to this, Long & Sitkin (2006, p.89-90) adopt Rousseau et al., and define it as, “comprising of the intention to accept vulnerability based upon positive expectations of the intentions or behavior of another”.

These definitions highlight a few central issues about trust; firstly, it takes place between a trustor and trustee. The terminology trustor is used in reference to an actor who is performing the act of bestowing his trust and trustee as the person or a given context that trust is being entrusted upon (Nooteboom, 2002, p.8). The trustor could either be between two persons, or between a person and an institution or any given context. Trustor and trustee in this study will hereby be referred to as public funding and implementing actors respectively. Secondly, for trust to take effect there has to be preconditions namely; uncertainty, risk and knowledge that require public funding and implementing actors to get involved in a transaction despite the risks involved (Giddens, 1990; Huemer, 1998 & Nooteboom, 2002). With these preconditions met, predictability and expectations are a natural outcome and act as the basis of trust to develop that result in public funding actors having faith in the ability and performance of an implementing actor.

2.5.1 Trust Concept

Trust has been conceptualized along instrumental and non-instrumental terms, with Giddens (1990, p.34) definition of trust skewed more towards the non-instrumental concept in which trust is seen as an emergent process that comes out of social interactions. Long & Sitkin’s (2006, p.89-90) definition of trust is more aligned to the instrumental concept whereby the public funding actors bestows their trust on the implementing actors expecting to get more gains than losses from a given transaction. It also acknowledges that public funding actors are limited in their ability to make decisions and because of this, can always be manipulated by opportunistic implementing actors (Williamson, 1993, p.463). Conceptualizing trust non-instrumentally, involves the public funding actor considering the benefit-loss conundrum as one of many forms of trust applied in different stages and contexts of a given relationship (Bradach & Eccles, 1989 & Lane, 1998). Each phase and context will evolve in their choice in using calculative trust and other influencing factors like the morals, norms, values and cognitions depending on the outcome that is desired by the public funding actors.

PRECONDITIONS, BENEFITS AND ANTECEDENTS OF TRUST

I will explain these concepts further in light of Giddens (1990, p.34) view by illustrating through Lewiciki & Bunker (1996) & Nooteboom (2002) trust models that captures them
adequately. I will also discuss the preconditions, antecedents and benefits of trust in a mandated collaboration network.

PRECONDITIONS
Both the Lewicki & Bunker (1996) & Nooteboom (2002) models illustrate the calculative, norms, values, morals as well as cognition based trust that are seen usually in the instrumental and non-instrumental conceptualization of trust in a three stage model. In the first stages of both the Lewicki & Bunker (1996) & Nooteboom (2002) model, the calculative type of trust is administered. This kind of trust is normally applied in the absence of limited information where both sets of actors have not had any prior transactions. Giddens (1990, p.33), asserts that ‘‘there would be no need to trust someone whose activities were visible and processes transparent’’. Therefore for trust to take place there has to be uncertainty caused by the lack of information. This is due to the fact that both public funding and implementing actors do not have any prior interactions. Thus uncertainty is a precondition of trust.

The public funding actor puts themselves in a risky situation by bestowing trust on the implementing actor. Risk as Giddens (1990, p.34) argues, is always associated with a threat in achieving a desired outcome which is not the case with trust, that is considered emergent. As such trust and risk are not tied to each other. Despite Giddens (1990) views on trust being emergent in sharp contrast to the rational school of thought (Williamson, 1993 & Coleman, 1990) that sees trust in a cost benefit analysis way, their views on risk are quite similar. Giddens (1990, p.35) asserts that risk can be calculated, where by the public funding actor knows beforehand the threats they are faced with in dealing with the implementing actor in regards to achieving the desired goal. Based on this, they will use the prior knowledge of the threat to limit the negative impact it will have in the final output. This way of the public funding actor using the prior knowledge to limit the negative impacts of the threat, is what Giddens (1990, p.35) refers to as acceptable risk. The rational school of thought equally views risk as being faced with a threat, its threat however is largely restricted to the individualistic opportunistic implementing actors who are considered to be limited in information and ability and its way of limiting threat is by using formal mechanisms. This does not in imply that Giddens (1990) view does not recognize that formal means is used; however, at some stage of the relationship the formal means is substituted with social control especially if the knowledge has spread across a wide span. Giddens (1990, p.38) further adds that the extent of risk, emanates from both the implementing actors and the environment in which the social relations is embedded in, thus both means of formal and informal control are used to mitigate risks. Uncertainty, risk and knowledge always go hand in hand in the decisions made by public funding actors on trusting implementing actors and are thus preconditions for trust to take effect in any situation.

BENEFITS OF TRUST
Trust encourage actors to cooperate by learning and sharing resources and information that leads to reduced transaction costs (Lewicki & Bunker, 1996; Nooteboom, 2002 & Sako, 1998). In the second and third stages of the Lewicki & Bunker (1996) & Nooteboom (2002) models an element of calculative trust is used though at a minimal. This form of formal control is substituted with social control through norms, values and cognition or expectation based forms of trust. It does not mean that the role formal mechanisms play ceases; rather social control takes a more central role. Having spent time with each other, obtaining knowledge on each other’s preferences both public funding and implementing actors interactions are regulated by the norms, values and morals in which the social context is embedded in. Studies have shown the relevance of abiding by the norms and morals of a
given context for businesses as a way of obtaining legitimacy (Tyler & Kramer, 1996; Hardy et al, 1998 & Sako, 1998). By conforming to the norms of the society, it’s argued that the implementing actor is considered belonging to the mandated collaboration network. With this come the benefits of association such as cooperation, learning as well as reduced transaction costs all accessed through sharing vital information which would not have been possible, if they were not involved in a trusting relationship (Sako, 1998, p.91). Besides these advantages that both public funding and implementing actor derive from trust, the latter comply with the norms and values of the society because they see this as a moral and acceptable practice thus taking on a form of social control (Tyler & Kramer, 1996, p.5).

ANTECEDENTS OF TRUST
Antecedents of trust are considered as the precursors for trust to develop in any given context. Continuing with the illustrative examples from the Lewiciki & Bunker (1996) & Nooteboom (2002) models, the two stages of both models especially the last one, has a heightened case of identification where both public funding and implementing actors have strong belief in each other’s competence and performance. Unlike in the earlier stages where information was limited, in this stage, information is a basis for trust to develop. The sense of expectation is increased because of the shared knowledge among both sets of actors. The knowledge is circulated through the different communication mediums in these social contexts. Within organizations and networks, rules and routines embedded in the institutions define the acceptable code of conduct in these contexts. Therefore both sets of actors know what is expected of them and will thus adhere to it. This is considered as a basis of trust to develop based on the compliance and accuracy of implementing actors in performing their tasks as stated. It is on this basis that Giddens (1990,p.34) asserts that confidence is derived on both the public funding and implementing actor based on the knowledge that they have obtained making them knowledgeable and able to execute their obligations well. The implementing actors do not only ensure they fulfill their obligations diligently, but also do so honestly and consistently thus resulting to the creation of trust in them. Through their performance, the trustworthiness of the mandated collaboration network in which the social relations is embedded in is equally created. Predictability and expectation are thus antecedents for trust to develop in the mandated collaboration network.

The above discussion using illustrations from Lewiciki & Bunker (1996) & Nooteboom (2002) models on trust, discuss the concept, preconditions, benefits and antecedents of trust. It indicates that trust does not have a clear divide, there is no instrumental or non-instrumental concept rather it is an combination of various concepts brought together to achieve a given goal. Networks are able to save on transaction costs and obtain crucial information through cooperation with other actors by displaying trustworthy behaviors (Sako, 1998, p.91). The concepts also shed light on how trust is created in different circumstances. Opportunism at all times will be a threat and because of this, public funding actors will always seek to improvise means of ensuring that its side effects are dealt with appropriately. Public funding actors also have to acknowledge that trust does not operate in a vacuum but is embedded in a social context and will occasionally influence the performance of their activities. This will require regular interchanging of controls, from formal to social depending on the context. Trust is thus seen to have an overall coordinating effect in the transactions between the public funding and implementing actors.

2.5.2 Production of Trust
Trust in mandated collaboration network is produced during the course of actors implementing their activities (Giddens, 1990; Long & Sitkin, 2006 & Zucker, 1986). This
model incorporates two types of trust, calculative and relational trust respectively (Long & Sitkin, 2006, p.89-90).

**CALCULATIVE TRUST**
This type of trust as previously discussed is used when public funding actors do not have any experience of working with implementing actors or lack information usually at the start of their relationship (Lane & Bachmann, 1996; Lewiciki & Bunker, 1996; Nooteboom, 2002 & Sako, 1998). Due to this limitation, public funding actors opt to use this type of trust to deal with any risk of opportunism from the implementing actors in order to achieve their desired mandated collaboration network goals. They do this by ensuring that the implementing actors adhere to the stipulated rules in their contracts as well as guide and monitor their activities till a time they have got ample information to assess their trustworthiness. Long & Sitkin (2006, p.90) further argue that this type of trust is also used by public funding actors to convince their implementing actors that it is of benefit to both of them to make use of this type of trust. I believe that the public funding actors are in a better position to convince the implementing actors on the importance attached to performing their duties as expected. However it is not enough to convince implementing actors of the benefits attached with complying with the public funding actor’s command and expect them to comply. I argue it will take effort and commitment from both sets of actor’s to put this into action in order to achieve the network’s goals. Long & Sitkin (2006, p.89-90) calculative constructs include; Ability and Integrity aspects.

**ABILITY**
Ability is defined by Long & Sitkin (2006, p.89) in terms of the task performance of the implementing actors and as calculus, knowledge or competence types of trust by Giddens (1990), Lewiciki & Bunker (1996) & Nooteboom (2002) respectively. Public funding actors evaluate implementing actors on the basis of their performance on the assigned tasks. Through this assessment they derive information about the trustworthiness of the implementing actors. At all times, the information sought by the public funding actors is to feed into their monitoring system and ensure that the implementing actors do fulfill their responsibilities while maintaining a working relationship. They base their decision on the financial and activity reports from which they are able to deduce if the implementing actors execute their duties well and within the confinements stated. As discussed earlier, public funding actors are able to determine the conduct and performance of the implementing actors through the activity and financial reports. Using this information, I believe they will be able to combat any case of opportunistic tendencies from implementing actors. An example of how public funding actors assess the ability of the implementing actors is illustrated in the first two of the three stages of the trust model of Lewiciki & Bunker (1996, p.118) calculus and knowledge types of trust. In these two stages, the public funding actors constantly monitor and control the actions of the implementing actors with an aim of acquiring information about them. Nootboomp (2002,p.90) equally views trust building as an incremental process that commences with public funding actors using control in the course of their interactions with implementing actors. They do this because of the limited information they have on their capability to meet their expectations. In all these cases it is evident that control will be used to ascertain the competence of the implementing actor. For trust to develop, implementing actors will have to demonstrate their competence in performing the assigned tasks. It is therefore incumbent on the public funding actors to offer contracts to implementing actors on the basis of the specific skills they possess in order to realize the network’s set objectives.
This type of trust that is derived from task related activities has however been disputed by Dirks & Ferrin (2001, p.456) as a direct cause of trust being generated. The authors argue that task related activities should be seen to play an underlying role of mediating the conduct of the actor which leads to the desired outcome. That way, the public funding actors are able to predict the outcome of the implementing actors. I agree to a certain extent with Dirks & Ferrin (2001, p.456) notion, especially in regards to trust playing a mediating role by altering the conduct of the implementing actor with an intended goal of achieving the outcome. I however dispute with them; in regards to the role that task related activities play in generating trust in a network. The medium of these task activities to the implementing actor’s is through rules. Rules are used by the public funding actor in the network with an intention of standardizing the conduct. It is through this that predictability of the actors conduct is attained. Through the predictability, the public funding actor is able to assess the implementing actor’s conduct, expectations set and thus trust can be derived. This goes to show that trust can be used as both a mediator and in a direct way too.

**INTEGRITY**

Long & Sitkin (2006, p.90) associate the integrity of the implementing actor’s with their willingness to meet the obligations assigned to them. This implies that besides the competence and ability that implementing actors possess their desire to perform the duties in an honest and committed way determines the credibility and authenticity of the entire process. In a mandated collaboration network, the public funding actor sets the rules and expects the implementing actors to abide by them. Internally, the public funding actors specify to implementing actors how they expect the activity and financial reports to be sent to them. This is normally done through electronic mail within a specific timeframe. In the event that the implementing actors do not deliver for instance a report on time without any valid reasons, then the public funding actor will have some queries to that regard and their commitment levels questioned. In such a scenario, the chances of nurturing trust depend on the implementing actor’s judgment of the situation with either honoring the agreed time or give prior notice. The focus thus being on the conduct displayed that reflects on the implementing actor’s personality and subsequent decision made on whether to trust or not.

The public funding actors also stipulate to the implementing actors how they should disseminate the information when communicating externally. They specify the use of symbols in all official communications. Edelman (1964, cited in Zald, 1996, p.86-89) argues that symbols are mainly used by government agencies as a means of guaranteeing their continued support to the public through the implementation of the governments activities within the communities that they serve. I cannot certainly (dis) agree with the author on the intent behind the use of symbols by the government but I do believe that symbols such as logos is a form of communication between the network and the external actors. The symbols display the logo of the network and every time it is used in any of the communications through print or media or in moving vehicles the external actors identify with it. In time they are able to predict and associate the symbol with the trustworthy impression they have derived through the way it has been displayed by the implementing actors (Hardy et al., 1998, p.64). It is for this reason that public funding actors ensure intense scrutiny of the validity of the information both internally and externally before it is disseminated. Correct and accurate information is thus a basis for further trust to develop. Even with the emphasis on realizing the goals, the public funding actor is also keen on ensuring that the process undertaken is credible and authentic. The role played by the implementing actors in building calculative trust is therefore vital because their actions have a reflection on the mandated
collaboration network they represent and not on their individual organizations (Beckert, 1996, p.328).

To this end, the rules serve their purpose of ensuring that implementing actors observe due process in performing their roles. By observing the rules, implementing actors display their commitment to their work and through it, a positive image is created of the network. This serves as basis for trust to develop in the mandated collaboration network.

**RELATIONAL TRUST**

This type of trust is associated with psychological needs such as empathy and show of support from public funding actors to implementing actors in order to motivate them with an aim of achieving a common goal. It involves the public funding actor identifying with the needs of the implementing actors personally. The aim is to give them a sense of belonging, where they feel appreciated with the resultant effect of them being voluntarily compliant and motivated to do their work (Long & Sitkin, 2006, p.90). The authors use the construct benevolence as one that public funding actors can use to evaluate the implementing actor’s trustworthiness.

**BENEVOLENCE**

This is associated with a public funding actor being responsive to the psychological needs of the implementing actor (Long & Sitkin, 2006, p.90). Unlike the calculative type of trust, the intent of the public funding actor is not only to realize the network’s goals. They are also keen on establishing a relationship with the implementing actor with an aim of sharing with them the network’s values in the process (Long & Sitkin, 2006, p.90).

Dirks & Ferrin (2001, p.456), defines trust as a, “psychological state that provides a representation of how individuals understand their relationship with another party in situations that involve risk or vulnerability.” Applying this definition to the mandated collaboration network requires the objectives be stated clearly. The relationship between the public funding and the implementing actors is firstly about realizing the network goals and the informal relationship follows. The binding factor is the realization of the network goal and all the risks involved pertains to that. If the public funding actor chooses to express compassion and care towards the implementing actors, it is considered as a basis for trust to develop. This is so because it impacts on their future performances. For instance, if the implementing actor enjoys a warm relationship with the public funding actor, it will show on the effort the implementing actor will expend on performing the duties. It is especially so if previously there was less effort involved. I agree with the authors and argue that the implementing actor will thus comply with any pressure exerted because of the fear of not performing as expected. This fear will however not be as a result of facing the penalties but because the implementing actor will not want to disappoint the public funding actor. Being able to shift the implementing actor’s concerns from fear of being penalized to voluntarily complying and not wanting to disappoint can only be addressed through personal interactions. This I believe, is because the implementing actor view the public funding actor as concerned with their personal struggles and hence share a form of identity with them. It is on this premise that productivity will be increased because of the care and concern the public funding actor has displayed to the implementing actor. This is thus a basis for trust to develop between the public funding and implementing actors. Similar sentiments are shared by Tyler & Degoey (1996, p.331) who argue that implementing actors become more focused on aspects of trustworthiness when they have established a social relation with the public funding actor. The authors argue that implementing actors will then begin to identify themselves as having a common cause with both the public funding actor and the mandated collaboration network resulting into voluntary compliance, cooperation and performance
improvement. Based on this, I argue that public funding actors can choose to establish an interpersonal relation with the implementing actors. It is through such reciprocal actions from the implementing actors that they will be able to deduce whether there is need for more or less of network trust in order to achieve the outcome.

In addition to integrity, relational trust can also be established through the reputation and similarities of actors in the network. Zucker (1986, p.62) points out that reputation and similarities through process based and characteristic trust can serve as a basis for personal trust to develop. Process based trust is the reputation implementing actors gain depending on how they undertake their tasks. The public funding actor will form their reputation based on how (un)satisfactorily they have done their work. I argue that an implementing actor would be evaluated favorably if they meet the goals assigned to them by the public funding actor.

A similar view is supported by Kramer (1996, p.226) in his discussion on the disparate views of trust held by both managers and their subordinates in a hierarchical relationship. The subordinates, the author argues are focused on fulfilling their obligations, because they know that any chance of them getting any benefit is heavily hinged on the manager's assessment of their assigned duties. The manager’s on the other hand focus on how well the subordinates complete their assigned duties and within which time frame since their own evaluation is dependent on the subordinates successfully completing their assigned duties. If the subordinate performs his duties satisfactorily, it is expected that the manager will also reciprocate in times of need in cases where the subordinate is seeking for another contract or even at times when the subordinate wants the manager to put in a good recommendation to enhance their reputation. In applying this analogy to the mandated collaboration network, I argue that both public funding and implementing actors might pursue different interests. But because they are aware of the fact that the attainment of their interests is dependent on one another, the implementing actor would comply with the public funding actor. Even though, in this case the balance of favor weighs heavily on the public funding actor than the implementing actors. This is because I believe the public funding actor being the supervisor has the authority to make any decisions. The implementing actor will thus ensure that they meet the desired network goals that are considered a priority by the public funding actor. Through this they will be able to establish a good interpersonal relationship between each other and it is these personal experiences that they would have undergone through together that will serve as a basis for trust to develop. The relationship thus that exists between the public funding and the implementing actors is a calculative one, where both sets of parties are looking after their own interest which will serve as a basis for relational trust to develop.

On the other hand, Zucker (1986, p.62) argues that characteristic based trust is generated on the basis of similarities between actors who find it easy to trust each other than those they do not share anything in common with. This kind of trust is generated when both the public funding and implementing actor have similar interests with each other. In a mandated collaboration network, the common interest between the public funding and implementing actors is restricted to accomplishing the goals. On a regular basis, the communication that ensues between these two sets of actors is involved with assessing the progress of the networks goals and how to resolve any challenges met. The goal alignment between both sets of actors is a basis for commitment which leads to the production of trust in the network (Brenkert, 1996, p.278). Having the same goals, Brenkert (1996, p.278) argues, gives the public funding actors confidence. I however disagree with this because I believe it is the implementing actor who gains more confidence. This is because through this goal alignment, the implementing actors feel a sense of belonging with the public funding actors. They can
discuss on issues pertaining to their work and this builds on their personal relationship and in turn their self-confidence.

Discussed above, trust in a mandated collaboration network can be formed both through the good performance of the implementing actors and through interpersonal interactions initiated by the public funding actor’s to the implementing actors. Through implementing actor’s competence and their observance of due process, trust can be nurtured in the network. Showing concern to implementing actors by the public funding actors is also another way of generating trust. The reputation implementing actor’s gain through their task performance as well as the similar goals also serves as additional ways of establishing trust in the network. Whichever means is used, requires commitment and cooperation by both sets of actors. It is also dependent on the objective of the public funding actor in seeking to nurture trust. This range of options on how trust can serve a specific purpose is an indication that trust as power is and should be used as a coordinative and regulative structure in the mandated collaboration network.

2.6 EFFICIENCY

The following chapter will discuss efficiency, which will be then followed up with how power and trust can both enable public funding actors attain efficiency.

Governments today no longer provide public services and goods alone but do so in collaboration with actors from the private sectors. Huge government expenditure incurred in the production of the public goods and services has been cited as the primary cause. The need to reduce on the costs has seen an emergence of other means of service delivery like subcontracting (Boyne et al, 2003; Greiling, 2006; Kettl, 2002; Lane, 2005; Heinrich, 2003 & Poister, 2003).

With these new forms of service delivery, however come new demands. There is a growing need for funds disbursed to the implementing actors to be accounted for by several stakeholders notably the policy makers and citizens (Heinrich, 2003; Lane, 2005 & Rhodes, 1997). This has resulted into performances being measured as a key component of many programs in the public sector today. In the past and in recent times broad goals are specified to the management and the manager is given discretion in its implementation. The difference however is in the increasing rate the current measurements are being enacted by the policy makers in the form of bills and passed on to be implemented by the managers in these public sectors (Heinrich (2003, p.25). This leaves them with less room to maneuver in terms of implementing the activities. Of interest in these measurement techniques being applied, is the emphasis that has been laid on the outcomes of the service delivery achieved, which information is normally widely circulated and accessed by everyone. This information, gives an in depth account of how the tax payers resources has been utilized thus answering queries that policy makers encounter in their daily course of work. This information is equally used by the policy makers to win political mileage, by highlighting its achievements through the impact that is seen in instances of jobs created and high literacy levels (Lane, 2005 & Greiling, 2006). It is for this reason, that performance measurements are core components of public sector programs and evaluations on the efficiency and effectiveness of the government programs done frequently.

2.6.1 Definition

Efficiency has been defined in a number of ways; Lane (2005, p.6) associates it with productivity; whereas Boyne (2003, p.16) relates it to how much of resources has been put
into a project and how much is realized; while Mintzberg (1983, p.268) argues it is associated with getting the best returns from a given investment. The convergence of these definitions leads us to efficiency as, the best outcome public funding actors can realize for the amount of resources they have invested. It focuses more as Lane (2005, p.6) remarks on the internal processes that public funding actors are involved in, in ensuring that the goods are produced in accordance to the stipulated way.

**TYPES OF EFFICIENCY**

Efficiency has been divided into two types; Technical and Allocative Jackson (1982, cited in Boyne, 2003, p.16).

*Technical efficiency* is the general definition that this study is adopting and I will maintain the usage of the term efficiency for clarity purposes. It is the proportion of how much resource the public funding actor has invested and how much has been realized. For instance, if 100,000 Swedish kronor is disbursed in a mandated collaboration network, of interest is how many schools were built with that money, or how many kilometers of road were constructed?

*Allocative efficiency* on the other hand, focuses on whether the returns meet the specific needs of the intended goal. In the case of roads being constructed, it seeks to find out, whether the road construction served its purpose. This is seen in terms of if it catered for all kinds of motorists or if the schools built for disabled students met their specific needs.

Efficiency has been quantified to meet the needs of the resource providers who are interested in numbers and broad figures to show that an achievement has been made. It is not easy to explain to a citizen, what impact a classroom specifically met to the intended recipients. It is however easier to explain to the policy makers that out of the 100, 000 Swedish kronor disbursed to the state, 1000 classrooms were built. Efficiency is thus an important measurement mechanism for public funding actors, because through it they are able to assess the entire process and what adjustment to make in case the goal is not met.

### 2.6.2 Measurement of Efficiency

Efficiency is usually quantified in financial terms and is divided into three aspects; cost, quantity and quality (Boyne et al, 2003, p.19).

**COST**

Costs are viewed as the financial resources needed to generate a given product or service (Boyne et al, 2003, p.19). For a mandated collaboration network to achieve its intended outcome, it will incur transaction and production costs (Lane, 2005, p.94-95). Lane (2005, p.95) points out that transaction costs are divided into two types; ex ante and ex post, with the former associated with negotiation costs that includes the duration and amount of effort that one puts in bargaining and contracting. Surveillance costs are associated with implementing the contract at the ex-post. Production costs on the other hand, are costs that public funding actors incur in meeting their goals. These costs are in two types; direct costs is used in the processing of the goods and services and include costs like rent and indirect costs are those that are not easily linked to processing costs like research costs (Boyne et al, 2003, p.17). Transaction costs however are harder to be measured compared to production costs because some of them are intangible in nature unlike some direct ones. For mandated collaboration network to be considered efficient, based on the costs explained above, it will need to minimize on its transaction costs. Public funding actors seek to minimize these transaction costs by using a vetting process like bidding and tendering to get the best potential
implementing actors who are capable and competent in the advertised work (Lane, 2005, p.60). To the public funding actors, incurring such screening costs at the ex-ante stage can be justified for as long as the costs of surveillance are kept low, because a competent implementing actor will not need as much supervision as one who is not competent (Ouchi, 1979, p.841).

Efficiency in such a case will involve public funding actors getting the best returns from the competent implementing actor. This is because they will be able to perform their obligations with minimal supervision and allow the public funding actor to focus on other important issues. The challenge however with public funding actors investing at the ex-ante stage is the hope of recouping its benefits in the ex post stage. They however might not be able to recoup these benefits if the implementing actor recruited is considered to be opportunistic. They do this by concealing their real identity and the public funding actor will not be able to detect a fraudulent actor from a genuine one (Lane, 2005, p.400). This will not only result to the objectives of the mandated collaboration network not being realized, but also increase the transaction costs. This is so because the public funding actor will immediately embark on getting a replacement to continue with the project implementation. Through this more transaction costs will be incurred. Efficiency in such a way will thus not be attained.

Costs used as a means of measurement have received criticism because of its focus on the direct costs neglecting the indirect ones that leads to budgetary concerns (Boyne et al., 2003, p.17). As a result of this, the aim of minimizing the transaction costs is not achieved thus hindering public funding actors from attaining efficiency.

**QUANTITY**
The quantity aspect of measuring efficiency focuses on how much of what has been invested has been produced (Boyne et al, 2003, p.18). The quantity is seen in terms of numbers where the output usually builds onto the public funding actor’s knowledge on how much work or activity has been performed. With the public funding actor’s aware of such details, adjustments can be made where the need arises. This allows them to assess the progress of achieving the set goals. A case in point is if the public funding actor spends 2 dollars, it is expected that the money spent should be commensurate to the number of hospitals built. It is however hard to measure intangible benefits because it is not easy to quantify it. Mintzberg (1983, p.271) argues that costs associated with tangible aspects are easily measured and linked to the organization. This is however in contrast to costs that are intangible and always associated with the society, a challenge the public funding actor is faced with. To the public funding actor however, the quantity the implementing actor produces in the course of performing the duties should be in accordance with the specifications of the contract. If the amount produced does not meet what has been stipulated, then efficiency has not been met because the best returns of the investment made have not been realized.

**QUALITY**
This element of efficiency looks at whether the output produced is in accordance to what was stated between the public funding and implementing actors in the process of delivering the goods and services (Boyne et al, 2003, p. 18). If the implementing actor delivers all the goods, at a low cost but does not meet the quality agreed then efficiency has not been met. This is because the best returns of the investment made have not been realized. Quality is thus considered as effort, with the amount of time the implementing actor exerts in implementing the activities assigned to them as a way of finding out how much effort has been allocated (Lane, 2005, p.40). This is seen through the reports through which the public
funding actors derive information about the amount of time the implementing actor spent. This serves as evidence to how much effort has been expended and in turn whether the outcome is commensurate. The challenge with assessing the implementing actor’s effort is that the public funding actor is entirely reliant on their version of events. How much effort they have spent in undertaking their assigned duties is only information privy to the implementing actor. As such, without cooperation from the implementing actors limits information to the public funding actor. This act of concealing information is known as hidden knowledge (Greiling, 2006, p.454). It involves the implementing actor using information opportunistically in order to wrongly mislead the public funding actor. Lane (2005, p.40) argues that public funding actors can address such cases of misrepresentation by intensely vetting the implementing actors before they are recruited. However, the challenge of information about the implementing actor is still limited and reliant on them telling the truth.

Despite the emphasis on the effort expended by the implementing actor that is seen in terms of how much time they have spent performing their task, the focus is always diverted to the costs incurred. The reason is that public funding actors will want to be seen to be cost efficient in order to consolidate their position at the network (Mintzberg, 1980, p.272). The resultant effect is that costs are now used as a standard measure in measuring quality with its impact seen in terms of how much has been achieved (Boyne et al., 2003, p.17). Because of this, a redefinition of efficiency to include a quantity measure that will go in as far realizing the efficiency objective has been recommended by Boyne et al.,(2003, p.17). Redefining efficiency however I argue is cumbersome since it has to go back to the policy makers to adjust it accordingly.

