The Construction of Immigrants’ Identity in the EU

A Foucauldian discourse analysis of EU common migration policy
ABSTRACT

The aim of the study is to analyse the discursive construction of the immigrants’ identity within the EU’s common migration policy. More specifically, this study seeks to identify what discourses are constituted within the EU, and how these discourses are constructed. Moreover, the study efforts to understand what consequences these discourses may have to the identity of immigrants. In order to achieve the aim of the study, a number of policy documents and agreements have been analysed. This analysis is implemented by applying a social constructivist approach, based on the notion about ethnic identities, securitisation theory, discourse theory and the theoretical concepts of Eurocentrism and Europeanisation. The methodological approach applied to the analysis is the Foucauldian genealogical discourse analysis.

The conclusion of the study is that the EU, through its policy documents, has contributed to the construction of the following discourses: identity discourse, threat discourse and power discourse. Consequently, the analysis showed that these discourses may affect the image of immigrants negatively. The strengthening of “we” and “them” identities is emphasised through categorisation of immigrants, integration provisions, and through managing security and migration questions together.

Key words: discourse, Eurocentrism, European Union, Foucault, identity, migration, power, securitization, social constructivism, threat
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Abbreviations

AFSJ: Area of Freedom, Security and Justice
CEAS: Common European Asylum System
EASO: European Asylum Support Office
EPIA: European Pact on Immigration and Asylum
EU: European Union
EURODAC: European Dactyloscopy
FRONTEX: Frontières Extérieures (External Borders)
IOM: International Organization for Migration
SIS: Schengen Information System
TCN: Third Country National
UN: United Nations
UNHCR: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
Introduction

Migration to Europe is not a new phenomenon. Under different periods, European history has been characterized by both waves of emigration and immigration. The aftermath of the World War II brought together mass migration of Europeans, who resided in former colonies, back to Europe. In the next years following the World War II, this mass migration was followed by a new wave of labour migration to support the new economic uprise in Europe. Finally, the current migration is a consequence of on-going conflicts, oppressive regimes, environmental catastrophes and poverty. Waves of asylum seekers are trying to reach Europe seeking for help and shelter. While the return of Europeans during the 1950s and the labour migration during the 1960-70s were met with sympathy in Europe, the attitudes towards the current group of immigrants are different, ranging from acceptance to panic (Peach, 1997: 270).

Refugees and migrants around the world risk their lives every day in desperate attempts to find safety or a better life being forced to leave their home. While international organisations, such as the Red Cross, the UNHCR and the IOM address the problem of migration in terms of humanitarian assistance and protection, the European Union (EU) perception of refugees, asylum seekers and third country nationals can be interpreted as a threat to EU’s security.

After the end of the Cold War, and especially after 9/11, the White House used Samuel Huntington’s “Clash of Civilisations” as a basis for its foreign policy (Said, 2001), but it is less well-known what the EU has chosen for a strategy after the terror attacks in Madrid 2004 and London 2005 in order to handle “the others” both beyond the borders of the Member States’ territories and the European borders.

During a long period of time, migration and asylum policy had remained Member States issue, but the European Community concluded that a comprehensive approach based on common rules and principles is necessary in order to manage migration flows. Milestones for a common migration and asylum policy were set up in the Treaty of Amsterdam and the Tampere Programme in 1999 and developed further in the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009, the Hague Programme in 2005, the European Pact on Immigration and Asylum (EPIA) in 2008 and the Stockholm Programme in 2010.
Problem of Study

Since the beginning of 1990s, the focus of migration in EU has changed. The question of migration has been increasingly politicized confronting the European Union with the challenge of migratory flows and flow of asylum-seekers in Europe. This circumstance has led EU Member States to develop a common migration policy (Huysmans, 2000: 751-77). In the 1990s, the Schengen Agreement and the Dublin Convention were established by the EU as the first step towards a common migration policy. Following this development, four policy documents have been enacted by the EU regarding the migration politics as a part of EU’s foreign policy during 1999-2013.

Three policies, including Tampere (1999), Hague (2005) and Stockholm Programmes (2010) were adopted for five-year periods and the Stockholm Programme and the EPIA (2008) are the policy documents that are valid today. Since the programmes were adapted during different time periods, their content reflect different concerns, beginning from common work for immigration and asylum policies to the cooperation with the third states and the consequences of financial crises. As a result it is possible to maintain that the EU’s agenda about asylum and migration politics has probably changed, being influenced by internal and external events.

Furthermore, the debate about EU’s migration policy is based on the concern about the increasing number of asylum-seekers and the fact that the responsibility among different EU Member States is distributed unequally (Theilemann, 2004: 47). These factors of concern in the asylum seekers debate had led to the question whether EU’s policies are based on the solidarity as it was claimed in the Treaty of Amsterdam, Article 80, or more restrictive approach. This debate represented migration as a challenge in the subject of domestic stability leading the security discourse to penetrate EU migrations policy (Huysmans, 2006: 67).

Several studies have noted the importance of studying migration phenomena in relation to increasing securitisation. Many claim that a securitisation of migration in the EU has developed since the establishment of the Schengen Convention (2000)\(^1\). This Convention is a good example of security discourse which linked immigration and asylum with border control and terrorism (Huysman, 2000).

\(^1\) Note: Also referred to as the Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 (Council of the EU, 2000)
The problem of the study is considered to be current and in constant need of research due to on-going migration flows, underlying causes and approaches that different states and organisations use. It is relevant to continue study in this field in order to contribute to a better understanding of the problem.

The format and the content of this study, namely, the chosen theoretical frameworks, method and a broad empirical material may contribute to a different approach to the study of migration.

**Aim of study and research questions**

The aim of the study is to analyse the discursive construction of the immigrants’ identity within the EU’s common migration policy. In order to achieve the aim, the following questions need to be answered:

- What discourses are possible to identify within the policy documents and agreements regarding the EU common migration policy?
- How are these discourses constructed?
- What are the consequences of these constructions for the identity of immigrants?

**Summary of previous research**

The EU common migration policy has been studied by many in the past years. Therefore the purpose of this section is to present a brief summary of previous research studies that have been done in the field of the EU common migration policy. This summary is composed by a number of studies that has been selected regarding the aim and theoretical framework that this paper has, with the purpose to gain a deeper knowledge in the field and get a different perspective to the possible result this study may come to.

Since the establishment of the Schengen Agreement (1985), and even more since the establishment of the common migration policy in EU (1999), many research projects have
noted the importance of studying and analysing the causalities and consequences of the implementation of the common migration system in EU. Several previous researches suggest that the EU common migration policy has attempted to restrict access to asylum seekers, leading to an increase of irregular migration from third country nationals (Boswell, 2003: 619-638). Furthermore, this increase of irregular migration had led to the implementation of a number of measures in order to restrict entry and stay in the EU. Thus, these measures have left third country nationals and asylum seekers with no other choice than risk their lives in dangerous routes in their attempt to reach the EU borders. (Boswell, 2003: 619-638; Hansen, 2008: 184-185). In other aspects, some studies has shown strong increasing xenophobia within the EU population toward asylum seekers and third country nationals, as a consequence of EU migration policy approaches and the securitization of migration in EU (Taras, 2012, Bale, 2008: 315-16). Moreover, many scholars in International Relations and security studies have claim that migrations flows in EU have been associated with criminality and terrorism, presenting immigrants as a security threat (Leonard, 2010: 231-254; Huysman, 2000: 751-77). Jef Huysmans, Professor of Security Studies at the Open University, argues that the social construction of migration into a security issue portrayed immigrants and asylum seekers as a challenge to welfare and EU citizens (Huysman, 2000: 751-77; Huysmans, 2006).

The summary presented in this section gives a clear picture of the significance in studying this subject. Since the debate about the EU common migration policy is more present than ever, following research is relevant for the field.

Limitation

The limitation of the study comes naturally since the EU has developed a Common European Asylum System (CEAS) since 1999, and developed the current legislative framework since 1990 (European Commission, 2014). The empirical material includes the Schengen Convention also known as Convention Implementing Schengen (2000) and the Dublin Convention (1990)². In addition to these two, four programmes complement the empirical material for the study. These four programmes relate both to migration and asylum policy:

² Note: Entered into force in 1997 (Council of the EU, 1997)

Key Definitions

There are several key definitions that are used in this paper that are relevant to understand the content of the study, and should be explained in more details. It is important to distinguish the following categories: alien, asylum seeker, illegal/irregular migrant, refugee and third country national. The definitions are taken from different international instruments and organizations.

Alien - any person other than a national of a Member State of the European Communities (Council of the EU, 2000: Article 1).

Asylum seeker - a third-country national or a stateless person who has made an application for asylum in respect of which a final decision has not yet been taken (EC, Council Directive 2003/9/EC, Article 2(c)).

Irregular migrant - a person who, owing to unauthorized entry, breach of a condition of entry, or the expiry of his or her visa, lacks legal status in a transit or host country. The term "irregular" is preferable to "illegal" because the latter carries a criminal connotation and is seen as denying migrants' humanity" (International Organization for Migration, 2014).

Refugee - any person who as a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and due to fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear or for reasons other than personal convenience, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence, is unable or, owing to such fear or for reasons other than personal convenience, is unwilling to return to it (Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 1951, Article 1).

Third country nationals (TCN) - any person who is not a citizen of the EU and is a citizen of a “third country”, meaning a country that is not a member of the European Union is considered a third country national. This meaning is derived from ‘third country’ in the sense of one not

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3 Note: “For the purposes of this Convention, the words “events occurring before 1 January 1951” in article 1, section A, shall be understood to mean either (a) “events occurring in Europe before 1 January 1951”; or (b) “events occurring in Europe or elsewhere before 1 January 1951”, and each Contracting State shall make a declaration at the time of signature, ratification or accession, specifying which of these meanings it applies for the purpose of its obligations under this Convention. (2) Any Contracting State which has adopted alternative (a) may at any time extend its obligations by adopting alternative (b) by means of a notification addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.” (UN General Assembly, 1967)
party to an agreement between two other countries (Eurofund, 2014). This denomination is often used in reference to other immigrants than refugees and asylum seekers.

Disposition

The paper consists of five chapters. The introductory part, chapter 1, has given a presentation to the study field, and explained the aim of the study followed by the research questions that this paper efforts to answer. Additionally, this first chapter has featured key definitions, the limitation of the study and a summary of previous research in the field. The first chapter is followed by chapter 2 that is devoted to the theoretical framework which consists of social constructivism theory notion of identity, securitisation theory, discourse theory and two theoretical concepts, namely, Europeanisation and Eurocentrism. Further, in the chapter 3, the methodology is presented. This chapter describes the chosen methodology, namely, Foucault discourse analysis, discusses the basis for the collection of the empirical material and used sources. After that, in chapter 4, the results of the study are presented as a combination of empirical material, constituted by background and six policy documents, and their analysis. The last chapter, number 5, is devoted to the discussion, made conclusions and suggestions for further research.
Theoretical framework

Considering the aim of the study, to analyse the construction of the immigrants’ identity within the EU’s common migration politics, a number of theories have been chosen to constitute the theoretical framework of analysis. Therefore, in this theoretical chapter of the paper, the following theories and sub-theories are going to be presented: social constructivists notion about collective identities with focus on ethnic groups, followed by securitisation theory, focusing on the transformation of certain issues into security issue and its consequences, discourse theory in more general terms, referring to the grounds of social constructivism and the significance of language, and theoretical concepts of Eurocentrism and Europeanisation.

