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Andersson, Gunnar
Publications (10 of 13) Show all publications
Andersson, G. (2019). Karl Popper und seine Kritiker: Kuhn, Feyerabend und Lakatos. In: Giuseppe Franco (Ed.), Handbuch Karl Popper: (pp. 717-731). Wiesbaden: Springer
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Karl Popper und seine Kritiker: Kuhn, Feyerabend und Lakatos
2019 (German)In: Handbuch Karl Popper / [ed] Giuseppe Franco, Wiesbaden: Springer, 2019, p. 717-731Chapter in book (Refereed)
Abstract [en]

Investigation of the criticism of Popper's philosophy of science from the point of view of the history of science. Is is shown how this criticism can be answered with the help of basic ideas in critical rationalism.

Abstract [de]

Thomas Kuhn, Paul Feyerabend und Imre Lakatos kritisieren Poppers Wissenschaftsauffassung mit den Argumenten, dass die Erfahrung keine sichere Grundlage für Falsifikationen von Theorien gibt, und dass falsifizierte Theorien in der Wissenschaftsgeschichte selten vollständig aufgegeben werden. Es wird gezeigt, dass eine kritische Diskussion von fehlbaren Prüfsätzen möglich ist, und dass es nicht notwendig ist, falsifizierte Theorien vollständig aufzugeben. Mit diesen Argumenten kann Kuhns, Feyerabends und Lakatos’ Kritik zurückgewiesen werden.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Wiesbaden: Springer, 2019
Keywords
Critical rationalism, philosophy of science, Kritischer Rationalismus, Induktion, Falsifikation, Prüfsatz, Theorie
National Category
Philosophy
Research subject
Theoretical Philosophy
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:umu:diva-165238 (URN)10.1007/978-3-658-16239-9_52 (DOI)978-3-658-16238-2 (ISBN)978-3-658-16239-9 (ISBN)
Available from: 2019-11-16 Created: 2019-11-16 Last updated: 2019-11-26Bibliographically approved
Andersson, G. (2019). Kritische Prüfung und Erkenntnisfortschritt. In: Giuseppe Franco (Ed.), Begegnungen mit Hans Albert: Eine Hommage (pp. 23-38). Wiesbaden: Springer
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Kritische Prüfung und Erkenntnisfortschritt
2019 (German)In: Begegnungen mit Hans Albert: Eine Hommage / [ed] Giuseppe Franco, Wiesbaden: Springer, 2019, p. 23-38Chapter in book (Refereed)
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Wiesbaden: Springer, 2019
National Category
Humanities and the Arts
Research subject
Theoretical Philosophy
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:umu:diva-156354 (URN)
Available from: 2019-02-12 Created: 2019-02-12 Last updated: 2019-02-12
Andersson, G. (2018). Karl Popper und seine Kritiker: Kuhn, Feyerabend und Lakatos. In: Giuseppe Franco (Ed.), Handbuch Karl Popper: Springer Reference Geisteswissenschaften. Wiesbaden: Springer
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Karl Popper und seine Kritiker: Kuhn, Feyerabend und Lakatos
2018 (German)In: Handbuch Karl Popper: Springer Reference Geisteswissenschaften / [ed] Giuseppe Franco, Wiesbaden: Springer , 2018Chapter in book (Refereed)
Abstract [de]

Thomas Kuhn, Paul Feyerabend und Imre Lakatos kritisieren Poppers Wissenschaftsauffassung mit den Argumenten, dass die Erfahrung keine sichere Grundlage für Falsifikationen von Theorien gibt, und dass falsifizierte Theorien in der Wissenschaftsgeschichte selten vollständig aufgegeben werden. Es wird gezeigt, dass eine kritische Diskussion von fehlbaren Prüfsätzen möglich ist, und dass es nicht notwendig ist, falsifizierte Theorien vollständig aufzugeben. Mit diesen Argumenten kann Kuhns, Feyerabends und Lakatos’ Kritik zurückgewiesen werden.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Wiesbaden: Springer, 2018
Series
Springer Reference Geisteswissenschaften, ISSN 2524-373X, E-ISSN 2524-3721
Keywords
Kritischer Rationalismus, Induktion, Falsifikation, Prüfsatz, Theorie
National Category
Philosophy
Research subject
Theoretical Philosophy
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:umu:diva-156379 (URN)10.1007/978-3-658-16242-9_52-1 (DOI)978-3-658-16242-9 (ISBN)
Available from: 2019-02-13 Created: 2019-02-13 Last updated: 2019-12-06Bibliographically approved
Andersson, G. (2016). The Problem of the Empirical Basis in Critical Rationalism. In: Jeremey Shearmure and Geoffrey Stokes (Ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Popper: (pp. 125-142). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
Open this publication in new window or tab >>The Problem of the Empirical Basis in Critical Rationalism
2016 (English)In: The Cambridge Companion to Popper / [ed] Jeremey Shearmure and Geoffrey Stokes, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016, p. 125-142Chapter in book (Refereed)
Abstract [en]

