Swedish refugee policymaking in transition?

Łukasz Górniok
Abstract

The aim of this dissertation is to examine the Swedish government’s responses to the Prague Spring, the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia, the anti-Semitic campaigns in Poland and, first and foremost, to Czechoslovak and Polish-Jewish refugees fleeing their native countries as a result of these events during the formative period of the late 1960s and early 1970s. This has been accomplished by examining the entire process from the decision to admit the refugees in 1968, to their reception and economic integration into Swedish society during the seven-year period necessary for acquiring Swedish citizenship. This study also analyzes discourses in Swedish newspapers relating to these matters and compares the media’s treatment of these two groups. The investigation is guided by factors influencing refugee policy formation such as bureaucratic choices, international relations, local absorption capacity, national security considerations, and Cold War considerations. Press cuttings, diplomatic documents, telegrams, protocols from the departments and government agencies involved, as well as reports from the resettlement centres, and, finally, refugees’ applications for citizenship form the empirical basis of this study.

The period under investigation coincides with three key developments in Sweden’s foreign, refugee, and immigrant policies – the emergence of a more activist foreign policy, the shift from labour migration to refugee migration and, finally, the shift from a policy of integration to multiculturalism. In this regard, the overarching objective of the study is to shed some light on these developments and to determine whether the arrival, reception, and integration of these refugees should be regarded as the starting point for new policies towards immigrants and minorities in Sweden, or if it should rather be seen as the finale of the policies that had begun to develop at the end of World War II.

The results demonstrate that Sweden’s refugee policy formation of the late 1960s and early 1970s was hardly affected by these major developments. It could be argued that a more active foreign policy was evident in the criticism of the events in Czechoslovakia and Poland and in the admission of the Czechoslovak of Polish-Jewish refugees to Sweden, but a detailed analysis of the motives shows that these decisions were primarily the result of international relations, national security considerations, and economic capacity, along with other considerations that had guided Swedish refugee policy in previous decades. Similarly, at the centre of Sweden’s reception of the Czechoslovak and Polish-Jewish refugees during the late 1960s and early 1970s was, like in previous decades, the labour market orientation of Sweden’s refugee policy. The Czechoslovaks and Polish-Jews did not experience any multiculturalist turn. Overall, Sweden’s responses to the Czechoslovak and Polish-Jewish refugees were consistent with the objectives developed at the end of World War II and thus did not represent a transition in Swedish refugee policymaking.

Keywords

Sweden, Czechoslovak refugees, Polish-Jewish refugees, Cold War, 1968-1972, active foreign policy, refugee policy, multiculturalism, national security, labour market considerations
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Uppsala, April 2016

*Lukasz Gorniok*
# List of abbreviations and acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AA</td>
<td>Arbetsförmedlingens Arkiv (The Swedish Public Employment Service Archives)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMS</td>
<td>Arbetsmarknadsstyrelsen (The Labour Market Board)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CC</td>
<td>The Coordination Committee for Activities for Polish-Jewish Youth in Scandinavia</td>
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<td>FAAC</td>
<td>Utrikesnämnden (The Foreign Affairs Advisory Committee)</td>
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<tr>
<td>HIAS</td>
<td>The Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICEM</td>
<td>The International Committee for European Migration</td>
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<tr>
<td>ID</td>
<td>Inrikesdepartementet, (The Ministry of Interior)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IU</td>
<td>Invandrarutredningen (Commission for Immigrant Investigation)</td>
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<tr>
<td>JC</td>
<td>Judiska Centralrådet (The Official Council of Swedish Jewish Communities)</td>
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<tr>
<td>JDC</td>
<td>The American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>JFA</td>
<td>Judiska församlingen i Stockholms Arkiv (The Jewish Community of Stockholm Archives)</td>
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<tr>
<td>KIF</td>
<td>Kommitten för intellektuella flyktingar (The Committee for Intellectual Refugees)</td>
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<tr>
<td>KSČ</td>
<td>Komunistická strana Československa (The Communist Party of Czechoslovakia)</td>
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<tr>
<td>LO</td>
<td>Landsorganisationen i Sverige (The Swedish Trade Union Confederation)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MFST</td>
<td>Mosaiska församlingen i Stockholm (The Jewish Community of Stockholm)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PZPR</td>
<td>Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza (The Polish United Workers’ Party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RA</td>
<td>Riksarkivet (The Swedish National Archives)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAK</td>
<td>Statens arbetsmarknadskommission (The National Labour Market Commission)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SEI</td>
<td>Socioekonomisk indelning (The Swedish socio-economic classification system)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SIV</td>
<td>Statens Invandrarverket (The National Immigration Board)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDU</td>
<td>Samarbetsnämnden för demokratiskt uppbygndasarbete (The Swedish Joint Committee for Democratic Reconstruction)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOU</td>
<td>Statens offentliga utredning (The Swedish Government Official Report)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UD</td>
<td>Utrikesdepartementet (The Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs)</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNRRA</td>
<td>The United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration</td>
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<tr>
<td>SUK</td>
<td>Statens utlänningskommission (The National Alien Commission)</td>
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<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</td>
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<tr>
<td>VPK</td>
<td>Vänsterpartiet Kommunisterna (The Left Party – the Communists)</td>
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PART I. ORIENTATION
1. Introduction

On 12 December 1970 Abram Gross, a Polish-Jewish refugee who had fled to Sweden one year earlier at the age of 49, wrote a letter to Gustaf Rudebeck, the senior administrative officer at the permit office of the National Immigration Board (Statens invandrarverket, SIV), the Swedish national authority for immigration control, telling the story of his arrival and reception in Sweden.\(^1\) He, along with close to 13,000 other people of Jewish background, had left Poland as a result of the Polish government’s anti-Semitic campaign, known as the ‘anti-Zionist’ campaign.\(^2\) The campaign itself began with the anti-Israeli policy in the aftermath of the Six-Day War in June 1967. Over time, it evolved into an anti-Semitic campaign, characterized by centuries-old and modern anti-Jewish prejudices with high levels of personal and societal discrimination, encouraging people of Jewish origin, many of whom did not identify themselves as Jews but as Poles, to leave Poland for Israel. This campaign and the exodus of the remnants of what used to be one of the largest and most vibrant Jewish communities in the world, caused considerable anxiety in many countries, especially in the United States and Israel. The Swedish government deplored the events and in December 1968 began to issue visas for Polish Jews interested in migrating to Sweden. Until the end of 1971, 2,696 Polish Jews arrived in Sweden.\(^3\)

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\(^1\) Abram’s real name has been changed to ensure confidentiality. This study follows other Swedish refugee research and regards Czechoslovaks and Polish Jews fleeing their countries in the late 1960s and migrating to Sweden between 1968 and 1972 primarily as refugees, alternatively refugee migrants. However, according to Heinz Fassmann and Rainer Munz, a distinction between these two groups should be made. The first group, Czechoslovaks, is correctly classified as political refugees because their migration was caused by the political crisis in Czechoslovakia. Polish Jews, however, following the Fassmann and Munz classification of European East-West migration during the Cold War period, should be regarded as ethnic migrants, since they belonged to an ethnic and religious minority of Poland and it was precisely this ethnic factor in the government-stimulated campaign that forced them to leave Poland. Heinz Fassmann and Rainer Munz, ‘European East-West Migration, 1945-1992’, The International Migration Review 28, no. 3 (1994): 527. Michael Marrus also places the Polish-Jewish migration among other ethnic relocations. Regarding the Czechoslovakian group, Marrus argues that they became refugees only after fleeing their country and settling in Western Europe or overseas. Michael Robert Marrus, The Unwanted: European Refugees in the Twentieth Century (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), 362. Dariusz Stola classifies both groups under the category of forced migrations. Dariusz Stola, ‘Forced Migrations in Central European History’, The International Migration Review 26, no. 2 (1992): 337.


\(^3\) This number includes those who arrived individually after being granted visas by the Swedish Embassy in Warsaw, and those who arrived as part of the Swedish resettlement programme from refugee camps in Austria and Italy, and is based on the calculations provided by the Jewish Community of Stockholm. See, for example, “Statistik över nya invandrare 1978-1972”, 23 May 1973, D 4 e:3, Flyktingsektionen, The archive of the Jewish Community of Stockholm (Judiska församlingen i Stockholms arkiv, JFA), The Swedish National Archives (Riksarkivet, RA).
Gross, along with his family, arrived in Sweden in mid-December 1969. After his arrival, he stayed at the reception centre (mottagningsförläggning) in Tylösand, located outside of Halmstad in the south-west of Sweden, where he completed Swedish language training. The stay ended in mid-April 1970 with a job placement in a warehouse in Malmö. However, not long after, Gross was fired due to, as he stated, his lack of language skills. He was enrolled in a new language training course in August 1970. It lasted four months, at the end of which he complained to Rudebeck that the training was insufficient for finding work in Sweden, or as he put it, “I guess that with this knowledge of language I will have difficulties getting a job.”

He argued for further vocational training to be able to find a job according to his ability and stressed that he had worked as a manager in a textile company prior to his migration. He hoped that Rudebeck would take an interest in his case, since “when leaving Poland I was informed by the Swedish Embassy that I would get a job in my field and all necessary steps to ensure that would be arranged.”

On 18 January 1971, Gross’s letter was forwarded to the Labour Market Board (Arbetsmarknadsstyrelsen, AMS), a government agency responsible for the labour market policy, which, in turn, asked the county division of the Labour Market Board (länsarbetsnämnden) in Malmö for a comment. A few days later, the board in Malmö informed AMS that no more language training could be offered to Gross since some doubts had been expressed concerning his ability to manage the vocational training. This negative assessment of Gross’s capability led Gösta Broborg, the senior administrative officer of AMS, to intervene. On 19 February 1970, Gross received a letter stating that although no language classes were available, the board would offer him vocational training.

However, not all cases were handled in the same way. On 11 March 1969, the administration of the Tylösand reception centre turned to AMS for the reimbursement of return travel from Sweden to Austria for Frantisek and Maria Kral, a Czechoslovak couple that had come to Sweden in mid-December 1968. The circumstances of the arrival of the Kral family differed from the Gross’ case. Firstly, the crushing of the reform movement in Czechoslovakia and the return of hardline communists in the late summer of 1968 drew critical reactions around the world. Like the Hungarians in 1956,
the Czechoslovaks who left their country after the Warsaw Pact invasion were perceived as courageous freedom fighters fleeing a communist regime and, thus, warmly welcomed in the West. The Swedish government showed sympathy towards those who fled or did not return to their native country in the weeks following the Soviet invasion. On 5 September, the government announced that all Czechoslovaks interested in migrating to Sweden should be granted visas and work permits, thus waving the normal requirement of sponsorship, potential employment or financial assistance for migration to Sweden. In the next months, until the end of 1971, 2,963 Czechoslovaks arrived in Sweden. This was a remarkable step, which perhaps could be related to Sweden’s refugee policy choices in 1943, when all Danish Jews were offered a safe haven by the Swedish government.

Like the Gross family, the Kral family was placed at the Tylösand reception centre and received basic language training. After the three months’ training had been completed, there was an attempt to find Frantisek Kral a job. The documentation provided by Erik Lundbom, the officer of the Tylösand reception centre, indicates that the administration of Tylösand enquired with ten companies about offering Kral a job. This endeavor underlines the fundamental principle of the Swedish refugee reception programme: all refugees should be placed in work, but no interest was given to their previous qualifications and work experience. This was a direct response to the needs of the Swedish labour market and was developed into policy after an increasing demand for labour at the end of World War II. In the Kral case, all attempts by the administration of Tylösand to find employment failed. The employers stated that they wanted a candidate with perfect Swedish language skills, and they stressed that they wanted someone younger. Frantisek Kral was 42 years old and prior to leaving Czechoslovakia he had worked as a construction engineer and his wife, aged 46, had worked as a clerk. After this failure, there were no further attempts to place him in work or to provide him with further language training. As a result, the Kral family asked for permission to return to Austria, where, as they claimed, better employment opportunities were available.

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8 This number includes those who arrived individually after the Swedish government offered the opportunity to migrate to Sweden, and those who arrived as part of the Swedish resettlement programme from refugee camps in Austria. For the former, see Ingvar Jönsson and Sam Ahlford to the Swedish Embassy in Prague, 21 Nov. 1968, E 3 A:7, Kanslibyrån, The archive of the National Alien Commission (Statens utlänningskommissionens arkiv, SUA), RA. For the latter, see Transport lists, E VII bb:8-12, Utlänningssektionen 1948-1972, AA.


10 Erik Lundbom to the Labour Market Board (Arbetsmarknadsstyrelsen, AMS), 11 Mar. 1969, E VII ba: 15, Utlänningssektionen 1948-1972, AA.
These two cases present different aspects of the Swedish policy towards refugees in the late 1960s and early 1970s. In fact, as we shall see, the experiences of the Gross and Kral families were not unique: since the end of World War II, both survivors of the Nazi Holocaust and individuals who had left their native countries for political reasons had, in the decades from the end of the war and until the late 1960s, experienced similar treatment. Since then, there was by no means a clear distinction between refugees and migrant workers. According to Lars Olsson, who examined the resettlement of Baltic refugees and liberated Polish concentration camp prisoners at the end of the war, the refugee policy became a part of the general labour policy and the entire political economy. The reception and subsequent attempts at integrating the Czechoslovaks and the Polish Jews arriving in Sweden in the late 1960s into the Swedish labour market has received little scholarly attention. This study will shed light upon these issues.

Yet, this dissertation will investigate the entire process of the acceptance, reception, and early economic integration into Swedish society of Czechoslovak and Polish-Jewish refugees. The late 1960s and early 1970s was a pivotal period of change in modern Swedish history. In particular, there were several key developments within Sweden’s foreign, refugee, and immigrant policies at this time. They will be presented in the following section of this chapter. By studying the entire process of the acceptance, reception, and early economic integration of the Czechoslovak and Polish-Jewish refugees it is possible to provide new knowledge on the Swedish government’s responses to these refugees – which is the main objective of this thesis – but also to shed some light on the above mentioned key developments and to determine whether the arrival, reception, and integration of these refugees should be regarded as the starting point for new policies towards immigrants and minorities in Sweden, or if it rather should be seen as the finale of the policies that had started developing at the end of World War II. Since the two groups arrived simultaneously, it is also possible to draw a comparison and analyze differences and similarities in the treatment of these two groups and consider what this reveals about the response of Swedish refugee policies.

**A pivotal period of change**
The late 1960s and early 1970s was, as indicated above, a turning point in Swedish history in many regards. Firstly, the second half of the 1960s signaled an important breakthrough for a new vision of Swedish foreign policy, the so-called **activism**. This approach brought Sweden to the forefront of world attention, not least since it meant that there was emphasis

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placed on democratic values, social justice, and aid to liberation movements. It resulted in a conduct which, as Ann-Sofie Nilsson claims, “hardly matched its [Sweden’s] size and objective international position.”

The foundations of the new, active foreign policy approach were laid, as Ulf Bjereld, Alf W. Johansson, and Karl Molin note, by the relaxation of East-West hostility, taking place after the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, but also as a consequence of certain major ideological reorientations, such as the general political radicalization at that time. This is not to say that before the 1960s, Sweden had remained silent about major international events. During the 1950s, as Hans Lödén points out, Sweden’s active advocacy was evident in the criticism of Communist pressure in Hungary, in the first United Nations Emergency Force action in the Suez Crisis, and, later on, in the United Nations’ military intervention in Congo. Tage Erlander, the Swedish prime minister, advocated a nuclear disarmament programme and the idea of the “non-atomic-club” presented to the First Committee of the UN General Assembly.

However, the actual shift towards the active foreign policy began with the change of leadership of the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs (Utrikesdepartementet, UD) in 1962. The new foreign minister, Torsten Nilsson, broke from his predecessor Östen Undén’s small-state diplomacy and placed more emphasis on involvement in world politics, especially in the areas of human rights, international cooperation, and providing aid to developing countries. According to Robert Dalsjö, this was also a clear shift in a more pragmatic direction towards “the traditional Swedish security policy”. In 1965, Foreign Minister Nilsson defined the new role of the state in the following way:

I am not inclined to allot Sweden the role of world conscience to which all parties concerned can be expected to listen. Sweden is a small country whose opinions do not carry particular weight in international contexts. However, in view of our firm anchorage in the democratic ideals of freedom and justice and because of the fact that we are not committed to any Great Power bloc, situations may arise in which our voice arouses more attention than is actually warranted by our size in the international family of nations.

Over time, the new active approach manifested itself in protests against all forms of persecutions and violence, especially against American bombings in

Vietnam, and in a willingness to mediate in conflicts or support efforts aimed at protecting the oppressed. In 1967, Olof Palme, then minister without portfolio, declared that “the fundamental moral values of democratic socialism oblige us to stand, on each and every occasion, on the side of the oppressed against the oppressors.”\(^{17}\) One year later, Foreign Minister Nilsson stressed at the congress of the Social Democratic Party that “we are irrevocably involved in an international network of events which we must accept, whether we like it or not. We must make the best contribution possible within our power.”\(^{18}\) In this regard, the events in Czechoslovakia and Poland constituted the perfect occasion to confirm the new standpoint.

One important feature of the new foreign policy paradigm was that the support concerned primarily Asian and African countries: a step which, as noted by Bjereld, Johansson, and Molin, could, and in fact did, mean supporting the Communist side of the Cold-War division.\(^{19}\) According to Olof Kronvall and Magnus Petersson, Swedish-Soviet relations improved during the time of détente, especially after Sweden’s criticism of American bombings in Vietnam. This resulted in a number of bilateral visits.\(^{20}\) The advancement was also evident in relations with other Eastern bloc countries. In particular, as presented later in this study, a remarkable improvement in Polish-Swedish relations took place during the 1960s.

Thus, there is no doubt that there was a major change in Sweden’s foreign policy orientation in the late 1960s. How did this development relate to the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and the Polish government’s anti-Semitic campaign? Did the new foreign policy approach affect the development of Swedish refugee policy?

Secondly, as many scholars have noted, the late 1960s and early 1970s witnessed the beginning of a major shift in post-war immigration to Sweden, namely a shift from more or less free labour market immigration to refugee immigration.\(^{21}\) This change occurred after two decades of a liberal immigration policy related to remarkable industrial and economic prosperity. This period was characterized by a massive influx of foreign labour, primarily from the common Nordic-labour market established in 1954, and from the organized recruitment of workers from Yugoslavia, Italy, and Greece.\(^{22}\) In 1969, at the peak of the labour influx, more than 60,000

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\(^{17}\) Documents on Swedish Foreign Policy, vol. 1967 (Stockholm: The Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 1968), 47.


\(^{19}\) Bjereld, Johansson, and Molin, Sveriges säkerhet och världens fred, 251.


labour migrants came to Sweden, of which 75% arrived from neighbouring Nordic countries. All in all, from the end of the 1940s to the end of the 1960s, some 300,000 labour migrants arrived in Sweden.

Until that time, the influx of refugees to Sweden had not been particularly large. Between 1950 and 1967, as Malin Thor Tureby points out, some 15,000 refugees arrived in Sweden, which constituted only about 5% of the total immigration to Sweden. The Czechoslovaks and the Polish Jews constituted approximately 25% of total refugee migration to Sweden at that time. Overall, the refugees who came to Sweden from 1950, arrived primarily as a part of an annual refugee quota (flyktingkvot) accepted from refugee camps run by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), coming primarily from Eastern Europe. Due to the agreement with the International Refugee Organization (IRO), about 10% of refugees with Tuberculosis were included in the quota. Despite the yearly quota, in 1956 Sweden accepted some 8,000 Hungarian refugees fleeing from the Soviet Union. However, the recession and increasing unemployment in the early 1970s lowered the demand for foreign labour. In fact, the first restriction was imposed already in March 1967 and concerned work permits for non-Nordic labour migrants before their arrival in Sweden. According to Tomas Hammar, this measure was intended to benefit the other Nordic countries. In February 1972, as Christina Johansson discusses, the Swedish Trade Union Confederation (Landsorganisationen i Sverige, LO) instructed its member organizations to not grant visas for foreign workers. The Swedish government accepted this recommendation thereby putting an end to all labour migration from non-Nordic countries. As a result, the total number of migrants decreased substantially.

However, beginning in the early 1970s, the number of refugees and family reunifications from developing countries increased and constituted the main part of immigration to Sweden. From 1972, refugees from non-European

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28 Ingvar Svanberg and Mattias Tydén, Tusen år av invandring. En svensk kulturhistoria (Stockholm: Dialogos, 2005), 333.
parts of the world, mainly from Asia, Latin America, and Africa, constituted the majority of refugees entering Sweden. The first group to be accepted early in the new decade was a group of 800 Ugandan Asians expelled by Idi Amin.31 In 1973, the migration of Chilean refugees escaping the coup d'état against President Salvador Allende began and until 1979, this group of refugees numbered more than 7,000, many of whom were highly educated.32 The late 1970s saw the arrival of the Christian minority of Assyrians escaping religious persecution in the Middle East, along with refugees from Africa.33 They were classified as refugees according to the 1951 convention relating to the status of refugees. However, the practice established in the late 1960s was for war-rejecters and de facto refugees to be granted asylum. This practice was written into the law of 1976.34 During the 1980s, the number of refugees increased from Poland, Eastern Turkey, Iran, and Iraq. The reception of these refugees earned Sweden a reputation for generosity and solidarity towards those fleeing wars and conflicts. Thus, the arrival to Sweden of the Czechoslovaks and the Polish Jews took place exactly at the starting point of this development.

Finally, the arrival and early integration of Czechoslovak and Polish-Jewish refugees coincided with the period of the development and introduction of a new multiculturalist policy. Mats Wickström, who has examined this development, termed the period between 1964 and 1975 as Sweden’s “multicultural moment”. He argues that this is because of radical changes that took place in Sweden’s policy of multiculturalism within the framework of the expanding Swedish welfare state.35 This period began with the government’s growing concern about the information provided to immigrants. In 1966, the first committee to deal with migrant issues was appointed, and in 1967 the first newspaper for immigrants, entitled Invandrartidningen (The Journal for Immigrants), was established.36 Swedish language education was another key area addressed by the government. In 1968, the language training for immigrants became free of charge at all levels, and in 1972 a new law was introduced which stated that employers had to pay for Swedish language education for their foreign employees. In addition, as Tomas Hammar argues, policy changes

33 Lundh and Ohlsson, Från arbetskraftsimport till flyktninginvandring, 34.
34 Ibid., 82.
36 Widgren, Svensk invandrarpolitik, 15.
contributed to changes in official terminology: the term “alien” (utlänning), which had negative connotations, was replaced with the word “immigrant” (invandrare). One consequence of this change in official terminology was that the national agency responsible for immigration control changed the name from the National Aliens’ Commission (Statens utlännings-kommission) to the National Immigration Board (Statens Invandrarverk) in 1969.37

Meanwhile, the Swedish state took increasing responsibility for immigrants’ long-term integration into Swedish society. In 1968, a new government committee, the Commission for Immigrant Investigation (Invandrarutredningen), was assigned the task of formulating the new policy for immigrants and minorities in Sweden38 In 1974, the committee presented three principles of multiculturalism as the basis for a new policy on immigrants: “equality” of social and economic rights, including equal employment opportunities for immigrants, which should result in equal socio-economic outcomes; “freedom of choice” for each and everyone to determine their own cultural affiliation and identity; and, finally, “cooperation” between immigrants and society at large. On 14 May 1975, the Swedish parliament passed an act on a new immigrant and minority policy.39 For Charles Westin, it meant a “radical break” with the traditional policy of assimilation.40 The Czechoslovaks and the Polish-Jews were the first to experience this policy shift.

Thus, it is clear that the late 1960s and early 1970s was a turning point in the development of new Swedish foreign, refugee, and immigrant policies. Czechoslovak and Polish-Jewish refugees arrived in the middle of these transformations and were the first to experience the new models and policies. Clearly, a comprehensive analysis of the acceptance, reception, and economic integration of these refugees contributes to a better understanding of this formative period of Swedish history. It also adds a valuable dimension to several research areas, such as Cold War history, refugee policy, foreign policy, and integration policy.

The major aim of this study is to examine the Swedish government’s responses to Czechoslovak and Polish-Jewish refugees during the formative period of the late 1960s and early 1970s. These responses include specific decisions and actions (and inactions) pursued by the government and state institutions in relation to the refugees. In addition, this dissertation will investigate the policies and policy implementation of non-state institutions.

and committees related to Sweden’s reaction to these refugees. In order to better understand the above mentioned responses, especially that of the Swedish community towards the refugees, there is an attempt to investigate the discourses present in Swedish newspapers. These discourses can be expected both to mirror and to have guided the responses towards refugees.

A particular focus will be placed on Sweden’s reactions to the events in Czechoslovakia and Poland, Sweden’s policies towards those interested in migrating from these countries to Sweden, and the Swedish authorities’ management of those who arrived between 1968 and 1972. This includes both the arrival and reception procedures, and the outcome of the integration of these refugees after the seven year period necessary for acquiring Swedish citizenship. Thus, this study covers the entire process from the decision to admit the refugees, to their reception and economic integration into Swedish society.

Furthermore, the study aims to shed some light on the developments in Swedish refugee, immigration, and immigrant policies in general and particularly to determine whether the arrival, reception and integration of these refugees should be regarded as the starting point for new policies towards immigrants and minorities in Sweden or if it rather should be seen as the finale of the policies that had started developing at the end of World War II.

The final aspect of the dissertation concerns the comparative analysis of the management of these refugee groups, although all the above mentioned aspects will be investigated separately for each group, and a comparison of results will be conducted throughout the study. This is intended to determine the differences and similarities in the treatment of the groups and what they reveal about Swedish refugee policies.

**Factors affecting host government responses**

Clearly, with such a broad scope, there were many factors that affected the Swedish government’s responses to Czechoslovak and Polish-Jewish refugees. These factors need to be placed into a more general framework of interpretation. Such a framework is useful because it provides a clear and comprehensive approach to the above mentioned responses.

This dissertation focuses on the set of factors identified by Karen Jacobsen in her study on the policy responses to refugees by host governments in Africa, Asia, and Central America. Jacobsen identifies four categories of factors that play a major role in these responses: *bureaucratic choices, international relations, local absorption capacity, and national security considerations*. These categories seem to be general enough to go beyond

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the geographical areas of Jacobsen’s study and, thus, they can be used as a point of departure to investigate the Swedish government’s responses to the refugees as well as to the events causing refugee flight. The following discussion outlines these factors.

The first category mentioned by Jacobsen, *bureaucratic choices*, concerns prior administrative decisions regarding refugees. These previous legal-bureaucratic policy choices, as Jacobsen underlines, affected subsequent refugee policy actions. For example, she points to the prior allocation of responsibility for refugees to a specific government agency. In contrast to assigning this responsibility to a department with already numerous other responsibilities, such as the Social Welfare Department, assigning responsibility to a separate government agency, she claims, had a key impact on successive decisions on refugee matters. Jacobsen concludes that a separate agency is characterized by a higher level of interest in refugee matters, thus guaranteeing the pursuial of more positive refugee policies.42

The second category, named as *international relations*, concerns the environment within which the government that is receiving refugees is acting. Jacobsen sees this influence as emerging from two sources: *the international refugee regime* and *the relations with the sending countries*. The international refugee regime affects the state’s behavior in a twofold manner: by employing incentives, such as financial support, and by enhancing pressures, primarily by using the threat of bad international publicity. Relations with the country from which the refugees are fleeing play a significant role because, as Jacobsen underlines, most countries adjust their responses depending on the refugees’ native country.43

One important factor that is not included in Jacobsen’s study was the influence of *Cold War considerations*. This was because the Cold War’s influence had no or very little importance on the refugee policy responses of developing countries, while at the same time it strongly influenced the resettlement policies in the West after the establishment of communist dictatorships behind the Iron Curtain. The most explicit example is the use of refugees by Western governments as tools in foreign policy and, in particular, as a way of reaching a strategic propaganda victory over the Communists. An illustration of this can be found in a work of Gil Loescher and John A. Scanlan that shows how the refugees were used for foreign policy purposes by the United States during the Cold War.44 Michael S. Teitelbaum observes that the refugees were used for foreign policy purposes

42 Ibid., 661.
43 Ibid., 664.
by both the sending and the receiving states. In addition, as it will be explained in the later part of the study, this factor was interrelated with other factors, such as national security considerations. Therefore, this factor will be added to Jacobsen’s model and used in the analysis.

The third category, local absorption capacity, is, according to Jacobsen, determined by two variables: economic capacity and social receptiveness. The former seems to be the major determinant of a country’s refugee policies. Jacobsen explains that economic capacity is determined by variables such as land availability, the carrying capacity of the land, employment patterns, and infrastructure. These considerations are discussed in a vast number of scholarly works, showing the priority of economic over moral concerns, something that is of special interest given the alleged stress on the moral dimensions of Swedish foreign policy during the period under consideration. For example, Kim Salomon’s study of the reception of the early Cold War refugees shows that the potential economic benefits influenced Western governments’ refugee choices. Salomon argues that these countries admitted displaced persons and refugees on the basis of purely selfish motives. The arrival of these people was perceived as an “injection to the labour market”, but in public emphasis was placed on the altruistic motives for refugee policy choices. This process stopped when the most attractive refugees, from the point of view of the labour market, had already been resettled. Gerard Daniel Cohen’s study of the adaptation of war refugees and deportees into French society reveals that state-organized efforts were aimed at redirecting these individuals to occupations regarded as being of national importance. High levels of education as well as intellectual skills were perceived as serious obstacles to integration. Diane Kay and Robert Miles also emphasize the role of economic interest behind the resettlement of refugees from Displaced Persons camps after the war. Lars Olsson has made the same point for Sweden. Madelaine Tress highlights the critical role of economic interest for the reception of Soviet refugees in the US and Germany in the post-Cold War period. Thus, the

50 Olsson, On the Threshold of the People’s Home of Sweden.
economic capacity variable was often regarded in terms of labour market considerations, which will also be the case in the present investigation.

Social receptiveness is the second variable determining local absorption capacity. Jacobsen states that this factor is complex and can be influenced by cultural, historical, and religious conditions. In particular, Jacobsen argues, ethnic affinity, “closeness”, and kinship ties between the group fleeing and the majority population in the receiving country can largely affect the willingness of the receiving community to accept refugees.\(^5^2\) Previous experiences of receiving refugee groups, or the tradition of offering refuge, can also affect responses. Beliefs about the motivations of refugees are another variable that can affect a community’s receptiveness. In particular, the more knowledge about the negative conditions in the country from which the refugees are fleeing, the higher the community’s sympathies. Jacobsen also pays particular attention to the role of opinions expressed both in society at large and in the field of domestic politics. The response of the local community is important, she claims, because the community can assist refugees directly, or can put pressure on the government’s refugee policy through protests and demonstrations, forcing the government to react. Similarly, opposition parties can force the government to react by exploiting refugee issues for political purposes.\(^5^3\) Two of these aspects will be dealt with in this dissertation: the community’s response and domestic political considerations.

The final category concerns national security considerations. According to Jacobsen, there are three major approaches for detecting the origin of security threats. The traditional approach assumes that these threats can arise either externally, when the presence of refugees leads to external aggression, or internally, when the refugees themselves are regarded as constituting a threat to the state. The revisionist approach, Jacobsen explains, incorporates environmental or socioeconomic factors, such as natural catastrophes, which affect a host government’s response to refugees. The third conception focuses on the structural dimension. It assumes that security threats can arise through refugees’ demands on available resources. Jacobsen emphasizes that these concerns lead to negative refugee policy responses from the host state.\(^5^4\) Like economic influences, security threats are regarded as major determinants of a receiving country’s refugee policies. David Forsythe stresses the primacy of perceived national security needs and their interplay with economic interests over other aspects in humanitarian


\(^{5^3}\) Ibid., 671.

politics.\textsuperscript{55} Cecilia Nottini Burch argues that issues relating to refugees can lead a hostile state to threaten to take actions against the host state.\textsuperscript{56}

**Systems theory**

When presenting these factors, Jacobsen refers to the main principles of systems theory. This approach, introduced by David Easton in the late 1950s, sees political processes as a system of behavior open to input from the environment in which it exists. The system constantly absorbs these influences and transforms them into outputs, primarily decisions and actions. These outputs, as presented in Figure 1, return to the environment and through a continuous feedback loop constitute the ‘new’ inputs for the system.\textsuperscript{57}

\begin{center}
\textbf{Figure 1.} The Basic Political System, by David Easton, 1965.
\end{center}

Since its introduction, as Michael Clarke points out, this approach has been used as a methodology for the study of political actions.\textsuperscript{58} To its proponents, it is a universal tool that can be applied to all kinds of political phenomena. Anything in political science, systems theorists declare, can be seen as a system and analyzed according to its inputs and outputs. To its opponents, the method ignores the importance of ideas in political life and, furthermore, the complex and dynamic conception of the system makes analysis complicated and time-consuming. Thus, the approach is better suited for analyses of particular occasions or segments of a state’s behavior, as is the case in this study.\textsuperscript{59}

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{56} Notini Burch, \textit{A Cold War Pursuit}, 19.
\textsuperscript{59} The example that offers a macro analysis is a Michael Brecher’s study of Israeli foreign policy decision-making processes. Brecher explores all possible components of the political system in an international
\end{flushleft}
In refugee policymaking, Jacobsen argues, the inputs-outputs approach of systems analysis can be applied to a wide range of processes. For example, prior refugee policy decisions affect subsequent decisions, that is, earlier policy outputs become subsequent inputs. The value of systems theory is also evident when envisioning the influence of both internal and external factors on the formation of refugee policy. In other words, much of the refugee policy formation can be explained in terms of systems theory. This approach will therefore be used to investigate the Swedish government’s responses to Czechoslovak and Polish-Jewish refugees during the formative period of the late 1960s and early 1970s.

**Immigrants’ occupational mobility**

The final part of the dissertation is concerned with the results of the refugees’ economic integration into Swedish society. In particular, it focuses on the impact of migration on their occupational mobility. It also attempts to assess whether the outcome of their integration was partly determined by the new policies of integration.

Occupational mobility is interesting for several reasons. Firstly, it is recognized that the physical act of moving from one place to another involves changes in occupational status. Ian McAllister points to several factors that have strong economic influences on subsequent careers. These are language skills, qualifications, family and social networks, but also the opportunities and experiences in the society to which the refugees have fled – the latter is determined by the policies of integration. Secondly, a study of occupational mobility allows a comparison between the ways in which the immigrants’ careers developed over time with that of the native population. The occupational mobility of immigrants can thus be used as an indicator of a state’s integration policy. Finally, the study of the occupational mobility of Czechoslovaks and Polish Jews is interesting because this process took place at the time of the development and introduction of the new multiculturalist policy in the 1970s.

Two components or variables are necessary in order to be able to analyze the impact of migration on occupational mobility. One is the pre-migration work history of the individuals involved, and the second concerns their post-immigration work experiences. Barry R. Chiswick suggests a U-shaped relations context: a complex environmental setting which refers to potentially relevant factors that may affect a state’s behavior; the communication network which determines the flow of information about the operational environment to decision-makers, decision-making elite, and their attitudes and perceptions, and the formulation and implementation of policy choices. Michael Brecher, *Foreign Policy System of Israel: Setting, Images, Process* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972).


pattern between these two employment experiences. This process begins with the occupational downgrading upon arrival, followed by a subsequent gradual adjustment to the new environment. The first phase relies on the degree of international transferability of the individual’s skills, education, and experience. The lower the transferability of skills, the larger the decline in occupational status. In addition, certain occupations require country-specific certifications (i.e., doctors, nurses, and teachers), while others are associated with specific human capital valued by one type of employer (i.e., government employees and civil servants). The skills of lawyers are less transferable than the skills of medical doctors and economists because of country-specific legal systems. The decline in occupational status from the act of migration is, as indicated above, followed by a subsequent rise over time. The degree of improvement is related to the initial decline. The steeper the decline, the steeper the subsequent increase. Furthermore, it depends on post-immigration investments, i.e., learning about the labour market, acquiring new skills, and obtaining necessary licenses. According to Chiswick, immigrants without skills or with only very low level skills are not likely to make large investments in skills in the country of destination for the same reasons that they did not acquire skills in their counties of origin. Thus, the U-shaped pattern is steepest for professionals with less-transferable skills and is least steep for immigrants who are very low-skilled or unskilled when they arrive.

With this in mind, researchers have examined various socio-economic factors that could affect an immigrant’s performance. Mary G. Powers and William Seltzer have demonstrated that women experience much lower initial status and less occupational mobility than men. Gilles Grenier and Li Xue stress the importance of the initial year after migration in finding a first job in the immigrants’ intended occupation. Research has also found that refugees have a deeper U-shaped pattern then economic migrants.

67 The gap between these two groups has been explained by the different set of noneconomic refugee calculations and a diverse composition of the refugee group. Chiswick, Lee, and Miller, ‘A Longitudinal Analysis of Immigrant Occupational Mobility’, 332–53. George J. Borjas discusses the differences between refugees and labour immigrants with regard to human capital characteristics and the period of arrival. George J. Borjas, ‘The Self-Employment Experience of Immigrants’, The Journal of Human Resources 21, no. 4
Kalena E. Cortes’ research comparing refugees and labour migrants’ performance in the labour market of the country of destination shows that after 15 years of living in the United States, the refugee group earned 20% more and had improved their English skills by 11% more than economic migrants. While this study does not aim to compare refugees and economic migrants, the basic hypothesis derived from previous research is that the refugee group should be expected to experience occupational decline from the act of migration, with a subsequent and substantial growth through the duration of their stay in the new country.

**Swedish refugee policy responses, 1914-1968**

After discussing the theoretical underpinnings regarding the factors affecting governments’ responses to refugees and concerning the outcome of integration into the labour market of the country of destination, this chapter turns to and reviews the development of Swedish refugee policymaking, including immigration and immigrant policies, during the approximately five decades that elapsed from the first contact of the modern state of Sweden with refugees during the First World War until the arrival of the Czechoslovak and Polish-Jewish refugees in the late 1960s. Overall, the Swedish refugee policy, as well as immigration and immigrant policies, went through extraordinary transformations during that period. How has previous research understood and described these developments? What were the factors that affected the Swedish government’s responses during this period?

The development of Swedish refugee policy and how scholars have studied these developments will be presented in chronological order in an effort to analyze not only the policy choices, but also to better reflect on the factors – using Jacobsen’s framework – influencing these choices. It begins with a review of the restrictive approach in the 1920s and the striking level of economic nationalism and anti-Semitism in the 1930s. The second part will present the shift to a more generous policy that previous research has situated in 1942 and the increasing role of labour market considerations. The third part presents the critical role of international influences and security interests in post-war refugee policy choices.

**Restrictive policy of the early 20th century**

Prior to 1914, Sweden was not a country of immigration or refuge, but a country of emigration. Sweden’s first contact with refugees took place during the First World War, when a group of refugees from the Russian Revolution

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began to arrive in Sweden. In response, the government authorities attempted to stop the unwanted immigration.\(^69\) However, already in 1914, restrictions preventing foreigners, primarily Roma people, from settling in Sweden had been introduced and three years later, in connection to the Bolshevik revolution, the passport and visa system was instituted. According to Carl Henrik Carlsson, East European Jews were included in discussions regarding groups that should be kept out of the country, but the 1914 legislation did not specifically mention East European Jews.\(^70\) The restrictions against foreigners remained over the next two decades.

In 1927, Sweden’s first immigration law, the Aliens Act, was enacted. Tomas Hammar, who in his dissertation from 1964 examined Swedish immigration legislation between the years 1900 and 1932, argues that this Act was determined by a mix of protectionist, nationalist, and racist motivations. The official aim of this Act was to protect the Swedish labour market from foreign competition and to protect the Swedish “race” from foreign elements. Foreigners were not allowed to compete with Swedes on the labour market.\(^71\)

Hans Lindberg, in his discussion of the Aliens Act of 1937, comes to a similar conclusion regarding the mix of factors influencing Swedish refugee policy during the 1930s.\(^72\) He also points to anti-Semitism as one among a number of factors influencing the legislation. Steven Koblik claims that anti-Semitic motives had a central role in Swedish refugee policies at that time.\(^73\) More recently, Karin Kvist Geverts argued that Swedish authorities discriminated against Jewish refugees on the basis of racial categorizations similar to the Nuremberg Laws of 1935. She claims that this racial categorization of Jews was seen as legitimate by Swedish society, since it was not met with any criticism.\(^74\) Pontus Rudberg reveals that the racial motives behind the 1927 legislation still applied in the second Aliens Act of 1937.\(^75\)

Set against these restrictive policies was a huge effort by voluntary organizations and individuals on behalf of those few individuals permitted to

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\(^69\) Svanberg and Tydén, Tusen år av invandring, 252.
remain in the country. These efforts included financial support, since the employment was reserved only for Swedish citizens, and advisory services, organized by Sweden’s Jewish associations, such as the Jewish Community of Stockholm (Mosaiska församlingen i Stockholm, MFST), and various aid organizations, not least the Labour Movement Refugee Relief (Arbetarrörelsens flyktinghjälp), but also Christian relief organizations. Rudberg, who has examined discourses within the MFST relating to Jewish refugees, shows that contrary to what has been assumed the MFST tried to get more Jewish refugees into Sweden, but was constrained by the need to adjust to the government’s policy and by the lack of economic resources.76

Malin Thor Tureby has analysed the history of the Swedish branch of the Zionist youth movement Hechaluz. The Hechaluz was a worldwide Jewish youth movement designed to prepare chaluzim (youth pioneers) for agricultural life in Palestine. In Sweden, the program included a small number of German Jewish refugees and the training was organized through in-farm-living education on Swedish farms.77

The policy shift of 1942

The attitude towards Jewish refugees changed dramatically in the autumn of 1942, when the news about the deportation of Norwegian Jews reached Sweden. Swedish priests, bishops, trade union activists, journalists, and politicians protested and, as a result, the Swedish government decided to welcome the Norwegian Jews that had managed to escape deportation, thereby saving the lives of some 900 people. The support was also provided for non-Jewish Norwegian refugees who left the country during the German occupation. From that point on, refugee immigration increased rapidly. In the autumn of 1943, the Swedish government engaged in saving the lives of Danish Jewry. As a result, about 8,000 Jews and 2,000 non-Jews were smuggled across the strait separating Denmark from Sweden. Swedish aid efforts were also implemented abroad. In mid-1944, Raoul Wallenberg, a Swedish diplomat recruited by the American War Refugee Board, together with his colleagues and assistants, issued Swedish protective passports to Jews in Budapest, saving some 7,000 people from deportation. Furthermore, in the autumn of 1944, Sweden received some 34,000 Baltic, 1,500 Ingrian, and 3,000 Russian refugees, and on top of that about 70,000 people who were evacuated from Finland.78 In the spring of 1945, Folke Bernadotte and


78 Byström, En broder, gäst och parasit, 56.
the Swedish Red Cross started to rescue prisoners from the labour and concentration camps in Germany. It is estimated that between 17,000 and 20,000 mainly Polish, French, Belgian, and Dutch prisoners, including 4,000 Jews, were transported to Sweden just before the end of the war. In July 1945, through the auspices of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA), Sweden received about 10,000 former prisoners, mainly Polish-Jewish survivors.79

All of this was a radical departure from the inter-war period in which refugees were accepted only in exceptional cases. This shift has been interpreted from several perspectives. Klas Åmark argues that the change of attitudes towards the Jewish refugees took place after Swedish politicians realized the scale and scope of the violence perpetrated by Nazi Germany, especially when the Nazis commenced large-scale killing operations.80 Paul A. Levine argues that in late 1942 Swedish officials understood the consequences of “the wrong response” and shifted its indifferent attitude towards an active one. The shift was aimed at improving Sweden’s reputation and strengthening the Swedish position in the soon to come post-war period.81 Mikael Byström refers to shared identity and history among Scandinavians. He introduces the concept of “Nordic prerogative”, according to which Sweden regards itself as responsible for ethnic Nordic “brothers”, primarily ethnic Northerners. According to this interpretation, Norwegian and Danish Jews were rescued due to the fact that they were Nordic citizens, not because they were Jewish. They were not regarded as equal to “ethnic” Norwegians or Danes, and were perceived as problematic and troublesome.82 Kvist Geverts agrees that anti-Semitism was explicit towards Norwegian and Danish Jews through the continued racial categorization of these individuals. She claims that anti-Semitic declarations were absent in the official statements, but constituted a background bustle affecting government policies and actions.83 Thus, several determinants identified in Jacobsen’s model, such as international relations, economic capacity, as well as “closeness” and kinship ties between the group fleeing and the majority population in the receiving country related to social receptiveness, appeared to be evident in previous research on the policy shift of 1942.

The growing influx of refugees and the increasing demand for labour, caused by the mobilization of troops and structural changes in agriculture, during the war led the Swedish government to reevaluate its attitudes and

79 Olsson, On the Threshold of the People's Home of Sweden, 18.
81 Levine, From Indifference to Activism, 282.
82 Byström, En broder, gäst och parasit, 262.
83 Kvist Geverts, Ett främmande element i nationen, 291.
policies towards the refugees. Now, the refugees should support themselves by working and thereby contribute to the Swedish economy.\textsuperscript{84} The details of these procedures are analyzed in a study by Lars Olsson on the placement of Baltic and Polish refugees and former concentration camp inmates who arrived in Sweden at the end of the war to work. Initially, as Olsson shows, the refugees were regarded as temporary guests who would return to their native countries immediately after the war. They were placed in sectors with the lowest wages and most unpleasant working conditions, such as forestry, agriculture, and peat work, areas where there was a shortage of labour.\textsuperscript{85} Commenting on that, Sven Nordlund writes, “Whereas previously refugees had been regarded as a drain on the economy, now they were increasingly seen as a resource to be exploited.”\textsuperscript{86}

In March 1943, the Swedish authorities made it legal for refugees to accept employment within the above mentioned areas. The institution responsible for the provisioning of work for refugees was a special Aliens Section within the National Labour Market Commission (\textit{Statens arbetsmarknadskommission}, SAK). The employment procedures were carried out at reception centres administrated by SAK’s county labour boards.\textsuperscript{87} In 1944, after the arrival of the Baltic refugees, the state took full responsibility for all refugees in Sweden. From then on, the support was organized in the same way as for Swedish citizens and included maternal and health support provided by the Government Board of Refugee Relief (\textit{Statens flyktingsnämnd}).\textsuperscript{88} In July 1944, the responsibility for dealing with foreigners was allocated to the National Alien Commission (\textit{Statens utlänningskommission}, SUK). This included all refugee matters, such as the supervision of the reception centres, and, in cooperation with the SAK, placement of refugees in work settings.\textsuperscript{89} Regarding the Baltic refugees, Olsson writes that all able-bodied refugees were obliged to take the work offered in branches of industry that were crucial for the national food supply, like in the beet fields. The county labour boards were obliged to report the results and were instructed to organize special work camps for refugees who refused to take state employment. These refugees had to reckon with serious consequences, such as a withdrawal of financial support or an eviction from the camp. No interest was shown in the refugees’ qualifications or experiences. In addition, a final date for the evacuation of the camps was set.

\textsuperscript{85} Olsson, \textit{On the Threshold of the People’s Home of Sweden}, 57.
\textsuperscript{87} Olsson, \textit{On the Threshold of the People’s Home of Sweden}, 58.
\textsuperscript{88} Byström, \textit{Utmaningen}, 274.
\textsuperscript{89} Olsson, \textit{On the Threshold of the People’s Home of Sweden}, 33.
by the SAK because of the arrival of survivors from the Nazi labour and concentration camps. This group was also seen as a relatively large group of able-bodied people that could be used to meet the demand for labour harvesting beets and peat. Just as in the case of the Baltic refugees, these newcomers were accommodated at reception centres administrated by SAK’s county labour boards. The same authority was responsible for choosing suitable employers. This situation changed in late 1945, when the Swedish authorities realized that these people were not planning to return to their native countries, but instead preferred to stay in Sweden. As a response, their official status was changed from repatriates to refugees, and they had to leave the camps and begin work just like other labour migrant groups. Like Olsson, Mikael Byström claims that despite this change in status there was still no interest in their education, qualifications, or special skills. The only exception was made for refugees with high academic degrees, who were offered positions as archive workers.

Undoubtedly, from close to 5,000 refugees in July 1939 to about 185,000 at the end of the war, Sweden went through an extraordinary transformation in its refugee policy. Seemingly, the public awareness of the increasing violence by Nazi Germany and pragmatic considerations to improve the country’s reputation played a significant role in this shift. Yet, the single factor that influenced Swedish refugee policy the most was the economic one. The refugees, as Olsson emphasizes, were to be placed within areas where, due to low wages and poor working conditions, the demand for labour was largest, and they were not to compete with native Swedish workers for other employment. He depicts this period as a time when the Swedish refugee policy became directly dependent upon labour market policy. Olsson concludes that the reception of Baltic and Polish-Jewish refugees brought Swedish refugee policy one step closer to an active labour market policy. In this case, the primary role of the economic capacity factor was more than evident.

**Post-war refugee policy choices**

Following the end of the war, Swedish industry increased and the economy grew dramatically. At the same time, shortage of labour became a crucial consideration as most refugees returned to their native countries. Initially, the gap was to be filled with Nordic workers, but in 1946 the government appointed the Working Committee for Foreign Labour (*Beredningen för*...
Beginning in 1947, the collective recruitment of highly qualified professional workers from Italy, Austria, and Hungary began. Attila Lajos, who has examined the import and reception of Hungarian labour between 1947 and 1949, observes that these workers were attractive due to their good knowledge of agricultural work and were brought to Sweden to supply the demand for agricultural and forestry work. The import of Hungarian labour lasted until 1949, when the new Communist government of Hungary cancelled the agreement. Lajos shows that about half of the group, 464 people, returned to Hungary, while the others were granted status as political refugees by the Swedish immigration authorities. He also found that most of the Hungarian workers left agriculture and moved to the cities, but remained in low-status jobs. Rudolf Tempsch shows that another group that came to Sweden to mitigate the increasing labour shortage was the stateless Sudeten-Germans arriving between 1946 and 1955.

Johan Svanberg has examined an encounter at a local workplace between foreign workers, particularly a few hundred Estonian refugees who had fled to Sweden in the autumn of 1944, and Swedish workers, primarily those associated with the trade unions. Most of these encounters, as Svanberg shows, were marked by a series of conflicts concerning working-class solidarity. The lack of industrial working-class culture among the Estonians impacted Swedish narratives about the group. This, in turn, influenced the Estonian counter-narratives about Swedes: they perceived the workers’ mutual solidarity as a threat and initially chose not to join the trade union. Eventually half of the group joined, which, according to Svanberg, shows that the group was internally divided and that the counter-narratives changed over time.

The relationship between foreign workers and the trade union movement at a national level, namely the Swedish Trade Union Confederation (Landsorganisationen i Sverige, LO), was the subject of Jesper Johansson’s dissertation. From the very beginning, as Johansson claims, LO insisted on the same social and economic rights for immigrants and Swedish workers alike. However, the attitude towards the influx of migrant workers remained ambivalent. On the one hand, LO expressed a more generous attitude and

argued that the labour migrants were necessary for industrial growth. On the other hand, the LO opted for controlled labour immigration that should be adjusted to the labour market, housing, education, and social services. The stress on control became especially evident in the late 1960s and early 1970s, i.e. the period under consideration in this dissertation. During the 1970s, Johansson claims, LO advocated the integration and adaptation of immigrants to Swedish society. Like Johansson, Zeki Yalcin has investigated the formation of the LO policy towards migrants. He claims that LO’s prevailing attitude was to control all possible areas concerning the influx of foreign workers: immigration policies, immigrant policies, and the terms and conditions for the immigrant workers within the trade union movement.