### 2.7 POWER TRUST INTERACTION

#### 2.7.1 Justification for proposition choice

The focus of this study as earlier reiterated is to contribute to literature that seeks to offer researchers and practitioners in this field both theoretical and practical means of addressing the coordination problem in the mandated collaboration network faced by public funding actors. Several models (Nooteboom, 2002 & Bachman, 2006), as discussed throughout this text has looked at the simultaneous use of both of these coordinative features, power and trust. Very few have however given as much detail in regards to the actual choosing of strategies that best suits the context of the public funding actor as the Long & Sitkin (2006) framework. It is this flexibility that the Long & Sitkin (2006) model offers from which I draw my motivation to use this framework and further improve on it to address the already stated problem.

My proposition consists of three main components; the two coordinating mechanisms, power and trust, balancing process and Efficiency.

**Coordinative Mechanisms**

Both power and trust are two of the four keywords that this study focuses on. By referring to the discussions above, it is reasonable to deduce that both power and trust are seen as coordinative and regulative mechanisms that public funding actors can use to attain their mandated collaboration network goals with the latter mechanism through cooperation (Bachmann, 2006; Giddens, 1984, 1990; Hardy et al, 1998; Lewiciki & Bunker, 1996; & Nooteboom, 2002). To be able to make a valuable contribution however, I add to the various trust literature that stress on the need to create a conducive environment. By employing trust building activities instead of using only one option, I argue that public funding actors should
be able to use each of these coordinating mechanisms when they see it appropriate. It is through their prism that efficiency can be attained because of the oversight role they play over the entire program and their close proximity to the implementing actors. They are therefore in a better position to know the needs of the network. The ‘how’ is however what this study seeks to investigate. It is therefore based on this that I chose to use the coordinative mechanisms simultaneously alongside the other two components.

**Balancing process**

Long & Sitkin (2006, p.91) define this concept as when managers, “achieve trust-control balance when they obtain a state where their superior-superordinate relations exhibit a harmonious integration of trust build and task control activities.” This in brief implies that the public funding actors can use this process to choose appropriate strategies that can lead to an optimum outcome both in terms of their performance and their relationship. The circumstances under which these processes are used require the public funding actors to decide on the specific balancing process to use. It is also dependent on the degree implementing actors understand their objectives that is assessed through their performance and the degree of goal similarities (Ouchi, 1979, p.846). Applying this condition to the balancing process needs one to know the circumstances under which each process is used. The balancing process consists of antithetical, orthogonal and synergistic types. Each of these processes is used under a particular circumstance; with the antithetical type considered as a zero sum game, implying that public funding actors cannot use both task control and trust building activities at the same time. For instance; if the public funding actor wants to tighten implementing actor’s rules on reporting procedures which is a task control activity. Under the circumstances it will be a task control activity requiring more regular submission of reports that will result into the desired outcome required. However, a trust building mechanism cannot be used in this instance because the trust building mechanisms needed are unable to thrive in such an environment. Trust can however come as an aftermath of the task control activity implementation but under a new balancing process type, the orthogonal. In this case, the condition set is that through the assessment done by the public funding actors on the implementing actors, they are able to gauge the performance and comprehension levels of the instructions stipulated. The outcome will however vary from tighter task activities to more trust building mechanisms. Using the balancing process gives the public funding actor an extra set of skills to base their decisions on besides their own intuitions and it is for this reason that I decided to use this process.

**Efficiency**

I discussed extensively my rationale for choosing to view balancing from efficiency point of view in Chapter 1. I argued that because of the prior knowledge the public funding actors have on the set targets for each of the efficiency aspects, they could use it to make better decisions. I stressed on the fact that each balancing process type was attached with specific instructions of use that public funding actors could use as guidance in choosing in the specific contexts each of the strategies. I explain my rationale below using each balancing process type alongside power, trust and efficiency. I will not discuss extensive my reasons for choosing costs because it has been extensively discussed throughout this study. But by linking costs to a specific antithetical balancing process, I base my rationale on the fact that issues to do with finances are always clearly stated. This is usually done in terms of how much is expected to be spent, on what items, the processes and procedures needed to be followed in using the money. The antithetical balancing process is equally defined by its restriction to using only one coordinating activity either power or trust but not both. Since anything to do with finances as discussed throughout
the literature has to be accounted for, I opted to use the control coordinating aspect. This is because information and conduct of the implementing actors are controlled to achieve the desired performance. Hence the reason for stating the proposition, costs vis-à-vis control for the orthogonal balancing process.

My rationale for linking quantity to the orthogonal balancing process is based on the argument that quantity is normally seen in the degree of the realizing the stated goals. This is an aspect that the public funding actors I argue do not have much leverage because they are equally judged by this outcome. It is therefore crucial for them to devise appropriate strategies to attain this target. They do this by ensuring that they raise the bar quite high for the quantity to be realized in order for them to be able to also meet their own targets. For instance if the implementing actors are expected to produce 100 bags of cement, it should be so, however failure to realize this target should be accompanied by explanations as to why it has not and how it can be compensated for. Using the orthogonal balancing process offers the public funding actors an opportunity to either take a firm approach by enforcing stringent rules whose targets should be met. They do this by setting reporting procedures after a given interval of the day. The public funding actor can also opt to monitor the progress of the implementing actor. In case where the target has not been met, they will give allowance to complete if their previous performance was satisfactory. Lastly, the public funding actor can choose to engage the implementing actor on a daily basis to find out the progress made in completing the assigned target with the hope that the implementing actors will feel motivated and work hard to meet the target. The one rule in using this process is based on the fact that the public funding actor cannot alter the required quantity required and as such using relational trust can only go as far as motivating the implementing actor; but the latter is fully aware that regardless of this, they are still expected to meet the target. Hence the use of quantity vis-a-vis orthogonal balancing process vis-à-vis formal control, calculative and relational trust.

I further linked quality to the synergistic balancing process with my argument focusing on quality that is normally seen in terms of how much effort an implementing actor exerts in performing their duties. Issues of quality have always been argued to be attributed to an individual’s conduct that can be easily influenced (Dirks & Ferrin, 2001, p.456). These authors show that when actors are accorded a degree of attention and concern, they respond positively. This is evident through the doubling of their efforts in the performance of their daily activities which can only be inferred from how much has been achieved. The public funding actor is thus presented with a range of options to choose from either by influencing the implementing actor’s conduct or using the control reminder to make sure the overall goal is met. They can choose to continue with expected target of the implementing actors reporting daily on their progress or relax the reporting depending on the previous assessment of their performance. Lastly, they can seek to establish personal interactions with the implementing actor to find out the challenges they encountered in executing their duties and how it can be amicably resolved. Using each of these approaches I argue allows for the public funding actor to assess which strategy (ies) to use where need be, that can bring the right result from the implementing actors. The performance of the implementing actor is however not as static as the two, costs and quantity aspects. This is because an individual’s conduct can be influenced by a number of other factors such as the weather; mood among others. Based on this; the synergistic balancing process allows the public funding actors to choose multiple options from both trust building activities and task controls that will contribute positively to achieving the network goal based on the current need (Long & Sitkin, 2006, p.96). Thus using formal controls, calculative and relational trust vis-a-vis the quality vis-à-vis
synergistic balancing process. Under this process, public funding actors can tighten the reporting procedures as is the case of our example, establish a personal relationship with the implementing actor as well as assess the performance to gauge whether or not to develop calculative trust. Unlike the former process, all these activities can be performed simultaneously and result into a positive outcome of attaining efficiency.

Additionally since accountability is of big concern using the balancing process will allow the public funding actor to focus on instilling a culture in which the responsibility levels of implementing actors is ingrained gradually. This framework assumes a management perspective that I also do, and it is the responsibility of the public funding actors to ensure that the implementing actors realize the goals stated to them.

Referring to the discussions above, it is reasonable to deduce that both power and trust are seen as coordinative and regulative mechanisms that public funding actors can use to attain their mandated collaboration network goals albeit the latter mechanism, through cooperation (Bachmann, 2006; Hardy et al, 1998; Lewiciki & Bunker, 1996; Giddens, 1984, 1990 & Nooteboom, 2002). In applying the Long & Sitkin framework (2006, p.81), there are a few considerations that I seek to clarify before embarking on the strategies that I propose public funding actors can use to get an optimum balance of trust and control in order to attain efficiency in the mandated collaboration network.

2.7.2 Proposition stated

Costs-Antithetical balancing process

By acknowledging that the means of measuring efficiency has been enacted by policy makers, the public funding actors do not have any means of altering the terms. It is here that I argue power and trust can play a role in ensuring that public funding actors attain efficiency. Using the antithetical balancing process of Long & Sitkin (2006, p.94), I recommend that the public funding actors only use the formal controls in order to achieve the desired goals. Costs are always stipulated to implementing actor’s right from the time they are subcontracted by the public funding actors to implement public services for the mandated collaboration network. Implementing actors as argued by Lane (2005, p.60) are expected to implement the activities assigned to them by minimizing transaction costs and part of that necessitates them using tendering and bidding in their procurement process in order to get suppliers who will offer them a reasonable cost.

In order to ensure that implementing actors do minimize their transaction costs, public funding actors should stipulate to the former actors what the acceptable and unacceptable costs are that they are expected to incur. They also notify them about the processes such as procuring that they should follow. In order to ensure that the implementing actors follow this, the public funding actors should follow the stipulation of these rules with regular supervision. This they can do by obtaining more frequent reports from the public funding actors rather than the periodic ones that the implementing actors are accustomed to. Through the reports, the public funding actor will be able to infer whether the implementing actors have performed their activities or not. They can also find out how much has been incurred in the process of implementing these services (Lane, 2005, p.66). This information that the public funding actors would have obtained will determine how much control to exert which as I have already mentioned can be in the form of more frequent submission of reports and supervisory visits. The public funding actors can equally use sanctions in case the implementing actors do not heed to their demands.
By public funding actors using formal controls in a situation like this, they would have dealt with two challenges that arise with them ensuring that implementing actors minimize costs in order to attain efficiency. 1) The information that the public funding actor would have derived from the implementing actor will enable them penalize or visit the implementing actors more often in order to deter them from the practice of opportunistic acts. 2) Additionally, the public funding actors will communicate clearly to the implementing actors about what is expected of them in terms of costs. The implementing actors will in turn know what to spend the funds allocated to them on and within which limits. Any unallowable expenses on their part will make them face sanctions. Since formal controls is always established in the mandated collaboration network, what this study seeks to offer is to tell the public funding actors that the degree should vary depending on the performance and conduct of the implementing actors.

The public funding actor will however not be able to institute calculative trust since the presence of both will nullify the effect felt by one. However, the successful implementation of the formal controls by the public funding actors will lead to the emergence of the calculative trust (Bachmann, 2006; Lewicki & Bunker, 1996 & Nooteboom, 2002). Calculative trust emerges from the performance of the implementing actors, if the implementing actors implement their activities satisfactorily by adhering to the rules stipulated to them by the public funding actors, the latter will develop trust on them. The development of Calculative trust however, is only limited to the public funding actor without the knowledge of the implementing actor’s performance. Unless the public funding actor displays satisfaction on their part to the implementing actor about their performance, this information will be only beneficial to the public funding actor in terms of having confidence in the activities of the implementing actor and guaranteeing the continuity of such positive results from them. This leads us to the proposition 1(P1); that public funding actors should institute formal control in order to minimize costs and opportunism that will lead to efficiency in the mandated collaboration network being attained.

**Quantity-Orthogonal balancing process**

In dealing with ensuring that the stipulated amount is delivered, a public funding actor can use both power and trust to realize the goals of meeting the specifications set (Long & Sitkin, 2006, p.95). The public funding actor will utilize the formal controls as is always done to ensure implementing actors comply. But they will also try to establish both calculative and relational trust, depending on their performance so that they double the effort they exert in performing their duties in order to achieve the stated indicator required. This type of orthogonal balancing process is usually used by public funding actors when they have very little discretion over the task controls that can affect the implementing actor’s efforts (Long & Sitkin, 2006, p.95). The quantity is one such aspect that the public funding actor has little discretion over, because the exact nature of the deliverables is specified before the implementing actor embarks on implementing their activities. This therefore leaves the public funding actors with no room for adjustment except fulfilling the stipulated terms. The formal controls are always a constant with calculative and relational trust dependent on the public funding actor’s assessment on the implementing actor’s performance. Tyler & Degoe, (1996,p.331) highlights cases where the implementing actor will be more responsive to the demands of the public funding actor because of the expectations, like promotion that they
will expect to get by meeting the goals. To this end, the relationship is a calculable one but nonetheless, gets the desired outcome achieved.

Dirks & Ferrin, (2001, p.456) on the other hand defines trust as a ‘“psychological state that provides a representation of how individuals understand their relationship with another party in situations that involve risk or vulnerability.”’ In here, the implementing actor’s vulnerabilities will be associated with their performance, because it is through this, that the assessments will be made and any future implications in relation to their contract will be based on. It will be ideal for the public funding actor to establish a relational type of trust with the implementing actor to allay any fears or concerns through speaking to them more often and giving them words of encouragement and support. Since trust is mainly based on reciprocity, the implementing actor will put in as much effort as possible to see to it that they do not let down the public funding actor by meeting the stated indicators. This way, trust would have motivated an implementing actor to realize the network goal of efficiency in a more sensitive way. Trust can thus be used by public funding actors to attain the desired specifications of the mandated collaboration network in cases where the formal means fails. That way quantity which is seen as a measure of efficiency will be realized even in its quantifiable state. With Proposition 2 (P2); that states public funding actors can institute both calculative and relational trust alongside formal controls in order to encourage implementing actors to exert more effort and realize the stated amount of quantity leading to attainment of efficiency in mandated collaboration network.

Quality-Synergistic balancing process
This therefore leaves the public funding actor with no option but to establish relational trust in such a case in order to influence the behavior of the implementing actors. This is done with an aim of making them refrain from performing such opportunistic acts. The public funding actor however has to first use the formal controls to ensure that the implementing actors do meet the stated criteria of effort. They will be able to obtain this information through the oversight role that they carry out on the implementing actors. With this information, the public funding actor will be able to decide on whether to apply calculative or relational trust. Calculative trust can be applied in case the public funding actor still has questions about the integrity of the implementing actor.

Long & Sitkin (2006, p.90) associates an implementing actor’s integrity with their willingness to meet the obligations assigned to them. This implies that besides the competence and ability that implementing actors possess their desire to perform the duties in an honest and committed way determines the credibility and authenticity of the entire process and eventual realization of efficiency in the mandated collaboration network. The focus is thus on the integrity of the implementing actors and the impression their identity creates because their actions have a reflection on the mandated collaboration network that they represent and not on their individual organizations (Beckert, 1996, p.328).
Additionally, if the implementing actor has fulfilled their obligations satisfactorily to the expectations of the public funding actor, the latter can then use the basis of the calculative trust that is existent and only known to them to further nurture relational trust. By nurturing relational trust between them, it is expected that the implementing actor will feel obliged to change their opportunistic ways of concealing information and begin to confide to the public funding actor. Both Tyler & Degoey (1996, p.331-333) & Dirks & Ferrin, (2001, p.457) have argued that open and honest relations with subordinates results to them reciprocating the action and this is seen in terms of them voluntarily complying. In fact Tyler & Degoey (1996, p.331-333) further adds that the reciprocity though tactical will be in the hope of
implementing actors benefiting in terms of on the job benefits that can only be attainable through the public funding actor. They will also be honest and trustworthy because of the trustworthiness displayed by the public funding actors. As a consequence, the implementing actors will feel the need to reciprocate which further establishes trust between both sets of actors. By the mere fact that the implementing actors will also look at the relation between the public funding actor and themselves as hinged to job related benefits, it is a manifestation of the coordinative effort of trust that alters the undesirable aspects of an implementing actors behavior and turns them into being cooperative.

With a motivated implementing actor, the public funding actor is then able to realize their efficiency goal because hidden knowledge would have been addressed through open communication that relational trust offers. Calculative trust will also enable public funding actors to further assess the conduct of the implementing actors through the use of formal trust to ensure that the implementing actor refrain from concealing information. The quality control aspect is very crucial for the credibility and authenticity of the final output of the mandated collaboration network. By instituting formal controls, calculative and relational trust, the public funding actor will then be able to ensure credibility of its output as well as realize efficiency in the mandated collaboration network. This leads us to the proposition (P3); that states public funding actors should use calculative trust alongside formal controls to ensure the integrity of the process of the implementing actors and nurture relational trust in order to influence the conduct of the implementing actors so that they comply voluntarily with the rules resulting to the attainment of efficiency.

Based on the above discussions, it is fair to conclude that both power and trust are mechanisms that the public funding actor can use simultaneously to achieve the mandated collaboration network’s goal. An integrated solution of both power and trust strategies, is a feasible solution recommended for public funding actors to enable them realize their network goals in an efficient way. Efficiency, which is the best outcome public funding actors can realize for the amount of resources they have invested in can only be attained by the public funding actor by using these two mechanisms when the need arises. Rules alone with the predictability, expectation and confidence derived out of it cannot ensure that the implementing actors fulfill their goals. Not even the single use of sanctions, rewards or incentives can realize goals on their own. To ensure that, costs incurred especially the transaction costs should not exceed what has been budgeted for. The output should be achieved in terms of the exact number that has been agreed by the parties in accordance to the contract stipulated. The quality required through the form of rules should be stipulated clearly to all implementing actors about what is expected of them.

However at the same time, the public funding actor should not overly rely on the formal controls, in such a collaborative arrangement in which achieving the outcome is dependent on the implementing actors. Even though the objectives of the mandated collaboration network have been explicitly stated by the policy makers to the public funding actors, the latter still have discretion on how they go about implementing the activities (Feldman, 2003, p.). It is this leverage that public funding actors have, that they can utilize to nurture trust in the mandated collaboration network in order to realize the efficiency concern. As earlier argued, both public funding and implementing actors are compelled to abide by policies issued, making it hard to adjust it. This means some of the challenges addressed with the measurements of efficiency can only be addressed if the policy makers issue a similar law to that effect. This however is beyond the mandate of the public funding actor; establishing trust in order to encourage cooperation, honesty, voluntary compliance in the implementing actors
is a more sustainable approach that public funding actors should pursue (Tyler & Degoe, 1996 & Dirk & Ferrin, 2001). Trust can then be used alongside the formal controls by the public funding actor with the aid of the balancing process, to devise ideal power and trust strategies that suit the current needs of the context (Long & Sitkin, 2006, p.89). They will equally be able to get a right balance even with using formal control as a constant coordinating mechanism. By building trust in their network, and depending on how the implementing actors respond, public funding actors will in turn get feedback on whether the strategies implemented are realizing the expected outcome or not with the possibility of adjustment where need be.

This integrated framework will also give the public funding actors an idea of how much trust implementing actors have on them. They are able to infer this information from how responsive the implementing actors are in terms of performing their activities. Trust thus seeks to harmonize the negative aspects that arise in the course of public funding actors performing their oversight role. Implementing actors will therefore not see the monitoring as a way of not having confidence in them through the trust. Rather, they will be more cooperative and through this, put in more effort to perform their activities that will lead to increased productivity and in turn efficiency in the mandated collaboration network. A conceptual framework (see figure 3) is thus arrived at that recommends the different propositions public funding actors should undertake in order to achieve efficiency.

2.7.3 Preliminary Conceptual Framework

This conceptual framework has been derived by using the Long & Sitkin (2006) framework. It seeks to find a practical approach for public funding actors to use in the execution of their duties in order to attain efficiency. It comprises of four components, task and trust building activities, the effect of these activities on the implementing actors as well as on the efficiency outcome. The box to the left is the formal control which denotes power. It comprises of rules and resources used by public funding actors in the process of performing their oversight roles over the implementing actors. It is positioned in the left because it is the formal controls that public funding actors always commence with through stipulating rules in the course of the implementation, therefore constantly used. These formal controls are used during the different phases of implementation with the input, process and output respectively with each of these phases, a stated output is expected. The corresponding box to the right is network trust that public funding actors can use alongside the formal control. It comprises of the implementing actor’s ability in terms of their competence to perform their roles. In addition to this, is the integrity an additional component of network trust. The focus here is on the due process followed by the implementing actors in the course of executing their duties and benevolence component, focusing on the interpersonal relations that the public funding actor can establish towards the implementing actors. Ability and integrity are considered as calculative type of trust with benevolence a relational one. These two boxes are connected to each other through the back and forth arrows implying that at any given time formal control or network trust can be used interchangeably.

Right below the formal control and trust boxes is the task and trust building activity boxes. The task activity box simply states the formal control that is deployed by the public funding actors in the course of executing their activities. As mentioned earlier, formal control is always used as a mechanism by public funding actors hence its inclusion as the only form of control. The trust building activity box comprises of three of the earlier stated propositions with P1 meaning proposition 1, 2 and 3 respectively. The task activity box is connected to the trust building activity box by an arrow denoting that these two activities are used
simultaneously by the public funding actor. The box below the task and trust building activities is the effect of these two activities on the implementing actors that later defines whether efficiency has been attained or not through the efficiency outcome box below the effect on implementing actor’s box. All these boxes starting right from the formal control and network trust are connected with arrows and they feed into the task and trust building activities. The effect of these activities to the implementing actors is indicated in the efficiency outcome box that will eventually show what outcome has been attained. The outcome stated there is the proposed outcome that will be attained if in P1; the public funding actors use formal controls alongside establishing trust which I argue that they will expect to cut down on unnecessary expenses and opportunism which will lead to an acceptable efficiency outcome. P2; If public funding actors institute formal controls alongside relational trust one after the other, they will be able motivate the implementing actors by making them realize their goals and attain the predefined quality. P3; if the public funding actor institutes formal control, calculative and relational trust, the implementing actors will be able to uphold the integrity and have a positive influence on their conduct that will result to the attainment of a credible quality process. The efficiency outcome is in turn fed back into the formal control and network trust strategies. This will aid the public funding actors to find out why the desired efficiency outcome has been attained or not. This process is an ongoing process that can be used and the information derived out of it help in addressing the efficiency conundrum.

Figure 3: Conceptual Framework (Adapted from Long & Sitkin, 2006, p. 97 and modified by author)
CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This chapter discusses my preconceptions of the study followed by the philosophical approaches undertaken, research strategy and research design respectively.

3.1 Preconception

As a master’s student enrolled in the entrepreneurship program, one of the earlier modules that I studied was managing networks and internationalization of Small and Medium sized Enterprises (SMEs). My background gave me an impetus to explore more on networks though initially I had very scant knowledge on public networks, I picked more interest with more reading. With my initial knowledge on networks especially SME that is normally associated with private sector network coupled with my new interest in public networks, I decided to study a complex type of network, the mandated collaboration network that is a combination of both the private and public networks. The management concept however in the private sector networks that the SMEs belong to is quite distinct from the mandated collaboration networks that spurred my interest. My quest to learn spurred me on to find out how actors from several sectors would pool their resources and accomplish their goals, while dealing with the day to day challenges. Such knowledge can only be derived by looking at the interaction process among the different actors thus my interest in the role of power and trust in this kind of network. This study is therefore a very new area for me as a researcher, and because of my limited knowledge, I presume my bias levels will be very minimal as I seek to go down the exploratory route.

3.2 Research Philosophy

This is defined as the “development of knowledge and the nature of that knowledge” (Saunders et al, 2009, p.107). This is essentially how the researcher views the world and in turn seeks to understand it. The researcher’s understanding of the world, allows for a balanced view of opinion, where reasonable doubt and enquiry are critiqued because of the information the researcher possesses and the alternatives chosen (Saunders et al, 2009, p.109). Research philosophy has been mainly divided into two positions; ontology and epistemology (Saunders et al, 2009, p. 109). Ontology concerns the reality and the views the researcher has about the world where as Epistemology, is viewed as knowledge that is relevant and appropriate for the study (David & Sutton, 2011; Denzin & Lincoln, 2005; Ritchie & Lewis, 2003 & Saunders et al, 2009). The ontological position has two main views, objectivism and subjectivism that have been highlighted in the literature. Objectivism view is associated with the actions of the social actors not influencing the social world that they exist in and Subjectivism view, involves the social actor being part and parcel of the creation of the social actions that exist within their social context (David & Sutton, 2011; Denzin & Lincoln, 2005; Ritchie & Lewis, 2003 & Saunders et al, 2009).

This study adopts the subjectivist view because the social actors under study are not independent of the interactions that occur within their environment. Actors in mandated collaboration networks can be categorized into groups of two; public funding and implementing actors respectively. The public funding actors represent the government interests at national, federal and county levels; implementing actors are representatives of the public, private and voluntary sector whose interest is both profit and nonprofit driven. The non-profit sector is associated with the provision of equitable and accessible resources to the communities and societies. The public funding actors are further divided into two; those that have the mandate to disburse funds to implementing actors in order for them to implement the mandated collaboration network’s goal of delivering the public service; and, those that do
not have the mandate to disburse funds. They however equally receive funding alongside the private actors to implement their activities that also contribute to the overall network goal. Both public funding and implementing actors goal is thus to accomplish the government’s objectives albeit different means used to achieve it. To this end, each of these sets of actors emerging from different social contexts, have come together under the umbrella of the mandated collaboration network to achieve a common goal of delivering a public service. It is through performing their routine activities that actors contribute to the creation of the social practices within the network making them not independent of the interactions hence a subjective view being adopted.

With the different set of actors contributing to the activities of the network through their routine tasks, the ontological position thus adopted is a constructionist one. Constructionism involves the different actors in the network contributing to the process, by interpreting the activities that takes place in the course of their interaction with other actors, as they perceive it and in turn subjects it to their own definition (Saunders et al, 2007, p.109). The different actors are seconded as lead actors from their respective firms to the network and therefore whatever position they hold, is indicative of their individual firm position in relation to the mandated collaboration network. Despite their individual lead actor positions from their individual firms, the public funding actors take the lead position within the mandated collaboration network. Even when actors interact with each other within the network and have an influence on the process of interaction that occurs on a routine basis which eventually shapes the outcome; they operate within the framework of the public funding actors. This implies that as implementing actors, when in interaction with the public funding actors, the rules and regulations of the latter take precedence. The actors input and influence is thus said to be constructionist because it is guided by the rules, regulations and norms of the public sector. Yet by the same token, the interpretation of these rules and regulations is restricted to how each of the actors receive additional information in the course of their daily interactions with other actors which I argue will shed more light on the role that power and trust play in the network (Saunders et al, 2007 & Morgan & Smircich, 1980). This study thus takes a subjectivist view and a constructionist ontological position.

Epistemology is associated with useful and appropriate knowledge that will build onto the existing knowledge that I have about the outer world (Saunders, 2007 & Ritchie & Lewis, 2003). There are three different epistemological positions highlighted; positivism, realism and interpretivism (Ritchie & Lewis, 2003 & Saunders et al, 2007). In the positivism position, the researcher does not influence the outcome of the study at hand because it occurs independently. Since the researcher is independent of the outcome of the study, it makes the researcher free from bias and allows for the findings to be easily replicated and generalized in similar contexts. Realism on the other hand, is a position that a researcher holds that they interpret very differently from the perception of the actor’s under investigation (Ritchie & Lewis, 2003 & Saunders et al, 2007). Saunders et al (2007, p.104) further divides it into two, direct and critical realism with the former is associated with direct interpretations of events by the actor. The latter, always attributes an underlying meaning to a particular event. They argue that what is certainly seen should not be directly interpreted as it is. The interpretivism position is involved with viewing the world from the perspective of the actors under investigation (Creswell, 2009; David & Sutton, 2011; Ritchie & Lewis, 2003 & Saunders et al, 2007).

As a researcher it’s imperative that I understand the meanings the actors being investigated attach to their daily practices which is normally interpreted through their routine tasks. The
meanings are derived socially and historically through the actors performing their tasks regularly and through their iterative process, they build onto the existing practices occurring within a given social context (Creswell, 2009; David & Sutton, 2011 & Saunders et al., 2007). It is for this reason that this study adopts Interpretivism as an ideal epistemological position because I will be able to obtain the information from the managers by understanding and interpreting their world from their perspective. Since mandated collaboration networks comprises of several actors, the emphasis is on the process of the interaction because each of the actors interpret their roles differently, interact with each other differently, a focus of this study. Thus by looking at the interactions that occur among all the actors, I will be able to deduce the role power and trust play in the attainment of efficiency in the network. To this end, we will be able to use open ended questions to interview managers so that I get as much information as possible to enrich my study. Saunders et al (2007, p.107) cites the criticism the Interpretivism position receives, as one of the outcome not being generalized. Emphasis however should be on the interactions that happen among the different actors while performing their duties and what can be learnt from it rather than focus on the outcome that can be used across a wide range of contexts. As Saunders et al., 2007 (p.107) further argues the ever changing stance of the actors redirects my efforts to the process that leads to the outcome rather than the outcome itself because it is through it that efficiency can be attained. This is compounded by the fact that the government policies are subject to changes time and again, and these changes have implications on the activities of the mandated collaboration network managers.

In summary I agree with Johnson and Clark (2006, P.108) who argue that the important issue is not so much, ‘whether our research should be philosophically informed, but it is how well we are able to reflect upon our philosophical choices and defend them in relation to the alternatives we could have adopted” and it is on this basis, that this study thus takes interpretivism as an epistemological position.