In order to test theories scientists use statements about observations and experiments. How  these test statements should be selected is a problem in Critical Rationalism. Different solutions to this problem are discussed. It is argued that test statements can be tested and critically discussed by comparing them with other test statements or by deriving unproblematic test statements.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016
Series
Cambridge companions to philosophy
Keywords
Critical rationalism, empirical basis, criticism
National Category
Philosophy, Ethics and Religion
Research subject
Theoretical Philosophy
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:umu:diva-124863 (URN)10.1017/CCO9781139046503 (DOI)978-0-521-85645-4 (ISBN)978-0-521-67242-4 (ISBN)978-1-139-04650-3 (ISBN)
External cooperation:
Available from: 2016-08-29 Created: 2016-08-29 Last updated: 2018-06-07
Andersson, G. (2013). Is Experience a Reason for Accepting Basic Statements?. In: C. Svennerlind, J. Almäng & R. Ingthorsson (Ed.), Johanssonian Investigations: Essays in Honur of Ingvar Johansson on His Seventieth Birthday (pp. 42-52). Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Is Experience a Reason for Accepting Basic Statements?
2013 (English)In: Johanssonian Investigations: Essays in Honur of Ingvar Johansson on His Seventieth Birthday / [ed] C. Svennerlind, J. Almäng & R. Ingthorsson, Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag , 2013, p. 42-52Chapter in book (Refereed)
Abstract [en]

The act of accepting a basic statement is distinguished from the logical justification of the content of a basic statement. Although experience cannot logically justify the content of a basic statement, it is argued that experience might be a reason for accepting a basic statement.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag, 2013
Keywords
Basic Statement, rationality, critical rationalism
National Category
Philosophy
Research subject
Theoretical Philosophy
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:umu:diva-66728 (URN)9783868381900 (ISBN)
Available from: 2013-03-04 Created: 2013-03-04 Last updated: 2018-06-08Bibliographically approved
Andersson, G. (2012). Den kritiska rationalismens intellektuella moral. In: Ola Lindberg (Ed.), Från ett öppet universum: Studier i Karl Poppers filosofi (pp. 18-26). Umeå: h:ström
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Den kritiska rationalismens intellektuella moral
2012 (Swedish)In: Från ett öppet universum: Studier i Karl Poppers filosofi / [ed] Ola Lindberg, Umeå: h:ström , 2012, p. 18-26Chapter in book (Other academic)
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Umeå: h:ström, 2012
Keywords
kritisk rationalism, intellektuell moral, Popper
National Category
Philosophy
Research subject
Theoretical Philosophy
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:umu:diva-61616 (URN)
Available from: 2012-11-20 Created: 2012-11-20 Last updated: 2018-06-08Bibliographically approved
Andersson, G. (2010). Rättfärdigande och kritisk prövning. Filosofisk Tidskrift, 31(3), 33-39
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Rättfärdigande och kritisk prövning
2010 (Swedish)In: Filosofisk Tidskrift, ISSN ISSN 0348-7482, Vol. 31, no 3, p. 33-39Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Stockholm: Thales, 2010
Keywords
Rättfärdigande, kritisk prövning, kritisk rationalism
National Category
Philosophy
Research subject
Theoretical Philosophy
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:umu:diva-36308 (URN)
Available from: 2010-09-27 Created: 2010-09-27 Last updated: 2018-06-08Bibliographically approved
Andersson, G. (2009). Critical rationalism and the principle of sufficient reason. In: Rethinking Popper (pp. 21-30). Berlin: Springer
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Critical rationalism and the principle of sufficient reason
2009 (English)In: Rethinking Popper, Berlin: Springer , 2009, p. 21-30Chapter in book (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.))
Abstract [en]

According to the principle of sufficient reason we should always try to give sufficient reasons for the truth (or high probability) of our opinions. All such attempts lead to a trilemma of justification: they force us to choose between infinite regress, logical circle, or dogmatism. According to the principle of critical testing we should always try to test our opinions critically. It is reasonable to claim that opinions that has survived critical tests are true. Such truthclaims are conjectural and do not confront us with any trilemma of justification. Scientific theories can be tested through observations and experiments. Statements about observations and experiments can be tested by experience. Although Critical Rationalism is a philosophical position, it can also be critically discussed. If we follow the principle of critical testing, no trilemma of justification arises when we claim that it is reasonable to accept Critical Rationalism. This opens the way for a critical philosophy stressing the fallibility of human knowledge.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Berlin: Springer, 2009
Keywords
Critical rationalism, justification, criticism, sufficient reason
National Category
Specific Literatures History of Ideas
Research subject
Theoretical Philosophy
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:umu:diva-21727 (URN)978-1-4020-9337-1 (ISBN)
Available from: 2009-04-17 Created: 2009-04-17 Last updated: 2018-06-08Bibliographically approved
Andersson, G. (2009). Förnuftig tro och intellektuell moral. Filosofisk Tidskrift, 30(4), 13-18
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Förnuftig tro och intellektuell moral
2009 (Swedish)In: Filosofisk Tidskrift, ISSN 0348-7482, Vol. 30, no 4, p. 13-18Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Stockholm: Akademilitteratur, 2009
Keywords
Reasonable belief, critical rationalism, Förnuftig tro, intellektuell moral, kritisk rationalism
National Category
Philosophy
Research subject
Theoretical Philosophy
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:umu:diva-30382 (URN)
Available from: 2009-12-19 Created: 2009-12-19 Last updated: 2018-06-08Bibliographically approved
Andersson, G. (2009). Review of Herbert Keuth: The Philosophy of Karl Popper. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press [Review]. Philosophy of the social sciences, 39(2), 324-332
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Review of Herbert Keuth: The Philosophy of Karl Popper. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press
2009 (English)In: Philosophy of the social sciences, ISSN 0048-3931, E-ISSN 1552-7441, Vol. 39, no 2, p. 324-332Article, book review (Other academic) Published
Keywords
Critical Rationalism, Karl Popper
National Category
Philosophy
Research subject
Theoretical Philosophy
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:umu:diva-23014 (URN)10.1177/0048393109332145 (DOI)
Available from: 2009-05-26 Created: 2009-05-26 Last updated: 2018-06-08Bibliographically approved
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