All the used theories share the same philosophical premises and to a large extent can be classified as sub-schools of social constructivism. The ontology of the theories is the assumption that reality is constituted in and through discourse (Hay, 2002: 199). According to Hay, Professor of Political Sciences at Sciences Po, Paris and Affiliate Professor of Political Analysis at the University of Sheffield, there is no objective social or political reality independent of our understanding of it and the reality is the product of social construction (Hay, 2002: 24). Consequently, the epistemology is to study the reality through studying these constructions, meanings, perceptions and understandings.

These theories are used as starting points in order to deconstruct a complex reality, help describe and explain the problem of study (the consumption function of theories). They contribute to a more complex and deep analysis, with different research objects in focus: individual level, group level, state and inter-state level, while all of them share the constructivists’ approach of shaping reality.

After the review of selected theories, an application of theories would present the connection between the problem, aim of study, research questions and theoretical framework.

Social constructivism

To begin with, the social constructivist theory can be characterised as a theoretical framework that see social reality as subjective and influenced by human consciousness in form of ideas
Constructivists claim that everything involved in the social world is made by people and thus it is also intelligible to them. They see the social world as a combination of thoughts, beliefs, concepts, languages, discourses and understandings among human beings, states and nations (Jackson, Sorensen, 2010: 163).

Social constructivism is based on several assumptions. One of them is that meaning and understanding are the central features of human activities, for instance the significance of language in providing different quality of social experience. Another assumption is that meaning and understanding have their origins in social interaction and in shared views to what symbolic forms (as for example, language) are to be taken. To sum up, the way an individual understand particular phenomena or processes is influenced by an individual understanding, that in turn is influenced by socio-cultural processes and social symbols, as well as time and place (Lock, Strong, 2010: 7).

Social constructivism is an umbrella theory that has many directions and sub-theories. The sub-theories that are presented further have their starting point in social constructivism. One of them is the theory about how ethnic identities are constructed.

Ethnic Identities

When it comes to the identity, constructivists claim that an ethnic group is an imagined, constructed and created through social interaction, in other words ethnicity as a dimension of identity is contextual, not given and therefore dynamic and changeable (Demmers, 2012: 26). Constructivists approach is directed against primordialism, id est assumption that an ethnic group is a natural community and ethnicity, together with gender, race and religion are a natural and inevitable fact of life. Constructivists on the other hand claim that identities, and more specifically, ethnic identities, are socially constructed (Demmers, 2012: 24-25).

The construction of identities is one of central issues in social constructivism. It stretches from the variety of identities on the individual level to the way an individual identity becomes subject to political decisions (Gergen, 2009: 50). The way we gain our identities based on the gender, age, nationality, religion, occupation, family status etc. is generated and defined by others or in relationship to others.

At the societal level these categorisation leads to formation of perceptions about nationalities and ethnic groups. These perceptions can be treated as a common knowledge or as a
prejudice and false stereotypes, depending on the person’s consciousness, individual experience and other factors. But very often “public reputations” of some nationalities are taken-for-granted realities, and this knowledge and public policies are interrelated (Gergen, 2009: 51).

The formation of so-called collective identities has serious consequences on the societies. It may lead to prejudice, demonisation, xenophobia, discrimination and genocide as prejudice extreme form. There are historical examples of such consequences - Holocaust of Jews, genocide in Bosnia and Rwanda. According to Gordon Allport’s study “The Nature of Prejudice” published in 1954 prejudice is usually ethnocentrically organised, since the prejudice is more likely to be formed from social identities, than from individual affections and cognitive processes (Taras, 2012: 12). Pierré-André Taguieff, a philosopher and director of research at the French National Centre for Scientific Research in an Institut d’Etudes Politiques de Paris, names three principal cognitive processes: categorisation of individuals and groups, a symbolic exclusion of select groups by stigmatising them and the barbarisation of select categories of others (Taras, 2012: 14). These processes show clearly the stages of exclusion and how something unimportant from the beginning may lead to serious consequences.

Further, it is necessary to present another perspective on making ethnic groups, namely, Barth’s approach. Fredrik Barth, a Norwegian social anthropologist, presented a critical view about the anthropological definition of ethnic groups. He meant that taking into consideration such questions as race, culture and common language is not enough to understand the phenomenon of ethnic groups (Barth, 1969: 11). Barth argued that even though a common culture is an important feature of ethnic groups, it is ethnic boundaries that define the group above all. Describing the boundaries he means social boundaries, namely, the boundaries that the members of the group recognize themselves in the social interaction. Consequently, on the one hand the members should be able to identify each other implying the same criteria for evaluation, but on the other hand it inevitably leads to the dichotomization of others as strangers (Barth, 1969: 15). Two main points of the described theory are, firstly, ethnic groups are social organization, not biological or cultural, and secondly, ethnic group formation is based on the mutual recognition of its members and the existence of “others”.

The problem of constructing collective identities, dichotomization of “we” and “others” and its consequences is developed further in the next part, devoted to securitisation.
Securitisation

Securitisation theory follows on from the previous theory, which examined aspects of ethnic groups’ formation and the notion of identity. As it was pointed out earlier, securitisation can be classified as a sub-school of social constructivism. Having defined what is meant with social constructivism, we will now move on to discuss securitisation.

Social Constructivism is a broad theory and it has become one of the dominant approaches for examining security practices that relates to the meaning of state security based on state identity. (Léonard, 2010: 231-254). Moreover, Sarah Léonard, Senior Lecturer in Politics, explains in her research about FRONTEX and securitisation, that securitisation theory is an approach to the study of security that is premised on the constructivist normative bases that the world is socially constructed, which means that it is impossible to completely evaluate whether threats are ‘real’ or not. Therefore, Leonard argues that the “Copenhagen school” propose that what it should be study is the process through which an issue is recognised as a security threat by the social construction of it. Moreover, this social construction in which a security issue may be constructed may be formed through in discursive process that prioritises them (Léonard, 2010: 231-254).

Security and securitisation are concepts that have been constituted in the frame of constructivism that relates to international relations. Namely, the concept of securitisation was developed by Barry Buzan, research professor of international studies at the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute (COPRI), and Ole Wæver, Professor of International Relations at the University of Copenhagen, in the framework of the “Copenhagen School” (S. Léonard, 2010: 231-254; Stritzel, 2007: 357-384). This new approach to security theory is not following a rigid domestic international distinction, mainly because of their studies are not state define, and claim that international security has a distinctive arena. Most studies in the field of security have only focussed on military actions. This interpretation differs from that of Buzan and Wæver, which move security out of the military sector and take it to a wider range of issues such as political and intellectual (Buzan, Wæver, 1998: 2). While the traditional position argues that security studies are about military force, Wæver argues that security is a stabilization of threatening relations and that security studies should explore the securitisation of those non-military threats (Buzan, Wæver, 1998: 4). The definition and criteria that constituted the concept of securitisation are established by the intersubjective existence of a threat in order to have substantial political effects (Buzan; Wæver; 1998: 25).
Security can be understood as identity, this means the self-conception of communities and of individuals identifying themselves as members of a community (Buzan, Kelstrup, Wæver, 1993: 19). Furthermore, the authors broadly define security as: “... a generic term that has a distinct meaning but varies in form. Security means survival in the face of existential threats, but what constitutes an existential threat is not the same across different sectors.” (Buzan, Wæver, 1998: 27). This definition forms the central focus of the study by Burry Buzan and Ole Wæver (1998) in which the authors aim to explain how issues become securitised. In order to develop the theory, the authors are required to provide a classification of what is and what is not a security issue. The first distinction that is important to make regarding security, is that international security is rooted in the traditions of power politics, while “social security” is about individuals and is largely economic (Buzan, Wæver, 1998: 21). Additionally, Buzan and Wæver, claim that societal security is about collective and their identity (Buzan, Wæver, 1998: 120).

**Societal sector**

Securitisation theory can be applied in several sectors such as: military sector, environmental sector, economic sector, societal sector and political sector. The societal sector relates to the societal security that is related to political security. This last two relates to each other directly through the organizational stability of states, systems of government, and the ideologies that gives governments and states their legitimacy (Buzan, Wæver, 1998: 119). In the frame of international security analysis, Buzan and Wæver argue that the issue of society is the ideas and practices that identify individuals as members of a social group. They define societal security as “...a large, self-sustaining identity groups; what these are empirically carries in both time and place.” (Buzan, Wæver, 1998: 119). Furthermore, the most common issues that can be seen as threats to societal security can be identify as migration, horizontal competition and vertical competition (Buzan, Wæver, 1998: 121). In the frame of securitization it is important to remark that the term societal is not the same as social security. While social security relates to individuals and is largely economic, societal security relates to collective identities and action taken to defend such “we identities” (Buzan, Wæver, 1998: 120). This “we identity” can be threat by issues such as migration, as to its identity (Buzan, Wæver, 1998: 120-121). Thus, society can react to the threat of migration through activities carried out by the community itself or by trying to move the issue to the political sector addressing the threat at the state level through legislation and border control (Buzan, Wæver, 1998: 122).
The societal sector, as it is early described by Buzan and Wæver, is about collective and their identity (Buzan; Wæver, 1998: 120). In this sector the collective identities evolve and change naturally as a consequence of internal and external developments. Such changes may be accepted as part of the evolution of identity or they may be seen as invasive and their sources may point to as existential threats. Depending on the holders of the collective identity, they may take a closed-minded or open-minded view of how their identity is constitutes and maintained the migrants or rival identities may be securitised (Buzan; Wæver, 1998: 23).

Buzan and Wæver mean that three components can determinate if a securitisation is successful or not. These three components are: existential threats, emergency action, and effects on interunit relations by the breaking free of rules (Buzan, Wæver, 1998: 26).

Finally, securitisation theory does not need indicators, it can be studied directly. Buzan and Wæver propose that the best way to study securitisation is through discourse analysis and political constellations, for example they mean that by questioning when does an argument with this particular rhetoric and semiotic structure achieve sufficient effect to make a community tolerate violations of rules and abuse of power that would otherwise have to be obeyed (Buzan, Wæver, 1998: 25). Consequently, for this study it is important to understand the processes of constructing a shared understanding of what is to be considered and collectively responded to as a threat. In language theory, the process of securitisation is called a speech act (Buzan, Wæver, 1998: 26). Therefore, in the following section the discourse theory is presented as part of the theoretical framework of this study.

**Discourse theory**

Discourse is another theory within social constructivism which in turn has also a variety of schools and sub-schools. The variety stretches from studying of the production of meanings, believes, social identities to the notion of “cultural hegemony” and “collective action frame” (Demmers, 2012: 117). There are a couple of points that all discursive theories share. Discourse theory has its starting point from structuralist and poststructuralist linguistic philosophy, specifically, that reality should be understood through language. *Language* contributes to the creation of reality and social world (inter alia social identities, social
relations), while the physical objects get their meaning through discourse. Consequently the social world is changed by changes in discourse (Jørgensen, Phillips, 2002: 8-9).

Discourse theory has its epistemological ground in interpretative study when human behaviour is studied from within. The theory examines how people understand social happenings and act themselves. Discourse theory places neither individual (agency) nor structure as ontologically prior entities and should be understood via both agency and structure-based theories. Both structures and agencies are the product of each other and reproduce each other, that is why it is inappropriate to ground the theory on either of ontological priors (Demmers, 2012: 119).