After the war, the influence of Cold War considerations and national security considerations on Swedish refugee policies appears to be evident. In particular, the growing military potential of the Soviet Union and its expansionist tendencies in Central and Eastern Europe caused serious concern for Swedish politicians and affected Sweden’s approach to issues relating to Eastern European refugees. The fear of Soviet expansionism was enhanced by the fact that Russia had at least since the 18th century been regarded as the main threat to Swedish national security. The increasing military potential of the Soviet Union and gradual polarization of the world as a consequence of the Cold War, led the Swedish government to re-evaluate the concept of neutrality to nonalignment to any of the superpower blocs, a concept, which according to Peter Lyon, meant a “dissociation from the Cold War while, perhaps, involving efforts to remove or, at least, mitigate some of the harshness of the Cold War struggle”. In this regard, Swedish foreign policy objectives were to foster friendly but cautious relations with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), and in particular to reassure the USSR that Sweden would stay away from high politics and would not be used as a base for Western attacks against the Soviet Union. At the same time, fearing a Soviet invasion, Sweden remained firmly on the side of the West in the East-West conflict and secretly cooperated with NATO. Thus, as

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100 Peter Lyon, ‘Neutrality and the Emergence of the Concept of Neutralism’, The Review of Politics 22, no. 02 (1960): 266.
Alexander Muschik emphasizes, Sweden conducted a sort of ‘double game’ in international relations.\(^{101}\)

These security concerns played a large role in how Sweden approached refugee related issues from the end of World War II. This has been examined thoroughly in Swedish historiography focusing on refugees. According to Anders Berge, who has studied Sweden’s refugee policy towards Baltic and Russian refugees during and immediately after the war, Swedish-Soviet relations largely determined Sweden’s handling of these refugees. From 1942, as Berge points out, the Swedish government cooperated with the Soviet legation in Stockholm in matters related to Baltic refugees. In particular, extensive information on issues concerning to Baltic refugees was passed to the Soviet legation during the war. In June 1945, Swedish authorities asked these refugees to return to the Soviet Union using their own funds. They were also prohibited from criticizing the new Soviet regime in the Baltic countries. Within the same framework, Soviet authorities were allowed to implement a propaganda campaign in Swedish newspapers and in the Baltic refugee camps. In January 1946, the Swedish state deported some 150 Baltic refugees to the Soviet Union. Eventually, however, in spite of Soviet demands, Sweden’s policy towards the Baltic refugees changed and the Swedish government refrained from deporting any more Baltic refugees.\(^{102}\)

Cecilia Notini Burch, who has studied Sweden’s handling of Soviet refugees during the period from 1945 to 1954, shows that national security concerns turned these refugees into potential internal security threats, resulting in the security police’s hunt for suspicious foreigners in Sweden.\(^{103}\)

Beginning in the mid-1960s, there was a general easing of the strained relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. The neutrals, according to Robert L. Rothstein, perceived this situation as “an opportunity to maneuver at local levels”.\(^{104}\) Swedish leaders had a number of practical reasons to believe in the success of détente. Firstly, located in the close vicinity of the Soviet sphere, Sweden supported all initiatives aimed at easing strained relations with the USSR and thereby hoped to reduce this serious threat to the nation’s security. The commitment to the détente was also driven, as Carl-Gustaf Scott points out, by Sweden distancing itself from the

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United States after their involvement in the war in Vietnam, associated with the “moral turn” in Swedish foreign policy, discussed in the introduction. The Swedish government was particularly anxious that American policy in this conflict would overextend the US military budget and weaken its commitment to Europe. This uncertainty about protection against the Soviet Union together with a gradual criticism of U.S. military action in Vietnam led to an ever-growing rapprochement with the USSR, a policy which Scott compares to the one driven by the Federal Republic of Germany, the so-called Ostpolitik.105 The opening to the East was also driven by the wish to increase trade and investment with the Eastern bloc. Finally, Swedish leaders were well aware of the possibilities for active involvement and greater autonomy in the international power system after the relaxation of East-West hostility. These aspects led the Social Democratic leaders to be some of the first to embrace détente.

At the beginning of the Cold War, international influence on Swedish refugee policymaking primarily came from the Western bloc. Beginning in 1948, as Mikael Byström and Pär Frohnert point out, the negative attitude towards the Soviet Union increased and Sweden positioned itself closer to the Western side.106 At the same time, international influences from the West, especially those emerging from the international refugee regime, began to determine Swedish refugee policy decisions. In 1954, Sweden ratified the 1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. According to the Convention, a refugee is

a person who owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.107

This convention, as James C. Hathaway puts it, was used as a strategic political tool by the West against the Soviet bloc. It emerged as a response to the need to define the legal status of those fleeing their countries, mainly illegally, after violent reprisals and state-run campaigns, of which many were exploited to demonize Communist regimes. Gil Loescher points out that the formulation of the convention, particularly the phrase, “fear of persecution”, left a lot of space to interpret the definition according to each signatory’s immigration law.108 Laura Madokoro adds that the common practice was to

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implement only certain aspects of the convention. Sweden did not restrict its refugee policy to the formal sense of the term. The status of refugee was applied to individuals who had been persecuted or were in danger, and had been able to leave their country.

At the same time, the Swedish government did not conform entirely to the Western political strategy to reach a strategic propaganda victory over the Communist states. Notini Burch argues that Sweden did not make the same political use of Soviet and Eastern European exiles as other Western countries, since this could affect its credibility as nonaligned in the eyes of the Soviet Union.

This was also true in 1956, when Sweden engaged itself on behalf of the Hungarian refugees fleeing Soviet intervention. Anders Wigerfelt, who has examined Sweden’s refugee policy towards the Hungarians, observes that Sweden was one of the first Western countries that decided to transfer Hungarian exiles from Austria. The decision emerged as an early response to the appeal of the UNHCR and the International Committee for European Migration (ICEM) to help Austria with the high influx of refugees. Apparently, both Cold War considerations and the influences of the international refugee regime were critical here.

Soon, however, the economic capacity factor outweighed other determinants. This was due to the changing economic conditions and the increasing demand for labour. The primacy of economic interests and their interplay with political interests was seen, for example, in 1956. According to Wigerfelt, only the initial decision allowing 1,000 refugees to migrate to Sweden was prompted by moral concerns and the intention to solve the problem with a high influx of refugees. The other decisions, concerning approximately 7,000 Hungarians, were linked to direct benefits for the Swedish labour market. Wigerfelt also notes that, precisely as during the war, no special interest was given to a refugee’s previous experience and many highly-educated refugees were relegated to the role of manual workers, whereas a few obtained employment as archive workers, a pattern that, as indicated in the introduction, can also be found when it comes to the treatment of Czechoslovak and Polish-Jewish refugees.

Two factors of economic capacity and bureaucratic choices were evident in the immigrant policies pursued by the Swedish state. In 1950, the

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111 Notini Burch, A Cold War Pursuit, 22–24. For the criticism of the UN Convention, see Hathaway, The Law of Refugee Status, 8.
113 Ibid., 11–118.
114 Ibid., 198.
responsibility for the resettlement of refugees was reallocated from the National Labour Market Commission to the AMS, an independent state agency responsible for matters related to the externally-recruited labour force. For Tomas Hammar, the AMS became an authority with “considerable resources and wide discretionary power to use them, actively promoting the national full employment policy.”115 From 1950 and onwards, the AMS was the key institution responsible for the selection and reception of both refugees and foreign labour. As an outcome, the same AMS offices and officers handled refugee and labour migrants in the same manner. From the same year, the AMS took charge of the new resettlement programme, often referred to in the literature as the refugee quota, offered for those who sought protection in the UNHCR camps.116 The scope of the programme was decided annually by the Swedish government in agreement with the UNHCR on the basis of proposals received by the AMS.

A memorandum issued by the AMS in August 1968 reveals how these procedures were carried out in practice.117 AMS’s responsibilities included proposing the size of the quota, the selection of refugees either in situ or on a dossier basis, their transfer to Sweden, and the placement of refugees into the Swedish labour market. For Central and Southern Europe, the selection was carried out through interviews conducted by representatives of the AMS, until 1969 the SUK, and from 1969 the SIV, and the Social Welfare Board (Socialstyrelsen) in the UNCHR camps. Decisions on residence permits were made immediately after the interviews and travel documents allowing refugees to enter Sweden were issued within four to six weeks by the Swedish embassies.

This programme was also dictated primarily by economic considerations. Thor Tureby shows that the selection of quota refugees during the 1950s was carried out on the basis of the refugees’ employability and potential to adapt to Swedish society. In fact, the same economic-efficiency criteria applied for the recruitment of refugees and migrant workers. In addition, all able-bodied refugees were placed in the same industries as labour migrants. This was presented as a way to enhance their integration into Swedish society. The economic criteria also played a role in the acceptance of refugees with tuberculosis, a group which constituted about 10% of the refugee quota. According to Thor Tureby, the decision to allow these refugees to come to Sweden depended as much on the political convictions and labour market experience of their relatives as on their own medical conditions and records.

Apparently, having an employment background in industry or agriculture was the most desirable.\footnote{118} After the refugees’ arrival in Sweden, most aspects of the resettlement work were carried out at reception centres administrated by the County Administrative Board. There were four regular reception centres (Alvesta, Moheda, Flen, and Hallstahammar) and numerous temporary places convenient for use when needed.\footnote{119} The stay at these centres lasted from three to six months during which Swedish language training and information were provided. Eventually, the stay ended with a placement in a job or some form of training in skills that were considered badly needed in the labour market at that time.\footnote{120} Since there were no general instructions on how to arrange these services, each reception centre was responsible for designing and providing services for the refugees in its care. Seemingly, the government did little to hide the labour market motivations behind its decisions regarding refugees. In 1967, the Official Government Report (\textit{Statens Offentliga Utredning, SOU}) on immigration issues, stressed that the AMS should prepare refugees’ employment in the labour market. For example, the selection and placement of refugees in work was officially recognized as “humanitarian manpower recruitment.”\footnote{121}

From the early 1970s and onwards, as already mentioned, the flow of refugees to Sweden increased. At the turn of 1972 and 1973, the first refugee group from developing countries arrived to Sweden. These were Ugandan Asians expelled by Idi Amin. Charles Westin, who has studied the result of their integration seven years after their arrival, states that this group managed to integrate into Sweden “surprisingly well”.\footnote{122} Westin lists two reasons for the success of their integration. The first was that after the seven years’ period, many had already accomplished, or were in the process of, educational or professional achievements. In particular, they mastered the Swedish language very well. The second reason was attributed to their exile situation. After being expelled from Uganda, the only option was to integrate into their new environment. In Westin’s view, this group also integrated itself better than the first group of refugees from Chile, migrating in late 1973 after the coup against Salvador Allende. The Chilean refugees differed from Ugandan Asians. They were political refugees, mainly students and trade union activists. This group had difficulties in adapting to their exile situation and Swedish authorities faced several social problems with the integration of

\begin{footnotes}
\item[120] Hammar, ‘The Integration or Non-Integration of Refugee Immigrants: Historical Experiences in Sweden’, 186.
\item[122] ”[...] förvånansvärt bra”. Westin, \textit{Möten}, 158.
\end{footnotes}
these refugees. After the subsequent arrivals of Chilean refugees, in March 1983 the government set up a working committee to explore the situation of Chileans in Sweden, as well as to explore the possibilities of their return to Chile or other Latin American countries. The conclusions regarding the enhancement of their integration into Swedish society concerned the improvement of Swedish language training, the recognition of their academic diplomas, and the placement of refugees according to their qualifications; a proposal that, as we shall see, was also important when it comes to the integration of Czechoslovak and Polish-Jewish refugees.

The overview presented above gives the necessary background against which the Swedish government responses towards Czechoslovak and Polish-Jewish refugees can be analyzed. The general conclusion is that after the establishment of the Iron Curtain, the factors that are likely to have influenced Swedish refugee policy were national security concerns, international influences, and economic interests. Economic criteria also determined immigrant policies pursued by the AMS and other state authorities. Thus, all factors identified in Jacobsen’s model, bureaucratic choices, international relations, local absorption capacity, and national security considerations, appeared and affected Sweden’s refugee policy choices and decisions during the Cold War. In addition, as already mentioned, the Swedish government responses were strongly influenced by Cold War considerations. The overarching question is whether the same factors affected policy decisions and government responses during the formative period of the late 1960s and early 1970s, i.e. how the policies can be understood and explained. In addition, a number of specific research questions have been formulated from the historical context discussed above. These questions will be presented in the following section of the chapter.

Questions and methodological approach
As already mentioned, the major aim of this dissertation is to examine the Swedish government’s responses to Czechoslovak and Polish-Jewish refugees during the formative period of the late 1960s and early 1970s. In particular, the study focuses on three major aspects of the process: Sweden’s reactions to events in Czechoslovakia and Poland and to Czechoslovak and Polish-Jewish refugees (Part II), Sweden’s management of these refugees (Part III), and, finally, outcomes of their economic integration (Part IV). In addition, discourses in Swedish newspapers relating to these matters are identified, since they can be expected both to mirror and to have guided responses towards the refugees. Thus, this study covers the entire process

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123 Ibid., 159.
124 Latinamerikaner i Sverige - En översikt. Rapport Från En Arbetsgrupp Inom Regeringskansliet, Ds A, 1984:3 (Stockholm: Arbetsmarknadsdepartement, 1984), 34; See also Mella, Chilenska flyktingar i Sverige.
from the decision to admit the refugees in 1968, to their reception and economic integration into Swedish society during the seven year period necessary for acquiring Swedish citizenship, spanning approximately a decade from the late 1960s to the late 1970s.

This period coincides, as already stressed, with key developments in Swedish refugee, immigration, and immigrant policies, namely: the development of a more active foreign policy; a shift from a more or less free labour migration to refugee immigration, and the formulation of a multiculturalist policy, replacing a policy of assimilation. By investigating the responses to the Czechoslovak and Polish-Jewish refugees, the study will first and foremost provide new knowledge regarding the policies towards these two refugee groups, but hopefully also contribute to a better understanding of the key developments.

The following research questions were identified as central for understanding the Swedish government’s responses to Czechoslovak and Polish-Jewish refugees during this period:

- What information and opinions about the events in Czechoslovakia and Poland and the Czechoslovak and Polish-Jewish refugees were presented by the press in Sweden?
- How were these matters reported by the Swedish Embassies in Prague and Warsaw?
- How did the Swedish government and government agencies react to the events in Czechoslovakia and Poland and the Czechoslovak and Polish-Jewish refugees and how were these responses and decisions motivated?
- How was the reception of these refugees organized?
- What problems arose with the integration of refugees into Swedish society?
- What was the outcome of their economic integration?

Taken together, the answers to these questions should make it possible to answer the general question regarding how the reception and integration of Czechoslovak and Polish-Jewish refugees can be understood and explained against the backdrop of the key developments in Swedish refugee, immigration, and immigrant policies at the time and the factors identified by previous research as determining these policies. All these questions will be investigated separately for each group and a comparison of results, both diachronic (horizontal, chronological) and synchronic (vertical, structural), will be conducted throughout the study. Several methodological approaches are used to address these concerns. This section presents these methods.

The study of Sweden’s reactions to events in Czechoslovakia and Poland and to Czechoslovak and Polish-Jewish refugees, which constitutes Part II of this dissertation, consists of several parts. The first involves the press reports
about these matters and is an attempt to investigate what information and opinions the press in Sweden constructed about these events, the processes behind them, and about the refugees. This has been done through a content analysis of press editorials dealing with these matters. The role of newspapers in informing and shaping public understanding of events and processes has been emphasized repeatedly. For example, Adrian Bingham states that newspapers “remain of immense historical value for the contribution they made to the public and political discourses of the period.” Antero Holmila adds that they “offer helpful insights into what was included and excluded, seen as significant, impossible and controversial in the discourses of the period.”

The press editorials are taken from the Press Archive (Pressarkivet). This is a large collection of press editorials and opinion articles gathered by the Department of Government at Uppsala University. The collection begins in 1950 and includes press cuttings from 45 Swedish national and local newspapers, representing all major Swedish political orientations. The archive is divided into two major sections: “the Swedish Department” (Svenska avdelning) and “the Foreign Department” (Utländska avdelning). The investigation is based upon editorials found in the Foreign Department’s collection of press cuttings labeled as “Czechoslovakia” (Tjeckoslovakien) and “Poland” (Polen) respectively for the period 1968 - 1972. Together, it includes some 1,000 texts, the vast majority being articles dealing with Czechoslovak matters. The same collection is also used to investigate how the press responded to the acceptance and reception of Czechoslovak and Polish-Jewish refugees in Sweden. The list of newspapers explored in this study is presented in Table 1.

In order to try to grasp what kind of information the representatives of the Swedish government and the state authorities received and thus on what they based their decisions, this study examines the diplomatic correspondence between on the one hand the Swedish authorities in Stockholm, mainly the UD, the SUK, the SIV, and the AMS, and, on the other, the Swedish Embassy in Prague (Sveriges Ambassad i Prag) and the Swedish Embassy in Warsaw (Sveriges Ambassad i Warszawa). This correspondence includes both public and confidential messages, memoranda, reports, and minutes from telephone conversations and meetings.

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125 Adrian Bingham, Gender, Modernity, and the Popular Press in Inter-War Britain, Oxford Historical Monographs (Oxford: Clarendon, 2004), 12.
Table 1. The political orientation of newspapers included in the study

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political orientation</th>
<th>Newspapers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Centre</td>
<td>Skånska Dagbladet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communist</td>
<td>Ny Dag</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>Dagens Nyheter, Eskilstuna Kuriren, Expressen, Göteborgs Handels-och Sjöfartstidning, Göteborgs Posten, Vestmanlands Läns Tidning, Västerbottens-Kuriren</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>Barometern Oskarshamns-Tidningen, Borås Tidning, Helsingborgs Dagblad, Kvällsposten, Norrbotens-Kuriren, Svenska Dagbladet, Sydsvenska Dagbladet Snällposten, Östersunds-Posten, Östgöta Correspondenten</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social-democratic</td>
<td>Aftonbladet, Dala-Demokraten, Nya Norrland, Smålands Folkblad, Värmlands Folkblad, Örebro-Kuriren</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syndicalist</td>
<td>Arbetaren</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Most of these files are found within the archive of the UD (Utrikesdepartementets arkiv), the archive of the Swedish Embassy in Prague (Beskickningsarkiv Prag), the archive of the Swedish Embassy in Warsaw (Beskickningsarkiv Warszawa), all at the Swedish National Archives (Riksarkivet, RA) in Stockholm. In this regard, also the archive of the SUK (Statens utlänningskommissionens arkiv), the archive of the Government Offices (Regeringskansliets arkiv), and the archive and library of the Labour Movement (Arbetarrörelsens arkiv och bibliotek, ARAB) have been examined in an effort to analyze the process that led to Sweden admitting Czechoslovak and Polish-Jewish refugees. With regards to the Polish-Jewish case, documents from the archive of the MFST (Judiska församlingen i Stockholms arkiv) regarding the decisions and responses of the Jewish Community in Stockholm, deposited in the RA, have been examined. Documents from the Israeli State Archives and the archives of the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee (JDC Archives), both located in Jerusalem, have also been used.

All these authorities were, in one way or another, involved in Czechoslovak and Polish-Jewish refugee matters and much of the information concerning the policies and actions of the government agencies and agents that formulated and executed these policies can be gained from their documents. This approach is a standard one in the study of political history. It assumes that documents produced by officials involved in the policymaking process defines the lines of action and reflects actual policy goals. The methodology used in this part of the study was to identify relevant documents and analyze them to re-create the decision-making process, often
chronologically, of a particular agency or agent. Though this documentation is scattered and sparse, these are the main sources of information that can be used to recreate the order of events, to understand why the Swedish government decided to admit these refugees, and how these decisions were motivated. In particular, the Swedish Embassy in Warsaw produced illuminating documents which form the empirical core of the study on Sweden’s response to the Polish-Jewish refugees. In addition, the official government publications, such as Documents on Swedish Foreign Policy, reports (Statens offentliga utredningar, SOU), parliamentary motions and minutes from the meetings of the Foreign Affairs Advisory Committee (Utrikesnämnden, FAAC) have been used as a complement to the diplomatic documents.

Part III of this dissertation describes Sweden’s management of these refugees. It includes the processes of arrival and reception. Regarding the arrival, the study draws on sources from the archive of the Swedish Public Employment Service (Arbetsförmedlingens arkiv), located in Söderhamn. This is a comprehensive archive containing information about the practical implementation of the Swedish resettlement and reception programmes and concerning decisions made by the AMS regarding foreign citizens. It also includes vast material collected from the AMS reception centres, including reports and protocols, information on residents, and decisions concerning their departures. This study focuses on the correspondence regarding the arrival and reception of the Czechoslovak and Polish-Jewish refugees in Sweden, the authorities’ decisions regarding where the refugees should be put to work, and their departure from the reception centres.

Since special attention is paid to the resettlement process, the empirical investigation includes a detailed examination of the reports written by AMS officers after visiting the eleven reception centres opened in late 1969, as well as a quantitative analysis of the weekly reports from these centres. The former includes information on the capacity of the camps, on the numbers, nationalities, and occupations of the residents as well as assessments of the centres’ chances of finding the residents jobs. They also provide details of the incentives created to promote the integration of refugees into Swedish society and of the problems that arose with this process. The latter provides information about the three major destinations to which the refugees were sent: job placement of the refugee and the relative(s), departure to another refugee centre, or housing for elderly people offered by the Social Welfare Board.

The final empirical section focuses on outcomes of of Czechoslovak and Polish-Jewish refugees into Swedish society. The degree of economic integration can be described and analyzed, for example, in terms of the occupational mobility of migrants after their migration. In this case, the impact of migration on the refugees’ occupational mobility during the seven
year period necessary for acquiring Swedish citizenship will be examined. In particular, under consideration is the refugees’ mobility from their last occupation in their country of origin to the latest occupation achieved in Sweden at the time of applying for Swedish citizenship.

In investigating this issue, this study takes an approach that differs from previous studies on Czechoslovak and Polish-Jewish refugees’ performance on the Swedish labour market. Previous studies have utilized data from censuses conducted by Statistics Sweden (Statistiska Centralbyrån) every five years between 1960 and 1990, which are indeed highly detailed and comprehensive, including variables such as country of birth, year of immigration, socioeconomic classification of employment, and income, making it possible to follow individuals over time. This study, however, uses two new sets of data. This is because data taken from the above mentioned censuses do not provide information on pre-migration characteristics, which makes it impossible to reconstruct the occupational mobility from the last job in the country of origin to the first job in Sweden. In addition, there is a lack of coherence in the classification system in the censuses conducted at the time of this investigation. For example, the educational variable was included only in the 1970 census. In view of these inconsistencies, it was decided to investigate new datasets in order to give a more comprehensive picture of the immigrants’ careers. Due to the specific character of the data, mainly numbers and variables, this part of the study applies a methodology known as descriptive statistics.

The key step in this analysis was to identify the refugees’ last occupation in their country of origin and their history of employment after migration. There are two different databases depending on the group studied. For the Czechoslovaks, the data regarding the last job before their migration to Sweden was taken from interview surveys carried out by the Swedish delegation during the selection process in the UNHCR refugee camp in Traiskirchen in Austria. There were 693 Czechoslovak refugees who arrived in Sweden in this way during the period 1968 – 1971. These interviews are kept in the AMS archive and include information about family, education, and employment prior to emigration. For Polish Jews, the data is derived from interviews with about 400 Polish Jews carried out by the MFST curators about a year after migration to Sweden. These sources are held at the MFST archive.

Without any doubt, these sources are dissimilar and there is of course a risk of misleading information in the interviews, since individuals who are trying to find refuge are likely to present themselves in as positive light as possible. The risk of biased information seems larger in the case of the Czechoslovaks because the interviews with the Czechoslovak refugees were conducted outside of Sweden, in the UNHCR refugee camps, whereas the Polish Jews were interviewed in Sweden a year after their arrival. However,
there is nothing that indicates that the information concerning vocation in Czechoslovakia should be biased and given the thoroughness of Swedish authorities concerning all refugee-related matters, one can assume that the information was properly verified by the Swedish officials conducting the interviews. Thus, an analysis of pre-migration occupations of Czechoslovak and Polish-Jewish refugees is possible using the sources discussed above.

When specifying subsequent employment, the data has been taken from the refugees’ applications for citizenship submitted seven years after their arrival in Sweden. These files are found in the archive of the Swedish Migration Board (Migrationsverkets arkiv) in Norrköping. The applicant could be granted Swedish citizenship if he or she was 18 years old or more, had resided in Sweden for the past seven years, was of good repute, and had financial support. Applicants were also asked to describe their occupational and housing history since their arrival in Sweden. Furthermore, they were expected to enclose certificates concerning their education and employment or financial support in Sweden. In this case, the risk of misleading information is small. Everything is documented in detail. The entire study of occupational mobility was conducted on a sample of 302 Czechoslovaks and 247 Polish Jews aged 15 to 75 at the time of their migration. These samples represent respectively 8% and 10% of the total number of people in these two refugee groups. It is therefore important to stress that this study makes claims only for the examined group of refugees, not for the entire refugee population.

One major limitation of the study is the almost complete absence of the gender issue on the research agenda. This is due to the absence of the gender dimension in the examined documents. The state ministries and agencies did not adopt a gender-specific framing and approach while referring to Czechoslovak and Polish-Jewish refugee matters, nor did not recognize gender differences between these two groups, presented in the last part of the dissertation. This is not to say that the state did not care about the gender. Rather, the gender variable was not seen as relevant by refugee policymakers. Thus, this study misses the opportunity to provide a comprehensive picture of gender on Swedish refugee policy in the formative period of the late 1960s and early 1970.

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2. Historical backgrounds and previous research

The purpose of this part of the chapter is twofold. Firstly, it will present the historical background to the events and emigration processes in Czechoslovakia and Poland in order to provide a better understanding of the Swedish government’s reactions to these crises. Secondly, it will present the existing literature that deals with these matters in order to situate this study in both an international and a national Swedish research context. It begins with a presentation of the historical development of these crises, namely the rise and fall of the Prague Spring in Czechoslovakia and the anti-Semitic campaign in Poland, and provides an account of the dynamics of the emigration processes. After presenting the historical background, it reviews the literature dealing with Sweden’s response to these events and to the refugees. All of these concerns will be investigated separately for each group.

Overall, very little has been written on the arrival, reception, and integration of Czechoslovak and Polish-Jewish refugees arriving in Sweden in the late 1960s. In the Czechoslovak case, as will be discussed, some research has been conducted into the Swedish government’s reaction to the Soviet invasion. However, there is nothing written about what happened to the Czechoslovak refugees after their arrival in Sweden. In the Polish Jewish case, there is more, but not much, research focusing on the Polish-Jewish refugees.

The arrival of these two groups to Sweden is mentioned in historical literature on Swedish refugee and integration policies, but this is only in passing and without any details of actions undertaken by the Swedish state. In addition, much of Swedish refugee historiography focuses primarily upon the number of newcomers, often providing incompatible data. For example, in their 1999 book on the Swedish shift from labour to refugee migration, *Från arbetskraftsimport till flyktinginvandring*, Christer Lundh and Rolf Ohlsson argue that Sweden received 3,100 Czechoslovaks and 2,700 Polish Jews. The official report on immigration in 1982 reports that 2,100 Czechoslovak and 2,300 Polish-Jewish refugees came to Sweden at that time. More recently, Izabela A. Dahl’s dissertation refers to 2,666 Polish Jews who entered Sweden between 1 January 1968 and 30 April 1972.

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129 Lundh and Ohlsson, *Från arbetskraftsimport till flyktinginvandring*, 79.

while Mikael Byström and Pär Frohnert round this number up to 3,000.\textsuperscript{131} The latter is the most appropriate number, since it includes both the quota refugees and the group that arrived through the UNHCR refugee camps. In fact, Dahl’s dissertation is the only one that differentiates between these two groups of Polish Jews. Some knowledge can also be obtained from personal testimonies of migrants and those involved in organizing their assistance, but this information is brief and incomplete. This study aims to fill these gaps.

\textbf{Czechoslovakia}

In many ways, 1968 was a milestone in the post-War era. It is depicted as “a major watershed in the history of the Cold War, marking the climax of a period of confrontation and the beginning of the era of détente”.\textsuperscript{132} The increase in media coverage served as an impetus to antiwar rallies and solidarity demonstrations that broke out in a number of Western countries. Related to that, the spirit of the New Left transformed itself into a revolutionary movement of an almost global nature. In the economy, decisions regarding American inflation and the gold crisis of 1968 affected American dominance of the Bretton-Woods system. Still, much of the world’s attention in 1968 was drawn to the east of Europe’s Iron Curtain, particularly to events in Czechoslovakia. The Prague Spring and the Warsaw-Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia are regarded as major events of the Cold-War era. For the first time since World War II, the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact armies invaded a fellow socialist country which, unlike Hungary in 1956, never intended to leave the communist bloc. The crushing of the Czechoslovak reform movement, known as “socialism with a human face”, took place at the moment when hopes of détente seem to have increased. This event, together with the Tet offensive during the Vietnam War, is listed among affairs that had the most profound effect on both sides of the Iron Curtain, forcing leaders to rethink the political frameworks of the postwar order.\textsuperscript{133} Finally, it left a major imprint on Czechoslovak society. Not only did it result in the emigration of several thousands of Czechoslovaks, representing the greatest brain drain in the history of Czechoslovakia, but it also became one of the major reference points for reformers in Czechoslovakia in their struggle for democracy in the 1980s.\textsuperscript{134}


\textsuperscript{133} Ibid., 3.

\textsuperscript{134} Archie Brown, \textit{The Rise and Fall of Communism} (London: Bodley Head, 2009), 397, 465, 593.
The Prague Spring and the Warsaw Pact invasion

The events in Czechoslovakia are characterized by two phenomena: the rise and fall of the Prague Spring. The Prague Spring was the culmination of a lengthy, complex process underpinned by dissatisfaction that began to be expressed by Czechoslovaks during the post-Stalin “thaw” period in the mid-1950s. It also stemmed from the deep economic recession experienced by Czechoslovakia in the 1960s. The latter encouraged a group of economic reformers to propose a modest reform aimed at stabilizing the economy. While initially rejected, the reform was accepted by Antonín Novotný, the President and First Secretary of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (Komunistická strana Československa, KSČ) in 1965.

Changes in the economy brought political pluralism closer to the debate. In particular, party intellectuals attempted to raise awareness concerning the need for political reforms. One of the most important voices of that time belonged to the Writer’s Union, an organization which openly criticized the repressive character of the Communist system. Further criticism came from the eastern part of the country and concerned the secondary role of the Slovaks in the KSČ. In October 1967, at a plenary session of the Central Committee, Alexander Dubček, the secretary of the Slovak Central Committee, highlighted Slovakian dissatisfaction regarding the role and position of Slovaks in the Party, indicating a need for change in the political leadership. Leonid Brezhnev, the General Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party, attempted to intervene on behalf of President Novotný, but abandoned this idea after visiting Prague. On 5 January 1968, the Central Committee plenum replaced Novotný with Dubček as Party Secretary of the KSČ. Two months later, Novotný resigned as President of Czechoslovakia and his position was taken by Ludvík Svoboda.

The Prague Spring followed the change of leadership. This was an eight-month period of wholesale societal transformation. According to Philip Windsor and Adam Roberts, this period can be separated into three phases. In the first, which lasted from early January to early April, media censorship was partially lifted and, as a result, reformist ideas circulated more freely. For example, the issues connected to the show trial of Rudolf

137 Ibid., 376; Raška, The Long Road to Victory: A History of Czechoslovak Exile Organizations, 3.
140 Brown, The Rise and Fall of Communism, 379.
Slánský and 13 alleged co-conspirators hanged in Prague in 1952, along with Jan Masaryk’s mysterious death in 1948, were re-opened for consideration.

The second phase, which lasted until early July 1968, saw the emergence of independent organizations in Czechoslovakia, such as the Club of Committed Non-Party Activists (Klub angažovaných nestraníků). Within this reformist current, one of the most radical publications of 1968, the Two Thousand Words manifesto, was produced. It was issued by a group of scholars and writers and emphasized the need for institutional change and the development of civil society.142

These developments alarmed the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact countries. In particular, the Communist leaders from Poland and East Germany were concerned that Czechoslovak events could impact their own countries. Czechoslovak-Soviet relations dramatically worsened after the bilateral summit in Moscow in early May 1968, during which the Soviets expressed their interest and concern over the way in which the Czechoslovaks were coping with recent events, but they did not receive any satisfactory answers. Relations did not improve when Dubček declined to meet other Communist leaders at a follow-up meeting in Warsaw.143

The third phase began with an attempt to reach some form of political agreement between the Soviet and Czechoslovak leaders at Čierna nad Tisou in eastern Czechoslovakia.144 The talks, which continued in early August in Bratislava, revealed the absence of any conciliatory stance from the leaders of the Soviet Politburo. They knew that the only way to protect the unity of the East European Communist system was immediate military intervention.145 The plan for the invasion, as John Dunbabin emphasizes, was already drawn up in May 1968.146 Yet, the Czechoslovak leadership and many in the West refused to believe that the Soviet Union would take this step. The incentive came from Soviet collaborators in the Czechoslovak leadership who requested the intervention of the Soviet Union.147 Late in the night of 20 August, the armed forces of the Soviet Union, East Germany, Poland, Hungary, and Bulgaria invaded Czechoslovakia.

The size of the invasion was larger than any other operation in Europe since 1945. On its first day, 175,000 troops crossed into Czechoslovakia.148 One week later, about half a million soldiers, mainly from the Soviet Union but with large East German, Polish, Hungarian, and Bulgarian contingents,
occupied the country. These forces immediately secured control of the country, including all major strategic and public buildings. First Secretary Dubček, President Svoboda, and other reformist members of the Presidium, had been flown to Moscow for negotiations with Soviet leaders.

Meanwhile, the invasion provoked a massive unarmed opposition from the Czechoslovak population. The reformers within the KSČ managed to organize a secret party congress to support the reforms of the Prague Spring, condemn the invasion, and convey this message to Dubček who was held in Soviet custody. Regarding the people of Czechoslovakia, Windsor and Roberts observes that: “The very widespread civilian resistance of the first few days took even the Czechoslovaks themselves by surprise, and included systematic attempts to undermine the morale of the invading forces as well as an almost total refusal of economic and political cooperation, or even of social contact.”

The remarkable passive resistance and the fact that the majority of the Czechoslovak presidium voted against the Soviet intervention, played a significant role in the negotiations held in Moscow. The Soviet leaders allegedly retreated from their plans to install a new, pro-Moscow government and allowed Dubček to keep his post as Party Secretary for the time being. Dubček was eventually replaced by Gustáv Husák as First Secretary of the Central Committee in April 1969. Meanwhile, with the return of conservative hard-liners began the period of extensive purges and the repression of those who favoured reforms, officially known as the ‘normalization’ process. The start of the normalization procedures marked the beginning of the Czechoslovak emigration process.

The Warsaw-Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia had a significant impact on the West. On August 21, a UN spokesperson issued a statement condemning the aggression. The Soviet Union’s actions were depicted as “yet another serious blow to the concepts of international order and morality which form the basis of the Charter of the United Nations and for which the United Nations has been striving all these years.” However, after the Soviet Union vetoed the Security Council resolution condemning this intervention, the issue was not transferred to the agenda of the General Assembly, as it had been in 1956.

149 Brown, The Rise and Fall of Communism, 393.
150 Ibid., 394.
151 Ibid., 395.
152 Windsor and Roberts, Czechoslovakia 1968, 97.
153 Brown, The Rise and Fall of Communism, 396.
Overall, there were mixed reactions from Western countries. In many cases, the reaction took the form of verbal censure and the cancellation or delay of bilateral visits to states participating in the intervention.\footnote{Vladimír V. Kusín,  From Dubček to Charter 77: A Study of 'Normalisation' in Czechoslovakia 1968-1978 (Edinburgh: Q Press, 1978), 33.} The British government, for example, cancelled all ministerial visits and tabled a UN Security Council resolution condemning the intervention.\footnote{Geraint Hughes, 'British Policy towards Eastern Europe and the Impact of the “Prague Spring”, 1964-68’, Cold War History 4, no. 2 (2004): 126.} The Australian government was clear in criticizing the invasion and supporting the people of Czechoslovakia: “The House expresses its distress at and its abhorrence of the armed intervention in Czechoslovakia […]; condemns this action as a breach of the United Nations Charter and of accepted international conduct; calls for the immediate withdrawal of the forces unlawfully on Czechoslovakian territory, and expresses the sympathy of the House for the people of Czechoslovakia in their ordeal.”\footnote{The Swedish Embassy in Canberra to the UD, “Australian Reaction to Czech events”, 29 Aug. 1968, HP1:626, 1920 års dossiersystem, The archive of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs (Utrikesdepartementets arkiv, UDA), RA.}

In some cases, however, the reactions were more cautious. For example, as Laura Madokoro observes, the Canadian authorities were cautious and strategic in their approach towards the Warsaw-Pact invasion because they were occupied with the prospect of military intervention arising from Canada’s NATO membership if Soviet aggression spread to other countries. She also claims that the United States condemned the invasion, but American officials saw it mainly as an occasion to strengthen NATO commitment in Europe.\footnote{Madokoro, “Good Material”, 164.}

Regarding the long-term consequences for East–West relations, Geraint Hughes observes that after a short period of outrage against the Soviet Union, American and West European criticism decreased and these countries reverted to a “business as usual” approach in their relations with the Soviet Union. Hughes presents an example of this in the British Foreign Office’s attitude which did not consider that the Soviet threat increased after the intervention in Czechoslovakia. This approach affected British-Soviet relations in the post-August 1968 period. Hughes, however, also argues that the world reaction to the Prague Spring was somewhat muted due to the cautious approach to dealing with the Soviet Union’s affairs. He also underscores the point that a major change towards friendly relations with the Soviet Union in the foreign policy of France and the Federal Republic of Germany, the latter known as Ostpolitik, was evident in the aftermath of the
Czechoslovak crisis.\textsuperscript{162} Harto Hakovirta observes a similar shift, from heavy criticism to a conciliatory policy, from the neutral states.\textsuperscript{163}

**The emigration of Czechoslovaks**

Previous scholarship has regarded the flight of Czechoslovaks after the Warsaw-Pact invasion in August 1968 as one of the major refugee migrations of the Cold-War period.\textsuperscript{164} However, unlike the movement of Hungarians in 1956, the exodus of Czechoslovaks did not result in a serious refugee crisis. The reason for this was the assistance offered by many governments and voluntary agencies.\textsuperscript{165} There are several factors that determined why the post-August migration did not cause any major refugee problems.

Firstly, Czechoslovak nationals who were escaping the occupation were met with deep sympathy in the West. Like the Hungarians in 1956, they were regarded as courageous “freedom fighters” escaping an evil Communist regime.\textsuperscript{166} Secondly, as Louise W. Holborn observes, this group was composed of many young and highly qualified people. She lists students, teachers, scientists, journalists, artists, and doctors. Holborn also points out that many of them spoke English, French, and German and that they were in possession of valid passports, and substantial savings.\textsuperscript{167} Thus, not surprisingly, a number of countries immediately offered them the opportunity to resettle. They also experienced efficient processing of asylum requests. For example, when the refugees began to arrive in neighboring Austria and the situation became serious, the UNHCR called for increased assistance for the exiles and many governments immediately offered resettlement places. However, as the Canadian example shows, some of these actions were highly determined by the economic potential of the people fleeing Czechoslovakia.

Secondly, Holborn continues numerous international voluntary agencies and Czechoslovak exile organizations offered their help in housing and feeding Czechoslovak migrants.\textsuperscript{168} Among them were Czechoslovak exile organizations which supported the Czechoslovaks after their arrival in their new host societies.\textsuperscript{169}

\textsuperscript{163} Hakovirta, East-West Conflict and European Neutrality, 161–164.
\textsuperscript{166} Loescher and Scanlan, Calculated Kindness, 87.
\textsuperscript{167} Holborn, Refugees, 518.
\textsuperscript{168} Ibid., 517.
Finally, the circumstances of Czechoslovak migration differed from previous refugee migrations. In particular, there was the possibility of a large exodus since the new Czechoslovak authorities left the border open for more than a year to allow the reformers to leave the country.170 Yet, despite this opportunity, the post-August emigration started rather slowly compared to the Hungarian wave in 1956. In October 1968, the UNHCR reported that the number of recognized Czechoslovak refugees was no higher than 3,500.171 A far larger group comprised of some 80,000 Czechoslovaks who had left during the Prague Spring and were abroad at the time of the invasion, mainly tourists, students, and people on official missions. They did not apply for asylum immediately, but preferred to wait for the events to run their course.172 The host countries allowed them to stay temporarily in order to assess the situation. About half of them returned home within two weeks after the invasion.173

Emigration increased in 1969, after the launch of a programme of repression directed against individuals who supported reformist policies. In the early autumn of 1969, some 42,000 Czechoslovaks were registered as refugees in the West and this trend continued until the end of the year. Meanwhile, the regime urged its citizens who were currently abroad to return, promising amnesty for all Czechoslovaks who had illegally left the country. The state also reestablished control over the border exit points in October 1969.174

An important point to add here, particularly in the context of the Polish anti-Jewish campaign presented in the later part of this chapter, is that the group that left Czechoslovakia between August 1968 and October 1969 included a significant group of Czechoslovak Jews. This emigration was motivated by the anti-Semitic campaign that erupted a few days after the Warsaw-Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in late August 1968. According to Paul Lendvai, the anti-Semitic propaganda erupted on 25 August 1968 and was related to the presence of two Jews, Dr. Frantisek Kriegel and Professor Eduard Goldstuecker, in the Presidium, who supported the position of Alexander Dubček and other reformers during the talks in Moscow.175 Overall, the scale of the official anti-Semitic campaign in Czechoslovakia was smaller than in the Polish case. Still, on 2 September 1968, the leadership of the Jewish Community in Czechoslovakia urged the Jewish population to

172 Loescher, The UNHCR and World Politics, 178.
173 Holborn, Refugees, 516.
174 Ibid., 517.
leave the country.\textsuperscript{176} At that time, there were 15,000 Jews living in Czechoslovakia, which accounted for 0.1 percent of the total population. One of the reports written by the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee (JDC) later stated that the percentage of Jews among the refugees was almost 100 times higher than the percentage of Jews in the country, accounting for more than 10 percent of the refugees.\textsuperscript{177} According to the MFST, 68 Czechoslovak Jews arrived in Sweden in the period between 1968 and 1969.\textsuperscript{178}

The total number of Czechoslovak refugees is hard to estimate. In fact, both international and Czech research provides uncertain estimates of the scale of emigration. According to Michael R. Marrus, about 80,000 Czechoslovaks either fled or did not return to Czechoslovakia after the Soviet invasion, and the majority of these became refugees.\textsuperscript{179} The same number is presented in Dariusz Stola’s comprehensive study on forced migrations in Central European history.\textsuperscript{180} However, Heinz Fassmann and Rainer Munz claim that twice as many Czechoslovaks left their country in the period 1968–1969.\textsuperscript{181}

Czechoslovak scholarship provides a somewhat more detailed account of this movement. Zdeněk R. Nešpor divides the post-August emigration into three migration waves, 1968–1969, the 1970s, and the 1980s, each characterized by different structural aspects.\textsuperscript{182} The first group that left Czechoslovakia, Nešpor claims, consisted of people with low educational background, mainly elementary and secondary school level, and with a strong yearning to improve their economic position. The second group, in 1969, included a large number of political dissidents who had urgent reasons to escape Czechoslovakia after the onset of the normalization processes. Pavel Tigrid adds one more category to the 1968–1969 movement: the professional cadres, such as doctors, engineers, technicians, architects, and professors, who took advantage of new opportunities in the West.\textsuperscript{183} Together, between 100,000 and 130,000 Czechoslovaks fled their country in the period 1968–1969.\textsuperscript{184}

\begin{footnotes}
\item “Socialutskottet inom andra socialsektionen”, report, 15 Feb. 1972, F 19:8, Huvudarkivet, JFA, RA.
\item Marrus, The Unwanted, 362.
\item Stola, ‘Forced Migrations in Central European History’, 337.
\item Pavel Tigrid, Politická emigrace v atomovém věku (Köln: Index, 1974), 92.
\end{footnotes}
The second wave, one that took place in the 1970s, included individuals who needed more time to rethink their future in post-1968 Czechoslovakia and decided to move after being disappointed with the outcome of the “normalization” process. These were mainly intellectuals, artists, scholars, and journalists, who, as Nešpor states, were ready to give up their positions in Czechoslovak society.\textsuperscript{185} The wave of the 1980s, in turn, consisted of politically motivated migrants who had previously been unable to leave Czechoslovakia and highly educated professionals fleeing due to economic and personal reasons. This group, according to Nešpor, was well-prepared for the departure: they were independent, mastered languages, and had numerous personal contacts abroad.\textsuperscript{186} Overall, it is estimated that up to 170,000 people left Czechoslovakia during the period 1968-1989.\textsuperscript{187}

In 1975, Louise W. Holborn created a list of all countries that were willing to welcome people from Czechoslovakia after the events of 1968. These were the United States, Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, Sweden, Switzerland, the Republic of South Africa, and Iran.\textsuperscript{188} As regards the number of these refugees, Holborn indicates that 12,000 Czechoslovaks entered the US.\textsuperscript{189} In the case of Switzerland, the correspondence of the Swedish Embassy in Bern reveals that between 8,000 and 9,000 Czechoslovaks entered the country after late August 1968.\textsuperscript{190} In the case of Canada, it was about 10,000 individuals.\textsuperscript{191}

Regarding the reception of these refugees, Holborn explains that the process was organized through a number of special camps which were opened by these governments, and that the reception of Czechoslovaks did not cause any major troubles.\textsuperscript{192} Apparently, as Laura Madokoro argues, many states competed with each other by presenting “better offers” for the refugees. She highlights an example of this in the reception process offered by the Canadian government. Taking advantage of recently declassified government records, Madokoro reveals that the Canadian programme was largely defined by national interest, primarily related to the potential economic benefits of the arrival of Czechoslovak skilled migrants. Madokoro summarizes that “Humanitarian assistance was a competitive venture”.\textsuperscript{193}

\textsuperscript{186} Ibid., 802.
\textsuperscript{188} Holborn, Refugees, 517.
\textsuperscript{189} Loescher and Scanlan, Calculated Kindness, 87. See also
\textsuperscript{190} The Swedish Embassy in Bern to the UD, 08 Jan. 1969, E 2:27, Kanslibyrån, SUA, RA.
\textsuperscript{191} The Swedish Embassy in Ottawa to the UD, 15 Jan. 1969, Ibid.
\textsuperscript{192} Holborn, Refugees, 517.
Concerning integration into the new societies, Nešpor argues that initially most of the Czechoslovak refugees experienced occupational decline, but eventually integrated well and showed no interest in re-emigration. This is also the conclusion reached by Sabina and Jan Kratochvil in their book, Austrálie - můj nový domov / Australia - My New Home, about the life stories and experiences of those who were accepted by Australia. The political engagement of refugees in their host countries in Western Europe and North America has been studied by Francis D. Raška. He observes that initially many of those previously involved in the Prague Spring distanced themselves from political involvement following their immigration. The factor that unified various exile groups was the appearance of Charter 77, a new civic initiative to recognize human rights in Czechoslovakia. Since then, Raška argues, the post-1968 exiles actively supported Czechoslovak democratic changes and substantially contributed to the collapse of the communist system in their country of origin.

**Reception and integration of Czechoslovak refugees**

There is also limited knowledge about Sweden’s reaction to the refugees from Czechoslovakia. As already mentioned, the relevant historical literature indicates that Sweden received between 2,000 and 3,000 Czechoslovak refugees. Some insights on Sweden’s response to this group can be gleaned from the literature on the history of the Czechoslovak minority in Sweden. Jiří Štěpán’s 2011 volume Československý exil ve Švédsku v letech 1945-1989 is the most comprehensive academic work on this subject. Štěpán explains the history of Czechoslovak postwar migration to Sweden, including the movement of Sudeten-Germans after the Munich agreement of 1938, the assimilation of Czechoslovaks in Swedish society, and he discusses the involvement of Czechoslovaks in organizing assistance for the pro-democratic movement in Czechoslovakia. Regarding Sweden’s response to the Warsaw-Pact invasion, Štěpán refers to a demonstration in Malmö which was attended by 15,000 people, including Olof Palme. He also states that the night of the invasion intensified the activities of the Czechoslovak minority in Sweden. These activities included organizing demonstrations against the Soviet occupation and sending appeals to Swedish officials, primarily to Prime Minister Tage Erlander. Additionally, various committees were established, such as the Society of Free Czechoslovaks in Southern Sweden (Sdružení svobodných Čechoslováků v jižním Švédsku). Some of them, as Štěpán demonstrates, remained active until the 1990s, organizing support.

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195 Jan Kratochvil and Sabiná Kratochvilová, My new home Austrálie = můj nový domov (Brno: Muzeum Exílu, 2006).
for democratic changes in Czechoslovakia.\textsuperscript{197} Yet, this volume fails to give any satisfactory account of the movement of Czechoslovak refugees. For example, he attempts to provide the number of those who came to Sweden - “We have detailed information regarding the wave of Czechoslovak migration after August 1968” - but instead provides figures concerning the total number of Czechoslovaks in Sweden, not the 1968 refugee group.\textsuperscript{198}

The subject of Sweden’s reaction to Czechoslovak refugees in 1968 appears in Štěpán’s article on the migration of the Pořízka family to Sweden. He points out that Jiří Pořížka with his wife Anna crossed the state border from Czechoslovakia to Austria, received passports according to the Geneva Convention, and moved to Sweden, but he fails to recognize that this was only possible following Sweden’s response to the movement of refugees.\textsuperscript{199}

Rolf Tamnes’ 1978 dissertation is a detailed study focusing on Swedish and Finish reactions to the Warsaw-Pact invasion, with particular focus on the political strategy of these countries. When looking at the time before the crises, Tamnes finds that Swedish-Soviet interactions were motivated by the fear of insecurity and the risk of spreading the crisis to other countries. During the crisis, there was intense criticism of the Soviet invasion. He writes that “It does not only concern the strength [of the protest]. The political leaders also inspired the population to take part in massive protests. [...] But first and foremost, one witnessed an outpouring of solidarity with a small country whose history was seen as a long and hard fight for freedom and independence from its superpower neighbours.”\textsuperscript{200}

According to Tamnes, a number of factors, such as anger, the tradition of criticism of the Soviet Union, and social-democratic solidarity, determined the harsh condemnation of the Soviet Union. Tamnes also discusses Sweden’s criticism of the Soviet Union by focusing on the concepts of Swedish neutrality and security policy at the time. Furthermore, he emphasizes the element of internal threat, emanating from opposing political parties who were seeking support during the 1968 election campaign. He points out that this criticism did not last long. According to Tamnes, the policy of sharp criticism of the Soviet Union diminished in mid-September 1968 and was replaced by a careful foreign policy of


\textsuperscript{198} “Pro československou emigrační vlnu po srpnu 1968 máme již přesnější infomrací”. Ibid., 32.


accommodation with the Soviet Union. This policy continued during the 1970s despite a few critical comments, such as Palme’s 1976 speech about the ‘creatures of dictatorship’. Overall, Tamnes concludes, Sweden’s reaction to the invasion of Czechoslovakia affected the formulation of Sweden’s role as a mediator in international conflicts.

Kristian Gerner confirms Tamnes’s findings that Sweden quickly returned to friendly relations with the Soviet Union. In his historical essay included in the proceedings of the ‘Swedish-Czechoslovak Solidarity 1968-1989’ event, organized by the Embassy of the Czech Republic in Stockholm in 2011, he observes that after the Warsaw-Pact invasion, the political parties gradually lost interest in the fate of Czechoslovakia. “After 1968”, he states, “Czechoslovakia and its fate became eclipsed in Swedish foreign policy by issues of the higher order”, meaning the relations with the Soviet Union.

For example, as Gerner points out, Sweden gave more support and help to communist regimes in Africa, Asia, and Cuba. In this regard, the outburst of Swedish interest in Czechoslovakia and the acceptance of Czechoslovak refugees in 1968 should be seen as a single exception, “the cause of a small sub-culture”, Gerner concludes.