3.3 Research Approach

The use of theory is important in making the link between the subject under study and the reality of it, which research approach addresses. Research approach is divided into two; Deductive and Inductive approach with deductive approaches associated with the testing of theories while the inductive approach taking an exploratory path (David & Sutton, 2011; Ritchie & Lewis, 2003 & Saunders, 2007). My study assumes both a deductive and inductive approach though lean more towards deductive, because I derive my past knowledge from previous studies done in the field that have given me a theoretical foundation for the research. Robson (2002, cited in Saunders et al, 2007, p.117) highlights five steps that a deductive approach undertakes; “deducing a hypothesis from the theory; expressing the hypothesis in operational terms; proposing a relationship between two specific concepts or variables; testing this operational hypothesis; examining the specific outcome of the inquiry and if necessary, modifying the theory in the light of the findings”. My study covers most of the steps mentioned by Robson (2002, cited in Saunders et al, 2007, p.117) because prior to the commencement of my study, I sought for a knowledge gap in an area where I could make a contribution. The process of finding the knowledge gap involved me reading literature in my subject topic and ensuring that it was an area that could lead to further insight on research that has already been undertaken by other author. It is on this basis that I came up with the role of power and trust in attaining efficiency in mandated collaboration network. This implies that I obtained my knowledge gap from the existing theory. I was also able to state three propositions in order to test the applicability of my view of how power and trust can be
used to attain efficiency within the mandated collaboration network which was only possible through the deductive approach by referring to past literature. I further went ahead to operationalize my study into concepts that could be researched and under each of these key words of power, trust and mandated collaboration network concepts like contracts and their interaction, monitoring roles emerged.

At the same time, I adopt the inductive method to explore the knowledge gap whose outcome is unknown to me and I can only find out the information by carrying out interviews with my target audience. This exploratory path I have taken has equally led me to state three propositions whose outcome will further bring useful insight into the study. Inductively, I conducted interviews with managers of the different firms in order to understand the role that power and trust play in attaining efficiency in the mandated collaboration network. The aim of these interviews was to establish the underlying causes of the role of power and trust in mandated collaboration network rather than search for the existing relationship.

Despite the clear demarcation emphasized in the literature about a research study taking either a deductive or inductive approach, I concur with Saunders (2007, p.124) and Ritchie & Lewis (2003, p.23) that it gives a wrong impression to qualitative studies like mine, about the fine margins applied to each process, making it hard to apply both processes in the study. I however argue that my study takes a more deductive than inductive approach based on my objective of improving on an existing theory. In the three earlier stated propositions, I sought to find out an optimum balance of power and trust activities that could be used by public funding actors to realize efficiency within the network. The overall findings particularly those related to the propositions stated earlier has added valuable insights to this study. The purpose of research was to improve on the Long & Sitkin (2006) framework, this has been realized. By testing the existing theory and coming up with new insights I argue will offer public funding actors a sustainable working approach in attaining efficiency. To be able to reach this conclusion, this study applied the deductive approach. The study compared, agreed and disagreed to the findings in relation to the previously stated literature to derive the underlying causes of issues. These insights further contribute towards several theories that I have used in the process of building a solid foundation for my study as well as to the overall literature on mandated collaboration networks hence the deductive approach.

3.4 Research Design

This chapter gives a general framework for collecting data and its subsequent analysis (David & Sutton, 2011; Ritchie & Lewis, 2003 & Saunders, 2007). A comprehensively done research design makes a good connection between the research questions, the research strategy and the tools used to collect the data. But before we delve into that, I want to highlight the type of study that I am undertaking.

Following on from my philosophical assumptions of having a subjectivist view, constructionist ontological position, interpretivism as an ideal epistemological position and both a deductive and inductive approach, all indications lead to my study being qualitative. A qualitative study, has been defined as "a naturalistic, interpretative approach concerned with understanding the meanings which people attach to phenomena (actions, decisions, beliefs, values)" (Ritchie & Lewis, 2003, p.3). This has only been possible through the strength of the qualitative study which is exploratory in nature, because it has enabled me to further investigate the underlying reasons of my research problem that has offered me new insights to my study (Ritchie & Lewis, 2003 & Saunders, 2007). The different managers of the public
funding and implementing organizations were interviewed in their capacity as managers of their organizations in their regular settings within the scope of the mandated collaboration network.

Conducting the interviews directly with the managers mainly through telephone and Skype allowed me to establish a rapport with them even though not in person, which made my interview more of a conversation rather than an interrogation. In some cases I opted to use the electronic mail to interview respondents who because of language and time considerations preferred this method. This does not imply that I did not probe (see table 3 section 3.4.2 below) on the different means of interview used, duration and length of interviews. Where need be I was able to probe further in order to understand their individual perceptions of the role that power and trust played in their daily activities in order to attain efficiency.

By probing and getting clarity through the ‘why’ questions that qualitative studies have been associated with (Creswell, 2009; Ritchie & Lewis, 2003 & Saunders et al, 2007). I was also able to understand the internal complex workings of the mandated collaboration network which I could not have easily understood and obtained in quantitative studies thus giving the qualitative type of study flexibility in seeking to find answers to questions that are not known and are only obtained through the interviewees. Thus the qualitative study was an appropriate and ideal choice to answer comprehensively my research question. Knowing that this study is qualitative with it being exploratory in nature, I was able to come with the appropriate research strategy, data collection choice within the time considerations and data analysis techniques.

3.4.1 Research Strategy

Yin (2003, p.5) highlights three factors that a researcher should consider in choosing a research strategy namely the ;“type of research question, extent of control an investigator has over actual behavioral events and the degree of focus on contemporary as opposed to historical events”. The research questions are normally framed commencing with; how, what, why, who and where that each define the strategy the researcher intends to use in obtaining data. How and why are normally linked with the case. In the case of my study, the focuses on the “how question, seeks to obtain further information on the role power and trust play in mandated collaboration networks attaining efficiency (Yin, 2003 & Saunders et al, 2007). Who, what and where questions on the other hand aimed at definitive quantifiable outcomes that are normally linked with the survey strategy (Yin, 2003, p.6). Whichever strategy the researcher ends up using, it also determines their levels of involvement in influencing the behavior of the subjects understudy in their specific contexts. A researcher’s degree of high involvement is usually seen in the experimenting strategy because the different phases of the process have been clearly defined with an expected outcome in an enclosed setting ideal for monitoring the process. Historical events are equally heavily reliant on past information too. The case study strategy on the other hand requires low involvement from the researcher because they are expected not to influence the subject understudy, rather to be observed in its actual social context capturing the entire conditions and processes taking place ( Yin, 2003, p.7-8). It is on the basis of the above discussed factors that my study seeks to adopt the case study strategy because of my research purpose that is exploratory in nature aiming to investigate the role power and trust plays within the mandated collaboration network towards attaining efficiency. The context which is the mandated collaboration network, within which it operates with all actors, is free of any influence from me because I will observe the entire process as an outsider as it happens and through my observations and
other means that I will use, I will then be able to answer my research question and meet my research objective.

A case study is thus a strategy that researchers use to investigate a given issue or a number of issues within a specific context that is obtained by looking at it from a single or multiple approach with both the issues under investigation and the ongoing process hardly defined (Creswell, 2007; Saunders et al, 2007; Ritchie & Lewis, 2003; & Yin, 2003). The main distinction between these single and multiple case study designs is the unit under investigation which for the former and in the case of this study is the mandated collaboration network. For the multiple case study, it is more than a unit under investigation for instance it can be a network studied as a unit with the processes among the network also studied as another unit or subunit all done at the same time. Besides the unit (s) under investigation, other factors do also determine the specific case study design that a researcher can choose from with the single case study stating; critical, unique, typical or representative, revelatory and longitudinal cases and the multiple case study highlighting the replication logic designed either literally or theoretically (Yin, 2003, p.47). A single case can be adopted if the case under investigation is critical in the sense that it aims to test a theory with the purpose of making adjustments or refuting with it, a resultant outcome thus being one of making a relevant theoretical contribution. A single case design is also used in unique circumstances when the subject under investigation is inimitable and very rare that warrants an extensive study that can be later on used as a reference document to inform different interested actors on new data. Additionally, it can also be typical or representative by highlighting the situation and conditions in their regular settings with an aim of enlightening the audience about such cases. The revelatory case is applicable when it seeks to offer new insight to a recurring problem that has not been adequately addressed in previous research hence offering new insight and the longitudinal case study, warranting the case to be investigated over a period of time in order to contribute to theory with insight towards specific intervals and under what circumstances such changes within specific intervals occur. A multiple case study can be chosen on the basis of a researcher seeking to verify previous results from a previous single case design study. In order to ascertain its accuracy, it will use the same conditions of the previous case study or will make a few changes with an aim of obtaining the same outcome or with some variations backed by reasons that were foreseen and are explainable.

This study takes a hybrid form of both a critical and typical case because this study seeks to improve the Long & Sitkin (2006) framework in order to make it applicable in the attainment of efficiency by both academicians and practitioners. It also takes place in a given mandated collaboration network context in which the role of both power and trust can be investigated by looking at the role played by all the actors and their activities and seeing how efficiency can be realized. Even though Thomas (2011, p.514) disagrees with Yin (2003, p. 47) on grounds that being typical or representative cannot be a basis for deciding to use a single case design because of the lack of generalizability. The circumstances and conditions understudy cannot be replicated nor do they contribute to the existing circumstances and conditions with their role limited to what they have been designed to do. Whilst I agree with Thomas (2011, p.514) in as far as the lack of generalizability and its limited role in the sphere of influence is concerned, I agree with Yin (2003, p.47) because the intent of typical or representative single case study designs is to mainly inform people of what actually occurs in such settings within certain conditions. The findings of are limited to this particular scenario as is the case of my study. My study however does not stop there but further seeks to not only inform but also improve an existing theory, which I argue can further strengthen the basis for using the
typical single case design by using it alongside the critical case ultimately decided by the purpose of one’s study.

Yin (2003, p.69) points out that it is necessary for the researcher to have a general information about the unit under investigation, the key aspects that are being studied within it and further literature obtained through secondary information from respective webpage’s and reports that can be crucial in decision making in the design process. Choosing a specific sector that captured my interest required me to draw my respondents from sectors that identified with my definition of the unit of study, mandated collaboration network. The other criterion was to decide on which sector to undertake my study on based the knowledge I had and whether it would answer my research question adequately. I therefore commenced with the option of selecting between the wood and the funding agency sector with the latter my final sector chosen based on the geographical position, actors, activities, size and mandate. The wood sector comprises of actors from all over Västerbotten region that concentrate on one or more of the activities related to producing wood related products. Since it is a product from the trees, most of these actors are located close to the forests. A funding agency is a public organization mandated by the government to oversee the disbursement and implementation of its funds (Lane, 2005, p. 93). It comprises of different actors from both public and private (profit and non-profit oriented sector) who all work towards a common goal.

The geographical position in which the potential respondents were concentrated in a given sector was a primary focus for me because it required I allocate time and resources to go to the specific site. My prior investigations indicated that most of the actor’s offices in the wood sector were located in the peripheries of the municipalities. This was in contrast to the funding agency actors that were located in the center of the municipalities with several branches making the former untenable for me due to time and resource considerations and the latter, the preferred choice (See Västerbotten Investment Agency webpage for details (http://viaVästerbotten.se/sectors/wood/facts-figures/)). Additionally, I tried to search through the web pages of the particular sectors and even reach out to the actors through electronic mail and telephone calls. My aim was to try and find out the kind of activities they are involved in and whether or not they would fit my description of the mandated collaboration network. My typical mandated collaboration network comprised of actors from public and private (profit and non-profit oriented sectors). However, the response I got from the wood industry respondents was very limited and in some cases no response at all, making it hard for me to continue focusing on this sector. The wood sector was also limiting in the sense that the activities the actors focused on were varied and diverse. It was not easy for me to cluster the actors under a respective mandate or size because of the few times different actors from for instance the university, private and public sector met quite often and communicated regularly. I was able to verify this in the course of a conversation with a lady who worked in the wood sector but as one of the university partners. I therefore needed a context in which there were regular interactions that I could be able to identify with in which the role of power and trust would be evident. This is not to say that the interactions were not regular, rather the rate at which actors will encounter desirable and undesirable aspects of power and opt to use trust would be minimal. Also since most of the actors are big private entities, their relation with the public sector will be better managed because of the reputation levels attached to both sets of actors hence not making it an ideal option.

In contrast to this fore mentioned sector, the funding agency sector had far more promising responses even when in the end I was unable to get all the respondents from the different
sectors. It is through one of these promising responses from an actor that worked closely with the funding agency sector that I decided to focus on this particular sector over the wood sector. The respondent explained to me the activities they were involved in with their focus on working towards a common objective alongside other actors. The other actors, the respondent mentioned consisted of the funding agency who worked hand in hand with them albeit in different roles to realize their common objective. The composition of other actors working closely with both respondents comprised of diverse backgrounds from both public and private (profit and non-profit oriented sector) who all contributed to the common cause was also a factor that I considered. The size was not such a big consideration for me but rather the mandate of each of the potential respondents that would determine the number of respondents I chose and from which sector.

Additionally, through literature that I read on mandated collaboration networks, I realized a few studies were done on funding agencies as compared to the health or community and infrastructure agencies (Milward & Provan (2003) & (1995); Edelenbos & Eshuis (2011) & Huxham & Vangen, 2005). Yet with the increase in the use of mandated collaboration networks to deliver public services, there has been a sharp increase in the allocation of funds by government to funding agencies specifically to oversee the overall implementation of the public objectives warranting the need for more light to be shed in such agencies. For instance the Deloitte (2013, p.3) Researcher’s report on Sweden indicated that that government increased its funding towards Research and Development to an estimate of 500 million Euros in the year 2008-2012. In such a case it would be necessary to study about such agencies that receive such funding and are in charge of the disbursement. Since they are the focal point of the funding it is better to understand the interactional process between the public funding and implementing actors and how best efficiency can be attained making it an ideal context to investigate the roles that both power and trust can play. Also through my prior discussions and literature reading, I found out that most of the potential respondents shared a common source of funding making it an ideal and appropriate sector to investigate the role of power and trust in such a context. As Ritchie & Lewis (2003, p.52) argue, the focus of the study in such cases is normally not focused on particular individuals in this case the managers or even the organization, but on the interaction process in which they play a vital role. By focusing on the process of achieving the collective network goal by the different managers and not individual manager’s personalities, I was able to get the perceptions they each held in regards to power, trust and efficiency through the course of their daily tasks.

This study thus adopts the case study as the research strategy, single case as the preferred design and a hybrid of both critical and atypical case study types that gives me the flexibility to be able to meet the objectives of this study. Case studies however are not entirely without any draw backs’, investigating several cases at the same time has been cited to pose a challenge to the researcher especially during the design stage of the study and have an impact in terms of the quality of the final content that is obtained (Creswell, 2007; Ritchie & Lewis, 2003 &Yin, 2003). But by the same token, both Creswell (2007, p.76) & Ritchie & Lewis (2003, p.52) argue that researchers should pay close attention to the number of cases and the constituting aspects they seek to investigate in order to mitigate the quality concerns that will arise during the design process. Yin (2003, p.54) further stresses on the need for caution in using the single case study on grounds that the researcher’s ability to undertake a study beyond a single unit is doubted because of the basis of designing the study such as rare circumstances which is instead seen to be a weakness in conducting a multiple case design and therefore in order to avoid such issues from arising, the use of the multiple case design is preferred. As argued before, since I based my decision of choosing the single case on the
critical and typical basis and not uniqueness, I reckon that the purpose of my study and not my inability determined by choice of selection and hence will not impact negatively to the study. Putting aside the draw backs associated with case study, my study will only use a single case method, where only the mandated collaboration network as a case will be studied alongside the processes in which the managers will be interviewed on the different perceptions they hold on power, trust and efficiency respectively.

3.4.2 Sampling

This is an important procedure of data collection in any study because not everyone can be used as a respondent based on reasons ranging from operational costs incurred in the course of arranging for interviews to time considerations, especially with student thesis that is usually with a time frame of a semester (Saunders et al, 2007, p.206). Sampling is also necessary because it helps in better preparation and organization of the study at hand to ensure all facets of the study are covered.

Sampling has been divided into two types; probability and non-probability sampling (Ritchie & Lewis, 2003 & Saunders et al, 2007). Probability sampling involves the researcher choosing an exact number of predetermined respondents randomly who meet the study criteria (Ritchie & Lewis, 2003, p.78). The findings of this sample size are normally used for generalization purposes to a larger audience and are associated with the quantitative type of studies. In contrast to probability sampling, non-probability sampling involves planned choosing of respondents who fit the specific description of the target respondents (Ritchie & Lewis, 2003, p.78). Rather than focus on the random respondents who should meet the study criteria used for generalization purposes, the focus on this kind of sampling is on the features that the respondents possess and whether or not they meet the study’s description. This type of sampling is normally associated with the qualitative type of studies like mine, with a focus on mandated collaboration network.

The case under investigation is the mandated collaboration network, funding perspective that comprises of managers from different sectors and the issues under investigation are their perceptions on power, trust and efficiency. The aim was to find out, how both power and trust lead to the mandated collaboration network achieving efficiency. In order to get that information, the managers the different organizations and sectors needed to be interviewed. In looking at this network as a unit of study, my criterion of selection was based on six factors; the actors, their common goal and source of funding, their mandate and size, geographical location as well as activities performed.

**Actors**

Based on my sample frame all the respondents I conducted interviews with, held managerial positions and in cases where they were not, they were recommended by their managers to attend the interview because they were seen as the best fit. In order to get these respondents, I had to use the purposive sampling technique which as argued by Ritchie & Lewis (2003, p.79) & Creswell (2007, p.129), its core purpose is to ensure that the selected respondents fit the stated criteria for the study as well as offer a broad range of perspectives in order to get different views from the respondents. The composition of these actors varied with actors coming from the regional political entities, national and supranational agencies that I will hence forth refer to as national agencies, nonprofit organization, business incubator and the investment promotion agency. I generated the sample frame by contacting individual managers through their respective web pages of their organizations and agencies (refer to appendix 2). It was through the initial discussions I had with the managers of these
organizations that they eventually participated in the interviews themselves or recommended to me the respondents they felt were placed better to respond to the demands of the study. In certain instances, I also had to use the snowball sampling technique, to get other respondents recommended to me by previously interviewed respondents (refer to appendix 3). This was in cases where I failed to get access to the particular respondents but through the snowball technique, they were overly responsive. Despite this kind of response, I still faced challenges in getting access to respondents from the profit oriented private sector and any attempts to seek audience with them even through the snowball technique was always turned down. I obtained the contacts of the representative of the branch organization as well the voluntary community based organization through the snowball and direct contact respectively however due to challenges of long distance communication; I was unable to conduct the interview with the representative of the branch organization.

**Common Goal and Source of funding**

Considering my selection criterion for a common goal shared by all actors, I chose to focus on all organizations that worked towards achieving regional growth and competitiveness within the Västerbotten region. The basis of arriving at this common goal shared by all actors was to look at their source of funding, which would determine their goals. In this case, the source of funding was from the European Union structural fund, central and regional government allocations and its common goal is for all the recipient actors to work towards regional growth and competitiveness. This meant that the national agencies, regional political entity and municipality in their various capacities shared the same regional growth and competitiveness goal as the investment promotion agency, business incubator and nonprofit organization albeit from different perspectives.

The national agency’s 1 goal is to ensure that funds are disbursed and projects implemented in accordance with this goal and to ensure this is adhered to, they oversee the implementation project. The disbursement of funds is based on how the tender applications contribute towards the growth of the region and in making it competitive. The national agency 2 contributes to the regional growth and competitiveness goal by supporting small and medium size enterprises through the disbursement of funds and overseeing the implementation of these activities that will create jobs and make the region competitive. The regional political entity contributes to this goal by ensuring that all regional projects meet the stated regional growth and competitive goal and at the same time contributes to prioritizing and representing of these goals at regional political level discussions. The municipality contribution in the attainment of the goal is by working closely with the national agencies and regional political entity to highlight areas of priority that actors vying for tenders should focus on. They also provide a conducive environment for investment through the enactment of laws and offering support where necessary. The investment and promotion agency contributes to this goal of regional growth and competitiveness by creating awareness about the region at both domestic and international platforms. Through this they intend to attract more investment in the region and make it competitive. The business incubator contributes to this goal by supporting the development and sustainable progress of startup firms. Through the support of these firms, the intent is for them to become sustainable and viable in order to provide employment opportunities for jobseekers within the region thus making it competitive. The nonprofit organization contributes to this goal through the environment sector by conducting studies on ways of improving renewable energy and coming up with innovative solutions that will not only be a source of job creation but also make the region competitive since it will attract other investors. All these actors are therefore joint together through the sharing of sources of financing which ultimately defines the goals that they all contribute towards its achievement.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actor’s</th>
<th>Common Goal</th>
<th>Actor’s role</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National Agency 1</td>
<td>Regional growth and competitiveness</td>
<td>Disbursement of funds and implementation of projects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Agency 2</td>
<td>Regional growth and competitiveness</td>
<td>Support Small and Medium size enterprises</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional political entity</td>
<td>Regional growth and competitiveness</td>
<td>Oversee regional projects and represent Västerbotten at political level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipality</td>
<td>Regional growth and competitiveness</td>
<td>Oversee regional projects and create conducive environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investment and promotion agency</td>
<td>Regional growth and competitiveness</td>
<td>Promote Västerbotten region by creating awareness at domestic and international forum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business incubator</td>
<td>Regional growth and competitiveness</td>
<td>Support startup firms to become viable and competitive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonprofit organization</td>
<td>Regional growth and competitiveness</td>
<td>Come up with innovative nonrenewable energy solutions and publish reports</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 1: Common goal shared by all actors**

**Geographical Location**

My choice of Västerbotten region earlier on as I started my thesis was because of the ease of collecting data since I was in Umeå then. However, as the study progressed, Västerbotten region was a good choice because of its proximate position to conduct a study with actors in a given location and their homogeneity, since they all adhere to the same goal of regional growth and competitiveness making it easy to investigate the interactional process. All the actors were either based in one of the municipalities of Västerbotten region or worked in all of the region’s counties with the region of Västerbotten set as the criterion. One of the regional political entities; the municipality as well as the business incubator was restricted to a particular Kommun of Västerbotten region. This variation should not be seen as weakness in sampling rather strength because it gives the study further insight into the relationship between these latter agencies whose scope of operation is restricted to a given area with those that are not. Creswell (2007) & Ritchie & Lewis (2003) further add that this insight is obtained when a particular type of purposive sampling, maximum variation sampling is used with an intention of getting differing views through the selection of respondents from varied contexts.

**Mandate**

Part of my prior preparation for selecting the target respondents was to look at if the actor’s mandate fit the network criterion. In order to achieve this, I investigated through the respective organizations webpage what their roles were and how they were formed that guided me in defining their mandate. Looking at the mandate of these organizations is crucial because it defines their purpose, with public funding actors (national agency’s 1, national agency 2, regional political entity and municipality) all deriving their mandate through the enactment of by-laws by the central or regional government respectively. National Agency 1 is both a national and regional agency mandated by the government. At the national level, it’s
tasked with the responsibility of coordinating women networks and at the regional level, it’s tasked with disbursing and implementing the European Union (EU) funds with its latter role, the focus of this study specifically on its operations in Västerbotten National Agency 2, is nationwide agency mandated by the government with different branches throughout the country with this particular branch, based in Västerbotten region. Regional political entity is a regional mandated political body that was formed in 2008 by the municipalities in Västerbotten region. Municipality, this is a municipality in Västerbotten region. The implementing actors (investment and promotion agency, business incubator, nonprofit organization) equally obtained their mandate from regional governments and the EU respectively. Investment and promotion agency is mandated by the regional political entity with the nonprofit organization mandated by the municipality and business incubator by national agency 1. This however in contrast to what was intended with this study seeking to get a balanced representation of the constituting actors. In the process of interviewing the nonprofit agency even with prior crosschecking of information on the website indicating it was a nonprofit organization, we found out that they had been formed by the municipality making it a public organization and not a privately formed one. Additionally the regional political entities; the municipality as well as the business incubator actors have a restricted mandate to operate within a specific sphere of operation within Västerbotten county, Skellefteå and Umeå municipalities respectively. Despite the restrictions on the scope of operation, having a different mandate from other actors does not in any way hamper the data collection process. All these fore mentioned agencies come together on the basis of their mandate and work hand in hand with a short to mid-term goal of making the region an ideal choice for investors and conducive for its inhabitants and a long term goal of ensuring regional growth and competitiveness thus making the presence of any actor within the region meeting the criterion for this study.

**Size**

This type of network comprises of two or more organizations with the constituent actors including the public funding and implementing actors at any given time. My basis of determining the size of the network was on seeking to get a balanced representation of all the actors from the three main sectors of the economy; public, private (profit oriented) and voluntary community based (nonprofit) sectors that constitute the network. In regards to the number of respondents to be interviewed, I was flexible with the exact number from the beginning despite purposive sampling being used with target respondents already known by me. In terms of the public sector, I had initially sought to get only three actors; namely the two national agencies and the regional political entity however as I continued with my interviews I noticed that the municipality equally played an important role hence its inclusion. I also sought to get 1 private (profit oriented sector) organization that worked towards the same goal but was unable to due to lack of responsiveness from the targeted respondents. The nonprofit organization was also included on the basis of the representation it offered from the nonprofit oriented sector, even though as earlier stated it was not formed by the private sector but rather the government. It therefore brings the total of the actors in the network to 7 from the initial target of 8. However the size variation in number with some organizations such as the national and regional agencies much bigger than the implementing actors was inconsequential as I didn’t use it as my criteria.

**Activities**

The common aspect with all these organizations were that they activities were focused on service delivery even though they came from varied sectors with the public funding actors
coming from the national and regional governmental positions that they hold whereas others were in the environment sector, investment and promotion as well as business incubator sectors respectively. The national and regional organizations focused mainly on overseeing the budgetary concerns and overall master plan of the project to be followed as such the activities they were involved in were of a monitoring nature that required them to meet the implementing actors and verifying the records. They are also tasked to report to the government and the European Union on the progress of the implementation of the project and this involved attending high level meetings in which they give progress on the ongoing projects. The implementing actors on the other hand, have to implement these activities for instance in the case of investment and promotion agency takes the form of organizing workshops and trade fairs to create investor awareness at both domestic and external forums in order to make the region grow and compete accordingly. The private nonprofit organization is normally involved with undertaking studies to find out better and innovative ways of improving the environment. Part of the studies is the dissemination exercise where they hold discussion forums in which they publish their findings to the different stakeholders. They also hold meetings amongst themselves to find out the new areas of interest and how they can improve by working together. The stakeholders here are mainly the university, Kommun and the different parastatals in the region that are set to benefit from the findings. The activities that the business incubator is involved in require working closely with entrepreneurs to start up their company and support them with business advice as well as training on different business skill components. They also support them by providing affordable offices to them, that they then leave when they are businesses are sustainable. By looking at each of this criterion, I was able to investigate the role that power and trust played in the interactions among the actors within the network.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actors</th>
<th>Activities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National Agency 1</td>
<td>Orientation, Monitoring and attending meetings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Agency 2</td>
<td>Orientation, Monitoring and attending meetings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional political entity</td>
<td>Orientation, Monitoring and attending meetings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipality</td>
<td>Orientation, Monitoring and attending meetings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investment and promotion agency</td>
<td>Organizing trade fairs and workshops to create awareness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business incubator</td>
<td>Training and business support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonprofit organization</td>
<td>Undertake research on renewable energy and disseminate information. Convene meetings with stakeholders</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Activities of actors in mandated collaboration network

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sectors</th>
<th>Agencies/ Organizations</th>
<th>Mandate</th>
<th>Source of Mandate</th>
<th>Source of funds</th>
<th>Scope of Operation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PUBLIC</td>
<td>National agency 1</td>
<td>Funding and Implementing</td>
<td>EU &amp; Swedish Government</td>
<td>EU &amp; Swedish Government</td>
<td>Västerbotten County</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Regional political entity</td>
<td>Funding and Implementing</td>
<td>County Council &amp; Municipalities</td>
<td>County Council &amp; Municipalities</td>
<td>Västerbotten County</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>National agency 2</td>
<td>Funding and Implementing</td>
<td>EU &amp; Swedish Government</td>
<td>EU &amp; Swedish Government</td>
<td>Västerbotten County</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Municipality</td>
<td>Funding and Implementing</td>
<td>By Law</td>
<td>Municipality</td>
<td>Municipality-Västerbotten County</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Table 3: Profile of Actors

With this mentioned, the ideal representation of a mandated collaboration network see figure 4 below would include a private sector and nonprofit organization from profit and nonprofit oriented sectors respectively; Having failed to interview the representative of the branch organization and turned down several times by other private profit oriented sectors, as well discovering that the nonprofit is formed by a public entity and not a private one, the current representation is as indicated in, Figure 5 below.