Anthony Giddens, a British sociologist, in his book “The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration” suggests an idea about the duality of structure. He means that structure and agency are mutually constitutive entities and cannot exist without each other. All human beings are born in certain social structures, but these structures in turn are also created by human beings. Consequently, it is a dialectical relationship that prevails (Giddens, 1984: 25). The dialectical character of the relationship is also applicable to the language. On the one hand language is a medium to express ourselves, but on the other hand the language is reproduced as a structure. This reproduction occurs chronologically in different places and times (Giddens 1984: 29-39).

People are born in structures that Giddens calls for “rules and resources”. The rules of social life are produced and reproduced of human beings consciously or unconsciously, but since these rules become daily routines for majority, they become also visible and researchable in the form of values and norms. Power according to Giddens is a key component of all social systems. While Gourevitch and Klemper, two researchers that studied the role of language in Rwanda and the Third Reich respectively, have concluded that power enables one to make own “story of reality”, that power is constituted by the use of language or discourse (Demmers, 2012: 116, 121).

The significance of words was also developed by a linguistic philosopher, Ludwig Wittgenstein. In his two famous works “Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus” and “Philosophical Investigations” he analysed the relationship between language and reality. He argued that since language is a human creation, it acquires its meaning through shared use. The sharing of meaning requires the existence of “we”, “our” and measure of agreement and solidarity (Lock, Strong, 2010: 152).
One of the main conclusions Wittgenstein drew, that is relevant for the present study, is that words are not simply the name of objects or phenomena, representing experience and things, but “*words are deeds*”. The way words are put into work in our communications and relationships they contribute to gain things that could only occur as a result of interaction. Consequently, what needs to be analysed is what the use of specific words seeks to accomplish. Apart from this, Wittgenstein pointed out the relational view of meaning or “meaning in context”, saying that context endows the words even more significance (Lock, Strong, 2010: 157).

Moreover, discourse theory is closely connected with constructivists’ approach of making ethnic groups when discursive approach is used to create social boundaries by narratives (Demmers, 2012: 118). The theory explains how identities are constructed, namely how “we” and “them” are produced. There a variety of discourses that are developed to create this distinction, exempli grātiā, East/West distinction, colonizer/colonized, freedom/terror etc. The discourses may have their roots on different levels, varying from “war on terror” rhetoric after 9/11 to local histories where rebels are glorified (Demmers, 2012: 127).

The stories together with specific historical and power context are in focus in discourse theory (Demmers, 2012: 118). The theory seeks to understand how and why social (inter alia ethno-national) categories are constructed through analysing the discourses that are created in various contexts. The so-called “discursive strategies of othering” are used, for instance, by right-wing political parties in Europe to create a discursive representation of Muslims. The discourse is created through claims about the hidden agendas and speculations about the real numbers of immigrants and threat from possible terrorists among Muslims. The named discourse leads in turn to discourse of exclusion that is very powerful, when it is both socially significant and politically functional (Demmers, 2012: 128-29).

**Theoretical concepts**

Having presented the main theories for the analysis of the study, namely social constructivism notion of identity, securitisation, and discourse theory, the following section presents two theoretical concepts that are directly related to the EU, Europe and their identity, and therefore they are relevant concepts to reach the aim of the study. Thus, these
concepts may contribute to a better understanding in the analysis of the EU policy documents.

**Eurocentrism**

The concept of Eurocentrism developed to describe characteristic aspects of Europe actions, *European identity* and finally the European-centred perspective. Even if there is not a named father of the concept of Eurocentrism (also known as Eurocentric), Samir Amin is known as one of the first one in applying this concept. He argues that Eurocentrism is best understood as a cultural phenomenon in which the West knows best (Sayyid, 1998: 127). Moreover, James M. Blaut, professor of anthropology at the University of Illinois at Chicago, also notable critic to Eurocentrism, claimed that Eurocentrism refers to a set of beliefs that are statements about empirical reality about superiority of Europeans over non-Europeans. Furthermore, he argues that Eurocentrism is not a matter of attitudes in the sense of values but rather a matter of science and expert opinion (Blaunt, 1993: 9). This concept has been used in several research studies as a method to understand modernity that begins and ends in Europe, which universalizes Europe as the primary and entitle space of modernity (Kamran, 2013: 355-377). Some attempts to justify Eurocentrism have been done. These attempts are based in the notion that Eurocentrism can be seen as no more than ethnocentrism. Therefore it is possible to countered racism by reverse-racism. The main problem with this argument is that erases the dimension of power from any relationship, and presents the relation as symmetrical, which clearly denies hierarchy or oppression. (Sayyid, 1998: 134)

**Europeanisation**

This concept develops in the frame of Eurocentrism, in order to analyse the influence of the EU *Acquis communautaire*\(^4\) the policy making and institutional structures of the Member States. Thus, this concept basically is a response to the EU integration and policy making (Mass, Truong, 2011: 68). According to Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, Europeanisation can as well be understood as “*the development at the individual level in Europe of people seeing themselves as Europeans.*” In other words, the development of a European identity (Buzan, Wæver, 1993: 62)

\(^4\) Note: also known as EU Community Laws regarding all the treaties, regulations and directives passed by the European institutions (Mass, Truong, 2011: 68).
These concepts of Eurocentrism and Europeanisation may contribute to the analysis of the discourses and identities that are constituted in the frame of EU common migration policy.

Application of Theories

Described theories are necessary to identify discourses in the EU common migration policy documents, the empirical material of the study. While the notion of identity and ethnicity in the frame of social constructivism contributes to the understanding of how different ethnical groups are perceived in these documents, the securitisation approach helps understand the way how ethnic groups are constructed could lead to see migration as a threat.

Discourse theory together with theory about ethnic identities and securitisation enable us to find explanation in the texts of the EU’s policy by analysing words and their meanings, contexts and categorisations in relation to the historical development, cultural traditions and actual events. The frame of ethnic identities, Eurocentrism contributes to the understanding of the perception of a European superiority over other ethnic groups and how this is characterized in the society.

In this part of the paper some theories and theoretical concepts have been presented, namely, social constructivism, securitisation theory, discourse theory, Eurocentrism and Europeanisation concepts. The selected theories and theoretical concepts contribute to answering the research questions of the study and to a more comprehensive analysis covering different discourses of migration policy and its consequences to the immigrants’ identity. Further, the methodology of the research and material are presented.
Method & Material

In order to achieve the aim of the study and answer the research questions discourse analysis has been selected as a scientific method. In this chapter Foucault discourse analysis would be discussed in comparison with some other types of discourse analysis. Apart from this, Foucault’s concept about truth, knowledge and power is thoroughly presented in order to create understanding of what is meant with discourse in Foucault’s view and how this method should be approached.

To begin with, applying discourse analysis means problematizing the essence of certain phenomena, analysing not only the content and the external form, but also historical and cultural contexts that have shaped the phenomena (Börjesson, 2003: 19). That’s why in order to analyse the discursive construction of the immigrants’ identity, the EU’s policies regarding migration, asylum and freedom of movement should be analysed to see the social practices behind the policy documents, as well as patterns and trends of this development.

Discourse analysis lets us capture the “taken-for-granted” meanings that are hidden as the absolute truth (Börjesson, 2003: 23). These meanings exist in political and organisational structures, power relations, including the EU’s politics and that is why it should be questioned. According to the notion of categorization, developed by inter alia Allport, Taguieff, and Barth’s concept about ethnic boundaries, the discourse that has grown round the category of migrants is constructed in relation to other categories and phenomena in the European society. As it was pointed out in the theory chapter, discourse analysis is considered to be an appropriate tool for deconstruction different categories of migrants see how it is constructed and how the EU’s common migration politics is shaped.

Discourse analysis as a theory and scientific method has developed in different directions and in the frames of different disciplines, such as, social science and linguistic. Some classify this development as different generations of discourse interpretation (Bergström, Boréus, 2012), while others name them as different approaches of discourse analysis (Jorgensen, Phillips, 2002).

Göran Bergström, researcher at Stockholm University, and Kristina Boreus, professor of political science at Stockholm University, present the three different generations of discourse analysis: the first generation focuses on linguistics; the second generation focuses on Foucault's archaeological study and Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA); and the third
generation focuses on discourses theory study of Laclau and Mouffe and Foucault's genealogical study (Bergström, Boreus, 2012: 357). Foucault's concept of knowledge, power and truth are used in most of discourse analysis theories. By analysing discourses from a Foucauldian point of view, the analysis approach is made in a wider sense than when it is made by a linguistic discourse analysis (Bergström, Boreus, 2012: 357). In the theoretical part we have discussed the philosophical premises of discourse and basic notions of language meaning in the discourse theory. Therefore, we would like to focus more specifically on the Foucauldian approach of discourse analysis.

Why Foucault?

The name of Michel Foucault is directly associated with discourse and vice versa. Michel Foucault is seen as one of the most profound and prominent philosopher of the twentieth century and at the same time one of the most contradictory and overestimated. Most of the discourse analyses today follow the Foucauldian discourse conception and all discourse approaches have its roots in Foucault theory (Jörgensen, Phillips, 2002: 12-13).

The choice of Foucauldian method, namely, *genealogical analysis*, for our research problem can be partly explained by the fact that chosen theories presume analysis of language and power, common knowledge, historical and cultural context, social practices and categorization of groups. The relationship between language and power is central in Foucault approach in contrast to critical discourse analysis, that is more ambivalent about that (Jörgensen, Phillips, 2002: 14). Another aspect that differ Foucauldian approach from critical discourse analysis is the view on the individual. According to Foucault the individual behaviour is determined by structures, while critical discourse analysis together with discursive psychology claims that individuals are both “masters and slaves of language” (Jörgensen, Phillips, 2002: 17). In the present study it is not individuals that are in focus and structures significance is assumed.

Foucault’s discourse analysis equips us with a deeper approach to these issues. Apart from this, Foucault’s approach is based not merely on the linguistics as for example Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theory, but the assumptions that language is a social practice along with other practices and the relationship between language, knowledge, truth and power.
Furthermore, Foucauldian discourse analysis, both as theory and method, would be presented with specific focus on genealogical study.

**Discourse analysis: Foucault**

Foucault’s notion about power is central in his philosophy. It got its most comprehensive articulation in the History of Sexuality and Discipline and Punish. He meant that power is a specific relational environment, where actors’ influence on behaviour through disciplining and regulating. The discussion about Foucauldian power used to boil down to the discussion what power is not. Consequently, power is not a structure or an institution, it is not something that one actor has and exercises, but power has strictly *relational* and impersonal character (Prado 1995: 66-7, 72).

What differs Foucauldian notion about power from its conventional understanding is that power is not considered to be advantageous. Power can be seen as a precondition for actions. Consequently, neither of actors is divided into weak or strong, but they all are elements of ruling web of power-relations (Prado, 1995: 68). Foucault claims that power does not belong to particular agents, but it is spread among different social practices (Jorgensen, Phillips, 2002: 13).

Another Foucault’s notion is the relationship between the power and the knowledge. He claimed that the way people consider something to be true or not and thinkable or not, depends on the type of discourse that is used (“truth effects”). Foucault connected two concepts of truth-regime and discourse formation to show the relationship between power and knowledge (Börjesson, 2003: 34).

Being a Marxist, phenomenologist and structuralist, Foucault sought to contextualize and historicize different kinds of knowledge, truth, rationality and reason. Foucault claimed that these categories are produced and embedded within social and cultural contexts. Similarly to Wittgenstein considered Foucault that words get their meaning in relation to other words and events and are not meaningful themselves (Lock, Strong, 2010: 245).