Before turning to studies on the economic well-being of Czechoslovaks, the non-academic literature must be mentioned. Vladimir Oravsky and Tomas Kramar’s book, titled Utbrytarkungens knep eller Hur jag slutade änglas och lärde mig älska Sverige, consists of several personal testimonies of Czechoslovaks who came to Sweden in 1968. It brings to light many aspects of the migrants’ reception and adaptation to life in Sweden. For example, Emilia Hjemgård describes her encounter with the Swedish state: “We received food, we received cleaning in common areas, we received toothbrushes, clothes, shoes, and a one-hour Swedish lesson per day. But we did not receive an explanation as to what we were waiting for, how long we would wait and the purpose of it all”. Although loaded with subjective judgements, these accounts represent the details of reception practices as seen through the eyes of participants, not as documented in the official reports, and, thus, they are of great importance to this study.

Czechoslovaks’ performance on the Swedish labour market has only been studied in limited cases. In 1990, Jan Ekberg published an article on the

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201 Ibid., 272.
202 Ibid., 325.
204 Ibid., 43.
economic and social mobility of immigrants arriving in Sweden until 1970. He shows that the Czechoslovak group, together with immigrants from Western Europe, moved upwards faster than any other foreign or native group at that time. The Czechoslovaks also tended to see the greatest increase to their income. Ekberg explains this as a result of the high number of highly educated individuals who had no expectations of returning to their native country.²⁰⁶ In another study, published in 1995, Kirk Scott examined the economic well-being of those migrants who entered Sweden prior to 1975. Like Ekberg, Scott observes that the refugees from Czechoslovakia performed better than other groups, especially when looking at blue collar employment and sharp increases in relative income. He also argues that this is related to the fact that they arrived as political refugees, had no thoughts of returning to their homelands, and were determined to pursue careers in their new country.²⁰⁷

Poland

The second event, the Polish anti-Semitic campaign, was of a different character. It had domestic political connotations, targeting one particular group, the ‘Zionist’, and was deeply embedded in anti-Israeli and anti-Jewish tendencies in the Soviet bloc. Like the crushing of the Prague Spring, the Polish anti-Semitic campaign resulted in the greatest human capital loss in post-war Poland. This emigration, as Dariusz Stola argues, became the symbol of communist Poland’s attitude towards Jews and Israel and reinforced the image of Poland as an anti-Semitic country.²⁰⁸

The following, like the previous section, firstly presents the origin and development of the anti-Semitic campaign in Poland, followed by an overview of the emigration of Polish Jews, and finally it turns to existing literature related to the Swedish state’s efforts directed towards those refugees who arrived in Sweden.

The anti-Semitic campaign in Poland

The outburst of the Polish government’s anti-Semitic campaign, officially known as the “anti-Zionist” campaign, had, to a certain extent, similar origins to the Czechoslovak crisis. On 8 March 1968, Polish police forces brutally attacked students at Warsaw University who were protesting against the ban on the Polish poet Adam Mickiewicz’s much-loved work Dziady (Forefathers’ Eve) which contained criticism of Tzarist Russia. For students,

the censorship of Mickiewicz’s work was an opportunity to express the demand for greater freedom, particularly in the context of the Prague Spring.\textsuperscript{209} The intervention did not silence the protests. On the contrary, it led to numerous demonstrations and violent confrontations with the police. After a few days of disturbances, the campaign changed in character. This is the point where the Czechoslovak and Polish campaigns separate. The Polish regime blamed “Zionists” for provoking the March disturbances. In the language of communist propaganda, as Dariusz Stola points out, they were depicted as agents of American imperialism, alien elements, traitors, and saboteurs, revisionists, or trouble makers.\textsuperscript{210} They were also portrayed as being alienated from the rest of the Polish population. Over time, “anti-Zionist” accusations permeated the local level, where old anti-Semitic sentiments were especially evident. The most widespread response to these attacks was the post-March emigration of Polish Jews that occurred between 1968 and 1972.

Yet, as Stola clearly points out, the beginning of the “anti-Zionist” accusations should be placed at the outset of the anti-Israeli campaign in June 1967, as a result of Moscow’s instruction to take the Arab side and condemn the State of Israel in the Six-Day War.\textsuperscript{211} Following this directive, on 12 June the Polish government ended relatively good bilateral relations with Israel and began to criticize Israel for its pro-Western orientation.\textsuperscript{212} Simultaneously, there was the beginning of attacks on Polish Jews who were allegedly celebrating Israel’s victory. On 19 June, Władysław Gomułka, First Secretary of the Polish United Workers’ Party (Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza, PZPR), told the public at the Congress of Trade Unions that there were “Zionist circles of Jews” supporting the state of Israel, calling them the “fifth column”. As he put it, “we do not want a fifth column to be created in our country. [...] Let those who feel these words are addressed to them draw the proper conclusions”.\textsuperscript{213} With these words, Gomułka brought forward a revival of ‘anti-Zionist’ and nationalistic tendencies embedded in postwar Polish society and politics. Yet, a complete understanding of the impact of anti-Semitic sentiments in Poland and the outcome of the 1967–68 campaign requires detailed knowledge of the events in the late 1940s and

\textsuperscript{209} Piotr Osęka, Marzec ’68 (Kraków: Znak, 2008), 145.
\textsuperscript{211} Ibid., 182.
\textsuperscript{212} Until that point, Poland was the only state in the Soviet bloc that had maintained diplomatic relations with the State of Israel. Marcos Silber suggests a layout of triadic relations to understand the Polish-Israeli relations before 1967. The three aspects of this combination included Poland, Israel, and Polish Jewry. Marcos Silber, ‘Foreigners or Co-Nationals? Israel, Poland, and Polish Jewry (1948–1967)’, Journal of Israeli History 29, no. 2 (2010): 213.
1950s. The next few paragraphs highlight the evolution of Polish-Jewish relations and the development of the ‘anti-Zionist’ campaign.

For most of the estimated 250,000–300,000 Polish Jewish Holocaust survivors, the postwar communist government in Poland was seen as a refuge against the brutality of Nazi Germany and prewar Poland. The new regime made efforts to fight anti-Semitism and supported the establishment of the State of Israel, providing military training for Zionist volunteers and opening the border for those who were interested in moving to the new state.\textsuperscript{214} Jerzy Eisler adds that many Polish Jews also found employment in higher positions in the PZPR and in the central administration, especially in the military and secret services of the Ministry of Public Security (\textit{Ministerstwo Bezpieczeństwa Publicznego}), a step that a large segment of the Polish population considered as collaboration with the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{215}

On the other hand, anti-Semitic beliefs were still widespread, especially at local levels, towards Jews returning from Soviet exile. Additionally, the popular ‘Judeo-Communism’ (\textit{Żydokomuna}) myth, which had a strong pejorative connotation, referring to alleged Jewish-Soviet collaborations, held sway over the population.\textsuperscript{216} The dramatic culmination of this period was the Kielce pogrom in July 1946 which, resulting in the killing of 42 Jews, for many was a clear signal to emigrate to Israel. In the next months, as Stola reveals, more than 70,000 individuals emigrated from Poland.\textsuperscript{217} Indeed, the emigration of Polish Jews became the central aspect of Israeli-Polish relations. In 1949, an emigration scheme between Poland and Israel was established and some 29,000 Jews, mainly religious Jews and Zionists, left for Israel.\textsuperscript{218}

This policy stood in marked contrast to the Soviet Union’s negative approach towards Jewish and Israeli affairs.\textsuperscript{219} Anti-Jewish attitudes were suppressed by the state in Poland following the replacement of the ruling nationalist wing of the PZPR in 1948, who had been under the leadership of Władysław Gomułka, with the ‘Muscovites’, the Moscow-trained faction who had many prominent Jewish communists.\textsuperscript{220} In 1956, Gomułka returned as the First Secretary of the PZPR and the post-Stalinist liberalization began.

\textsuperscript{216} For more about the Judeo-Communism myth, see, André Gerrits, \textit{The Myth of Jewish Communism: A Historical Interpretation}, Gods, Humans and Religions 16 (Bruxelles: Peter Lang, 2009).
\textsuperscript{217} Stola, \textit{Kraj bez wyjścia?}, 50.
\textsuperscript{218} Ibid., 61; Silber, ‘Foreigners or Co-Nationals?’, 216.
\textsuperscript{219} Initially, during the period 1947-1949, the Soviets’ attitude towards the State of Israel was very positive. The Soviet Union was the first state that recognized the Jewish state and military support was provided through Czechoslovakia. See: Arnold Krammer, \textit{The Forgotten Friendship: Israel and the Soviet Bloc, 1947-53} (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1974), 54–123.
\textsuperscript{220} Stola, ‘Anti-Zionism as a Multipurpose Policy Instrument’, 179.
For Polish Jews, the period that followed was characterized by a substantial revival of Jewish life, including numerous cultural and educational activities and contacts with international Jewish relief organizations. Thus, when the ban on Jewish emigration to Israel was lifted in the late 1950s, some 51,000 individuals, more than half of the total number of the Polish-Jewish community, decided to move to Israel.

Meanwhile, there was a split within the Polish Communist party between the conservative and right-wing nationalist group known as Natolinians, and the more liberal and partly Jewish faction known as Pulawians. Apparently, the Jewish composition of the Pulawian faction began to play a significant role in the intra-party struggle. In 1964, Mieczysław Moczar, one of the leaders of the Natolinian faction, was appointed head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (Ministerstwo Spraw Wewnętrznych). Being in charge of the police and security apparatus, Moczar began to control Jewish organizations and individuals. This had a profound impact on the development of the 1967–1968 campaign.

At the outbreak of the anti-Israeli campaign in June 1967, the Jewish community of Poland was estimated at around 25,000–30,000, a small remnant of the post-war Jewish population of Poland. This group, after previous waves of primarily Zionist and religious migrations, consisted of highly assimilated individuals who, for the most part, did not acknowledge any Jewish identity. However, it did not take long before these individuals became the major target of the new ‘anti-Zionist’ current. After Gomułka’s remark on the alleged Zionist fifth column on 19 June 1967, numerous executives, writers, and scholars were accused of supporting the State of Israel or ‘Zionism’, and the purge in the party leadership and army began.

The Swedish government was apparently well aware of these Polish-Jewish issues. The reports preserved in the UD archives indicate that the Swedish Embassy in Warszawa sent several reports regarding the complexity of these relations and the usage of the Jewish-ethnic argument in the intra-

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222 Stola, Kraj bez wyjścia?, 132. According to Marcos Silber, the easing of restrictions on emigration of Polish Jews has to do with the ethnonational logic in the Polish nation-building. It served to achieve a more homogenous identity of the Polish state. See: Silber, ‘Foreigners or Co-Nationals?’, 217.
224 The exact number was difficult to determine because of the large size of Jews not registered in any Jewish organization. Stola gives the number of some 30,000 individuals. Albert Stanowski refers to 36,800 Polish Jews living in Poland in 1967. See: Stola, Kraj bez wyjścia?, 219; Albert Stankowski, ‘Nowe spojrzenia na statystyki dotyczące emigracji Żydów z Polski po 1944 r.’, in Studia z historii Żydów w Polsce po 1945 roku, ed. Grzegorz Berendt (Warszawa: Żydowski Instytut Historyczny, 2000), 103–51.
party power struggle. Hypothetically, knowing the course of previous incidents, one could imagine the consequence of the 1967–68 campaign.

In March 1968, with the rise in protests against the regime’s ban of Mickiewicz’s play, the government attempted to overcome the crisis by exploiting Polish anti-Semitic attitudes. According to Stola, both Jews and non-Jews, especially intellectuals, independent-minded writers, scholars, and artists, were depicted as “Zionists” responsible for provoking public demonstrations and destroying the country. They were portrayed as being different from the rest of the Polish population, mainly due to their elitist reputation, which served to alienate them from the rest of society.

There was an immense scale to the campaign that began following the events in March. It permeated all levels of the communist party activists and affected all levels of Polish society. The “anti-Zionist” propaganda, which often combined centuries-old anti-Semitic slogans, conspiracy theories, and modern anti-Jewish accusations, was actively communicated to the public through daily newspapers, posters, brochures, leaflets, and billboards. Furthermore, anti-Jewish slogans were exhibited at major communist party meetings, some of which gathered thousands of party activists, as well as at provincial and district committee sessions. The participants were allowed to accuse others without having to prove or substantiate their allegations in any way. As a result, people from all segments of society experienced racial discrimination. Students were suspended from their studies, and adults were dismissed from their jobs. In addition, as presented in the next section, Jews were encouraged to leave Poland for Israel by both the authorities and individuals, primarily through anonymous letters and phone calls.

In comparison with the international response to the events in Czechoslovakia, the Polish government’s anti-Semitic campaign gained less international attention. The criticism that did exist came primarily from the US and Israel. The documentation found in the Israel State Archives reveals that as early as 14 March 1968, the American Jewish Congress voiced the accusation that “Efforts by government officials to transfer responsibility for a surging desire for freedom to a ‘pro-Zionist’ conspiracy is dismaying proof of the classical readiness of Polish authorities to indulge in a scurrilous and racist appeal to latent anti-Semitism”.

226 In 1946, the Swedish Embassy in Warsaw reported to the UD about the Kielce pogrom and the visit of the representative of the JDC, who asked about the opportunities for the migration of Polish Jews to Sweden. See: The Swedish Embassy in Warsaw to the UD, 08 Aug. 1968, F1d:71, 1920 års dossiersystem, The archive of the Swedish Embassy in Warsaw (Beskickingsarkiv Warszawa, BW), RA. In 1967, the UD asked the Embassy about the difficulties with the emigration of Polish Jews to Israel. See: The UD to the Swedish Embassy in Warsaw, 24 Jun. 1957, F1d:71, 1920 års dossiersystem, BW, RA.


December 1968, Joshua Eilberg, a Democratic member of the US House of Representatives, wrote an appeal to Dean Rusk, Secretary of State, to urge the Embassy in Warsaw to pay careful attention to what was happening in Poland and “repeat its warning to the Polish Government against the violent anti-Semitic campaign”. In January 1969, a remark on anti-Semitism in Poland by Jacob K. Javits, a Republican Senator, was printed in the Congressional Record. In Israel, the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee of the Knesset adopted a resolution entitled, “The Persecution of Jews in Poland”, and conveyed it to parliaments around the world.

The documents in the Israeli State Archive also include some of the international press commentaries on the first days of the campaign. Apparently, these were, as will be discussed, much bolder than the early Swedish editorials. On 14 March, the centre-left newspaper, The Guardian, wrote that “it is difficult to refrain from comparing what is happening today in Poland with Hitler’s conception of a world-wide Jewish plot and Stalin’s contention of international Zionist conspiracy”. One day later, Neue Züricher Zeitung, a liberal newspaper, wrote that “The leadership of the Polish Party continues to follow stubbornly the same line as in the past. He incites the masses against the students and the intelligentsia by exploiting anti-Semitism”. The same day, The Montreal Star reported “An overt manifestation of anti-Semitism is now going on in Poland [...] The regime has mounted a campaign which blames Jews and pro-Israel Poles for the disturbances [...] What is significant is the Government’s resort to anti-Semitism to cover its own shortcomings. It is a return to something one would have thought went out with Hitler”.

**The emigration of Polish Jews**
The issue of Jewish emigration from Poland appeared early in the ‘anti-Zionist’ campaign. The first comment suggesting emigration as a solution to the alleged “fifth column” problem appeared, as already discussed, in Gomułka’s speech in mid-June 1967. Initially, the way to put pressure on people to emigrate was through a deliberate policy of dismissals from government and party leadership posts. These dismissals also included officials from public administration and newspapers.

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230 Eilberg to Rusk, 18 Dec. 1968, # 12:4225, ISA.
231 Memorandum by Kadish Luz, 27 Mar. 1968, # 11:4225, ISA.
232 “Interpretation of the Anti-Semitic events in Poland and their condemnation”, report, 6, 18 Mar. 1968, # 11:4225, ISA.
233 “Interpretation of the Anti-Semitic events in Poland and their condemnation”, report, 6, 18 Mar. 1968, # 11:4225, ISA.
234 “Interpretation of the Anti-Semitic events in Poland and their condemnation”, report, 6, 18 Mar. 1968, # 11:4225, ISA.
The issue of emigration returned after the March riots. On 19 March, in his first appearance after the crisis, broadcasted live on both TV and radio, Gomułka offered emigration passports to “those who consider Israel as their homeland”. On 11 April, the Polish Prime Minister Cyrankiewicz announced the government’s official position. “The simultaneous loyalty to socialist Poland and imperialist Israel”, he stated, “is not possible. A choice has to be made and the conclusions drawn. Whoever wants to draw these conclusions in the form of emigration will not encounter any obstacle”.

Yet, the procedure of the processing of applications to leave the country, as Josef Banas points out, was particularly humiliating. Firstly, candidates had to apply for a visa at the Embassy of the Netherlands, which after the Six-Day War represented Israeli affairs in Poland. Secondly, they had to apply for a four-page travel document allowing individuals to leave Poland and travel to other destinations. While applying for the latter document, the individual had to ask for permission to renounce his or her Polish citizenship. He or she also had to pursue a number of certificates issued by organizations such as the internal revenue service, the housing administration, the Communist Party, the military command, and from their employer, and the university, and pay all the prescribed fees. The waiting period for the official exit permit varied from a few weeks to several months. After granting the permission for emigration, the document stated, “The holder of this certificate is not a Polish national”, and explained that “The travel document entitles the holder to leave the Polish People’s Republic and to go to Israel”. In fact, the applicants for emigration had to indicate Israel as the official destination, even if they had no intentions of going there. The last part included the shipment of luggage and departure from Warsaw Gdańska railway station to Vienna. The refugees granted a Swedish visa travelled directly to Sweden, primarily with a ferry from Świnoujście to Ystad.

The change of destination was possible only after arrival in Vienna due to the efforts of the Jewish relief agencies, such as the Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society (HIAS) and the JDC. Yet, the involvement of these agencies on behalf of Jewish migrants preferring countries other than Israel (noshrim, ‘drop-outs’) was not clear from the beginning. On 27 March, Samuel L. Haber, JDC Executive Vice Director reported to Akiva Kohane, JDC officer in Geneva, about his discussion with Gaynor Jacobson, Executive Vice President of HIAS. During this discussion, Jacobsen wondered whether the JDC would...

236 “[...] tym, którzy uważają Izrael za owną ojczyznę, gotowi jesteśmy wydać emigracyjne paszporty”. Stola, Kraj bez wyjścia?, 220.
237 “Nie jest bowiem możliwa lojalność wobec socjalistycznej Polski i imperialistycznego Izraela jednocześnie.Tu trzeba dokonać wyboru i wyciągnąć zeń właściwe konsekwencje. Kto te konsekwencje w postaci emigracji wyciągnąc pragnie, ten nie natrafi na żadne przeszkody”.Ibid., 221.
238 Banas, The Scapegoats, 176.
provide care and support for Polish Jews. He also wondered whether the Jewish Agency would agree that these people should be encouraged to proceed to the United States. Gaynor proposed to discuss this matter thoroughly among the JDC and HIAS before proceeding with the discussion in Israel.239

On 1 May 1968, HIAS determined its position to support those who wished to travel to the United States and elsewhere. It stated that “it was prepared to assume, if necessary, responsibility for travel arrangements, processing expenses and auxiliary costs for Polish-Jewish families who want to rejoin their relatives in the United States, Canada, Brazil, Australia, and other Western countries”.240 On 29 May 1968, the United States Department of State recognized Polish Jews as refugees and declared that the US was prepared to accommodate “any foreseeable demand” of Jews from Poland.241 The same day, HIAS, commending the humanitarian attitude of the US government, announced its readiness “to provide assistance, financially and otherwise, to any Jew in Poland who succeeds in leaving that country and comes to the United States”.242 At the beginning of June, closer cooperation between the JDC and HIAS officers on the support of Polish Jews in Vienna, especially in view of the migrants’ occupational composition, was discussed. The officers agreed that members of the intelligentsia and highly educated migrants needed first rate and extensive assistance, and that HIAS “would have to send a top person to be in charge of this operation so it can continue at the steady speed”.243

Stola observes that initially, despite the government’s call for emigration, the number of applications was very low. Seemingly, Polish Jews, like Czechoslovaks, preferred to wait for events to run their course. Over time, when “anti-Zionist” attacks permeated to the lower levels of society and thus more individuals had experienced anti-Semitic attacks, the rate of emigration applications increased to over 500 per month. By the end of 1968, the total number of applicants reached 3,500; almost all of them were approved.244

From the beginning of this emigration, there was a high number who preferred destinations other than Israel. On 27 August 1968, HIAS reported that out of 751 Polish Jews who had arrived in Vienna up to that point, about a third asked for assistance to migrate to the US and elsewhere in the

239 Samuel L. Haber to Akiva Kohane, 27 Mar. 1968, # 325, Poland: Emigration, 1965-1969, AJDC New York Records, JDCA.
244 Stola, Kraj bez wyjścia?, 221.
West. The support offered by American welfare organizations led to increasing conflict with the Jewish Agency, an Israeli authority responsible for immigration to that country. The Jewish Agency claimed that HIAS should not appear as a rival to the State of Israel and stressed that if it was not for that rivalry, migration to Israel from Eastern Europe would have doubled.

In 1969, the number of emigrants at first decreased and then, after the Politburo’s decision to stop emigration from 1 September 1969, increased in the summer of 1969, reaching close 4,000 applications. These were those who had hesitated to apply in the previous months, but now being faced with restrictions to emigration, decided it was time to move. In fact, there was no difference in the processing of travel documents after 1 September and emigration continued until the end of 1972. As a result, as Albert Stankowski shows, 12,927 individuals left Poland between 1968 and 1972. He also observes that only 40 percent of the emigrants moved to Israel, while the majority left Vienna or Rome to go to the United States and West European countries. Like Stankowski, Stola indicates that the majority of these refugees settled in the United States, Canada, France, West Germany, Sweden, and Denmark, while only the minority (30 percent) moved to Israel. Regarding these destinations, most details are provided for the Scandinavian countries. Edward Olszewski indicates that about 3,000 Polish Jews migrated to Denmark. He also explains that these refugees were very ambitious, and went on to achieve high positions in the economy, science, culture, and social life. Stankowski is more precise and states that 2,825 Polish Jews migrated to Denmark between 1968 and 1972. The reasons for the migration to Scandinavian countries included the positive handling of migrant matters, the liberal visa policy, tuition-free university education, the high standard of living, the Social-Democratic government, and the activity of Polish-Jewish associations.

Regarding the composition of Polish-Jewish refugees, Stola observes that this group included an extraordinary number of individuals with university-level diplomas and students, mainly engineers, doctors, people with economic and humanist education, as well as former employees working in foreign affairs, military intelligence, and the judicial system. He claims that

247 Stola, Kraj bez wyjścia?, 229.
248 Stankowski, ‘Nowe spojrzenia na statystyki dotyczące emigracji Żydów z Polski po 1944r.’, 144–146.
249 Stola, Kraj bez wyjścia?, 223.
251 Stankowski, ‘Nowe spojrzenia na statystyki dotyczące emigracji Żydów z Polski po 1944r.’, 146–147.
the percentage of highly educated people was almost eight times higher than among the Polish population in general.252

Besides these studies, most of the relevant publications concern the processes of identity construction and community building once the refugees were settled in their host societies. Joanna Wiszniewicz dedicated much of her short life to conducting interviews with the 1968 émigrés. In 1992, she published a collection of interviews with those that emigrated to Israel and, in 2008, she published a large collection of interviews with refugees from all around the world, covering a broad spectrum of themes and subjects related to Jewish-Polish identity in the host societies.253 Like Wiszniewicz, Teresa Torańska interviewed the Polish-Jewish refugees in various countries, which resulted in a movie and a book published on this subject.254 Marcin Starnawski also collected a number of interviews with Polish-Jewish refugees from Scandinavia and elsewhere for his study on the reconstruction of a disintegrated community. Finally, some information can be found in personal memoirs and diaries, such as those written by Henryk Dasko, who emigrated from Poland to Denmark and, later on, to Canada, or by Filip Istner, who left Poland firstly for Israel and then later moved to Sweden.255

**Reception and integration of Polish-Jewish refugees**

Unlike the Czechoslovak case, some scholarly work has been undertaken on the Polish-Jewish refugees arriving in Sweden in the late 1960s. The two most important scholarly works relevant to this study concern, on the one hand, the process of identity formation among young Polish-Jewish refugees after their arrival in Sweden and, on the other hand, the migration processes and changes in identity construction.256 The former is addressed by Julian Ilicki in 1988, the latter by Izabela A. Dahl in 2013. Ilicki’s doctoral dissertation, *Den förändliga identiteten. Om identitetsförändringar hos den yngre generationen polska judar som invandrare till Sverige under åren 1968–1972*, is a detailed study of identity construction and integration processes among the younger generation in the Polish-Jewish group. Using

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252 The proportions revealed in the previous studies refer to 1,823 university diploma and 944 student applicants. See: Stola, *Kraj bez wyjścia?*, 222; Eisler, ‘1968: Jews, Antisemitism, Emigration’, 56.


256 In addition, Jaff Schatz published a study on the formation and career of the generation of Polish-Jewish Communists, including several Polish-Jewish refugees from Sweden, but this study falls outside the scope of this investigation. Jaff Schatz, *The Generation: The Rise and Fall of the Generation of Jewish Communists of Poland* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991).
data from a survey sent out in 1984 to 1213 individuals and completed by 441 participants, which gives a response rate of 40 percent, Ilicki observed several changes in the self-perceived identity. For example, before coming to Sweden, as he emphasizes, the group was secular, often explicitly atheist and very much “Polonized”. However, as time passed, more than two thirds of the respondents defined their identity as dramatically less Polish and more Jewish. In particular, respondents from the Malmö area reported that they considered themselves as “Jews”. This shift did not necessarily reflect a change in the level of religiousness in general. The higher degree of Jewish religiousness was primarily found among people married to Swedish Jews, who resided in Stockholm, and who had higher socio-economic status in Poland.

Most importantly for the present study, Ilicki provides extensive socio-economic and demographic characteristics of the respondents and comments on the role of the Swedish authorities in selecting which individuals to admit. When comparing Danish and Swedish attitudes towards the Polish-Jewish group, he elucidates, although without any empirical evidence, that the Swedish authorities made a selection from the applications, choosing candidates with “good” occupations, mainly doctors, students, and able-bodied individuals, whereas the Danish approach was to accept all Polish Jews interested in coming to Denmark. In addition, Ilicki presents various activities and publications of the Polish-Jewish refugee community in Sweden, such as the Coordination Committee for Activities for Polish-Jewish Youth in Scandinavia (CC), the Biuletyn Reunion ’68 magazine, and the publication Nasze Czasy.

Dahl’s doctoral dissertation, Ausschluss und Zugehörigkeit: Polnische jüdische Zwangsmigration in Schweden nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg, is a study of two groups of Polish-Jewish refugees who came to Sweden: those who were Holocaust survivors and arrived in 1945 with the “white busses”, and those who migrated in the 1968–72 period. She finds that the mechanisms of social belonging and exclusion were closely related to the formation of identities in the new environments in both cases. Although not specifically focusing on the immigration process, Dahl’s thesis also explores the ways in which the refugees arrived in Sweden. Regarding the arrival and reception of those coming between 1968 and 1972, Dahl bases her study on a considerable amount of archival sources and interviews. She finds that similar reception processes applied to both groups and that the people

258 Ibid., 259.
259 Ibid., 262.
260 Ibid., 159.
involved in organizing support between 1968 and 1972 were those refugees that has arrived in 1945.\footnote{261}

Yet, even though Dahl brings to light many aspects of Sweden’s response in 1968, such as the role of the MFST, considerable amounts of source material relevant to this topic is not used. For example, the key role of the Swedish Embassy in Warsaw remains unexplained. Furthermore, while investigating the coverage of Polish-Jewish affairs in two Swedish newspapers, the liberal Dagens Nyheter, and communist Ny Dag, the press reports on the Polish-Jewish emigrants are not discussed. To be fair, the acceptance of the refugees is not the focus of Dahl’s dissertation. However, the available sources suggest that the process leading to the acceptance of a part of the Polish-Jewish group migrating to Sweden in 1968–1972 was far more complex than suggested by Dahl. This study attempts to provide a more detailed picture of the Swedish response.

Apart from these studies, little has been written about the performance of this group in Sweden. In a 2005 article, however, Harald Runblom claims that the Polish Jews arriving in 1968–1972 played a vital role for Jewish culture in Sweden during the latter half of the century.\footnote{262} The other historical literature about the Polish-Jewish group is imprecise and inaccurate. For example, in an article by Elżbieta Michalik included in Edward Olszewski’s conference volume on Poles in Scandinavia, the author claims that Sweden admitted 6,600 Polish citizens of Jewish origin between 1969 and 1973, which is more than twice the actual number.\footnote{263} Halina Vigerson’s study on medical doctors among the Polish migrants to Sweden also seems to be imprecise. Vigerson states that “many” of the 6,600 individuals who migrated from Poland to Sweden between 1969 and 1973 were the Polish Jews, and that many (100) were medical doctors.\footnote{264}

Finally, like in the Czechoslovak case, some insights concerning the resettlement and integration processes can be gained from the non-academic literature. Jerzy Sarnecki’s biography of his father, Hilarys historia, is one of the most recent that includes a personal narrative of arrival and reception in Sweden.\footnote{265} Although Sarnecki’s subjective point of view limits the validity of the information, this is a valuable source of first-hand knowledge regarding the stay in Sweden. In addition, some personal accounts about the arrival and reception of Polish Jews to Swedish society can be found.

\footnotetext[261]{Dahl, Ausschluss und Zugehörigkeit, 2013.}
\footnotetext[262]{Harald Runblom, ‘Polish-Swedish Migration Patterns’, in Polen & Sverige 1919-1999, ed. Harald Runblom and Andrzej Nils Uggla (Uppsala: Centrum för multietnisk forskning, 2005), 34.}
\footnotetext[265]{Jerzy Sarnecki, Hilarys historia: samtal med Hilary Sarnecki (Stockholm: Carlsson, 2013).}
The economic status of the Polish Jews has not been studied separately. However, in 1985 Jan Ekberg published a study on immigrants who arrived in Stockholm in 1969, which includes the refugees from Poland. The problem with Ekberg’s figures from the perspective of this study is that he, just like Vigerson in her analysis of Polish professional careers in Sweden, does not distinguish Polish-Jewish newcomers from the non-Jewish Polish group. Ekberg stresses that the refugees from Poland had the highest occupational mobility among all groups in the study, including the Swedish control group, but the study only concerns the 1969 immigration. Thus, although the Jews from Poland were certainly included in Ekberg’s investigation, no conclusions can be drawn about them from his study.

In summary, a large gap exists in previous research on Czechoslovaks and Polish Jews in Sweden. In particular, the literature on Sweden’s acceptance and reception of these refugees is almost non-existent, while other aspects, such as the identity and community formation of the Polish-Jewish group, have been addressed by scholars. In the Czechoslovak case, some scholarly work has been conducted on the Swedish government’s reaction to the Soviet invasion, but there is nothing written about the reception and integration of the Czechoslovak group. The present study attempts to fill these gaps.

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PART II. REACTIONS
3. Sweden’s reactions to events in Czechoslovakia and to Czechoslovak refugees

The previous chapter demonstrated that the Swedish refugee policy changed dramatically in the autumn of 1942. This shift has been interpreted from numerous perspectives: humanitarian, ideological, political, and pragmatic. At the same time, the reception and integration of these refugees into Swedish society was largely determined by economic capacity: the refugees were seen as a labour force and were placed in jobs unrelated to their skills and past experience. In the post-war period, Sweden’s reaction to refugees was primarily determined by such variables as international relations, national security considerations, and economic capacity. For example, Sweden’s reaction to the Hungarian refugees in 1956 was determined by factors such as the international refugee regime and economic capacity. For this period, the set of factors identified by Karen Jacobsen appear to be applicable to the Swedish case. This part of the dissertation attempts to answer the question whether the same factors determined Sweden’s reactions to Czechoslovak and Polish-Jewish refugees in the late 1960s.

This chapter begins with Swedish reactions to the Prague Spring and the Warsaw-Pact invasion, and then turns to Sweden’s response to Czechoslovaks interested in migrating to Sweden. Following the same structure, the next chapter analyzes Sweden’s response to the anti-Semitic campaign in Poland and to Polish Jews interested in coming to Sweden. Both chapters end with a brief review of the factors affecting Swedish refugee policy choices in the late 1960s.

Sweden and the Prague Spring

Previous research promotes the notion that Sweden’s reaction to the 1968 Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia was generally characterized by a sharp but short-lived criticism of the USSR. 267 Similarly, after expressing outrage at the Warsaw-Pact invasion, Britain and the other Western powers reverted to a “business as usual” approach in their relations with the Soviet Union. However, very little has been written about Sweden’s response towards the Prague Spring. How did the Swedish government react to this development? How did this reaction affect Sweden’s response in late August 1968? Was there a connection between these responses and the acceptance of

Czechoslovak refugees? These are the major questions to be discussed in this chapter. It begins with an analysis of editorials in the Swedish press. This is necessary in order to understand what information was delivered to the Swedish public, and in what way. After that, the reports of the Swedish Embassy in Prague will be investigated to consider what was known about the Prague Spring among civil servants and decision-makers in Stockholm. In the last part, the Swedish government’s response to this event will be presented and analyzed.

The Prague Spring in the Swedish press
It is not an exaggeration to say that the reporting of the rise and fall of the Prague Spring dominated all other Cold War themes in the international news sections of the Swedish press in 1968. Literally hundreds of articles were published on the developments in Czechoslovakia, in a wide range of media. Obviously, this is related to the significance of the Prague Spring reforms and the magnitude of the Soviet response to the events.

Overall, from the very beginning of the process of change in Czechoslovakia, the editorials of mainstream Swedish newspapers were largely supportive of the new Czechoslovak leadership and the changes that were brought about. The arrival of Alexander Dubček as the First Secretary of the KSČ was framed as the triumph of the reform-communist forces over the most orthodox Communist regime. The liberal Dagens Nyheter expressed this explicitly in its headline titled “The victory of the reform programme”. The newspaper claimed that it was “a success for those who have argued that today’s economic problems cannot be solved with yesterday’s methods.”

The social-democratic Örebro-Kuriren announced victory over “a diehard and incorrigible communist doctrinaire” who “found himself in a defensive position against new and unavoidable measures.”

The press was also concerned about the future direction of Czechoslovakia. For example, the editorial of the conservative Sydsvenska Dagbladet Snällposten (SDS) argued that the change in leadership “implies that the more liberal-minded forces in the country emerged victorious” and that “the economic reforms will be developed further.” The syndicalist Arbetaren suggested that the change required further drastic measures, such as the rehabilitation of political prisoners, while the conservative Helsingborgs Dagblad claimed that “it was necessary to have extensive

personnel changes in the political institutions.” In March, the editorial of the conservative Barometern Oskarshamns-Tidningen argued that the key challenge for Czechoslovak leaders was to maintain the symmetry between, on the one hand, greater personal and economic freedom and, on the other, a good relationship with Moscow. The conservative Norrbotens-Kuriren stressed that the new leadership in Prague must “proceed with caution.”

The change of president and the announcement of a new action programme in early April 1968 enhanced the positive attitude of the press, which tended to frame these events as “the new era”. The liberal Expressen announced “The Czechs New Deal is called FREEDOM”. Nerikes Allehanda, another liberal newspaper, stressed that Czechoslovakia paved the way for others to follow. The headlines carried by other newspapers included “The bloodless revolution” or “The Revolution in Prague”.

A positive appraisal of the changes in Czechoslovakia was also put forward by the communist weekly, Ny Dag. On 11 April 1968, the editorial summarized recent developments in the following way:

> It is clear that processes of adjustment are both desirable and necessary. They indicate that there is development. New technology requires new forms of coexistence. This technology evolves constantly and requires a constant revision of social structures. [...] It is reasonable to assume that this reform of internal conditions will continue and extend to other socialist countries.

One month later, the newspaper quoted large parts of the Two Thousand Words manifesto, a document calling for more rapid progress towards democratic changes in Czechoslovakia. At the same time, some newspapers attempted to place Czechoslovak events into a Swedish context. At the end of March 1968, Dagens Nyheter published an editorial titled, “If Prague was Stockholm”, that described the events as if they were taking

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272 "Tjeckoslovakerna tror på våren,” Barometern Oskarshamns-Tidningen, March 21, 1968; [...] gå fram med försiktighet.”


274 See, for example, "Ny epok med våren i Prag," Aftonbladet, April 11, 1968.


276 "Tjeckoslovakien visar nya väg," Nerikes Allehanda, April 1968.


place in Sweden. The two countries were compared in a very precise and explicitly defined manner, hinting at an alleged relationship and similarities between the Social-Democratic government and the Communist dictatorship:

Imagine that a couple of thousand workers and students march through the city centre and gather at the junction of Kungsgatan and Sveavägen during rush-hour in the late afternoon. They protest in support of Olof Palme as president and chanting Pal-me in rhythmic chorus. [...] Torsten Nilsson is sharply criticized in the party press. He is presented as totally incapable of leading the country's foreign policy.

Some articles argued that the neutral Swedish welfare state was the goal of the protesters in Prague. An example is an article from the social-democratic newspaper Aftonbladet titled, “Freedom’s ferment in Prague: We want to be like Sweden”, in which the paper’s correspondent Sonja Westling sketched a picture of a young Czechoslovak named Milan for whom Sweden was an ideal model for Czechoslovakia: “Milan’s dream is that Czechoslovakia will one day become like Sweden, neutral, unbound by the world's two power blocs with full freedom of speech, and preferably Sweden’s good economics.”

Over time, Soviet-Czechoslovak tensions became the dominant theme characterizing the framing of the Prague Spring in the Swedish press. Some editorials chose to discuss them with regard to the Soviet intervention in Hungary in 1956. “Will the 1968 Czechoslovakia become the new 1956 Hungary?” asked the SDS editorial in mid-July 1968. It argued that a direct Soviet military intervention was unlikely since the Soviet Union had much more to lose from intervening, particularly in their relations with other communist countries. Conservative newspaper, Borås Tidning, followed the same line of reasoning: “There are good reasons for thinking Soviet military intervention in Czechoslovakia unlikely and there is therefore no need to fear a repetition of the intervention in Hungary, particularly because the Soviets have other, powerful means of applying pressure, these are

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mainly economic in nature.”285 Others described it as a “war of nerves” between the Czechoslovak and Soviet leaderships. For example, on 23 July 1968, the social-democratic Nya Norrland wrote that “the Soviet war of nerves against Czechoslovakia bears all the signs of being the initial preparation for direct intervention.”286 Similarly, the liberal Göteborgs Posten argued that a “war of nerves” was placed on the shoulders of the people of Czechoslovakia.287

For a short time in the beginning of August 1968, the Swedish press announced the victory of Dubček’s politics. For example, Aftonbladet reported that “the Prague leaders have defended and had their political line accepted by other Warsaw-Pact members”. Consequently, the newspaper argued that a new era in Soviet-East European relations had begun.288 The social-democratic Värmlands Folkblad depicted Dubček as “the great victor”.289 Ny Dag saw democratic changes as indispensable: “there is every reason to believe that democratic forces in Czechoslovakia, inside and outside of the Communist Party, must face up to all attacks and continue with the stimulating regeneration of the socialist system, which is a necessity”.290 However, when the Soviet pressures on Czechoslovakia increased in mid-August 1968, the press returned to their previous pessimistic views. On 13 August 1968, the editorial of centrist newspaper Skånska Dagbladet argued that the most recent developments were a “reminder for Dubček that there are limits to what can be achieved in Czechoslovakia.”291 On 22 August 1968, the front-page headline of Ny Dag called for “Full support for the people of Czechoslovakia”.292

To sum up, the vast majority of editorials across the political spectrum were supportive of the changes in Prague. The Swedish press regarded Czechoslovakia as a model for other communist states to follow and portrayed First Secretary Dubček as a winner. It is also obvious that

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287 "Dialogen fortsätter,” Göteborgs Posten, August 02, 1968.
288 "Pragledarna har slagit vakt om och fått sin politiska linje accepterad av de övriga medlemmarna i Warszawapakten.” "Seger för Dubček politik,” Aftonbladet, August 05, 1968.
289 "[…] den store segerherren.” "Vad sker härnäst?” Värmlands Folkblad, August 05, 1968.
290 "[…] det finns dock all anledning tro att de demokratiska krafterna i Tjeckoslovakien, inom och utom det kommunistiska partiet, skall komma till rätta med alla attacker och lyckligt genomföras den stimulerande nydanning av sitt socialista system, vilket alltmer framstår som en nödvändighet.” "Propagandaväg som avslöjas,” Ny Dag, July 18, 1968.
291 "De nya militära påtryckningarna är en otrevlig påminnelse för Dubček om att det finns gränser för vad man kan tillåta sig i Tjeckoslovakien.” "Dubček’s begränsade rörelsefrihet,” Skanska Dagbladet, August 13, 1968.
Czechoslovakia was regarded as similar to Sweden. The developments were understood from a Swedish perspective and put to use in domestic political debates (“the Swedish model” as a source of inspiration versus Swedish social democracy as hard-line communism). This framing is likely to have affected readers’ support for the democratization of Czechoslovakia and for those driving the process. These readers of course included members of government and people working for state agencies.

In the next section, there will be an analysis of the information mediated by the Swedish Embassy in Prague to the UD. What did the Swedish government know about the events in Czechoslovakia, besides what they could learn from the press?

Information from the Swedish Embassy in Prague
Starting in early January 1968, when Alexander Dubček replaced Antonín Novotný as First Secretary of the KSČ, the Swedish Embassy in Prague began to provide the UD with extensive reports detailing the gradually increasing democratization efforts in Czechoslovakia. A quick look at the available sources in the archive of the Embassy suggests that Swedish diplomats were well informed and that they closely monitored the developments.293 The following example of embassy reports from the final month of the Prague Spring should suffice to paint an accurate picture.

After the crucial bilateral talks at Čierna nad Tisou and the multilateral conference in Bratislava at the beginning of August 1968, the embassy in Prague reported to Stockholm about the increasing pressure on the Czechoslovak government. On 7 August 1968, in a five-page report marked “strictly confidential”, Harry Bagge, the Swedish ambassador to Czechoslovakia, summarized the most recent Czechoslovak-Soviet relations. Like the Swedish press, Bagge referred to a “war of nerves”: “The Soviet policy has, there can hardly be any doubt, attempted through a war of nerves to force the new party leadership in Prague to retreat.”294 Bagge apparently, also in line with the Swedish media, identified with the leaders of the reform movement, stressing that “the pressure on Dubček and his colleagues […] must have been terrible.”295 Bagge also observed the large variety of views from outside and inside the crisis: “Abroad, Dubček’s prestige has clearly increased, mainly due to the solidarity he managed to mobilize, but also due to the endurance. At home, the regime has also been strengthened, although

293 See, for example, volumes Ffd:22 and Ffd:23, 1920 års dossiersystem, The archive of the Swedish Embassy in Prague (Beskickningsarkiv Prag, BP), RA.
295 ”Trycket på Dubček och hans medearbetare […] måste ha varit ohyggligt.” Harry Bagge to the UD, 7 Aug. 1968, Ffd:23, 1920 års dossiersystem, BP, RA.
one can be puzzled by how quick the Russian cannonade calmed down. ‘Too good to be true’ is the main reaction here.”

Uncertainty about these developments was also found in the correspondence from other diplomatic missions. On 31 July 1968, Nils Möller, Air Attache at the Swedish Embassy in Moscow, summarized his meetings with American officers and noted the importance of understanding that “the recent Soviet measures were alarming.” One day later, Leif Belfrage, the Swedish Ambassador to the United Kingdom, reported to Stockholm about British internal debates concerning Czechoslovakia’s future. “Within the Foreign Office”, Belfrage wrote, “one does not really believe in the Soviet’s genuine interest in the continuation of the relaxation.” He reported that British diplomats refrained from making any contact with Soviet and Czechoslovak ambassadors.

Some of this information was passed on by the UD to Swedish legations elsewhere. In addition, the Swedish press clippings were forwarded from Stockholm to the Swedish embassies. For example, on 2 August, information on how the two mainstream newspapers—the conservative-leaning Svenska Dagbladet and liberal-leaning Dagens Nyheter—responded to the bilateral talks in Czechoslovakia were sent from Stockholm to the Swedish embassies in Moscow and Washington.

Due to the detailed documents sent to the UD from Prague and other embassies, the Swedish government was in possession of a great deal of information concerning the Prague Spring. Seemingly, there were enough details to catch UD’s attention and play a role in determining its critical position towards the crisis. Such a position would have been expected following the foreign policy statements at the time, such as the 1967 declaration by Olof Palme voicing a firm ambition to “stand on each and every occasion, on the side of the oppressed against the oppressors”.

What was, then, the Swedish position on the issue?

**Sweden’s response to the Prague Spring**

Sweden’s first, and apparently only public and official comment on the events in Czechoslovakia, appeared in Foreign Minister Nilsson’s talk at the
Congress of the Social Democratic Party on 12 June 1968. The speech was a summary of the political developments on both sides of the East-West divide, and the Prague Spring, like the anti-Semitic campaign in Poland, was one of the topics of Nilsson’s speech.

The Minister began his talk on Czechoslovakia with reference to the 1948 Prague coup d’état. He depicted this event as a tragedy that “has drowned the country down deeper and deeper into political oppression and economic stagnation”. He then focused on the role of the people of Czechoslovakia who, according to Nilsson, “have managed to make the Communist government considerably less rigid”. Finally, he stated that although “it is still too early to speak of a return to democracy [...] we must welcome the humanization and liberalization which have undoubtedly characterized recent developments in Czechoslovakia.”

Although this statement, and particularly the last part of Nilsson’s speech, was clearly supportive of the changes in Czechoslovakia, it is hard to conclude that Sweden’s support of the Prague Spring was particularly emphatic or strong. No official support for the people of Czechoslovakia, nor any explicit criticism of Soviet pressure, appeared in the speech. Rather, the talk should be seen as a positive but moderate comment on the reformist changes in Czechoslovakia. This had to do with Sweden’s interest in upholding the Soviet Union’s confidence in Sweden’s policy of non-alignment. Strong support of the Czechoslovak democratization process would negatively impact these relations and Nilsson most likely wanted to avoid controversy, especially in the context of the visit of Alexei Kosygin, Chairman of the Soviet Council of Ministers, to Stockholm scheduled for mid-July 1968.

Indeed, the subject of Czechoslovakia was not explicitly discussed during the Kosygin’s visit. Instead, a general Swedish-Soviet communiqué emphasizing non-interference in internal affairs and respect for state sovereignty and territorial integrity was issued on July 13. It stated that:

The Government of Sweden and the Soviet Union consider that a strengthening of peace and the maintenance of the security of the people require that international relations should be built on the basis of a repudiation of the use of violence or the threat of violence and international disputes should be solved solely by peaceful means. [...] The parties were agreed on the importance of developing co-operation between all European states both on the basis of equality, non-interference in internal affairs, respect for state sovereignty and territorial integrity, and on the basis of other principles as contained in the United Nations Charter.

301 Documents on Swedish Foreign Policy, 1969, 1968:40; See also Tamnes, Svensk og finsk reaksjon på Tsjekkoslovakia-krisen 1968: Sikkerhetspolitiske utfordringer og muligheter, 262–268.
302 Documents on Swedish Foreign Policy, 1969, 1968:279.
The content of the communiqué and the rapprochement with the Soviet leadership sparked heavy criticism from the political opposition. On 26 July, Sven Wedén, the leader of the People’s Party (Folkpartiet), stressed that “A continuation of the government’s silence could lead to the misunderstanding that the significance of Sweden’s policy of neutrality has changed.” Olle Dahlén, another leading politician of the People’s Party, stated in Dagens Nyheter that “Erlander’s silence is both striking and humiliating.”

In the weeks preceding the 1968 elections, the Social Democratic government could not ignore this criticism. Sven Wedén was targeted in an attempt to discredit him in the eyes of the Swedish public. On 2 August 1968, Prime Minister Tage Erlander stated that “Wedén has ‘as always’ spoken in the wrong way, at the wrong time, and in the wrong place.” Five days later, he challenged Wedén’s criticism by asking in Aftonbladet, “How would that look if we, in the midst of events, said something that meant we did not trust Kosygin’s word?” The Foreign Minister accused Wedén of being ignorant of government policies and strategies, stressing that any support for Czechoslovakia expressed during discussions with Soviet leaders would have made their task all the more difficult.

The campaign against Wedén – which, to a certain extent, remained of the so-called Hjalmarson affair that had erupted in the late 1950s following criticism from Jarl Hjalmarson, the leader of the Conservatives (Högerpartiet), against the visit of Nikita Khrushchev, the First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and which led to the cancelation of the visit by the Soviet government and to the exclusion of Hjalmarson from Sweden’s delegation to the General Assembly of the United Nations - continued even after the Warsaw-Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia. On 5 September 1968, in a debate broadcasted by Swedish TV, Nilsson referred to a “top secret” document as the reason for the government’s cautious approach towards Czechoslovakia. However, due to its “high secrecy”, the document could not be presented to the public. Wedén, who seemingly had been given the opportunity to study the document, was banned from commenting on its content.

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306 "Hur skulle det se ut om vi mitt under händelserna sa något som betydde att vi inte litade på Kosygins ord?" Ibid.
308 Once made public in 1994 by Carl Bildt, then the Prime Minister, the document appeared to be the report sent to the UD by Agda Rössel, the Swedish Ambassador in Belgrade, on August 17 1968, stating that the Czechs would appreciate Western silence on the issue. It was not an official Czechoslovak standpoint and,
Scholars discuss this matter in terms of Sweden’s deepened rapprochement with the USSR. Rolf Tamnes, who interviewed several Swedish officials on that occasion, states that the Swedish side actively discussed the Czechoslovak case with their Soviet counterparts. For example, he points out that Minister Nilsson took the initiative to discuss the matter with Vasili Kuznetsov, the First Deputy Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union, and that Prime Minister Erlander discussed the issue with Chairman Kosygin.\(^{309}\) However, as Tamnes observes, in the spring of 1968 Sweden was primarily interested in being seen as nonaligned in Soviet eyes and no critical comments were made.\(^{310}\) Similar to Tamnes, Olof Kronvall and Magnus Peterson emphasize that Sweden’s primary goal was to strengthen the Soviet Union’s confidence in Swedish nonalignment.\(^{311}\) For Aryo Makko, the Swedish government not only refused to take a strong stand against Soviet policy but also made “friendly overtures” towards the visitors and, thus, he claims, accepted Moscow’s position on Czechoslovakia.\(^{312}\)

This study claims that the officials were determined not to raise any additional concern with the Soviet representatives. When looking more closely at the meeting of the FAAC, which took place on 15 August 1968 and during which Kosygin’s visit was reported to the Swedish parliamentary advisory council, one sees that no initiative was taken to discuss the Prague Spring with the Soviet representatives. During the meeting, the Foreign Minister reported that there was no need to present the Swedish position on the Czechoslovak issue, since it had been publicly expressed at the Congress one month earlier. Secondly, as he stated, the information from the Swedish Embassy in Prague indicated that the Czechoslovak side did not perceive any military threat. Finally, Nilsson reported that Dubček strongly desired the support of Communist groups in Western Europe and Communist countries in Eastern Europe.\(^{313}\) Eventually, as stated by Nilsson in his memoirs a decade later, the Czechoslovak leadership was convinced that the Soviets


\(^{310}\) Ibid., 307.


\(^{313}\) "[...] endast var kommunistiska grupper i Västeuropa och kommuniska länder i Östeuropa som understödde honom." "Stenografiskt referat av utrikesnämndens sammanträdé torsdagen den 15 augusti 1968," 29, 15 Aug. 1968, Utikesnämndens protokoll, the archive of the Foreign Affairs Advisory Committee (Utrikesnämndens arkiv), The archive of the Government Offices (Regeringskansliets arkiv).
would not use any military force against Czechoslovakia and, thus, there was no reason to raise any additional concerns.\footnote{314}{Torsten Nilsson, Människor och händelser i Europa (Stockholm: Tiden, 1978), 288.}

To sum up, because of the numerous and detailed reports from the embassy in Prague, the Swedish government was well informed about the developments in Czechoslovakia. In June 1968, the UD showed its interest in those changes, but remained fairly cautious when it came to publicly expressing support for the new leadership in Czechoslovakia. For several reasons, of which perhaps the most important was related to Swedish national security considerations, particularly the credibility of Sweden’s policy of nonalignment, the Swedish leadership believed that there was no reason to raise any additional concerns during Kosygin’s visit in mid-July 1968. Yet, the nature of the government’s response gave rise to domestic political contestation and opposition in the 1968 election campaign, leading to the conclusion that the Swedish response was also affected by domestic political considerations.