![Figure 4: Ideal composition of actors in a mandated collaboration network](image-url)
3.4.3 Data Collection

The data collection method is dependent on the kind of research questions one seeks to answer. My study’s aim is to explore the perceptions held by managers in regards to power, trust and efficiency and to answer them adequately, I had to use the semi structured interview as a form of collecting valuable information. Interviews have been divided into structured, semi structured and unstructured interviews (Creswell, 2007; Ritchie & Lewis, 2003 & Saunders et al, 2007). Structured interviews involve the researcher using a standard set of questions to all its respondents with an aim of generalizing the findings to a wider population. This type of interviews is usually done in quantitative studies where the emphasis is on the numbers and its generalizability but not on the follow up questions (Saunders et al, 2007, p.312).

Semi structured interviews involves the researcher using a standard set of questions with flexibility on probing cases where one feels the need to seek clarification (Ritchie & Lewis, 2003, p.311). Unstructured interviews on the other hand involves the researcher not using any standard questions, but needs to have an overall plan of what needs to be investigated is central to it being unstandardized. Saunders et al (2007, p.311) refers to it as in-depth interviews but the emphasis here is to get as much information as possible from the respondent through probing and allowing the respondent to take the lead in certain instances. Semi structured and unstructured interviews have been normally associated with qualitative studies due to its flexibility in allowing researchers to get more information from its respondents through probing.

As I mentioned earlier my study adopted the semi structured interviews power and trust have in attaining efficiency in mandated collaboration network, the need to target the different respondents at their different levels was necessary. With this in mind, there was a separate interview guide for the public funding managers that had a mandate for overseeing the disbursement and implementation of regional funds, a second one for public sector managers that had the mandate to implement but not oversee the regional funding aspect and the last one that targeted both the private and voluntary community based organizations who are recipients of this regional funding and therefore report to the public funding actors that oversee the funding and implementation for the outcome of their assigned duties.
The variations among the three different sets of respondents in the interview guide (see attached in appendix1) was mainly in the mandated collaboration network theme, where the relationship between the public sector (mandated oversight role of funding and implementation) vis-à-vis the public sector (mandated to implement) and private and voluntary community based organizations was sought. The questions thus were altered depending on which respondent were being interviewed and was not limited to the mandated collaboration theme (see appendix1). Additionally, the interview guide for the public sector (mandated to implement not to fund) in certain areas sought to seek their relationship between themselves and the public sector (mandated oversight role of funding and implementation) and between themselves and the private and voluntary community based organizations. Doing it this way, allowed for new perspectives and underlying themes to be discovered which brought valuable insight into my study. During the interviews probing took the shape of questions usually posed to the respondents ranged from using ‘why’ in cases where I needed further a response from the respondent in regards to their own view; what ,when I needed further clarity and explanation and how, when I used an open ended question to get a specific response in regards to the subject at hand which made the respondents explain clearly what perceptions they held and further insight into the study (Saunders et al, 2007, p.330). Semi structured interview also allowed me to make modifications to the interview guide with every interview that I did, in order to get the responses that I needed for the questions that I asked. That way, with every probe and clarification I sought I was able to understand the context of the respondent’s better which is an advantage of this type of interview (Creswell, 2007; Ritchie & Lewis, 2003 & Saunders et al, 2007).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sectors</th>
<th>Agencies/Organizations</th>
<th>Respondent’s position</th>
<th>Means of Interview</th>
<th>Length of Interview</th>
<th>Date of interview</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PUBLIC</td>
<td>National agency 1</td>
<td>Executive Officer, Northern Region (Västerbotten/Norbotten)</td>
<td>Skype/Telephone Email</td>
<td>58 minutes 56 words</td>
<td>13th, March Thursday, 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Regional political entity</td>
<td>Strategic Manager Business and Innovation</td>
<td>Skype/Telephone</td>
<td>56 minutes</td>
<td>31st March Monday, 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>National agency 2</td>
<td>Business Development Advisor</td>
<td>Skype/Telephone</td>
<td>52 minutes 51</td>
<td>18th March 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Municipality</td>
<td>Manager</td>
<td>Email</td>
<td>1,016 words</td>
<td>27th March, Thursday, 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PUBLIC</td>
<td>Investment Promotion Agency</td>
<td>Director</td>
<td>Skype/Telephone Email</td>
<td>1 hour 40 minutes .25 seconds 87 words</td>
<td>13th, March Thursday 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Business Incubator</td>
<td>Project Manager</td>
<td>Email</td>
<td>464 words 364 words 57 words</td>
<td>18th March 2014 19th March 2014 21st March 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRIVATE</td>
<td>Non-profit organization</td>
<td>Project Manager</td>
<td>Skype/Telephone</td>
<td>50 minutes 08 seconds</td>
<td>19th March, Wednesday</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4: Interview profile of respondents
3.4.4 Data Analysis

There is no specific approach in analyzing qualitative data, with the researcher’s aim of pursing the study the determining factor to which type of data analysis is eventually used (Ritchie & Lewis, 2003, p.200). This study adopted the thematic type of data analysis, which is a “method for identifying, analyzing, and reporting patterns (themes) within data” (Braun & Clarke, 2006 p. 79). The thematic type of data analysis is ideal for my study because it is not restricted to any philosophical assumptions but rather as a researcher I was able to answer my research question, no matter my philosophical stand. With my ontological position being constructionist in nature, using the thematic analysis enabled me scrutinize and interpret the underlying reasons behind each actor’s perspective towards power and trust and how it led to efficiency in the mandated collaboration network. In addition to that, this approach has been cited by the authors to be the foundational basis of any qualitative type of analysis that is easy to learn, which further validates my reason for using it.

Thematic analysis is further divided into two fold; Theoretical (deductive) or inductive and latent or semantic dimensions (Braun & Clarke, 2006 p. 83-84) that a researcher can use in identifying the patterns within the data. Theoretical dimension involves the theories guiding the process of analyzing, where by the patterns are derived based on the literature reviewed whereas inductive dimension, lets the produced data guide the analytic process, the former of which this study adopts. The focus of this study sought to find out the role that power and trust in mandated collaboration led to the attainment of efficiency, as such, by using theoretical or deductive dimension, the patterns identified fell under the key aspects of power, trust and efficiency. This theoretical way of identifying patterns has been critiqued for being narrow and ignoring other data collected that could add further insight, however, the purpose of using this approach was for it to derive and answer questions specific to the research which is the main intent of the study (Braun & Clarke, 2006, p.84)

Aside from deriving the patterns that is then used to build onto the themes , the extraction and making meaning of these patterns is then done either through the semantic or latent dimension (Braun & Clarke, 2006, p.84). The former dimension takes the approach of taking what the respondent mentions at face value whereas the latent seeks to get the underlying reasons behind what the respondent states. This study adopted the latter dimension, latent because taking the respondent’s face value view was not sufficient for me to derive the responses that I needed in order to find out the role that power and trust play in mandated collaboration network attaining efficiency. As evident in chapter 5, both these concepts play a subtle role which if not reviewed thoroughly through the latent dimension, will not be able to meet the objectives of the study thus adopting it.

Braun & Clarke (2006, p.86-93) suggested six steps of analyzing the data that I have compressed into three; that commenced with acquainting of one’s self with the generated data through the transcriptions, generating of codes as well as themes that are later reviewed, defined and named that is then used to contribute to the writing of the report. There is no fixed starting point in which data analysis actually commences, in fact, acquainting one’s self with the data obtained from the conducted interviews from respondents is considered as the very first attempt at beginning to analyze except that is done by the researcher for the purposes of obtaining a general idea about the overall data in their midst Strauss (1987, p.4). One of the strengths of using semi structured interviews is that, with every interview done, one is able to go through it and make adjustments to suit the objective of the study which I did. Every after an interview with a respondent I listened through the audio recordings to get a sense of what the main aspects were and this helped me build onto the further interviews.
that I did, because I was able to restructure the interview guide as well as become familiar on a general level with the general idea emanating from the interviews. Since I didn’t record all the interviews as some were sent through electronic mail, I made sure I read through the contents and followed through with any questions that I had with the respondents.

On completion of the interviews, I immediately embarked on transcribing the audio recordings from the interviews that I had recorded to writing it down in a verbatim format. How much one transcribes of the audio recordings, is a judgment best left to the researcher at hand with the focus normally on it being done on the aspects that are contributing to the study (Strauss, 1987, p.267). This meant that I transcribed question by question on what was relevant to my research objective and guided by the interview guide, and in the case of the follow up questions, I incorporated it under the particular themes that it fell under. I did a total number of 5 transcriptions, with the other two interviews conducted through electronic mail thus not warranting it done. I also transcribed according to the different levels of respondents, this meant that I did not use the same structure of interview guide for both public funding and implementing actors, since the questions addressed to them were different. While transcribing the data, I also took notice of how the respondents responded to the questions I addressed to them, this helped me to further deliberate on the aspects of the questions that I asked, that made them respond in a particular way, which Saunders et al., (2007, p.475) mentions that it helps in reading the ‘‘tone and nonverbal communication’’ of the respondents. Transcription thus is just not considered as a mere process of putting down the audio recordings into words, but also as one reacquaints one’s self with the generated data they equally interpret and establish meaning to it (Braun & Clarke, 2006 & Ritchie & Lewis, 2003).

After transcribing the data, I arranged all the data under their different levels, public funding and implementing actors respectively and then started coding the entire document. Since this studied is guided by the theory, I already had a number of questions that I specifically coded around in order to gain further insight into these aspects. Strauss (1987, p.20-21) defines coding as, ’’the general term for conceptualizing data; thus, coding includes raising questions and giving provisional answers (hypotheses) about categories and about their relations.’’ Since my study was being guided by theories, I already had themes that the patterns contributed to from the coding. I divided my themes into the five different aspects of my study, on network governance, mandated collaboration network, power, trust and efficiency and there were key patterns that fell under each of these headings. Even though the key words focused on power, trust, efficiency and mandated collaboration network, the network governance was vital as it gave further insight into the overall management of networks which is sphere of our study. Under each of these themes for instance network governance, the categories involved included the objectives of the study as well as how the organization was formed. In power and trust, the main categories were crosscutting with communication, monitoring aspects dominating the patterns. Therefore the codes generated contributed fed into the categories that further contributed to generating more insight under the respective themes. For proper organization of my study, I assigned each organization under public funding and implementing actors respectively and then allocated the different themes under each of them in several excel worksheets manually. Doing it this way, I was able to compare and contrast and see emerging perspectives emanating from each of these respective respondents organization under study (Ritchie & Lewis, 2003, p.177).

In the process of reviewing the themes, Braun & Clark (2006, p.91) mention two ways of doing this. The first technique is by checking to ensure that all the patterns under this theme
have been captured well and are consistent to the overall themes. This meant, I had to go back to the excel worksheets of the respective respondents and review it thoroughly. At some point, I also went as far back to the raw data and transcripts to ensure that I had captured every detail under the themes. The second technique that Braun & Clark (2006, p.91) mention is to further verify how valid the content displayed under each of themes are in terms of whether that true meaning had been captured in relation to the raw data. In order to ensure accuracy and in addition to reviewing the raw data and individual transcripts for any missed content, I also referred to the literature review to make sure that I had captured all the themes under study and that the patterns discovered were contributing to the theory earlier stated as well as compared it against my conceptual model.

To further validate the themes, in the events that I felt I needed more clarity on particular themes, I communicated back to the individual respondent through electronic mail and they responded immediately clarifying my earlier interpretation. I also cross checked some of the details that I needed especially about the actors organizations ,contexts and processes under which they operate, by going to the respective web pages of each of the actor’s organizations, to further validate the content that I had. In essence I was able to carry out both cross member and triangulation by seeking more information from both the respondents and from their respective web pages and midterm reports (Gasson, 2004 & Merriam, 1988). Ultimately, as Braun & Clarks (2006, p.91) argue, the accuracy of your document is entirely dependent on how you theorize and analyze it, which essentially starts from the beginning. With the reviews done on both these levels, I was able to draw comparisons on the different levels of actors, public funding and implementing and gain much insight which enabled me then to embark on writing the report since my themes had been previously selected from the theories.

![Figure 6: Merged data analysis process](image)

### 3.5 Ethical considerations

Observing ethics in data collection is considered an integral part of the entire process (Creswell, 2007; Ritchie & Lewis, 2003 & Saunders et al., 2007). Prior to conducting any of the interviews, the consent of the targeted respondents was sought for. Since I did purposive sampling I had a general knowledge about the characteristics of my respondents, but I was able to get access to each of my respondents either through the contacts in their respective web pages or through snow ball sampling in which I had to ask respondents that I had interviewed to recommend me to respondents who could meet this criteria. Since I did not know any of the respondents that recommended me to these respondents personally, I waiver any chances of bias occurring here. I established my communication with the selected respondents through their officially designated electronic mail. This email clearly spelt out my identity as a student and pursuing this study for purely academic purposes. I also disclosed the objective of the study to the respondent and the reasons why I chose them for my study, explaining the contribution they will make towards it. In case the respondent felt they did not meet the criteria stated or they were engaged at work, they delegated this responsibility to a colleague who they cited were equally capable of participating in the study.

In addition to this, all the respondents held different managerial and senior positions in their respective organizations and as such the process of being granted the interview was
extensively vetted. This means that every interview conducted was done so with full knowledge and consent of the respective respondents. (Saunders et al, 2007, p.184).

By stating the purpose of the study as being academic, I also ensured that the identities of the respondents are not disclosed and information to be kept in confidence. Ritchie & Lewis (2003, p.67) defines both anonymity and confidence as concealing the identity of the respondents to external audience and stating clearly the identity of the respondents in the study to the full view of everyone respectively. In regards to the issue of anonymity, I did not use the real identity of the respondents but rather defined them by their stated objectives and not at any one point, did I link any direct quotations to a respondents true identity, all attributions were related to the assigned descriptive names used. In addition to the confidentiality aspect, since I conducted interviews through electronic mail too, I was involved in sending the interview guides to the respondents through the very channel. I ensured that I shared the interview guide and the follow up questions via electronic mail with specific respondents and never outside of the two of us. All this as Saunders et al., (2007, p.187) argues if not upheld comprises on the credibility of the data obtained.

In keeping with the ethics code, I also assured the respondents that the data collected would in no way be used to harm them. To ensure this, I have hidden their identity as well as clearly explained to them the intent of this study as being purely academic. In case of any doubts, I also promised to share with them the content of the findings. This topic is quite sensitive since it deals with relations between different actors, who play an oversight role over actors who are implementing. The perspective therefore held by each respondent should be reported in a very objective way without distorting any facts (Ritchie & Lewis, 2003, p.68), which I have ensured to do all throughout the report. At all times, I have ensured that I have maintained the discussion to what is specifically understudy and steered completely away from any issues that would otherwise not be relevant to the study.
CHAPTER FOUR: EMPIRICAL RESEARCH AND FINDINGS

The chapter will present findings from the empirical study conducted using the semi structured interviews with respondents from the mandated collaboration network.

4.1 Network Overview

An overview of the different actors that constitute the mandated collaboration network is necessary, in order for the reader to understand the context of this study. The findings of my study are based on interviews done with a sample of 7 managers working in different entities that are formed or funded by the government all aiming to achieve a common goal from two main sectors, public and private. The 7 managers interviewed either disburse or receive funding from the European Union (EU) and Swedish local, regional and central government. The common objective of all these actors is to achieve regional growth and competitiveness in Västerbotten region which all the actors interviewed are working towards achieving it. The interviews conducted are further divided into three levels; public organizations with a mandate of funding, public organizations with a mandate to implement and private organization that equally implement which I will categorize as public funding and implementing actors accordingly because the nonprofit organization contrary to initial thoughts is mandated by the municipality, making it mandated by the municipality. The 7 entities interviewed are all from Northern Sweden, thus the focus is on Västerbotten region. Any one actor that operates in Västerbotten and works jointly towards this common goal does qualify to be a respondent, which is a common feature among all these respondents.

I will present the findings according to the different mandates; funding versus implementing actors with public organizations- funding mandate as public funding actors and public organizations-implementing and private organization implementing as implementing actors respectively. It should also be noted that the respondents comprise of agencies, political entities, business incubators and nonprofit organizations. All respondents hold managerial positions in the respective organizations and in cases where they do not hold it, they were recommended to be better placed to avail information by their managers or colleagues.

4.1.1 Public Actors-Funding Mandate

National Agency 1

Network Governance

This agency has been formed by the government to implement its national policy, one of regional development, growth and competitiveness. To meet this objective, it has been given the mandate to play an oversight role of disbursement of EU structural funds to implementing actors within the region. It performs this role by working closely with designated political bodies and other private actors within the region who all contribute to the realization of this goal. ‘’With our partner’s cooperation from the structural fund scope, we send those further to the partner scope and then they prioritize the projects on which we take the decision to grant the money’’. As a result of this mandate by the government to play an oversight role, it normally takes its directives as well as reports to both the Swedish government and EU.

Mandated Collaboration Network

This agency performs its funding and disbursing mandate by stating an expression of interest through which the implementing actors bid for the projects and are selected on merit basis with cooperation from their partners. ‘’We have control of the money and project applications come to us. Together with our partnership in the structural funds scope from (private, environmentalists, politicians), we take the first look and see whether tender based
applications meet the criteria to apply for regional funding.’’. The process of awarding the contracts is continuous and involves actors meeting on a regular basis over a course of time in which they are informed about the progress of their applications. ’’We have about three meetings in a year and every time we meet, we talk about their applications notifying them which ones are more acceptable and would help with regional competitiveness’’. As part of its oversight role the organization it funds is required to give periodic accounts of its usage showing progress on its part through the indicators specified.

Power
In this organization, the medium used to communicate with implementing actors is through telephone, face to face visits and electronic mail when exchanging documents. In the case of face to face visits with implementing actors, the respondent says that they are required to visit them, at least thrice in a year. The specific location is however not specified with the respondent stating that anyone from their organization can go to the implementing actor’s premises with the implementing actor equally open to pay visits. ‘’We are also obliged to visit them at least a minimum of 20% that is about thrice in a year to assess their progress’’. The respondent states that they usually notify public and private actors during meetings on the channels of communication they should use. In terms of communicating to an external population, the web page is mainly used that contains a special document where citizens can put in any questions or recommendations they have. Implementing actors are expected to use the organization’s logo as well as letter heads at all times in any of their official communications.

In defining the objectives and scope of this organization, the respondent says that there is a program already written down that guides their actions. This also applies in the selection process of implementing actors in the implementation of the services; they follow a criterion which has already been written down. ‘’No one chooses, they are already chosen. There is an agreement that partners should work with.’’

In the course of selecting the implementing actors, respondent says that they involve them in their decision making process. This they usually do, during meetings where they seek their views and advise them accordingly. If the implementing actors have been selected, the respondent further follows up to assess their performance by visiting them as well as reviewing their activity and financial reports. In case they do not meet the expected performance, the respondent says dialogue will take place and in severe cases their contract is terminated with the funds initially disbursed, taken back. ‘’We stop the project, take the money back and they won’t be able to get the money or their benefit’’. To avoid such instances, the implementing actors are able to access incentives through a different department that can motivate them into achieving their goals. ‘’there is a separate unit that can offer incentives for investments through this separate unit. Their incentive schemes are very transparent and guided through rules.’’(IPA webpage.)

Trust
The objectives of this agency are explicitly stated in the programs to the implementing actors when performing their duties making them aware of the standards expected of them. In order to ascertain the fact that the implementing actors are aware of these expectations, performance reviews and regular communications occur. ‘’We have regular meetings, telephone conversation and communicate via email on projects.’’. The outcome of these meetings is usually fed back into the project in cases where there are lapses by the implementing actors.
In terms of the selection process, the respondent was asked, if an implementing actor had experience in a similar project or worked in an organization with similar goals would have an impact on the process of awarding the contracts, his response was mixed. He said even though experience is essential, it is the ideas that these actors put forward that are instrumental in their being successful. ‘‘It depends on the project ideas that the partners have and their effects, of course experience, results and purpose do count but does not give one an additional advantage’’. In terms of relationship building, both public funding and implementing actors build a personal relation based on trust as time goes by because they get to know what both sets of actors expect of each other. The respondent says, ‘Yes it does, it creates a friendship because both partners get to trust each other. These companies learn the rules and we understand how they work’’. The relation between the public -implementing and private actors is good based on the fact that they talk regularly and in some cases raise issues of concern in the implementation of the project.

Efficiency

Efficiency to the respondent implies that the costs the public funding and implementing actors incur on performing their tasks should be commensurate to the outcome. ‘‘Our main emphasis is on cost efficiency, where the money in the projects is used in the right way. Other considerations for efficiency include the credibility of the entire process where emphasis is put on whether the stated procedure is followed and acceptable by law. This, the respondent remarks, ‘They are supposed to first of all be involved with anything that is legal tender. They also go through the tendering process, where different contractor’s prices are compared. They also buy and undertake the projects through legal tender. The quality of the items being tendered should be compared and we see it through their reports and expenses to see if the right process has been met or not.’’. In order to assess if due process is followed, such information is obtained through the performance review activity and financial reports of the implementing actors.

Regional Political body

Network Governance

This is a regional mandated political body that was formed in 2008 by the municipalities in Västerbotten region. Its objective is to oversee the socio and economic development in the region and ensure regional growth and competitiveness. ‘‘The municipals are the local level and we are the regional level, we have the task from the government to deal with regional issues’’. The scope of operation this regional political body has been stipulated to work with is in Västerbotten region and with the municipals and private sector respectively as actors, with whom they are expected to achieve their objective. This political body is not only funded by the government but they also monitor its performance in executing its tasks. ‘‘The government finances our projects with money from the municipals and regional government, and they make sure that we are doing our job in the national policy, by evaluating our projects’’.

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Implementing actors respond to the call for applications expressed by the regional body, and as a criterion for these actors that they fund, they expect them to be based in the Västerbotten region and compete alongside other applicants in the bidding process based on the project ideas presented. This call for application is usually done by the regional political body informing the different implementing actors on the opportunities available through the entities web page, physical meetings as well as through the newspapers, ensuring that this
information is widely circulated. ‘We announce and inform the municipals and universities about the tenders available, and give them suggestions before taking decision in applications of projects. We also have meetings and equally inform people through the papers and websites for the Swedish authority of growth and our own website’. The outcome of this bid is usually informed to the implementing actors through meetings held with them in which both the regional body and implementing actors discuss the viability of the projects and its potential benefits. They also use electronic and regular mail as ongoing process of assessing the implementing actor’s application. In its part, the regional political body expects the implementing actor it funds to give progress of their implementation exercise by assessing the outcome achieved in the process in order to ensure the goals set are realized. This is done by communicating through physical meetings or reviewing reports with the implementing actors on ground on the progress of their activities. ‘We talk and discuss the program and rely on what the project owner on the ground say’.

**Power**

Telephone, personal visits, social media and electronic mail exchanges have been cited by the respondent as the medium of communication with partners and implementing actors alike. The respondent says that they only tell the implementing actors on what medium to use in the course of their meetings but do not clearly state it from the onset. In terms of the number of times they communicate with the implementing actors as well as their partners; it is once in a week and once a month respectively. When queried whether they were specific with where they convene their meetings, the respondent said they were flexible in where they met, just as long as they are able to accomplish their tasks. ‘we communicate once in a week with communities and once in a month with municipals in different areas’.

In terms of disbursing information about the outcome of the projects to the citizenry, the respondent says they usually use their webpage where information is periodically updated on the recent happenings of meetings held with ministers and projects financed as well as the results. The use of the organization’s official logo and letter head in all official communications is usually stated to the implementing actors in the course of performing their tasks. The organization’s objectives and area of operation have already been predetermined; the respondent says they refer to the organization’s framework. Additionally the criteria used in selecting implementing actors are determined by the board, since different projects call for different demands. Overall, the focus is usually on the value that the potential candidate is presenting forward.

When asked if they involved the implementing actors input in their decision making process, the respondent stated that they usually sat down with the potential implementing actors and listened as well as discussed with them the ideas. In terms of verifying if the implementing actors perform their duties as expected, respondent mentions monitoring is done which involves these actors sending reports to them once a year. Besides that, they also go to visit the project owner on ground to see for themselves the activities being performed. They also meet and during these meetings they discuss the progress of the report with the actors.

In the case of default by the implementing actors, where they do not fulfill the terms of their contract, the respondent mentions amicable solutions as the first course of action. He says they engage the implementing actors in a dialogue in order to find out what are the issues of concern. If all fails however, the respondent says they take back the money and discuss with Agency 1, which disburses and oversees the implementation of the EU funds. I further queried if the respondent’s organization offered incentives to the implementing actors to which the respondent said that the incentives given was non-monetary in nature and were in
form of the expert advice they are given. ‘We don’t give them incentives, we give them our advice’.

Trust
The regional political entities’ objective which is, to oversee the socio and economic development in the region and ensure regional growth and competitiveness is enshrined in the policies enacted by the legislators. For the regional political body to ensure that these objectives are fulfilled, the respondents say they assess the activities of the implementing actors by paying personal visits where they sit and discuss the progress they have made. They also review reports sent by the implementing actors which is done once a year coupled with informal calls that are made on a regular basis. The feedback obtained from such reviews, the respondent mentions are used internally to improve the future performance of the implementing actors.

In respect to the selection process, the criteria usually emphasized on are the competence and ideas presented by the implementing actors. As such, experience or having worked with a project that has similar goals as this regional political body, the respondent mentions are not an added advantage. ‘No, it is based on the project and if it brings in any new insight ’. However when I asked the respondent how he was recruited to this position, he cited his past managerial experience in the health care system, which implies that experience, is a factor, but only when recruiting managers and not for contractors from the implementing actors.

The relationship between the implementing actors who are hired to implement the activities and this organization is considered to be good. The respondent mentions that communication is vital for the relationship between both parties to be good. He cites, accomplishing tasks as expected, honest communication even when faced with any challenges, because in the end all their work depends on another actor accomplishing their tasks, making communication an essential aspect of relationship building. ‘We communicate, its important they tell us if there are any challenges since our work all contributes to the big picture’.

Efficiency
The respondent views efficiency in terms of the process and efforts through which the implementing actor’s activities have been accomplished. Through this, the respondent mentions you are able to gauge the competencies of the implementing actors in undertaking these tasks. With the right skills and right application, the quality of the activities will ensure a satisfactory outcome. Costs do play a role; they should be spent in line with what is being produced as well as quantity, which is seen in terms of how many jobs have been created. The overall emphasis is on the quality, which is the process in which implementing actors are performing their activities that determines how much is spent and what is realized.

Agency 2
Network Governance
This agency has a nationwide mandate by the government objectively to support small and medium size enterprises that do not have more than 250 employees, right from the inception stage, with ideas of starting their business, offering counseling and consulting services for a period of 3 years. It works closely with the private sector, as part of the requirement by the government in order to fulfill their objectives. Its main source of funding is the central government and EU. ‘As a company owned by government, we work with all different types of companies and organizations. We do not compete with existing private consulting firms but we just add something to the market that they cannot provide. That’s the rule of the government’.
Mandated Collaboration Network
The nature of relationship between the Agency 2 and the implementing actors is contractual in nature. They express their interest for application through the competitive bidding process using criteria stated by the EU to select actors to implement these projects. “We use the Open competitive bidding, a very complex European Union structure which requires us to go out to the market. Since we are big actors in the system we have to do it centrally through the European Union website in which they have something like a newspaper where all costs of proposals have to be published and its open to everyone who can fix the job to beat”.

Communication about the outcome of their application is usually done through regular and electronic mail as well through telephone. However, the in depth communication done between this agency and implementing actor is only done when they have won the bids and are in a contractual arrangement with the contracting party. “We have an established system that works and if you haven’t signed the contract yet you don’t give out information as this may offend certain people. So we have set up a system and structure where its only several persons that may communicate and specific things they communicate about. They also have to avoid the buildup of private relations things, so everything has to be in order”. The implementing actors input are usually limited during the contractual process since every aspect of it has been stipulated in policies, making it hard to incorporate their views. “Sure we welcome input, but it depends on the structured system if you have structured system it is very difficult to establish true communication in an over very structured system, how do you implement communication in a structure, communication doesn’t just happen”.

Power
The medium of communication actors used in this agency include; electronic mail, personal visits, telephone calls and newsletters normally sent through electronic mail. This communication can either take place formally, which obliges the implementing actors to have predetermined monthly, quarterly and annual schedules in which the progress of its activities is shared. However, the respondent mentions, that on an informal level they meet with these implementing actors normally during business functions during which they normally consult and seek advice. “There are formalized structures that we do every month, quarterly and annually. However most of the communication is done informally either we meet in a workshop and take five minutes or have lunch or even making informal calls.”. Because of this combination of formal and informal communication means, the respondent states that there is no designated place to meet, in certain cases, they meet at the implementing actor’s premises and in other cases, at the municipal’s buildings or in a totally neutral area like the workshop vicinity. The formal means of communication is normally specified to the implementing actors but since most of the information done is informal, it is thus implicitly stated. The logo and letter head of the organization should be used by the implementing actors alongside the EU logo since they are one of the financiers of the project. The public can also mainly access information about the activities undertaken through the quarterly, annual reports normally in the form of a presentation posted on the organization’s webpage.