Foucault wrote inter alia about how the western values are created. He analysed human practices on the West that led to the creation of “right” and “wrong”, “normal” and “abnormal” within different historical cultural eras. The analysis concerned also the
construction of what is taken to be human in the west and how the west handles our “selves” in everyday life. There are certain cultural ideas and practices that have been adopted during the history and are today considered to be “appropriate” in the west (Lock, Strong, 2010: 246).

In his work “The Order of Things” Foucault discussed that many classifications of people are done arbitrary, based on the assumption that the systems of classifying the worlds are both “true” and “natural”. It reflexes the discourse of power as well, showing that characterization of “true” and “natural” are the way the things are (Foucault’s “games of truth” or “truth effects”). Connecting together the notion about historical and cultural context together with the notion about “truth” and “natural” Foucault came to the conclusion that the discourse of objectivity is just another discourse (Lock, Strong, 2010: 247). Foucault developed his conclusion by naming three ways how people become objects within discursive system of classification: dividing practices by physical exclusion of certain members of society, scientific classification, mostly used in psychiatry and medicine, and subjectification in terms of social-discursive resources of self-identity (Lock, Strong, 2010: 247-250).

While the formal approach to discourse analysis in made in terms of text analysis, Foucault’s approach is made under the concept of knowledge, in which he moves away from linguistic towards more empirical approaches to discourse (McHoul, Grace, 1995: 26-29). “For Foucault, knowledge is much more a matter of the social, historical and political conditions under which statements come to count as true or false”. (McHoul, Grace, 1995: 29).

Foucault’s discourse analysis is characterized by several complications. One of them is the relationship between discourse and texts’ interpretation. Discourse analysis includes different dimensions, namely, text analysis and analysis of social practices. Another complication implicates relationship between discourse analysis and two key notions: archaeology and genealogy that are considered to be two main analytical strategies in discourse analysis. The latter complication means the difficulty to distinguish these two approaches (Bergström, Boréus 2012: 358-59).

Firstly, archaeology includes investigation of existing disciplines, system of knowledge. These investigations are exercised in order to understand the discursive practices that led to the production of these systems and disciplines. Archaeology aims to understand how “knowledge” has come to be knowledge or how “truth” has come to be truth and what kind of justification has been used. Archaeology’s task is not to find similarities or common points,
but to show the diversities, comparatives and challenge conventional views, what is considered to be natural, obvious, undeniable and evident (Prado, 1995: 25-26). In contrast to archaeology that is directly related to the clarification of the history of the rules genealogy seeks to understand forces and events that formed discursive practices (Alvesson, Karreman 2000: 1128).

Foucault suggests that power to shape the world can be observed through the research of various categories that discourses are based upon. The categories are not neutral; they show the power-relationship, the current system of values and hierarchies (Börjesson, 2003: 38).

Niels Åkerström Andersen, Professor and Research Manager at Department of Management, Politics and Philosophy, Copenhagen Business School, explains Foucault’s genealogical analytical strategy as the historical dimension of the knowledge archaeology. (Åkerström Andersen, 2003: 17)

Examples of Foucault Works and the Genealogical Strategy

One of the ways to understand genealogical strategy is to refer to Foucault’s analysis of madness, penalty and sexuality. In his studies Foucault traced the constitution of the fundamental categories of madness through the psychiatric reform (which he treated as “new form of social control”, Prado 1995: 23), punishment and categorization of prisoners through the penal reform as the imposition of control and, finally, the development of sexuality as a regulating regime (Prado, 1995: 23).

What is necessary to mention is that according to Foucault it is not only madness, for instance, that is socially constructed, but “reason” as well. These both phenomena have been constructed historically by a series of exclusions, while history is the expression of collective “we” and thus history is partial, subjective and marked by its origins. According to Foucault, “...history (as the privileged form of consciousness) is the western myth...” (Donnelly 1994: 332).

Åkerström Andersen present a framework for genealogical analysis in which the eye of genealogy is the differences continuity/discontinuity (Åkerström Andersen, 2003: 17). Furthermore, Andersen’s interpretation of the aim of genealogy is to question the present discourses and practices “...by referring them back to the hegemonic conditions under which the have been established, which also includes pointing out ruptures in the ground on which strategies, institutions and practices are shaped.” (Åkeström Andersen, 2003: 20). However,
he means that the origin of a social phenomenon is not necessary the establishment of the phenomenon (Åkeström Andersen, 2003: 20).

Application of Foucauldian Genealogical Discourse Analysis

Since Foucault’s work has been interpreted in many different ways and each interpretation takes its own perspective, we consider it to be essential to make our own interpretation of Foucault. In this part, our understanding and interpretation of Foucauldian approach to discourse analysis will be presented as a tool for the present study. Firstly, Foucault’s notions about formation of knowledge, truth and power are our epistemological fundamentals for the analysis. Knowledge and truth are not objective; they do not exist by themselves as part of the objective reality, but are constructed artificially by structures, institutions, agents and societies. In this way the power is exercised, when knowledge and truth are defined by those, who have the power to create discourses (Foucault, 1978). Analysing the texts of the EU’s migration policies enables to see what is presented as truth and knowledge in the EU rhetoric. Secondly, more specific, while implementing Foucauldian approach of the policies’ texts the following aspects are going to be considered:

- What is being presented as threaten?
- What issues are being presented as problematic?
- What is the purpose and consequences of managing certain questions together?
- What interest underlies the constructed discourses?

By answering these questions while analysing the empirical material it would be possible to identify the used discourse and what is more important how these discourses are being constructed through language.

Material

Firstly, the empirical material includes primary sources, namely, the documents enacted by the European Union, the European Pact on Asylum and Immigration, Schengen Convention (2000) and Dublin Convention (1990). To begin with, three policies (Tampere 1999, Hague 2005, Stockholm 2010) have been chosen, since they represent the EU’s programmes starting
in 1999 and to the present, while other documents are the result of the key decisions by the EU’s Council concerning migration, asylum, border controls and security. These documents are enacted in different periods of time and the analysis of them would allow us to get a retrospective view.

It is necessary to mention, however, that among three programmes that we analyse, it is only the Stockholm Programme that is valid today, not the Tampere and Hague Programmes. Even though the latter two programmes are not in force, they have contributed to the constitution of the discourses in the present migration politics and in the EU generally. Apart from this, it is a genealogical approach that is applied in the present study, not the archaeological one, when the historical development is in focus.

Secondly, scientific articles and books would be used as secondary sources in order to present the background information of the development of the EU’s migration politics. The background information aim to give to a broad picture of the migration process occurred in EU, since the end of the World War II, in order to give the reader the historical framework of the study.

The selected resources are considered to be reliable and valid. Firstly, the amount of empiric material is large and represents an overall picture. Secondly, when it comes to discourse analysis the discussion about being critical towards used sources is not that crucial, because all the sources are part of reality (Börjesson, 2003: 16). At the same time it is important to distinguish criticism towards primary and secondary sources. The EU’s documents, id est primary empirical sources, represent the reality and cannot be seen as objective, while it requires to be critical towards scientific articles and books through giving consideration to the authors, institutions and years when the sources were published.

**Critical Reflections on Methodology**

In order to evaluate the results of the study there are several criteria that are applied, namely, reliability, validity and generalization (Flick, 2011: 207). To begin with, reliability of the study in the discourse analysis may be doubted because of subjectivity of the researchers, exempli gratia, and preconceptions about the EU as an intergovernmental institution, about its migration and asylum politics and attitudes towards certain groups. There is a risk that the
choice of empirical material to be influenced by the researchers identity and opinions (Bergström, Boreus, 2012: 400-1) While identifying and analysing discourses in the empirical material by focusing on specific wording, phrases, the context can be interpreted by different recipients and that may weaken the reliability. Being conscious about the researchers’ possible bias, subjectivity and the thorough presentation of the research process would contribute to higher reliability.

The validity of the study, on the other hand, could have an advantage and disadvantage. The advantage is that the study design as it is presented is coherent; however, the research question and analysis tools’ close relation to the researcher’s perspective may lead to a predictable result that implies a question of its validity (Bergström, Boreus, 2012: 406). In order to increase the validity of the study an extensive review of Foucault's’ works together with interpretation of Foucault's’ notions been implemented and, as a result, methodological application to this specific study is presented above (in “Application of Foucauldian Genealogical Discourse Analysis”).

The generalization of a qualitative study is very limited. The achieved results are claimed to be valid beyond the empirical material (Flick, 2011: 210). Present study is focused on the specific context and process, id est, migration to the EU. Consequently, the findings of the study cannot be valid independent from the original context, which means that the level of generalization is quite low.

Division of work among the authors of the thesis

This paper has been written by two authors with equal participation in research and writing. However, some divisions in the writing process have been done in order to reach a wider perspective. One of the authors, namely Alexandra Lebedeva, has deepened more in the study of the social constructivist theories, while the other author, Maria Mercedes Lopez, has focused on securitisation studies. Both authors have been involved in collecting empirical material, analysing their context and making conclusions.
In this part of paper the methodology, Foucault’s discourse analysis has been presented. Apart from this, it was necessary to describe Foucault’s philosophical grounds about power, knowledge and truth, as well as two Foucauldian approaches: archaeology and genealogy. After that the application of genealogical discourse was made with presentation of specific aspects that contribute to the analysis of the immigrants’ identity construction within the EU’s common migration politics. The methodology description was followed by presentation of material, both primary and secondary sources. Finally, some critical reflections were made regarding reliability, validity and generalization, and the division of work between the authors.
Result

The purpose of the current study is to analyse the discursive construction of the immigrants’ identity within the EU common migration policy. Furthermore, this analysis efforts to identify the possible discourses that are constituted in the policy documents, how they are constructed and what are the consequences for the immigrants’ identity. Consequently with the aim of the study, the theoretical framework was presented. The theoretical chapter, consisting of social constructivism notion of identity, securitisation notion of the threats to the “we identity” and discourse theory about the dialectical relationship between language and reality; in addition to the Foucauldians methodological approach, gives the study the tools to the analysis of the empirical material that is presented in the following chapter. This part is devoted to the result of the empirical material analysis. Firstly, some background facts are presented. This background has been selected regarding its relevance to the later analysis. The background is followed by the presentation of six policy documents within EU common migration, primary material, that have been analysed. Finally, the analysis of the policies is presented in form of the identified discourses.

Background

The background information includes description of the migration history to Europe from two different perspectives; one of them has its focus on time periods while the other is a geographical one. The presentation of the history of migration to Europe is followed by a number of events, terror attacks in USA, 2001 and in Europe, 2004, 2005, and the financial crisis of 2008. In the timeline below these and some other current historical events are presented together with the adoption of migration policy documents.

Different waves of migration to Europe

According to Ceri Peach, professor of social geography of Oxford University, the migration to Europe has gone through three periods: “reflux”, “influx” and “refuge” (Peach 1997: 269). The first period “reflux” (1945-62) is characterized by the return of ethnic Europeans back to Europe from former European colonies, like French from North Africa or Dutch from
Indonesia. The second period was labour migration (1950-73 - labour migration, 1974-93 - family reunification), when European economies have expanded and were in need of workforce, Turks to Germany or Algerians to France. From 1950s to 1960s Western Europe encouraged migration to Europe in to rebuild post-war Europe (Melis, 2001: 10). The third period of migration (post-1988) that we observe even today is the flow of refugees and asylum seekers. The first refugees escaped from the Islamic revolution in Iran and North Africa followed by refugees from Eastern Europe after the fall of the USSR.