**Sweden and the Warsaw-Pact invasion**

The Swedish government’s relatively cautious response to the first phases of the Prague Spring constitutes an important background for the next stage of this study, that of understanding the Swedish reaction to the Warsaw-Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia. As previously, the first part the analysis will focus on editorials in the Swedish press. After that, the information conveyed by the Swedish Embassy in Prague will be presented and discussed. In the final part, Sweden’s response to the crisis in Czechoslovakia will be analyzed.

**The Warsaw-Pact invasion in the Swedish press**

The news about the nocturnal invasion of Czechoslovakia came too late to be included in the morning newspapers. However, they appeared in Swedish radio and TV news, and made it to the headlines of the evening newspapers. Several discourses are evident in the reporting of the invasion in the first few days after the crisis. Firstly, most editorials described the intervention as a historical tragedy. Örebro-Kuriren saw it as a drama affecting both Czechoslovaks and other Eastern bloc societies.\footnote{315}{"Det kommunistiska våldet talar åter till Europa," Örebro-Kuriren, August 22, 1968.}


A second noteworthy feature is that the invasion was placed alongside other Czechoslovak tragedies of the twentieth century: the German
occupation of Sudetenland in 1938 and the 1948 Communist coup d’etat. “The well-known pattern”, stated the editorial of the liberal newspaper *Uppsala Nya Tidning* (UNT), and it continued:

The first time the invaders were Germans and the second time Russians were responsible for what happened. This time there are both Russian and German soldiers, alongside Poles, Hungarians and Bulgarians, in the occupation army that raped Czechoslovakia’s right to self-determination.318

*Örebro-Kuriren* went even further. The newspaper stated that “Adolf Hitler used similar methods when his troops marched into Czechoslovakia 30 years ago.”319 In a similar manner, *Dala-Demokraten* argued that “The Russian attack on Czechoslovakia conveys to the people of Europe the same feeling of fear and anxiety as was the case in 1939. This is how much the clock has been turned back.”320

Thirdly, security concerns were widely discussed in the press commentaries. The *SDS* editorial argued that during these uncertain times each country had to look after itself, since “there is significant risk of being taken by surprise as long as there is turmoil in Central Europe.”321 *Dagens Nyheter* observed that the “Superior powers crushed Czechoslovakia’s freedom with the language of force. Violence triumphs just as when Hitler occupied the country thirty years ago”. Concerning the failure of bilateral relations with the Soviet Union, the paper argued that: “Apparent calm and external stability in Europe has once again proved to be a chimera.”322

Finally, the massive unarmed opposition of the Czechoslovak population was underlined in the comments. On 26 August 1968, *Skånska Dagbladet* wrote that the united people of Czechoslovakia forced the Soviets “to understand clearly that they had no role in Czechoslovakia.”323 *UNT* observed that the Soviets had met with more resistance than they expected.324 Together with this subject, there was a discussion of Sweden’s

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role in supporting the Czechoslovak struggle. For example, on 22 August 1968, *Expressen* saw it in the following way:

> But through the rightly administrated freedom in our own country, while never forgetting what a privilege we have, we can help secure freedom to survive, giving them a chance that within, as we hope, a not too distant future it will return, not only to the Czechoslovak people, but to all people who live under oppression and lack of freedom.\textsuperscript{325}

On 27 August, like one week earlier, the *Ny Dag* front-page headline called upon its readers to “Show solidarity with the people of Czechoslovakia”.\textsuperscript{326}

Thus, at the centre of this reporting, in a very powerful and compassionate way, was the portrayal of the Czechoslovak crisis as a human tragedy, one of a number of political disasters that had befallen Czechoslovakia in the 20th century. These editorials were accompanied by numerous articles detailing the development of the situation in Prague and elsewhere in Czechoslovakia. These reports, like in the reporting of the Prague Spring, most likely played an important role in reinforcing and promoting a pro-Czechoslovakian position in Swedish society.

**Information from the Swedish Embassy in Prague**

On 21 August 1968, at 03.45am, a Swedish Embassy telegram reporting that “in several places the Russian, Polish, and East German soldiers crossed the border into Czechoslovakia at midnight” was dispatched to the Prime Minister’s Office in Stockholm.\textsuperscript{327} After receiving the cable, Sten Sundfeldt, the Head of the UD Press Department, called Ambassador Bagge and asked him for a meticulous report on events in Czechoslovakia. In the next hours, the Embassy exchanged a number of telegrams with the Prime Minister’s Office and the UD describing the developing situation in Prague and elsewhere in Czechoslovakia. The content of these telegrams tended to be very precise: “In Prague everything is calm. Thousands of people are on the streets but the Prague police stand idly by and let the East German military policemen direct traffic.”\textsuperscript{328} Overall, the cables carried similar information to what appeared in the Swedish media at that time.

\textsuperscript{325} "Men genom att rätt förvalta friheten i vårt eget land, genom att aldrig ett ögonblick glömma vilket privilegium vi har, kan vi hjälpa friheten att överleva, ge den en chans att inom en, som vi hoppas, inte alltför avlägsen framtid komma åter, inte bara till det tjeckoslovakiska folket, utan till alla de folk som i dag lever under fortryck och i ofrihet." *Expressen*, August 22, 1968.

\textsuperscript{326} "Visa solidaritet med folket i Tjeckoslovakien," *Ny Dag*, August 27, 1968.

\textsuperscript{327} "Med flera ställen om att ryska, polska och östtyska trupper vid midnatt överskridit gränsen till Tjeckoslovakien*. The Swedish Embassy in Prague to the UD, telegram, 21 Aug. 1968, F1d:23, 1920 års dossiersystem, BP, RA.

\textsuperscript{328} "I Prag är allt lugnt. Tusentals människor är ute på gatorna men prargolisen står överksam och låter östtyska militära poliser dirigera trafiken". The Swedish Embassy in Prague to the UD, telegram, 21 Aug. 1968, F1d:23, 1920 års dossiersystem, BP, RA.
Almost immediately, the UD and the Embassy began to discuss the plan for evacuating Swedish citizens in Czechoslovakia.\textsuperscript{329} This process was to be initiated if the situation got any worse. On 21 August 1968, at 12.00 am, the Embassy confirmed that the Soviet Union had begun to expand its control of the Czechoslovak-Austrian border, which could make evacuation more difficult to execute.\textsuperscript{330} This exchange of information continued over the next hours and days. From it, the Swedish government received the most updated and detailed information on the crisis.

**Sweden’s response to the Warsaw-Pact invasion**

The Swedish reaction began with a statement issued by the UD in the early morning of 21 August. The document stated that:

> The Swedish Government, deeply aware of the seriousness of what has occurred, wishes to express the warm sympathy of the Swedish people, in sorrow and disappointment with what has now afflicted the people of Czechoslovakia. The Government hopes that the time will not be too distant when liberty and human rights will once more gain the upper hand over violence and oppression.\textsuperscript{331}

This statement was later supported by FAAC, which announced that “These events are a relapse into methods which we hoped would never again be used on our continent”.\textsuperscript{332} At the level of domestic politics, all political factions condemned the Warsaw-Pact intervention. This was also true for the Left Party – the Communists (Vänsterpartiet Kommunisterna, VPK), which was actually one of the first parties to criticize the Soviet’s aggression. The party also demanded that the relations with the USSR should be reevaluated through, for example, recalling the Swedish Ambassador from Moscow. This went hand-in-hand with the VPK leadership’s earlier position on the events in Czechoslovakia. Previous research has interpreted VPK’s position as a way of distancing VPK from the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{333} In the spring of 1968, Carl-Henrik Hermansson, the leader of the VPK, had refrained from taking any official stance towards the Prague Spring. In late July 1968, the VPK leadership decided to send a party delegation to Czechoslovakia, with the aim of “studying your [the KSČ] party’s work and the current development in Czechoslovakia to gain a better understanding of the conditions.”\textsuperscript{334} At that

\textsuperscript{329} The Swedish Embassy in Prague to the UD, telegram, 21 Aug. 1968, F1d:23, 1920 års dossiersystem, BP, RA.

\textsuperscript{330} The Swedish Embassy in Prague to the UD, telegram, 21 Aug. 1968, F1d:23, 1920 års dossiersystem, BP, RA.

\textsuperscript{331} Documents on Swedish Foreign Policy, 1969, 1968:179.

\textsuperscript{332} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{334} “[...] studera ert partis arbete och den aktuella utvecklingen i Tjeckoslovakien för att vinna bättre kunskap om dess förutsättningar och innebörd.” ”VPK vill studera förnyelsen i Prag,” Vestmanlands Läns Tidning, July 31, 1968.
time, the social-democratic *Dala-Demokraten* suggested that “there is no doubt that the real cause of Mr. Hermansson’s silence is that he is so tightly bound to far-left extremist groups that he believes it is best to keep quiet.”\(^{335}\) However, the major criticism came from the pro-Soviet factions in the party, associated with the other leading communist newspaper, *Norrskensflamman*. In late August 1968, *Norrskensflamman* was the only daily newspaper advocating a pro-Soviet line.\(^{336}\)

The criticism against the Warsaw-Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia was also expressed at vast demonstrations in support of Czechoslovakia that took place across the country. In Stockholm, for example, during the demonstration at Sergel’s square (*Sergels torg*), Foreign Minister Nilsson described the suppression of the Prague Spring as a “world-wide political tragedy” and a “shattering defeat for freedom and the forces of democracy”.\(^{337}\) In Malmö, Olof Palme criticized the orthodox Communists: “If they are now returning, this is not as liberators but as oppressors, tainted by a 20-year-old terror, which is now coming back. Once again it happened that in a communist country a freedom movement has been stopped by force.”\(^{338}\) A few days later, Nilsson condemned Communism even more strongly: “Communism has not been capable of winning over people, and therefore the country in which the Communist movement originated must secure its influence by force.”\(^{339}\)

That the Swedish reaction was initially robust and clear-cut is in accordance with previous findings. According to Hakovirta, who has examined the responses of neutral countries to Cold War crises, the Swedish reaction was far more intense than the responses of other neutral states.\(^{340}\) Certainly, the harsh criticism expressed against both the Warsaw-Pact invasion and Communism in general was in line with the new active foreign policy, targeting the forces of reaction and repression. However, it was also a reaction to Sweden’s domestic political context, particularly in relation to the outspoken criticism from the non-socialist opposition. Carl-Gustaf Scott

\(^{335}\) ”Den verkliga orsaken till hr Hermansson’s tysnad är dock med all säkerhet att han är så hårt bunden vid extremistgrupperna på den yttersta vänsterkanten att han anser det klokast att hålla tyst.” ”Hr Hermansson,” *Dala-Demokraten*, July 22, 1968.


\(^{337}\) Documents on Swedish Foreign Policy, 1969, 1968:180.


\(^{339}\) Documents on Swedish Foreign Policy, 1969, 1968:186.

suggests that it emerged from the struggle to win the votes of anti-Communist voters during the final weeks of the 1968 election campaign.  

Previous studies also indicate that Sweden’s objection to the Warsaw-Pact invasion quickly lost its initial sharpness. Tamnes, as mentioned already, argues that the sharp criticism subsided by mid-September 1968. Hakovirta relates this phenomenon to Swedish concerns for détente at the UN General Assembly Plenary Session on 2 October 1968. During this talk, Foreign Minister Nilsson referred to the legal and moral aspects of the violation of the Charter of the United Nations, while avoiding any critical comments on the Soviet Union. Scott refers to the declaration of Swedish-Soviet friendship between Nilsson and Viktor Maltsev, the Soviet Ambassador to Sweden, in August 1969.

This study claims that Swedish-Soviet relations remained relatively unchanged during the entire period of crisis. Swedish diplomats were engaged in regular discussions with their Soviet counterparts regarding the development of bilateral relations. On August 21, the UD called Ambassador Maltsev for a meeting to present the government’s statement. The document was rejected by the Soviet Ambassador. According to a pro memoria in the archive of the Swedish Embassy in Prague, Petr Klimenkov, the counselor at the Soviet Embassy in Sweden, had stated that the reason for its rejection was that it described the Soviet’s use of violence in Czechoslovakia. Klimenkov had, according to the same source, also expressed his hopes that the Swedish government would understand the position of his government and that this event would not disturb existing relations between the two countries. One week later, Ole Jödahl, State Secretary for Foreign Affairs, assured Ambassador Maltsev that there was no risk of bilateral relations being harmed. In his strictly confidential account of the conversation, Jödahl clarified Stockholm’s attitude towards the matter: “The Government hoped that these contacts would be maintained and developed, but one could not ignore that they were affected by what had occurred and by what might happen going forward in Czechoslovakia.” On September 3, Maltsev paid one more visit to the UD. He met with Alva Myrdal, then the Consultative

343 Hakovirta, East-West Conflict and European Neutrality, 162.
347 ”Regeringen hoppades att dessa kontakter skulle kunna bibehållas och utvecklas, men man kunde ej bortse från att de påverkades av vad som förekommit och vidare kommer att ske i Tjeckoslovakien.” Promemoria by Ole Jödahl, 29 Aug. 1968, HPt:626, 1920 års dossiersystem, UDA, RA.
Minister for Disarmament Affairs, who repeated that Sweden “intends to continue and develop our relations with the Soviet Union.”

Thus, due to national security considerations, it remained in Sweden’s best interest to continue to pursue friendly relations with the Soviet Union. Commenting on that, Scott argues that it was “vital for Stockholm to foster cordial, if not amiable, relations with Moscow.” Interestingly, as Christer Jönsson and Bo Petersson suggest, the USSR was well aware of these motives and did not even bother to respond to Swedish criticism.

Overall, the decisions to condemn the Soviet violation of the sovereignty of a small European state and to accept the Czechoslovak refugees were founded in a thinking influenced by the new active approach in foreign policy. This stance meant that Sweden should stand on the side of democratic values, social justice and liberation movements. From that point of view, the criticism of the Soviet Union and the acceptance of Czechoslovaks fleeing the Warsaw Pact invasion would ensure Sweden a position in world affairs. However, the conciliatory line towards the USSR raises questions regarding these claims. The following years witnessed an ever-improving rapport with the Soviet Union. In 1970, the UD described Swedish-Soviet relations as developing “favorably in the spirit of good-neighborly relations to the benefit of both countries.” In June that year, during his visit to Moscow, the new Swedish Prime Minister Olof Palme confirmed “the increasing relations in trade, science, technology, culture, sports and tourism.” According to Scott, these relations were further enhanced by “the royal treatment” bestowed upon Plame. Thus, there is a good reason to agree with Scott that the outburst against the USSR in August 1968 should be perceived as an “isolated incident” in these ever-improving mutual interactions. The acceptance of Czechoslovak refugees did not impact the Swedish rapprochement with the USSR.

**Sweden and Czechoslovak refugees**

The Swedish government quickly expressed solidarity with the people of Czechoslovakia. On 21 August, at the demonstration in support of Czechoslovakia in Stockholm, Foreign Minister Nilsson stressed that

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348 The UD to the Swedish Embassy in Moscow, chieffertelegram, 03 Sep. 1968, HP1:626, 1920 års dossiersystem, UDA, RA.
We have all been struck by the unanimity and the unity shown by the Czech people during the events of the last six months. Despite severe external pressure, the people have remained calm and self-controlled and have rallied round the country’s leaders in a way that has aroused our admiration. [...] We should like to express our respect and our solidarity with the Czech people.\(^{355}\)

In Malmö, Olof Palme ended his speech by declaring “Czechoslovakia is not far away. Its people are close to us. Our intense desire is that this people ought to gain their freedom and independence.”\(^{356}\) One week later, the Foreign Minister highlighted the unarmed Czechoslovak resistance: “The courage, and the endurance, which the people of Czechoslovakia have shown during a tragic circumstances are an inspiration to us all.”\(^{357}\) The widespread civilian resistance was also reported by the Swedish press. As early as 23 August 1968, the UNT editorial reported that this resistance surprised the Soviets and made them rethink their strategy in Czechoslovakia.\(^{358}\)

Strong support was also expressed by the Swedish public. In central Stockholm, people gathered at the Sergel’s square and at the Haymarket (Hötorget), where the non-Socialist parties organized a demonstration.\(^{359}\) These protests also took place adjacent to the embassies of the Warsaw-Pact countries involved in the invasion as well as in other major Swedish cities. In Malmö, as Štěpán discusses, the demonstration was a gathering of some 15,000 people.\(^{360}\) The support was also expressed by various organizations and institutions. For example, the Swedish Writers Association expressed solidarity for Czechoslovak writers.\(^{361}\)

In early September 1968, the Swedish government even actively helped Czechoslovaks by offering them the possibility of migrating to Sweden. It is this episode that constitutes the focus of this chapter. It begins, like the other sections in this study, with the investigation of how the Swedish press reported Czechoslovak emigration. The study then analyses how the Swedish embassy in Prague informed the UD about Czechoslovaks interested in migrating to Sweden. Finally, Sweden’s response to the Czechoslovak refugees, travelling both individually and from the UNHCR refugee camps, will be analyzed.

\(^{355}\) Documents on Swedish Foreign Policy, 1969, 1968:184.
\(^{357}\) Documents on Swedish Foreign Policy, 1969, 1968:187.
\(^{358}\) “Motståndsvilja,” Upsala Nya Tidning, August 23, 1968.
\(^{359}\) The UD to the Swedish Embassy in Prague, telegram, 21 Aug. 1968, F1d:24, 1920 års dossiersystem, BP, RA.
\(^{360}\) Štěpán, Československý Exil ve Švédsku v Letech 1945-1989, 47.
\(^{361}\) “3000 tjeckoslovaker väntas komma hit. Flyktingläger rustas”, Svenska Dagbladet, September 06, 1968.
Czechoslovak refugees in the Swedish press

Overall, the subject of the emigration of Czechoslovaks after the Warsaw-Pact invasion received very little publicity in the Swedish press in comparison to the Prague Spring and the events of late August 1968. Until August 1969, only a few editorials commented on this topic. However, the papers that did actually write editorials about the issue, framed it in a specific way.

As early as 25 August 1968, Göteborgs-Posten published an editorial titled “Take care of them!” which specifically argued for the granting of asylum to Czechoslovaks who were in Sweden at the time of the invasion. The main point of granting asylum was, according to the paper, that “it [was] a convenient opportunity to show Swedish solidarity.” “The government should clearly declare”, the editorial argued, “that those Czechoslovaks who, for legitimate reasons, wish to stay here will be treated as refugees. They should be given the opportunity to receive asylum and an alien’s passport.” The paper claimed that this decision should be implemented immediately. “The Swedish government should not hesitate to take its responsibility”, Göteborgs-Posten concluded.

A few days later, the first information about the Czechoslovaks interested in migrating to Sweden appeared in the press. On 3 September, a Svenska Dagbladet article titled “The visa queue to travel here” reported that some 100 Czechoslovaks had applied for Swedish visas since the beginning of the Warsaw-Pact occupation. Like Göteborgs-Posten, Svenska Dagbladet took a strong position on behalf of the Czechoslovaks and advocated granting them asylum in Sweden. The paper stressed that agreement between the two authorities responsible for refugee and immigrant policies, the AMS and the SUK, was necessary and that the “applications should be treated favourably.” The Czechoslovaks should be granted residence and work permits “as quickly as possible”, the article stated.

Later on, perhaps due to the complex and gradual nature of Czechoslovak emigration, the press focused on why the expected massive emigration wave had not materialized. On 20 September 1968, Barometern’s editorial observed that “the expected mass exodus from Czechoslovakia did not happen.” The reason for this was, according to the paper, the confidence of Czechoslovak citizens in the ability of their leaders to overcome the


problems. The editorial argued that emigration had not taken place because of the widespread belief that the reformists would return to power. It also referred to the great number of Czechoslovaks who had returned to their country after the suppression of the Prague Spring. It erroneously claimed that as many as 140,000 Czechoslovaks had returned to their homes in the weeks following the invasion, whereas, as pointed out by Holborn, this number was much smaller.\textsuperscript{365}

In late October 1968, \textit{Skånska Dagbladet} provided a more detailed and more political account of the matter. The paper noted that about a thousand emigrants continued to flee from Czechoslovakia every day to the West. The situation was compared to the emigration from Hungary in 1956. The fear of reprisal for participating in the reform movement was mentioned as the major reason for emigrating. The editorial also commented on the living conditions in the Communist countries behind the Iron Curtain: “These flights from the Eastern countries show more than anything else that people would rather leave behind their beloved homelands, relatives, and friends than live under constraints and oppression. This is the worst possible assessment for the dictatorships in the East.”\textsuperscript{366}

In the summer of 1969, \textit{SDS} reported that according to official Czechoslovak statistics, following the invasion, some 40,000 people had fled or had not returned from abroad. The paper also noted that despite the recent restrictions imposed on emigration by the new Communist leadership, interest in emigration was still relatively high, since “thousands of people queue outside the Western consulates in Prague every day.”\textsuperscript{367} In a similar manner, the liberal-leaning newspaper \textit{Vestmanlands Läns Tidning} observed that emigration triggered by the open border policy was “unique within the communist world” and that many continued to travel abroad as tourists and then registered themselves as refugees in Austria.\textsuperscript{368}

To sum up, stress on the need to admit Czechoslovaks to Sweden was evident in the reporting on Czechoslovak emigration in the Swedish press. In particular, many political and ideological concerns, especially those related to various forms of oppression, were incorporated in the narrative of these editorials. Apparently, \textit{Ny Dag} refrained from commenting on the subject of emigration from Czechoslovakia.

\textsuperscript{365} Holborn, \textit{Refugees}, 517.

\textsuperscript{366} ”Denna flykt från öststaterna visar bättre än mycket annat att människor när de så kan hellre lämnar en kär hembygd, anhöriga och vänner än lever kvar i tvång och förtryck. Detta är det sämsta betyg som diktaturen i öst kan få.” ”Flyktningströmmen från Tjeckoslovakien,” \textit{Skånska Dagbladet}, October 24, 1968.

\textsuperscript{367} ”[...] står tusentals människor i kö utanför de västliga konsulaten i Prag varje dag.” ”Augustistormens härjning”, \textit{Sydsvenska Dagbladet Snällposten}, August 21, 1969.

\textsuperscript{368} ”[...] unikt inom den kommunistiska världen.” ”Vad tjeckerna riskerar,” \textit{Vestmanlands Läns Tidning}, August 21, 1969.
Information from the Swedish Embassy in Prague

News of the Czechoslovaks interested in migrating to Sweden reached the Swedish government immediately after the suppression of the Prague Spring. On 23 August 1968, Ragnar Petri, counsellor at the Swedish Embassy in Warsaw, reported to Stockholm about Czechoslovaks approaching the Embassy and investigating the opportunities of obtaining Swedish visas. The officers in Warsaw informed the Swedish authorities that they intended to grant short-term visas for those who had valid passports and necessary tourist travel permits. Most likely, the people mentioned by Petri were Czechoslovaks who, for one reason or another, were in Poland at the time of the invasion and decided not to return home.

Over the next weeks, two more reports regarding the Czechoslovaks interested in migrating to Sweden were sent to Stockholm. On 26 August 1968, the UD received a telegram from the Embassy in Vienna, informing them about a large number of Czechoslovaks enquiring about Swedish visas and permission to work. Commenting on the matter, Karl-Gustav Lagerfelt, Swedish Ambassador to Austria, suggested that there should be a special easing of visa requirements. In a similar manner, Agda Rössel, the Swedish Ambassador to Yugoslavia, informed Stockholm about recent enquiries. In addition, Rössel discussed the reason for emigration and reflected on the composition of the group: “Many do not dare to return due to reprisals for their previous outspokenness. It is mostly a highly qualified labour force, for example doctors and dentists.” As an example, she described the case of a prominent medical doctor involved in the Two Thousand Words manifesto.

Copies of these telegrams were sent to the SUK, the government agency dealing with visa enquiries. Apparently, protecting Swedish immigration policy and upholding immigration regulations was regarded as more important than acquiring highly skilled and well-educated professionals from Czechoslovakia. On 2 September 1968, the government agency replied that they refused to take any action. The reply stated that “The Commission is currently not prepared to make any changes.” The government did not respond to any of these matters.

369 Ragnar Petri to the SUK, 23.08.1968, E 3 A:5, Kanslibyrån, SUA, RA.
370 Karl-Gustav Lagerfelt to the UD, 26 Aug. 1968, E 2:26, Kanslibyrån, SUA, RA.
371 "Många vågar inte återvända fruktan repressalier tidigare frispråkighet. Rör sig flesta fall om högt kvalificerad arbetskraft t ex läkare, tandläkare." Agda Rössel to the UD, chieffertelegram, 29 Aug. 1968, HP1:626, 1920 års dossiersystem, UDA, RA.
372 "Kommission för närvarande icke är beredd göra några ändringar". Ingvar Jönsson and Sam Ahlford to the Swedish Embassy in Vienna, 2 Sep. 1968, E 2:26, Kanslibyrån, SUA, RA.
Sweden’s response towards Czechoslovak refugees
Initially the government did nothing and the agency responsible for refugee matters was not willing to facilitate the immigration process. However, this was soon to change. The Swedish government eventually responded when it received news, via the UD, on international efforts on behalf of the Czechoslovak refugees. On 2 September 1968, the Australian Embassy in Stockholm informed the UD about the Australian government’s decision to intervene on behalf of Czechoslovaks who fled or did not wish to return to their country after the Soviet invasion. The decision was to offer resettlement opportunities for those interested in migrating to Australia. It was, the document stated, “in accordance with the Australian government’s action in the past when refugees from Eastern Europe, including Czechoslovakia, have decided to take up residence elsewhere.”373

Further information concerning initiatives taken by other governments was sent from Klas Böök, Swedish Ambassador to Switzerland, and concerned the liberalization of entry permits for the Czechoslovaks wanting to go to Switzerland. The decision, according to the Ambassador, was a response to the increasing number of Czechoslovaks interested in obtaining Swiss entry permits. He reported that around 600 Czechoslovak and 100 other East Europeans awaited the opportunity to migrate to Switzerland and assumed that permits would be granted to applicants “regardless of whether they possessed funds or were refugees in the strict sense.”374

There was also information received directly from other countries. A statement made by Mitchell Sharp, the Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs, regarding a decision to streamline the handling of applications from Czechoslovaks for admission to Canada, was sent to the Swedish authorities at the beginning of September 1968. The statement also explained that immigration officers were to be dispatched to Belgrade to help deal with applications and that, furthermore, staff at Canadian missions “wherever and whenever the number of applications requires it” would be reinforced.375

Thus, in a short time, the Swedish government learned about several efforts to welcome Czechoslovak refugees who wanted to migrate to countries like Australia, Canada, and Switzerland. Apparently, the Swedish government did not hesitate to follow suit. On 5 September 1968, Rune Johansson, Swedish Minister of the Interior, announced at a press conference that all Czechoslovaks interested in migrating to Sweden should be granted visas and work permits. These visas were to be issued “even if their [the refugees’] financial support in Sweden was not secured.” 376

373 The Australian Embassy in Stockholm to the UD, 02 Sep. 1968, E 2:26, Kanslibyrån, SUA, RA.
374 “[...] oavsett om dessa förfogade över medel eller vore flyktingar i egentlig mening”. The Swedish Embassy in Bern to the UD, 02 Sep. 1968, E 2:26, Kanslibyrån, SUA, RA.
375 The Canadian Embassy in Stockholm to the UD, 13 Sep. 1968, E 2:26, Kanslibyrån, SUA, RA.
decision has been made”, the Government explained, “since, in recent days, the Swedish embassies in Vienna and Belgrade have received a number of enquiries from Czechoslovak citizens on the possibilities of travelling to Sweden.\textsuperscript{376} The applications were to be sent from Swedish embassies to the SUK, the body responsible for granting visas.\textsuperscript{377}

Unfortunately, no more sources detailing the process behind this decision have been found in the Swedish archives. Perhaps there was no discussion on this matter, but instead they reached a swift decision? There are several reasons why this could be the case. Firstly, a quick decision to admit the Czechoslovak refugees would improve the image of Sweden, both domestically and abroad; an image that had to some extent been compromised as a result of the Swedish-Soviet rapprochement in July 1968. Indeed, the early and generous efforts to come to the aid of the refugees were immediately applauded by the UNHCR.\textsuperscript{378} Secondly, it would be in keeping with a tradition of opening the borders to East European refugee migration. Finally, it would be in line with the harsh criticism against the intervention expressed two weeks earlier. It would also mirror the sympathy with Czechoslovakia expressed by the Swedish press, and by the public.

Furthermore, the decision to admit Czechoslovak refugees most likely also had economic motives, i.e. concerning the possibility of obtaining highly-skilled labour. As already mentioned, the economic potential of the highly-skilled Czechoslovaks was valued among the countries offering their assistance: they did nothing to hide their interest in obtaining skilled labour.\textsuperscript{379} Furthermore, as already mentioned, the practice of accepting refugees on the basis of their employability and potential ability to adapt to Swedish society was well established in Sweden, and, for example, had characterized the admission of Hungarian refugees in 1956. In fact, that Sweden’s reaction towards Czechoslovak refugees was determined by the economic capacity factor was indicated by the SUK immediately after the decision to admit Czechoslovak refugees to Sweden. On 6 September, in a telegram sent to the Swedish Embassy in Vienna, the SUK explained that the job placement of Czechoslovaks would depend on the Swedish labour market.\textsuperscript{380}

To conclude, Sweden’s response towards the Czechoslovaks was most likely a result of careful consideration rather than a kind-hearted approach.

\textsuperscript{376} ”[…]
"även om deras försörjning här icke är tryggad. […] Beslutet har fattats med anledning av att de svenska ambassaderna i Wien och Belgrad under de sista dagarna har fått ett antal förfråningar från tjeckoslovakiska medborgare angående möjligheterna att få resa till Sverige.” Lennart Geijer and Bengt Girell to the SUK, 05 Sep. 1968, E 2:26, Kanslibyrån, SUA, RA.

\textsuperscript{377} Ove Jönsson and Ragnar Wahlström to the UD, 01 Nov. 1968, E II e:57, Utlänningssektionen 1948-1972, AA.

\textsuperscript{378} ‘HCR Bulletin’.


\textsuperscript{380} The SUK to the Swedish Embassy in Vienna, 06 Sep. 1968, E 1:5, Ordföranden, SUA, RA.
to the refugees. This conclusion will be further substantiated when compared to Swedish efforts on behalf of Polish Jews in 1969, presented in the later part of this study.

The decision to open the border to the Czechoslovak refugees was immediately reported by the Swedish press. On 6 September 1968, *Dagens Nyheter* borrowed a lot from the Johansson press conference and informed that between 2,000 and 3,000 Czechoslovaks were expected to arrive in Sweden. The newspaper reported that the institution responsible for the reception processes would be the AMS, which, as the paper argued, “shall, in accordance with the previously successful programme of resettlement, move Czechs to Swedish working life through Swedish language courses.”

*Svenska Dagbladet* reported that the preparations for the refugees’ arrival had already begun. *Göteborgs-Posten*’s editorial clearly supported the decision of the Swedish government: “Following the many demonstrations that intended to condemn the assault on Czechoslovakia, that sentiment must now be expressed in action. By providing refugees the opportunity to live and work in Sweden, we transform our sympathy into an active response.” The paper also stressed the responsibility of Swedish society towards these newcomers, “to ensure that they will receive unwavering support from the Swedish public.”

In mid-September, discussions concerning the status of the Czechoslovak newcomers began. On 9 September 1968, Alexej Voltr, Czechoslovak Ambassador to Sweden, visited the UD and expressed his appreciation for Sweden’s criticism of the occupation of Czechoslovakia and the decision to admit Czechoslovaks. He also hoped that these newcomers would not be classified as refugees because, as he put it, “it is important to depoliticize their stay in Sweden.”

Senior Administrative Officer of the AMS, Ragnar Wahlström, advocated a different stance. “The Czechoslovak citizens”, he claimed, “are, in many cases, penniless and in need of care while awaiting employment and housing.” Wahlström stressed that if the Czechoslovaks were categorized...
as refugees, this would allow the AMS to offer improved assistance in the reception centres. The same category was proposed for some 400 Czechoslovaks who were visiting Sweden at the time of the invasion.\(^{386}\) On 13 September 1968, the government agreed with the AMS and announced that all Czechoslovaks would be regarded as refugees.\(^{387}\)

Obviously, this was a misuse of the legal definition of the 1951 UN Refugee Convention. The Czechoslovaks in the second group were those who had come as tourists, students, and persons on official missions and, thus, had not been exposed to persecution resulting from the Warsaw-Pact intervention. Yet, the Swedish government was not alone in assigning refugee status to all Czechoslovaks. In Canada, as Madokoro discusses, officials decided to assign refugee status to Czechoslovaks outside of Czechoslovakia in order to acquire highly-skilled labour in the form of Czechoslovak exiles.\(^{388}\)

At the beginning of November 1968, concern was expressed regarding the character and, as a result of this, the costs for taking in the Czechoslovaks. In particular, SUK representatives raised the issue of the requirement to financially support the newcomers. The officers doubted that all Czechoslovaks would be able to “support themselves in Sweden through work in the foreseeable future.”\(^{389}\) On 8 November 1968, the Ministry of the Interior (\textit{Inrikesdepartementet}, ID) announced that the number of visas would be limited to 2,000 - the number that had previously been promised by the ID.\(^{390}\) Less than two weeks later, the SUK informed the Embassy in Prague that the quota had been filled and normal requirements for Czechoslovak migration to Sweden would be applied.\(^{391}\) This put an end to unlimited immigration to Sweden offered to the Czechoslovaks after the Warsaw-Pact invasion.

The 2,000 visas granted to Czechoslovaks places Sweden far behind other states that offered their assistance to this group. As already mentioned, by the end of 1968 there were some 12,000 Czechoslovaks expected to enter Canada, a similar number was to arrive in the US, and about 9,000 to Switzerland. Interestingly, only a \textit{Helsingborgs Dagblad} editorial commented on the policy shift. On the first year anniversary of the invasion of Czechoslovakia, the paper labelled Sweden’s change of attitude towards Czechoslovak refugees as “humiliating”. “Not that long time ago”, the paper

\(^{386}\) Ove Jönsson and Ragnar Wahlström to the UD, 01 Nov. 1968, E II e:57, Utlänningssektionen 1948-1972, AA.

\(^{387}\) Sven-Erik Nilsson and Ingemar Kjällberg to the AMS, 13 Sep. 1968, E 2:26, Kanslibyrån, SUA, RA.

\(^{388}\) Madokoro, ‘Good Material’, 2010, 166.

\(^{389}\) “[…] inom överskådlig tid skulle kunna genom arbete försörja sig i Sverige.” Rune B. Johansson and Ingemar Kjällberg to the AMS, 08 Nov. 1968, E 1:5, Ordföranden, SUA, RA.

\(^{390}\) Rune B. Johansson and Ingemar Kjällberg to the AMS, 08 Nov. 1968, E 1:5, Ordföranden, SUA, RA.

\(^{391}\) Ingvar Jönsson and Sam Ahlford of the SUK to the Swedish Embassy in Prague, 21 Nov. 1968, E 3 A:7, Kanslibyrån, SUA, RA.
argued, “the Swedish authorities realized that it was our duty to receive as many [Czechoslovaks] as possible”. This attitude, the editorial noted, has been “significantly cooled down”, forcing Czechoslovak refugees to “move to find a safer future in other countries”. “They should have been able to find this security here in welfare-focused Sweden”, Helsingborgs Dagblad concluded.

Undoubtedly, the initial Swedish policy towards Czechoslovaks was very generous. For two months, all refugees who were interested in migrating to Sweden were allowed to do so. The requirements for financial support or potential employment were waived and the travel costs were covered by the government. By offering this support, the Swedish government alluded to the opening up of its border to Danish Jewry. Soon after, however, the Swedish government withdrew its offer. The SUK’s concern to protect the Swedish labour market seems to have been decisive in reaching this decision. The change should thus, most likely, be understood as an example of how economic capacity affected decisions related to Swedish refugee policy. Yet, when speaking of Swedish aid to the Czechoslovaks, it is important to recognize that a number of these refugees arrived in Sweden from UNHCR refugee camps as quota refugees through the Swedish resettlement programme. The arrival of these refugees is the subject of the following section.

**Czechoslovaks arriving from UNHCR refugee camps**

Between 1968 and 1971, Sweden sent four selection missions to the UNHCR refugee camps to select refugees wishing to resettle in Sweden. These selections took place in the autumn of 1968 (I), in the spring of 1969 (II), in the autumn of 1969 (III), and in the autumn of 1970 (IV). In total, 693 Czechoslovak and 148 Polish-Jewish refugees arrived in Sweden in this way (Table 2).

This section focuses on the arrival of Czechoslovak quota refugees.

The size of the quota was decided annually by the Swedish government on the basis of proposals received by the AMS. For 1968, the refugee quota was set at 500 and was to be filled during two selection missions. The first of these took place in late spring 1968, filling about half of the quota.

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393 During the selection mission in UNHCR refugee camps between 1968 and 1972, 894 Czechoslovaks were selected by the Swedish delegation. However, AMS transport lists indicate that only 693 of them actually arrived in Sweden, which means that 201 Czechoslovaks, after being selected for migration to Sweden, decided to travel to other destinations or return home. See Transport lists, E VII bb: 8-12, Utlänningssektionen 1948-1972, AA.

394 The ID to the AMS, 23 Apr. 1968, E 2 J:4, Utlänningssektionen 1968-1975, AA.
Table 2. The arrival of the Czechoslovak and the Polish-Jewish refugees in Sweden, 1968-1972

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Czechoslovaks</th>
<th>Polish Jews</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Individual arrivals</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>2411</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugee quota</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autumn 1968</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spring 1969</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>61</td>
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<tr>
<td>Autumn 1969</td>
<td>421</td>
<td>64</td>
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<tr>
<td>Autumn 1970</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other arrivals</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>2693</strong></td>
<td><strong>2696</strong></td>
</tr>
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The preparation for the second selection started in the summer. On 16 August 1968, Ove Jönsson, Director of the Employment Office of the AMS, and Senior Administrative Officer Broborg informed J. B. Woodward, Chief of the Resettlement Section of the UNHCR, that a selection team could be sent to Austrian, Italian, and Turkish UNHCR refugee camps during the autumn. They also underlined that “it is possible to a limited extent” that the Swedish government would increase the quota for this selection.395

These plans had to be modified after the Austrian government had drawn attention to the increasing number of Czechoslovaks fleeing the Warsaw-Pact invasion. On 30 August 1968, Dr. Herbert Krizek, Officer in the Austrian Ministry of Interior, responsible for refugee and migration matters, telephoned Broborg regarding the substantial number of Czechoslovaks who, after arriving in Austria, expressed their wish to travel on to Sweden. He asked Broborg whether the next resettlement programme could be speeded up.396 On 3 September, the Austrian government sent an official letter expressing the Austrian’s “desire” that the Swedish state draft mainly Czechoslovaks in the next selection. It also explained that many among those interested in migrating to Sweden were academics and highly-qualified professionals.397

Initially, the Swedish representatives did not respond to these questions. Perhaps Swedish officials did not feel obliged to explain their position because of the government’s decision to allow unlimited migration of Czechoslovaks to Sweden. Yet, after the involvement of the UNHCR, in particular after a telephone conversation between Woodward and Broborg in mid-September 1968, during which Woodward informed Broborg that about 300 Czechoslovaks and 150 other nationals were interested in coming to

397 Norström to the AMS, E II e:57, Utlänningssektionen 1948-1972, AA.
Sweden, the Swedish government announced that it would extend the 1968 refugee quota to 1,000.\textsuperscript{398}

To what extent this decision was the result of the involvement of the UNHCR is not known. It is evident, however, that the decision was met with appreciation from the international refugee regime.\textsuperscript{399} Thomas Jamieson, Director of Operations of the UNHCR, called it “a special action towards solving the problem of Czechoslovaks who have sought asylum in Austria.”\textsuperscript{400}

The selection work began on 7 October 1968 at the large Traiskirchen refugee camp near Vienna. The Swedish delegation was comprised of five officers: Head of Delegation Gösta Broborg, the AMS’s Section Secretary Ulla Öhrner, the SUK’s Section Secretary Gösta Thorn, the Social Welfare Board’s Research Secretary Carl-Erik Blomqvist, and a medical doctor. Five English and German interpreters were provided by the UNHCR. After four days of work, Broborg wrote his first report to Stockholm, informing the authorities about the situation for Czechoslovaks in Austria and about assistance efforts offered by other countries. Regarding the progress of selection, he wrote that 85 Czechoslovaks had already been selected since the beginning of the mission.\textsuperscript{401} The first group of refugees left Austria for Sweden in October.

Yet, Broborg was somewhat pessimistic about the future: “The interest in emigration is proportional to events in the home country and one gets the feeling that they want to place an ocean between them and their homeland. Many travel to Australia and Canada. Furthermore, Sweden has no tradition as a destination country for emigration from Czechoslovakia […] It is impossible to estimate how many we will be able to accept.”\textsuperscript{402}

As a result, the selection included other nationalities interested in migration to Sweden, especially from Hungary and Poland. The government also instructed the delegation to continue the mission at the UNHCR refugee camps in Italy and Turkey, where more refugees were registered for Sweden, and increased the final quota of 200 visas.\textsuperscript{403} In the end, some 950 refugees

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399 J. B. Woodward to Gösta Broborg, 03 Oct. 1968, E II e:57, Utlänningssektionen 1948-1972, AA.

400 “UNHCR Geneva Interoffice Memorandum”, No.34, 30 Sep. 1968, E II e:57, Utlänningssektionen 1948-1972, AA.


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were selected at the end of 1968, of which only one-fifth was of Czechoslovak origin (Figure 2).404

![Bar chart showing the representation of nationalities selected by the Swedish delegation from the UNHCR camps between 1968-1972.](image)

**Figure 2.** The share of nationalities selected by the Swedish delegation from the UNHCR camps between 1968-1972.


In 1969, Sweden sent two selection missions to interview and assess refugees wishing to migrate to Sweden. In both cases, the circumstances were similar to those observed in the autumn of 1968. At the beginning of February Woodward asked Broborg if, due to the substantial increase of Czechoslovaks and other Eastern European nationalities interested in coming to Sweden, it would be possible to have the next Swedish mission in the early spring of 1969.405 When forwarding this request to Director Jönsson, Broborg suggested waiting until the previous group had been assigned employment: “In mid-February, we have about 850 refugees accommodated in reception camps. Their placement hasn’t gone as we had hoped.”406

In April more enquiries were sent to Stockholm. Firstly, the Austrian Ministry of Interior explained that some 300 Czechoslovak refugees were

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406 ”Vi har i mitten på februari ca 850 flyktingar i förläggning. Utplacering går inte i den takt vi hade hoppats.” Gösta Broborg to Ove Jönsson, 18 Feb. 1969, E II e:57, Utlänningssektionen 1948-1972, AA.
registered for emigration to Sweden. In this correspondence, Krizek made it clear that the admission of Czechoslovaks would benefit Sweden directly: “These asylum seekers are mostly trained in technical and metalworking occupations. Some are construction workers. There are also graduates with technical professions interested in migration to Sweden.”

Secondly, the UNHCR repeated its request. These letters caused the Swedish officials to discuss the 1969 quota, a discussion that reveals the importance of labour-market considerations. The economic conditions, as reported by the AMS, were favorable: “Labour-market developments during the winter months of 1968-1969 are characterized by an increased demand for labour, especially in industry, and there is expected to be a continued rise in the demand for labour.” Apparently, the earlier problem with the resettlement of refugees was not as serious as it had been believed, since this argument disappeared from the discussion. Given these reasons, on 25 April 1969 the government set the 1969 refugee quota at 500.

Like before, the selection began in Austria in the Traiskirchen refugee camp. On 21 May 1969, Broborg reported that “The Czechs are very confused when it comes to emigration. They do not know what they want. It seems that they want to stay in Austria while they monitor developments in their native country. Of 350 registered for us in Traiskirchen, 80 are Czechs. It is difficult to say how many will actually come.” This hesitation seemed to dissipate with the arrival of new groups from Czechoslovakia. They missed the registration, but they arrived just in time to meet the Swedish delegation and be included in the resettlement programme. In the end, the total number of resettled refugees reached 515 in the spring of 1969.

The request regarding the second selection of refugees from the UNHCR camps was already sent before launching the first operation. On 12 May 1969, Jamieson wrote to the AMS about the difficult position facing the countries that had initially taken in refugees. Jamieson’s description of the situation was given, as he stated, “in the hope that your government might

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410 The AMS to the ID, 31 Mar. 1968, E 2 J:3, Utlänningssektionen 1968-1975, AA.
413 The ID to the AMS, 05 Sep. 1969, E VII ba:20, Utlänningssektionen 1948-1972, AA.
consider increasing the present quota of 500 visas’. Just as before, judging by the lack of response from the Swedish officials, they did not pay much heed to these early requests. Undaunted by the lack of reply, Woodward continued his struggle to gain Sweden’s attention. On 8 August 1969, he attached a copy of a letter from the Austrian Ministry of Interior to the UNHCR representative in Vienna that assessed Swedish resettlement plans. Woodward added that 300 asylum seekers were registered and waiting for the arrival of the Swedish mission in Traiskirchen and between 250 and 300 refugees were ready for assessment in Italy. Eventually, these letters resulted in the decision to set the second refugee quota to 1000.

The selection began in Austria on 13 October 1969 and ten days later the results of the first selections were reported to Stockholm. This time, Broborg was more positive about the outcome. He reported that about half of the accepted refugees were Czechoslovaks and that many enquired about the possibility of migrating to Sweden. As a result, the Czechoslovaks constituted close to two-thirds of the total arrivals in late autumn 1969. The mission in Italy resulted in the selection of 408 refugees, most of them from Hungary and Poland.

Thus, a pattern emerges with regard to the approach taken by the resettlement programme towards the Czechoslovaks. Firstly, in the initial phase, Swedish officials largely ignored requests to increase the refugee quota due to the Czechoslovak crisis. Negotiations did not begin until there was increased international pressure on Sweden, which points to the important role of the international refugee regime. Secondly, it was only after being assured that industry and labour market conditions were stable and that there would thus not be any problem with placing refugees in work that Swedish officials engaged in discussions regarding the refugee quota. In this regard, Swedish aid on behalf of the Czechoslovaks from UNHCR refugee camps was even more strongly linked to the economic capacity determinant than the one presented in the previous section. Finally, despite the increased attention given to the Czechoslovak question in decision-making discussions, the actual missions were quickly adjusted to accept all refugees interested in migrating to Sweden due to the changing situation in the UNHCR refugee camps.

Publicly, the AMS rejected that the resettlement programme had become directly dependent upon the labour market policy. On 14 November 1969, a Dagens Nyheter article reported that 600 Czechoslovak refugees would travel to Sweden after the selection in the Traiskirchen refugee camp. On this

414 Thomas Jamieson to the AMS, 12 May 1969, E II e:59, Utlänningssektionen 1948-1972, AA.
occasion, the newspaper interviewed Broborg. He denied accusations that the delegation was only looking after Swedish interests by choosing certain types of skilled workers while rejecting others: “Many people believe, Mr. Broborg says, that we are here to defend Swedish business interests and pick out different types of skilled workers, while giving others the cold shoulder. No, this is purely a humanitarian act that is being executed in cooperation with the UN and Austrian authorities.” Eventually, as already stated, the number of Czechoslovaks who arrived in Sweden was lower and only reached 421 individuals.

The resettlement procedure in 1970 was no different. The first enquiry regarding the size of the quota was sent to Stockholm in mid-April, but no decision on the quota was made until late October when problems with the work placement of Polish Jews had been resolved. However, the quota of 500 was lower than the number of those interested in coming to Sweden, which caused concern for the UNHCR. On 17 November 1970, Warren A. Pinegar, Director of the Americas and Europe Division of the UNHCR, called the Swedish decision “a great disappointment.” In response, Broborg explained that “the Swedish delegation regrets that the number of those accepted is lower than usual owing to the restriction of the quota. Under normal circumstances almost everybody presented to the Delegation would have been accepted.” The selection began in Italy in mid-November and continued in Austria in December. Only 10 percent of the individuals selected belonged to the Czechoslovak group. The vast majority, 65 percent, were Hungarians. The occupational composition of the Czechoslovak and Polish-Jewish refugee groups will be presented in the last chapter of this dissertation.

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422 Broborg and Jönsson to the Swedish Embassy in Vienna, 06 Nov. 1970, E II e:57, Utlänningssektionen 1948-1972, AA.
4. Sweden’s reactions to events in Poland and to Polish-Jewish refugees

Sweden and the anti-Semitic campaign in Poland
As a result of both the liberalization of the Polish system after 1956 and the general easing of geo-political tensions between the East and West, the 1960s was a decade of remarkable improvement in Polish-Swedish relations. Beginning in 1961, when a historical trade agreement between Poland and Sweden was reached, a series of Polish-Swedish round-table conferences for political, economic, and scientific dialogues were organized by both countries. Between 1963 and 1967, a number of ministerial visits took place from both sides (Table 3). In the economic sphere, after the Soviet Union, Poland became Sweden’s most important economic partner in the East.426 On the international scene, the common areas included the demilitarization and denuclearization of the continent.

Table 3. Bilateral visits between Poland and Sweden 1963 – 1967, by year of visit

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<th>Year</th>
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<td>1963</td>
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<td>June</td>
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<td>October</td>
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In November 1967, Swedish Prime Minister Tage Erlander paid an official visit to Poland and consolidated these relations. The rapprochement was to be continued in 1968 with some important visits scheduled for both sides. At the same time, the period was marked by the return of nationalist forces within the Communist party and the emergence of the Polish government’s anti-Semitic campaign. This became difficult to ignore. How did the Swedish government react to these developments? As in the previous chapters, the study begins with a comprehensive review of what was known about the campaign and, in particular, what information was reported by editorials in the Swedish press and in the reports of the Swedish Embassy in Warsaw. This will be followed by an analysis of the Swedish state’s response to these events.

**The anti-Semitic campaign in the Swedish press**

Unlike events in Czechoslovakia, the Swedish press initially paid very little attention to the Polish government’s anti-Semitic campaign. At first, after the pacification of the student protests on 8 March 1968, the press focused primarily on the origin of the crisis, noting the substantial differences from developments during the Prague Spring. For example, SDS reported that although the slogan “Poland is waiting for its own Dubček” was often repeated by the Polish protesters, there was no sign that the Polish leadership would follow the path of the Czechoslovaks. Along the same line, GHS argued that events in these two countries were characterized by completely different patterns. The *Aftonbladet* editorial was concerned with whether Poland would become “the new Hungary” since both crises, according to the editorial, had begun in the same way. The Cold War dimension of the events in Poland was also apparent in a *Dagens Nyheter* editorial which reported that there was thus far no response from Moscow.

Over time, the press began focusing more on the increase in anti-Jewish measures taken by the Polish regime. On 17 March, *Dagens Nyheter* reported that several high-ranking Jewish officials had lost their government posts. The paper argued that this was an attempt to camouflage the government’s own problems using traditional Polish anti-Semitism. In another article, which appeared at the same time in several Swedish newspapers, Wiesław Patek attempted to analyze the revival of anti-Jewish resentments and prejudices. He stated that identifying the “Zionists” as the

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causes of the riots was an absurd charge. Patek concluded that the small remnants of the once great Jewish population of Poland were great patriots. Interestingly, the terms “Zionist” and “anti-Zionism” were written in quotation marks to indicate that this was how the events were being presented by official Polish sources.