Regarding the organizations objectives and scope of direction, the respondent mentions that they are directives from the government that specifies to them how they are expected to work in order to achieve the desired goals. “Well we don’t have so much possibilities since we have directives, rules from the top you have to work like this you have to work like that from the government”.
In terms of involving implementing actors in the decision making process, the respondent mentions that they listen to their views, but equally wonder how the decision making process that is based on strict rules allow additional input from the actors thus rendering their input limited to suggestions and with negligible impact in the activities. ‘We listen to them but we have rules that guide our work’.

In respect to assessing the performance of the implementing actors, the respondent mentions communication in which the implementing actors inform the public funding actors on any of the projects they are undertaking on a regular basis. They also report on a monthly, quarterly and annual basis in which they assess the progress they are making in their activities. Through these reports the public funding actor can equally be able to report on their own progress. “In our business department normally they have to report every client case, every time they work something of a client they have to register it with the database and our system administrators can look it up immediately. Due to the new rules our consulting part of the business, has to report to the authorities in Stockholm four times a year and one end report of the year. This is because it is European money”.

In the event that the implementing actors do not meet their stated obligations, the respondent states that they seek an amicable solution to find out why the implementing actor was unable to deliver the outcome as expected. Though in severe cases, the respondent mentions that they will hold onto the benefits of the implementing actors. The thing with the Swedish culture is that you can talk about everything and we can always find a solution for everything. Mostly in the end we will have our desirable solution because all we have to say is it’s the rules and that have to apply. So we will have to follow this since you signed the contract and we can’t help you out of this one because if we are to do something that is not within our rules we take the big risk of losing our own finances and we can’t do that.”. This seldom happens though, because the respondent says the implementing actors are committed to this project so they will not seek to jeopardize their interests. “The partners want economic growth so it is in their interest that they oblige to what is expected of them. They are more committed and we do not do anything about that, they fulfill their obligations by themselves”.

The incentives given to the implementing actors in this organization, the respondent mentions is normally non-monetary in nature and it is in terms of the exposure and reputation the actors get by working with their organization. “Most of the incentives that we give them is non-monetary in nature, we give them publicity and honor that a small and medium size business can easily build on.”

**Trust**

The implementing actors are made aware of the overall organization’s objective that is ingrained in the organizations program, which will act as a guide to them as they pursue their activities. To ensure that the implementing actors work towards the same objective, they report regularly to the public funding actor, providing them with an account of their daily activities that public funding actors will then review to assess whether or not they are working towards the same objective by assessing the progress of the implementing actor’s activities through a shared database that the latter regularly update after every activity that is then accessed instantly by the public funding actor. “In our business department normally they have to report every client case. Every time they work on something of a client, they have to register it in the database and our system administrators can look it up immediately”.
From the reviews of the implementing actor, the public funding actor is able to assess their own performance which, the respondent mentions, is done by focusing on the way they communicate with the implementing actors as well as on the whole process to find out if it is functional or not. Alongside this, there are two other personnel who review the work independent of the public funding actors and essentially act as the broker between us and implementing actor. These personnel, the respondent mentions seek to find out if our methods work or not and how it can be improved. The feedback that we get from such input helps us to further achieve our objective and also guide the implementing actors better.

Despite the respondent mentioning earlier that criteria used for selecting implementing actors was strictly merit using competitive bidding, this however was not the same criteria used in his selection or recruitment. The respondent mentioned that in addition to applying for the job on merit, it involved him being recommended to get it. This shows that similarities and experience can play a role in the selection criteria though this is restricted to the manager’s level. ‘Word of mouth, my neighbor said I know the CEO of this company and they are looking for a business consultant working with immigrants wouldn’t that be a nice job for you, so I applied in the last five minutes to the time via email and they accepted me’.

Additionally, the respondent states that the rules of the organization limit their selection process, because they cannot work more than once with implementing actors they have worked with in the past. ‘Well there are rules for that, sometimes you may look at that and sometimes you may not and sometimes you may not hire someone you worked with earlier. It depends on the rules you have to apply and even though experience is an important factor we are not allowed to work with someone we worked with earlier’.

Building relationships in this organization is limited to professional code of conduct, with the respondent mentioning that the way of conduct in this organization between actors is regularized. The respondent mentions that the public funding actor can meet a number of times utmost 4 in a year in which they discuss work related issues. ‘I think it depends on the structured system if you have structured system it is very difficult to establish true communication in an over very structured system, how do you implement communication in a structure, communication doesn’t just happen’. The respondent adds that the implementing actors are also not expected to enjoy a personal relationship with each other in the course of them performing their activities.

**Efficiency**

In regards to efficiency, the respondent identifies it, as the implementing actors performing their activities in the legally prescribed way and that the outcome realized is in conformity with the stated goals. ‘To me efficiency means doing the right thing on legal ground and showing the results that come with it.’. The focus of efficiency, the respondent adds, is not limited to only costs, but the entire process that implementing actors go through to realize the organizations goals. In order to achieve that, the respondent mentions the implementing actors have to use our stated procedures to accomplish the desired goals. ‘For us to be efficient, we use our own methods and fundamental regulations that these partners have to adhere to’.

However the respondent acknowledges that it is not easy to attain efficiency by only using your own methods, at times there are cases where we adopt some methods from the implementing actors to ensure that the desired outcome is obtained. ‘In some cases, we have to try and develop other methods that are compatible with the partners to ensure that the desired outcome is obtained’. In order to ensure that implementing actors are working
towards achieving efficiency, we specify to them in print the different specifications we expect from them during the course of undertaking their tasks. “We have a catalogue of criteria where we specify what we expect from the partners. We look at the quality, the entire process that partners go through before achieving their outcome”. This makes cost not the most important aspect of efficiency but the process of undertaking these activities and outcome realized is equally crucial.

**Municipality Network Governance**

This is a municipality in Västerbotten region whose objective is to provide a favorable environment for both the local inhabitants and potential investors to live, work and do business in. In order to achieve this, they support small and medium size enterprises as well as Research and development ones who they fund to achieve this municipality’s goal of making it attractive. They work hand in hand with organizations that support this goal both from both the public and private sectors. The government’s role is mainly considered as a source of funding with funds coming from the EU and regional development funding channeled through the regional political body. “The main role is through co-financing of different projects, mostly with EU funds and Regional Development funding (channeled through regional political body)”

**Mandated Collaboration Network**

This municipality invites calls for applications for potential implementing actors to bid in implementing public services through advertising in their web page as well as through the nationwide tender service. ‘All tenders are advertised using the service “E-avrop”, a national tender service. They are also advertised on the web page of the Kommun’. There is several criteria used by the municipal actors to get an all equal measurement technique to award contracts to the implementing actors, however it is not static but varied with the different tender process needing different requirements. “The criteria are different for different tenders. Usually it is a balanced selection where different criteria (for example performance, price, and references) are given a certain weight (for example, performance 40%, price 20% and references 40%)”. On completion of the contracts, they notify the implementing actors about the outcome of their application process mainly through the electronic mail. ‘All who have expressed interest in the tender are informed (by E-mail generally) about the outcome’. The terms of contract between the municipality and the implementing actors is varied, with different contracts having different requirements that implementing actors should abide by with the respondent mentioning that, ‘it is different for different contracts’. To ensure that the implementing actors do fulfill their contractual obligation, the municipality engages them in periodic submission of reports as well as in personal meetings. ‘It depends on the nature of the contract but in most cases it is a combination of written performance reports, and active participation from the municipality in steering groups’.

**Power**

The means used for communication is varied depending on the particular situation, from personal meetings, telephone, electronic mail as well as video conferencing. This is usually done in a span of 2-4 weeks on a formal basis but regularly, on an informal basis. The respondent adds that there are equally no specifications on the means of communication except the stated period it should take place as well as the logo of the organization. The nature of the communication will determine the vicinity of the meetings, with respondent
citing premises of partners, municipals and in some cases anywhere outside of these two locations. ‘’Meeting places differ. Many times we meet at partner facilities, sometimes in municipal buildings and sometimes on “neutral” ground.”’. When I asked the respondent how the community members and people outside the organization would get information about the activities of the organization, the respondent mentions advertisements as well as social media as mediums aimed at targeting them ‘’End users that are part of processes get information as a part of that. The public are targeted by different means, advertising (printed media, web pages, TV, radio), by creating events and similar.’’

The objective and scope of operation of the organization, which is to provide a good environment to live, grow and do business in is decided by another department.” It is mostly decided on by the management of the department for society development (Samhällsutveckling), but backed up by the municipal management”. In terms of selecting implementing actors, the criteria this public funding actor uses is varied, with the respondent stating that it depends on one project to the other. Regardless of the outcome, all implementing actors, who have participated in the selection process, are informed through electronic mail.

In decision making, the implementing actor’s input are considered in the process of the selection when they are involved in discussions about their project ideas with the public funding actors. However, when I asked if the community members input was sought for, the respondent answered in the negative, citing the need for specific skills in this particular stage. ‘’I don’t think there is a tried and tested system for that and in most cases the tenders are so specific that it is hard to give input without specialized knowledge.’’ To ensure that the implementing actors are performing their tasks as stipulated, they send reports based on their activities as well as finances to the public funding actors. Additionally, the municipality through their participation in the steering groups, holds these implementing actors accountable for their performances. ‘’It depends on the nature of the contract but in most cases it is a combination of written performance reports, and active participation from the municipality in steering groups etc.’’. I queried what was done to the feedback obtained from the implementing actor’s performance assessment, to which the respondent mentioned that it is used internally to better future projects. ‘’The feedback is handled in the organization and taken into account in new projects and situations. In severe cases we make organizational changes to account for the feedback.’’

I further inquired from the respondent on what his reaction will be if they realize that the implementing actors do not meet their stated goals as expected. He mentioned a number of scenarios, with the implementing actors, not receiving payment, to the need to revisit some clauses of the contract to cater for both parties and in extreme cases, end the contract. The respondent acknowledges that if the alterations made to the contract are significant, then a new contract and selection process has to be undertaken. ‘’It differs; the contract can be ended prematurely if the breach is severe. In most cases it is a case of withholding some payment. In some cases, yes, the contract can be rewritten. But large changes mean the contract has to be ended and a new tender performed – so we try to avoid that’’.

The respondent also offered a solution to addressing such matters, which he said goes back to the selection process, to ensure that the implementing actors, recruited share the same values as the organization. ‘’Different partners have different roles and in most cases it is a case of “recruiting” partners that share our goals and targets, who believe in the ideas. By doing so,
they are motivated to meet their obligations and that is usually sufficient. Sometimes the situations change and one partner are replaced by another, who can be more active.

In regards to incentives, I asked the respondent whether they give the implementing actors, actors any incentive to motivate them to do the work. He responded that the incentives given are non-monetary in nature in which they considered their participation and collaboration with the partners as incentive since it offered them an opportunity to contribute to the process ‘The main incentives for cooperation are that it gives the partners a chance to make a change, to be active in shaping the society they live, work and act in.’

Trust
Since the municipals’ objective is clearly stated for all actors to be aware of, I asked the respondent how they ensured everyone involved in the process of implementing the project identified with the same cause. To that, the respondent mentioned that they exert an amount of effort in ensuring that all implementing actors are informed about it. ‘Mainly, yes. We try to put a good deal of labor into making sure the objectives are communicated, understood and accepted’.

I asked the respondent if experience and similarity in goals from previous assignments could be considered as a criteria in the selection process and his response was an affirmative response only if they have been included as part of the criteria to be used. ‘Yes, if it has been stated as a criteria in the tender, otherwise, no.’ When I further inquired if such criteria was applicable in the recruitment of managers in this municipal, the respondent simply mentioned for the duration of time he has been working in these projects it is merit based.

In respect to relationship between actors, the respondent mentions they emphasize a lot on the communication aspect in which the implementing actors can easily confide in them pertaining issues they face during the implementation of the activities. ‘In most cases we have an open communication and we try to assist in any difficulties that they face. It can be anything from difficulties in reaching the target groups, to economic problems.

Efficiency
Efficiency is seen in relative terms in respect to whether the input, implementing actors, inject in their activities is of value when the outcome is realized. ‘For us, it is the extent to which resources (time, effort or cost) is well used for the intended purpose.’ The respondent cites various cases of efficiency considered to have been attained, commencing with implementing actors, meeting their activity goals and indicators or in some cases, when they fulfill the objectives as stated. ‘Ideally, when targets and objectives are met. In some cases though, it is more a question of having performed the right (planned or re-planned) activities to the extent agreed upon.’. The respondent is quick to note, that in considering efficiency, it has to be looked at in regards to the context the implementing actors are operating in and the threats they face. ‘We have to be aware that working with employment and businesses, we work in a context and external factors, outside of our control, can have large impacts. For example, the economic slow-down in 2008 had effects that were not foreseen, and meant some initiatives were quite far off from their targets. But still the partners did a very good job given the circumstances’.
An optimum situation of attaining efficiency to the respondent is when implementing actors, realize higher returns than what was invested in. ‘Optimum is gaining as much results as possible, with as little resources as possible (leverage).’
In regards to where the emphasis should be, cost, quality and quantity in regards to attaining efficiency, the respondent mentions that it is dependent on the given situation, different situations call for different preferences though the cost ceiling is normally specified. "There is always a balance between cost, quality and quantity, and what is most important is different in different cases. Most of the time, the cost is pre-defined and we aim for the highest possible quality for a given cost. But in some cases it is beneficial to trade off some quality, to reach a larger quantity."

4.1.2 Public Actors-Implementing Mandate

These are organizations that have been given the mandate to only implement and not fund unlike the four mentioned above.

Investment Promotion Agency (IPA)

Network Governance

This is an agency whose objective is to attract potential foreign investors and assist them in the process of getting established in the county. "This is a regional agency with two main objectives, the first one is to market Västerbotten to potential foreign investors and the second is to assist those who are interested in the process of getting established here". In order to achieve this, and in some cases stipulated, they work with small and medium size enterprises, large companies, and tertiary institutions alongside other public organizations. They are funded by the municipalities, EU and Regional political body that share the same goals as them. "Funding is only from government from various governmental institutions whether it’s the regional municipalities or European Union."

Mandated Collaboration Network

This investment promotion agency does not call for applications from the public, because it has a different mandate, one of implementing to which the respondent mentions that it, "never invests money in companies nor do we call for applications". They however do bid for applications through the mandate given to them and they obtain this information from the public funding actors whom they notify on the submission of their applications as well the details involved. "We decide ourselves, when we need to have a good dialogue and in order to have this good dialogue its necessary to meet every now and again. So way we do it, is we tell them when we have already applied for the funding, the kind of activities we will do, that we specified in the document". This agency’s applications are vetted on the viability of the indicators that they state in relation to the objectives they are required to meet that the respondent mentions, "The donors expect us to have a good list of potential investors and number of jobs created". In the same vein, it is the same indicators that the public funding actors use to assess the progress made towards accomplishing the objectives to which the respondent remarks, "We have of course some indicators that we have to report to them, then we have two internal goals when I started this I said to the employees that there are goals we should have one is to become the best investment agency in Sweden because we are coming from a rather small region so we have to be smarter than all the others in order to have our voice heard the other thing is that I want to be able to say we have given the government and tax payers a return on investment". In terms of input, this agency gets its directives from the regional plan framework that comprises of other actors within the region and hence not able to contribute to the process of decision making however the respondent mentions that, "we try to follow their general outline and we should but exactly how we do it, they don’t get it done to the detail".
Power

In this organization, telephone, electronic mail and formal meetings are the medium of communication with the public funding actors, says the respondent. The formal meetings include meetings with financiers and other partners that contribute to their common objective. “We have a steering committee that consists of bodies that finance us, other stakeholders like Umea University and representatives from the counties”. The respondent also cites an unspecified number of meetings with the municipalities in a given calendar year as well as with the board members of their organization in which they discuss issues of concern to their work. There are also informal communications that occur, usually through telephone or dropped in visits that seek to query issues of concern to both actors. The respondent mentions they also use social media sites like twitter and LinkedIn, as avenues to meet their potential clients. “We are active in social media like twitter, LinkedIn, through our webpage; we are however not active on face book because we don’t think it caters for our business clientele”. The respondent mentions most of their meetings with public funding actors and other partners are usually formal in nature and work restricted with flexibility in where they meet. ‘We meet with the steering group and our donors as well as other stakeholders during the formal meetings that can take place in either our offices or theirs too, at the municipalities during which we share with them our current and future work plans’.

I further inquired from the respondent if there were other specifications in terms of communication that was stressed to them by the public funding actors, to which he emphasized the use of EU logo alongside their company logo in every official communication. ‘They look at every detail, is the logo big enough or small enough’.

I inquired from the respondent in regards to how the objectives of the organization were derived, and whether or not they were consulted in the process. The respondent cites these commands originate from the government. “These directives come from the government”. In regards to whether they contribute to the decision making process of their organizations activities, the respondent cites a framework comprising of partners at the region level that outline for them their activities even though he mentions that, the framework does not go to an extent of specifying the finer details .The respondent further adds that with the ‘discretion left to us to choose what activities we want to focus in, we are able to look for particular activities that we feel applies to us and we then inform the public actor, donor accordingly’.

I further queried the respondent on whether he thought that the donors shared the same commitment levels as them in regards to attaining the objectives set, and he answered that the goal was mutual and they further illustrated their commitment by supporting them financially through their activities. ‘Yes they do, our donors aim is to see that this region is promoted in order to achieve regional and economic growth. It is our donors thus who provide us with the funding to undertake these objectives’.

In terms of the criteria that the public funding actor applies to them to get funding, the respondent mentions indicators such as number of jobs created, how many clients the respondent has been able to attain, as well as having a database that is well managed and avail information to the public funding actors in due course. ‘The donors expect us to have a good list of potential investors, to create jobs, to have a good reporting system, customer relationship management systems, as well as get investors that are environment friendly.’

In regards to reviewing their performances, the respondent says that they have meetings with their board every three months in which they review their performances and mention managed or unmanaged progress to accomplish the stated goals. ‘Normally once every quarter, we have quarterly board meetings where we go through the activities we have done
and the activities that will come. Well we have to say for every report how many of those indicators we have made and what the figures are so that they can see if there is a chance that this project will fail if we don’t reach the target. Of course these are things which are difficult to forecast beforehand. They also want to have a balance in the number of jobs created but in some cases we have to say sorry to the stated goals so we can struggle to get a 50-50 balance’.

In case the goals set are unable to be met or procedures not followed, the respondent mentions that they usually refer back to us to get more details as to what happened. In case the reasons are not considered satisfactory by them, they expect us to pay a price for it and this could be in terms of financial reimbursements ‘Well the normal procedure is that they come back to us and they say we need more information with this and that. Maybe you understand why we want to check beforehand because we will be asked to pay for unallowable expenses or our funds are withheld’.

I asked the respondent if they received any incentives for the work that they did, to which he responded to the negative. He mentioned the public funding actors funding their projects do not give any incentives rather it is a separate department from Agency 1 that offered incentives. ‘We do not have any incentives for our work since our funding comes from Agency 1, Regional political body and municipalities and Agency 1 and none of them give any incentives. However, Agency 1 administers the funds and they have a separate unit that can offer incentives for investments through this separate unit. Their incentive schemes are very transparent and guided through rules.’

**Trust**

The objectives of this agency are embedded in the policies, which the respondent says they have to abide by. In achieving these objectives, they work hand in hand with their partners and public funding actors from within the region through a framework that guides them on what is expected. ‘Different donors have their own expectations and requirements; there is a full frame work of rules to work with. We have through the region, a regional development plan where then important clusters for Västerbotten have been identified and we try to work with specifically those clusters and sectors and try to follow their general outline’. Aside from working closely with the regional partners and funders, the respondent mentions that they report their activities and have meetings with the public funding actors after every 4 months in which they are expected to show their progress. The feedback obtained from these discussions with partners and public funding actors, the respondent says is cultivated back into the organization for future improvement.’ We build it back into our system and see areas of improvement’.

In regards to the selection process, the respondent mentions they submit their applications for a bid but inform the public funding actors prior to that about their interest in pursuing particular goals in specific sectors. The selection process follows due process, therefore experience and goals similarity of public funding actors is not a criterion that is used in the selection process. I further inquired from the respondent on how he became a manager, to which he responded that he had prior experience working in a similar project funded by the same public funding actors and since there was no public notification about the job, he assumes that it was an appointment” I was appointed, I should say, while working for the municipality. We were project financed and we had half of our financing from the E.U structural fund which and the other half with the municipalities and my role was the same as now though before with a focus on a smaller number of industries and so it’s basically the same work but there was no official advertising of the job so I guess I would say I was
appointed.’’. Even though experience is not used as a criterion, in the appointment of individual managers, it plays a role.

In regards to the relationship the agency has with the public funding actors, the respondent mentions it is a mixed bag, with some cases the relation being good and with others, not so good. ‘The relationship with the municipalities I would say is good and with regional political entity, we are trying to have a good dialogue and I think we have one. There is however a lot of bureaucracy in the E.U which is very time consuming to deal with ‘‘. Regardless of this, the respondent acknowledges that they still seek to maintain good relations because achieving their goals is dependent on them too. ‘‘It is important we have a good relation with them because it’s through the good relations that they will recommend potential investors to us.’’ Besides these relations, this organization also maintains a good relation with other partners and potential clients in the region ‘‘we have agreements with partners in the region and we are at the highest level.’’

Efficiency
Efficiency in the prism of the respondent is related to one having considerable time and financial resources to plan for the activities in order to realize the goals. To achieve these goals however, the respondent mentions that the slow decision making process that involves approving activities as well as its funding, impinges on efficiency being attained. ‘‘There is a lot of bureaucracy; we take time to get the right decisions from them. For one to be efficient there has to be a better lead time with funding issues as well as long term and exact goals. We started out with a plan for two years, which has now been reduced and it does not give time for us to plan effectively’’.

The respondent mentions that some of the issues arising from not being able to attain efficiency in respect to funding is external but internal to the public funding actors who fund them thus having a negative impact in their internal operations but. As a result of such problems, programs earlier ear marked based on funding from these public funding actors is hampered with, making them use time to look for alternative sources rather than focus on implementing these projects. ‘‘Initially we use to get funding for 2 years, before that for 3 years and now 1 year. We have had administrative issues with EU funds. These funds were to end by 2013, and there was a new program but the negotiations between Sweden and the EU took much longer in Sweden so their mandate was extended till 2015. So we have to work hard on finding survival money in 2014’’.

Despite these challenges, the respondent mentions that the public funding actors expect them to meet a certain number of deliverables that they use to measure their performance and in the process ascertain how efficient they have been. ‘‘The donors expect us to have a good list of potential investors, number of jobs created, to have a good reporting systems and customer relationship management systems, stress on the targets in numbers, financing bodies, number of companies, leads, visits, male and female numbers, immigrants as well as ensure the companies investing in the region are environment friendly.’’ The one challenge with using these number based outcomes the respondent remarks based on the values derived from their work, cannot be quantified making it hard to fully ascertain for fact the contribution made. ‘‘It is also hard to measure quality issues, we market the region abroad but how can you measure the awareness of Västerbotten.’’

Business Incubator
Network Governance
This is a business incubator based in a municipality in Västerbotten region, whose aim is to support start-up firms by providing affordable office premises, counseling and consultative
services from experts in their respective professions as well as link them to established businesses so that they can compete favorably with businesses elsewhere. Their ultimate goal is to support and develop businesses in this municipality which if successful, will contribute to job creation in the region, adding to the current tally of 150 jobs created and 87 companies progressing through the startup phase to become established small and medium size enterprises. ‘‘A total of 87 companies have grown up in our creative atmosphere and most of them are still going strong. In other words, we are a very good example of how a region can successfully support young entrepreneurs’’. It is funded by the municipality, EU, Regional political body alongside with Umeå Kommunföretag AB, all working to achieve the same objective as the organization. Besides these financing roles, it works closely with these institutions as well as other similar actors within the sector to achieve its objective through, ‘‘Cooperation concerning the support, financing and organizing of seminars of young entrepreneurs’’.

Mandated Collaboration Network
The business incubator obtains information about submitting its applications through their donors, with the respondent citing, ‘‘Yes, they publish information on their website and also inform by email’’. As part of the vetting process, the incubator is expected to submit the budgetary estimates of their activities as well contracts that they have with all partners and carry out a risk assessment of their activities. They are informed about the outcome of the application through regular and electronic mail as well as through telephone conversation. In terms of what they are expected to do, the public funding actors clearly stipulate to the business incubator, as the respondent mentions ‘‘periods we shall report activities and expenses’’. In regards to contributing towards the contractual process, the business incubator respondent cites, ‘‘Yes, I am involved in the process of designing the project, usually with an external consultant’’. In an effort to ensure that the business incubator’s objectives are met, the respondent mentions, ‘‘we have board meetings about 10 times a year (20 hours). I also have to report regularly to our donors about our activities and how we are working towards our goals’’.

Power
The medium, the respondent uses to communicate with both the public funding and implementing actors and partners is mainly through email, telephone, personal visits, webpage and regular post. However, they have additional requirements when communicating with specific public funding actors, agency 1 and regional political body who fund them, where they are expected to fill in application forms as a procedure prior to meeting them. In addition to this, the respondent mentions they meet with the board and public funding actors on a regular basis to discuss issues related to their work normally in the conference room of their premises. ‘‘We have board meetings about 10 times a year (20 hours). I also have to report regularly to agency 1 about our activities and how we are working towards our goals’’. These meetings usually take place in the organizations.

In terms of the objectives of the business incubator, the respondent mentions it is predetermined in a plan framework by the public funding actors and partners that guide them on what they are expected to do and how they should do it. ‘‘The project plan for what we are going to accomplish is the tool for my work. We have all activities specified in the project plan.’’ In regards to the commitment of the public funding actors towards achieving these objectives, the respondent mentions their continued funding and support is an indication of that. ‘‘I think they all have agreed about what we shall accomplish, most impact is felt with the municipality who follow the project more closely’’. I enquired from the respondent if they
notified them about any opportunities to apply for projects, to which she responded that the public funding actor that funds them, sends to them email as well as publishes the details on their website.

In regards to the criteria they use to award those projects, the respondent mentioned that aside from writing a project that captures the core objectives of supporting young and incoming entrepreneurs, it should include details related to the costs as well as assessment of threats to the project. ‘‘That’s a lot of things that has to be in order, application with budget, cooperation contract with all partners, risk analyses, contract for renting the building’’.

When I inquired on what basis the respondent attained this position, I did not get a response as to how, but holding the position as a project manager, she mentioned that the roles and responsibilities she undertakes have all been included in her terms of agreement by the public funding actor. ‘‘The project plan for what we are going to accomplish is the tool for my work. In general I am responsible for financing, marketing, and support to Young entrepreneurs as well administration of the project.’’

The performance of this organization in terms of achieving its goals is normally reviewed through the regular reports and personal visits made by the donors and the board. In terms of the implications the business incubator faced if they did not meet the stated goals, to which the respondent mentioned that they would have to explain to the public funding actors them the reasons as to why they were unable to achieve it. ‘‘They expect us to work towards reaching our goals and if we do not reach them we have to analyze why, what happened and why didn’t it work.’’. The respondent further adds one instance where they were unable to meet goals and their open dialogue with their public funding actor resulted to a positive outcome ‘‘For example, once upon a time we could only help entrepreneurs under 30 years and yet we also had to consider the equality component among men/women. We found out that girls often start business after 30 years. Then we applied to our funders to make a change so we could attract women less than 40 years. After that we have had 50 percent men, 50 percent women.’’ In terms of incentives, the respondent mentions that the public funding actors do not give them any incentives in the course of performing their work.

**Trust**

The objectives of this organization are clearly stipulated in the overall plan of the organization. The respondent mentions that achieving these goals is not a difficult task since they have even been able to complete some of the tasks assigned to them before the stated time is required. ‘‘Yes we have quite realistic goals and we have already reached them before deadline.’’ In addition to this, the respondent mentions that they communicate with their public funding as well as with the board on a regular basis in which they discuss the progress of their activities thus working towards the same organizational objective. The outcome of these reviews, the respondent says is usually fed back into the system to better future performances.

In regards to the selection process, the criteria normally used to award the projects to this business incubator is based on the main values of the project of supporting young and incoming entrepreneurs as well as any threat analysis done on the project. Experience and goal similarities that this business incubator thus has had prior to this application are not considered. ‘‘The criteria is the core objective of supporting young and incoming entrepreneurs, which should include details related to the costs as well as assessment of threats to the project’’.
When I asked the respondent, about the relationship they have with the public funding actors, the response was that she spoke to them when she was seeking information in terms of acceptable and unacceptable expenses. ‘With agency 1, we usually talk about what we are allowed to buy and if we are allowed to buy certain things for ex a smart board.’

In regards to the relationship the respondent has with the supervisor, she mentions she confides in the supervisor with any of the challenges she faces in the course of performing her tasks “Yes I have good relation with my boss, I think it’s a very supportive relation. I can tell about problems and get support.”

**Efficiency**

Efficiency is seen in terms of the outcome the organization achieves in comparison to how much has been invested in. ‘The amount of successful companies and company growth’.