Even though the categorisation of these three periods of migration is not that clear as it looks like, it is possible to summarize them in time and contextual paradigm. Due to different origins of the immigrants, pushing and pulling factors the reaction towards immigrants and migration itself was different varying from sympathy and acceptance to panic (Peach, 1997: 270). Migration slowly started to be considered not only as an economic issue, but as a security matter (Melis, 2001: 11).

Europe has experienced a drastic change from being a continent of emigration during 1918 to 1945 to a continent of immigration after the World War II. As a consequence, the cultural and ethnic composition has become more complex and heterogeneous (Peach, 1997: 280-81).

Apart from time perspective the migration to Europe can be understood through the “geographical” perspective, namely, South-North migration (from the Mediterranean region and Sub-Saharan) and East-West migration (from Central and Eastern Europe) (Doomernik 1997: 284). These flows of migration are explained mostly by economic and political factors, like unemployment, economic crisis, the end of Cold War. When it comes to refugees on the contrary the routes are shaped according to the “intermediate structures” (economic and political links between countries) and geographical proximity (Doomernik 1997: 289).

Migration to the EU the last years was influenced by the events in the North Africa and Middle East, instable situation in Somalia, Ethiopia, Afghanistan, the Arab Uprising and latest, the civil war in Syria. FRONTEX Annual Risk Analysis from 2014 shows these migratory routes clearly (Frontex, 2014).

**Historical events: effect on EU migration**

There are a number of events occurring around the world that directly or indirectly affects the EU. In this chapter some of the major events are presented, inter alia, terror attacks in New

The impact of terror attacks in Europe

To identify if the terror attack of 9/11 has made some impact on EU immigration policy is not easy. By looking closer to the changes in the EU agenda, shifting to an agenda that prioritize security connected to issues of migration control, international crime and international terrorism, it is possible to draw some conclusions (Luedtke, 2009: 133).

By early 2001, the Schengen zone (EU External border agency) has become a fact, and the European commission has established the Tampere Programme (1999). This Programme, aimed to develop an open and secure EU, committed to the obligations of the Geneva Convention and able to address humanitarian needs based on solidarity. (Luedtke, 2009: 130). In 2001, ten days after the attack, the EU approved a package of anti-terrorist measures (Luedtke, 2009: 133). Furthermore, The European Council meeting on November 21,
announced that EU’s fight against terrorism is a priority objective. Adam Luedtke, Assistant Professor of Political Science at City University of New York, argues that EU developed a new perception that terrorists, or potential terrorists, were exploiting the national immigration and asylum rules. For example, the family reunification, which has always taken an important place in the EU’s common migration policy, gained a new form after 2001. One of those provision that concerned children reunification with family members, concluded that children above the age of 12 were restricted of the right to family reunion. Luedtke means that this restriction appears to be specifically aimed to deem a security threat related to young Muslim men. (Luedtke, 2009: 143).

Moreover, the terror attack in London 2005, and the terror attack in Madrid 2004 are not the first time Europe suffers of this kind of violence acts. The Irish Republican Army (IRA) established in 1920 and the Euskadi ta Askatasuna (ETA) establishes in 1959 have committed similar acts against innocent civilians in Europe before. However, Katie Friesen research at “School of International Studies”, University of Denver, argues that the Madrid bombings of 2004 and London bombings of 2005 have contributed to the orientation of security policy and society’s view of terrorism in Europe. She means that since these acts have taken place, many Muslims in Europe remain characterized by the society and by the media as extremist and unwelcome (Friesen, 2007: 12).

Financial crisis in Europe

Another meaningful event that has affected the world’s economy and not least the European economy is the financial crisis that began in 2008. The crisis in Europe has influenced the development of EU common politics and migration politics as well. According to European commission the economic crisis of 2008 is in “the midst of the deepest recession since the 1930s”, the Great Depression (European Commission Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs, 2009). The crisis began 2008 when the Iceland’s banking system collapsed then spread further to Ireland, Greece and Portugal during 2009. During this period the Europe has faced the collapse of financial institutions and high government debt that led to a low confidence in European economies (European Commission Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs, 2009).
Since it has not passed so long time after the crises can be considered has finished and the recession is gradually replaced by boom, it is problematic to talk about concrete changes. At the same time some facts should be mentioned. The financial crisis in Europe has shown how the relationship between Members States is functioning and that not all the states have been affected the same way. The economic crises is going to continue to have consequences for migration politics in long term, simply because the social-economic situation has changed, unemployment has risen, especially among youth and the social welfare system appeared not to work in all European states (European Commission Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs 2009). The rise of xenophobic moods and the “success” of far-right wing is also one of the consequences. The forecast for the results of the elections to the European parliament says that far-right parties would be able to build a coalition and even though they are still going to be a minority, their political power is growing.

The presented history of migration to Europe and the terror attacks in Europe and the USA, the financial crisis have influenced the development of the EU’s common migration politics and it’s discourses and are going to continue influence it. Consequently, they should be regarded in the analysis of the EU’s migration discourse. Further the empirical material, id est, policy documents are presented.

**Policy documents**

The empirical material of the study includes Convention implementing the Schengen Convention (2000), the Dublin Convention (1990) and policy documents of the European Asylum Support Office (EASO). These policies are: the Tampere Programme (1999), the Hague Programme (2005), the European Pact of Immigration and Asylum (2008), and the Stockholm Programme (2010).

EASO is EU’s agency that is responsible for developing of Common European Asylum System (CEAS) through enhancing of common practice on asylum matters (European Asylum Support Office, 2014). CEAS was firstly mentioned in the Tampere Programme (1999), when it was decided to work towards establishing of CEAS (European Council, 1999: section II of part A). The agency supplies the EU and Member States with necessary expertise in the field (European Asylum Support Office, 2014).
Furthermore, these six documents regarding the EU migration policy are fully committed to the obligations of the Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees of 1951 (further “the Geneva Convention”). All the EU Member States have signed and ratified the Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees of 1951, this means that the Member States of the EU have responsibility to inter alia adopt the national legislation concerning refugees (UN General Assembly, 1951: Article 36) and cooperate with UNHCR (UN General Assembly, 1951: Article 35) as well as admitting that there refugees unlawfully entering the territory of other states directly from the territories where their life or freedom are threatened, noting that contracting states shall not apply any restriction to the movement of such refugees and shall allow them a reasonable period of time in case they are obtaining admission in another country (UN General Assembly, 1951: Article 31).

It should be also noted that the Member States decided to adopt a common framework for intergovernmental cooperation in the area of security, foreign policy and justice by means of Maastricht Treaty (Melis, 2001: 13). In practice the Treaty of Maastricht (1992) meant that Member States had still the principal responsibility for the EU asylum policy, but the Council was required to associate the Commission’s work on asylum (Kaunert, Léonard, 2012b: 8).

The Treaty of Amsterdam (1999) created the area of freedom, security and justice and developed further the norms that were set up by the Treaty of Maastricht. Member States agreed by means of the Amsterdam Treaty to treat third country nationals matters on a common basis (Melis, 2001: 49-50) and rules regarding the EU’s external borders and immigration policy have become Community responsibility (van Krieken, 2001: V).

Further in December 2009 the Treaty of Lisbon was enacted to amend the constitutional treaties of Maastricht and Rome and completed the Treaty of Amsterdam. The entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty had significantly influenced the development of the EU asylum policy, because the EU was granted a new competence in the field of asylum, the EU institutions’ roll increased and, finally, the Charter of Fundamental Rights was rendered (Kaunert, Léonard, 2012: 1408).

Schengen Convention - free movement in Europe (2000)

The rise of immigration question on the EU policy agenda did not took place until the end of the 1980’s. The EU’s constitutional structure and European policies incorporated migration through transitional and intergovernmental fora, the Trevi accords and the Schengen
Agreement. Marco Martiniello, director of the centre for ethnic and migration studies in Belgium, claims that the application of the Schengen Agreement, developed in 1985, clearly associated immigration with criminality, terrorism and border control (Talani, 2012: 16, Martiniello, 2006: 316). The Schengen Agreement abolished internal borders within the EU, and created a common external border. The Agreement was created with the aim of common actions regarding the following points: free movement of people; facilitate the transportation and movements of goods; strength external border control; create an internal monitoring of people’s movement; cooperation within police and intelligence office; cooperation and harmonization of visa policy, asylum policy and control of irregular immigrants entry and stay. The Schengen Information System (SIS) was developed as common database with information about asylum seekers and police registers. This database is available for all Member States authorities (Hansen, 2008: 66). The Schengen agreement was developed primarily by the States of the Benelux Economic Union (Belgium, Netherlands and Luxembourg), the French Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany only, leaving other Member States outside of the decision making process (Martiniello, 2006: 316; Hansen 2008: 66). The fact that this agreement was negotiated behind closed doors, poses a major problem for European democracy. Martinello argues that the Schengen Agreement stresses interior or exterior frontier crossing, mobility conditions, visas and state responsibility for dealing with asylum applications (Martiniello, 2006: 316).

As consequence of the Schengen Convention (2000), which is the implementation of the Schengen Agreement established in 1985, the free-movement of people increased and the EU external borders became an issue that soon needed to be controlled. FRONTEX was established in 2004 and is the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union. In other words, FRONTEX has been established to manage and coordinate an operational external border control (European Union, 2014). Peo Hansen, professor at the Political Science department and the Institute for Research on Migration, Ethnicity and Society of Linköping University, argues that the fight against illegal immigrant has contributing to a major investments in the border control. He claims that FRONTEX can be seen as one of the main instruments of the EU that focus into improves the coordination of the fight against illegal immigration, especially in the Mediterranean area. (Hansen, 2008: 184). FRONTEX also carries out risk analyses, develops research studies related to the control and surveillance of external borders. (European Commission, 2014) The European commission called for a risk
analysis rapport on the illegal immigration coming from North Africans countries in order to the need of develop patrol networks in the Mediterranean Sea in cooperation with North African countries (Hansen, 2008: 184).

Dublin Convention - Country responsible for asylum application (1990)

Initially, the European cooperation on asylum was developed in the framework of the Ad Hoc Group on Migration in 1986. The group adopted a Convention that determines the state responsible for examining an application for asylum. This convention is known as the Dublin Convention, established in 1990 (Kaunert, Leonard 2012b: 7).

The EU has emphasized the necessity for restriction of population flows by developed common regulations (Talani, 2012:16). In terms of legally binding agreements, the Dublin Convention is the first document that is directly linked to asylum question (Martiniello, 2006:318). In 1990, the Dublin Convention determined the frame in which the EU Member State are responsible to scrutinize an application for asylum seekers pursuing international protection under the Geneva Convention of 1951 and the EU Qualification Directive (Talani, 2012: 16). In other words, this convention established how the Member States shall determine the State which is responsible for examining the application for asylum (Council of the EU, 1990: Article 15). This means that the state responsible is that of the applicant´s first entry into EU territory (Martiniello, 2006: 318). Moreover, the Eurodac was introduced in the frame of the Dublin Convention. This system highlights the restrictive basis of the Dublin Convention. (Huysmans, 2006: 68; Talani, 2012: 16). The Eurodac refers to a central register of fingerprints of all who claim asylum at the borders of Member States (Talani, 2012: 6). The European Commission claims that: “EURODAC makes it easier for EU States to determine responsibility for examining an asylum application by comparing fingerprint datasets.” (European Commission, 2013).