In addition, the press began to place more emphasis on the individuals affected by the campaign. On 16 April 1968, conservative-leaning Kvällsposten focused on the large-scale expulsion of Jews from the Communist party and from government posts. Four days later, Aftonbladet provided one of the few first-hand accounts of the campaign in Poland. In the article, the newspaper correspondent interviewed several students about their view of the situation in Poland. These interviewees confirmed arrests and expulsions from universities directed against the “Zionists.” Several other newspapers also focused on the aggressive, anti-Semitic propaganda towards Polish-Jewish citizens.

The correspondence from Poland was also included in Svenska Dagbladet on 21 May 1968. An article authored by Sigvard Lindqvist focused primarily on the origin of the campaign, stating that the core of the problem was the difficulty of maintaining Polish-Jewish relationships in Polish society.

A very different angle was expressed by Ny Dag. Overall, it clearly expressed its support for the Polish government. For example, on 9 May 1968, it stated that “He [Gomułka] requires that, in the interests of state power, Jewish citizens are loyal to the state of which they are citizens. Such a requirement could be made by most states in the world.”

The Swedish press also relied on articles reprinted from British and North American newspapers, primarily from the social-democratic newspaper The Observer or the liberal-leaning New York Times. These were detailed reports or analyses of the mechanisms of the campaign that drew largely on personal interviews and material collected from international news services. In

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433 "Ridan går ner för den öppna debatten i Polen," Kvällsposten April, 18 1968.
comparison to the previous articles, they presented a more comprehensive and detailed picture of the campaign.

To sum up, the events in Poland had somewhat lower coverage in the Swedish press in comparison to the Prague Spring. Over time, however, when the scope of the campaign increased, the press became gradually more interested in these events and did not fail to communicate the essence of the campaign. How, then, did the Swedish Embassy in Warsaw report these events?

**Information from the Swedish Embassy in Warsaw**

Like in the Czechoslovak case, the Swedish Embassy’s reporting on the campaign was extensive. It began as early as the summer of 1967, describing and analyzing the revival of the stereotype of Jewish communism. The return of the “Zionist” theme to political discourse after the Six-Day War was firstly reported by Petri, an officer at the Embassy. On 16 August 1967, he wrote to the UD about Gomułka’s remarks about the “Zionist fifth column” of 19 June and about the increasing suspicion against the allegedly pro-Israel officers in the Polish army. The increase in anti-Israeli and anti-Jewish attitudes was also mentioned in a comprehensive report issued by Erik Kronvall, the Swedish Ambassador to Poland, for the visit of the Swedish Prime Minister to Poland in November 1967. In February 1968, Petri relayed information about the emerging protests after the regime’s ban on Mickiewicz’s play, Dziedy.

On 12 March, Ambassador Kronvall reported the eruption of violence against a demonstration held by students on 8 March. He stressed that the rally was met with violent attacks by the police forces (“these were dispersed by tear gas, police batons”). A day later, he defined the cause of the crackdown on the protestors as follows: “The increasing demand for freedom, especially freedom of speech and democracy, has been expressed.” On 21 March, Kronvall sent a sample of official publications, including Gomułka’s speech to the Politburo and articles from the Polish press, to Stockholm.

Beginning in late March 1968, the Embassy started to report the ongoing attempts to purge the state administration of the alleged “revisionists”.

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439 Ragnar Petri to the UD, 16 Aug. 1967, Fid:4, 1920 års dossiersystem, BW, RA.
441 "Dessa skingrades med tårgas, batongchocker". Kronvall to the UD, chieffertelegram, 12 Mar. 1968, HP:663, 1920 års dossiersystem, UDA, RA.
442 “Ökade krav på frihet, särskilt yttrandefrihet och demokrati har ställts.” Kronvall to the UD, 13 Mar. 1968, Fd:4, 1920 års dossiersystem, BW, RA.
443 Erik Kronvall to the UD, 22 Mar. 1967, HP:663, 1920 års dossiersystem, UDA, RA.
444 Erik Kronvall to the UD, chieffertelegram, 27 Mar. 1968, HP:664, 1920 års dossiersystem, UDA, RA; Erik Kronvall to the UD, 27 Mar. 1968, HP:664, 1920 års dossiersystem, UDA, RA; Erik Kronvall to the UD, 02 Apr. 1968, HP:664, 1920 års dossiersystem, UDA, RA.
Over time, the dominant theme became the evident anti-Jewish tone of the campaign. On 23 April, Kronvall reported the eruption of anti-Semitism in the Polish media: “the struggle against the ‘Zionists’ has, among other things, evolved into an extensive and savage anti-Semitic press campaign, aimed at showing the damage caused by Polish Jews to polish society.”445 Like the Swedish press, the officers of the Embassy wrote the terms “Zionist” and “anti-Zionism” within quotation marks to indicate the origin of the vocabulary. In late May, Petri reported anti-Jewish incitement led by Moczar’s security apparatus. “Polish domestic politics have adopted a clear anti-Semitic character”, he stated.446

The reporting on the increasing anti-Jewish campaign in Poland coincided with reports on the ongoing Polish-Swedish rapprochement, evident from the beginning of the 1960s. For example, in November 1967, the Embassy sent to Stockholm a 30 page document describing the impressive progress of bilateral relations during the 1960s.447 Initially, the Swedish government did not respond to any of the reports sent from the embassy regarding the development of the Polish government’s anti-Semitic campaign. The only time when Polish-Jewish affairs attracted the attention of the UD was when Abba Eban, the Israeli Foreign Minister, visited Sweden in May 1968. At this occasion, the UD issued a strictly confidential memorandum summarizing the early reports from the Swedish Embassy in Warsaw, which proved that the UD had acknowledged these reports, but had, thus far, not found it necessary to comment on them.448

In summary, the Swedish Embassy in Warsaw sent the UD numerous detailed reports regarding the ongoing developments, from official publications to analyses conducted by the ambassador and others. This suggests that the Embassy kept a close eye on the anti-Semitic campaign and that the UD, like in the Czechoslovak case, was well aware of the developments in Poland. However, as will become evident, despite these numerous reports, the UD remained largely uninterested in this matter until mid-June 1968.

445 “Kampen mot "sionisterna" har bl.a. utvecklas till en omfattande och hätsk antisemitisk presskampanj, ägnad att visa vilka skador de polska judarna vållat det polska samhället.” Ragnar Petri to the UD, 24 Apr. 1968, HP1:664, 1920 års dossiersystem, UDA, RA.
446 “[...] har den polska inrikespolitiken antagit en klart antisemitisk prägel.” Ragnar Petri to the UD, 02 May 1968, HP1:664, 1920 års dossiersystem, UDA, RA.
448 The document issued on 25 April 1968 informed that in late March, the question about the increasing anti-Semitic campaign was raised by the State Secretary for Foreign Affairs Ole Jødahl with Polish Vice Foreign Minister Marian Naszkowski, but Naszkowski referred to the official line and this issue was not later discussed. Promemoria by the UD, 25 Apr. 1968, HP21:14, 1920 års dossiersystem, UDA, RA.
Sweden’s response to the anti-Semitic campaign

The first time the UD officially commented on the emergence of the anti-Semitic campaign in Poland was in mid-June 1968 at the Congress of the Social Democratic Party, during which Foreign Minister Nilsson criticized the Polish government regarding this development. Nilsson’s speech was given some three weeks after an attempt by the MFST and the Official Council of Swedish Jewish Communities (Judiska Centralrådet, JC) to alert the government to the situation of the Jews in Poland. On 27 May, Ivar Müller, the Chairman of the MFST, payed a visit to the UD to submit an appeal to the Swedish government. It was a two-part document containing the official stance of the organizations involved and a summary of the anti-Jewish tendencies in Poland, aiming to keep officials fully briefed on events. Overall, the communities demanded a response from the Swedish Government to the ongoing discrimination of the Jewish population of Poland. The document stated: “Outraged and heartbroken over these events, we appeal to the Swedish government to take this seriously and with reference to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, alert the Polish government to the reactions that the discrimination against the Jewish population in Poland evokes.”

On 4 June 1968, Marc Giron, Deputy Director-General for Political Affairs at the UD, informed the Embassy in Warsaw of the MFST and JC appeal. Giron also reported to Warsaw that the same appeal, including the demand to allow Polish Jews the right to travel to the Nordic countries, provided they had relatives there, had been sent to the Finish, Danish, and Norwegian governments. The Swedish legations in the respective countries were asked to report on the outcome of this appeal.

Apparently, this appeal did not meet with success. In the Finish case, after the concerns of the Jewish community were discussed at a government meeting, it was decided that Finland would not interfere in the internal affairs of other countries. In Norway, John Lyng, the Norwegian Foreign Minister, expressed anxiety over the anti-Semitic campaign in a speech to parliament on 21 May, but no further action was planned at the time of the report. In Denmark, the discussion on Polish-Jewish affairs was triggered by a question posed by the Social-Democratic opposition to Poul Hartling.

449 "Upprörda och förtvivlade över dessa skeenden vädjar vi till den svenska regeringen att allvarligt och under hänvisning till Förklaringen om de mänskliga rättigheterna uppmärksamma den polska regeringen på de reaktioner, som diskrimineringen av den judiska befolkningen i Polen väcker." Ivar Müller to Torsten Nilsson, 27 May 1968, E2:3, Hemliga arkivet, SUA, RA.

450 Marc Giron to the Swedish Embassy in Warsaw, 04 Jun. 1968, F1d:34, 1920 års dossiersystem, BW, RA.

451 The UD to Hichens Bergström, 04 Jun. 1968, F1d:34, 1920 års dossiersystem, BW, RA.

452 See also: Dahl, Ausschluss und Zugehörigkeit, 2013, 253.


454 The Swedish Embassy in Oslo to the UD, 19 Jun. 1968, HP21:14, 1920 års dossiersystem, UDA, RA.
the Danish Foreign Minister, on the occasion of the visit of Józef Cyrankiewicz, the Polish Prime Minister, to Copenhagen. The question concerned whether the Danish government would express its concern over events in Poland at the time of Cyrankiewicz’s visit to Denmark. Hartling replied that “there was not enough documentation on Polish actions to bring up the question during an official state visit.” He, however, expressed his hopes that the Polish government would not continue its policy.

The UD also asked Ambassador Kronvall for his opinion on the Jewish petition. In his reply, Kronvall argued that: “Although I well understand the outrage in Sweden, I do question the appropriateness of making that reaction public, which could counteract its aims.” Similar concerns regarding the sensitivity of the Polish leadership to any criticism were expressed in the US.

Swedish comments on the Polish government’s anti-Semitic campaign were preceded by an incident involving the representatives of the People’s Party. In late May 1968, some Stockholm City Council members from the party protested against plans for a visit by the Council to Warsaw in August the same year. The reason for the protest was the evident racial persecution conducted by the Polish state. This protest was immediately reported by the press. Svenska Dagbladet quoted Per-Olof Hanson, member of the People’s Party in the Stockholm municipality, who explained that “We have done thorough studies that suggest that the harassment and persecution of Polish Jews are worse than what has been presented in Swedish newspapers.”

Dagens Nyheter argued that although the protest could not be expected to have a direct effect, it nonetheless had a strong moral value.

The protest became the subject of an internal discussion in Stockholm City Council. The Conservative Party was ready to join the protest whereas the Social Democrats and the Communists refused to take any action. Again, the press commented on these decisions. On 11 June, Expressen’s headline made its position clear, “It is right to say no”.

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455 “[...] att det icke förelåg tillräckligt material om de polska åtgärderna för att frågan skulle ägna sig att tas upp under ett officiellt statsbesök.” The Swedish Embassy in Copenhagen to the UD, 01 Jul. 1968, HP21:14, 1920 års dossiersystem, UDA, RA.
456 The Swedish Embassy in Copenhagen to the UD, 02 Jul. 1968, HP21:14, 1920 års dossiersystem, UDA, RA.
457 “Ehuru jag väl förstår upprördheten i Sverige vill jag ifrågasätta lämpligheten av att i dagens läge låta reaktionen få offentliga former vilka skulle kunna motverka syftet.” Kronvall to the UD, 05 Jun. 1968, HP1:664, 1920 års dossiersystem, UDA, RA.
458 National Community Relations Advisory Council, internal correspondence, 29 Apr. 1968, #11:4225, ISA.
459 “Vi har gjort ingående undersökningar som tyder på att trakasserierna och förföljelserna mot de polska judarna snarast är värre än vad som framgått i svenska tidningar.” The UD to the Swedish Embassy in Warsaw, 30 May 1968, HP21:14, 1920 års dossiersystem, UDA, RA.
460 The UD to the Swedish Embassy in Warsaw, 31 May 1968, F1d:71, 1920 års dossiersystem, BW, RA.
461 The UD to the Swedish Embassy in Warsaw, 13 Jun. 1968, HP21:14, 1920 års dossiersystem, UDA, RA.
Nyheter argued that it was right to protest against the Polish government’s anti-Semitic campaign. Liberal Västerbottens-Kuriren stressed that the rejection of the visit should be followed by an official protest by Sweden against the persecution of Jews.\textsuperscript{463} This is exactly what eventually happened.

On 12 June, the day after the press coverage, Foreign Minister Nilsson, as indicated above, took a stance on the issue. In a speech held at the Congress of the Social Democratic Party, interestingly the very same congress during which the Prague Spring was commented upon, he told the audience that “the recent reprisals against the few Jews left in Poland after the massacres of the Nazi era have confounded and disturbed a broad section of Swedish public opinion.”\textsuperscript{464} These attacks, he explained, brought an end to any hopes the Swedish government had had for Polish developments after 1956.

Thus, the statement did not include any passage explicitly warning the Polish government of the potential consequences of the campaign, as the MFST and the JC had demanded. Rather, like the part on the Prague Spring, it was simply a negative remark on the Polish government’s policies. However, the indirect criticism of the Polish anti-Jewish policies—through the remark that these policies had “confounded and disturbed a broad section of Swedish public opinion”—could be read as an attempt to satisfy the demands of the MFST and JC. It thus confirms that the involvement of the Jewish Community in Stockholm and the protest of the People’s Party in the Stockholm City Council were recognized by the government. Contrasting Swedish disappointment concerning current developments with the positive attitude following Gomułka being returned as First Secretary of the Party in 1956 might have been a way of stressing the importance of bilateral relations.

There is, however, also another aspect related to domestic political considerations. One objective of the speech was likely to counter the opposition’s argument that the Social Democrats did not care about the communist anti-Semitic campaign. The speech was delivered during the final months of the 1968 election campaign. It was held after the protest by the People’s Party in the Stockholm City Council but did not take the form of an official statement expressed at a national level. Instead, Nilsson gave the speech to the audience at the Social Democratic Congress.

The domestic context was underlined by the UNT editorial. The paper argued that Nilsson’s speech should give the Social Democrats in the Stockholm City Council reason to reconsider their stance on the visit to Warsaw.\textsuperscript{465} In contrast, Dagens Nyheter presented the speech in a more

\textsuperscript{463} "Ingen resa till Warszawa," Dagens Nyheter, June 12, 1968; "Folkpartiets..." Västerbottens-Kuriren, June 12, 1968.

\textsuperscript{464} Documents on Swedish Foreign Policy, 1969, 1968:40.

\textsuperscript{465} "Vad rör oss Polen?" Uppsala Nya Tidning, June 13, 1968.
general manner, reporting that the government had criticized the persecution of Jews in Poland.\footnote{466}

Whatever Nilsson's reasons were—I will return to yet another possible interpretation—the comment was intolerable for the Polish Communist regime. On 17 June, Michal Kajzer, the Polish Ambassador to Sweden, visited the UD and explained that the Foreign Minister's speech on internal Polish affairs “surprised the Polish government.”\footnote{467} Against this background, Ambassador Kajzer emphasized that the visit of Polish Prime Minister Cyraniewicz, planned for late June 1968, could no longer take place. Apparently, the response was also prompted by Swedish press coverage of the Polish anti-Semitic campaign. On 19 June, Antoni Szymanowski, the former Polish Ambassador to Sweden, explained to Ambassador Kronvall that the anti-Polish press publications, the rejection of a visit to Warsaw by the People's Party, and, finally, Nilsson's criticism made it impossible for the Polish side to conduct the visit.\footnote{468}

The decision surprised the Swedish government. Until the very last moment, the UD was preparing for the visit, and exchanged telegrams with the Embassy in Denmark regarding the details of Cyraniewicz's stay in Copenhagen.\footnote{469} On 18 June, another Polish-Swedish round-table discussion was to be held in Tällberg.\footnote{470} For Nilsson, the situation was clear: “I think it is a Foreign Minister's duty to express a country's prevailing opinion”, he stated in an interview with the social-democratic newspaper Arbetet.\footnote{471} According to SDS, Nilsson had stated that “the criticism of the situation in Poland is a part of our current policy of neutrality.”\footnote{472} On 18 June, the UD instructed the Embassy in Warsaw to provide an explanation that the statement by the Foreign Minister reflected the opinion of Swedish society and that the visit had been postponed after an agreement.\footnote{473}

The Swedish press reacted enthusiastically to the Polish decision. For example, Expressen headlined its article, “Thank you for the cancellation”, and argued that the Polish Prime Minister was doing “a good job when he decided to stay at home”.\footnote{474} Dagens Nyheter commented that there was no
reason that Cyran kiewicz’s decision should be perceived as an insult to Sweden. To make matters worse, some newspapers chose to illustrate the Polish anti-Jewish campaigns in a way that established a link between the Nazi persecution of the Jews and the ongoing campaign. For example, SDS illustrated an editorial published 20 June 1968 with a picture of the entrance to the Auschwitz concentration camp with the sign Arbeit macht frei, thus making a direct comparison between Poland’s anti-Semitic campaign and Nazi Germany’s policy of exterminating the Jews. One month earlier, Helsingborgs Dagblad had illustrated an article on the Polish anti-Jewish campaign with a picture of Warsaw in ruins after the Second World War.

For further discussion, it is important to first highlight that Kronvall and other officers at the Swedish Embassy in Warsaw dedicated much of their work, perhaps more than they were assigned to do, to informing Stockholm about the “anti-Zionist” campaign. They were well acquainted with the history of Polish-Jewish post-war relations and sent numerous reports detailing the 1968 crisis. The information was gathered from key party publications and daily press reports, as well as from informal meetings and conversations with Polish officials and foreign diplomats. It is therefore reasonable to assume that their reports could have influenced Sweden’s involvement in the issue of Polish-Jewish emigrants presented in the next chapter of this study.

Yet, like in the Prague Spring case, the Foreign Minister’s statement did not explicitly refer to the solidarity with “the oppressed against the oppressors”. Rather, it appeared as a sudden, tactical response within the context of domestic political wrangling. This was most likely not a coincidence. The domestic political context and the Social Democratic Congress were in many ways ideal for criticizing Polish policies in a less public way, but at the same time ensuring that the message got through both nationally and internationally.

In summary, it was not until mid-June 1968 that the UD commented on the emergence of the anti-Semitic campaign in Poland. Before that, the Swedish government had occasion to react to this development after numerous reports and analyses from the Swedish Embassy in Warsaw and after the engagement of the MFST. In the latter case, the UD decided to investigate and await reactions from the other Nordic countries before taking a stance. Eventually, it responded after protests from the People’s Party, indicating the importance of domestic political considerations.

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Sweden and Polish-Jewish refugees
The Swedish government thus did not initially show much interest in the numerous reports from the Swedish Embassy in Warsaw regarding the events in Poland. Criticism of the anti-Semitic campaign expressed during the Congress of the Social Democratic Party in mid-June 1968 was most likely the result of internal pressures, in one case those emerging from the demands of the MFST and, in another, from the center-right political opposition. Did this situation change when Polish Jews interested in migrating to Sweden became the key issue? The overarching aim of this part of the dissertation is to shed light on how the Swedish government invited these refugees to Sweden and how this was justified. The first part presents how the Swedish press became more attentive to the issue of Polish-Jewish emigration in general, and, later on, to the migration of Polish Jews to Sweden. The second part focuses on the information sent from the Swedish Embassy in Warsaw until late 1968. Finally, the last part of the chapter will be a discussion of the Swedish government’s responses to those Polish Jews who were interested in migrating to Sweden. The latter analysis also addresses the actions taken by the government, the MFST, and other actors involved in Polish-Jewish refugee matters. In addition, there will be an analysis of the practices of the Swedish Embassy in Warsaw towards prominent Polish-Jewish applicants, and a discussion concerning the role of Jakob Goldstein, Chairman of the Association for Polish Jews in Sweden (Föreningen polska judar i Sverige).

Polish-Jewish refugees in the Swedish press
Starting from late spring 1968, articles appeared in the Swedish press describing the emigration of the small remnant of Polish Jewry. On 14 May 1968, *SDS* published a report from Vienna concerning the increasing number of Polish-Jewish refugees arriving in the capital of Austria on their way to Israel. According to the newspaper, this group consisted of “the most varying professions, where even intellectuals together with engineers and doctors are represented.” Commenting on the Polish government’s policy towards these émigrés, the article argued, “it seems now that the Polish communist authorities will establish a kind of second ‘Final Solution to the Jewish Question’.”

Initially, the main theme emerging in the press coverage was related to the increasing number of Polish Jews leaving Poland. However, it was not an easy task due to the limited information available from Polish government agencies and the state controlled Polish media. In late April 1968, *Svenska*
Dagbladet reported that 30 Polish Jews emigrated from Poland each week.\textsuperscript{480} One week later, Borås Tidning announced in its headline that “100 Polish Jews emigrate each week from Poland”.\textsuperscript{481} In June, Dagens Nyheter stated that 300 out of 1000 applications for emigration had already been approved.\textsuperscript{482} This uncertainty regarding the number of refugees was also evident in the autumn 1968. On 29 October, Borås Tidning returned to the subject and reported that around 1,000 Jews had emigrated from Poland since the beginning of 1968.\textsuperscript{483} One day later, Arbetet referred to 3,000 émigrés.\textsuperscript{484} In early November 1968, Västerbottens-Kuriren argued that some 2,000 Polish-Jewish emigrants had left Poland since the beginning of the campaign.\textsuperscript{485}

Overall, the Swedish press presented Polish-Jewish emigration in a straightforward manner. For example, on 21 December Expressen wrote the following: “A new wave of anti-Semitism washes over Poland. Jews are dismissed from their jobs, forced to leave their homes and, in many cases, forced to flee abroad. Those who leave the country automatically lose their Polish citizenship.”\textsuperscript{486} On 10 May 1968, the editorial of conservative-leaning Östgöta Correspondenten argued that “the campaign is popular and public opinion can force it to continue. […] For those remaining, life will undoubtedly be hard in the coming years.”\textsuperscript{487} Borås Tidning pointed to the anti-Jewish purges and discrimination as being among the reasons for the increasing emigration.\textsuperscript{488} In February 1969, Kjell Rönnelid, whose text, titled “A Polish martyrdom”, appeared in several regional newspapers, argued that “Jews are subjected to the most insulting treatment, and this has led to a rapid and extensive emigration, even under humiliating conditions.” Rönnelid continued, “The extent of the on-going exodus of Polish Jews suggests that within a few years Poland could be entirely without this element in the population.” Rönnelid even saw a parallel to the Nazi policies: “The nasty thing is that the authorities exploit and even inflate the anti-Semitic prejudices. One can wonder about the reason. Did the Polish

\textsuperscript{480} “Förtvivlan hos 30000 i Polen. Allt fler judar vill emigrera,” Svenska Dagbladet, April 20, 1968.
\textsuperscript{481} “100 polska judar utvandrar i vecka,” Borås Tidning, April 28, 1968.
\textsuperscript{482} “Judarna tar tjockt med smör,” Dagens Nyheter, June 24, 1968.
\textsuperscript{483} “Mörkret sänker sig åter över Polen,” Borås Tidning, October 29, 1968.
\textsuperscript{484} “Polsk nystalinism,” Arbetet, October 30, 1968.
\textsuperscript{485} “Hårdare linje i Polen”, Västerbottens-Kuriren, November 08, 1968.
\textsuperscript{487} “[...] kampanjen är populär och den allmänna opinionen kan tvinga den att fortsätta. [...] För dem som stannar kommer livet också med all säkerhet att bli hårt de närmaste åren.” “Fraktionspolitik bakom polsk antisemitism”, Östgöta Correspondenten, May 10, 1968.
\textsuperscript{488} “100 polska judar utvandrar i vecka”, Borås Tidning, April 28, 1968.
government leaders decide to create some sort of final solution to the so-called 'Jewish Question' in Poland?"\(^{489}\)

It was not only Rönnelid who contextualized the campaign and emigration in terms of Nazi Germany. As previously discussed, a picture showing the infamous sign at the gates of Auschwitz was used to place the events in Poland into this context, as was, in particular, the phrase 'the final solution'. On 26 June 1969, commenting on the permissions for emigration, Västerbottens-Kuriren argued that First Secretary Gomułka “copied” Hitler and “forced the Jews to pay half of their property in tax for permission to emigrate.”\(^{490}\) The context of the war experience was also evident in the SDS editorial on 16 March 1969, which argued that:

The persecutions in Poland obviously do not have the same terrible character as those of Nazi Germany. It is not a question of exterminating Jews in gas chambers and burning the corpses in the crematoria as in Hitler’s time. [...] Nonetheless, a number of prominent Jews have suffered a difficult fate. They have been forced to leave their houses and homes in order to cross the border into other countries. [...] For good reasons, one could soon start to talk about the 'final solution' of the Jewish problem in Poland.\(^{491}\)

In early 1970, the individual experiences of emigrants were highlighted. On 15 January 1970, Aftonbladet published a report written by Åke Lif about one Polish-Jewish family travelling by train from Warsaw to Vienna. Lif interviewed the family during their journey. He stated, “Mum and her four sons have no idea where to go when they reach Vienna. They are prepared to take every chance to have a future”. He also cited the mother who stated that “we are prepared to divide the family. My two oldest sons have professional training [...] the two other boys go to school.” Lif concluded, “There are not that many Jews left in Poland today.”\(^{492}\)

\(^{489}\) "Judarna utsätts för den mest förolämpande behandling och detta har lett till en snabb och omfattande emigration, även den under förödmjukande villkor. [...] Just nu pågår en utvandring av polska judar i en omfattning som antyder att Polen inom ett par år kan länkas vara nästan utan detta befolkningselement. [...] Det otäcka just nu är dock att myndigheterna utnyttjar och t o m blåser upp de antisemitiska fördomarna. Man frågar sig vad anledningen är. Har den polska statsledningen beslutat sig för att åstadkomma någon slags 'slutgiltig lösning' av den s.k. 'jude frågan' i Polen?" "Ett polskt martyrium," Småländs Folkblad, February 01, 1969; Nya Norrland, February 03, 1969; Sydöstra Sveriges Dagblad, February 13, 1969.


\(^{491}\) "Förföljelserna i Polen har givetvis inte samma fruktansvärda karaktär som på sin tid i Nazityskland. Det är inte fråga om att utrota några judar i gaskamrar och förbränna liken i krematorier som under Hitlers tid. [...] Ändå har en hel rad framstående judar drabbats av ett obärdigt öde. De har tvingats lämna hus och hem för att bege sig över gränsen till andra länder. Flertalet har valt Österrike som mellanlandningsplats. [...] Man börjar snart med fullgoda skäl kunna tala om 'den slutgiltiga lösningen' av det judiska problemet för Polens del. "Den slutliga lösningen?" Sydvenska Dagbladet Snällposten, March 26, 1969.

Eventually, like in the reporting of the anti-Semitic campaign, some newspapers reprinted articles from British and North American newspapers. On 5 January, *Svenska Dagbladet* published a *New York Times* article on one of the major dilemmas of the emigration, namely the obligation of those leaving Poland to renounce their Polish citizenship. The paper called the emigrants “non-persons” because of this demand. It also quoted a Polish Jew who lamented that “if I leave, I am a traitor, and if I stay, I am a Zionist.”

Some newspapers also included letters to the editor that attempted to defend the Polish Government’s policy. On 1 March 1969, the social-democratic newspaper *Smålands Folkblad* published a reply to Kjell Rönnelid from a “reader” concerned with the alleged anti-Polish tone of Rönnelid’s text. The position of Marian Michalak, the author of the letter, was that there was no discrimination of Jews in Poland. Rönnelid replied: “The recent developments received extensive coverage in the world press, and the about 25 former Polish citizens that arrive daily in Vienna without passports [...] can attest, that what is happening in Poland has nothing to do with patriotism and democracy but more so with chauvinism and intolerance.” Similarly, on 14 February 1969, *Arbetaren* included a letter that polemicized against one newspaper article authored by Svante Foerster. In this case, the author of the letter recommended a trip to Poland to verify the attitudes of Poles towards the Jews.

Thus, the issue of Polish-Jewish emigration was very much at the forefront of press coverage of the anti-Semitic campaign. Certainly, it was typified by the overarching theme of this framing, namely the rapidly approaching end of Jewish life in Poland. This was presented in various ways to the readers. It included the factual narrative, the reference to Nazi Germany, and the personal narrative. Perhaps the most outspoken was the editorial of centrist newspaper *Östersunds–Posten* in February 1970, which argued that “ironically, the Polish communist regime has almost succeeded where the Nazis did not, to make Poland free of Jews.”


494 "Den senaste utvecklingen har fått en mycket omfattande beskrivning i världspressen, och det ca 25-tal f d polska medborgare som dagligen anländer till Wien utan pass [...] kan intyga, att vad som sker i Polen i det här sammanhanget inte har något att göra med patriotism och demokrati utan så mycket mer med chauvinism och intolerans." "Judarna i Polen," *Smålands Folkblad*, March 01, 1969.


Information from the Swedish Embassy in Warsaw

Mid-July 1968 was the first time the Ambassador informed Stockholm about Polish Jews interested in travelling to Sweden.497 In this correspondence, Kronvall informed the UD about Polish-Jewish visitors to the Swedish Embassy and about the procedure of emigration: “The difficulty [with migration to Sweden] is that, if permission to leave is granted, the departure must be made through Austria.”498 However, he underlined that this detour was facilitated by the support provided in Vienna to those interested in migrating to the USA and other countries. Kronvall asked whether the UD knew anything about this support.

Kronvall’s enquiry was forwarded to the Swedish Embassy in Vienna which, in turn, confirmed that HIAS provided assistance for the migration of Polish Jews to the United States and other countries that offered job opportunities. The Embassy indicated that Sweden could become one of those countries due to the close cooperation between HIAS and the MFST.499 It is not possible to ascertain if Kronvall received this answer, but in late August 1968 he again reported on Polish Jews coming to the Swedish Embassy in Warsaw to make enquiries regarding visas and diplomatically expressed his frustration over not being able to provide any assistance to the visa applicants: “Our response could not be anything but the usual.”500

Since the UD did not comment on any of these issues, on 2 September 1968 the Ambassador turned directly to the SUK asking about the possibility of obtaining visas through the Swedish Embassy in Vienna.501 As was the case in the initial response regarding the Czechoslovak refugees, the SUK replied that they were refusing to make any changes to general-visa requirements. In this case, however, the Commission indicated that “the decision may depend on the circumstances of the particular case.”502 Apparently, this last formulation gave Kronvall some hope that visas would be granted and he replied by sending a few of the recent applications received by the Embassy in Warsaw. He also repeated that he urgently needed instruction on how to deal with these applicants.503 In early October 1968, Kronvall sent all his previous reports about Polish Jews to the SUK. Furthermore, he stressed that “if the number of Jewish visa applicants can

497 “Vid flera tillfällen den senaste månaden har ambassaden besökt av polacker av judisk börd, vilka önskar resa till Sverige.” Kronvall to the UD, 17 Jul. 1968, HP21:14, 1920 års dossiersystem, UDA, RA.
499 The Swedish Embassy in Vienna to the UD, 16 Aug. 1968, HP21:14, 1920 års dossiersystem, UDA, RA.
500 “Vårt besked kunde icke bli annat än det vanliga.” The Swedish Embassy in Warsaw to the UD, 28 Aug. 1968, F1d:34, 1920 års dossiersystem, BW, RA.
501 The Swedish Embassy in Warsaw to the AMS, 02 Sep. 1968, F1d:34, 1920 års dossiersystem, BW, RA.
502 ”Avgörandet får bero på omständigheterna i det särskilda fallet.” The AMS to the Swedish Embassy in Warsaw, 04 Sep. 1968, F1d:34, 1920 års dossiersystem, BW, RA.
503 The Swedish Embassy in Warsaw to the AMS, 19 Sep. 1968, HP21:14, 1920 års dossiersystem, UDA, RA.
be taken as a measure of the extent an intensity of the discrimination, the latter has increased rather than decreased.”

Yet, like the UD, the SUK met Kronvall’s concerns with silence. This lack of response together with the steadily growing number of Polish Jews visiting the Embassy apparently made the Ambassador try an even more active approach. In a telegram to the UD of 7 November, Kronvall pointed out that despite his repeated requests for instructions, no reply had been received. He also emphasized that not only had the UD not replied, he was also still waiting for a response from the SUK regarding the 60 applications from Polish Jews interested in migrating to Sweden. In particular, Kronvall demanded answers to two unequivocal questions:

With regard to the applicant’s often extremely difficult situation and the distressing nature of the case, I request the department’s support in obtaining a prompt decision in the following. Firstly [...] we need information on the Swedish policy towards Polish-Jewish emigration to Sweden. Should all categories be eligible or rather certain groups be favoured, like those with special education etc.? Secondly, how long should it normally take to get an answer regarding a visa application?

Meanwhile, an appeal by Dag Halvorsen, a correspondent for the Norwegian social-democratic newspaper Arbeiderbladet, came to the fore. The appeal was a letter sent on 6 October from Prague reporting on anti-Semitism in Poland and calling upon the Scandinavian countries to grant Polish Jews admission. The letter was sent to the Swedish, Danish, and Norwegian foreign ministries, the social-democratic party leaderships in these countries, and a number of journalists. Halvorsen stressed the collective responsibility to assist Polish-Jewish refugees and, by highlighting the humanitarian traditions that existed in the Nordic countries, he advocated opening the borders for them. He wrote: “For countries with humanitarian traditions, such as the Scandinavian states, it must be obvious that we need to help those Polish Jews who wish to travel to Scandinavia.”

Apparently, this appeal, together with the explicit demand on behalf of the Polish Jews by Ambassador Kronvall, eventually forced a response from Stockholm. On 8 November 1968, Lennart Myrsten, Deputy Director-

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504 “Om antalet viseringssökande judar kan tagas som mått på diskrimineringens omfattning och intensitet, har denna senare snarare ökat än minskat.” The Swedish Embassy in Warsaw to the AMS, 07 Oct. 1968, HP21:14, 1920 års dossiersystem, UDA, RA.

505 The Swedish Embassy in Warsaw to the UD, 07 Nov. 1968, HP21:14, 1920 års dossiersystem, UDA, RA.


General for Legal Affairs at the UD, organized a meeting with representatives of the ID (Bengt Girell and Rune Berggren) and the SUK (Ingvar Jönsson and Sven Bundsen) to discuss the matter. The meeting resulted in a decision to grant 30 visas for Polish Jews. “All categories are eligible. No group should be favoured over another”, the SUK informed the Embassy in Warsaw on 12 November. The visa applications were to be submitted to the Embassy in Warsaw, but visas were to be granted by the SUK. In this sense, the procedure was similar to the one applied in 1956 for Hungarian refugees. Unlike the refugee quota determined annually for migrants from the UNHCR refugee camps, it was a separate quota allocated under special circumstances.

This part of the study reveals a four-month struggle for the acceptance of Polish Jews led by the Embassy in Warsaw, and in particular Ambassador Kronvall. Until November 1968, the Swedish government and the government agencies responsible for refugee and immigration policies remained reluctant to act upon the reports sent from Warsaw informing them of the increasing number of Polish Jews interested in migrating to Sweden. Thus, initially, the government did not show any interest in admitting Polish Jews to Sweden. The response only came after a sharply formulated demand and an appeal sent to Stockholm, the former from Ambassador Kronvall and the latter from a Norwegian journalist. The appeal, which was sent not only to the Swedish but also to other Scandinavian governments, was hard to ignore. Still, however, the number of visas granted to Polish Jews was inadequate to meet the demand reported by the Warsaw Embassy. This still rather restrictive policy, however, was about to change in the spring of 1969. This change is the topic of the next chapter.

**Sweden’s response towards Polish-Jewish refugees before July 1969**

Kronvall’s efforts on behalf of Polish Jews did not stop after the decision to grant 30 visas. In fact, the Ambassador directly attempted to increase the quota. In a telegram in cipher of 15 November, he wrote the following:

> The flow of Polish Jews who wish to migrate to Sweden is increasing every day and our waiting room is often crowded with entire families wanting information regarding their opportunities [to migrate to Sweden]. We repeat our request for information.

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508 Lennart Myrsten to Ole Jödahl, 19 Nov. 1968, HP21:14, 1920 års dossiersystem, UDA, RA.
509 “Alla kategorier kan komma i fråga. Ingen grupp gynnas framför andra grupper.” The AMS to the Swedish Embassy in Warsaw, 12 Nov. 1968, HP21:14, 1920 års dossiersystem, UDA, RA.
510 “Strömmen av judiska polacker som önskar emigrera till Sverige ökar nu varje dag och vårt väntrum är överfyllt av ofta hela familjer, som önskar besked om sina möjligheter. Vi anhåller än en gång att få uppgifter.” The Swedish Embassy in Warsaw to the UD, 15 Nov. 1968, HP21:14, 1920 års dossiersystem, UDA, RA.
However, despite this effort, on 19 November the SUK informed the Embassy that the quota was already filled and that no further extension would be considered.511

Kronvall also commented on a suggestion regarding a joint Scandinavian statement concerning the Polish Jews, saying that such a declaration of principles could be counterproductive. The problem was, according to the Ambassador, the sensitivity of the Polish government. He argued that “there seems to be a significant risk that officials on the Polish side would find themselves forced to intervene. In this respect, it cannot be ruled out that the opportunity for Jews to go to the Nordic countries would then be removed entirely.”512 Such a remark, according to Kronvall, should probably be seen in the context of the worsening of Polish-Swedish relations in June 1968. He was certainly aware of the fact that any Swedish official declaration of support for the Polish Jews would impair relations even further, and perhaps might even harm the process of granting Swedish visas.

All this confirms the critical role that Kronvall played in shaping Sweden’s response on behalf of the Polish-Jewish refugees. Perhaps it was not a coincidence that the Ambassador was deeply involved in the Polish-Jewish case. After all, it was the third time he had served as a Swedish diplomat in Warsaw, each time experiencing ongoing campaigns against the Jews. In 1932, 28 year old Kronvall started his diplomatic career as an attaché at the Swedish Embassy in Warsaw. This was a time when Polish right-wing nationalism was imbued with anti-Semitism and the Jews were accused of being Poland’s most dangerous enemy. Kronvall left the post in 1933 to join the Swedish Embassy in Berlin. In 1947, he was appointed as Counsellor at the Legation of the Swedish Embassy in Warsaw, and served there until 1949. As already mentioned, this period was associated with anti-Jewish pogroms erupting after the return of Polish Jews from the USSR. On 25 January 1963 Kronvall returned to Warsaw, this time as Ambassador, and remained in office until the end of his diplomatic career in October 1969.513

As Ambassador, Kronvall often wrote to Stockholm about the development of bilateral relations, the Polish disarmament proposals, intellectuals, political activists and the highly restrictive atmosphere. Thus, perhaps Kronvall’s reaction to the anti-Semitic campaign and the plight of Polish Jews was a result both of his previous experiences of assaults on, and persecution of, the Jews and his perception of the Polish Communist state.

511 Ingvar Jönsson and Sam Ahlford to Lennart Myrsten, 19 Nov, 1968, E2:3, Hemliga arkivet, SUA, RA.
512 "[...] synes stor risk föreligga för att man på officiellt polskt håll skulle se sig tvungen att på något sätt ingripa. Härvid kan inte uteslutas att judarnas möjligheter att bege sig till de nordiska länderna då skulle komma att försvåras." Erik Kronvall to the UD, 19 Nov. 1968, HP21:14, 1920 års dossiersystem, UDA, RA.
513 Erik Kronvall, biography, Pr:430, 1920 års dossiersystem, UDA, RA. See also: "Bagge och Kronvall", Fg:14, 1920 års dossiersystem, BW, RA.
Unfortunately, the available sources in the UD archive do not allow a more in-depth analysis of his motives.

The leaders of the Jewish Community began playing a more active role in Polish-Jewish refugee matters from early December 1968. The absence of the Jewish Community leaders in the early phases of the debate on the issue of Polish Jews interested in migrating to Sweden was connected to the MFST’s strategy for its relations with Swedish authorities. On 10 September 1968, a meeting between Chairman Müller and David Köpniwsky, the Director of the MFST, took place.

At this meeting, Müller advocated that the MFST should not pressurize Swedish authorities into taking action on behalf of the Polish Jews who had already left Poland following the anti-Semitic campaign.514 “Perhaps it would be good”, he argued, “to save our efforts of influencing the UD on behalf of Jews persecuted in their native countries.”515 Director Köpniwsky had a slightly different idea, “I assume that we will continue to help individuals, reunification cases, and others that become relevant, [in their migration] to Sweden. I also believe that one should notify the AMS regarding the situation of Jews when actions to bring in refugees [from the UNHCR camps] become relevant.”516 The discussion ended with a decision to support individuals willing to come to Sweden. In addition, it was decided that the requirement of the SUK for granting visas to individual applicants, such as financial support, was to be met by the Jewish community.517 Support was also given to the Jewish Student Association’s initiative of calling the UD to join the International protest day against the “anti-Zionist” campaign in Poland on 11 November 1968.518

On 6 December 1968, Chairman Müller met with Leif Leifland, Desk Officer at the UD, to express his concerns over the limited number of visas issued and the delays in dealing with the applications. Müller assured Leifland that the MFST was ready to help all Polish Jews wanting to migrate to Sweden. He also wondered whether “the Foreign Minister, together with the Minister of the Interior, should bring up the SUK’s handling of the

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514 A similar practice by the MFST was observed by Pontus Rudberg during the Second World War. See: Rudberg, The Swedish Jews and the Victims of Nazi Terror, 1933–1945.
515 ”Det kunde nog vara klokt att spara våra ansträngningar att påverka UD till förmån för förföljda judar i deras hemländer.” Ivar Müller and David Köpniwsky, minutes, 10 Sep. 1968, F19:9, Huvudarkivet, JFA, RA.
516 ”Jag förutsätter att vi fortsätter med att hjälpa i enskilda fall, återföreningsfall och andra sådana som blir aktuella, till Sverige. Jag anser också att man bör fästa arbetsmarkn. styrelsens uppmärksamhet på judarnas situation när aktioner för att ta hit flyktingar blir aktuella.” Ivar Müller and David Köpniwsky, minutes, 10 Sep. 1968, F19:9, Huvudarkivet, JFA, RA.
517 Ivar Müller and David Köpniwsky, minutes, 10 Sep. 1968, F19:9, Huvudarkivet, JFA, RA.
518 Rosa Goldenson, report, 11 Nov. 1968, F 4 c:3, Flyktingsektionen, JFA, RA; The Jewish Student Associations in Sweden (Judiska Studentklubbarna i Sverige) to the UD, 15 Dec. 1968, HP21:14, 1920 års dossiersystem, UDA, RA.
applications, specifically regarding entry visas that were to be reconsidered.”

This was seemingly a key demand that—just as Kronvall’s demand and the appeal from Halvorsen two months earlier—affect the attitude of the UD towards Polish-Jewish refugees. After the meeting with Müller, Leifland met with William Wachtmeister, Director-General for Political Affairs at the UD, who agreed with Leifland that there was a discrepancy in Swedish diplomacy towards Polish Jews: “It would be inconsistent to, on the one hand, officially criticize the Polish government’s policy towards the Poles of Jewish origin and, on the other hand, through an ungenerous visa policy, prevent Jews who want to leave Poland to travel to Sweden.” Wachtmeister and Leifland therefore wanted a more liberal policy towards the Polish Jews. They proposed this idea to Minister Nilsson who concurred and asked them to inform Eric Holmqvist, the new Minister of the Interior, about the change in policy. When briefing Holmqvist, Leifland stressed that Nilsson, “is in favour of granting additional entry rights.” Leifland also later referred to the parliamentary debate in late March 1969 regarding Swedish solidarity with small states in distress.

However, Minister Holmqvist, who could give direct orders to state agencies responsible for refugee and immigration policies, showed no particular interest in opening Sweden’s borders to these refugees. On 20 December 1968, the SUK informed the Embassy in Warsaw that the quota had been increased to 100, far less than the number of applications at that time. In a reply to this decision, Lars Bergquist, First Secretary of the Embassy, listed the number of visas issued to Polish-Jewish refugees by other governments. He wrote:

The Western embassies here estimate that the number [of Polish Jews who left Poland] lies between 6,000 and 10,000 people. The majority of these have gone to Israel. About 2,000 visas are estimated to have been issued by Canada, while the United States accounted for 400-500. Among the other countries which granted visas in larger numbers, the UK should be mentioned […] Over the past 10 months, Swiss visas have been given to 50 people. Since events in March, Swedish visas have been

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519 ”[…] utrikesministern nu i samråd med inrikesministern kunde ta upp SUK:s behandling av ansökningar om inresetillstånd till omprövning.” Leif Leifland, Promemoria, 06 Dec. 1968, HP21:14, 1920 års dossiersystem, UDA, RA.
520 ”Det vore inkonsekvent att å ena sidan officiellt kritisera den polska regeringens politik mot polacker av judiskt bord och å andra sidan genom en snål viseringsspolitik hindra de judar som vill lämna Polen att bege sig till Sverige.” Leif Leifland, Promemoria, 06 Dec. 1968, HP21:14, 1920 års dossiersystem, UDA, RA.
524 The SUK to the Swedish Embassy in Warsaw, 20 Dec. 1968, F1D: 71, 1920 års dossiersystem, BW, RA.
granted to 60 people that identified themselves as Jews. 220 visa applications have been submitted.\textsuperscript{525} By early February, a total of 417 visa applications were submitted in Warsaw, of which 147 were accepted, 124 were rejected, and 146 were still pending.\textsuperscript{526} In particular, the number of cases pending was growing fast and at the beginning of April it reached 250 cases. “This will be extraordinarily difficult to process”, Kronvall reported to the UD.\textsuperscript{527} As before, he asked Secretary Leifland to enquire with Interior Minister Holmqvist about the possibility of increasing the quota.

Similar enquiries to the UD were made by the leadership of the Jewish Community. On 20 January 1969, Chairman Müller enquired about whether a new quota could be set up through the official channels of the government.\textsuperscript{528} After one of his telephone conversations with the UD, Chairman Müller wrote that “No one wants to make a decision. However, the Foreign Minister is determined that the issue will be closely monitored and, when necessary, he will take a position and definitely grant permits.”\textsuperscript{529} Interestingly, these contacts also resulted in an exchange of information between the UD and the Jewish Community in Stockholm. For example, by late January 1968, Leifland sent Müller an article received from the Swedish Embassy in Vienna on the issue of anti-Semitism in Poland.\textsuperscript{530}

Yet, the attempts of the Embassy and the Jewish Community only resulted in a very small increase to the quota.\textsuperscript{531} One of the possible reasons for this could be the negative attitude of Minister Holmqvist. In a transcript of a telephone conversation of 9 May 1969 between Director Köpniwsky and Bengt Girell, Director-General for Administrative Affairs at the ID, Köpniwsky wrote the following:

Girell spoke yesterday with the Minister and agreed to a quota of an additional 100 visas, which Girell announced to the SUK. D.K. [David Köpniwsky] thanked Girell but

\textsuperscript{525} ”[...] härvarande västambassader räknar emellertid med att siffran ligger någonstand mellan 6-10,000 personer. Majoriteten av dessa har farit till Israel. Ca. 2,000 viseringar beräknas ha givits av Canada, medan USA svaret för 4-500. Bland övriga länder som i större utsträckning lämnat visering kan nämnas Storbritannien [...] Schweiziska viseringar har under de gångna 10 månaderna givits till ett 50-tal personer. Svenska visa har till personer som själva betecknat sig som judar lämnats i 60-talet fall sedan marshalhållerna. 220-talet visumansökningar har inlämnats.” The Swedish Embassy in Warsaw to the UD, Fid:34, 1920 års dossiersystem, BW, RA.

\textsuperscript{526} The Swedish Embassy in Warsaw to the UD, 04 Feb. 1969, HP21:14, 1920 års dossiersystem, UDA, RA.

\textsuperscript{527} ”[...] blir denna sida av visering verksamheten utomordentligt svårbemästrad.” The Swedish Embassy in Warsaw to the UD, chiffertelegram, 09 Apr. 1969, HP21:14, 1920 års dossiersystem, UDA, RA.

\textsuperscript{528} Leif Leifland, minutes of the visit of Ivar Müller, 22 Jan. 1969, HP21:14, 1920 års dossiersystem, UDA, RA.

\textsuperscript{529} ”Man vill inte fatta något generellt beslut. Utrikesministern är angelägen att frågan hålls under uppsikt och så fort det behövs kommer man att ta ställning och säkerligen bevilja ytterligare tillstånd.” Ivar Müller, minutes of the telephone conversation with the UD, 21 Feb. 1969, F19:6, Huvudarkivet, JFA, RA.

\textsuperscript{530} Leif Leifland to Ivar Müller, 28 Jan. 1969, HP21:14, 1920 års dossiersystem, UDA, RA.

\textsuperscript{531} Bengt Girell to Marc Giron, 17 Apr. 1969, HP21:14, 1920 års dossiersystem, UDA, RA.
also enquired about what else the Community could do (mainly Philipsson and D.K.) to persuade the Minister and the Government to accept much larger quotas. Girell: Holmqvist was determined that he did not want to go any further at this point. Holmqvist said that the Foreign Minister finds it easy to be benevolent. Girell thought that we should not do anything further but await [further developments]. Besides, there is always the opportunity to fill the [existing] quotas if they are not [fully] used.

DK: I understand that we should wait a bit and cooperate with Girell. I'll call and let you know. Girell: I think so.532

Minister Holmqvist’s attitude towards admitting the refugees was undoubtedly negative. He had a different task from Nilsson and his opposition could, for instance, result from difficulties in finding accommodation for refugees arriving at that time. Furthermore, the note is a brief summary of Girell’s account and may have overlooked important details. Perhaps more attention should be given to the close contact between the MFST and Girell. This cooperation is interesting for several reasons. Firstly, it reveals that the leaders of the Jewish Community followed a strategy of close and informal contacts with key actors in the government agencies that had been used in the attempts to rescue Jews during the Nazi era. They thus reached out to various state authorities in an attempt to discuss Polish-Jewish migration to Sweden.533 This was also the case in February 1969, when the Community contacted the SUK to receive access to contact details of those who applied for Swedish visas and had relatives in Sweden.534 In mid-April 1969, Director Köpniwsky asked the Embassy in Warsaw what should be done in order to move these issues forward (“what can we do and should we appeal to Torsten Nilsson?”). The Embassy replied that they should contact the ID, since, as they put it, “the matter belongs there.”535

Secondly, Girell proved to be a valuable source for getting information on the decision-making processes.536 He was well informed about the sentiments within the ID, and, his advice to refrain from further actions might indicate that he wanted to prevent the Community from moving too


535 "[…] saken ligger till." David Köpniwsky, minutes of the telephone conversation with Kaj Falkman, 18 Apr. 1969, F19:6, Huvudarkivet, JFA, RA.

fast and thus risking a backlash. However, it is of course also possible that he acted on behalf of Holmqvist. Regardless of which, he seems to have personally supported the immigration of Polish Jews to Sweden since he was one of the officers who took part in the discussion on the campaign against Polish Jews and decided on the first quota in November 1968.

Over time, Girell seems to have become something of an ally for the community in matters regarding the Polish Jewish refugees. In mid-June 1969, after the news of a planned cessation of emigration from Poland from 1 September 1969, Girell suggested that Köpniwsky make an official request to the ID to increase the quota. The cooperation paid off and a few days later Köpniwsky wrote about his telephone conversation with Girell: “He [Girell] was thankful that my letter managed to persuade the Minister to increase the quota to 100. This was the most that could be achieved.”