The respondent mentions that the challenge they face with achieving efficiency is the little resources invested into the business incubator and yet the outcome of it is expected to have a far reaching impact.” They put in quite little money in the project and the outcome is socioeconomically big! So costs is the big thing”.

I asked the respondent, what the remedy would be so that the organization would be able to attain efficiency, to which the respondent mentions the need to find a steady source of funding to their project. ‘The big challenge is how to find sustainable financing to the incubator.’

**Non profit organisation**

**Network Governance**

This is a public nonprofit organization formed by the municipalities whose aim is to promote use of renewable energy in the Northern part of Sweden. It performs this role with several partners who head different projects such as forest energy, biogas, high school education as well as with information among other aspects. The respondent heads the forestry energy fund project and is 100% financed in that context which will be the focus of our study. All these partners despite their different projects work towards achieving the same mission of increasing use of renewable energy albeit in different forms. ‘Yes we all have the same mission or task to achieve, that is to increase the use of renewable energy in different forms. I work with forest energy, we have a colleague working with biogas and we have also people more involved with high school education and we have two persons working with information to run the home page and so on’.

The work method this organization uses is a triple helix work cooperation formed by the municipality that includes enterprises, public communities and universities brought together to achieve the goal. “It initially came from municipalities to form this and it was a group of people who formed the organization and the work method, the same triple helix concept which we have continued to work with”. In this method, a lead partner role of leading the organization is used and is always assumed by a partner that is well endowed financially and competently such as the university that will play an oversight role of ensuring all the partners deliver what is expected of them though in this case, they both partake in this lead partner role despite their size. ‘We share the lead partner but this is rather unique because we are too small an organization you could say that it’s the University that is the lead partner. They need to be rather big, they need to have strong finance and they need to have the skills to run a big project as well as work as the manager to make sure that the activities are fulfilled and so on. But the administration of the finances is run by universities, who have skills and they have several European Union projects within Universities, so we should share but in a sense it’s the university which is the lead partner”. It is main source of funding is through the
municipalities, region of financiers and European Union who contribute each to one third of the total budget, a role mainly performed by the government to whom they direct their progress reports too.

**Mandated Collaboration Network**

This organisation as an implementing actor, bids for applications for tenders but prior to submitting in, its application, it discusses the areas of interest with the steering group that gives it approval. The respondent elaborates on this process, "So for example, if I want to work more in a specific area, the steering group should be involved to say this is okay because we use money from the municipalities as co financiers. Then we attract more financing with this municipality money by putting in money from regional and European Union financing and so. In this way the people who put in the money must have a vote in which kind of projects we should be involved in, so this is the basic concept.”.

The private organizational actors are thus expected to get approval from the steering committee, but in terms of the basis their application is vetted on, the respondent remarks that, ‘I want to say that we are also free if we can motivate why we should be in a particular area, its usually not a problem to get the support from the financiers. The difficult thing is however to actually work with a successful application that results in money’. Notification on the feedback of the tender applications submitted is normally done through personal meetings, electronic mail and telephone calls. These organizational actors in order to ensure they meet the requirements of the cross border cooperation work closely with partners from both Sweden and Finland as well as with universities, public communities and enterprises. They also involve the forest owners and sector in their meetings, thus incorporating their opinions. The respondent asserts, ‘yes, the big forest owners, they come to these meetings and it’s a good way for them to see what is happening in this project. If there is something happening here which is of interest to our organization, we can contribute because we have money to promote regional development and they are part of the forest sector and we like to have input from the regional actors”. These organizational actors are assessed on a periodical basis by the public funding actors, to ensure that they meet the stated objectives through the submitting of reports by the lead partner as well as personal meetings.

**Power**

This organization communicates to its public funding actors and partners mainly through personal meetings, telephone calls and electronic mail. The respondent states that they have a steering group comprising of elected representatives from each of its partners including themselves and donors with whom they have a number of personal meetings and telephone conversations with regarding their activities. They additionally hold meetings in which participation in it is open to all community members. ‘We have a steering group that comprises of representatives of the financiers from the municipalities who are politicians. They have seven meetings every year normally 4 or 5 physical meetings and 2 or 3 telephone meetings. And the steering group is elected for one year, but normally you can say the steering group is prolonged until next year in which they can choose the same people, say yes and then it’s done. And then we have this open meeting once a year where you invite all the members on a wider range and you tell them what we are doing and so on’. There is no particular place where the respondent says they meet their public funding actors and partners, since there scope of operation is all over northern Sweden so they go where their respective public funding actors and partners are. ‘We can meet in different parts of northern Sweden.”. The respondent also mentions that it is them who decide when they can have meetings and notify the steering group accordingly. ‘We decide, we announce yearly that we
have a steering group meeting where we report what we are doing and we go through the financing and you know the tradition we announce it is time to meet and we will have such a meeting tomorrow."

The objectives and approval of activities as well as overall direction of this organization are predetermined by the steering groups a position the respondent says they abide by. This position is further observed by the organization because their financiers are part of the steering group who make these decisions.” As a whole we have a steering group which decides which kind of projects we should be involved in, what kind of mission we should have that points to us the direction as an organization”. The respondent is however quick to note that despite the involvement of the steering group in the decision making process, they too have a leverage in terms of deciding the priority areas they think is ideal for their organization which is all dependent on whether or not they can justify their reasons for their preferred choices.

In terms of viewing experience and goal similarities as a form of criteria for the steering group is not in question, since the focus is on what projects this organization is bringing forward and its return value. The respondent states that in terms of commitment from its donors and partners, there is a need for constant revision since the members of the steering group keep changing, so does the overall objective held. This comes with occasional cases of disagreement in regards to the direction the organization should follow, but this is however resolved during the steering meetings in full presence of all partners and donors. “Of course sometimes there are disagreements in the direction of the scope of the project and that’s why you have steering group meetings. Of course this dialogue has been going on for a long time but as the projects are different from 10 years ago, you have to also redefine or redirect the goals slightly. I mean the course of the organization has moved to a different direction, therefore you will have to redefine the goals also according to the present projects and so on”.

I further inquired from the respondent how the public funding actors assessed their performance, to which he responded that in the project that he leads, the role of compiling activity and financial reports was undertaken by a lead partner from among the other constituting partners in this project. This lead partner ensured that the reports were compiled from all the other partners then submitted to the public funding actors every after four months. “Every four months its one activity period, after each four months we report what kind of activities we have been performing, we report our expenses, each one of the 8 partners, reports that to the lead partner. One partner always acts as the lead partner and then they compile the finances and report from all the other partners into one project report”.

In the event that the stated goals are not met, the respondent says they usually ask for further explanation on the contentious issues and if it is not sufficient, they will not accept their explanations, though he agrees that it is seldom that way. “Normally they send to us a report and ask for additional information. If it’s not within the accepted costs, then it’s denied but normally that’s in the small part of the expenses that is not accepted, that can happen”.

In regards to incentives, the respondent mentions that they do not receive any monetary related incentives though acknowledge that the mere involvement of their financiers like the municipalities is a reason for motivation. ‘The municipalities are involved in our work and we do projects together’.”
Trust
This organization’s objective is usually communicated by the steering group and focuses on the wider usage of renewable energy in Northern Sweden. In order to ensure the objectives are implemented, the public funding actors engage in regular communications with meetings conducted by the steering group as well as review activities and financial reports that assess their performance to find whether or not they meet the objectives. The outcome of these reviews are usually injected back into the organization’s system with more amendments made into the process for all the actors involved in the organization to work towards the same goal.

The selection process of the organization being awarded contracts as well deciding on the activities they undertake is decided by the steering group. They take the role of determining which activities the organization should focus on even though the respondent mentions that as long as they are able to justify their reason for venturing into the particular activity then they can bid for the tenders.

The option for experience and goals similarity in the award of tenders in this organization is not considered, but on a personal level, when I enquired from the respondent whether experience did play a role in holding his current project manager position, he mentioned that he has prior experience in a project similar as this and successfully accomplished the tasks assigned to him, thus getting this position. “The cooperation between the University and I started as a result of a previous project financed by the European Union. I was responsible for information and outreach to make the results of the research available to the public and I was involved as the project leader for the University. This cooperation project was very successful and I started to work with a new project and as a result of that successful application I started to work with this organization”.

In terms of the relationship the organization has with the public funding actors, the respondent mentions, that they work together to achieve the common goal. He however, cites a challenge of considerable delays that are involved with compensation of their funds on completion of their work. “Hard to agree on everything, professional relationship is the crucial thing. We face challenges of financing, we take one year till we are reimbursed”.

Efficiency
The respondent remarks that working as a project coordinator in the research project in his organization makes him looks at efficiency in terms of the output they realize in relation to the set objectives. “Number of seminars, manuscript, easy to count are project indicators”. The process of producing this outcome which in efficiency terms is related to the quality of the outcome is also assessed in terms of the regular communication the respondent’s organization has with the public funding actor’s “the reporting shows working towards goals”.

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CHAPTER FIVE: ANALYSIS

This section will analyze the findings in light of the research question on a theme by theme basis.

5.1 Network Governance

The mandate of all the actors in the network has been derived from either the central or regional governments through the enactment of by-laws or issue of decree, with the different levels of government as a source of mandate varying among them. These actors in the network come from both public and not for profit sector with mandate from the different levels of government, to each execute the government’s policies. The findings show the actors in the network divided into two blocs of public funding and implementing actors, with the public funding actors comprising of the political regional bodies and national agencies on one hand, and on the other, comprising of public implementing and not for profit implementing actors. The distinction is further seen within the public funding actor’s bloc, where the variation is evident in terms of the mandate obtained among the actors, with both sets of national agencies deriving their mandate from the central government and the political regional entity as well as the municipality deriving theirs from the regional and local government respectively. What is also evident is the means through which these public funding actors obtain their mandate, with the two sets of national agencies both established through the issue of decree and with it national and regional presence, while the political regional entity and the municipality have been formed through passing of by-laws at the regional and local level thus defining their respective presence at these respective levels. The implementing actor’s bloc is equally split in terms of how they obtained their mandate with both the investment promotion agency and nonprofit organization formed by the regional political entity and municipality respectively and the business incubator formed by national agency 1. These findings essentially denote that the source of mandate dictates the scope of operation and jurisdiction for each of these respective actors explaining why a regional and local government mandated actor’s jurisdiction is limited to the region and municipality respectively. The means through which the mandate has been enacted, by-laws or issue of decrees does not hold any special status because ultimately it is the purpose for which the actors have been enacted that matters since each actor is expected to contribute to the bigger picture of implementing the government service delivery goal.

The formation of the not for profit implementing actors through a decree from a public funding actor-municipality, is however in contrast with earlier studies done (Huxham & Vangen, 2005 & Stoker, 1998). Both these authors argued they owe their existence to the private sector, with their inclusion to this network often seen inform of a directive issued by one of the levels of the government in order to contribute to the implementation of their policies. However these contrary findings are supported by Provan & Milward (2001, p.416) who argue that it is inconsequential for nonprofit implementing actors to be associated with the private sector, because they receive their funding mostly from the public funding actors and thus equally held in the same stature as actors from this sector making this finding rather a new insight but with limited impact. This is so because in addition to Provan & Milward (2001, p.416) views, the public implementing actor from the investment and promotion agency states the existence of such organizations that have been formed and registered as private companies but actually belong to the local government, thus making it not an entirely private actor ‘Well it varies we’ve had some financing from the utilities for our business but it has not been included in the core financials that we have to present to the E.U ,so the utilities are registered as private companies but are owned by the municipalities, they are not
100% private’ (Director, IPA 13/3/2014). Therefore we can conclude that not all, not for profit actors, can be considered as being established by the private sector with some of the shares of the company belonging to the regional political entities that use it as a vehicle of achieving their goals within the region and community respectively.

All the actor’s roles and responsibilities and source of funding for their activities is predetermined by the mandate they hold requiring a joint concerted effort by all public funding actors in the eventual implementation of the network’s goals. Both the public funding and implementing actors derive their specific roles and responsibilities in the network from the mandate that they are given, with the public funding actors assuming the disbursing of funds and oversight role and the latter limited to implementing the networks objectives. In terms of disbursement of funds role, the public funding actors derive their funding from three main sources; EU, central and regional government respectively with the focus on regional political bodies obtaining their financing mainly from the central government as well as in the form of taxes collected from the municipalities within the region. The public funding national agencies on the other hand, both obtain their funding from the EU. This EU funding comes with its own restrictions, dictating to the public funding national agencies specific criterion of implementing actors, private and public that they should work with to realize the goals. It also dictates to them the need for all EU implementing actor fund recipients to work towards achieving regional growth and competitiveness with all actors working towards the same objective.

The influence of national agencies in setting the terms required to realize the goals and with it the subsequent funding obtained through the EU largely agrees with Dimitrakopoulos & Passas (2003, p.440) in terms of inclusion of such actors dictating the terms of the network with other actors expected to adhere to them. With the primary motivating factor of accomplishing the network’s goals, and with the main source of funding the EU, all recipient actors from both divides are expected to work towards achieving the goal. To this effect, the findings show that there is a concerted effort by both sets of public funding actors, national agencies and regional political entities alike to work towards achieving the growth and competitiveness goal through joint consultations and both equally playing a role in the process of awarding of contracts. The regional political entities as argued by Span et al., (2012, p.187) being the custodians of the region are considered to know the regions needs better and thus contribute to this process by approving particular projects linked to the network’s goals and awarding contracts to actors whose projects focus on areas of priority, where development is needed most in the region. The role played by both sets of public funding actors is thus in effect an influence by these national agencies to exert their influence through the EU funding criteria because all actors are expected to contribute to the implementation of the network’s objective.

The role played by the public funding actors is however not limited to joint consultative effort in the contractual process but also in its financing and with this comes the oversight role. The findings show that all the public funding actors make 1/3 of the contribution towards the total budget of project in order to accomplish the goals of the project. As highlighted previously, the sources of funding for all actors come from the region as well as allocations by central government and EU, the criteria of the latter’s funding equally states that the regional political entities do make a contribution towards this regional project alongside the national agencies in order to achieve the common goal. In addition to the disbursement of funds role, the public funding actor’s role is also extended to an oversight one with all the public funding actors monitoring the activities of the implementing actors by
obtaining reports from them on a periodic basis, through which they are able to assess the progress of the implementation of the activities of the network. This implies that the role of financing, disbursement and oversight is seen as a collective effort by all the public funding actors in the network. It also implies that the concept of a collaborative effort in this network is not limited to sharing goals but the active participation of all public funding actors in the entire process. All the public funding actors are thus seen as equal partners in a relation limited among themselves, in the execution of the coordinative and regulative role they play for the network. This makes the accomplishment of the regional growth and competitiveness goal a mutual aim to all public funding actors, achieved through a collaborative effort. The implementing actors are however only limited to the implementation of their activities, and not involved in funding matters of the network, a mandate designed specifically to the public funding actors.

The distinction thus arising between these two sets of public funding actors in undertaking the disbursement, financing and oversight role is in terms of the restrictions placed by their financiers, with the EU emphasizing more specific requirements to the national agencies unlike the regional governments with the regional political bodies that even though they have to account to the government and the citizens, their restrictions are not as specific as the former actors (Lane, 2005, p.41-42). These specifications also extend in terms of the partners that both public funding and implementing actors are expected to work with, with the specifications dictated to them both about the kind of partners they should work with and as a result of this, all partners and stakeholders mainly come from the regional governments, national agencies as well as other actors from the respective sectors in which the actors are involved in.

These finding largely agree with all these authors in as far as the new role that government is playing, one of ensuring its policies are implemented by playing a minimized managerial role (Dimitrakopoulos & Passas, 2003; Halkier, 2005; Rhodes, 1997; & Stoker, 1998). The findings however, do not fully support, Stoker (1998, p.21) in regards to the overlapping role aspect and blurring of boundaries with all the actors in the network. To an extent, this is true as is seen in the case of public funding actors who all perform similar roles and the fact that they work together in performing these coordinative and regulative roles to ensure the network achieves its goal, their mandate can be considered as overlapping. However, this role is only limited to the public funding actors in this regard, with the implementing actors role limited to undertaking the assigned tasks. Even in variations such as the scope of geographical and sectoral coverage that both sets of actors are involved in, the roles are clearly stated with the public funding and implementing actors each holding on to their specific roles. The issues thus that arise out of accountability due to the confusion of the overlapping roles that Stocker (1998, p.21) mentions does not apply in this context due to the clearly defined terms of operation for both sets of actors.

5.2 Mandated Collaboration Network Analysis

The public funding actor takes the lead in terms of verifying and disseminating information pertaining to applications and the expression of interest, with the medium used varying considerably. There are varied approaches used by public funding actors in communicating to the implementing actors about the expression of interest. The findings show the public funding actors disseminate information about the expression of interest of the respective tenders to the implementing actors via their respective web pages, newspapers and in some cases; they inform them by visiting them personally. They also use the same channels in informing the implementing actors on the outcome of their applications. It is thus
not only limited to the formal channels of web pages and newspapers, but equally so is the personal efforts they make towards going to the implementing actors premises to notify them about the opportunities and outcome. The public funding actors in disseminating this information then expect the implementing actors to follow the set criteria stipulated in the expressions of interest, which they duly oblige with in order to compete favorably with other bidders for the tenders. The implementing actors are thus assessed and awarded the contracts based on the project ideas they have presented and how it contributes to meeting each of the set specific indicators assigned to the respective implementing actors.

Prior to the contracts being awarded to the implementing actors, there are contractual processes seen in the course of submitting their applications that vary among the implementing actors. The findings show that implementing actors are split in terms of notifying the public funding actors about their intent to bid either before or after the submission of the application. The public implementing actors inform the public funding actors after submitting their application about their application process as procedural matter because they know the approval and award of the contracts is in their domain. The not for profit implementing actor however cites the need for discussions to occur between themselves and the steering committee prior to submitting applications because of the need for them to approve the project that the implementing actors will be focused on. This finding shows that decisions pertaining to bidding in the case of the not for profit implementing actor need prior consultation unlike the other implementing actors who notify the public funding actors after submitting it in.

These findings have been supported by Mandell & Keast (2008, p.178-179) who argue that the government’s role in the formation of nonprofit implementing actors is seen in three types of relationship; horizontal, vertical and equal partnerships. The horizontal relation the authors add involves equal sharing of resources among peers of the same level, whereas vertical involves the government issuing directives in a top down approach that the actors are expected to abide. The equal partnership involves the government not issuing any directives to the implementing actors but rather seeing these actors as equal partners who can contribute to the implementation of the policies in an innovative way. In terms of the relation between the public funding and nonprofit implementing actors, all these types of relations mentioned by Mandell & Keast (2008, p.178-179) do manifest in the latter’s structure. The vertical relation is seen in terms of the mandate they derived from the public funding actors that holds them accountable for the implementation of the services. The horizontal is not fully applicable in this context, but aspects such as prior consultation before submitting in their tenders with the steering committee members is an aspect of it and the equal partnership is further seen in terms of pursuing the same objectives but not the sharing of power. This makes the not for profit implementing actor and the mandated collaboration network as a combination of all these structural composition relations. Span et al, 2012, p.190-191) further cites cases of local government using the horizontal approach that they refer to as bottom up approach because of the demerits of the vertical structure that inhibits actors to make individual contributions outside of their parent companies as well as the rigidity involved with bending rules.

This however, does not make them more efficient than the implementing actors who have the vertical structure, because in some instances this kind of approach leads to implementing actors causing a lot of confusion in terms of who should take the lead thus leading to unattainment of the networks goals and inefficiency (Span et al, 2013, p.190-191). This kind of
approach however, applies to these private not for profit implementing actors in terms of realizing their goals are concerned.

This study is thus able to draw a conclusion that even though the nonprofit implementing actors has been formed through the mandate of the regional political bodies, it makes them partially aligned to the private not for profit sector and on the other hand to the public sector. They however still maintain the horizontal structural composition internally. This means at any one point in the mandated collaboration network as evidenced by both Mandell & Keast (2008, p.178-179) & Span et al. (2013, p.190-191), several structures are used on a bilateral level between the public funding actors and the respective implementing actors, all with an aim of accomplishing the networks goals.

**The contractual process is an oversight function of the public funding actors; therefore public funding actors seeking the participation of implementing actors in this process is met with varied responses.** The findings show that the public funding actors are divided between those who seek input from the implementing actors and those who do not seek it. The former usually seek input from the implementing actor it in the course of processing the bids, but this is done as a procedural matter in which they ask the implementing actors to expound more about the project ideas and the expected impact it will have the region based on the stated criteria and specific indicators that each implementing actor has to achieve. The public funding actors on the other hand, who do not involve the implementing actors in the process of the contract; cite the restriction in the stipulated rules for not involving them in the process. The implementing actors views on their participation in the contractual process is misconstrued with their involvement in the decision making process of the assigned activities. All the implementing actors with the exception of the not for profit implementing actor, cite being involved in meetings with key stakeholders, that occur after the award of the contract with the discussions that take place between them and stakeholders limited to the design and overall coordinative role that implementing actors as representatives of their organizations undertake. This is however not the case with the not for profit implementing actor who by consulting the steering committee members are in effect involved in matters pertaining to their contractual process because other considerations such as finance will also come up, which is in contrast with the other two implementing actors involvement with their consultation limited to their project ideas rather than their specific interests. This illustrates to us that even within the public funding actors, they have mandates specific to each of their roles and not a uniform one that applies to all and similarities are drawn with earlier suggestions that the public funding national agency actors mandates are more restricted than the public funding political regional entities based on their sources of finance. It is also probable as argued by Span et al., (2012, p.187)that the public funding regional political bodies are considered to be closer in terms of identifying with the causes of the community than the public funding national agencies who follow the rules very strictly hence them involving the implementing actors in discussions that pertains their project ideas. Thus the public funding actor’s specific mandates is both seen as enabling and constraining in the performance of their activities that hinders them from achieving the mandated collaboration networks objectives.

**There is also variation seen in terms of how public funding actors track the progress of the implementing actors with both public implementing actors cite communicating directly to the public funding actor and the not for profit implementing actor reporting to the public funding actor through the lead actor.** The public funding actors in performing their oversight role stipulate to the implementing actors the medium of
communication that should be used that both sets of actors agree to it being through personal meetings as well as submitting financial and activity reports through electronic mail. This not for profit implementing actor equally does submit their financial and activity reports as well as conduct meetings but do so through the lead partner who delivers it finally to the steering committee. What this implies is that the face to face meetings with the public funding actors take place in the discussions with the steering committee but besides that the lead partner is the one responsible for ensuring that public funding actors get the reports on time. These findings are in contrast with both Giddens (1984, p. 4) & Ouchi (1979, p.843) that highlights about managers playing a critical role in monitoring the activities of their subordinates. Giddens (1984, p.4) goes as far as saying that it’s the manager’s role to intensely monitor in order to ensure the desired goals.

Ouchi (1979, p.843) further adds that ways managers can control and expect results is by controlling the outcome of the subordinates activities which in this case are the reports. Information is thus vital in effectively exerting information but by delegating this responsibility to the lead partner from whom the public funding actor then obtains the information is uncharacteristic of the mandated collaboration network. This lead partner role is however again a feature of the private sector that is built on the horizontal structure and this justifies the argument that private not for profit implementing actors alongside the public funding actors within the mandated collaboration network improvise all means possible to ensure they attain the desired goal, whether it be delegating its responsibilities or adjusting its structural composition, ultimately the results justify the mechanisms used.

5.3 Power Analysis

There is a unanimous response by all actors in the mandated collaboration network in regards to their organizational objectives being predetermined irrespective of their mandates. The findings show that all actors in the network have a predetermined objective assigned to them that contribute to the common goal of achieving regional growth and effectiveness. They all cite their objectives have been stipulated in a document that serves as the reference for the execution of their tasks with variations seen in terms of who they think has drafted this document. Almost all the actors indicate the government’s role or a higher structure in the hierarchy involved in the definition and stipulation of these objectives with the nonprofit actor as the only exception citing the steering committee, a group comprising of different stakeholders including a government representative as the one tasked with stipulating these objectives. Irrespective of the author of the objectives, all their tasks lead to the network’s common goal, with the national agencies public funding actors tasked with the responsibility of ensuring that the EU funds are accounted for, in accordance with the stipulated objectives and the goals implemented. Alongside them, the regional political entities equally account for the regional and municipality funds obtained through their tax collection and allocations from central government with the creation of a hospitable and investor friendly environment of paramount importance to the region.

The implementing actors on the other hand, also contribute to this goal and common network objective with the investment and promotion agency, creating awareness and aiding investors in establishing their businesses within the region ;business incubator, making the region competitive by supporting small and medium size startup firms that can contribute to job creation and investor confidence; nonprofit actor, using research publications to come up with innovative nonrenewable energy solutions that have an impact in the region. In view of the fact that all these actors’ objectives have been predetermined and yet all contribute through their own activities to working towards the same common regional growth and
By issuing decrees or by-laws, they have created a network and a framework that all the actors are expected to abide by in order to realize the network’s goals (Benson, 1975, p.106). Since this involves the enactment of policies, it can be inferred from the predetermination of the actor’s objectives, that no actors in the mandated collaboration network are involved in the process of drafting such policies with their input restricted to the execution of the network’s goals predetermined by the policy makers. Responsible for the enactment of the mandate specifying the roles and responsibilities of actors, the policy makers are essentially delegating their authority to the public funding actors to oversee the realization of the network goals. The public funding actors equally derive their authority from the policies in form of rules that specify the resources and how much is allocated towards the network, the area of focus of the actors and the different stakeholders they are allowed to work with in realizing the mandated collaboration network goal. Together with the rules and resources already stipulated, the findings show the public funding and implementing actors already performing their roles through their ongoing activities ensuring the policy maker’s goals are realized. The policy makers are thus able to exercise their power by using their legitimate authority to achieve their own sectional interests, which is evidently seen throughout the formation of the mandated collaboration network as well as the assigned mandates to all actors and the network itself.

The public funding actors entirely rely on obtaining information from the implementing actors in executing their oversight function through the deployment of specific mediums of communication that is marred with inconsistent use between formal and informal approaches among the actors. The medium of communication used by public funding actors varies considerably throughout the implementation phases of the mandated collaboration network. During the tendering and bidding process, the findings show that public funding actors use formal channels of communication such as electronic and regular mail, web pages, print as well as visit the potential implementing actors personally to further transmit information about the expression of interests for the tenders. Through these means, electronic and regular mail implementing actors are notified about the requirements needed to be met whereas the web pages, and print further add to the information by specifying where certain documents can be obtained and in which format they should be presented. This is as cited by a respondent who states that, “we have a catalogue of criteria where we specify what we expect from the partners. We look at the quality, the entire process that partners go through before achieving their outcome”. (Manager, National Agency 2, 18/3/2014). The medium of communication thus used in this phase by the public funding actors can be argued to have achieved the goal of getting right implementing actors as indicated through the findings that show both the public funding and implementing actors being aware of the expectations with the former expecting the latter to meet the stipulated requirements and the latter in addition to the expectations needed cite the beneficial and viable components of their project ideas in the region. The basis for assessing their bids is thus on the project ideas as well as on the set indicators that they are expected to meet.

It has to also be noted that, the personal visits that the public funding actors undertakes is towards partners that they work closely with in ensuring the implementation of their activities.
and not to first time implementing actors. This is seen through the findings in which the public funding actors stress the use of both formal and informal means in not only communicating to them about the expression of interest but also in the process of informing them about the progress and the eventual outcome of the bids of which some respondents cite even meeting with implementing actors during lunch time to update them on upcoming information. “Most of the communication is done informally, either we meet in a workshop and take five minutes or have lunch or even make informal calls” (Manager, National Agency 2, 18/3/2014). By taking on both a formal and an informal approach, the public funding actor is ensuring that the goal of getting the right implementing actors to implement the activities of the network in an efficient way is realized. The medium of communication used by public funding actors is in itself thus a medium of exercising power through the rules stated in their communication with the implementing actors during the tendering and bidding process.

During the contractual phase, the public funding and implementing actors communicate regularly with each other on a formal and an informal basis in implementing the network’s activities. The medium of communication used by the actors in this phase is mainly through regular and electronic mail with telephone calls used by the implementing actors when they seek to get further clarification from each other on the processes and procedures related to them realizing their goals. In this phase, the findings show that the public funding actors specifically review reports, both financial and activity that have been submitted to them by the implementing actors that will enable them gauge the extent of progress through the activities performed and the costs incurred in the course of the implementation of these activities. They also supplement this action by paying personal visits from time to time, either at the respective implementing actor’s premises or at the field sites where the activities are being implemented. In the performance of the duties, the public funding actors equally stress the need for implementing actors to use the EU logo in all their official communications and as argued by Edelman (1964, cited in Zald, 1996, p.86-89) its intent is to show the public the continuous role the public funding actors intend to play in the region through funding. The purpose of the regular communication thus between the public funding and implementing actors is to assess the progress implementing actors are making towards the implementation of their assigned activities. In the course of the assessment, the public funding actors reiterate to the implementing actors their objectives and the need to follow due process in order to ensure that not only the assigned objectives are realized but also that its credibility is intact. The whole intent of public funding actors carrying out the assessment through the regular communication and visits is to derive crucial information from the implementing actors that they can then use to predict the outcome of the information to help them in planning as well as to control their outcome and conduct so that they can intervene where need be in order to ensure that the public funding actors desired goals are met (Ouchi, 1979, p.843).