In 1999 a new step was taken towards a common asylum policy through the introduction of an area of freedom, security and justice. It was recognized for the first time that the EU needed a common migration policy based on the respect to human rights and freedoms and partnership with the countries of origin and transit (van Krieken, 2001: VI). During the Tampere Summit European leaders have agreed on a five years plan (1999-2004) to create a common procedure and status for granting refugee status and TPS, strengthen citizens’ access
to justice across borders and boost rights of long-term residents from non-EU countries (Winestock, 1999). The Tampere programme (also known as Tampere Milestones) and commitments that were taken by member states during the European Council aimed to adopt a more liberal and generous migration policy (Melis, 2001: 3).

Hague Programme (2005-2010)

Hague Programme was adopted in 2005 in replacement for the Tampere Programme (1999) and was applied during 2005-2009. The programme developed further norms and rules concerning strengthening of freedom, security and justice in the Union, such as asylum, migration and border policy, establishment of the Common European Asylum System (1999), integration and partnership with third countries (Kaunert, Léonard 2012b: 13-14). The programme was certainly affected by the terror attacks on September 11, 2001 in the USA and on March, 11, 2004 in Madrid in the way that security issues and border controls being more urgent. During the period when the Hague Programme (2005-2009) was valid an EU external borders agency, FRONTEX, was also created.

European Pact on Immigration and Asylum (2008)

The European Pact on immigration and asylum is the basis for common immigration and asylum policy in the EU (Council of the EU, 2008). This pact was adopted the 17 of June 2008, with the aim to create an including migration management among the EU, with the objectives of mutual solidarity and responsibility. The European Council made five basic commitments in the frame of the establishment of the Pact. This commitments regards: to organise legal immigration with regard to each Member States priorities and needs; to control illegal immigration; to reinforce border control; to construct a Europe of asylum; to improve partnership with countries of origin (Council of the EU, 2008: Article 4)

Stockholm Programme (2010-2014)

The Stockholm Programme is in turn a successor to the Hague programme (2005). The programme aims to strengthen EU citizens’ security and promote their rights, right to free movement inter alia. Apart from this, the following questions are included: asylum and migration policy (adoption of The Global Approach to Migration and Mobility in 2011), external borders controls and cooperation with third states, specifically in the south and
eastern borders (Kaunert, Léonard, 2012a: 1405). The Stockholm Programme as well was affected by the events prior to its adoption, such as economic crisis (Collett, 2013: 2), terror attacks in London (2005) and entering into force of the Lisbon Treaty (2009) by including new provisions in the Programme in comparison with previous ones and in the way that the EU as an organisation has become responsible under the European Convention for Human Rights (1953). The Stockholm Programme is valid until 2014.

Analysis

The analysis presents a number of discourses that are relevant to achieve the aim of the study. Additionally, these discourses are selected based on the theories that have been chosen as the theoretical framework for the analysis. Consequently, the outline for the following presentation of the discourses is made in accordance with the selected theories. Firstly the identity discourse will be presented, secondly the securitization discourse take place, named “threat discourse”, and finally the “Power discourse”, related to the Foucauldian notion of power that is presented in the documents in terms of solidarity and responsibility.

Identity discourse

With the help of discourse analysis and social constructivist theory about identities, a discourse concerning construction of different group identities due to citizenship can be identified.

Elspeth Guild, Jean Monnet Professor as personam at Radboud University, Nijmegen, claims that categorization of an individual as an immigrant has an immediate impact on the relationship between the host state and the individual. Guild means that the categorization leads to certain perceptions about individual’s social and economic situation (Guild, 2011: 82). Foucault’s notion about arbitrary classification of people and those categories are not neutral get it’s exemplification in the EU’s migration policies. Below are some examples of how this classification is done and normalised through two identified discourses: freedom of movement, identity and prejudice discourse.
Freedom of Movement

The regulation of process of migration and asylum seeking in the documents is accompanied by strengthening and promoting of human rights and freedoms, rule of law and democracy. Member States and the EU bear responsibility for human rights protection according to the Geneva Convention of 1951, the European Convention on Human Rights of 1953 and other human rights instruments. The leading human rights discourse in EU’s migration policy documents, the Schengen and Dublin Conventions can be characterized by different approaches towards EU’s citizens and third country nationals.

One of the central parts in human rights discourse belongs to the right to move freely throughout the European Union, while security and justice are considered to be a precondition for this right to be exercised (European Council, 1999: Article 2). The freedom of movement was the first time introduced in the Schengen Agreement of 1985 and Convention implementing Schengen Agreement of 2000. While abolishing the internal borders, the external borders of the EU were strengthened by, for instance, introducing penalties for the unauthorized crossing of external borders (Council of the EU, 2000: Article 3), introducing the category of “alien” while talking about non-EU citizens and “subjects to visa requirements” (Council of the EU, 2000: Article 5, 9, 19), as well as, introducing “thorough checks”, border controls and surveillance (Council of the EU, 2000: Article 6).

Strengthening of external borders in the way it is described before may represent one of the dividing practices that Foucault talked about, when certain members of society are physically excluded.

Furthermore, regulated migration flows being an issue of security and justice are also a precondition for the right to move freely. Even though freedom is proclaimed to be granted not only to the EU’s citizens, but to the third country nationals also, the further development of this rule in policy documents makes a distinction between these two groups. At the same the phrasing of the Article 3 of the Tampere Programme (1999) creates the dichotomy “we-them”:

“This freedom should not, however, be regarded as the exclusive preserve of the Union’s own citizens. It is very existence acts as a draw to many others world-wide who cannot enjoy the freedom Union citizens take for granted. It would be in contradiction with Europe’s traditions to deny such freedom to those whose
The dichotomization “we” or “the Union’s own citizens” versus “them” or “others” and the appellation of “Europe’s tradition” may be the way of creating ethnic boundaries through, firstly, common traditions and culture, and secondly, through the confirmation of the existence of others, that Fredrik Barth presented in his study of ethnic groups, which is describe earlier in the frame of social constructivism theory.

Furthermore, the right to move freely and reside freely is considered to be one of the central rights of the EU citizenship. Both The Hague (2005) and The Stockholm (2010) Programmes refer to this right in the EU’s citizenship context and point out its central and fundamental character:

“The right of all EU citizens to move and reside freely in the territory of the Member States is the central right of citizenship of the Union.” (European Council, 2005: Strengthening freedom, citizenship of the Union)

and

“The right to free movement of citizens and their family members within the Union is one of the fundamental principles on which the Union is based and of European citizenship. Citizens of the Union...” (European Council, 2010: Article 2.2)

These two quotes represent how two questions are joined together, id est the right to free movement and the EU citizenship.

Another distinction is made concerning lawfully resident in the Union and irregular immigrants. In the EU’s policy documents the term “illegal immigrant” is used in the sense of irregular immigrant, while most international fora prefer less normative terms as “undocumented” or “irregular” migrants. The division of third country nationals into legal and irregular is made exclusively according to the host state’s knowledge (Guild 2011: 82). The measures regarding fair treatment of third country nationals, integration and entitling them of rights and freedoms are directed to those nationals “who reside legally in the EU” (European Council, 1999: Article 18). There is no reference to irregular immigrants either in the human rights context generally or freedom of movement specifically.

The aspiration to entitle third country nationals who are lawfully resident in the EU may be observed, but the scope of rights they are entitled to is not the same as for the EU’s citizens.
EU’s citizens have a predominant role. By the virtue of fact that a person is a third country national it limits the scope of rights and freedoms. Article 21 of the Tampere Programme (1999) reads as follows:

“The legal status of third country nationals should be approximated to that of Member States' nationals. A person, who has resided legally in a Member State for a period of time to be determined and who holds a long-term residence permit, should be granted in that Member State a set of uniform rights which are as near as possible to those enjoyed by EU citizens…” (European Council, 1999: Article 21)

To sum up, freedom of movement can be characterized by different approaches towards the EU citizens, third country nationals residing legally in the EU and irregular immigrants. The scope of freedom varies depending on the category a person belongs to.

Integration and prejudice

Another discourse that can be identified, concerns integration and prejudice discourse in form of anti-racism and -xenophobia norms. As it was presented in the theoretical part xenophobia and discrimination are the forms of prejudice and the consequence of the collective identities formation and categorisation of people.

Integration is seen as a significant element in the development of an area of freedom, security and justice. Moreover, both the Hague (2005) and the Stockholm (2010) Programmes state that integration is a “two-way process” and requires commitment from both immigrants and the host society (European Council, 2005: Article 1.5, European Council, 2010: Article 6.1.5).

There are several elements of integration that are described in the policy documents as necessary for successful integration. Among them are access to employment, education opportunities and language skills. Both the Hague (2005), the Stockholm (2010) Programmes and the EPIA (2008) are permeated by the idea that immigrants should learn language of the hosting country and share “the European values” to be integrated:

“Integration: (...)  
- implies respect for the basic values of the European Union and fundamental human rights,
- requires basic skills for participation in society...” (European Council, 2005: article 1.5)

and

“They will include specific measures to promote language-learning and access to employment, essential factors for integration; they will stress respect for the identities of the Member States and the European Union and for their fundamental values” (Council of the EU, 2008: part I (g)).

To make it the other way round these conditions for successful integration may be interpreted as if an immigrant does not learn a language and does not share the fundamental values of the EU it will preclude the immigrant from successful integration. While successful integration is named as one of the necessities for stability and security and consequently learning language and sharing fundamental values are considered to be necessary for inter alia maintaining of security throughout the EU. This attitude towards successful integration and European values reflects the Eurocentric moods, with perhaps some anxiousness about immigration as a threat to social and cultural European identities.

Migration should be accompanied by measures for inclusion and integration, otherwise racist and xenophobic attitudes increase. Some studies have showed that migration to the EU is linked with growing right-wing political parties, xenophobia, intolerance and racism (Melis, 2001: 23). In the analysed documents there are some measures directed to prevent discrimination, racism, xenophobia and unfair treatment of some groups.

Already in the Tampere Programme in 1999 it was stated that there is a necessity to lead an open dialogue with civil society and strengthen citizens’ acceptance and support (European Council, 1999: Article 7) and that non-discrimination measures must be enhanced (European Council, 1999: Article 18). There is an assumption in the documents that the citizens of the EU lack the acceptance and tolerance towards other ethnicities:

“Since diversity enriches the Union, the Union and its Member States must provide a safe environment where differences are respected and the most vulnerable protected. Measures to tackle discrimination, racism, anti-Semitism, xenophobia and homophobia must be vigorously pursued.” (European Council, 2010: Articles 2.3, 2.3.1)

and
“All forms of discrimination remain unacceptable. The Union and the Member States must make a concerted effort to fully integrate vulnerable groups, in particular the Roma community, into society by promoting their inclusion in the education system and labour market and by taking action to prevent violence against them.” (European Council, 2010: Article 2.3.3)

According to discourse theory and the duality of structure, language does not only reflect the reality, but it also creates reality and social world. The discourse against discrimination, racism and xenophobia is chronologically reproduced in all policy documents, while there is some contradiction with integration and human rights discourses.

Asserting that successful integration requires employment, sharing European values and knowing respective European language limits immigrants’ opportunity to maintain their own identity and values. Securitizations scholars argued that integration in the EU is directed to shape a common culture and have control over the institutions of cultural reproduction, as school, religious institutions and language rights. The political decisions of the EU reflect the perceived threat towards “we” identity and societal security (Buzan, Waever, de Wilde, 1998: 122).