Thus, after this decision was made, some 450 visas for Polish Jews had been granted since the beginning of reports on Polish Jews interested in migrating to Sweden. In all cases, it required a lot of effort from Ambassador Kronvall and the MFST to convince the authorities to agree to increase the quota. Still, however, at that time there were some 300 applications pending a decision from the SUK. Overall, like in the second half of 1968, Swedish authorities were reluctant to open the borders to Polish Jews. This approach was in sharp contrast to the policies towards Czechoslovak refugees.

**Sweden’s response towards Polish-Jewish refugees after July 1969**

On 11 June 1968, both *Dagens Nyheter* and *Expressen* reported Polish plans to put an end to emigration from Poland after 1 September 1969. In addition, *Dagens Nyheter* reported that “about 100 Jews emigrate weekly.” On the next day, the MFST forwarded these articles to the ID and stressed the urgent need to provide Polish Jews the opportunity to migrate to Sweden “during the short period that has been offered.” At the same time, Kronvall informed the UD of the dramatic increase in the number of applications after the decision to close the border had gone public: “Practically the entire embassy’s staff is now dealing with these and other visa applications [...]”

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537 “Han hade tack vare mitt brev lyckats förmå statsrådet att öka kvoten med ytterligare 100. Det var det mesta som kunde åstadkommas.” David Köpniwsky to Bengt Girell, 12 Jun. 1969, F19:6, Huvudarkivet, JFA, RA.

538 The ID to the SUK, 13 Jun. 1969, HP21:14, 1920 års dossiersystem, UDA, RA.

539 Minutes of the Commission for Immigrant Investigation (*Invandrarutredningen*, IU), 2 Jul. 1969, F 1:1, 2:a byrån, SUA, RA.


541 “[...] under den korta tidrymd som tydligen står dem till buds.” Köpniwsky, minutes of the telephone conversation with Bengt Girell, 09 May 1969, F19:6, Huvudarkivet, JFA, RA.
applicants emphasize that given the new time limit it is crucial that their applications are processed quickly."

At the beginning of July, a large group of MFST representatives met with the IU—a newly established government committee assigned the task of formulating a new policy for immigrants and minorities in Sweden—to express their concerns about the delays in granting visas. The uncertainty as to whether the Community would be able to cover the necessary expenses in connection with the arrival of Polish Jews was a source of additional anxiety. The leaders of the MFST also stressed the problems with the reception of Polish Jews, which will be discussed in the later part of the study. In response to these queries, Yngve Möller, the Chairman of IU, declared his willingness to discuss these concerns with Minister Holmqvist and the leadership of the SUK.

Thus, the meeting with the IU was used by the leaders of the Jewish communities as yet another channel to promote Polish-Jewish migration to Sweden. However, as things turned out, there was no response from any of the institutions responsible for migration. It is unclear whether or not the MFST received support from Girell at this time. If they did, it was to no avail. Only nine days after the meeting with the IU, Director Köpniwsky made an unprecedented move in his discussions with the government institutions. He called the UD and requested an immediate increase of the quota to 1,200 visas.

Meanwhile, on 3 July 1969, the Danish Embassy in Stockholm announced that Denmark would offer entry visas for Polish Jews. The decision was motivated by “the imposed deadline for Jews to emigrate.” This information aroused widespread interest among the Swedish authorities. On 16 July, the SIV and UD asked the Embassy in Warsaw for its opinion on the matter. They were particularly interested in the number of visas granted by Denmark and whether this affected the number of applications to Sweden.

In a reply, Kronvall reported that 1,300 applications had been submitted to the Danish Embassy, compared with 1,800 submitted to the Swedish Embassy. He also argued that Denmark’s decision “is not expected to greatly influence” the number of applications to Sweden and listed a number

547 The Swedish Embassy in Warsaw to the UD, 13 Aug. 1969, HP21:14, 1920 års dossiersystem, UDA, RA.
of factors that affected the decision to migrate to Sweden, such as relatives already living in Sweden, educational opportunities, high living standards, and good job opportunities.\textsuperscript{548}

Seemingly—I will return to the issue below—the combination between the shift in policy from Denmark and the information from Kronvall (and possibly the demand from Köpniwsky) were sufficient to convince the government and government authorities to change their policy towards the Polish Jews. On 24 July 1969, the ID informed the National Migration Board, a new government authority responsible for immigration policy after 1 July 1969, that the quota for Polish Jews was to be increased by 500 visas. This doubled the total number of visas to 1150, according to the ID.\textsuperscript{549} In fact, by the end of July, the total number of visas granted to Polish Jews was even higher, reaching 1,291. The increase of granted visas in July 1969 is evident (Figure 3).

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure3.png}
\caption{The number of visas granted to the Polish Jews, November 1968 – July 1969. Source: "Protokoll över polska beslut", # A IV, Tillståndsbyrån/registerenheter, The archive of the Swedish Migration Board (Migrationsverkets arkiv, MA).}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{548} "[…] kan knappast väntas i större utsträckning påverka." The Swedish Embassy in Warsaw to the UD; 17 Jul. 1969, HP21:14, 1920 års dossiersystem, UDA, RA.

\textsuperscript{549} The ID to the AMS, 24 Jul. 1969, F1d:71, 1920 års dossiersystem, BW, RA.
The Danish decision thus played an important role in the change of the Swedish policy in July 1969. Most likely, the Swedish government did not want to be seen as a country that offered less support to Polish-Jewish refugees than its neighbour. In formulating this policy, the Swedish government could of course also have been guided by humanitarian considerations, but there is no evidence to support this assumption. On the contrary, the discussions among the partners involved in the decision-making processes reveal that the Swedish government was reluctant to admit these refugees to Sweden. I will return to the discussion about the motives for the policy shift and then also address the question whether or not economic considerations played a role in the case of the Polish Jews. We already know that economic arguments were made in the debate regarding the admittance of Czechoslovak refugees.

In light of the new government policy, the Jewish Community attempted to solve the problem of the pending applications. On 31 July 1969, Köpniwsky discussed the issue with Kjell Öberg, Director-General of the SIV, and raised the recent increase of the quota as an opportunity to speed up the process, or as he put it, “Here is an opportunity to be generous in the way this is applied.”550 Kronvall also pressed the government to quickly address the delay. In mid-August, he wrote to the UD and stated that “it seems very important to inform as many applicants as possible about the decisions before 1 September, in order to allow applicants the opportunity to go to Austria or Denmark in the case of a negative response from Sweden.”551 The statement, which was made just two weeks before the expected cessation of all Jewish migration from Poland, indicates that the Ambassador wanted to help until the very last possible moment.

As previously mentioned, there was no difference in the processing of travel documents for Polish Jews after 1 September. On 2 September, the UD sent a telegram to Warsaw enquiring about any changes in the conditions for Polish Jews.552 When Kronvall replied that nothing had changed and that Polish Jews continued to submit their applications, the SIV asked for these documents.553 On 8 October, the UD informed the Embassy that 1,800 visas had been granted to this group thus far. The UD also wanted to learn about other destinations for Polish-Jewish refugees.554 In a response, the Embassy

552 The UD to the Swedish Embassy in Warsaw, 02 Sep. 1969, HP21:14, 1920 års dossiersystem, UDA, RA.
554 The UD to the Swedish Embassy in Warsaw, chiffertelegram, 08 Oct. 1969, HP21:14, 1920 års dossiersystem, UDA, RA.
provided a detailed report on the migration to Canada and Denmark. In the Danish case, for example, the Embassy reported that some 3,000 individuals had applied for visas since 1 January 1969, but only 1,000 of these had been granted. Overall, the report stated that no decrease in the number of applications and no change in the immigration policy of these countries had been observed.555

These news resulted in an immediate increase of the quota by the SIV. All decisions were actually now in the hands of the SIV. On 16 October, the SIV authorized the Embassy to “without consulting with Stockholm, issue 200 visas for Jewish emigration.”556 Similar instructions were issued at the beginning of November 1969 and in December 1969, resulting in a total increase of 300 visas.557 It is interesting that neither the Jewish Community nor the Embassy had asked for these actions.

In late November 1969, the Embassy reported a decrease of applications for Swedish visas. Warsaw also summed up that from the total number of 3,000 applications submitted to the Embassy since the beginning of the ‘anti-Zionist’ campaign, around 2,000 had been granted visas.558 At the beginning of 1970, Bergquist assured Köpniwsky that “everything went smoothly” with the process of granting visas.559 In March 1971, Warsaw reported the easing of restrictions in Poland, and six months later that Polish Jews were no longer forced to renounce their citizenships.560 In total, according to the Jewish Community, 2,411 Polish Jews arrived after being granted visas by the Swedish Embassy in Warsaw.561

The migration of these refugees to Sweden did not attract much attention in the Swedish press. On 27 June 1969, a Dagens Nyheter editorial mentioned the arrival of about 200 Polish Jews to Sweden since the beginning of the year. This was, according to the article, an opportunity to provide humanitarian assistance: “Humanitarianism requires that these rejected humans are given a helping hand.”562 Two weeks later, the same newspaper interviewed Director-General Öberg, who said, “We give visas at a pace that makes it possible for the AMS and the Mosaic [Jewish] communities to take care of the Polish Jews. No rejections have been made.

558 The Swedish Embassy in Warsaw to the UD, 27 Nov. 1969, HP21:14, 1920 års dossiersystem, UDA, RA.
559 "Allt löpte bra." David Köpniwsky, minutes of the meeting with Lars Bergquist, Jan. 1969, F19:6, Huvudarkivet, JFA, RA.
We do not use quotas.” A similar story was told to SDS by Ingmar Källberg, Deputy Director-General of the SIV, “None of the Polish Jews have been refused a visa. They are not included in the refugee quota but are treated as if they had refugee status.” Neither Öberg nor Källberg were being entirely honest, the records of the Jewish Community make it clear that at least 175 applications had been rejected by the SUK at the time of these interviews.

Returning to the reporting of the migration of Polish Jews to Sweden, only one editorial, that appeared in Västerbottens-Kuriren on 7 February 1969, observed that “This [the Polish-Jewish refugee migration] is something that has attracted surprisingly little attention.” However, the lack of publicity on the subject was not accidental. The MFST did what it could to avoid media coverage of the Polish-Jewish migration, as will be discussed in more detail below. In particular, Jewish officials were afraid that media reports would adopt anti-Polish rhetoric which, in turn, would reverberate on the other side of the Baltic Sea and affect the relatives of migrants still in Poland and, furthermore, jeopardize the emigration from Poland and immigration to Sweden (and other countries), a point also made by Ambassador Kronvall, as we have seen.

The Polish side monitored the foreign press in regard to this issue. In August 1969, Życie Warszawy, the government newspaper, adopted the voice of an outraged citizen who felt duty-bound to protest against an “anti-Polish show” on Swedish television. The letter commented on the form and content of the programme, but also presented an analysis of Sweden’s anti-Jewish policy in the 1930s:

The authors of the programme brought to the studio several former Polish citizens, who had recently emigrated from our country to Israel and found themselves in Northern Europe. In front of millions of viewers, Poland and Polish people were spattered with unquotable epithets. I am not aiming to polemicize with them, but the question occurs to me whether Sweden, as any other country, has the moral right to organize such campaigns?

A somewhat sharper response, in the form of a verbal protest from the Polish Ambassador to the Swedish authorities, was formulated after the broadcast

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567 Lars Bergquist, promemoria, 05 Mar. 1969, HP21:14, 1920 års dossiersystem, UDA, RA.
568 This is the original translation of Życie Warszawy’s article which was included in Kronvall’s correspondence. Erik Kronvall to the UD, 07 Aug. 1969, F1d:71, 1920 års dossiersystem, BW, RA.
of the Swedish radio programme *Brännpunkt* on 2 July 1969. This programme commented upon the Polish Government’s deadline for Jewish emigration and mentioned the arrival of Polish-Jewish migrants to Sweden. On 11 July 1969, the Polish Ambassador to Sweden visited the UD to express his distress about the content of this broadcast. The programme, according to the Ambassador, was “extremely one-sided”. The Ambassador’s concern was that “the broadcast had been received badly in Poland and this would harm Swedish-Polish relations.”  

Apparently, the UD’s reply that the Swedish government did not have any influence over Swedish media did not satisfy the Polish authorities, since this complaint was repeated over the following weeks.  

In mid-February 1970, Claes I. Wollin, the new Swedish Ambassador to Poland, was summoned to the Polish UD to give an explanation for Sweden’s “anti-Polish campaign”. Wollin, who, in contrast to Kronvall, generally seems to have been more concerned about bilateral relations between Poland and Sweden than the situation of the Polish Jews, reported to Stockholm the concerns expressed by the Polish side. He was told that “Poland wanted good relations with Sweden and was anxious not to do anything that might impair this relationship. Unfortunately, there is an ongoing campaign in Sweden against Poland, in conjunction with Sweden’s assertions regarding anti-Semitism in Poland, a state of affairs that is categorically denied by the Polish side.”

The Polish UD presented to Wollin a report from the Polish Embassy in Stockholm. According to this report, Sweden’s anti-Polish media rhetoric was clearly evident. This was presented as the major obstacle for improvements to bilateral relations: “The Polish side could not accept such insulting articles and they hope that the Swedish side will take official action to put an end to it.” Wollin also reported that Polish media had responded to the alleged Swedish “anti-Polish campaign” with articles and programmes aimed to discredit Sweden’s hospitality towards asylum seekers. On 25 February 1970, the Ambassador reported that the Polish television programme *Światowid* had made an attempt to slander Sweden, pointing to Sweden’s reception of American deserters from the Vietnam War. *Światowid* had, according to the Ambassador, contrasted the alleged objectivity of Polish media with the purported bias of their Swedish activities.

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570 Sten Sundfeldt, promemoria, 26 Aug. 1969, HP1:665, 1920 års dossiersystem, UDA, RA.


572 “Från polsk sida kunde man inte acceptera dylika kräkande artiklar och man hoppas att något skulle kunna göras från officiellt svensk sida för att få ett slut därpå.” HP1:665, 1920 års dossiersystem, UDA, RA.

counterparts, where “a series of tendentious and strongly critical programmes, against Poland, had recently been shown.”574

Thus, the Polish leadership was extremely sensitive to any Western reference to the anti-Zionist campaign. Understandably, the Jewish Community did not want to add fuel to the fire by further enraging the Polish government through public criticism of their campaign. The leaders of the Community took several measures to prevent this from happening. In March 1969, the Community asked the Embassy in Warsaw to treat these matters with “secrecy”.575 The Community also urged Polish-Jewish refugees arriving in Sweden to avoid public statements to the media and keep in mind the delicate balance between their right to speak openly and the safety of their relatives.576 Apparently, they were preaching to the choir. At the beginning of 1970, Leifland noted that “Polish Jews who have arrived here in recent years have been very careful not to publicly criticize Polish 'anti-Zionist' policy. They do not want to jeopardize the opportunity for others to be granted permission to leave the country.”577 Finally, when despite all efforts the subject of the migration of Polish Jews appeared in the media, the Community reacted immediately.

In December 1969, two articles on the arrival and reception of Polish Jews appeared in the Swedish press. The first, published on 7 December by *Sydsvenska Dagbladet*, reported on the reception of the newly arrived Polish Jews in Blekinge County. The story, which ran almost three pages, noted in the headline on the front page, “At least 1,500 Polish Jews migrated to Sweden.” The newspaper stressed that “discrimination of Jews regularly occurs” when presenting the reasons for their emigration from Poland.578 Three days later, a weekly magazine, *Vecko-Journalen*, reported on the reception of newly arrived migrants in Skåne County. The article reported in detail, although not necessarily correctly, about the process of migration and the total number of migrants: “The government has authorized the Swedish Embassy in Warsaw to grant entry permits for 2,000 Polish Jews during a first round. [...] Every day, a small boatload of Polish Jews arrives in

574 ”Där hade under senare tid en rad tendentiösa och mot Polen starkt kritiska program visats.” HP1:665, 1920 års dossiersystem, UDA, RA.
575 ”[…] önskvärd sekretess.” David Köpniwsky, minutes of the telephone conversation with Leif Leifland, 18 Dec. 1969, F19:6, Huvudarkivet, JFA, RA.
Sweden.”

In both these cases, the anti-Polish rhetoric was easy to identify. For example, Vecko-Journalen depicted the “anti-Zionist” campaign in the following way, “In 1939 Hitler's extermination machine searched to annihilate Polish Jews—now, 30 years later, anti-Semitism flares up again with a People's democracy as the instigator. Jews have become second-class citizens. They are discriminated against, forced to leave the country.”

Köpniwsky reacted strongly to this rhetoric. On 18 December 1969, he contacted the UD and expressed his deep concern regarding this publicity, stating that this publication was against the agreement between the UD and the Jewish Community that prescribed that “one should not give any publicity to the reasons given [for migration].” This attempt was only partly successful since the subject of Polish-Jewish migration to Sweden received special attention in Western media, particularly in German, American, and Israeli media, where attention was given to Sweden’s tradition of offering humanitarian aid and providing refuge. For example, the German television program Weltspiegel emphasized that “The Swedes traditionally kept their borders open for political refugees from Eastern Europe.”

This narrative was even more evident in the reporting by American television channel, NBC. Their report began with photos of the Jewish cemetery in Warsaw to remind the viewer that Polish Jewry had once been a large and vibrant community. The narrative that followed was concise, “The Nazis killed most. Now the Polish Government is getting rid of the rest. The Jews are packing, taking what they can.” In marked contrast to the situation in Poland, the reporter introduced the Swedish case:

A temporary home is provided by the Swedish government. This one is in Ronneby in southern Sweden. Language training is also given. Young refugees have to learn Swedish before they can enter school or hold a job. Their parents have to learn Swedish, too. Most of the Jewish Poles who have come to Sweden are well-educated. [...] Many felt more Polish than Jewish. Many do not want to be filmed nor have their names disclosed. They are afraid for their relatives and friends, their fellow Jews still

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581 "[…] man inte skulle giva någon publicitet av givna skäl.” David Köpniwsky, minutes of the telephone conversation with Leif Leifland, 18 Dec. 1969, F19:6, Huvudarkivet, JFA, RA. What Köpniwsky said could be interpreted in two ways, either as in the translation above—that the reasons for the migration should not be discussed publicly—or, that it, for obvious reasons, should not be discussed publicly, i.e so as to not further antagonize the Polish government. For my argument, it does not matter which interpretation is the most accurate. What is important is that the UD and the MFST had agreed to try to keep the Polish Jewish migration to Sweden out of the press in order to not jeopardize the project.

In summary, the news of the Politburo’s decision to put an end to the emigration from Poland after 1 September 1969 motivated the actors involved in lobbying for an increase to the Polish-Jewish quota to increase their efforts. Yet, the actual shift in Swedish refugee policy towards the Polish Jews came only after the news that the Danish refugee policy had been opened up, allowing Polish Jews to migrate to Denmark. Once again, international influence on the Swedish government’s refugee policymaking, and perhaps the threat of negative international publicity, seems to be the critical factor in shifting Sweden’s refugee policy.

An issue related to the study of Sweden’s response to the Polish-Jewish refugees is Sweden’s response to the Soviet-Jewish refugees in the 1970s. A quick look at Sweden’s initial reaction to the persecutions of the Soviet Jews in the early 1970s reveals that, like in the Polish case, the Swedish government was reluctant to condemn the policy of the USSR against its Jews. In January 1970, representatives of the four non-socialist parties, Per Ahlmark of the People’s Party, Staffan Burenstam Linder of the Moderate Party, Thorbjörn Fälldin of the Centre Party, and one social democrat, Evert Svensson, Chairman of the Swedish Association of Christian Social Democrats, tabled in the Second Chamber of the Swedish Parliament a Motion urging the Parliament to declare its concern and dissociation from the anti-Semitic attitudes embedded in Eastern European politics. The main focus of the Motion was the status of the Jews in the Soviet Union. The group accused the Soviet Union of a “cultural genocide” and called the Swedish Parliament to support Soviet Jews willing to migrate to Israel. Sweden, according to the authors, should criticize the USSR in a similar way as in the case of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. They also stated that the Swedish parliament had a responsibility to speak out against these crimes due to the negative attitudes against Israel embedded in Swedish society.584

The Motion came up for debate in the Foreign Affairs Committee (Utrikesutskottet). On 12 March 1970, the Committee made a statement commenting on the motion. The statement stressed that the protection against persecution of individuals and groups was the most basic principle of Swedish foreign policy and emphasized that the Swedish government on several different occasions, as in the case of South Africa and the colonies of Portugal, had opposed the persecution of groups. In addition, the statement of Foreign Minister Nilsson made at the Congress of the Social Democratic Party in 1968 was recalled. In the opinion of the Committee, the government

584 Andra Kammaren Protokoll no 358 år 1970, 3.
should continue to provide protection against the persecution of individuals and groups according to the UN principles.\textsuperscript{585} This rather cautious statement issued by the Committee was approved by the Second Chamber.\textsuperscript{586} Ahlmark, however strongly criticized it. He called on the Committee to express its opinion more firmly and unequivocally and brought up two examples of more powerful statements from the Netherlands and Switzerland respectively, but to no avail.\textsuperscript{587} Ahlmark returned to the topic in 1971 and asked the Foreign Minister explicitly about Sweden’s attitudes towards the repression of the Jews in the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{588} In a reply, Nilsson stated that the actions by the Soviet Union were a cause of concern. He declared that Sweden, as part of the United Nations, would continue to prevent all forms of discrimination. However, he referred to the difficulties and restricted possibilities to act against one of the UN Member States.\textsuperscript{589} In addition, as already mentioned, the Swedish-Soviet rapprochement continued in 1970 and there was therefore no interest in condemning the Soviet policy against its Jews.\textsuperscript{590}

**Supporting prominent applicants**

This part of the study focuses on the Embassy’s practice of supporting some of the applicants, the more prominent ones such as officials and highly educated professionals, in order to secure their migration to Sweden. This practice contradicted the policy of equal treatment of applicants established in November 1968, which stated that “no group should be favoured over another.”\textsuperscript{591} However, the Embassy does not seem to have followed these instructions. It began promoting specific individuals long before the first quota for Polish-Jewish migrants was authorized by the Swedish government. On 5 August 1968, Ambassador Kronvall contacted Sten Sundfeldt, the Deputy Undersecretary of the UD, about a recent enquiry from Juliusz Katz-Suchy, the former Secretary of the Polish mission at the United Nations, and his wife about the possibility of migrating to Sweden. Kronvall wrote the following:

As you will find in the attached photocopies of 'biographical data', both are highly worthy people [...] Now I am wondering if you would like to inform the Myrdal couple about the immigrant visa applications (sent to the Immigration Board simultaneously

\textsuperscript{585} Utrikesutskottets utlåtande no 5 år 1970, 3.
\textsuperscript{586} Ibid., 119.
\textsuperscript{587} Andra Kammarens Protokoll no 15 år 1970, 114.
\textsuperscript{588} Riksdagens Protokoll no 3 år 1971, 34.
\textsuperscript{589} Riksdagens Protokoll no 10 år 1971, 20.
\textsuperscript{590} Scott, ‘Swedish Vietnam Criticism Reconsidered’, 252.
\textsuperscript{591} “Ingen grupp gynnas framför andra grupper.” The SUK to the Swedish Embassy in Warsaw, 12 Nov. 1968, HP21:14, 1920 års dossiersystem, UDA, RA.
with this letter) and have your colleagues speak to the person who will be processing these applications to speed up the process as much as possible.⁵⁹²

It is interesting to note that Kronvall wanted Sundfeldt to contact Alva and Gunnar Myrdal. The obvious reason for this is that Julius Katz-Suchy and Gunnar and Alva Myrdal knew each other from their time in India, where they both worked as Ambassadors, and from their work at the UN. Alva Myrdal was also involved in the work of the Swedish Joint Committee for Democratic Reconstruction (Samarbetsnämnden för demokratiskt uppbrygnadsarbete, SDU), a committee that, among other things, was involved in various educational and aid efforts on behalf of the former concentration camp inmates that arrived in Sweden at the end of, and immediately after, World War II, something that Kronvall certainly knew.⁵⁹³

On 29 August, Sundfeldt replied to Kronvall that the Katz-Suchy were to be granted visas.⁵⁹⁴ Joanna Bielecka-Prus and Aleksandra Walentynowicz in their study of public intellectuals observe that Gunnar Myrdal’s attempt to secure employment for Katz-Suchy proved unsuccessful.⁵⁹⁵

A similar practice of promoting and advocating some applications can be seen in the case of Mieczysław Kowadło-Kowalik, the former Counsellor of the Polish Embassy in Sweden. In September 1968, Kronvall wrote to Sundfeldt stating, “Being faced with his persuasive efforts (one becomes horrified when one learns about such specific cases of racial persecution), where your name was mentioned repeatedly, I promised him to write to you about his case.”⁵⁹⁶ Although Sundfeldt could not remember Kowadło-Kowalik from Stockholm, he declared that he would support his case in the SUK.⁵⁹⁷ On 29 January 1969, being already in Stockholm, Kowadło-Kowalik sent a letter to Kronvall, expressing his gratitude for the Ambassador’s involvement.⁵⁹⁸

⁵⁹² “Som du finner av bifogade fotostatikopior av ’biographical data’ är båda högt förtjänta personer. [...] Nu undrar jag om Du skulle vilja underrätta makarna Myrdal om immigrantviseringsansökningarna (som insändes till Invandrarverket samtidigt med detta brev) och låta någon av Dina medarbetare tala med den som kommer att handlägga ansökningarna för att i möjligaste mån söka påskynda handläggningen.” Erik Kronvall to Sten Sundfeldt, 05 Aug. 1968, HP21:14, 1920 års dossiersystem, UDA, RA.
⁵⁹⁴ Sten Sundfeldt to Erik Kronvall, 29 Aug. 1968, HP21:14, 1920 års dossiersystem, UDA, RA.
⁵⁹⁶ "Inför hans bevekande påtryckningar (man blir ju upprörd när man får kännedom om dylika konkreta fall av rasförörläge), varvid Ditt namn nämndes upprepade gånger, lovade jag honom att skriva till dig om hans fall.” Erik Kronvall to Sten Sundfeldt, 20 Sep. 1968, Fid:71, 1920 års dossiersystem, BW, RA.
⁵⁹⁷ Sten Sundfeldt to Erik Kronvall, 26 Sep. 1968, Fid:71, 1920 års dossiersystem, BW, RA.
Overall, special attention was given to colleagues from the diplomatic corps and to officials and highly educated professionals and the emphasis was placed both on their previous achievements and their potential contribution to Swedish society. On 13 May 1969, Lars Bergquist, Secretary of the Swedish Embassy in Warsaw, informed Gustaf Rudebeck that two applications, as he saw it, deserved favourable treatment. Regarding the first, Bergquist wrote, “a doctor, professor, [...] an internationally known scientist. [...] I believe he would make an important contribution for us [in Sweden].” The second applicant was depicted in a similar way: “He is a former diplomat, lately the Ambassador to Uruguay. Certainly he could [...] be integrated into Sweden to his and our benefit.” About another professional, this time a young mathematician, Bergquist stated, “As far as I understand, he would make an extraordinarily important contribution for us.” In mid-June 1969, Bergquist wrote explicitly that “it concerns an outstandingly qualified person [...] I can imagine that the family would quickly acclimatize to Sweden, and that they would make an important contribution for us.” In another case, the officials showed special favour for two old friends of the Embassy, “They are both well known by us here at the Embassy, as well as by our colleagues. They have both earned reputations as loyal and talented officials.” The officers of the Embassy attached documents supporting this claim, such as CVs, reference notes, and music recordings.

In February 1969, Secretary Bergquist discussed the issue of supporting prominent individuals with Rudebeck in Stockholm. They agreed that, “in separate letters to the SUK, the Embassy would support particularly distressing, or for other reasons important, visa applications from Polish Jews.” In the following weeks, the Embassy sent nearly 20 recommendations supporting specific applicants in their efforts to acquire

599 “[...] som jag tror vara förtjänta av positiv behandling.” Lars Bergquist to Gustaf Rudebeck, 13 May 1969, F1d:71, 1920 års dossiersystem, BW, RA.
600 “[...] en läkare, professor, [...] en internationellt känd forskare. [...] Jag tror att han skulle kunna göra mycket fina insatser hos oss.” Lars Bergquist to Gustaf Rudebeck, 13 May 1969, F1d:71, 1920 års dossiersystem, BW, RA.
602 ”Såvitt jag förstår skulle han kunna göra utomordentligt goda insatser hos oss.” Lars Bergquist to Gustaf Rudebeck, 01 Jul. 1969, F1d:71, 1920 års dossiersystem, BW, RA.
entry permits to migrate to Sweden. In two cases, attention was paid to the political engagement and oppression during the March events, but only after outlining the benefits that the acceptance of these individuals would bring to Swedish society: “In both cases humanitarian aspects also [my italics] support the granting of visas. [...] [They] have been suspended from their earlier posts because of political and anti-Semitic reasons.”607 In one case, the Embassy mentioned the re-unification of a refugee family.608 This practice diminished after the summer of 1969, when a more liberal policy was adopted by the Swedish government.

Thus, unlike the Czechoslovak case, economic capacity did not appear as a factor affecting the Swedish government’s decisions about the resettlement of Polish-Jewish refugee group in Sweden. The major argument for why Sweden should accept these refugees pointed to the anti-Semitic campaign in Poland. However, economic considerations mattered in discussions regarding the acceptance of prominent Polish-Jewish individuals. The potential to make a positive contribution to the Swedish economy and society in general was the “selling point” constantly made from the Swedish Embassy in Warsaw.

**The Association for Polish Jews in Sweden**

This part focuses on the role of the Association for Polish Jews in Sweden, and particularly the activities of its Chairman, Jakob Goldstein in the discussions concerning the migration of Polish Jews to Sweden. The foundation of the Association, its structure, as well as its activities in supporting Polish Jews migrating to Sweden have already been discussed by Izabela A. Dahl. During the period 1968–1972, as Dahl has shown, the Association contacted Polish Jews interested in migrating to Sweden, financially assisted them, and was instrumental in obtaining housing upon their arrival, primarily in the Stockholm area. In particular, its activities included enquiring with new arrivals about other individuals interested in migrating to Sweden, contacting these individuals by telephone, financing their migration to Sweden, organizing their reception and housing, mainly in large apartments in the suburbs of Stockholm, and assisting them with their contacts with social services and other institutions. Dahl also mentions that the Association played an important role as a pressure group, especially in the acceleration of bureaucratic procedures and on behalf of those individuals whose applications had been rejected.609 This study focuses on the latter point and investigates the Association’s attempts to influence

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607 "I både fallen talar också humanitära synpunkter för viseringar. [...] har avstängts från sina tidigare tjänstgöringar på grund av politiska och antisemitska motiv." Lars Bergquist to Gustaf Rudebeck, 13 May 1969, F1d:71, 1920 års dossiersystem, BW, RA.
608 Lars Bergquist to Gustaf Rudebeck, 03 Jul. 1969, F1d:71, 1920 års dossiersystem, BW, RA.
decision-making processes and its relationship with the MFST and Swedish government agents.\textsuperscript{610} 

The scope of the activities between the Association and potential migrants to Sweden caused a lot of concern among the institutions involved in Polish-Jewish refugee matters. On 8 January 1969, the AMS informed the Jewish Community about their problems with Chairman Goldstein. Goldstein, as Broborg put it, “runs and buzzes everywhere. The atmosphere surrounding him is crotchety both in the County Labour Board and in the SUK. [...] He does not have the knowledge required to follow the rules of the game.”\textsuperscript{611} The leaders of the Jewish Community also felt constrained by Goldstein’s behaviour.\textsuperscript{612} In particular, they were afraid that his initiatives could jeopardize the chances of other Polish Jews coming to Sweden.

In March 1969, the activities of the Association became one of the subjects discussed between the Secretary of the Embassy in Warsaw and representatives and the MFST. After this meeting Secretary Bergquist wrote:

The Association for Polish Jews plays a significant role in Polish-Jewish emigration [...] In particular, the Association assists in taking care of immigrants when they arrive in Sweden and, in a large number of cases, in providing them with money to cover the costs of their departure from Poland. [...] The Association is also an important lobbyist.\textsuperscript{613}

In September 1969, Köpniwsky attempted to cut Goldstein off from Polish-Jewish refugee matters. He asked the UD to refrain from forwarding any correspondence from Warsaw to the Association.\textsuperscript{614} He also attempted to prohibit the Association from representing Polish-Jewish migration matters. “The Community does not consider Goldstein to be authorized to speak on behalf of the Polish Jews”, Köpniwsky informed the UD.\textsuperscript{615} Eventually, in late 1969, the MFST assumed responsibility for the financial support and control of the Polish-Jewish migrants by sending money to the Embassy in Warsaw and asking the Embassy to distribute the funds to the migrants that needed it most.\textsuperscript{616}

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\textsuperscript{611} “Han springer och surrar överallt. På länsarbetsnämnden är det en irriterad stämning mot honom, likaledes på SUK. [...] Han har inte kunskaper att följa spelets regler.” Rosa Goldenson to David Köpniwsky, 08 Jan. 1969, F19:6, Huvudarkivet, JFA, RA.

\textsuperscript{612} Lars Bergquist, promemoria, 22 Sep. 1969, HP21:14, 1920 års dossiersystem, UDA, RA.

\textsuperscript{613} ”En väsentlig roll när det gäller den polsk-judiska emigrationen spelas av 'Föreningen polska judar i Sverige'. [...] Föreningen biträdde särskilt vid omhändertagande av emigranterna när dessa kommer till Sverige samt försträcker enligt uppgift i ett stort antal fall vederbörande pengar till utresan från Polen. [...] Föreningen har också stor betydelse som påtryckningsgrupp.” Lars Bergquist, promemoria, 05 Mar. 1969, HP21:14, 1920 års dossiersystem, UDA, RA.

\textsuperscript{614} Leif Leifland to Lars Bergquist, 16 Sep. 1969, F1D: 71, 1920 års dossiersystem, BW, RA.

\textsuperscript{615} ”[...] församlingen icke anser Goldstein vara auktoriserad tala å polska judarnas vägnar.” The UD to the Swedish Embassy in Warsaw, chiffertelegram, 15 Oct. 1969, HP21:14, 1920 års dossiersystem, UDA, RA.

\textsuperscript{616} B. Maier to Kaj Falkman, 24 Oct. 1969, HP21:14, 1920 års dossiersystem, UDA, RA.
The actions of the Association for Polish Jews in Sweden shed a new light on the circumstances surrounding the assistance provided by the Jewish Community to Polish Jews. Chairman Goldstein apparently interpreted the cautious strategy of the community—not to provoke the Polish government, to keep the issue of immigration out of the press, and to help Polish Jews at an individual level—as a lack of response and, using the Association’s contacts, he assumed the role of helping Polish Jews in migrating to Sweden. These efforts caused a lot of frustration among the MFST officials. As has been pointed out by Carlsson and Rudberg, the Jewish community was the consultative body for the government and the government authorities in all matters relating to Jews and Judaism, a position that the MFST leadership jealously safeguarded: they wanted to be in control.617 In the end, thanks not least to their longstanding and close contacts with the government authorities and thus their long experience of dealing with these kinds of institutions, they managed to exclude the Association from discussions on Polish-Jewish migration to Sweden.

The relationship between Goldstein and the MFST is strikingly similar to that between another maverick, namely Gilel Storch and the community during World War II. Storch, as Goldstein, was frustrated over what he regarded as the inertia and excessive caution of a bureaucratic organization not doing enough, whereas the MFST regarded both Storch and Goldstein as threats to their carefully crafted strategies and painstakingly established relations with government authorities and thus, in the end, as a threat to the relief efforts.618

Polish Jews arriving from UNHCR refugee camps

The final part of this chapter discusses the acceptance of 148 Polish Jews from UNHCR refugee camps in the years 1968–1971. In general, this group consisted of people who had left Poland with Israeli visas, but after reaching the transit point in Vienna sought to resettle in countries other than Israel and ended up in one of the UNHCR refugee camps, at first in Austria and then in Italy. While being in these camps, they registered for resettlement to Sweden and were subsequently selected during one of the four Swedish selection missions, which took place in autumn 1968, spring 1969, autumn 1969, and autumn 1970. Unlike the Czechoslovaks, this group received almost no international attention and there were no international influences, such as those made by the UNHCR or the Austrian government, to extend the quotas because of these refugees. It is probably correct to say that this

group would have been ignored without the involvement and commitment of the MFST.

Apparently, the only document enquiring whether Sweden would be interested in assisting Polish-Jewish refugees is a letter of John F. Thomas, the Director of ICEM, sent to the UD on 7 November 1969, reporting on the increase in numbers of this group in Austria and proposing financial contributions to the 1970 ICEM refugee budget in order to support them. Apart from this, the only pressure on the Swedish government to include Polish Jews in the resettlement programme was exerted on the UD domestically, by the leadership of the MFST.

From September 1968, the MFST’s strategy was to draw the Swedish authorities’ attention to the presence of Polish Jews in the UNHCR refugee camps. On 17 September 1968, Director Köpniwsky agreed with Broborg—who had the responsibility at the AMS for the selection of refugees from UNHCR camps—to mark the documents of the Polish refugees of Jewish origin with a signature allowing their later identification: “However, I have made a deal with Broborg that in the future when he conducts interviews and finds that he has to deal with Jews, he will make a small mark in his notes for his own and our purposes.” This was an interesting request for two reasons. Firstly, this is yet another example of the close contacts between the MFST and the Swedish state agencies, especially concerning the selection and acceptance of refugees. Secondly, this request was of particular importance given that a practice of marking Jewish passports with the letter M was established in the 1930s by the Foreigners’ Bureau (Utlänningsbyrå) to exclude Jewish refugees from migration to Sweden.

Although Broborg agreed to Köpniwsky’s request, no special marks or signs have been observed in the documents from interview surveys undertaken by the Swedish delegation during the selections in Austria between 1968 and 1971. Still, however, the MFST was well informed about the number of Polish Jews applying to Sweden, which could indicate that this information was forwarded by Broborg via phone conversations. Furthermore, the Polish Jewish refugees were easily distinguishable in transport lists. This is because of two fields used to indicate the country of origin and the religion of the immigrant. The Polish Jewish refugees are marked in these lists as “POL JEW”.

619 Thomas Jamieson to the UD, 07 Nov. 1969, E II e:39, Utlänningssektionen 1948-1972, AA.
620 David Köpniwsky, minutes of the meeting with Ivar Müller, 20 Sep. 1968, F19:9, Huvudarkivet, JFA, RA.
621 ”Jag har emellertid gjort en överenskommelse med Broborg, att i fortsättningen då han själv intervjuar och finner att han har med judar att göra, att han då för eget och vårt bruk gör en liten kråka i sina anteckningar.” Rosa Goldenson to David Köpniwsky, 17 Sep. 1969, F19:9, Huvudarkivet, JFA, RA.
622 Kvist Geverts, Ett främmande element i nationen, 208.
623 See "Migration movement from Italy to Sweden […]", certification, 22 Jan. 1969, E VII bb: 8, Utlänningssektionen 1948-1972, AA.
The selection of refugees in the autumn of 1968 resulted in the arrival of 19 Polish Jews in Sweden. After they had been accepted, there was a particular administrative difficulty. In spite of the fact that these individuals were officially recognized as political refugees, they had no passports from their native country and the SUK objected to issuing aliens’ passports or other documents. Reporting the problem to the AMS Director Jönsson, Broborg complained that of the entire group selected in Austria, only four Polish-Jewish refugees who had also applied through the Swedish Embassy, had made their way to Sweden.624 Broborg made it clear that the acceptance and arrival of these refugees in Sweden should not be a problem:

I do not think that our relationships with the East should be damaged if we let in a handful of Polish Jewish emigrants, who have been presented [to us] by the UNHCR and meet the requirements of the 1951 Convention [...] Neither do I believe that the Polish authorities care about where these people travel with their emigration passports, i.e. a document that does not include the right to return.625

This was, in fact, a significant statement of support for the migration of Polish Jews to Sweden. Eventually, alien’s passports were issued and the remaining refugees were transported to Sweden.626

In 1969, the MFST continued to make enquiries with the AMS about the Polish Jews in UNHCR refugee camps. In addition, starting in late 1969, Inga Gottfarb—who, on behalf of the MFST, had been involved in the Kinderstransport in 1939, in rescuing the Danish Jews in 1943, in aiding the Holocaust survivors who arrived in Sweden at the end of and immediately after the war, and furthermore had worked for Joint for 17 years—took part in the Swedish selection missions as a representative of the SUK.627 Soon after, Gottfarb became a source of information about the progress of the resettlement programme for Köpniwsky and other Jewish officials.628 As a result, the MFST was well informed about the number and personal details of the Polish Jews selected in the UNHCR refugee camps.

In late 1969, Broborg told Director Köpniwsky in a telephone conversation that there were no Jews among the 24 Polish refugees selected from Austria.629 The reason for this was that some 90 percent of the Polish Jews

626 “Statistik över nya invandrare 1978-1972”, 23 May 1973, D 4 e: 3, Flyktingsektionen, JFA, RA.
627 Inga Gottfarb, Den livsfarliga glömskan (Stockholm: Langenskiöld, 2006).
629 Rosa Goldenson to David Köpniwsky, minutes of the telephone conversation with Gösta Broborg, 17 Dec. 1969, F19:6, Huvudarkivet, JFA, RA.
arriving in Vienna at that time were immediately transferred to the Italian UNHCR refugee camps. Indeed, when the Swedish delegation continued its mission in Italy, the selection included 64 Polish Jews. The resettlement of late 1970 added 4 more Polish Jews to the group.

One aspect of the Swedish authorities’ management of refugees that would be worth to examine in the future is the change of the procedures of the selection of refugees from the UNHCR refugee camps. The first time, the disagreement regarding the method of interviewing and selecting the refugees appeared to be evident was during the selection of the Czechoslovaks and the Polish Jews in late 1969. At that time, Inga Gottfarb criticized the practice of conducting four separate interviews with applicants interested in migrating to Sweden. She argued that a combined and comprehensive interview would be completely sufficient, especially in the case of highly educated applicants. By this Gottfarb referred to the number of Polish-Jewish refugee intellectuals who applied for migration to Sweden at the UNHCR refugee camps in Italy. She also proposed that the time between the selection and the transfer of refugees to Sweden should be used for the initial Swedish language training. This proposal did not meet with a favorable response from Broborg at that time.

In 1971 Gottfarb returned to the issue of the interviews. This time she stressed the problem of incompetent translators, who, according to Gottfarb, did not respect the confidentiality of interviews and often pursed their own interests while working as translators. She also pointed to the lack of clearly formulated goals for the selection work and to the work pressure on the members of the Swedish delegation, which negatively influenced the selection process. Gottfarb proposed that humanitarian, psychological, emotional, and medical concerns should be weighed against economic considerations. A solution would be a division of applicants into three categories: the “professional” category, chosen according to labor market demands; the “hardcore” category for those refugees needing medical care, selected according to humanitarian criteria, and the “other” category accepted according to the refugees’ connections to Sweden, their chances of finding work, study or re-schooling, political persecution or other factors. The “professional” category should constitute 70-80 percent of all selected refugees, but the rest should be divided between the “hardcore” and “other” categories. Gotfarb’s categories, not least the fact that 70-80 percent should

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631 “Statistik över nya invandrare 1978-1972”, 23 May 1973, D 4 e: 3, Flyktingsektionen, JFA, RA.
632 Gösta Broborg to Ove Jönsson, 18 Nov. 1969, E VII bb:9, Utlänningssektionen 1948-1972, AA.
633 After World War II, the “hardcore” category referred to refugees who were old, chronically sick or had a disability, and could not be resettled.
be selected according to labour market demands, points to the importance of economic considerations in the Swedish refugee policy also in the 1971.

**Conclusion**

One of the most interesting results of this chapter is the combination of factors that influenced Swedish policies towards the Czechoslovak and Polish-Jewish refugees. The two initial determinants of Sweden’s responses to the events in Czechoslovakia and the Czechoslovak refugees were *national security considerations* and *Cold War considerations*. Like in previous decades, the main objective of the Swedish state was to balance its non-aligned position in the East-West polarization. Every conceivable reaction to East European affairs, be it the crisis or the refugee matter, was weighed against that of national security. To remain neutral was particularly important in the case of the expansion of the conflict in Eastern Europe. Indeed, the Swedish Military Intelligence Agency (*Militära underrättelsetjänsten*), as Stig Ekman shows, closely monitored the military exercises of the Warsaw Pact armies in the first half of 1968.  

This affected Sweden’s reactions to the Prague Spring: Swedish officials did not express any concerns regarding the Prague Spring during Kosygin’s visit in July 1968. Yet, in late August 1968, the Swedish government did express harsh criticism of the Warsaw Pact invasion. It is self-evident that an invasion requires a different response than concerns regarding a process of liberalization. Sweden, in spite of its non-alignment, ideologically belonged to the West. In this sense Sweden was never neutral and was thus susceptible to pressure to criticize the Soviet Union and the Communist system. This was also motivated by the need to improve Sweden’s position in relation to the Western powers that had been strained by the rapprochement with the Soviet Union, following Kosygin’s visit. In addition, the unequivocal condemnation of the Soviet’s violation of a small sovereign state aligned with Sweden’s new active foreign policy and, furthermore, offered an opportunity to balance the equally harsh criticism of the US war in Vietnam. The influence of *national security considerations* on the diminution of the initial criticism should not be underestimated.

The decision to open the borders to all Czechoslovaks interested in migrating to Sweden in September 1968 was taken after the Swedish government had learned of several other efforts to welcome these refugees, which indicates the key role of the international environment in affecting the Swedish response at that time. By admitting all Czechoslovak refugees who wanted to come to Sweden, the government showed that Sweden actually

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stood fully on the side of the oppressed peoples. This step was met with great appreciation from the international refugee regime and improved Sweden’s international position. The Czechoslovak “freedom fighters” received widespread support, including respect from Swedish society at large for their resistance against the Soviet Union. The events in Czechoslovakia also received wide coverage in the Swedish press. Thus, the influence of variables such as *international relations* and *social receptiveness*, especially the influence from the host community, i.e., the Swedish understanding of events in Czechoslovakia, thus seem to be evident.

However, over time, Sweden rather quickly refrained from its criticism of the Warsaw Pact invasion and reverted to its cautious posture vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. In November 1968, when the Czechoslovakian case was no longer a major international issue, the Swedish government withdrew its generous offer to admit everyone from Czechoslovakia seeking refuge in Sweden. This shift in policy took place after the inquiry into financial support for the Czechoslovak refugees was raised with SUK officials. Thus, it seems that as soon as the international pressure to act on behalf of the refugees from Czechoslovakia subsided, the acceptance of Czechoslovak refugees was no longer an important issue for Swedish officials; it was business as usual and the traditional labour market orientation of Swedish refugee policy returned to the forefront. The *labour market considerations* thus determined the change in Swedish refugee policy. Economic interests were also evident in the case of the selection of Czechoslovaks from the UNHCR refugee camps during the period 1968–1971. In fact, the Czechoslovaks only constituted a small part of those selected during the missions organized to help solve the problem of Czechoslovak refugees.

The composition of factors influencing Sweden’s response to the Polish-Jewish events and emigration was different. Firstly, national security considerations were absent. The crisis in Poland posed no direct threat to Swedish security. Although the Polish anti-Semitic campaign had found resonance in other Eastern Bloc countries (and anti-Semitism existed in the Soviet Union throughout the period), it was an entirely domestic Polish matter, without the involvement of other countries. Unlike the Czechoslovak case, there was therefore little risk that criticism would be regarded as a move against the Soviet Union that could escalate the conflict.

Seemingly, *the relations with the sending country* determined the Swedish government’s response in this case. In particular, the criticism of the anti-Semitic campaign would have a detrimental impact on Swedish relations with Poland, which, after the Soviet Union, was Sweden’s most important economic partner in the East. Thus, initially, despite large amounts of information from Ambassador Kronvall and others at the Swedish Embassy in Warsaw detailing the increasing anti-Jewish sentiments and policies, the Swedish government seemed to not concern itself with the
events in Poland. Eventually, in June 1968, Sweden expressed its concerns over the developments, but the reaction to the increasingly vicious persecution of Polish Jews was still cautious: the UD expressed its concern regarding the campaign, but did not categorically condemn it. Perhaps for the same reason, the government remained reluctant to react on behalf of Polish Jews interested in migrating to Sweden despite a number of efforts from Ambassador Kronvall and the MFST.

The shift in the refugee policy took place in June 1969 after the Swedish government had learned about Denmark's decision to grant visas to all Polish Jews interested in migrating there. Like in the Czechoslovak case, international relations, and in particular, the threat of bad international publicity from not accepting these refugees, seems to have been the decisive push for the Swedish government to open its borders to the Polish Jews. From that point on, the amount of visas offered by Swedish government agencies exceeded demand.

There is one further aspect that needs to be addressed. It has to do with the framing of the events in Poland and its possible effects on the decision to protest against the anti-Semitic campaign and to admit the Polish Jews into Sweden. It is difficult to actually prove that the framing of the events mattered. However, it could be argued that when the developments in Poland began to be understood and represented analogously to the Holocaust, the role of the passive bystander was no longer an option. The Swedish press frequently made references to the persecution of the Jews during the Nazi era. The events unfolded in the very same country as those during World War II, but this time with the Communist regime in the role of the villain, fulfilling the Nazi goal of making Poland "free of Jews". For a government stressing the moral aspects of its foreign policy, this understanding of the situation made it impossible not to act. Furthermore, opening the borders to persecuted Jews echoed the reception of the remnants of Norwegian Jewry, the rescue of the Danish Jews, and the White busses expedition, thus enforcing the image of Sweden as a moral superpower.
PART III. MANAGEMENT
5. Arrival and reception processes

Previous research has demonstrated that the reception of refugees in Sweden in the years 1914–1968 was determined by factors such as economic capacity and bureaucratic choices. The former was evident, for example, at the end of the Second World War when all able-bodied Baltic and Polish refugees were forced to take jobs in sectors with the lowest wages and most unpleasant working conditions, such as forestry, agriculture, and peat work. Similarly, the intention towards the Hungarian refugees in 1956 was to provide work for them as quickly as possible, although, as Wigerfelt points out, better educational opportunities were offered in comparison to earlier refugee groups. Economic capacity also determined the acceptance and reception of refugees arriving thorough the Swedish resettlement programme from the UNHCR refugee camps. The latter factor, bureaucratic choices, was apparent since the same government agency, the AMS, was involved in the entire process, from the “selection” to the arrival of the labour migrants/refugees and their placement in employment. This meant that after a short Swedish language training course, the refugees were placed in jobs or some form of training in skills considered urgently needed on the Swedish labour market at that time. They were treated in the same manner as imported workers and almost no interest was given to the refugees’ previous education, qualifications, or special skills. However, there was one exception, namely the group of refugees with high academic degrees who were usually offered positions in archives.

This part of the thesis attempts to examine whether the same factors determined the reception of Czechoslovaks and Polish Jews during the formative period of the late 1960s. In particular, the arrivals and departures of refugees from reception centres will be investigated in this chapter. In the first part, the focus is placed on the arrival and reception of the Czechoslovak refugees, especially at reception centres that accommodated the vast majority of the Czechoslovaks. The second part focuses on the arrival and reception of Polish Jews. In this case, the assistance offered by Swedish Jewish communities will also be analyzed. Finally, there will be an investigation into the responses of the Swedish community and state agencies to the problems arising from the reception of these refugees.