These findings further show that most of the follow up conversations is done mainly through electronic mail and personal visits related to queries pertaining to the implementation of the activities that the implementing actors seek response to from the public funding actors. The focus on such follow up meetings between the public funding and implementing actors is always centered on the usage of the funds, with questions raised around allowable and unallowable expenses on the part of the implementing actors by the public funding actors. The outcome of these follow up conversations is thus dependent on the satisfactory responses offered by the implementing actors, with both public funding and implementing actors citing the amicable resolution of the confusions that arise around the
incurred expenses. In some cases however, in the event that unsatisfactory responses are given to the public funding actors by the implementing actors, they are either asked to reimburse the funds or in extreme cases though very rare the contract terminated. Addressing these concerns raised by implementing actors is important for the successful implementation of the networks goals since the public funding actor’s own performance is based on how well the implementing actors perform their roles (Lane, 2005, p.43). In order to address these concerns of accountability, the findings show that the public funding actors have periods in which they send in progress reports of the activities that they have been assigned to do to specific government branches. By executing these activities the public funding actors are exercising power through the use of their authority derived from their mandate to ensure that costs and due process are adhered to as stipulated with the rules serving as the medium of power through the medium of communication.

The findings show that both public funding and implementing actors did not receive any form of social incentives with their version of incentives seen in the form of cooperation, interaction and reputation earned as a result of the collaboration with public funding actors in the course of implementing their projects. Both public funding and implementing actors remark that they do not offer social incentives in kind but the participation of the public funding actors in the process of executing the network’s duties is considered by both sets of actors as an incentive in itself. This is arguably so when the participation of a public funding actor gives the implementing actor publicity that they can then use as a basis of further expanding their business. ‘Most of the incentives that we give them is non-monetary in nature, we give them publicity and honor that a small and medium size business can easily build on.’ (Manager, National Agency, 2, 18/3/14) It also gives an opportunity for the actors to participate in the process of building the society that they live in. ‘The main incentives for cooperation are that it gives the partners a chance to make a change, to be active in shaping the society they live, work and act in.’ (Manager, Municipality, 27/3/14). These findings are in contrast to Lane (2005, p.52) view of social incentives that are normally used to motivate subordinates through benefits such as tax holidays with this new perspective of incentives shedding new light on how to manage collaborative efforts in a network. Incentives was however offered to foreign investors and the specific details stipulated in the webpage of the public funding national agency actor 1 that was accessed through the webpage of the public implementing investment and promotion actor. The public implementing investment and promotion actors have knowledge about the incentives because of the objective that mandates them to work with local and foreign investors. Thus social incentives contrary to Lane (2005, p.52) argument is limited to foreign investors and not national ones.

In all these activities and the entire implementation process, the public funding actor uses the rules to stipulate to the implementing actors what it is that they want them to do as well as the resources in form of funding to ensure that the implementing actors do accomplish their assigned goals. To this end, power is seen as enabling the government achieve its efficiency objective by using the rules to serve as the guideline, resources to facilitate the implementation of the activities and communication as a medium used for all actors to be able to access the necessary information needed.

5.4 Trust Analysis

The establishment of trust in mandated collaboration network depends on the outcome of the assessment undertaken by public funding actors on the performance of implementing actors in their assigned duties. The findings give a mixed opinion about how trust is established in mandated collaboration network with it being calculative, in the sense
that public funding actors will decide on whether to establish trust on an implementing actor or not based on their performance. It is emergent because out of the interactions that take place between both sets of actors, through the rules and resources, trust arises. The findings show that the public funding actors convey these rules to the implementing actors through formal channels such as regular and electronic mail through which they circulate the stipulated rules in form of printable documents both in soft and hard copy that the implementing actors can refer to. The public funding actors in performing their duties, stipulate to the implementing actors about the specifics of the job and the due process in terms of what activities they are expected to undertake, the set targets they are expected to achieve, within which time frame they are expected to accomplish the assigned task as well as details pertaining to the use of funds that are all expected to be performed within the legal framework.

In clearly stipulating these rules, the public funding actor seeks to ensure that the implementing actors have a guideline from which they can refer to in implementing their regular activities, so that they not only accomplish their goals but do so efficiently. In order to ensure that the implementing actors do abide by the rules and work towards achieving the efficiency objective, the public funding actors use the same medium of regular and electronic mail supplemented with personal visits and telephone calls to assess the progress of the implementing actors in implementing their activities. The findings show that the implementing actors do submit periodic activity and financial reports, from which public funding actors derive information about the progress implementing actors are making in undertaking their activities as well as whether they used due process in the implementation or not. By adhering to these rules, we can deduce that both sets of actors are aware of the objectives expected of them and depending on the satisfactory outcome of the assigned duties, trust begins to emerge based on the competence displayed by the implementing actors. These findings are supported by views from Lewiciki & Bunker (1996, p. 118) & Nooteboom (2002, p.90) & Giddens (1990, p.34) who all agree with the finding that trust emerges out of the information derived by managers in the assessment of implementing actor’s performance.

**The commitment towards the implementation of the mandated collaboration objective by both public funding and implementing actors is further indicated in the commitment levels that they both have towards the process.** The findings show that the implementing actor’s perspective on the public funding actor’s show of commitment towards efficiency in the mandated collaboration network is seen through their continued funding of the implementing actors activities. In some cases also implementing actors from the nonprofit organization have held occasional meetings to reiterate to the rest of the partners within the organization the objective of the network. Likewise, the public funding actors view the commitment level of the implementing actors from their continuous performance of activities and see no need to further motivate them since they benefit from the mandated collaboration network arrangement. By being aware of the objectives and constantly performing to realizing it, through the medium of rules, both the public funding and implementing actors ensure that trust is further established in the mandated collaboration network. More so, trust through the medium of rules ensures that both the public funding and implementing actors by following the due process ensure that all actors are working towards the same goal. Through the continued funding the public funding actors provide the implementing actors with, they are then able to perform their activities regularly. Trust is then formed through the rules and resources medium that enables the implementing actors to perform their routine practices, brought as a result of both the public funding and implementing actor’s performance of their activities, oversight and implementation respectively. These findings are supported by
Giddens (1990, p.98) who argues that trust is formed through the performance of actors that serves as a basis of both actors assessing their own performance through their routine performances. Additional studies done by Giddens (1990, p.114) & Long & Sitkin (1990, p.90) further argue that the conduct the implementing actors equally display, showing their commitment level through the application of due process results into public funding actors having integrity in them, which in turn leads to them relying on their outcome through their ability to predict their actions, which all serves as a basis for trust to develop.

Despite the public funding and implementing actors performing their roles that contribute to trust generation, trust is effectively established in the mandated collaboration network and not the actors through their actions. The findings show that public funding actors stipulate rules that require implementing actors to use specific communication means such as social websites, web pages that display the information on the outcome of the mandated collaboration network activities on each of the respective actor’s webpage. Alongside displaying such information, as is the case with all official communication, the public funding actor’s state clearly to the implementing actors that they should display the information alongside the EU logo. Even though the implementing actors did not specify any reason for being instructed to using the logo, it can be deduced that by publishing information and inserting the EU logo in the document, it is a means of the public funding actors specifically the national agencies communicating to the community about their continued support through the implementation of these projects. It should also be noted that the EU alongside the government are the main financiers of these regional projects hence the need to display their logo so that the community actors are made aware of the role they play in the region.

These findings are supported by Edelman (1964, cited in Zald (1996, p.86- 89) who asserts that government agencies use symbols as a means of showing the public the continuous role that they intend to play in the region through funding. The author adds that in trying to communicate with the community, they use condensation symbols, that communicate to them the targets that it seeks to meet and on the other hand, use referential symbols, to express a message that the community can identify themselves with. The findings however, is inconclusive for this study to be able to deduce which type of symbol it is based on the fact that it is only EU logo that is displayed. Hardy et al., (1998, p.80) further adds that the symbols used by organizations to display its trustworthiness is based on the positive perceptions that the community actors derive from the usual display of the organizations logo and unless the organizations reputation is tarnished, the community actors will associate it as a trustworthy organization. It is for this reason that public funding actors control the outcome of the information from the mandated collaboration network to ensure that the information and the medium used disseminates accurate information. This further circulation of information through the stipulated medium is still a basis of trust being circulated to other actors, outside of the network because the continuous circulation is indicative of the credibility of the outcome.

It is on the basis of these findings that show both public funding and implementing actors allocate specific tabs on their web pages or even hold open meetings that enable them take in input or feedback from the community. Through this feedback, they can then build it back to their system so that where there is error; they do make adjustments where necessary in order to implement their activities better. It is thus through the regular practices facilitated by the use of rules and resources that ensures that trust in mandated collaboration network is established. Trust thus through the rules ensures that the mandated collaboration
networks goals are realized and efficiency met. To the extent, that the community actors know how to relay their feedback to the public funding actors, it is a further agreement that meaning has been shared and a basis for trust to develop and further disseminated. Trust in this case is thus developed through the confidence that the community actors place on communicating their feedback, through the designated channels that the public funding and implementing actors have designed for their feedback.

The findings show that there is a provision catered for by both sets of public funding and implementing actors, to obtain feedback from the community actors. National agency 2, Investment and promotion agency as well as the business incubator, all cite the use of external consultants by both sets of actors to verify how effective their internal processes are in terms of performing their duties. Both these sets of actors cite, the role of the external consultants is to ensure that they apply the right approaches in order to achieve the stated objectives. Accuracy and integrity are thus important aspects emphasized on in the dissemination of the process. These findings further agree with Giddens (1990, p.85) that it is at the communication aspect that both public funding and implementing actors should place strict emphasis on because the community actors use these forums to equally base their trust on these actors. With the external consultants approach that is used by some of public funding and implementing actors, it gives confidence in both sets of actors, in disseminating the information to the community actors knowing that they have undergone extensive reviews to ensure the outcome of accurate and credible information. Additionally Giddens (1990, p.42) argues that the outcome of this information is widely circulated and usually beyond the control of the public funding actors and it is for this reason that its outcome is controlled. This is in itself a basis for trust to develop; because based on the accuracy and consistency of the information being derived from the activities of the public funding and implementing actors, both sets of actors and essentially mandated collaboration network will derive trust in it.

The public funding actor by deriving information from the implementing actors through the assessment done uses the reputation that they have obtained through the skills and symbols the implementing actors apply correctly all obtained through the rules stipulated to them as a basis for trust to develop between them. Even though through the public funding and implementing actor’s performance, trust is established in the mandated collaboration network and not on the actors, it is a basis for trust to develop between both sets of actors. As indicated through the findings that trust emerges based on the correct application of implementing actor’s duties, the reputation that they make for themselves of being reliable and competent is a basis for trust to develop. Equally so is having similar goals that both public funding and implementing actors work towards, with the experience derived from working together aiming to achieve something in common also serving as a basis of trust to develop. This is evidenced through the findings that show both sets of actors all working towards the same regional growth and competitiveness goal of the mandated collaboration network goal and by following the due process in executing their roles, they intend to achieve efficiency in the mandated collaboration network. These findings are supported by Zucker (1986, p.62) views on trust emerging between two sets of actors on both instances.

Other personal and managerial experiences and similarities is not a basis for trust to develop. The findings show that almost all public funding actors mention that whilst they acknowledge the value of having such relations based on the fact that the implementing actors are already conversant with the public funding actor’s requirement, it is easier to work with them. The
policies however, do not allow it, with almost all public funding actors mentioning that it has to be part of tender criteria in order to be considered as a basis for selection. These finding disagree with Lane (2005, p.61) earlier study that suggests that a basis for public funding actors to select implementing actors is the prior experience that they have in the past that allays any fears of the implementing actors reneging on their contracts. As it is evident from the findings, the implementing actors are not only motivated but committed to perform their duties, so past experience as a basis for selection is not a criteria applied by public funding actors nor is it a basis for process trust to develop within the mandated collaboration network.

Trust between the public funding and implementing actors is further deduced through the relationship that exists between them. In terms of the relationship that exists between the public funding and implementing actors, the findings are varied. The findings show that the relationship between the public funding and implementing actors is of a professional nature, whereas the relationship that exists between public funding actors, who all perform the same oversight role, is cordial and based on an open relationship. These findings to an extent agree and disagree with Willem & Lucidarme (2013, p.21) findings in as far as the relationship between the two sets of trusts exists. These authors findings highlighted, that the calculative or cognition based trust, only manifests itself in contexts like mandated collaboration network where the relations of actors is vertical in nature. The findings do attest to Willem & Lucidarme (2013) in regards to the relationship that exists between the public funding and implementing actors, in which the former are only concerned about work related activities with the latter, thus making the relationship as one based on calculative trust. In some cases however, like the public funding actor national agency 2 cites, that it is part of the regulations cited in which they are expected to maintain a professional relationship between both sets of actors. “We have set up a system where its only several persons that may communicate and they have a structure and things they communicate about and they have to avoid the buildup of private relations things”(manager, national agency 2,18/3/14). This justifies the relationship between the two sets of actors and gives provision for affect based type of trust to exist, in the event that the public funding actor national agency 2’s rules were changed, unlike Willem & Lucidarme (2013) findings that make it a definite expectation.

In addition to this, cognition or calculative based trust can be limited to mandated collaboration networks because of the practices of the public funding actors towards the implementing actors. The investment and promotion agency, cite concerns about bureaucratic processes in terms of accounting for funds disbursed, in which the public funding actors cite specific requirements, which if not met, they are penalized. Additionally in the decision making processes, delays associated to the approval of their activities leads to a poor planning process on the part of the implementing actor, investment and promotion agency thus further affecting the relations between them. The relation between the regional political body and the local government and the implementing actors has also been mentioned by the implementing actors to be smooth. They cite they are able to communicate more frequently and are more involved in their activities. Emphasis however has to be placed, on these regional and local government entities as being partners to agency 1 and agency 2 in which they work closely in approving projects together. However, the agency 1 and 2 all disburse EU funds, and as such, it’s arguable that the relationship between them and the implementing actors is very strict because of the rules that guide them. In this case, whilst the studies concur with Willem & Lucidarme (2013, p.21) in regards to cognition based trust being present in mandated collaboration networks, other contextual factors such as individual public funding actors rules as well as the conduct of public funding actors towards implementing actors determines such relationships and should be considered.
However, these findings too disagree with Willem & Lucidarme (2013) in regards to affect based trust, which Long & Sitkin (2006, p.90) equally refers to as relational trust, existing in mandated collaboration network among the public funding actors who all play an oversight role over the implementing actors. It can be argued that, the relation that exists among the public funding actors is affect or relational based trust because it is limited to one set of actors who all perform the same oversight role concluding that it is after all a horizontal and not a vertical relation. However, by the mere fact that these are constituent actors of the mandated collaboration network, it sheds further light and disagrees with Willem & Lucidarme (2013) findings, that both cognition and affect based trust do not exist in mandated collaboration network. Further findings is seen in the relations that exist between immediate supervisor of the implementing actor of the business incubator and implementing actor herself, in which she discusses her problems with the supervisor and the supervisor in turn offers her support. This further disagrees with the Willem & Lucidarme (2013, p.21) findings that rule out the possibility of affect based trust in mandated collaboration network. As a result of this supportive relationship between the immediate supervisor and the public implementing actor, business incubator, it can be deduced that it is why the implementing actor met the targets before the allocated time. “Yes we have quite realistic goals and we have already reached them before deadline” (manager, business incubator).

This finding is supported by Long & Sitkin (2006, p.90) in regards to relational trust motivating the implementing actors, thus leading to increased performance through the support and empathy of the supervisor. It is also supported by Dirks & Ferrin (2001, p.456) who equally argue that relational trust between a manager and a subordinate results into cooperation and voluntary compliance between them. It is therefore highly probable that because of the relational trust that exists between supervisor and the public implementing actor, business incubator the latter was motivated to work because of the supportive hand the supervisor offered to her. Additionally, even in situations where the implementing actors did not meet the stated goals or used unallowable expenses, in their discussions with the public funding actors they always resolved it amicably. It was only in few instances that the unallowable expenses incurred were demanded to be reimbursed by the public funding actors and in some extreme cases, though very seldom, they terminated the contract. By and large however, the public funding actors have confidence in the ability of the implementing actors in executing their assigned duties and this further solidifies their personal relationships. Trust like power through the findings is thus seen to play a direct as well as moderating role by coordinating and regulating the activities of the mandated collaboration network.

5.5 Efficiency Analysis

Both sets of actors hold a mixed view in terms of how they view efficiency with public funding actor’s emphasizing on costs and due process while implementing actors focus on the indicators they are expected to meet as well as their internal processes. Public funding actors are split in their views of how they view efficiency between the costs incurred with a commensurate return of output expected and the due process observed with in a legal framework that looks at the entire implementation process. The public funding actors that view efficiency in terms of costs namely agency 1 and municipality argue that the costs implementing actors incur in implementing their activities should in turn have a good return in value for their outcome. On the other hand, the public funding actors who view efficiency in terms of due process notably agency 2 and regional political body argue that it is following the rules stipulated throughout the process that can lead to an efficient outcome. The point of convergence thus for both sets of public funding actors to attain good value for money spent,
will require the implementing actors to follow the due process required of them. For instance through the tendering and bidding process, they will be able to get a pool of actors offering low cost and a variety of quality with more quantity making the process competitive and thorough (Lane, 2005, p.183). The implementing actors view on efficiency is equally split with business incubator and not for profit actors relating it to the outcome expected from the implementation of their activities seen in the form of indicators. The investment and promotion agency views it in terms of the internal processes pertaining to the period it takes to get feedback from public funding actors in regards to approval of their projects and obtaining resources for it. It can be argued that the variation by both sets of actors in their perspective of efficiency is as a result of the role they are expected to play, with the public funding actors viewing it in terms of how much money is spent or due process and implementing actors through due process and in form of indicators whose targets they are expected to meet and their performance assessment hinged on.

The attainment of efficiency in mandated collaboration network calls for flexibility in assessing the outcome with both internal and external factors cited as hampering efforts to realize it. Both public funding and implementing actors acknowledge the need for flexibility in measuring efficiency. The findings show that public funding actors not allocating ample funds to the activities of the implementing actors and yet expecting a huge societal impact is considered impractical by the implementing actors. In some cases, the public funding actors have taken a considerably long time to reimburse activities that implementing actors have undertaken in implementing the mandated collaboration networks goals. Additionally the bureaucracy involved in the decision making process by the public funding actors, is seen as hampering efforts by implementing actors to plan in advance so as to execute their work satisfactory. Even the mechanism used by the public funding actor to measure for efficiency has been further highlighted by the implementing actors as a hindrance rather than a facilitator because of its inability to measure some of the intangible benefits that have been obtained from the implementation of their activities ‘It is also hard to measure quality issues, we market the region abroad but how can you measure the awareness of Västerbotten.’(Manager, investment and promotion agency, 13/3/14). In a bid to address some of the concerns of the implementing actors, the findings show that the public funding actor has sought to incorporate some of the implementing actor’s approaches that are similar to the public funding actor’s into their system so that the implementing actors are able to continue executing their activities and lead to attainment of desired outcome. They also acknowledge that external factors do impact negatively in the implementation of the activities and in such cases the objectives stated should be adjusted in accordance with the needs on the ground.

5.6 Adjusted Conceptual Framework

The above is indicative of how trust can be established in mandated collaboration network. In order to answer the research question related to the role that trust plays in the network, I will argue it along with the propositions set forth from Long & Sitkin (2006) integrated framework.

In looking at the Long & Sitkin (2006) framework, the authors suggested ways of how public funding actors can use it to manage effectively. I chose a few propositions, based on the balancing processes of these authors, and the different phases that public funding actors pay attention to in deploying control measures. I argued that in each of these phases, that I set forth a particular type of trust can be nurtured that will allow for the ease in the
implementation of the activities as well as the successful accomplishments of the mandated collaboration networks objectives.

(P1); Public funding actors should institute formal control in order to minimize costs and opportunism that will lead to efficiency in the mandated collaboration network being attained.

The findings do not agree with this proposition despite formal controls being always a given constant used by public funding actors in performing their oversight duties. Through the rules stipulated by the public funding actors to the implementing actors, the findings show that the latter adhere to the rules. This is evidenced by the fact that the public funding actors have confidence in their ability to perform, through the common objectives and commitment shared by all. Additionally, both sets of actors have been involved in periodic exchanges in which assessment is done to verify the extent of accomplishment of the implementing actor’s activities. Despite the rules being followed, the findings show that implementing actors are fulfilling their assigned tasks even though efficiency may not be attained due to cost implications. The public funding actor’s usual focus on the implementing actor’s activities is on the costs as well as the due process in performing these activities. Most of the challenges that both public funding and implementing actors cite is related to costs incurred that have not been allowed. However, the implementing actors cite the confusion that arises with the use of funds on unallowable items is due to not getting clear guidelines as to what exactly is accepted and not accepted even though the findings say otherwise. They equally raise concerns about limited funds allocated to them to execute their activities, with the funds not being commensurate to the outcome that it is expected to achieve.

What these findings denote, is that efficiency cannot be expected to be attained if the implementing actor’s costs considerations are not met adequately. The issues arising out of the need for funds to be increased pertains to the disproportional impact expected vis-a-vis the stated costs as well as un allowed incurred expenses that all indicate to the fact that the disbursed funds allocated to the implementing actors to execute their activities is considered insufficient by the implementing actors. Formal controls alone cannot certainly address such challenges by the rules alone and even if funds do get allocated, the need for both sets of actors to be engaged in meaningful discussions during the contractual process is necessary in order to address some of these concerns. The findings show that costs are usually predetermined and the rules are inflexible hence the concealing of information by implementing actors on unallowable expenses incurred that are later found out during the course of assessment by the public funding actors. The intent thus of using formal control to minimize transaction costs as well as eliminate on the hidden knowledge through the monitoring has not been addressed. Nor can calculative trust arise in such a situation, between the public funding and implementing actors due to the latter not performing as expected. These findings thus that do not also agree with Long & Sitkin (2006, p.94) use of only one type of mechanism either trust or control in circumstances such as this, with other contextual factors such as other costs considerations influencing the outcome. This type of antithetical balancing process thus should not be used by public funding actors to expect efficiency, though they can expect the tasks met.

Proposition 2 (P2); public funding actors can institute both calculative and relational trust alongside formal controls in order to encourage implementing actors to exert more effort and realize the stated amount of quantity leading to attainment of efficiency in mandated collaboration network.
Despite the cost implications cited as a hurdle in achieving efficiency in mandated collaboration network, meeting the stated amount has not been met with such similar instances. The findings show that both calculative trust and relational trust do arise in the mandated collaboration network. However, the former is restricted to public funding actors only and the latter between these two sets of actors. Calculative trust exists between public funding and implementing actors based on the accomplishment of their assigned tasks. With implementing actors following the due process and the rules stipulated this type of trust is expected to emanate from their performance as perceived by the public funding actors. It is also derived through the continuous oversight role public funding actor’s play even when implementing actors default on the unallowable expenses expected of them. The public funding actors resolve such issues amicably and only in extreme cases are they terminated or asked to reimburse. Based on such a relationship; it is evidence enough that calculative trust can be established alongside formal controls.

It is also evident that through the continuous assessment done alongside the calculative trust that the public funding actor derives, the quantity stipulated to the implementing actor will be realized. Lewicki & Bunker (1996) & Nooteboom (2002) trust models agree with these findings by arguing that managers use formal controls to gauge how much trust to invest in the subordinates with the degree of both trust and control varying depending on how fast the subordinates is responsive to the stated rules. Additionally, the public funding actors cite specifications from their financiers that restrict them to having a certain level of conduct between both sets of actors. This however does not mean it cannot be established, with the public implementing business incubator actor, citing a supportive relation that exists between her and the immediate supervisor except that this type of relation is at an interpersonal level. On an institutional level however, the public funding actors specifically the public funding national agencies that are funded by the EU emphasize on the aspect of implementing actors adhering to the rules that stress on the need to maintain a certain level of conduct between themselves and the implementing actors, thus the calculative kind of trust based on work relations. Relational trust also exists between the public funding actors ‘’We have set up a system where its only several persons that may communicate and they have a structure and things they communicate about and they have to avoid the buildup of private relations things’’. These findings do agree with Willem & Lucidarme (2013, p.21) in regards to cognition or calculative based trust existing in mandated collaboration network. However, in terms of affect or relational trust, the findings indicate that it is limited to interpersonal relations between an implementing actor and an immediate supervisor as well as among the peers of the public funding actors in the mandated collaboration network, thus not being in agreement with Willem & Lucidarme (2013, p.21) earlier findings. Despite this, the public funding actor cannot establish relational trust at a mandated collaboration network level, though it can be done at an interpersonal level. These findings also do not agree with Tyler & Degoe (1996, p.331) findings in regards to the implementing actors performing these activities as a basis of expecting benefits related to the task at hand for instance future contracts. However, the findings also show that the rules restrict some public funding actors, such as national agency 2 from working with implementing actors that they have worked with before. Thus past experience and relations does not count nor do the implementing actors use this as a basis of working hard rather than to just oblige by the rules stipulated. The findings thus partially support the proposition that public funding actors should use calculative rather than relational trust alongside formal controls as a means of encouraging implementing actors to meet the stipulated targets.
(P3); public funding actors should use calculative trust alongside formal controls to ensure the integrity of the process of the implementing actors and nurture relational trust in order to influence the conduct of the implementing actors so that they comply voluntarily with the rules resulting to the attainment of efficiency.

The findings do agree with this proposition is as far establishing formal controls and calculative trust, since formal controls is an expected mechanism used by public funding actors and calculative trust is an automatic outcome if the implementing actors perform satisfactorily to the needs of the public funding actors. The findings agree with this bit of the proposition as a way of eliminating opportunistic actions from implementing actors, through the periodic monitoring done by the public funding actors. The findings also show that monitoring will highlight the concealed implementing actor’s information, and bring it to the attention of the public funding actors. Thus the chances of the implementing actors taking advantage because of information asymmetry are very limited. The challenge however of obtaining efficiency is not limited to hidden knowledge, with the findings showing that bureaucratic decision making by the public funding actors hampers the implementation process of the implementing actors and therefore they are not able to meet the targets as expected. This bureaucracy is also seen in terms of reimbursing implementing actors expenses incurred on the activities they are expected to implement which also affects their implementation process. Even though not citing the specific challenges as the implementing actors, the public funding actors do also acknowledge that challenges external to both of them do arise that hampers implementing actors from achieving the stated objectives and in effect efficiency. In such cases, the findings suggest that the public funding actors re-adjust initial goals, to enable implementing actors to focus on the revised goals based on the challenges they encounter. They have also adapted some of the successful processes used by implementing actors in order to make it easy for them to realize the goals and attain efficiency in the process. To this end, the findings agree with the proposition in as far as using calculative trust alongside formal controls that will result into bringing integrity into the process of implementing the activities all evidenced through the reports obtained and assessed as well as the above practical suggestions by the public funding actors. However, calculative trust serving as a basis of relational trust can only be used if the latter is limited between two individuals and not between the public funding and implementing actors due to the restrictions stipulated to the former. Besides seeking to establish calculative trust to ensure that efficiency is achieved, it is in the interest of the public funding actor to address these bureaucratic delays in decision making, which is at the core of their coordination process in order for the implementing actors to have adequate time and resources to plan and implement their work accordingly.
Public funding actors trust in implementing actors

Institutional level
- Ability
- Integrity
Interpersonal level
- Benevolence-

Public funding actors control in implementing actors

Formal Control
- Rules
- Resources

Task control activities
Formal control
- Clearly Defined Rules
- Flexible Rules
- Adequate Resources
- Expeditious Decision making

Trust building activities
Institutional Level
- Calculative trust building
Interpersonal level
- Relational trust building

Efficiency Outcome
- Acceptable costs
- Attainment of predefined quantity
- Credible Quality process

Figure 7: Adjusted Conceptual Framework
CHAPTER SIX: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

Based on the research problem, this study sought to find out the role that power and trust play in attaining efficiency in mandated collaboration network. This study approached the problem from a management perspective and in order to answer it extensively, the questions were subdivided into three sub questions seeking to find out the role that power and trust play in managers attaining efficiency, as well as the perceptions they hold about efficiency. The mandated collaboration network is the unit of study as such our conclusions give an overall assessment from the different manager’s views in this network.