Categorisation of Immigrants

Further it is possible to observe a contradictory aspiration to make Europe attractive for highly qualified workers and at the same time prevent the brain drain in the third states. To begin with, Europe today is rehabilitating after the financial crises and is facing an economic challenge as a consequence of ageing population and changing demographic situation. There is a great demand of qualified workers that would contribute to the economic development. Europe is being often referred to as “an old continent” (Demeny, 2006: 31). The population of Europe is sinking and ageing, which leads to social and economic consequences for the societies. Different attempts have been taken in order to adjust to distortions of the ageing population, as automatisation of labour and new technologies, increasing of retirement age etc. (Demeny, 2006: 37). Migration may also be considered to be one of the answers to this challenge:

“Legal migration will play an important role in enhancing the knowledge-based economy in Europe, in advancing economic development, and thus contributing to the
implementation of the Lisbon strategy. It could also play a role in partnerships with third countries.” (Council of the EU, 2010: Article 1.4)

and

“It (international migration) can contribute decisively to the economic growth of the European Union and of those Member States which need migrants because of the state of their home countries, and thus contributes to their development” (Council of the EU, 2008)

Some features of this discourse can be pointed out. Firstly, it is legal immigrants that are seen as a resource, and irregular immigrants are not mentioned at all. Secondly, there is an interest in highly qualified workers (Council of the EU, 2008: Article I.b: “to increase the attractiveness of the European Union for highly qualified workers”), which means that the EU and its Member States would not spend their own economic resources to educate the workers, but would benefit from their competence and paid taxes.

Another example is taken from the Stockholm Programme, 2010:

“Access to Europe for businessmen, tourists, students, scientists, workers, persons in need of international protection and others having a legitimate interest to access the Union’s territory has to be made more effective and efficient.” (European Council, 2010: Article 1.1)

The syntax structure of the sentence, namely the mentioning of businessmen and tourists in the first place, followed by other categories and only in the end talking about persons in need of international protection reflects the discourse of the EU migration politics, its priorities and interests.

According to Barbara Melis, policy adviser of the European Parliament, the migration rules of the EU demonstrate concerns about the quantity and quality of new arrivals, in order to prevent arrivals of “wrong migrants”(Melis, 2001: 3). This statement gets its support in the policy documents where it is stated that the EU should be more attractive for high qualified workers. While the EU considers other categories than labour migrants, for example, refugees or asylum seekers as “non-economic” immigrants, it fails to see the potential and motivation to work among these groups (Colett, 2013: 2).

On the other hand, the EU has begun to address migration management through cooperation with third states, namely, migrant-sending states and transit states. This cooperation includes
two different approaches: on the one hand, strengthening of external borders and combating irregular migration, smuggling and trafficking, and on the hand, preventive measures in order to address the causes of migration, refugee flows and minimise the brain drain (Boswell, 2003: 619).

“Efforts to promote concerted mobility and migration with countries of origin should be closely linked with efforts to promote the development of opportunities for decent and productive work and improved livelihood options in third countries in order to minimise the brain drain.” (European Council, 2010: Article 6.1.2)

The commitment to prevent the brain drain from the third states is contradictory to the previous discourse, where the EU is willing to attract high qualified professionals from other states to enhance knowledge-based economy in Europe. It is well educated immigrants that tend to be more welcomed to the EU, than those who can be a burden for economy and social system.

Threat discourse - “we identity”

The EU common migration policy has developed securitization discourses in relation to migration, since the abolishment of internal borders (Schengen Agreement) in 1985. According to securitization theory, the world, and therefore also security threats, are socially constructed. This presumption that securitization theory is based on, applied to the analysis of the EU policy documents, may contribute to recognize the process through which an issue becomes a security threat (Leonard, 2011: 235). Furthermore, this part of the analysis, presents the “threat discourse” that can be identified by applying securitization theory, the concept of threat to the “we identity”, and the concept of Eurocentrism.

The Schengen Convention (2000) implies the development of a new migration policy common for all Member States. This common migration and asylum policy, that has been in force since 1999, has linked migration and security politics, amplifying the feeling of threat to EU’s security and affecting the “we identity” of EU citizens. In 1999, The Tampere presented its milestones towards a union of freedom, security and justice, giving an official starting point for a common migration and asylum policy. The milestone number 3 claims that:
“This in turn requires the Union to develop common policies on asylum and immigration, while taking into account the need for a consistent control of external borders to stop illegal migration and to combat those who organise it and commit related international crimes.” (European Council, 1999: Article 3)

The Tampere Milestones, as presented above, address the question of migration and asylum seekers in relation to security questions. As it is featured in the securitization theory, an issue can be defined as securitised when the societal security is based on collective and their identity. Furthermore, political decision, in this case in form of policy documents, can influence people’s identity by creating discourses that recognised, as it is presented in the quote above, asylum and immigrants as a security threat (Leonard, 2011:235, Wæver, Buzan; 1998:122). The EU common migration policy development has shown characteristic actions of securitization, reinforcing the “we identity” in the EU citizens. This may contribute to the increasing of fear towards immigrants. As it is featured in The Hague Programme (2005) regarding integration in the EU, reinforcing Eurocentric identity:

“Integration (...) implies respect for the basic values of the European Union and fundamental human right...” (European Council, 2005: Article 1.5)

This approach to integration may create tension and hostility between migration, identity and territory, implying that EU citizens can experience processes in which they perceive “the others” as a negative presence (Wæver, Buzan, 1993: 46, 163). The EU common migration policies as it is presented in this chapter may increase the Europeanisation process, which at the individual level leads EU citizens to see themselves as European, and therefore “the others” gain a picture of a possible threat to the European identity. (Wæver, Buzan, 1993: 62)

A possible reaction from society to such a threat is through moving the question of migration to the political agenda, leading to potentially securitization of the issue. Once the question of migration reaches the political agenda, this can be securitized and therefore legislations and border control can be implemented, such as the implementation of FRONTEX (Wæver, Buzan; 1998: 122). It is important to remark that the establishment of FRONTEX (2004), as it was presented in the background part, was developed after the EU common migration policy has been securitized, linking the implementation of borders control as a consequence of securitization trend (Leonard; 2011: 236). These securitization features can be identified throughout all EU common migration and asylum policy. Both the Tampere milestones
(1999), being the first official document, linked migration to security, and the Stockholm Programme (2010), being the last official document, claims that:

“A Europe that protects: An internal security strategy should be developed in order to further improve security in the Union and thus protect the lives and safety of citizens of the Union and to tackle organised crime, terrorism and other threats. The strategy should be aimed at strengthening cooperation in law enforcement, border management, civil protection, disaster management as well as judicial cooperation in criminal matters in order to make Europe more secure.” (European Council, 2010: Article 1.1)

Finally, as it is featured in the securitization theory, it is possible to identify discourses that present an issue as an existential threat. Further, this development of the EU common migration policy may lead to a feeling of threat to the European identity leading to insecurity, hostility and a negative picture of migration.

**Migration - Terrorism**

The following discourse may concretely present an example of a security issue that has been move to the migration agenda. This discourse regards the appearance of terrorism in EU common migration policy. Terrorism makes its first appearance in the Hague Programme (2005). Since the establishment of the Hague Programme (2005), the link made between terrorism and migration is clear.

Since terrorism has made its appearance in the official documents in the Hague Programme (2005) it is also possible to identify a relation between fighting terrorism and control borders. Moreover, the feeling of frighten towards asylum seekers and third country nationals has increased, opening a wider gap between EU citizens and migrants. Several studies claim that 9/11 created an opportunity to develop a number of different securitization discourse within migration policy, facilitating a link between the concepts of migration to terrorism (Friesen, 2007: 12, Huysmans, 1998: 226–55). The Stockholm Programme (2010) and the Hague Programme (2005) addressed the question of terrorism as question of border control in order to protect EU citizens:

“Security, by engaging with third countries to combat serious and organised crime, terrorism, drugs, trafficking in human beings and smuggling of persons, inter alia, by focusing the Union’s counter-terrorism activities primarily on prevention and by
protecting critical infrastructures, internal and external security are inseparable. Addressing threats, even far away from our continent, is essential to protecting Europe and its citizens.” (European Council, 2010: Article 7.3)

and

“The citizens of Europe rightly expect the European Union, while guaranteeing respect for fundamental freedoms and rights, to take a more effective, joint approach to cross-border problems such as illegal migration, trafficking in and smuggling of human beings, terrorism and organised crime, as well as the prevention thereof.” (European Council, 2005: Article 1)

As an example of this, the Stockholm Programme (2010) shows clear relation between security and migration policy, in which the migration policy-making bases on the protection of EU citizens rather than addressing the question of asylum, and socio economic immigrant, with a solidarity perspective. As it is feature in the securitization theory by moving a particular issue, in this case the violent acts of terrorism into a specific area, which in this case is the migration area, gives an special right to restrict it (Leonard, 2011: 235). Moreover, the relation between security and migration policy is characterized by the meaning that the safety of the EU citizens relies upon EU external border control. In this sense, it is possible to understand that migration is a threat for EU citizens. Furthermore, this discourse, can lead to the EU citizens to feel frighten by asylum seekers and irregular immigrants.

Recognising that threaten regarding terrorism is located outside the EU, leads to a straight link to migration. Even if the EU has been confronted by terror attacks since ETA and IRA established, the question of terrorism has not been approached before in terms of border control. Furthermore, FRONTEX is mention, in the Stockholm Programme (2010), as a tool to prevent terrorism.

“The threat of terrorism and organised crime remains high. It is therefore necessary to work with key strategic partners to exchange information while continuing to work on longer-term objectives such as measures to prevent radicalisation and recruitment, as well as the protection of critical infrastructures. Operational agreements by Eurojust, Europol, as well as working arrangements with Frontex, should be strengthened.” (European Council, 2010: Article 7.3).

Finally, these analyses present several discursive examples in EU common migration policies that relate terrorism to migration.
Power discourse

The next discourse that can be observed concerns power and how it gets its form according to the discourse theory and Foucault’s theory. Therefore looking back at the methodological part of the paper, it is advantageous to repeat Foucault’s notion that power is not a structural, but a relational environment. Within the power discourse in the EU’s migration policy it is possible to identify solidarity and responsibility discourse. This discourse reflects the power relationship that is built between the EU and its Member States.

To begin with, it has been proclaimed both in the Treaty of Amsterdam (1999) and in the policy documents that the EU’s common migration policy should be based on the principle of solidarity and shared responsibility. The issue of fair burden sharing between Member States has been characterized as one of the most sensitive and arguable issue in debate on migration (Toshkov, de Haan, 2013, Thielemann, 2004).

Originally in 1990 the Dublin Convention adopted a distribution of the examination of an asylum request by the Member States. The Dublin Convention included provisions about the Member States responsibility primarily to the country of first entry. Consequently, the quantity of asylum seekers coming to those states that are situated far away from the EU external borders and, for instance, Mediterranean states, is disproportionate (Thielemann, 2004: 58).

The policy documents at focus name solidarity as the basis to respond to humanitarian needs and protection for displaced persons. The necessity to share burden from economic and demographic developments within the EU may have its origin from the Tampere Programme (European Council, 1999: Article 4, 16) and up to the Stockholm Programme (European Council, 2010: Article 1.1). At the same time it is mentioned that one of the general principles is respect for the different legal systems and traditions in different Member States (European Council, 2005: General Principles).