The arrival and reception of Czechoslovaks

It is hard to know whether the Swedish Embassy in Prague, in the same way as the Swedish Embassy in Warsaw, promised the Czechoslovaks who were

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635 Wigerfelt, Ungrare i folkhemmet, 169.
applying for Swedish visas that they would be able to get jobs corresponding to their educational level or previous occupations. However, the economic capacity determinant of the reception of the Czechoslovak refugees was evident from the very beginning of their migration to Sweden. On 6 September 1968, the day after announcing that it would be possible to obtain Swedish visas, the SUK sent a telegram to the Swedish Embassy in Vienna reporting that the individuals who received visas “will be granted work permits” and that “what kind of job they would be placed in would depend on the Swedish labour market.”\(^636\) Apparently, the SUK wanted to make sure that there would not be complaints regarding the placement of refugees in sectors where the demand for labour was high. The labour market principle also applied to the selection of Czechoslovak refugees from the UNHCR refugee camps. The instructions for the selections, issued by the Swedish government to the AMS, included a statement that the AMS was to “ensure that able-bodied refugees would be placed in work.”\(^637\)

Regarding their arrival in Sweden, the Czechoslovak newcomers were in a more privileged position than the Polish-Jewish group. On 20 September 1968, the Swedish government authorized the AMS to cover travel costs for the Czechoslovak refugees incurred during their trip from Austria to Sweden.\(^638\) In practice, they could organize their travel by public transport and private cars and they were later reimbursed for tickets or petrol. In addition, they were granted a sum of 7 dollars per person for each day of travel to cover necessary expenses during the journey. The transport of refugees from the UNHCR refugee camps was organized by chartered planes from Austria and Italy to Malmö Bulltofta airport. Passengers were allowed 23 kg of luggage and additional belongings were sent by post.\(^639\)

Upon arrival in Sweden, the Czechoslovaks had to register at the transit centre in Malmö.\(^640\) The stay in Malmö lasted up to two days, during which time information was provided and an initial medical examination was conducted. After this, the refugees were moved to one of the reception centres, administrated by the AMS’s county labour boards, where a reception programme was provided. The stay at these centres lasted from three to six months during which Swedish language training and introduction-to-Swedish-society classes were provided. A quick look at the education provided at the reception centres is necessary in order to understand the entire reception procedure.

\(^636\) “[…] kommer också att få arbetstillstånd här. Yrkesplacering blir beroende av arbetsmarknaden i Sverige.” The SUK to the Swedish Embassy in Vienna, 06 Sep. 1968, E 1:5, Ordföranden, SUA, RA.
\(^638\) Ove Jönsson and Ragnar Wahlström to the UD, 1 Nov. 1968, E II e:57, Utlänningssektionen 1948-1972, AA.
\(^639\) The AMS to the Travel Agent, 10 Jun. 1969, E VII ba:15, Utlänningssektionen 1948-1972, AA.
\(^640\) The AMS to the ICEM, 10 May 1969, E VII bb:11, Utlänningssektionen 1948-1972, AA.
In 1968, as already mentioned, the Swedish government authorized free Swedish language education for all migrants. Since there were no general instructions on how to arrange this education, each reception centre was responsible for providing these services to the refugees on its own initiative. In practice, this education was offered either by the Workers’ Educational Association (Arbetarnas Bildningsförbund) or by the Study Promotion Association (Studiefråmjandet). In Alvesta reception camp, which hosted a substantial number of Czechoslovak refugees, these matters were regulated by general instructions established in 1967. According to this document, the main goal of the programme offered to residents was twofold: to eliminate the frustration at an early stage after arrival and to facilitate their adaptation to the new environment. This was to be achieved through educational and social opportunities. The education aimed to introduce Swedish language so that residents would acquire basic communicative skills. The classes were planned to run for 4–6 weeks with an average of 4–6 hours per day. The introduction-to-society classes included meetings with representatives from various key institutions, such as the Police, the AMS, and the Social Welfare Board. In addition, residents were offered a medical examination and a small sum of pocket money. The entire reception programme in Alvesta centre, according to general instructions, was to be finished within three to six months.

After the three to six months at the centres, the refugees were expected to be ready to enter Swedish society and not least the labour market and were placed in jobs or some form of training in skills considered urgently needed on the labour market. However, the job placement of refugees did not go according to plan when it came to the numerous highly educated individuals. In fact, this was the biggest problem the AMS faced with the refugees in the late 1960s and early 1970s. It primarily concerned Polish-Jewish refugees, but the Czechoslovak group was also affected.

The problem became evident in the autumn of 1969, when several reports were sent from the reception centres to the AMS complaining that large numbers of highly educated Polish-Jewish refugees was posing an obstacle to the successful job placement of the residents at the centres. In reply, the AMS explained that it had decided to conduct a thorough investigation of the process of job placement and/or opportunities for vocational training for the

643 In the Alvesta reception centre, every adult refugee received 7 SEK for the first 10 days. Kronoberg County Labour Market Board, report, 11 Dec. 1973, E 2 D:2, Utläningssektionen 1968-1975, AA.
644 Hammar, ‘The Integration or Non-Integration of Refugee Immigrants: Historical Experiences in Sweden’, 186.
refugees. Two AMS officers, Karl-Erik Winblad and Gunborg Kjellberg, were instructed to visit eleven reception centres accommodating Czechoslovak and Polish-Jewish refugees in late 1969 to evaluate this problem. The centres visited were Degeberga, Kolboda, Lidköping, Lundsbrunn, Marstrand, Sätra Brunn, Tylösand, Ulricehamn, Vejbystrand, Åhus, and Örenäs. These were both regular reception centres and temporary places convenient for use when needed. Each centre was reviewed according to a standard format. Firstly, information on the capacity of the centre, the number of residents, and their national and occupational structure was summarized. Secondly, the ongoing or potential placement of refugees in jobs was evaluated. Eventually, there was an assessment of the quality of the services provided for residents, including the employment counsellor (arbetsvägledare) and career counsellor (yrkesvägledare).645

The places that primarily accommodated Czechoslovaks were Vejbystrand, Kolboda, and Sätra Brunn. The reports issued after each visit are a particularly useful source of information on the reception procedures regarding the Czechoslovak refugees. Vejbystrand accommodated some 53 Czechoslovak refugees, mainly young families and single men at the time of Winblad’s visit. Winblad marked in his report that these were mainly people with high school education, many of whom were engineers, construction workers, taxi drivers, workshop workers, and chemists. The chances for finding employment for such a group, according to Winblad, were good.646 He also emphasized the “excellent” cooperation between the administration at the centre and the AMS county labour board, something that undoubtedly played a role in his evaluation of the situation. Regarding the living conditions at this centre, Winblad pointed to problems with schooling and sanitary facilities.647

In proceeding with these reports, this dissertation utilizes the registers listing weekly departures from the respective refugee centres. They provide information about the three major destinations of refugees leaving the centers: job placement of the refugee and the relative(s), departure to another refugee centre, or housing for elderly people offered by the Social Welfare Board. Additional notes indicate whether the refugee would move to another refugee centre to begin studies, which could mean both intensive language training and university education. Since there were both permanent and temporary reception centres, the analysis of these weekly registers, presented in Figure 4, includes different time periods. The time lines presented here are helpful in putting the AMS visits into a broader

645 See, for example, Karl-Erik Winblad, report of the visit in the Örenäs reception centre, 14 Nov. 1969, E VI a:11, Utlänningssektionen 1948-1972, AA.
646 "Fö ö bedöms möjligheterna goda att skaffa anställning åt flertalet i gruppen för övrigt." Karl-Erik Winblad, report from Vejbystrand, 19 Nov. 1969, E VI a:11, Utlänningssektionen 1948-1972, AA.
647 Karl-Erik Winblad, report from Vejbystrand, 19 Nov. 1969, E VI a:11, Utlänningssektionen 1948-1972, AA.
perspective. In addition, aside from the eleven reception centres visited by two AMS officers, presented above, the analysis includes refugees’ departures from Alvesta reception centre which also hosted a substantial number of Czechoslovak refugees.

Figure 4. Destinations of refugees’ departures from various reception centers hosting the Czechoslovak and the Polish-Jewish refugees. 
Source: E VI a:11, Utlänningssektionen 1948-1972, AA.

The study of the weekly departures from the Vejbystrand reception centre confirms Winblad’s assessment. More than 70 percent of the Czechoslovaks who lived in the centre from October 1969 to May 1970 were directly placed in jobs. The remaining group, some 25 percent of the refugees, was sent to other refugee centres, particularly to the reception centre in Alvesta.

A similar assessment was made regarding the possibility of job placement for the refugees at the reception centre in Kolboda. Overall, there were 116
refugees staying at this centre at the time of the AMS visit on 19 November 1969, of which 81 percent were Czechoslovaks. According to Winblad’s report, this group consisted of “many technicians and industry workers”, and for the majority of them the chances of job placement was assessed as “very good.”

In his report, Winblad also pointed to the close cooperation with external institutions, such as the Social Welfare Board and the Swedish Social Insurance Agency (Försäkringskassan). In the end, two-thirds of the refugees who lived in Kolboda from November 1969 to late February 1970 were placed in jobs.

The assessment of the job placement opportunities of the refugees at the Sätra Brunn reception centre was also very positive. Kjellberg, who had visited this centre on 19 December 1969, stressed that the process should not create any difficulties. However, the occupational composition of the Sätra Brunn residents differed from those of Vebystrand and Kolboda. Firstly, the group at Sätra Brunn was diverse both nationally and professionally. There were 204 residents at Sätra Brunn reception centre in late 1969, of which 60 percent were Czechoslovak and 30 percent Hungarian refugees. The group consisted of many industrial workers, but there were also civil servants and doctors. Kjellberg reported that the employment prospects of this group were “fairly good, [there should be] no problems at all in finding work for industrial workers”. Regarding the younger residents, he wrote, “Some young people with interrupted education from their home countries will be placed in the intensive Swedish language training after the basic course.”

In the end, as the study of the refugees’ departures reveals, almost 30 percent of the residents left Sätra Brunn for studies, primarily for the intensive language training.

The practice of sending young Czechoslovak and Polish-Jewish refugees to continue their education was already established by late 1968. On 28 November 1968, in a letter addressed to the reception centres hosting the refugees, Ragnar Wahlström, Senior Administrative Officer of the AMS, wanted to draw the other AMS officers’ attention to the young refugees whose education had been discontinued. In particular, Wahlström asked them to provide information about the numbers of those interested in continuing their studies in Sweden and about their needs. The idea was to assess the need for, and explore possible future activities of, continued education in Sweden. Several centres from around the country also

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648 ”Många industriarbetare, tekniker, sjukvårdsyrken […] för de flesta goda.” Karl-Erik Winblad, report of the visit in the Kolboda reception centre, 03 Dec. 1969, E VI a:11, Utlänningssektionen 1948-1972, AA.
649 Departures from the Kolboda reception centre, E VI a:11, Utlänningssektionen 1948-1972, AA
651 Departures from the Sätra Brunn reception centre, E VI a:11, Utlänningssektionen 1948-1972, AA
responded and sent the AMS lists of individuals who had not finished their education or wanted to continue studying at the university level.

The necessary condition to continue education at Swedish universities was, as Wahlström put it, to “sufficiently master the Swedish language.”

Seemingly, the AMS was well aware that the initial language training provided at the reception centres, in average lasting only two months, did not equip the refugees to meet this requirement. Therefore, cooperation with the branch of Lund University in Växjö was established to provide intensive Swedish language training for refugees. This training was also offered, for example, at the reception centre in Marstrand, where it was developed in cooperation with the University of Gothenburg. The offer for refugees included courses in Swedish technical language as well as low-speed language training for the elderly. These classes attracted many Czechoslovak and Polish-Jewish refugees and there was a long waiting list for enrollment.

Thus, with the exception of young refugees interested in continuing their studies at Swedish universities, the reception of the Czechoslovak refugees during the formative period of the late 1960s, just like the reception of other previous refugee groups in Sweden, was dictated primarily by the economic capacity factor. The principle that mattered most to the Swedish authorities after the arrival of the refugees in Sweden was successful job placement. The economic role that was expected of them was clear from the very beginning. Did the same principle determine the reception of the Polish-Jewish refugees?

The arrival and reception of Polish Jews
The arrival of the Polish-Jewish refugees in Sweden differed from the arrival of the Czechoslovaks. Unlike the Czechoslovaks, the Polish-Jewish refugees had to pay for their travel to Sweden. Most of them arrived at Ystad, on the Swedish south coast, by ferry from Świnoujście. Upon arrival, they were registered by AMS officers, who had been informed of the arrival by the Swedish Embassy in Warsaw. After registration, the refugees were, like the Czechoslovaks and other refugee groups, transported to one of the reception centres, primarily in the south of Sweden. Those who had accommodation organized by relatives, friends, or institutions, such as the Association for Polish Jews, did not have to stay at the centres.

The other difference was that the Swedish Embassy in Warsaw apparently informed individuals interested in migrating to Sweden that the job placement in Sweden would be in jobs relating to the refugees’ previous experience and occupation. It caused a lot of confusion among the Polish-

652 “[...] ... behärskar svenska språket.” Ragnar Wahlström, “Intensivkurser i svenska språket”, 28 Nov. 1968, E VI a:11, E VI a:11, Utlänningssektionen 1948-1972, AA.

653 See, for example, Abram Gross to the SIV, 8 Dec. 1970, E III a: 88, Utlänningssektionen 1948-1972, AA.
Jewish refugees when they realized that this was not the case. In addition, this group consisted of an extraordinarily large number of highly educated individuals, students whose high school and university studies had been discontinued due to the anti-Semitic campaign and elderly people who did not necessarily fit the picture of a group that would be easily placed to work.

The problem with the job placement of the Polish-Jewish refugees began after the arrival of a large group of Polish-Jewish refugees in the late summer and autumn of 1969. This group consisted of people who had not applied for emigration in the early phases, when the campaign began, but had preferred to await the outcome of the process to see whether the campaign would stop. The major factor that pushed them to apply for emigration passports was the Politburo's decision that threatened to stop emigration from 1 September 1969 and thus the risk that the opportunity to emigrate from Poland would cease. In this group there were also individuals whose applications for passports had been delayed for various reasons.

On 26 September 1969, Bertil Öjerbrand, the AMS officer at Ulricehamn refugee centre, that mainly accommodated Polish-Jewish refugees, reported to the AMS the increasing problem with the employment of Polish-Jewish residents. Öjerbrand explained that the problem was due to the particular occupational composition of the group:

Those who have been in the camp for more than a month have occupations that make them difficult to place [in jobs]. They are not employed in their professions because of poor language skills and the competition within their profession. Employers who can accept unskilled labour do not hire them because they know that as soon as they have learned Swedish relatively well, they will switch to their professions.654

Three days later, the administration of Kisa reception centre reported to Tord Wretman, the AMS Executive Officer, that “certain difficulties” were expected to be encountered with the job placement of the Polish-Jewish residents. According to the letter, the reason for this was that “the majority of the newly arrived have high [levels of] education.”655 Thus, in both cases, the occupational composition of the Polish-Jewish refugees, and particularly the group’s profile as highly educated, was seen as problematic and as an obstacle to the successful placement of these individuals in jobs.

As already discussed, the AMS reacted promptly to the potential crisis. In late 1969, they decided to conduct a thorough investigation of this problem by sending two officers to visit a number of reception centres and evaluate the situation. Among the places entirely or mainly inhabited by Polish Jews

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655 “[...] då flesta av de nyanlända har höga utbildningar.” Östergötlands County Labour Board to the AMS, report, 29 Sep. 1969, E II a:44, Utlänningssektionen 1948-1972, AA.
were Degeberga, Lidköping, Lundsbrunn, Marstrand, Tylösand, Utlicehamn, Åhus, and Örenäs. The reception centre in Örenäs was the first centre to be visited by AMS officer Winblad. He begins his report by summarizing the visit with a description of the group staying at this centre. It consisted of 146 Polish-Jewish refugees with a diverse set of occupations, including 25 academics, 15 students, 8 teachers, 6 physicians, 7 engineers, 5 clerks, 3 translators, 2 journalists, 2 medical technicians, 2 tailors, 2 dressmakers, a pharmacist, a researcher, an accountant, a statistician, a former colonel, a film producer, a dentist, a furrier, a textile printer, and a watchmaker.

In the next section of the report, Winblad began by reflecting on the problems with placing this group in jobs. The major problem, according to the AMS officer, was the refugees’ lack of adequate language skills. He lamented that “only a few can be placed [in a job] with their existing knowledge of Swedish” while the majority was in need of intensive language assistance.656 According to the report, this service could improve the efficiency of the job placements. In the later part of the report, the quality of the Swedish language training, provided in Örenäs by the Study Promotion Association from Malmö, was assessed and found to be very effective. Winblad also identified another major obstacle for effective job placement, namely the lack of employment and career counsellors. The advantage of the Örenäs centre was, according to Winblad, their cooperation with external institutions, such as the Jewish Community in Malmö and Lund University Student Union. Weekly departures from Örenäs suggest that some actions were taken to address his concerns over the job placement services. After more than five months, more than 75 percent of the residents were placed in jobs, most of them in late spring of 1970.657

The next place Winblad visited was the reception centre in Degeberga. At the time of his visit, on 20 November 1969, there were 57 Polish-Jewish refugees staying at this centre. Of them, 17 students were waiting to be transferred to the reception centre in Marstrand for the intensive language training provided at that centre by Gothenburg University. The remaining group included a cashier, a dressmaker, civil engineers, a police major, a radio repairman, a hair dresser, a painter, a driver, a student of musicology, a history teacher, a tailor, a storage worker, a photographer, an actor, a manual worker, a language teacher, a nuclear physician, and a technician. Regarding the job placement of this group, Winblad expected that the process would be easy to accomplish. He concluded that most of the refugees from this group could be employed and listed a number of local industries that had already been contacted by the Degeberga officers to help deal with

656 “[...] endast ett fåtal kan placeras med de nuvarande kunskaperna i svenska.” Karl-Erik Winblad, report of the visit in the Örenäs reception centre, 14 Nov. 1969, E VI a:11, Utlänningssektionen 1948-1972, AA.
657 Departures from the Örenäs reception centre, E VI a:11, Utlänningssektionen 1948-1972, AA.
this task. He also highlighted the importance of the support offered by the municipality of Kristianstad, the Swedish Trade Union Confederation, and the Social Welfare Board.\textsuperscript{658} In the end, like in Örenäs, more than 75 percent of these refugees were placed in jobs.\textsuperscript{659}

On the next day, Winblad visited the reception centre in Åhus, located 20 kilometers west of Degeberga. This visit took place just after the arrival of 48 Polish-Jewish refugees, which doubled the number of residents. Like in Degeberga, there was a group of 17 students waiting to relocate for intensive language training, but the transfer did not take place until February 1970. The remaining group consisted of people who had held non-manual jobs in Poland, primarily clerks, teachers, and journalists, and Winblad stressed that extra support, particularly a number of employment and career counsellors, might be needed to place these refugees in work.\textsuperscript{660} Apparently, as the report indicated, support from the municipality of Kristianstad had been offered, something Winblad regarded as a promising sign for the future. The problem with finding employment for people belonging to the non-manual salaried professions was reflected in the outcome of the work placement process. The result was lower than in the two previous cases, reaching some two-thirds of the Åhus residents.\textsuperscript{661}

Similar concerns about the work placement of refugees with non-manual professions were also expressed about the residents of Lundsbrunn reception centre. Gunborg Kjellberg, the second AMS officer, who visited this centre on 14 November 1969, expected a number of problems in finding work for refugees with less manual occupations, such as judges. According to Kjellberg, there were two ways to meet this challenge: one was to offer comprehensive career guidance, and the other to provide contacts with local companies and authorities. Another problem, as Kjellberg pointed out, was a number of students who, due to the limited number of places, did not qualify for the intensive Swedish language training in Marstrand.\textsuperscript{662} In fact, the study of the refugees’ departures from Lundsbrunn reveals that it took another four months before this opportunity was offered to the residents. In the end, some 25 percent of the refugees had left the centre for further studies, while 71 percent had been placed in jobs.\textsuperscript{663}

\textsuperscript{658} Karl-Erik Winblad, report of the visit in the Degeberga reception centre, 20 Nov. 1969, E VI a:11, Utlänningssektionen 1948-1972, AA.

\textsuperscript{659} Departures from the Degeberga reception centre, E VI a:11, Utlänningssektionen 1948-1972, AA.

\textsuperscript{660} Karl-Erik Winblad, report of the visit in the Åhus reception centre, 21 Nov. 1969, E VI a:11, Utlänningssektionen 1948-1972, AA. The non-manual jobs, known also as white-collar jobs, include mainly professional-administrative and technical-clerical occupations. The non-manual category is taken from the Swedish socio-economic classification system (Socioekonomisk indelning). See more:Socioekonomisk Indelning (Stockholm: SCR, 1983).

\textsuperscript{661} Departures from the Lundsbrunn reception centre, E VI a:11, Utlänningssektionen 1948-1972, AA.

\textsuperscript{662} Gunborg Kjellberg, report of the visit in the Lundsbrunn reception centre, 14 Nov. 1969, E VI a:11, Utlänningssektionen 1948-1972, AA.

\textsuperscript{663} Departures from the Åhus reception centre, E VI a:11, Utlänningssektionen 1948-1972, AA.
The centre in Tylösand hosted 74 Polish Jews and 8 Czechoslovaks at the time of the AMS visit. In this case, as Kjellberg stressed, the process of work placement had started with drivers and electricians. Yet, apart from the residents with manual professions and students selected for the intensive language training, the prospect of work placement for the other refugees in their respective occupations was described as poor. A particular difficulty was seen regarding the older refugees. Finding employment for this group was seemingly a complex issue. The younger generation refused to be separated from their families, while older refugees rejected job placements anywhere other than the major Swedish cities. This refusal was also motivated by a wish to keep the families together, namely the need to live together with their studying children. In response, Kjellberg suggested professional career counsellor support to assess the actual qualifications and needs of these refugees. These problems were reflected in the destinations of the refugees’ departures. In the end, less than 60 percent of the refugees who went through the Tylösand refugee centre between December 1968 and May 1970 were placed in jobs.

The reception centre in Ulricehamn accommodated 20 refugees from Poland, 8 from Czechoslovakia, 2 from Greece, and 1 from Hungary by the time of Kjellberg’s visit. This group, according to Kjellberg’s list, included students, dressmakers, a technician, a programmer, an economist, a salesman, a telephone operator, a nurse, and a musician. Kjellberg stated that “dressmakers were easy to place and a few others are also ready for placement”. The outcome of job placement in Ulricehamn was higher than in Lundsburnn and Tylösand, and, in fact, the highest of all reception centres presented in this study. Almost 80 percent of the residents of this centre were placed in jobs.

In many cases, as already stated, the transfer from one centre to another was related to the intensive language training. The final destination was often the reception centre in Marstrand. This was one of the biggest centres visited by the AMS officers and could host up to 200 residents. By the time of Kjellberg’s visit, on 19 November 1969, there were 156 refugees staying in Marstrand, mainly from Poland. Seemingly, the courses organized and the assistance provided to refugees interested in receiving further language education had attracted a lot of interest among the Polish-Jewish refugees.

664 Gunborg Kjellberg, report of the visit in the Tylösand reception centre, 18 Nov. 1969, E VI a:11, Utlänningssektionen 1948-1972, AA.
665 Departures from the Tylösand reception centre, E VI a:11, Utlänningssektionen 1948-1972, AA.
666 ”Sömmerskorna placeras med lättethet, några andra är också aktuella för utplacering.” Gunborg Kjellberg, report of the visit in the Ulricehamn reception centre, 05 Dec. 1969, E VI a:11, Utlänningssektionen 1948-1972, AA.
667 Departures from the Ulricehamn reception centre, E VI a:11, Utlänningssektionen 1948-1972, AA.
668 Karl-Erik Winblad, report of the visit in the Marstrand reception centre, 20 Nov. 1969, E VI a:11, Utlänningssektionen 1948-1972, AA.
The study of weekly registers reveals that there were a lot of arrivals and departures, far more compared to the other centres. The outcome of refugees’ departures was that close to two-thirds of the Marstrand residents were placed in jobs, whereas every fifth person left for further studies in Gothenburg, Stockholm, or other university cities.669

A notable exception, which from the very start had a different approach towards its residents, was the Lidköping reception centre. It hosted 45 refugees from Poland, 8 from Romania, and 6 from Czechoslovakia at the time of Kjellberg’s visit. Regarding this group and the job placement possibilities of its members, Kjellberg wrote the following:

Except for the doctors, a sewing machine repairer and a tailor (who actually got a job offer) there are serious difficulties with the job placement in their respective professions - in many cases this is completely impossible. It also takes a long time before they realize this and accept employment in industry or retraining.670

Thus, rather than to engage in a discussion of how to make use of the resources and competences of the refugees, the urge to find them work in Swedish industry was stated quite explicitly. However, due to the efforts of a career counsellor, not many ended up working in Swedish industry, but rather continued studying. The counsellor was described by Kjellberg in the following way:

[...] an employee who dedicates much of his time and interest to thoroughly discussing the educational opportunities for these youths. The discussions can be conducted at an early stage [after the arrival] without an interpreter, because the officer concerned has excellent language skills, for example he speaks Russian. Yv [career counsellor] also provides applications for the respective schools.671

This was an exceptional support compared to the assistance provided at other centres. It also, as indicated above, influenced the outcome of the job placement of these refugees. The percentage of refugees placed in jobs only reached 47 percent, which was the lowest figure of all places visited by the AMS officers, while the percentage of those sent to further education reached 28.

669 Departures from the Tylösand reception centre, E VI a:11, Utlänningssektionen 1948-1972, AA.
Thus, the large amount of refugees with non-manual professions was one of the main obstacles to the successful and smooth placement of Polish-Jewish refugees in jobs in the Swedish labour market. The complaints over these issues, expressed in the above mentioned reports, confirm that economic considerations were the guiding principle in the reception of refugees in the late 1960s. A good summary of the expectations for this particular group was provided by Bertil Björkdahl, Head of the County Labour Board from Blekinge. On 23 December 1969, Björkdahl reported to the AMS:

The Polish immigrants of Jewish origin cause a number of problems. Those who have discontinued their education at a secondary or post-secondary level demand to continue their studies, which itself is quite understandable. They are not interested in entering the labour market to take employment in industry for a certain period of time, during which they could adapt to Swedish society, and then continue their studies. The County Labour Board in Blekinge has arranged study-visits to industries where they have been received in an excellent manner. But the result has been negative.672

Another finding is the substantial number of those who left their centres for further studies. In February 1970, Ulla-Britta Andersson, the Head of the Örserum reception centre, wrote to the AMS about the great eagerness among the newly arrived youths to continue their interrupted education.673 In mid-January 1970, the report summarizing the educational need of the refugees staying at the Swedish reception centres indicated that one-third of all residents were interested in continuing language training. Apart from students, these were mainly middle-aged and older refugees, often highly educated, who rejected the opportunity of being placed in jobs that did not match their previous professions.674 They also rejected the chance to be retrained in other professions and insisted on acquiring a placement matching their previous qualifications or experience.675 Some of them were close to retirement with little or no chances for re-qualification to new professions.

On 30 April 1970, Rune Nilsson of the Ronneby reception camp, complained to AMS officer Broborg about the difficulties with job placement...
of this group: “These specific people represented very exclusive and ‘difficult’ occupations. The camps have thus gone to enormous efforts to try to satisfy all specific demands.” Nilsson also listed a number of examples aimed to illustrate these efforts. About one of the residents, Nilsson wrote: “Offered several employments with accommodation. Always declined when everything was clear. Waited for something that never came.”

The same problem led the administration of the Alvesta centre to ask the Social Welfare Board for help in August 1970. At that time, there were 147 refugees from Poland and 14 from Czechoslovakia living in the centre. In total, out of the 581 refugees staying at this centre at that time, including 429 refugees and 152 relatives, 244 were directly placed in jobs, 59 received further education, 81 were sent for intensive language training to facilitate their work placement, 30 were offered housing by the Social Welfare Board, 7 were employed as archive workers, and 8 were placed in retraining for new occupations. After a three-day visit, the Board suggested several improvements to the reception procedure. In general, the Board stated, the residents had refused to accept previous job placements because they did not match their qualifications and previous jobs or were low-paid. The Board also observed that a special wish was expressed by the refugees to be placed only in the major Swedish cities, such as Stockholm, Gothenburg, and Malmö. This was motivated by the desire to live in close proximity to a Jewish population. The second request raised by the residents was, as indicated above, to be placed close to their children, preferably in the same large cities. Parents wanted to live with their children who studied at the universities. The problem here was the serious shortage of housing in the university towns. In many cases, these problems, as pointed out by the Social Welfare Board, resulted in serious psychological and social problems.

The Social Welfare Board suggested improving the quality of assistance offered at the centres. In particular, it proposed employing an additional officer to deal with the frustration and mental health of the residents. According to the Board, this should facilitate the management of the residents.

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AMS that they should use the threat of moving refugees out of the centres, and “if necessary”, he argued, “put the ‘threat’ into action.”

Thus, there was a lot of frustration among the AMS officers regarding the placement of Polish Jews in jobs (and, as discussed above, among the refugees). Apparently, as the AMS report presented in the later part of this chapter reveals, this was the first time the AMS county labour boards had to deal with such a large number of highly educated refugees who refused to accept to be placed anywhere in the Swedish labour market that the AMS saw fit, and demanded further language education. The AMS attempted to investigate this problem thoroughly, but there was no discussion concerning the solution to the problem once the investigation had been carried out.

Overall, the findings in the weekly registers indicate a substantial diversity in the outcome of job placements for the Polish Jews at the different reception centres in the late 1960s. This outcome varied from a little more than 47 percent in Lidköping to close to 80 percent in Ulricehamn. An attempt to explain these differences was made through four key features highlighted by the AMS officers. These are: the problems regarding highly educated refugees (I), the support of employment or career counsellors (II), contacts with external institutions (III), and the opportunity of receiving intensive language training at the centre (IV). The distribution of these features among the receptions centres evaluated in late 1969 has been documented in Table 4. Unfortunately, there is no pattern that could explain this variation of results. Similarly, a statistical examination of the relationships between these factors and the outcome of job placements, conducted with the help of Two-Factor Analysis of Variance (Anova), did not bring any significant results.

The specification of the regression model is

\[
\hat{y} = b_0 + b_1 x_1 + b_2 x_2 + b_3 x_3 + b_4 x_4
\]

where \(\hat{y}\) is a response variable indicating percentage of refugees placed in jobs, \(x_1\) is a dummy variable indicating if the problem with highly educated refugees was indicating, \(x_2\) is a dummy variable indicating if employment or career consultancy was provided, \(x_3\) is a dummy variable indicating if contacts with external institutions were established, and \(x_4\) is a dummy variable indicating if intensive language training was provided. This study revealed a lack of significant effects of these features.
Table 4. Characteristics of reception centers visited by the AMS officers in November and December 1969

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<th>Refugee centres</th>
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Sources: E VI a:11, Utlänningssektionen 1948-1972, AA.

The involvement of the Jewish Communities

An important point to add here is that the situation for the Polish Jews at the reception centres was not only investigated by state authorities, but also by the representatives of the Jewish communities from Stockholm, Gothenburg, and Malmö. In fact, as Dahl discusses in her dissertation, a number of social workers were assigned the task of visiting the places where the Polish Jews were staying, to get in touch with them, and to provide necessary information and contacts with the Jewish communities.\(^{681}\) In July 1969, these visits were conducted in Alvesta, Växjö, Toftaholm, Ulricehamn, and Lidköping. Later on, in the autumn of the same year, the centres in Ystad, Ronneby, Älmhult, Storebro, Kisa, Degeberga, Åhus, Sölvesborg, Hällevik, and Örenäs were visited by employees of the Jewish Communities. In 1970, the investigation was carried out in Sättra Brunn, Älmhult, Tylösand, Växjö, and Moheda, and, in 1971, in Alvesta.\(^{682}\)

Obviously, the reports issued after these visits had a different purpose than the documents presented by the AMS officers. For obvious reasons, they focused on problems experienced by the refugees rather than problems experienced by the administration of these centres. In particular, the quality of the services offered, including employment consultations and language training, and the prevailing attitude among the residents, were carefully examined. For example, regarding the Kisa reception centre, visited on 11

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\(^{681}\) Dahl, Ausschluss und Zugehörigkeit, 2013, 275–280.

\(^{682}\) Reports of visits in reception centres, F 4 c:2, Flyktingsektionen, JFA, RA.
and 12 November 1969, Dina Weintraub, one of the social workers who was employed by the Jewish Community to conduct these visits, wrote:

There was an irritable atmosphere, everybody was impatient. They think that nothing is being done by the management of the centre to provide them with work, and many of them pointed out that [...] this concerns providing jobs for intellectuals. However, it was considered that he [the manager of the centre] easily manages the situation for the Czechoslovaks, because most of them are workers.  

Weintraub also noted the disappointment the refugees felt after the information received from the Swedish Embassy in Warsaw. In the report from the Alvesta reception centre, she wrote:

There was a perceptible feeling of discouragement and of being misled by the Swedish Embassy in Warsaw, which, according to most spokespersons, did not mention a single word about the current situation on the Swedish labour market, but assured everyone that as soon as they learned Swedish reasonably well, they would find a position without difficulty. They bear this in mind and believe that they ought to get a privileged position in the job placement. These claims have in turn created a certain irritation within the administration of the centre.

Some dissatisfaction was also expressed towards the Swedish language training. Hans Baruch, another social worker employed by the Jewish Communities to conduct the visits, after visiting the Ronneby reception centre stressed that “Several participants were dissatisfied with it [the language education]. Partly because three hours [daily] are too few, and partly because it lacked modern facilities, so the education was ineffective.”

Besides sending the social workers to the reception centres, and thereby establishing contact with the refugees, the activities of the Jewish Communities included contacting the universities concerning the possibility of accepting Polish-Jewish refugees interested in continuing their education at a university level, as was the case with Stockholm University in February 1969, or assigning the Social Affairs Committee (Socialutskottet) the task of assisting the refugees in all kinds of cases.  

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684 ”Det förmärks ett visst missmod och en känsla av att ha blivit vilseledd av den svenska ambassaden i Warschau, som enligt de flestas utsago inte har nämnt ett ord om dagens situation på den svenska arbetsmarknaden utan försäkrat alla att de, såsnart de lärt sig behjälpligt svenska, utan större besvär får arbete. Man tar fasta på detta och anser sig böra få en privilegierad ställning vid arbetsanskaffningen. Dessa yrkanden har i sin tur skapat en viss irritation hos lägerledningen.” Dina Weintraub, report, 09 Aug. 1971, F 19:8, Huvudarkivet, JFA, RA.

685 ”Flera deltagare var missnöjda med det. Dels ansågs 3 tim som för få, dels saknades moderna hjälpmedel så undervisningen var ineffektiv.” Hans Baruch, 30 Oct. 1969, report, F 4 c:2, Flyktingsektionen, JFA, RA.

accommodation of Polish Jews, particularly finding housing in the Stockholm area, the Association for Polish Jews was, as mentioned earlier, actively involved. Apparently, many of the newly arrived refugees knew about the Association and contacted Chairman Goldstein for possible assistance in finding accommodation. The correspondence between the MFST and HIAS’ offices in Vienna, Rome, and Geneva, reveals that an attempt was made to direct the stream of refugees to cities other than Stockholm. However, this was not successful due to the activities of Chairman Goldstein. On 22 October 1969, Goldstein sent a letter to the Social Affairs Committee at the MFST asking the committee to provide two places for the representatives of the Association in the Committee. Unfortunately, no documents have been found that reveal if the MFST sought to limit the role of the Association at this time, as they had previously.

In addition, apart from the Polish Jews, a number of Czechoslovak, Hungarian, and Romanian Jews were assisted by the Jewish Community on that occasion. Between 1968 and 1971 about 140 Jewish refugees from these countries arrived in Sweden, primarily as part of the refugee quota. An interesting fact is that, in spite of the fact that the Czechoslovak Jews accounted for more than 10 percent of the total number of Czechoslovak refugees; in the Swedish case this share was less than 3 percent (Table 5).

Table 5. The arrival of the Jewish refugees to Sweden, 1968-1971

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Arrival year</th>
<th>Poland</th>
<th>Hungary</th>
<th>Romania</th>
<th>Czechoslovakia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>1738</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>520</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>328</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>2630</strong></td>
<td><strong>66</strong></td>
<td><strong>16</strong></td>
<td><strong>68</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


687 Rosa Goldenson to David Köpiwsky, 15 Aug. 1969, F 19:8, Huvudarkivet, JFA, RA.
688 Jakob Goldstein to the MFST Social Affairs Committee (Socialutskottet), 22 Oct. 1969, F 19:8, Huvudarkivet, JFA, RA.
6. The Swedish community’s, political, and bureaucratic responses to the problems

The increasing problem with the reception of highly educated Czechoslovak and Polish-Jewish refugees encouraged interest from different political and social actors who sought to help address these challenges. The first institution that acted on behalf of these refugees was the Committee for Intellectual Refugees (Kommitten för intellektuella flyktingar, KIF) initiated in 1969 by Prof. Gunnar Myrdal. The KIF was the product of numerous meetings and letters that Myrdal and his colleagues at the University of Stockholm held and sent in the name of those refugees. They attempted to shed light on the weaknesses of the Swedish reception system and the difficulties faced by highly educated and prominent specialists and scientists after their arrival in Sweden. KIF consisted of representatives of various authorities and organizations, such as the Trade and Industry Ministry (Handels- och industridepartamenten), the Stockholm Touristtransport Association (Stockholms Turisttrafikförbund), the Swedish Industry Association (Sveriges Industriförbund), Stockholm University, and the Swedish Confederation of Professions (SACO). The establishment of the KIF is reminiscent of the development of both the Subscription for Exiled Intellectuals (Insamlingen för landsflyktiga intellektuella) and the SDU during World War II, which, as mentioned earlier, aimed to support intellectual and cultural reconstruction in Central Europe after the war. The SDU was initiated by, among others, Alva Myrdal, Gunnar’s wife.

The KIF’s point of departure was to put forward a proposal to simplify the reception procedure of refugees. However, during the first year, the KIF received more than 90 visitors and an enormous amount of correspondence with questions purely on employment and educational matters. This slightly changed the focus of their approach: rather than entering into the debate on the general reception procedure, the KIF invited various Swedish authorities, migrants’ associations, employers, and other actors to address the particular problems and challenges faced by these refugees. The discussions confirmed that the Swedish integration policy was not prepared for such a distinctive group of refugees and, thus, no adequate solutions were available. As a result, by the end of November 1970, the Committee issued a proposal, titled

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689 In April 1971, the institution changed its name to the Committee for Refugees in Sweden (Kommittén för flyktingar i Sverige). Report of the Committee for Intellectual Refugees, 27 Nov. 1970, E VII ba:21, Utlänningssektionen 1948-1972, AA.
Refugees’ Adaptation to Sweden (Flyktingars anpassning i Sverige), aimed at improving the situation of refugee intellectuals.691

Firstly, the document distinguishes the group of refugee intellectuals from all other groups of migrants and states that the high educational level and experiences of these refugees prompts the assumption that they should assimilate much faster than other migrants. Furthermore, the report emphasized, they represented the most sought after professions at the time. However, the report also stressed that the AMS lacked experience in dealing with this specific group of refugees. They thus had to follow the same reception procedure as labour migrants and were given the same kind of jobs. Consequently, the highly educated refugees were placed in jobs that were “poorly or not at all consistent” with their professional backgrounds. The KIF thus, in this particular case, opposed equal treatment of all newcomers. The report stated that these highly educated refugees “may have something more to offer” to Swedish society provided they were allowed to utilize their qualifications rather than ending up forced to acquire skills considered highly needed on the labour market at that time. This training would lead to the eradication of the values that they had brought to Sweden, i.e. knowledge and experience in their professional fields, the KIF stated. This situation was particularly harsh for elderly refugees who, as the report stressed, had little or no chances of finding a job after being retrained in new occupations. The KIF also objected to the separation of families, especially when children were granted a place at intensive language training and parents were not allowed to accompany them. This could lead to a life in isolation and loneliness, the document concluded.692

Finally, the particular challenges faced by the Czechoslovak and the Polish-Jewish refugee intellectuals were listed. The first problem was the limited number of contacts with Swedish institutions and society outside of the reception programme. An exception highlighted by the KIF, was the reception centre in Marstrand, presented earlier in this chapter. The report also highlighted two initiatives by external institutions to meet the refugees already in the centres, one from the Jewish Communities and one from the Swedish Medical Association (Sveriges läkarförbund). The latter aimed to inform refugees with medical training about educational and work opportunities. The KIF proposed to increase the number of contacts with external governmental and non-governmental institutions, such as workers and trade union organizations, migrants’ associations, and political and social institutions, and to include these meetings in the curricula of the language and introductory classes.

One of the institutions proposed was the East European Social Committee (Östeuropeiska Socialkommitten), a left-wing organization that had attempted to establish contacts with the refugees from Poland and Czechoslovakia. The official goal of the committee was to facilitate the refugees' contacts with Swedish institutions and to help with practical matters, such as residence permits, education, and social support. The representatives of the Committee strived to visit the newly arrived refugees in the reception centres. However, they were not always welcomed by the residents. For example, the residents of the Mölle reception centre refused to meet the representatives of the Committee when they wanted to visit the centre.693

To return to the KIF report, the second problem identified concerned the difficulties with the employment of Czechoslovak and Polish-Jewish refugees. This was related both to serious doubts regarding the refugees' specializations and a lack of flexibility in matching job offers to refugees' qualifications. In addition, the refugees' poor Swedish language skills were mentioned by the Committee. This diagnosis of the situation led the KIF to propose three possible solutions.

First, it proposed to increase the number of archival jobs for refugee intellectuals. This employment, as already mentioned, had been available to highly educated refugees since the end of World War II. In 1956, for example, it was offered to a number of Hungarian refugee intellectuals.694 Apparently, this opportunity had also been mentioned as one of the options by the Swedish Embassy in Warsaw to applicants for Swedish visas.695 The KIF proposed that each state authority, university, or department should turn to the AMS with a request to employ archive workers and even suggest the proper candidates. The scope of the work could vary according to the need. It could include organizing documents, administration, and information, but also research and teaching. The idea was that the AMS should cover the costs and the SIV should inform archive workers about the job offers provided within the state sector. The KIF, however, also mentioned one possible down-side with this arrangement, namely a risk that the refugee intellectuals would be assigned to tasks below their skills and that they would not be promoted to higher positions.

The second idea was to take advantage of the refugees' specializations and engage them as consultants within various state sectors. This could benefit both parties as the refugees would make good use of their knowledge and employers would not need to employ them permanently, the document

694 See: Wigerfelt, Ungrare i folkhemmet, 198; Byström, Utmaningen, 273; For more information about the archival work see: Bob Engelbertsson, Arkivarbetare vid Uppsala universitet 1934-1980. En studie av en arbetskraftsresurs ur ett systemperspektiv (Uppsala: Centrum för handikappforskning, 1997).
695 Dina Weintraub, report, 09 Aug. 1971, F 19:8, Huvudarkivet, JFA, RA.
stated. Finally, the report referred to the possibility of supplementary training offered by the AMS. In this case, the KIF argued, the AMS and the SIV should initiate a pilot institution to engage refugees as archivists, consultants, and trainees, and to monitor the progress of their careers. Aside from these proposals, the KIF suggested to reestablish the “Sweden at Home” model. This model originated from the 1920s and aimed at hosting tourists in private families. How the Swedish state reacted to these proposals and tried to address the problems is the topic of the next part of this chapter.

At the beginning of 1971, the problems associated with the reception of the Czechoslovak and the Polish-Jewish refugees became the topic of discussion also in the Swedish parliament. On 15 January 1971, two Social Democratic members of Parliament, Ingvar Svanberg and Kaj Björk, submitted a motion to parliament, numbered 110, in which they stressed the difficulties with the reception of highly educated refugees and argued for new ways of taking care of them. The major challenge, according to the MPs, was to provide employment corresponding to the refugees’ special qualifications. It would be a waste of valuable resources if Sweden did not make use of the capacities possessed by these refugees, they argued. They proposed to map the refugees’ capacities in order to assign the refugees to tasks that would give them personal satisfaction and would be of particular value to Swedish society.\(^{696}\)

Five days later, the representatives of the Liberal People’s Party proposed two motions concerning the situation of refugee intellectuals. The first, number 134, referred to the problem of validation of foreign academic diplomas and to the placement of highly educated refugees in archival work, which, according to those who presented the motions, had been developed for much less qualified workers. This motion argued that these refugees should be appointed to research positions within academia. It also referred to the proposals presented by the KIF.\(^{697}\) The second motion, number 159, opted to include the refugee intellectuals in the debate concerning these matters.\(^{698}\)

These motions led the Parliamentary Interior Committee (Riksdagens Inrikesutskott) to submit a request to the AMS for an evaluation.\(^{699}\) In mid-April 1971, Bertil Olssen, Director-General of the AMS, and Gösta Broborg presented an official response to the committee’s request. The report addressed the concerns raised in the motions and presented the AMS’s solutions to this challenge. The document begins with a general background, outlining the scope of the problem. In the last 4–5 years, the document


\(^{698}\) Motion nr 159 år 1971, 20 Jan. 1971.

\(^{699}\) Gunnar Grenfors to the AMS, 18 Feb. 1971, E II e:62, Utlänningssektionen 1948-1972, AA.
stated, a radical and dramatic shift in the composition of the migrant/refugee population coming to Sweden had occurred, a shift from manual labour, i.e. labour migrants, to highly educated refugees. According to Olssen and Broborg, out of 6,300 refugees who had come to Sweden between 1968 and 1970, 54 percent were academics or intellectuals and almost all of them (90 percent) were from Czechoslovakia and Poland. A study of these two groups, the report continued, had confirmed that the proportion of intellectuals among the Polish Jews was higher (95%) than among the Czechoslovaks (75%).

However, Olssen and Broborg employed a rather broad definition of highly educated refugees. This group, as mentioned later in the report, included occupations such as doctors, dentists, technicians, economists, lawyers, physicists, artists, journalists, clerks, civil servants, agronomists, foresters, and pharmacists.

The introduction was followed by an analysis of four major difficulties regarding refugees’ placement in work: language deficiencies, the high number of elderly refugees, the differences between foreign and Swedish exams/degrees, i.e. the problem regarding validation and recognition, and finally the refugees’ lack of interest in manual jobs. Regarding language deficiencies, Olssen and Broborg agreed that the problem was that the compulsory education in Swedish was too basic: the refugees simply did not learn enough during the short time allocated for the course. Olssen and Broborg therefore suggested extending the intensive language training for refugees who needed this education in order to be able to accept and deal with qualified jobs and for students whose education had been discontinued. The latter were to be eligible for studies in the same way as Swedish students, including the possibility to obtain financial support from Centrala studiestödsnämnden, CSN, but their number was to be restricted by a quota.

Regarding the second concern, the AMS officials stated that among the occupations represented by highly educated refugees, such as those mentioned above, there were a significant number of intellectuals who were elderly and therefore difficult to employ. For these elderly intellectuals who were not assigned to any jobs, special accommodation was organized by the Social Welfare Board. According to Olssen and Broborg, there were 235 apartments provided for these refugees in the years 1968–1970.

The third problem was the difference in educational attainment. This was particularly evident in the case of medical personnel. The document reports that some 200 doctors arrived in Sweden from Czechoslovakia and Poland in the years 1968–1970. They went through the intensive language training but, in spite of that, 10 percent were not allowed to continue to practice medicine since they did not meet the professional standards demanded in Sweden.

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The final challenge emphasized in the document was the lack of interest in retraining to other professions, primarily manual ones. Olssen and Broborg assumed that this phenomenon might be explained by the fact “that it had not been uncommon in their home countries that people with intellectual professions or academic education are forced for political reasons to accept totally unskilled manual jobs. The motive for their flight may have been a desire to work in the profession in which they have been trained.” Nonetheless, the officers viewed retraining as a way to achieve a better position for the refugees in the new country.

Thus, the focus of the report was placed on the allegedly most striking characteristics of the refugees, leaving aside the deficiencies of the Swedish reception system, such as the excessive requirement imposed on professionals by the Swedish labour market, mentioned in the KIF report. The last part of the report was dedicated to the placement of refugee intellectuals in work in the archives. Olssen and Broborg reported that the number of refugees working as archivists had increased from 287 in February 1970 to 640 one year later. The AMS agreed with the KIF that “it will be necessary to follow up those who are placed in archival work, both Swedes and foreigners, and that further efforts should be made for their placement in the open [labour] market”. Eventually, they proposed to allocate 25 new administrative positions to deal with the placement of archive workers to both the private and public sectors, starting from 1 July 1971.

After this report, the parliamentary interior committee began to examine motions 110 and 159. In November 1971, it published its final statement rejecting any actions directed to particular groups of refugees. It stated that the privileged treatment of refugee intellectuals threatened to create heavy demands from other groups, for example newly qualified academics. The committee also opposed mapping refugees’ capacities, since this, according to the statement, would be an additional burden on the AMS budget. Regarding the future of the archival workers, the committee agreed that “actions are taken that archival work, to a greater extent than has been the case, becomes a gateway to the appropriate employment in a regular form.” However, the committee did not present any plan for how this

702 “[…] det vara nödvändigt att följa upp de fall som placerats i arkivarbete, såväl svenskar som utlänningar, och att ytterligare ansträngningar bör göras för deras placering i öppna marknaden.” Olsson and Broborg to the Parliamentary Interior Committee, 14 Apr. 1972. E II e:62, Utlänningssektionen 1948-1972, AA.
703 “[…] åtgärder vidtas för att arkivarbetet i högre grad än hittills varit fallet blir en sluss till adekvata anställningar i reguljära former.” Inrikesutskottets betänkande nr 29 år 1971, 2 Nov. 1971.
should be done, nor did it suggest any further steps or actions. In the end, the AMS proposal to increase the efforts on behalf of refugee intellectuals, especially those aimed at improving their placement in adequate jobs, was rejected by the parliamentary interior committee. Similarly, the committee rejected the motions submitted to the Swedish parliament on the grounds that they would result in the positive special treatment of one group of refugees and would thus violate the principle of equal treatment. The financial burden imposed by such services also played an important role in the government’s response.\textsuperscript{704} Apparently, as a letter sent from the KIF to the AMS in June 1971 indicates, the actual number of archive workers declined.\textsuperscript{705}

**Conclusion**

While in the previous chapter national security considerations and international relations, not least Cold War considerations, were shown to be very powerful determinants of Sweden’s reactions to the events in Czechoslovakia and Poland and to the Czechoslovak and Polish-Jewish refugees, this chapter concludes that the reception of these refugees was determined by such factors as bureaucratic choices and labour market considerations. This is because of the prior allocation of the responsibility for refugees to the AMS, a government state agency also responsible for externally recruiting labour. The AMS approach towards refugees was, like in previous decades, dictated primarily by economic imperatives; that is, to place refugees in jobs. This praxis, as Lars Olsson has shown, was already established at the end of World War II.

What was new, however, was the extraordinarily high numbers of highly educated refugees, something that challenged the established policy. In other words, due to the high percentage of highly educated refugees, also described as refugee intellectuals, who opposed being assigned manual jobs in Swedish industry, and instead insisted on employment in their respective professions, the reception centres experienced unexpected difficulties with placing these refugees in jobs. These problems originated from the expectations induced by the labour market orientation of the reception programme and the lack of willingness to adjust the reception procedures to this new group of refugees.

The problems with finding suitable employment for the refugee intellectuals were further aggravated by the fact that many of these professions required fluency in Swedish, something the refugees, after finishing basic Swedish language training, did not possess at all. In addition, the number of intensive language classes, that could potentially have solved

\textsuperscript{704} Inrikesutskottets betänkande nr 29 år 1971, 2 Nov. 1971.

\textsuperscript{705} The KIF to the AMS, 16 Jun. 1971, E VII ba:21, Utlänningssektionen 1948-1972, AA.
the problem, was limited. In fact, the difficulty with the placement was also
caused by the large number of students whose studies had been discontinued
and who also needed to take the intensive language training to master the
Swedish language in order to be able to continue their studies, and by the
group of elderly refugees, for whom finding employment had proven difficult.
It is important to stress that these problems primarily concerned the Polish-
Jewish refugees. However, the Czechoslovak refugee intellectuals were also
mentioned in the AMS report.

