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När det offentliga är konsument utgör i normalfallet inte tidigareprestationer, oavsett om de är dåliga eller bra, del av grund förkontraktstilldelning. Här presenteras hur ratingsystem, liknande desom finns på privata marknader, kan utformas och användas i offentligupphandling. Därigenom ökar förutsättningarna för bättre matchningmellan vad som efterfrågas och vad som levereras. En annan möjligkonsekvens är att det blir mindre intressant för oseriösa leverantöreroch de som ägnar sig åt ekonomisk brottslighet, att delta i offentligupphandling. Analysen visar att det inte finns några betydande rättsligahinder för ett sådant system. 

Purpose: This study aims to empirically evaluate the effectiveness of government auditing of local authorities' compliance with the procurement rules.

Design/methodology/approach: A diff-in-diff approach is used where the measure of compliance is (changes in) the incidence of private litigation under the Public Procurement Act, in audited vs non-audited municipalities. Further, semi-structured interviews were conducted with chief procurement officials.

Findings: No statistically significant effect is found. While strong effects of audits can be ruled out, the statistical results and the interviews do not, however, contradict a modest but long-lasting effect.

Originality/value: Few studies have addressed the effect of public procurement auditing on compliance. This study develops an empirical framework and presents empirical results.

This article addresses the relation between the design of regulatory agencies and efficiency, arguing that authority concentrated to a single individual outperforms more collegial decision-making when the regulated firms' interests are aligned. The tentative explanation is that concentrated leadership reduces the risk for capture. This argument is developed from an empirical case on the markets for mobile and fixed broadband. In the mobile market, the regulated firms are similarly positioned, whereas in the fixed broadband market, the firms typically have adversarial positions, with an incumbent being challenged by entrants. A statistical analysis of regulatory agencies in 33 European countries lends support to the argument that regulation of mobile broadband benefits from having a single decision-maker whereas a bureaucratic regulation with more collegiality functions as well for the fixed broadband.