Despite solidarity and shared responsibility principles there are some trends that show uneven burden, both economically and demographically. It is southern and eastern borders that are affected most. Eiko Thielemann in his article about refugee burden-sharing states that policy harmonisation undermines burden-sharing, which leads that some Member States are facing
substantially higher influx of immigrants, especially in comparison with their population size (Thielemann, 2004: 64). This disproportionality is named in the policies:

“...give fuller consideration, in a spirit of solidarity, to the difficulties of those Member States subjected to disproportionate influxes of immigrants...” (Council of the EU, 2008: Part III, d)

and

“For those Member States which are faced with specific and disproportionate pressures on their national asylum systems, due in particular to their geographical or demographic situation, solidarity shall also aim to promote, on a voluntary and coordinated basis, better reallocation of beneficiaries of international protection from such Member States to others, while ensuring that asylum systems are not abused. In accordance with those principles, the Commission, in consultation with the UNHCR where appropriate, will facilitate such voluntary and coordinated reallocation. Specific funding under existing EU financial instruments should be provided for this reallocation, in accordance with budgetary procedures...” (Council of the EU, 2008: Part IV, c)

While proclaiming solidarity as a general principle, the European Council states the following in the EPIA:

“The European Council recalls that each Member State is responsible for the controls on its section of the external border. That control, giving access to a common area of free movement, is exercised in a spirit of joint responsibility on behalf of all Member States.” (Council of the EU, 2008: Part III)

The recall may lead to the double interpretation of the responsibility that the Union and Member States have. There is an aspiration to introduce a common external border in order to secure the common area of free movement, but at once the European Council place responsibility for the border control on each Member States.

Apart from this, the consequences of the financial crisis have also showed how solidarity and responsibility principle is not working in practice. Spain, Portugal and Greece in the south, the Baltic States in the East and Ireland in the west are among those states that were affected
most, that in the EC report is called “A Symmetric Shock with Asymmetric Implications” (European Commission Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs, 2009).

To sum up the power relationship in the EU concerning migration demonstrates unequal and unfair distribution of burden between Member States, as well as distribution between the EU and Member States. These unequal conditions are the result of the EU regulations and norms. Moreover, the proclaimed solidarity principle is applied only in relation to the EU’s Member States, but not in relation to others.
Conclusion

Returning to the aim of the study and the questions posed at the beginning of this study, it is now possible to make some conclusions. This chapter presents firstly a discussion on the results and the analysis, secondly a discussion regarding the chosen theoretical framework and methodology, and finally some ideas about future research.

The aim of the study was to analyse the discursive construction of the immigrants’ identity within the EU’s common migration policy. This analysis was fulfilled through answering three research questions about what discourses are possible to identify within policies and agreements regarding the EU’s common migration policy, how these discourses are constructed and, finally, what are the consequences of these constructions for the immigrants’ identity.

Discussion on the Results of the Study

By looking at the results of the analysis it is possible to conclude that three discourses have been identified in the EU’s common migration policy in accordance with the theoretical framework and methodology of the study: identity discourse, securitization discourse and power discourse. These discourses were identified in the policy documents that concluded our empirical material. It is necessary to mention that the empirical material may include other discourses as well, but they are not relevant for this study.

The first discourse - identity discourse is constructed in several ways. Applying the theories of social constructivism and securitization together with Foucauldian discourse analysis it has been observed that behind the freedom of movement rules, integration and prejudice provisions, categorisation of immigrants lays the identity discourse. The identity discourse is constructed in a way, that one group, namely, the EU’s citizens, and the other group, immigrants, are dichotomized.

By identifying different approaches to the right to move freely in the documents and analysing the text the following conclusions can be drawn. Firstly there is a clear categorization of EU’s citizens, third country nationals who reside legally and irregular immigrants. This categorization and the fact that different groups obtain different scope of
rights and freedoms are represented as a consequence of the European community development and European citizenship. The fact that the EU citizens have more rights only by the virtue of their citizenship is being accepted and normalised.

According to social constructivists theory the European identity is constructed in contradiction to the “others”. The usage of phrases “our own citizens”, “the Union’s own citizens” and “our territory” reflects the social practices of setting distance between the Europeans and others. Another example is presenting human rights and freedom, democracy and rule of law as Europe’s traditions and values, that contributes to what Gergen called for “public reputation”, when the Europeans get the reputation of being law-abiding, respectful and democratic. This is something that should be questioned and problematized, since belonging to an ethnic group or obtaining of certain citizenship does not automatically lead to sharing the same values.

From the theoretical point of view of securitization it is possible to make some conclusions about how the “threat discourse” has been constructed. The social practice of setting distance between the Europeans and other mention the identity discourse, was also possible to identify within the securitization discourse and the notion of the we identity. The EU common migration policy documents, namely the empirical material for this analysis, have shown a clear link between the societal sector and the security agenda, leading to an evident securitization of migration. Expanding the security agenda into the societal sector has social and political consequences; moreover it contributes to the construction of the securitization discourses. Therefore, we can conclude that this study has shown that it is possible to identify a threat discourse in EU common migration policy documents and that this discourse can be seen as securitising practices. This justifies a number of policies that control migration in a way that would not have been considered legitimate otherwise (Buzan; 1998:24–5).

Finally, the power discourse is constructed through the solidarity and responsibility provisions between the Member States and the EU. The analysis has shown that the burden between the EU and the Member States, as well as between the Member States has been shared unequally due to simply different geographical positions and economic situation. The EU’s legislation, specifically, the Dublin Convention, legitimized an uneven distribution of asylum seekers. The consequences of this legislation and the economic crisis that has affected different Member States differently show how the power relations are constituted.
Further after it was presented how the discourses are constructed, the consequences of the identified discourses for the immigrants identity can be discussed. To begin with, the impact of categorising people in the migration context has been noted by Elspeth Guild and in more general terms by Pierré-André Taguieff in his description of principal cognitive processes leading to xenophobia and discrimination. Categorisation of people as “immigrants”, “aliens”, “third country nationals” in contrast to “citizens of the EU” and as “illegal/irregular immigrants” in contrast to “legally residing immigrants” is a first step followed by partly exclusion of respective groups from human rights discourse.

Apart from this, the duality in approaching freedom of movement for the EU citizens and for the third country nationals, contributes to develop a negative view towards immigrants and strength the “we” identity. The threat to the European identity lead to reinforcing the “we identity” in the EU citizens contributes to the increasing of fear towards immigrants as response to the believing that the EU identity is in risk. As it is presented in the result chapter, the construction of the securitization discourse has consequences in form of an increase fear towards third country nationals and asylum seekers, a fear of insecurity, and a feeling of threat to national economic well-being. This behaviour is a clear sign of securitization, being that these threats are presented in the discourse as real ones; it results in deep consequences in the EU societal sector increasing the gap between “we” and “them”, affecting integration. Thus, it is possible to conclude that constructions of the “we identity” discourses lead to a negative image for the immigrants identity.

Furthermore, the duality is presented in a manner that migration policy documents address European citizens’ freedom of movement in a completely opposite approach than the freedom of movement that third country nationals and asylum seekers have. On the one hand it represents the EU efforts to demolish the interior borders between the Member States for political and economic purposes, but on the other hand it implicates a reinforce of the external borders to maintain internal peace and security and even more important, to protect its’ citizens from external threats. This leads inevitably to the double standards strategy.

Consequently, it was also shown the discourses affect the view of immigrants. The results of this study support the idea that an increase negative picture of migration based on the notion of Eurocentrism is clearly presented in the policy documents. The documents that have been used as empirical material for this study present immigrants through different categories legitimizing a negative view towards asylum seekers and third country nationals.
Discussion on theory and methodology

According to the used theories and Foucault discourse analysis several discourse were identified that underlie the EU’s migration discourse. From a theoretical point of view, we can confirm that the chosen theoretical framework, formed by the social constructivist notion of ethnics groups formation, securitization theory, and Eurocentrism, has shown been relevant for the analysis of the identified discourses.

Approaching the social constructivist theory about the formation of identity, ethnic groups and dichotomization of “we” and “them” has contributed to the understanding that the EU’s policies themselves are not constituting ethnic groups of immigrants coming to the EU, but the EU’s policies create indirectly conditions for “we”-“them”, while mentioning “the EU’s own citizens” and “the others”, categorizing EU’s citizens and non-citizens, enabling different groups with different scope of rights and freedoms. These conditions that can be seen as a logic consequence of the establishment of the common area and need to strengthen exterior borders are one of the examples of the double standard strategy, used by the EU.

The securitization theoretical approach has contribute to the study by the particular development of the theory, which bases in European policy making, security studies and practice of discourses. This theory has given us tools to identify when a issue may be securitized, in this particular study, to understand how migration discourses can be constructed within securitized practice. Furthermore, the social constructivist approach to securitization studies has contributed to the analysis of how identities can be reconstituted within discourses.

The discourse theory about the role of language in creation reality and understanding the reality has confirmed the necessity to analyse the texts, since “words are deeds”. The wording, sentences structures, sequence of the words reflect the EU leading migration discourse, when businessmen, highly-qualified professionals, tourists and students are welcomed, and the asylum seekers are often mentioned in conjunction with criminalisation of migrations. What’s more, refugees and asylum seekers are not mentioned while talking about work that in turn shows that they are not considered being immigrants that may contribute with their knowledge and skills.
Finally, the two theoretical concepts used in the study, namely *Eurocentrism and Europeanization*, have contribute to the understanding of behaviours and attitudes regarding the European identity, as well as how the European values are presented in the EU common migration policy documents. These two concepts are directly linked to the study, given that the study analysis EU policy documents.

The methodology of the study, Foucauldian genealogical discourse analysis has been suitable for the analysis and to be able apply the selected theories to the empirical material. The method itself is rather ambiguous and may be interpreted in different ways, which make it difficult to apply. At the same time it provides more freedom and opportunities to analyse the problem and come with new results.

Even though the selected theories and methodology have contributed to the better understanding of the research problem and analysing it, *other theories and methods* could probably also contribute to a new perspective for the problem. Rational choice, that has an opposite philosophical premises in comparison with social constructivism, could be used in order to explain the EU’s approach towards different kinds of immigrants, especially, when it comes to highly qualified workers. Historical institutionalism, on the other hand, could be used in order to explain the historical development of the EU as an institution and historical development of the migration policies in relation to different events as critical junctures (terror attacks and others).

The application of rational choice or historical institutionalism would require another methodology and, therefore, it would result in other views on the research problem. The methodology of the study could be changed in favour of content analysis or analysis of ideas.

**Future researches**

Finally, the question that can be researched in the future, and that was not treated in this paper, inter alia, is the role of specific Member States that obtain more power in the EU, for instance, Germany or France and their impact on the migration policy of the EU, in contrast to other Member States, that consider leaving the EU, for example, the United Kingdom.
Other questions that were partly discussed in this paper but need to be researched deeper, are the events in the Mediterranean, that affect the EU’s common migration policy and it’s securitisation in form of the control of the external borders of the EU. Furthermore, the impact of the terror attacks in Europe, committed in 2004 and 2005 can be researched further with focus on the European values as the terrorist’s target.

The last two years have shown to be full of tragic events, mainly in Syria and Ukraine that may have consequences for the EU’s immigration. Other on-going conflicts and instabilities in the north-west Africa and the Middle East are shaping the migration flows to Europe and should be considered in the further migration policy-making.

Considering that the year 2014 is a year when some crucial decisions can be made, both by the EU’s citizens during the election to the European Parliament and by the EU’s Commission adopting a new policy that would replace the Stockholm Programme, future research may be proper to be made.

Finally, we want to remark that another approach to migration is possible. While addressing the EU’s Parliament in 2004, Kofi Annan, the former Secretary General of the UN, said “The message is clear. Migrants need Europe. But Europe also needs migrants. A closed Europe would be a meaner, poorer, weaker, older Europe. An open Europe will be a fairer, richer, stronger, younger Europe – provided you manage migration well.” (United Nations, 2004).
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