Thus, one conclusion is that the Swedish reception system was not
prepared for such a group. When the AMS was asked to evaluate the
problem, it stated that an unprecedented structural change in the history of
immigration to Sweden had taken place, a shift from labour migrants looking
for manual jobs to a high number of highly educated refugees. Thus, the
administration of the reception centres was not prepared to deal with the
work placement of such a large number of refugee intellectuals. Apparently,
the experience gained from the placement of refugee intellectuals in archival
work during World War II was not sufficient to deal with this issue. There
were only a few facilities that offered intensive language classes which could
ease this problem. Still, however, the available places in Marstrand, Uppsala,
or Växjö were limited and refugees had to wait for several months to begin
their education.

Thus, not enough was done to reduce the problem. In particular, no
interest was shown in improving the placement of highly educated refugees
in adequate jobs or in increasing the number of archival jobs available for
elderly refugees by the parliamentary interior committee. The committee
was reluctant to agree to a specific proposal for improving the situation of
refugee intellectuals submitted by the KIF, as well as to the AMS proposal to
increase its efforts on behalf of these refugees. In fact, neither the initiatives
from society at large, nor the concerns raised by members of the Swedish
parliament and officials at the reception centres and at AMS, affected the
government’s refugee policies. The Swedish state possibly opposed changes
in the reception programme on behalf of these refugees since they were seen
through the lens of the labour market orientation of Swedish refugee policy.
The main objective was to place them in jobs as quickly as possible and
thereby render them productive.
PART IV. OUTCOMES
7. Occupational mobility

Thus far, this dissertation has demonstrated that Swedish refugee policies during the formative period of the late 1960s and early 1970s did not differ greatly from the policies pursued in earlier decades. National security considerations, Cold War considerations, and social receptiveness were identified as important reasons behind admitting Czechoslovak and Polish Jews into Sweden. It has also been shown that the Swedish government’s reception programme was chiefly motivated by pragmatic and economic interests. To this end, the study has examined the complex process leading to the admission of these refugee groups and the various ways they were assisted once in Sweden. This chapter focuses on the last part of the spectrum, that is, the economic integration of Czechoslovak and Polish Jews into Swedish society. In particular, the impact of migration on the refugees’ occupational mobility during the seven year period necessary for acquiring Swedish citizenship will be investigated. In this regard, unlike the previous chapters, this chapter does not aim to determine the range of factors that explains the economic integration of Czechoslovak and Polish Jews. Rather, it seeks to determine the results of this process over the period that includes the development of the new multiculturalist policy. In fact, the economic integration of foreigners did appear in the discussions regarding multiculturalism in the late 1960s and early 1970s. In particular, the equality concept, one of three cornerstones of the new multiculturalist policy, assumed that foreigners should have equal access to work. This was intended to result in equal socio-economic outcomes.706

The occupational attainment among Czechoslovak and Polish-Jewish refugees will be analyzed by studying each refugee’s mobility from their last occupation in their country of origin to their latest occupation achieved by the time they applied for Swedish citizenship, that is, the seven year period after their migration. In investigating this issue, this chapter takes an approach that differs from previous chapters. While the other chapters were based either upon relevant editorials and other articles depicting events in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Sweden or correspondence, reports, and protocols from various institutions involved in the complicated process that eventually resulted in Czechoslovak and Polish-Jewish refugees coming to Sweden, this chapter explores interview surveys and the refugees’ citizenship applications.

The examination of the occupational mobility of Czechoslovak and Polish-Jewish refugees is presented as descriptive statistics with the help of graphs.

and tables.\textsuperscript{707} It begins with a detailed presentation of the data collection and the classification of occupations identified in this study. This is necessary in order to understand how occupational mobility was measured. The second part presents the characteristics of the Czechoslovak and Polish-Jewish refugees obtained from this analysis. The third part concerns the results and how they should be interpreted.

**Data collection and the process of analysis**

As discussed earlier, this study employs two different set of sources to determine the last occupations held by Czechoslovak and Polish Jews prior to their migration to Sweden (To). For the Czechoslovaks, the data comes from interview surveys undertaken by the Swedish delegation during the selections in Austria between 1968 and 1971. In total 693 Czechoslovak refugees arrived to Sweden in this way. Complete information about the pre-migration work experience was found for about 500 of them. For the Polish Jews, the data is derived from interviews with about 400 Polish Jews carried out by curators of the MFST in late 1969 and early 1970.

There are some concerns regarding these samples. The Czechoslovak group represents some 16 percent of the entire refugee group: the vast majority of the Czechoslovak refugees migrated to Sweden individually during the two-month period from September to November 1968. However, these are the only documents found in the archives that provide complete information about the education and employment situation of the Czechoslovak refugees prior to their migration. In the Polish-Jewish case, the representativeness of the sample is slightly lower, 13 percent. One possible reason for this is that the interviews were carried out mainly in the Stockholm area. However, once again, these are the only sources available in the Swedish archives that document the pre-migration work history of the Polish Jews that ended up in Sweden.

When determining the subsequent occupational mobility, the study relies on the refugees’ applications for citizenship submitted seven years after their migration to Sweden. In these documents, the applicants provide information regarding housing, education, and employment history since their arrival in Sweden. All the information is listed chronologically and includes categories such as full and part-time employment, vocational

practice, language training, university courses, child care, and housework. The education and employment records are often supported by school and work certificates. The fact that the information used here had to be substantiated by employers, government agencies, and educational establishments makes it unlikely that the refugees tried to inflate their achievements. Furthermore, one has to assume that the information provided in the applications was verified by SIV officers.

When applying for Swedish citizenship, the refugee’s work history was organized as follows: the first occupation after arrival in Sweden (T1), the second occupation (T2), the third occupation (T3), and finally the latest occupation (Tx). If information regarding all of these steps was not available, the focus has been placed on the latest/last information.

Before presenting the findings and analyzing the results, there is one final concern regarding the samples that needs to be discussed, namely the loss of data. The applications for citizenships from refugees who arrived in the late 1960s are the oldest documents held in the archive of the Migration Board and, despite heroic efforts by the archivists, it has not been possible to find many of these documents. Some possible explanations for these gaps are that the refugees left Sweden for other destinations, changed their names, or passed away before applying for citizenship. Regardless of which, a complete documentation was found for 245 Polish Jews and 306 Czechoslovaks aged 15 to 75 at the time of their migration.

These samples represent respectively 8 and 10 percent of the refugee groups and are significant in their own right. However, the question arises whether the loss of data has had an impact on the results. Did the composition of the refugees arriving in the late 1960s differ from the composition of those arriving later? The sources do not permit an answer to this question. Therefore, it is important to stress that this study only makes claims for the examined group of refugees, not for the entire refugee population. Nonetheless, this study can serve as a baseline for future studies on occupational mobility of these and other refugee groups in Swedish society.

The information on occupations was coded according to the Swedish socio-economic classification system (Socioekonomisk indelning, SEI). This classification estimates socio-economic positions according to employment status. It consists of eighteen basic categories of the economically active population (A) merged into six major groups: unskilled and semiskilled workers (A1), skilled workers (A2), assistant non-manual employees (A3), intermediate non-manual employees (A4), employed and self-employed professionals, higher civil servants and executives (A5), and self-employed (other than professionals) (A6). The economically inactive population (NA) is broken down into 6 categories: students (NA1), housewives (or male equivalents) (NA2), pensioners (NA3), people affected by sickness and/or
disability (NA4), long-term unemployed (NA5), and military conscripts (NA6).\footnote{Socioekonomisk indelning, vol. 1982, Meddelanden i samordningsfrågor 04 (Stockholm: SCB, 1983), 6–8.}

**Characteristics of the samples**

In order to evaluate the impact of migration on immigrants’ careers, it is necessary to present some demographic characteristics of the Czechoslovak and Polish-Jewish refugees at the time of their arrival in Sweden. The variables used to present these two groups are gender, age at migration, and work experience before arrival. Table 6 reveals two major differences between the groups. The first concerns age at the time of migration, the second employment experience. The Czechoslovakian group was younger (75% aged 18-35 years) compared to the Polish-Jewish counterparts (38% aged 18-35 years and 42% aged 36-55 years). Turning to employment experience, more than 90% of the Czechoslovaks had worked before migrating to Sweden. In contrast, only two-thirds of the Polish Jews had work experience from their native country. This difference, as will be discussed below, is a result of the extraordinarily high number of students in the Polish-Jewish group.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristics</th>
<th>Czechoslovaks</th>
<th>Polish Jews</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Men</td>
<td>Women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex</td>
<td>67,5</td>
<td>32,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age at migration</td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>27,7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Standard deviation</td>
<td>8,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The year of migration</td>
<td>1968</td>
<td>24,2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1969</td>
<td>63,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>10,1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1971</td>
<td>2,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The economically active population</td>
<td>91,7</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The economically non-active population</td>
<td>8,2</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number (n)</td>
<td>206</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Transport lists, E VII bb: 8-12, Utlänningssektionen 1948-1972, AA; Interviews, D 4 e:3, Flyktingsektionen, JFA, RA.

In the Czechoslovak case men dominated the sample. Indeed, the fact that more than two-thirds of the Czechoslovak refugees were males, a gender distribution that also characterized the composition of the labour migrants,
could have a marked effect on the reception and integration processes of this group. However, as mentioned in the introductory chapter, state agencies did not adopt a gender-specific framing and approach when referring to Czechoslovak and Polish-Jewish refugee matters. The Polish-Jewish group was more balanced and included more families with children.

Table 7 reveals a key difference in the employment structure of the two groups. Every third Czechoslovak (34%) belongs to the group of manual workers who worked in skilled or semi-skilled jobs (A2). These were mainly mechanics, electricians, turners, and toolmakers in the case of the men, and hairdressers and waitresses in the case of the women. The second group (21%) consisted of those who had previously worked in unskilled manual positions (A1), mainly in textile and automobile factories.

Table 7. Occupational distributions of the Czechoslovak and the Polish-Jewish refugees at the arrival

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristics</th>
<th>Czechoslovaks</th>
<th>Polish Jews</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Men</td>
<td>Women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEI for the economically active population</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A1</td>
<td>19.9</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A2</td>
<td>44.7</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A3</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A4</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A5</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEI for the economically non-active population</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NA1</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NA2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NA3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NA4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NA5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number (n)</td>
<td>206</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Sources: Transport lists, E VII bb: 8-12, Utlänningssektionen 1948-1972, AA; Interviews, D 4 e:3, Flyktningsektionen, JFA, RA.*

Note: The economically active populations (A) includes unskilled and semiskilled workers (A1), skilled workers (A2), assistant non-manual employees (A3), intermediate non-manual employees (A4), employed and self-employed professionals, higher civil servants and executives (A5). The economically inactive population (NA) includes students (NA1), housewives (or male equivalents) (NA2), pensioners (NA3), people affected by sickness and/or disability (NA4), long-term unemployed (NA5).

In the Polish-Jewish case, the dominant group (28%) was characterized as employed and self-employed professionals, higher civil servants, and executives (A5). These were mainly highly educated engineers, pharmacists,
medical doctors, and lawyers with many years of experience. In this particular group, the average age at migration was 45 years and the majority was male. Students (NA1) were the second largest group among the Polish Jews (26%). This group consisted of those who had newly graduated from universities as well as those who had not been able to complete their studies due to the anti-Semitic campaign. The majority was between 19 and 23 years old and had mainly studied technical or medical disciplines.

**The outcome of occupational mobility**

Given what has been said about the theoretical explanations for the U-shaped pattern of occupational mobility and international transferability of an individual’s skills, education, and experience, it seems evident that the Czechoslovak and Polish-Jewish group would represent two different trajectories of occupational adjustment. The Czechoslovak group that primarily consisted of young manual workers should suffer much less economic disruption from the act of migration than the group from Poland, consisting primarily of professionals and students whose skills have little international transferability. Yet, this group should have a significant increase in their status with the duration of time.

Figure 5 shows how the occupational mobility for economically active (A) Czechoslovak and Polish-Jewish refugees changed over time. The major observation is that a decline in occupational status caused by the act of migration (from T0 to T1) was greater for Polish-Jewish refugees than for Czechoslovaks. Once established in Sweden, their occupational status improved (from T1 to Tx). These trajectories are consistent with the evidence found by Chiswick and others regarding economic disadvantages after the physical act of moving, followed by a gradual improvement, resulting in a U-shaped trajectory of occupational adjustment.709 This can be further analyzed when looking at changes in distributions of occupational categories among the Czechoslovak and the Polish-Jewish refugees since the arrival to Sweden.

709 Chiswick, Lee, and Miller, 'A Longitudinal Analysis of Immigrant Occupational Mobility', 332–53.
Figure 5. Occupational mobility of economically active Czechoslovak and Polish-Jewish refugees over time.

*Sources:* Transport lists, E VII bb: 8-12, Utlänningssektionen 1948-1972, AA; Interviews, D 4 e:3, Flyktningsektionen, JFA, RA; Personal files, Medborgarskapsbyrån, MA.

*Note:* The figure shows changes in occupational mobility of economically active Czechoslovak and Polish-Jewish refugees from last occupation before arrival to Sweden (T0), to the first occupation after arrival in Sweden (T1), the second occupation (T2), the third occupation (T3), and the latest occupation (Tx).

Figure 6 presents the percentage change from pre-immigration (T0) to post-immigration occupations (T1-Tx). It shows that the greatest decline in occupational status immediately after the arrival (T1) was experienced by professional employees (A5). Some 92 percent of the Czechoslovak and 75 percent of the Polish-Jewish professionals experienced a decrease in occupational status. As noted earlier, this downward mobility occurred because professionals are those who either require country-specific certifications or are valued only by one type of employer. In their case, obtaining licenses and other credentials takes longer than for other professions. This process was somewhat more pronounced for Polish-Jewish professionals.

The number of those who ended up in the lowest ranked occupational category (A1) after their arrival to Sweden increased. Furthermore, the number of students significantly increased. Obviously, this was due to a number of refugees from higher categories joining the Swedish language training.
Figure 6. Changes in occupational distribution among the Czechoslovak and the Polish-Jewish refugees since the arrival to Sweden.

Sources: Transport lists, E VII bb: 8-12, Utlänningssektionen 1948-1972, AA; Interviews, D 4 e:3, Flyktingsektionen, JFA, RA; Personal files, Medborgarskapsbyrån, MA.

Note: The figure shows changes in occupational mobility of economically active Czechoslovak and Polish-Jewish refugees from last occupation before arrival to Sweden (T0), to the first occupation after arrival in Sweden (T1), the second occupation (T2), the third occupation (T3), and the latest occupation (Tx).
This growth was most evident among professionals (A5) and intermediate employees (A4) who took advantage of opportunities for acquiring Swedish-language skills and occupational licenses. In the Polish case, more than half of the immigrants ended up outside the labour market after migration. This prompts a question about the origins of this development.

Perhaps a better way to understand the complexity of the occupational mobility of immigrants is to examine how pre-immigration occupations and post-immigration occupations relate to one another. The following presents the shift from the last pre-immigration (T0) to the first post-immigration occupation (T1). Table 8 reveals, for example, that among Czechoslovak unskilled workers, 58% remained in their pre-immigration occupation group. For Czechoslovak professionals, 3% remained professionals and 46% experienced a decrease, of which some 20% ended up in the lowest occupational category. The most common occupations were restaurant work or nursing assistance. Among Polish-Jewish professionals, 22% remained in their major occupation group and 40% experienced a decrease in occupational status, of which 10% reported employment belonging to the lowest category, often in industries and cleaning (Table 9). One important aspect to note here is that these could be both full and part-time jobs: the refugees often listed all jobs held since their arrival in Sweden and onwards without distinguishing between different forms of employment. The scholarly literature has not considered the question of how these forms of employment relate to one another in the context of the U-shaped pattern of migrants’ occupational mobility. A hypothesis worth testing is that migrants would, at least initially, experience a shift from full-time to part-time jobs, but over time would end up in full-time positions. Another assumption worth testing is that women more often than men ended up in part-time jobs.

Furthermore, some 36% of the Polish professionals reported education, primarily the intensive Swedish-language training. These were mainly engineers, pharmacists, and medical doctors who had transferable skills and could easily continue working in their original occupations as soon as they had learned to master the new language. Not all professional, however, had this opportunity. For example, a group of lawyers and diplomats whose skills were less transferable across national borders experienced a loss in occupational status. Regarding the subsequent occupations, previous studies have found that the initial decline in status is followed by an increase over time, resulting in a U-shaped pattern.
Table 8. The occupational change from the last pre-immigration (T0) to the first post-immigration occupation (T1) for the Czechoslovak refugees

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pre-Immigration Occupation</th>
<th>Post-Immigration Occupation</th>
<th>A1</th>
<th>A2</th>
<th>A3</th>
<th>A4</th>
<th>A5</th>
<th>A6</th>
<th>NA1</th>
<th>NA2</th>
<th>Distribution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>A1</td>
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<td>11,3</td>
<td>3,2</td>
<td>20,9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>52</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9,8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>33,7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A3</td>
<td>53,1</td>
<td>9,4</td>
<td>12,5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>18,8</td>
<td>6,3</td>
<td>10,5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A4</td>
<td>26,5</td>
<td>10,2</td>
<td>8,2</td>
<td>8,2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>42,9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>16,3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>10,7</td>
<td>10,7</td>
<td>7,1</td>
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<td>9,2</td>
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<tr>
<td>NA2</td>
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<td>12,5</td>
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<td>2,6</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distribution</td>
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<td>3,6</td>
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<td>0,7</td>
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<td>24,8</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Transport lists, E VII bb: 8-12, Utlänningssektionen 1948-1972, AA; Interviews, D 4 e:3, Flyktningsektionen, JFA, RA; Personal files, Medborgarskapsbyrån, MA.

Note: The following categories are includes in the table: unskilled and semiskilled workers (A1), skilled workers (A2), assistant non-manual employees (A3), intermediate non-manual employees (A4), employed and self-employed professionals, higher civil servants and executives (A5), students (NA1), and housewives (or male equivalents) (NA2).

Table 9. Occupational change from the last pre-immigration (T0) to the first post-immigration occupation (T1) for the Polish-Jewish refugees

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pre-Immigration Occupation</th>
<th>Post-Immigration Occupation</th>
<th>A1</th>
<th>A2</th>
<th>A3</th>
<th>A4</th>
<th>A5</th>
<th>NA1</th>
<th>NA2</th>
<th>NA3</th>
<th>NA4</th>
<th>Distribution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>20</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7,8</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td>46,7</td>
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<td>3,3</td>
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<td>6,7</td>
<td>11,8</td>
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<td>22,2</td>
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<td>5,6</td>
<td>5,6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7,1</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td>9,1</td>
<td>22,7</td>
<td>36,4</td>
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<td>1,5</td>
<td>27,8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>26,3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NA2</td>
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<td>50</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>1,6</td>
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</tr>
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<td>46,2</td>
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</table>

Sources: Transport lists, E VII bb: 8-12, Utlänningssektionen 1948-1972, AA; Interviews, D 4 e:3, Flyktningsektionen, JFA, RA; Personal files, Medborgarskapsbyrån, MA.

Note: The following categories are includes in the table: unskilled and semiskilled workers (A1), skilled workers (A2), assistant non-manual employees (A3), intermediate non-manual employees (A4), employed and self-employed professionals, higher civil servants and executives (A5), students (NA1), housewives (or male equivalents) (NA2), pensioners (NA3), people affected by sickness and/or disability (NA4), and long-term unemployed (NA5).
The next two tables present the relation between the last pre-immigration occupation (To) and the latest post-immigration occupation at the time when the refugees applied for Swedish citizenship (Tx). The overall picture must be said to be far from satisfactory: only about a half of the refugees who became Swedish citizens reported jobs corresponding to their pre-immigration occupations. Some 64% of the Czechoslovak professionals had experienced a decrease in occupational status (Table 10).

As for the Polish-Jewish group, the employment category that had become most common was the one of assistant employees (A3) (Table 11). This was the outcome of assigning a number of professionals to archival work. Those ending up in archives or doing archival tasks at different university departments were the ones whose skills had little or no international transferability, primarily lawyers, diplomats, and generals, who, often due to their age, had little chance of retraining to other professions. In the end, 15% of the Polish-Jewish professionals were placed in archive work at various institutions. It is unlikely that this group reached better occupational positions after the period observed in this study.

Table 10. Occupational change from the last pre-immigration (To) to the latest post-immigration occupation (Tx) for the Czechoslovak refugees

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pre-Immigration Occupation</th>
<th>A1</th>
<th>A2</th>
<th>A3</th>
<th>A4</th>
<th>A5</th>
<th>NA1</th>
<th>NA2</th>
<th>NA3</th>
<th>NA5</th>
<th>Distribution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>22.6</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>20.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A2</td>
<td>31.4</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>33.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A3</td>
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<td>49.6</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A4</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>49</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A5</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>32.1</td>
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<td>3.6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9.2</td>
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<tr>
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<td>0</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NA2</td>
<td>62.5</td>
<td>12.5</td>
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<td>12.5</td>
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<td>12.5</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distribution</td>
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<td>26.2</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>3</td>
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<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Transport lists, E VII bb: 8-12, Utlänningssektionen 1948-1972, AA; Interviews, D 4 e:3, Flyktingsektionen, JFA, RA; Personal files, Medborgarskapsbyrån, MA.

Note: The following categories are includes in the table: unskilled and semiskilled workers (A1), skilled workers (A2), assistant non-manual employees (A3), intermediate non-manual employees (A4), employed and self-employed professionals, higher civil servants and executives (A5), students (NA1), housewives (or male equivalents) (NA2).
Table 11. Occupational change from the last pre-immigration (T0) to the latest post-immigration occupation (Tx) for the Polish-Jewish refugees

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pre-Immigration Occupation</th>
<th>A1</th>
<th>A2</th>
<th>A3</th>
<th>A4</th>
<th>A5</th>
<th>A6</th>
<th>NA1</th>
<th>NA2</th>
<th>NA3</th>
<th>NA4</th>
<th>NA5</th>
<th>Distribution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
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<td>7.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>A2</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>43.3</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>67.6</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>13.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A4</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>44.4</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>7.1</td>
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<td>15.2</td>
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Sources: Transport lists, E VII bb: 8-12, Utlänningssektionen 1948-1972, AA; Interviews, D 4 e:3, Flyktingsektionen, JFA, RA; Personal files, Medborgarskapsbyrån, MA.

Note: The following categories are included in the table: unskilled and semiskilled workers (A1), skilled workers (A2), assistant non-manual employees (A3), intermediate non-manual employees (A4), employed and self-employed professionals, higher civil servants and executives (A5), students (NA1), housewives (or male equivalents) (NA2), pensioners (NA3), people affected by sickness and/or disability (NA4), and long-term unemployed (NA5).

Conclusion
Overall, the descriptive results presented in this study are consistent with the findings of other scholars regarding the occupational mobility of migrants after their arrival in the host country: that is, the occupational status decreases upon arrival followed by a subsequent increase in accordance with the duration of residence. However, due to significant socio-demographic differences between Czechoslovak and Polish-Jewish refugees, their occupational trajectories differed from one another. The Czechoslovak group, consisting primarily of young and experienced males, was similar to that of economic migrants. They experienced the decrease in occupational status upon arrival followed by a subsequent increase in parallel with the duration of residence. The Polish-Jewish group consisted of many highly educated individuals, students whose education had been disrupted, and elderly people. Thus, there was less manual employment experience among Polish Jews and they experienced greater decreases in occupational status.
When looking at the distribution of occupational categories over time among the Czechoslovaks and Polish Jews, this dissertation agrees with previous studies that the greatest decrease in occupational status was experienced by professionals with the lowest international transferability of skills. In fact, many of the Polish-Jewish refugees, especially those working in archives, remained in the lower occupational category when they applied for Swedish citizenship. Thus, this study also argues that the initial decline in occupational status as compared to the one held in the country of origin does not always indicate a subsequent increase in occupational status. It can be true for immigrants with easily transferable skills, but for the group of lawyers, diplomats and generals, the possibilities for adjusting to the labour market were rather limited.

Equal access to work for foreigners was one of the foundations of the Swedish-equality discourse in the 1970s. The ideal scenario would be that these foreigners should have access to jobs corresponding to their previous experiences and occupations. The examination in this chapter concludes that regardless of the multiculturalist turn in Sweden, the economic adjustment and integration of foreigners depended on the degree of international transferability of an individual’s skills, education, and experience.
8. Conclusion

The major aim of this study is to examine the Swedish government’s responses to the Czechoslovak and Polish-Jewish refugees during the formative period of the late 1960s and early 1970s. This has been achieved by focusing on the entire process from the decision to admit the refugees in 1968, to their reception and economic integration into Swedish society during the seven year period necessary for acquiring Swedish citizenship. In particular, three major aspects of the process have been examined: Sweden’s reactions to events in Czechoslovakia and Poland and to Czechoslovak and Polish-Jewish refugees, Sweden’s management of these refugees and, finally, outcomes of their economic integration. These aspects were analyzed with the help of factors identified by Karen Jacobsen as critical in the host government responses to refugee matters, namely bureaucratic choices, international relations, local absorption capacity, especially the community’s response and domestic political considerations, and, finally, national security considerations. In addition, the influence of Cold War considerations was included in the study. These factors were used to determine Sweden’s responses both to the events causing the exodus and to the refugees. Furthermore, discourses in Swedish newspapers relating to these matters were studied. These discourses were expected both to mirror and to have guided the responses to the refugees. Finally, since the two groups arrived simultaneously, a comparison of the differences and similarities in the treatment of these two groups was done throughout the study.

In a wider context, this study aims to shed some light on the developments in Swedish refugee, immigration, and immigrant policies in the late 1960s and early 1970s – the development of a more activist foreign policy, the shift from labor migration to refugee reception and, finally, the shift from a policy of integration to multiculturalism. In the following, a summary of the results and a discussion regarding the factors influencing Swedish government responses to the Czechoslovak and Polish-Jewish refugees will be provided. This part also discusses whether the arrival, reception, and integration of these refugees should be regarded as the starting point for the above mentioned new policies towards immigrants and minorities in Sweden, or if it rather should be seen as the finale of the policies that had started developing at the end of World War II.

In 1968, much of the world’s attention was drawn to the east side of the Iron Curtain in Europe, particularly to the Prague Spring and the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia. The former was a period of partial
decentralization of the economy and of democratization, known as the “socialism with a human face”. Sweden was well informed about this development. The Swedish government received numerous and detailed reports from the Swedish Embassy in Prague and the Swedish press informed the public about all developments in Czechoslovakia. The study of press commentaries reveals that the press across the political spectrum was very supportive of the changes in Prague and regarded Czechoslovakia as a model for other Communist states to follow and First Secretary Alexander Dubček as a winner.

Sweden’s official reaction to the Prague Spring was limited to a talk by Foreign Minister Torsten Nilsson at the congress of the Social Democratic Party on 12 June 1968. Although the speech expressed a clear support of the changes in Czechoslovakia, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs (UD) remained fairly cautious when it came to publicly expressing support for the new leadership in Czechoslovakia. In particular, no official criticism of Soviet pressures on Czechoslovakia or explicit support for the people of Czechoslovakia appeared in the speech. For several reasons, of which perhaps the most important was related to the credibility of the Swedish policy of nonalignment, the Swedish leadership did not raise any additional concerns over Soviet pressures on Czechoslovakia or explicit support for the people of Czechoslovakia appeared in the speech. For several reasons, of which perhaps the most important was related to the credibility of the Swedish policy of nonalignment, the Swedish leadership did not raise any additional concerns over Soviet pressures on Czechoslovakia during the visit of the Soviet Prime Minister Alexei Kosygin in mid-July 1968. Eventually, a general Swedish-Soviet communiqué emphasizing the non-interference in internal affairs and the respect for state sovereignty and territorial integrity was issued, which gave rise to domestic political contestation and opposition in the 1968 election campaign. Overall, Sweden’s response to the Prague Spring was largely determined by the credibility of the Swedish policy of nonalignment, reflecting the role of national security considerations and Cold War considerations.

On the night of 20–21 August, close to 200,000 Warsaw Pact troops crossed into Czechoslovakia and secured Soviet control of the country. The crushing of the Czechoslovak reform movement made a great impact on the West and resulted in harsh criticism of the invasion and support of the people of Czechoslovakia. However, after the initial outrage against the Soviet Union, the criticism decreased and many countries in the West reverted to a “business as usual” approach in their relations with the Soviet Union. This was also the case for Sweden. The Swedish government, like in the case of the Prague Spring, recurrently received updated and detailed information on the crisis from the Swedish Embassy in Prague and the Swedish newspapers dedicated much of their attention to the events in Czechoslovakia. At the center of this reporting was the mediation of the Czechoslovak crisis as a human tragedy in a very powerful and compassionate way. This framing, like the reporting of the Prague Spring, most likely played an important role in reinforcing and promoting a pro-
Czechoslovakian orientation in Swedish society, resulting, for example, in vast demonstrations for Czechoslovakia across the country in late August 1968.

The Swedish government’s response to the invasion began with a statement issued by the UD on the early morning of 21 August condemning the “violence and oppression”. The harsh tone against both the Warsaw Pact invasion and Communism was evident. At the level of domestic politics, all political factions condemned the Warsaw Pact intervention. Sweden’s criticism of the Soviet Union, as previous studies have shown, however quickly lost its initial sharpness. In fact, this study claims, that the Swedish-Soviet relations remained relatively unchanged during the entire period of crisis and regular discussions regarding the development of bilateral relations were held between Swedish and Soviet politicians and diplomats. The influence of Sweden’s Cold War considerations and national security considerations on the fading away of the initial criticism should not be underestimated.

The exodus of Czechoslovaks after the Warsaw Pact invasion in August 1968 is regarded as one of the major refugee migrations of the Cold-War period. It is estimated that between 100,000 and 130,000 Czechoslovaks fled their country in the period of 1968-1969. Overall, as victims of Soviet/Communist aggression they were met with a deep sympathy in the West and a number of countries opened their borders to them after the events in 1968. Sweden’s immediate reaction to admit all Czechoslovaks interested in migrating to Sweden in September 1968 came directly after the Swedish Government learned about several other international efforts to welcome those refugees. The decision from 5 September 1968 allowed all Czechoslovaks interested in migrating to Sweden to do so. This study lists several reasons why Sweden decided to employ such a generous refugee policy. Firstly, it would improve the image of Sweden, both domestically and abroad, an image that had to some extent been compromised as a consequence of the Swedish-Soviet rapprochement in July 1968. When Australia, Switzerland and Canada opened its borders Sweden could not afford not to do the same. Secondly, it was in keeping with a tradition of opening the borders to East European refugee migration. Furthermore, it was in line with the criticism against the intervention expressed two weeks earlier. Finally, it mirrored the sympathy with Czechoslovakia expressed both by the Swedish press and the Swedish public. The influence of variables such as international relations and social receptiveness, especially the community’s response, i.e., the Swedish understanding of the events in Czechoslovakia, thus seem to be evident.

Nonetheless, as time went by, the requirement for financial support of the refugees was raised and Swedish officials withdrew the original generous offer to admit everyone wanting to come, limiting the number of visas to
2,000. In November 1968, after the quota of 2,000 refugees had been filled, the free migration to Sweden for refugees from Czechoslovakia came to a quick halt. After that, the only alternative for those still interested in migrating to Sweden became the selection from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) refugee camps, primarily from the Traiskirchen camp in Austria. This change could be understood as an example of how Sweden’s response to the refugees was affected by economic capacity. In a way, this shift was also parallel to the change in the Swedish reaction to the intervention in Czechoslovakia.

With regard to the Sweden’s response to the Czechoslovak UNHCR refugees, a certain pattern can be observed. Overall, the institution responsible for the Swedish resettlement program was the Labour Market Board (AMS), a government agency responsible also for externally recruited labour. The AMS approach towards refugees, established already at the end of World War II, was dictated primarily by the economic imperative. The AMS officials did not really respond to requests to increase the refugee quota due to the Czechoslovak crisis and the negotiations did not begin until international pressure on Sweden became more apparent. Secondly, the Swedish officials engaged in discussions on the refugee quota only after being assured that industry and labour market conditions were stable and that there thus would not be problem with refugees’ placement to work. Finally, although the missions were organized to select Czechoslovak refugees wishing to migrate to Sweden, the actual missions were quickly adjusted to the changing situation in the UNHCR refugee camps to accept other refugees interested in migrating to Sweden, primarily from Hungary. This, once again, points to the important role of international relations and economic capacity.

The reception of the Czechoslovak refugees, just like the reception of other previous refugee groups in Sweden, was dictated primarily by prior bureaucratic choices to allocate the responsibility for refugees to the AMS and economic capacity. The principle that mattered most to the Swedish authorities after the arrival of the refugees in Sweden was the successful job placement. The economic role that was expected of them was clear from the very beginning. This group, as presented in the last chapter of the dissertation, was younger (75 percent aged 18-35 years) compared to their Polish-Jewish counterparts (38 percent aged 18-35 years and 42 percent aged 36-55 years) and consisted of a large number of individuals, primarily male, who had worked before migrating to Sweden. Thus, this group was similar to that of the economic migrants. They experienced a decrease in occupational status upon arrival followed by a subsequent increase in parallel with the duration of residence, a pattern identified in previous research on the occupational mobility of migrants.
The events in Poland were of a different character than the ones in Czechoslovakia. The Polish anti-Semitic campaign, known as the “anti-Zionist” campaign, although caused by similar problems as in Czechoslovakia, i.e. demands for economic and political reforms, and also inspired by the Prague Spring, was a domestic crisis deeply embedded in an intra-party struggle, which targeted one particular group, namely people of Jewish origin, many of whom did not identify themselves as Jews at all but as Poles. The campaign emerged after a crack-down on a student protest on 8 March 1968. As an attempt to overcome the political crisis the Polish regime began to blame Jewish (and non-Jewish) intellectuals, independent-minded writers, scholars, and artists, labeled as “Zionists”, for provoking public demonstrations and destroying the country. The alleged “Zionists” were, as previous research points out, depicted as agents of American imperialism, alien elements, traitors, and saboteurs, as revisionists, and trouble makers. During the next months, the campaign permeated all levels of the communist party and affected all levels of Polish society.

However, “anti-Zionist” accusations, which often combined centuries-old anti-Semitism, conspiracy theories, and modern anti-Jewish charges, had been hurled already at the outset of the anti-Israeli campaign after the Six-Day War in June 1967. Following Moscow’s instruction to take the Arab side in this conflict and to condemn the State of Israel, the Polish government ended bilateral relations with Israel and began to accuse Israel for its allegedly pro-Western orientation. At the same time, the Polish Jews were accused of constituting a “Zionist fifth column” and a purge in the party leadership and the army began. In March 1968, the “anti-Zionist” propaganda was actively communicated to the public through daily newspapers, posters, brochures, and billboards. The “Zionists” were suspended from their studies or dismissed from their jobs, and were encouraged to leave Poland for Israel.

In comparison to the Czechoslovak case, the crisis in Poland gained less international attention. The criticism of the Polish government came primarily from the United States and Israel. The Swedish government was very well aware of the Polish anti-Jewish turn in 1967 and the development of the “anti-Zionist” campaign after the March 1968 events thanks to numerous detailed reports – everything from official Polish publications to analyses made by the ambassador himself and others – sent from the Swedish Embassy in Warsaw in general and in particular from Swedish Ambassador to Poland, Erik Kronvall, to the UD. However, the Swedish government did not show much interest in these reports.

The anti-Jewish measures taken by the Polish regime were also reported by the Swedish press, especially when the scope of the campaign increased. In late May 1968 an attempt to alert the Swedish and other Scandinavian governments to the situation of the Jews in Poland was made by the Jewish
Community of Stockholm, MFST. However, after realizing that no reactions to the discrimination against the Jewish population in Poland were planned in the other Scandinavian countries, the UD refrained from taking any action. At the same time, the persecution conducted by the Polish state became the object of protest by some Stockholm City Council members of the People’s Party. They objected to plans for a visit by the Council to Warsaw. The protest and an internal discussion in the Stockholm City Council that followed were immediately reported by the press. Eventually, after this press coverage, Foreign Minister Torsten Nilsson commented on the emergence of the anti-Semitic campaign in Poland. The comment was, just as his initial remarks on the developments’ in Czechoslovakia rather cautious: Nilsson expressed his concern over the campaign and his disappointment with the developments, but did not categorically condemn it.

Nilsson’s focus on his disappointment with the developments in Poland, might be regarded a way of stressing the importance of the bilateral relations that had evolved during the 1960s resulting in Poland becoming the second most important Swedish trading partner in the Eastern bloc. Thus, the influence of domestic political considerations and relations with the sending country was evident. Nilsson’s criticism, unequivocal but not harsh, was absolutely intolerable for the Polish communist regime and a visit of Polish Prime Minister Józef Cyrankiewicz, planned for late June 1968, was cancelled.

The issue of the Jewish emigration from Poland appeared almost from the start in the “anti-Zionist” campaign. The first comments suggesting emigration as a solution to the “fifth column” problem appeared already in mid-June 1967. Then, the issue of emigration returned after the March riots in various official statements. The necessary condition for those wanting to leave the country was to renounce their Polish citizenship and indicate Israel as the official destination, even if they had no intentions of going there. In late May 1968, the United States Department of State recognized Polish Jews as refugees and declared that the US was prepared to accommodate these refugees. The change of destination was possible in Vienna and Rome due to the efforts of two Jewish relief agencies: the Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society (HIAS) and the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee (JDC). In the end, as scholars indicate, only some 30 to 40 percent of close to 13,000 individuals who left Poland between 1968 and 1972 migrated to Israel, while the majority left for the United States, Canada, and West European countries.

Starting from July 1968 Kronvall informed the UD about Polish-Jewish visitors to the Swedish Embassy interested in migration to Sweden. This was the beginning of Kronvall’s four-month struggle for the acceptance of Polish Jews as refugees, during which he sent numerous letters to the UD and other state agencies regarding visas for Polish Jews, but did not receive any
response. In November 1968 in no uncertain terms he demanded information on the Swedish policy towards Polish-Jewish emigration to Sweden. Meanwhile, an appeal from a Norwegian journalist was sent not only to the Swedish but also to other Scandinavian governments. This appeal, due to its international scope, was hard for the Swedish government to ignore and, most likely as a consequence of the appeal, a decision to grant 30 visas for Polish Jews was made. After that, Kronvall continued his actions to increase this number, but his efforts only resulted in a very small increase of the quota. In spite of this lack of success it seems obvious that Kronvall did play a role in shaping Sweden’s response on behalf of the Polish-Jewish refugees. Kronvall was a veteran who had worked at the embassies in Warsaw and Berlin during the Nazi era and the Holocaust and again in Poland directly after the war. He thus had first-hand experience both of Polish and Nazi German anti-Semitic policies, something that might explain his perseverance in the late 1960s. Although he did not immediately get results, he most likely paved the way for the decisions to come.

The limited number of visas and the delays in processing the applications led the representatives of the MFST to take a more active role in Polish-Jewish refugee matters from early December 1968. They were by then already involved in helping individual Jews leave Poland but now stepped up their efforts and attempted through close and informal contacts with key actors in the government agencies to increase the quota. This was partially successful and they managed to convince the UD to grant additional entry rights for the Polish-Jewish refugees. However, it was the Ministry of the Interior (ID) that had the final say in the matter, and, as it turned out, the Minister of the Interior, Eric Holmqvist did not want to increase the quota.

Overall, this approach was in a sharp contrast to the policies towards Czechoslovak refugees. In June 1969, some 450 visas for Polish Jews had been granted since Kronvall began reporting on Polish Jews interested in migrating to Sweden one year earlier. An almost complete turnaround took place sometime in June 1969, after the Swedish government had learned about the Polish Politburo’s decision to put an end to the emigration from Poland after 1 September 1969 and about Denmark’s decision to grant visas to all Polish Jews interested in coming to Denmark. Soon after, the ID informed about an increase of the quota for Polish Jews by 500, resulting in a total of 950 visas. From that point on, the Swedish government agencies offered more visas than there was an actual demand for. In March 1971, the number of Polish Jews who had arrived after being granted visas by the Swedish Embassy in Warsaw reached 2,411. In addition, 148 Polish-Jewish refugees arrived in Sweden from the UNHCR refugee camps. Thus, the Danish decision to grant visas to all Polish Jews interested in coming to Denmark most definitely played an important role in the Swedish policy shift in July 1969. Sweden’s response to open its borders to the Polish Jews seems
to have been determined primarily by the threat of negative international publicity from not accepting these refugees (international relations). Possibly this decision also had to do with the framing of the events in Poland. It could be argued that when the developments in Poland started to be understood and represented analogously to the Holocaust, the role of the passive bystander no longer was an option. However, also in the case of the Polish Jews the economic capacity considerations seem to have mattered; arguments regarding the value and usefulness for Swedish society of individual Jews were routinely made and also seem to have yielded the desired result. With regards to the press coverage of the arrival of these refugees to Sweden, unlike in the Czechoslovak case, the Polish Jews received very little publicity in the Swedish press, something that was in line with the wish of the leaders of the MFST who did not want to jeopardize the Polish-Jewish emigration by antagonizing the Polish government.

The reception of the Polish-Jewish refugees, like the reception of the Czechoslovaks refugees, was dictated by such variables as bureaucratic choices and the economic capacity. The guiding principle of the policy employed towards refugees was, like in previous decades, to place them in jobs as quickly as possible. After the refugees’ arrival in Sweden, most aspects of the resettlement work were carried out at reception centres administrated by the AMS County Administrative Board. There were several permanent reception centres and numerous temporary places convenient for use when needed. The stay at these centres lasted from three to six months during which Swedish language training and information were provided. Eventually, the stay ended either with a placement in a job or some form of training in skills considered badly needed in the labour market at that time or in a departure to other refugee centres – primarily for students attending intensive language classes – or in the refugees being transferred to housing for elderly people offered by the Social Welfare Board.

However, this system was not prepared for the reception of highly educated intellectuals, especially not for people having professions that required fluency in Swedish, something the refugees, after finishing basic Swedish language training, did not possess at all. In addition, the number of intensive language classes, that could potentially have solved the problem, was very limited, a fact that also affected students whose studies had been discontinued and who also needed to take the intensive language training to master the Swedish language in order to be able to continue their studies.

The problem with the job placement of highly educated refugees, primarily the Polish-Jews, became evident in the autumn of 1969, when several reports were sent from the reception centers to the AMS complaining that the large numbers of refugee intellectuals was an obstacle to the successful job placement of the residents at the centers. The AMS decided to conduct a thorough investigation of eleven reception centers hosting the
Czechoslovak and the Polish-Jewish refugees. Four key features were highlighted by the AMS officers: the problems regarding highly educated refugees; the support of employment or career counsellors; the contacts with external institutions, and the opportunity to get intensive language training at the centres. In order to evaluate the actual outcome of job placement at the different reception centers, an investigation of the registers listing weekly departures from the respective refugee centers was conducted. The findings of this study indicate a substantial diversity in the outcome of job placement of the Polish Jews at the different reception centers in the late 1960s. This outcome differed substantially; it varied from a little more than 47 percent in Lidköping to close to 80 percent in Ulricehamn, an outcome which could perhaps be related to the engagement of the employment and career counsellors.

The increasing problem with the reception of the highly educated Czechoslovak and Polish-Jewish refugees gave rise to an interest from different political and social actors to help to deal with these challenges. One of the first initiatives that emerged from society at large was the Committee for Intellectual Refugees (KIF), which consisted of representatives of various authorities and organizations. In late 1970, the KIF issued a proposal aimed to improve the situation of refugee intellectuals. The report stated that these highly educated refugees should be allowed to utilize their qualifications rather than being forced to take the jobs offered by the AMS or acquire skills considered needed on the labour market at that time. The report also stressed the difficult position of elderly refugees, who had little or no chances of finding a job after being retrained to new occupations, and the limited number of contacts with Swedish institutions and society. The KIF proposed several measures to address these issues. The first was to take advantage of the refugee’s specializations through, for example, engaging them as consultants within various state sectors. The second idea was to increase the number of archival workplaces available for refugee intellectuals. Finally, the report referred to the possibility of supplementary training offered by the AMS.

The problems associated with the reception of the Czechoslovak and the Polish-Jewish refugees also became the topic of discussion in the Swedish parliament. In January 1970, three motions were submitted. They concerned the difficulties with the reception of highly educated refugees, the validation of foreign academic diplomas and the placement of highly educated refugees to archival work, and, finally, a suggestion to include the refugee intellectuals in the debate concerning these matters. These motions led the Parliamentary Interior Committee to submit a request to the AMS for an evaluation. Overall, the AMS regarded the arrival of Czechoslovak and Polish-Jewish refugee intellectuals as a structural change in the history of immigration to Sweden, a shift from labour migrants to highly educated refugees. According
to the AMS, there were four major difficulties regarding the refugees’ placement to work: the language deficiencies; the high number of elderly refugees; the differences between foreign and Swedish exams/degrees, i.e. the problem regarding validation and recognition, and finally the refugees’ lack of interest in manual jobs. The AMS agreed to extend the intensive language education for refugees who needed this education in order to be able to accept and manage qualified jobs and for students whose education had been discontinued. The AMS officials also agreed with the KIF that further efforts should be made for the placement of refugee intellectuals in the archival work.

However, despite the AMS quite positive response to increase the efforts on behalf of refugee intellectuals, especially those aimed to improve their placement in adequate jobs, the proposal was rejected by the parliamentary interior committee. Similarly, the initiatives from parliamentarians and society at large were rejected by the committee. The reason was, as the committee stated, that the privileged treatment of refugee intellectuals threatened to create heavy demands from other groups. The committee did not present any plan for how to proceed, nor did it suggest any further steps or actions.

Overall, the Swedish reception system was not prepared for such a group of refugees. Much of the support with the reception of the Czechoslovak and the Polish-Jewish refugees was provided by the local host communities, such as the Society of Free Czechoslovaks in the Southern Sweden for the Czechoslovak refugees, and the MFST and the Association for Polish Jews in Sweden for the Polish-Jewish refugees. In the latter case, the two organizations had very different modus operandi, which caused friction.

Regarding the economic integration of Polish Jews, significant differences existed in the occupational trajectories compared to the Czechoslovak refugees. The Polish-Jewish group consisted of many highly educated refugees, students with disrupted education and elderly people. They experienced greater decrease in occupational status than the Czechoslovak group. The greatest decrease in occupational status was experienced by professionals with the lowest international transferability of skills. This process was more evident for Polish-Jews, many of whom remained in the lower occupational category at the time they applied for Swedish citizenship. In this respect, the study makes a new contribution to this research area. It reveals that the initial decline does not always indicate a subsequent increase in occupational status. It can be true for immigrants with highly transferable skills but for the group of lawyers, diplomats and generals, the possibilities for labour market adjustment were rather limited.

Thus, to come back to the goal of this study, the Swedish government’s responses to Czechoslovak and Polish-Jewish refugees during the formative
period of the late 1960s and early 1970s had consistently been formulated in accordance with the objectives established in the previous decades. In many regards, the entire process from the decision to admit the refugees in 1968, to their reception and economic integration into Swedish society during the seven year period necessary for acquiring Swedish citizenship did not differ substantially from processes in previous decades. The three major developments within the Swedish foreign, refugee and immigrant policies that occurred at that time were somewhat less prominent in these two cases than expected.

In the Czechoslovak case, it can be determined that the new active foreign policy approach manifested itself in the harsh protest against the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia and in admitting all Czechoslovak refugees wanting to come to Sweden. However, Sweden, in spite of its non-alignment, ideologically belonged to the West and the international crisis resulting from the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia required taking a stand. Furthermore, when the invasion was no longer a major international issue the Swedish government withdrew its generous offer. In the Polish-Jewish case, it could be argued that the development of a more activist foreign policy was evident in the criticism of the anti-Semitic campaign and in an opening the border to the persecuted Jews in July 1969, but a closer look indicates that these responses emerged as a result of different domestic and international pressures, i.e. a criticism raised by the opposition and Denmark’s decision to grant visas to all Polish Jews interested in migrating there.

Regarding the structural change in the Swedish migration policy, a shift from labor migrants looking for manual jobs to a high number of highly educated refugees was underlined by the representatives of the AMS, but also by politicians and society at large. However, at the center of Sweden’s reception of the Czechoslovak and Polish-Jewish refugees during the late 1960s and early 1970s was, like in previous decades, the labour market orientation of the Swedish refugee policy. The refugees were expected to become an asset to the Swedish economy. After the arrival of Czechoslovak and Polish-Jewish refugee intellectuals, the problems with finding suitable employment for these newcomers began. This study demonstrates that, despite the AMS willingness to increase its efforts on behalf of this group, almost nothing was done to reduce the problem. Any change to the reception program, i.e. the placement of highly educated refugees in adequate jobs, the increase of the number of archival works available for elderly refugees, represented a cost.

Finally, it seems unlikely that Sweden’s decisions regarding these refugees were founded in a thinking influenced by the new multiculturalist turn. Among the three principles of a new policy on immigrants, i.e. equality, freedom of choice, and cooperation, the only aspect that appeared to stand
out in the discussion on the integration of refugees into Swedish society was the equal employment opportunities for foreigners. Yet, this discussion concerned a special treatment of one particular group of refugee versus other refugees, not the existence of refugees in the Swedish society. Thus, nor in this case, did the Czechoslovaks and Polish-Jews experience any policy shift.

In conclusion, this study shows that Swedish refugee policy making of the late 1960s and early 1970s was hardly affected by the major developments in Swedish foreign, refugee and immigrant policies that occurred at that time. In this regard, Sweden’s responses to the Czechoslovak and Polish-Jewish refugees should not be seen as the starting point for new policies but rather as the finale of the policies that had started developing at the end of World War II. This study also demonstrates the importance of national security considerations, of economic capacity and other factors influencing the Swedish government’s responses. These were also the factors affecting Swedish refugee policy in the period 1914–1968. To answer the question posed in the title, these practices did not reflect a transition in Swedish refugee policymaking. The study also highlights the complexity and diversity of these responses towards two different groups of refugees, and how these responses changed over time.

spelade en avgörande roll och att Sverige var angeläget om att inte skapa en konflikt med Sovjet.


Sammantaget togs beslutet att ta emot tjeckiska flyktingar i en tid då svenska utrikespolitik förändrades mot att bli mer aktiv i sitt stöd för demokratiska värden, social rättvisa och liberala reformer. Mot bakgrund av detta framstår den skarpa kritiken av Sovjets och Warszawapaktens invasion och mottagandet av tjeckoslovakiska flyktingar som ett tydligt ställningstagande. Men det handlade om ett tillfälligt avsteg, en isolerad händelse, från den utrikespolitiskaline som kom att följas under kommande årtionden som innebar att Sverige prioriterade goda relationer med Sovjet.

Det är uppenbart att ambassadören Kronvall var betydelsefullt för att Sverige skulle ta emot de polska judarna, men även det faktum att andra länder som Danmark tog beslut om att ge visa till polska judar påverkade de svenska myndigheterna. Hotet om att få dålig internationell publicitet och rädslan för att stå passiv då den sista spillran av polska judar som överlevt Förintelsen förtrycktes drev på den svenska viljan att ta emot polska judar. Det fanns i Sverige under dessa år en diskussion kring judarnas situation inte bara i Polen utan även i Sovjet som påverkade opinionen i riktning mot att vilja ta emot polska judar och uppmärksamma antisemitismen i Östeuropa. Sammanlagt anlände 2 411 polska judar till Sverige via svensk ambassaden i Warszawa och ytterligare 148 från UNHCR-läger.


Urvalprocessen vid val av flyktingar i UNHCR-lägren var föremål för diskussion redan i samtiden. Intervjuöförfarandet och de frågor som ställdes kritiserades. Intervjuerna tog i alltför stor utsträckning fasta på den sökandes yrke och möjlighet att kunna passa in på svensk arbetsmarknad än humanitära, psykologiska, känslomässiga och medicinska skäl. Överhuvudtaget skulle urvalsprocessen i UNHCR-lägren vara intressant att studera närmare i kommande forskning.


Sammanfattningsvis visar avhandlingen att svensk flyktingpolitik i praktiken inte förändrades så mycket under slutet av 1960-talet och början av 1970-talet. De generella förskjutningar som skedde i svensk inrikes- och
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