6.1 General Conclusions

*How does power influence the role managers in mandated collaboration network play towards attaining efficiency?*

The findings have shown power in mandated collaboration network plays several roles, most of all a coordinative and regulative one that enables managers to attain efficiency. It however has several levels to it, with directives coming from the upper echelons of the policy makers till the execution of the policies at the implementing level. Policy makers use their legitimacy derived from the electorate who elect them to their positions in the legislative assembly to enact policies that they deem necessary for socio and economic development of regions. Using their legitimate right to enact policies, they issues policies for the formation of entities such as mandated collaboration network that will ensure that its policies in the regions are implemented. Alongside the formation of mandated collaboration network, the policy makers also earmark a portion of the resources to the network towards implementing its projects. Power however in mandated collaboration network is relational in nature, because it involves different levels of actors performing their role in order to realize the goals. The policy makers thus in a bid to ensure that its policies will be implemented, issue further policies that determine the objectives and selection criteria of the constituent actors in the network. By issuing such policies, the different actors on the onset of joining the network are made aware of their roles and how it contributes to the main network objective. This entire role played by the policy makers is derived from the position they hold as legislators from which they use the policies as well as the resources at their disposal to achieve the desired policy goals. Power thus plays a role, right from the level of policy makers, enabling the policy makers to use the policing power to enact laws as well allocate funds and set up a coordinative structure that will ensure that its policies are implemented. To this end, the policy makers will have been enabled by power through the use of resources and policies to achieve the desired outcome albeit at a policy level.

As the mandated collaboration network gets operational, the coordinative and regulative role is undertaken by the public funding actors from the public sector with a funding mandate, who play an oversight role on the implementing actors that comprise of both public and private actors. The public funding actors exercise their oversight function over the implementing actors by issuing rules that guide their conduct as well as regulate how they utilize the resources allocated to them for implementing the policies. The public funding actors perform this regulative and coordinative role by assessing the reports and personally visiting the implementing actors ensuring that they are on course towards implementing the networks policies. Through this assessment done by the public funding actors, they are able to derive information that it then uses to control the conduct and influence the outcome of the implementing actor’s activities in accordance with the networks goals. Power in this case plays a role of enabling the public funding actors to control the behavior of the implementing actors through its rules as well as influence the outcome of the implementing actors through
the resources that enables them to realize the networks goals and attain efficiency. In the cases that the implementing actors are not able to meet the stated goals, the public funding actors are within legitimate rights to intervene and ensure that the networks goals are met. Even though no kind of incentives are offered, the mere fact that these goals are being achieved in the midst of several actors all with an aim of realizing a socio and economic regional goal, albeit being coordinated through a government structure leads to the cooperation among all stakeholders resulting into policy implementation and network efficiency. Power thus plays a role in managers in mandated collaboration network towards efficiency by empowering the managers through the use of rules and resources in the course of performing their activities to accomplish the policy objectives and in the process do so efficiently. That way the policy legislators and the objectives of both the public funding and implementing actors realize their mandated collaboration network goals.

How does trust influence the role managers in mandated collaboration network play towards attaining efficiency?

Trust in mandated collaboration network is mainly calculative or cognitive in nature with a few aspects of relational trust between public funding actors and at an interpersonal level, between an immediate supervisor of an implementing actor and the implementing actor. Calculative trust enhances cooperative behavior in implementing actors by ensuring they accomplish the networks objectives. The implementing actors duly fulfill their objectives in accordance with the rules stipulated to them by the public funding actors. The implementing actors know that the terms of their contract are hinged onto their performance and they risk being penalized if they don’t meet the stated goals therefore work towards meeting it. By complying with the rules stipulated to them by the public funding actors and accomplishing all the assigned tasks, they are in essence displaying trustworthy behavior towards the public funding actors who will judge their performance on their competence and integrity to accomplish the tasks. The public funding actors by assessing their performance through the periodic submission of reports and discussions that follow will then develop confidence in the ability and integrity of the implementing actor based on their performance.

The rule and resources which is a medium of trust in mandated collaboration network will have facilitated the implementing actor to cooperate with the public funding actors, thus resulting into efficiency. Calculative trust would have played a role by ensuring that the implementing actors cooperate through the use of rules, thus resulting into efficiency in mandated collaboration network. The cooperative behavior that arises as a result of the stipulated rules equally brings in a high commitment level between both sets of actors in a mandated collaboration network. This results into implementing actors performing their activities diligently and to the best of their ability resulting into voluntary compliance, high commitment level towards realizing their objectives and in the end increased productivity and efficiency. Calculative trust thus plays a role through the stipulated rules to cultivate cooperative behavior, through their compliance that results to high commitment level, increased productivity and thus attaining efficiency.

Relational trust too plays a role among the public funding actor’s by enhancing honest and open discussion, which is as a result of performing similar roles over a long period of time that requires regular interactions. Relational trust, through an empathic stance of a supervisor equally plays a role in implementing actors attaining efficiency by motivating them to accomplish their objectives thus enabling them to surpass set targets, even though this is limited to an individual case. Public funding actors can use their good relations with the implementing actors to create a good atmosphere that will motivate their subordinates. Trust thus in mandated collaboration network plays a role of encouraging implementing actors
through the rules stipulated to them by the public funding actors to cooperate with each other in the course of realizing the stated objectives of the network as well as become committed cue to the good cooperation that exists and realize high productivity as well as open and honest discussion all leading to meeting the networks goals and efficiency in the end.

*How do managers perceive efficiency in mandated Collaboration network?*
Efficiency in mandated collaboration network is perceived in two fold; by the public funding actors who play an oversight role on the implementing actors; as well as the implementing actors who execute the network’s policies. By performing their oversight role over the implementing actor, the public funding managers verify the performance of their activities and if due process is observed in its implementation. The public funding actors therefore perceive efficiency in light of following the due process which results into a cost effective process and an expected stated objective of the network. The implementing actor view it in terms of the objectives they are expected to accomplish and with that comes the focus on budgetary concerns and costs as well as lead time in decision making that affects the planning process and ultimately the accomplishment of the networks objectives. This makes the efficiency aspect not only limited to the implementation of the activities by the implementing actors, but also a note to the public funding actors, that it takes both their efforts to realize the networks goals and attain efficiency.

Not accomplishing the stated objectives therefore is not only a performance concern from the implementing actors, however external eventualities do also contribute to not meeting the goals. In order to ensure efficiency therefore, the public funding actors have sought to be flexible and re-adjust previously stated objectives in cases where the external factors are beyond the public funding actor’s control. They have also adapted successful methods used by implementing actors in order to further facilitate a favorable environment in which the implementing actors can implement their activities. The implementing actors however argue that true efficiency cannot be achieved based on using quantifiable performance measurement techniques that are used to measure unquantifiable service related outputs. With that, their exact outcome and impact will never be known and achieving efficiency becoming unrealistic. Therefore, what public funding actors as well as policy makers should put into consideration is that unless the performance measurement tool used to assess the true impact of unquantifiable services is established, efficiency might seem an unrealistic and untenable goal to achieve.

*How does power and trust play a role in mandated Collaboration network attaining efficiency?*
Both power and trust thus play a coordinative and regulative role in ensuring that efficiency is attained in the mandated collaboration network. Rules and resources as a medium of both power and trust lead to implementing actors realizing the networks objectives. By following what is stipulated in the rules and by using resources to influence the outcome through the public funding actors, both power and trust ensure that implementing actors accomplish their objectives and through it attain efficiency. Attaining efficiency thus involves the collective role of both sets of actors to put aside ideological differences and work towards achieving the main goal of the mandated collaboration network.

### 6.2 Contributions

#### 6.2.1 Theoretical Contributions
This study sought to find out the role that power and trust plays in mandated collaboration network in attaining efficiency. Most of the studies done in mandated collaboration network
focus on single aspects such as power or trust but the dual role that both concepts play is seldom studied. By investigating these concepts in mandated collaboration network context simultaneously, the findings have added onto both literature of trust and power. The findings do confirm that trust does play a role by bringing about cooperative behavior, high commitment and increased productivity. It also confirms Lucidarme & Willem (2013, p.21) earlier findings that cognition based trust were more certain to be found in mandated collaboration network. However, it adds a new dimension that affect or relational trust, can be individually created between manager and subordinate therefore enabling the positive impacts associated with trust to still have an impact though at an interpersonal level or between actors who perform the same roles.

The findings also show that power is not after all only related to sectional interests and the use of coercive measures, even in the absence of incentives, the implementing actors have duly complied. This study thus deviates from the role that power is normally associated with in mandated collaboration network by Huxham & Vangen (2005, p.175-176) as being very one dimensional, to also being two dimensional alongside trust playing a coordinative and regulative role to accomplish the networks objectives and realize efficiency. This study also makes theoretical contributions in the study of efficiency, with the findings showing that the problem is not only limited to the measurement tools used for assessing performance of actors or is it hidden knowledge, action and costs. Rather at times, efficiency is not also attained due to external factors as well as shortcomings on the part of the managers who play an oversight role over their subordinates. In mandated collaboration network, the findings show that not all actors are within a clear divide of public and private sector rather, all actors within the network can be equally mandated by the public sector and still implement policies. Additionally, the theoretical contribution is made in the public administration and management by stating that horizontal and vertical relations can co-exist in mandated collaboration network, but only within the same level. This means that the relation between the public funding actors who play an oversight role over the implementing actors, is vertical in nature because the directives are taken from the public manager however internally, the implementing actors from the nonprofit sector as well as other sectors; follow through with the horizontal relations.

6.2.2 Societal contributions

The focus of this study was mainly on the role that power and trust plays in mandated collaboration network attaining efficiency. Mandated collaboration network is a global concept, and Sweden like the rest of the world is seeking for collaborative solutions to address these issues. The findings of this study inform the society about the processes involved in the implementation of public services and the role played by each and every actor. Through this, they are able to partake in the implementation process by vying for tenders and knowing where to obtain the necessary information and the due process to be followed by going to the respective web pages of the actors advertising for tender. By following the process played by both sets of actors in implementing the networks activities, societal actors will know that it takes commitment, aspects of transparency, accountability, commitment and cooperation to achieve a common goal.

They can equally contribute to the process of public services being implemented by providing suggestions or grievances in the feedback column in the web page of the respective actor’s web page. By doing this, they will be contributing to the attainment of efficiency in the delivery of public services since adjustments will be made to the internal processes as per their own reviews and external reviews too.
These findings also inform policy makers about the need to be flexible about the objectives normally stated for mandated collaboration networks to achieve. These findings show that even with regular monitoring of activities done by public funding actors to implementing actors, there will always be other contextual factors that will hamper the successful implementation of the process. This calls for more powers to be given to the implementing actors to allow them to adjust the stated objectives and not just reduce the stated target as was indicated in the findings. Allowing them to adjust stated objectives, is a way of engaging public funding actors in the process of policy making, with their role restricted to offering practical input to the policy makers. This is done, so that the objectives cited are made from a well-informed position and can be achieved. Achieving this is not impossible and as seen in the findings, trust can always be established and can equally lead to efficiency when used with the right motive.

6.3 Recommendations for public funding actors in mandated collaboration network

Relational trust was found to exist among public funding actors and between supervisor and implementing actor with calculative trust largely found in mandated collaboration network. This does not rule out any individual attempts by public funding actors to establish a relational type of trust between themselves and their implementing actors, and they are therefore recommended to carry out such similar acts of empathy towards the implementing actors at a personal and not institutional level in order to motivate them to realize their goals. By establishing relational trust, they will be able to reduce on the issues related to accountability and bureaucracy. This can be achieved through the process of open and honest communication between public funding and implementing actors in which the latter, will feel free to disclose concerns as soon as they arise and not wait till the time of assessments is done.

Public funding actors should also be accommodative of the challenges faced by the implementing actors. Most of the challenges arise from the fact that they have not followed the rules related to allowable and unallowable costs and since the public funding actors need the funds accounted for because their own performance is based on how well they perform their role with the implementing actors, they use all means to bring the implementing actors to account for it. Rather than seek punitive measures such as reimbursement, they should communicate explicitly in print and in person and on a more regular basis to ensure that such cases seldom arise and if they do, create an avenue in which the implementing actors inform the public funding actors immediately.

The aspect of measuring performances and hence efficiency needs to be revised. Even though this is a concern of policy matter, voices heard from the pragmatists can equally push the agenda for non-quantifiable measures of efficiency to be improvised. Efforts made towards this can go to show the extent that implementing actors do actually play and contribute towards the achievement of these goals at both the network and society level.

Delays in decision making and approving projects have been cited by implementing actors as impacting on their planning which ultimately has an impact on the overall mandated collaboration network goals. They should therefore pay attention to their internal processes in order to ensure that it does not impact negatively on the implementing actors.

The aspects of costs should be looked at critically, with implementing actors citing insufficient funds to realize the expected goals. In order to address this, they should devise a
way of engaging implementing actors in the process of determining funds for their assigned projects just as they give audience to them to listen to their ideas. That way a consolidated solution would have been found.

6.4 Quality Criteria

6.4.1 Validity

Validity as a quality criterion is essentially related to accuracy of the findings (Creswell, 2009 & Ritchie & Lewis, 2003 & Saunders, 2007). It is considered in two folds; internal and external validity, with the former associated with accuracy in terms of investigating what the study sought to explore and the latter, in regards to whether the findings of this study can be applied to similar contexts outside of this current sample population (Ritchie & Lewis, 2003, p.273). In order to ascertain internal validity, Hammersley (1992, cited in Ritchie & Lewis, 2003, p.274) mention four areas of concern that a researcher should bear in mind to ensure internal validity of the research; “sample coverage, capture of the phenomenon, identification, interpretation and display”. In terms of the sample coverage, since this study utilized a purposive sampling, there was a set criterion for the specifications of the respondents. This means that rather than selecting the respondents at random, this study sought to conduct interview with managers from specific organizations that composed of the mandated collaboration network. For this study, the focus was on organizations that were undertaking regional growth and competitiveness project receiving funds from the EU and the different levels of government, that means the sampling frame comprised of all actors be it public or private that were involved in executing this objective. The role of the actor did not matter, as the focus of this study was in the relation that exists among both public funding and implementing actors through which power and trust emanates from.

To ensure that I was targeting the right respondents, I used the first interviews I conducted to inform myself more about the other contributing actors who would fit into the network, and it is through these interviews that I was able to select other actors to participate in the study. From the information I obtained about the prospective respondents, I was then able to send them electronic mail to seek for an interview, of which some obliged and some did not. This left my earlier target of seeking to interview 8 actors from the three different sectors hard to get as I ended up settling with 7 respondents. Compounded to this challenge, I only realized that the nonprofit actor was not formed by a private actor, further affecting the broad representation that I had intended for this study. Having 7 respondents with all actors having mandates from the public sector does not certainly give a true picture of the mandated collaboration network, however this study can be used as a spring board to other mandated collaboration network studies to be conducted that will give a broad representation of actors from the three different sectors. It is on this basis that I argue I had no bias or preference for the respondents that I interviewed in the study; rather it was the objective of each of the actor’s organizations that was a determining factor. Prior to conducting the interviews, I went to the respective organizations web page where I was able to derive more information about the prospective respondent. To further ensure that all the respondents interviewed met the criterion, through the interviews conducted I queried what their role was and I was able to determine their mandate, whether it was public funding or implementing mandate. Therefore all the actors interviewed did meet the criteria set and defined the characteristics of the network understudy. This was all done to ensure internal validity of the research study. I further ensured internal validity of the data generated by ensuring that the interviews I held with all the respondents was in a setting of their preference where they felt comfortable. Since most of my interviews were done via Skype or phone and electronic mail, except for the latter in the case of the first two, the respondents chose for themselves the particular
setting in which the interview would take place and it was normally at their office premises over the internet at a specified time.

In addition to that, in order to ensure that all vital questions as well as the ones that followed up were answered, I probed and in cases where I still needed more clarification, I sent mail to the respective respondents who duly obliged to respond to it. The fact that the theoretical or deductive dimension of thematic analysis was adopted, the theories used guided the way I identified my patterns which contributed to the overall themes of the study. In order to ensure validity of this process, I further crosschecked the raw data and transcripts to ensure that I captured the true picture of the raw data and in no way did I apply any subjectivity. I also further did both member check and triangulation by verifying from the respective actors web pages as well as from the respondents themselves to verify what was stated as accurate.

External validity or generalization on the other hand is involved with assessing whether the findings of this study can be applied to other contexts (Creswell, 2009 & Ritchie & Lewis, 2003 & Saunders, 2007). Ritchie & Lewis (2003, p.264), divides it in threefold; representational, inferential and theoretical. Representational generalization is concerned with whether the findings from this study can be applied to other similar contexts. The focus of this study is on the role that power and trust play towards attaining efficiency in mandated collaboration network. The relationship between public funding and implementing actors was the focus with the pursuance of the implementation of policies. This implies that the findings of this study can be applied to any actor outside of this particular context who implement policies for the government and receive funding too from a shared resource with other actors. Inferential generalization on the other hand involves, the findings of the study being applicable to other mandated collaboration contexts outside of this current one (Ritchie & Lewis, 2003, p.266). This is looked at in terms of the time frame and transferability of the findings, of which with the former, even though the study has been carried out within a specific period of time, the internal processes do not change overnight since it is a mandated network and operates through government policies. Therefore it takes time to change the internal structures of the network and as such, I contend that the findings of this study can be applied to any similar mandated collaboration network regardless of time.

In terms of the transferability aspect, the findings of this study can however not be applied to similar mandated collaboration networks that as mentioned above receive funding from a common kitty, and involve several actors who are mandated by the government to implement its services. This study’s intent was to have a broad representation of actors from the three sectors, public, private and voluntary and community sectors however; I was unable to reach out to the private actors from both the profit and nonprofit oriented sectors. With these findings skewed more towards actors with public orientation, including the nonprofit actors who were formed by the public funding actors therefore transferring these findings out of this current context will not be possible.

In terms of theoretical generalization, the focus is on whether the findings of this study do contribute to the theory (Ritchie & Lewis, 2003, p.266). The findings of this study certainly contribute to the trust, power, efficiency, mandated collaboration network and governance theories. Findings such as the existence of relational trust albeit at a personal level, do contribute to trust building efforts by managers in mandated collaboration network and as such towards the trust theory. Equally, despite the use of control mechanisms, the findings also show that the commitment of the actors is not as a result of; rather it is because it is in their own interest to see to it that they meet the objectives and benefit from it. Therefore the use of power in this context is not entirely coercive in the sense that, there is cooperation
from the actors which implies that trust building even though calculative trust is very high, can be nurtured in the network. Such findings do contribute towards the theory as well as to managers who play such roles in such contexts.

6.4.2 Reliability

The focus on reliability is on the consistency of the findings, with reliability seeking to find out if similar findings would be obtained in case a different study was conducted with similar approaches (Saunders, 2007, p.367). In order to ensure accuracy in the findings, this study was subjected to several iterative processes during the analysis stage to make sure the data obtained was consistent to the generated data as well verifying it through member checks and triangulation. Through this intense scrutiny, adjustments were made to ensure that the correct interpretation of the data was captured in the findings. Additionally, by going through the different processes of the research exercise, it is an indication of the rigor involved in ensuring that the findings of this study are reliable. The respondents, who were involved in the study, were selected purposively but independent of any bias since this topic is a very new topic to me, and with every interview I was gaining more insight. So any subjectivity on my part was not possible as well as conducting the interview with managers of the respective organizations ensured that I was better prepared and precise with the interviews bearing in mind time was of essence. The managers were equally knowledgeable and adapt at covering the extensive aspects of the interview in detail, so there was no comprise on the quality of the data collected. The data analysis process ensured that proper coding and pattern were revealed and triangulation and member checks performed to ensure that the data obtained was accurately interpreted. Therefore at all times, I maintained objectivity in the entire process.

6.5 Areas for Further Study

This study was unable to incorporate both the private sector profit and nonprofit oriented actors due to accessibility issues. Further research in this area would shed more light to the role that public funding and implementing actors comprising of public, private nonprofit and private profit actors would play in the implementation of the policies.

Additionally, further studies need to be done on the relational trust element existing in mandated collaboration network but at horizontal and not vertical levels. The findings show that the horizontal structure as well as the vertical structure is used among the public nonprofit implementing actors. The findings also show such relations existing internally within the public implementing actors as well as the public funding actors. A study thus done on the role that relational trust plays in horizontal relations within the mandated collaboration network will shed more light into the studies done in public network

Studies on efficiency usually approach it from an agency problem, with hidden knowledge and action as the emphasis. Further studies should be done seeking to find out how contextual matters, lead to efficiency not being attained with a focus on the managers. The findings here indicate that the public funding actors do contribute to delays through bureaucratic decision making processes and reimbursement as well as allocating insufficient funds. Studies should be done focusing on the contextual challenges that managers undergo in performing their activities.

6.6 Limitation

Accessibility to respondents was such a big concern; as such I was not able to reach out to the private profit oriented actors that would have made it the ideal mandated collaboration network study.
REFERENCES


LIST OF APPENDICES

APPENDIX 1- Interview Guide

Public Sector
  1. Network Governance
What is the name of your organization and how was it formed?
What are your objectives? Who are the different stakeholders involved in the activities that you do? Can you please list their names?
What is the role of the government in this partnership that you have?
How did you become a manager? What are your roles and responsibilities as a manager?
How do you decide on the roles and responsibilities?
  2. Mandated Collaboration Network
How do you express your interest to the public to vie for government tenders?
What criteria do you use to award these tender to the public?
How do you communicate to them about the outcome of their application? Probe
What are the terms of the contract if the actor has been awarded the contract?
Do the public have any input in the final contract? If yes, state what kind of input they have and if no, why?
How do you track the progress of the implementation of the contract?
What are the implications if the terms of the contract have not been met by the actors?
Is there room for redress in case of misunderstandings between your organization and the actors that you supervise? If yes, how do you resolve it?
  3. Power
How often do you communicate with your partners? Please state the number in days or months.
What kind of medium do you use for communication? Do you specify to them how they should communicate with you?
How about the end users of the services that you deliver? How do they get access to such information? What medium do you use to target them?
Where do you meet in case of any meetings? Are these specific designated places for your meetings with you partners?
Are the partners supposed to give you any updates prior to your meetings? If yes, what?
What do you do to partners to ensure they meet their obligations? What are the implications if the partner does not meet their obligation?
Do you give them any incentives?
  4. Trust
Do you think the partners understand the main objective of the partnership? How do you ensure they do it?
How do you relate with your partners that you fund? Do they report to you any difficulties that they are faced with? If yes, what? If no, could you know the reason why?
Does prior experience influence your decisions in selecting a partner after the bid has been called?
How about if the participants have worked in a project as yours and they share the same goals as yours? Does it play a role in your selection process? Does a partner’s commitment level indicate that they will fulfill their tasks? How do you tell one’s commitment level?
How is information disseminated on completion of the work? How does the government and society obtain information on the performance of the projects?
What do you do with the feedback obtained from these briefing exercises that you perform to the different stakeholders? How do you ensure that you improve?

5. Efficiency
What do you understand by the term efficiency?
What do you consider as a satisfactory job done by your partners?
Do you consider the costs, quality and quantity of the outcome of the partners? What exactly is the optimum situation?

Interview Guide—Public Sector Level 11

6. Network Governance
What are the objectives of your network? Who are the different stakeholders involved in the activities that you do? Can you please list their names?
What is the role of the government in this partnership that you have?
What role do you play in the partnership that you have with the private sector?
How did you become a manager? What are your roles and responsibilities as a manager?
How do you decide on the roles and responsibilities?

7. Mandated Collaboration Network
Donor questions

- How do you express your interest to the government to vie for contracts?
- What kind of interaction do you have with your donors?
- What do they expect from you in order to give you funding?

How do they communicate to you about their expectations from the funding that you receive?
Do you have any input in the activities that you undertake? If yes, state what kind of input do you have and if no, why?
How do you track the progress of the implementation of your goals?
Do your donors offer you any incentive?
Is there room for redress in case of misunderstandings between your organization and the actors that supervise you? If yes, how do you resolve it?
What are the implications if you have not met the expectations that your donors have specified to you in the contract?

With private sector

- What kind of interaction do you have with your partners?
- What do your partners expect from you in turn?
- What do you expect from your partners?
- What incentive do you offer your partners in order for them to associate their activities with yours?
Is there room for redress in case of misunderstandings between you and the partners? If yes, how do you resolve it?

8. Power
How often do you communicate with your partners? Please state the number in days or months.
What kind of medium do you use for communication with your donors and partners? Do you specify to your partners and do your donors in turn specify to you how communication should take place?
Where do you meet in case of any meetings? Are these specific designated places for your meetings with you donors/partners?

9. Trust
Do you think the partners understand the main objective of the partnership? How do you ensure they do it?
How do you relate with donors/partners? Do they report to you any difficulties that they are faced with? If yes, what? If no, could you know the reason why?

Potential Investors/Clients
Do prior experience, same goals and commitment level influence your decisions in selecting a partner after the bid has been called?
How is information disseminated on completion of the work? How does the government, society obtain information on how the projects have been performed?
What do you do with the feedback obtained from these briefing exercises that you perform to the different stakeholders? How do you ensure that you improve?

10. Efficiency
What do you understand by the term efficiency? What do you consider as a satisfactory job done by your partners? What about your donors?
Do you consider the costs, quality and quantity of the outcome of the partners? What exactly is the optimum situation?

Private and Voluntary Community Sectors Actors-Interview Guide

1. Network Governance
What is the name of your organization? How was it formed?
What are the objectives of your organization? How did you come up with these objectives?
Where are your activities based and who decides the scope and coverage of your activities?
What is your position in your organization?
How did you get these roles and responsibilities?
Do you work with other organization or agencies? Can you list them?
On what basis do you work with them?
Have you ever worked with National Agency 2? What kind of relationship do you have with them? What about with National Agency 1? How did you get in contact with them?

2. Mandated Collaboration Network
What requirements are you expected to possess to apply for the call of applications? Did you meet them?
Did you get any feedback from your application? Which medium was used?
If your application was successful, did they clearly state to you what activities were you expected to perform?
Did you have any input in the decision making process in the activities that you are expected to perform? If yes, state what kind of input did you have and if not, why?
Do you understand the activities that you are supposed to undertake? Have they been explained to you?
Do you think you will be able to accomplish it? If not, why?
Is there room for redress in case of misunderstandings between you and the partners that fund you? If yes, how do you resolve it?

3. Power
How often do you communicate with your donors/partners? Please state the number in days or hours.
What kind of medium do you use for communication? Do they specify to you how you should communicate with them?
Where do you meet in case of any meetings? Are there specific designated places for your meetings with your supervisors?
Do the donors/partners expect you to meet your obligations without fail? What are the implications if you do fail to meet them? What are your reasons for not meeting these obligations? Do they offer you any grounds to explain?
Do they try to encourage you to carry on with your assigned duties, if yes, what? (Do they give you any incentives? What exactly?)

4. Trust
Do you understand the main objective of the partnership that you have with the organization that is funding you?
Are the objectives clearly spelt out to you? Where do you find it?
How is your relationship with your supervisor? Do you like it? If yes, why? If no, state how you think it can be improved.
Do you report any difficulties that you are faced with to your supervisor? If yes, what? If no, could you know the reason why?

5. Efficiency
What do you understand by the term efficiency?
What is considered as a satisfactory job done by your funding partners?
Do they consider the costs, quality and quantity associated with your outcome? What exactly is the optimum situation?
What are the challenges that you face in achieving the stated outcome?
What remedies can you suggest?
APPENDIX 2: Letter to Respondents contacted directly

Hello **********,  
My name is Acan, Ramlat Ali, and I am a master’s student from Umea University currently undertaking my master’s thesis in Business development and internationalization on the role of power and trust in mandated collaboration networks. Mandated collaboration network is a complex type of network that has been formally formed by the government. It comprises of several interest groups and companies that come together with an aim of achieving a common goal, usually one that is of societal benefit for instance one of creating jobs in the region. My target group is funding institutions, nonprofit community based organizations, and profit based organizations, regional government and Kommun who are contributing to a common cause. My aim is to find out as I had earlier mentioned the role that power and trust plays in such situations so that these networks can realize their goals. I therefore ask that you provide me with some of your limited time towards my interview because I am positive your contribution will be valuable to my study as it will bring in your context’s insight to it.

On completion of my study, I will share the findings with you so that way you will be able to benefit from the insight too.

Please consider my urgent request and if it’s agreeable with you do let me know the time and date that we could conduct the interview. I look forward to hearing from you soon.

Acan, Ramlat Ali  
Student, Umea University,  
Umea
APPENDIX 3: Letter to respondents contacted through Snow ball sampling

Hello*****,
My name is Acan, Ramlat Ali and I am a master’s student from Umea University.
I got your contact address from ****** because I wanted to conduct an interview with you for my master’s thesis in Business development and internationalization on the role of power and trust in mandated collaboration networks.
Mandated collaboration network is a complex type of network that has been formally formed by the government. It comprises of several interest groups and companies that come together with an aim of achieving a common goal, usually one that is of societal benefit for instance one of creating jobs in the region. My target group is funding institutions, nonprofit community based organizations, and profit based organizations, regional government and kommuns who are contributing to a common cause.
My aim is to find out as I had earlier mentioned the role that power and trust plays in such situations so that these networks can realize their goals. I therefore ask that you provide me with some of your limited time towards my interview because I am positive your contribution will be valuable to my study as it will bring in the Region’s insight to it.

On completion of my study, I will share the findings with you, that way you will be able to benefit too.
Please consider my urgent request and if it's agreeable with you do let me know the time and date that we could conduct the interview. I look forward to hearing from you soon.
Acan, Ramlat Ali
Student, Umea University,
Umea
Regards,
Ramlat