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Publications (10 of 20) Show all publications
Sundström, P. (2018). Are Sensory Concepts Learned by "Abstraction" from Experience?. Erkenntnis
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Are Sensory Concepts Learned by "Abstraction" from Experience?
2018 (English)In: Erkenntnis, ISSN 0165-0106, E-ISSN 1572-8420Article in journal (Refereed) Epub ahead of print
Abstract [en]

In recent years, many philosophers and scientists have argued or accepted that it is impossible to learn primitive sensory concepts like "blue" and "red". This paper defends a more qualified picture. I try to show that some received characterisations of "learning" are nonequivalent and point towards different learning-nonlearning distinctions. And, on some ways of specifying such a distinction, it might be correct that we do not and cannot "learn" a concept of blue. But on other ways of specifying such a distinction, we can and do sometimes "learn" a concept of blue from experiences of blue. The latter part of the argument connects with some traditional "abstractionist" views, and I defend the present claims in view of some widely circulated concerns about "abstracting" concepts from experience. I close with some reflections on how one might, in view of all this, think about "the learning-nonlearning distinction".

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Springer, 2018
Keywords
concept learning, sensory concepts, nativism, abstractionism, Fodor
National Category
Philosophy
Research subject
Theoretical Philosophy
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:umu:diva-146884 (URN)10.1007/s10670-018-0002-z (DOI)2-s2.0-85045460424 (Scopus ID)
Available from: 2018-04-21 Created: 2018-04-21 Last updated: 2019-06-04
Sundström, P. (2018). How physicalists can - and cannot - explain the seeming "absurdity" of physicalism. Philosophy and phenomenological research, 97(3), 681-703
Open this publication in new window or tab >>How physicalists can - and cannot - explain the seeming "absurdity" of physicalism
2018 (English)In: Philosophy and phenomenological research, ISSN 0031-8205, E-ISSN 1933-1592, Vol. 97, no 3, p. 681-703Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

According to a widely held physicalist view, consciousness is identical with some physical or functional phenomenon just as liquidity is identical with loose molecular connection. To many of us, this claim about consciousness seems more problematic than the claim about liquidity. To many—including many physicalists—the identification of consciousness with some physical phenomenon even seems "absurd" (Papineau 2002) or "crazy" (Perry 2001). A full defence of physicalism should explain why the allegedly correct hypothesis comes across this way. If physicalism is true and we have reason to accept it, why does it seem "absurd"? One possibility is that this is fully explained by the fact that we have an erroneous understanding of consciousness or its physical basis. This explanation is embraced by few if any physicalists. It is rejected by many, including proponents of the "phenomenal concept strategy", which lately has become the dominant strategy for defending physicalism. But the "error explanation" is clearly the most plausible explanation that is available to physicalists. So this paper argues.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Blackwell Publishing, 2018
National Category
Philosophy
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:umu:diva-133599 (URN)10.1111/phpr.12394 (DOI)000450091700007 ()2-s2.0-85017376418 (Scopus ID)
Available from: 2017-04-13 Created: 2017-04-13 Last updated: 2019-01-08Bibliographically approved
Sundström, P. (2018). On representationalism, common-factorism, and whether consciousness is here and now. Philosophical Studies
Open this publication in new window or tab >>On representationalism, common-factorism, and whether consciousness is here and now
2018 (English)In: Philosophical Studies, ISSN 0031-8116, E-ISSN 1573-0883Article in journal (Refereed) Epub ahead of print
Abstract [en]

A strong form of representationalism says that every conscious property of every mental state can be identified with some part of the state’s representational properties. A weaker representationalism says that some conscious property of some mental state can be identified with some part of the state’s representational properties. David Papineau has recently argued that all such theories are incorrect since (a) they construe consciousness as consisting (partly or wholly) in ‘‘relations to propositions or other abstract objects outside space and time’’, whereas (b) consciousness is ‘‘concrete’’ and ‘‘here and now’’. Papineau defends instead a kind of ‘‘qualia theory’’ according to which all conscious properties are intrinsic non-relational properties of subjects. He argues that this theory bypasses the difficulties he identifies for representationalism. Similar worries about representationalism, and similar ideas to the effect that some qualia theory, adverbial theory, or sense-datum theory fares better with respect to these worries are relatively wide-spread. I argue that Papineau’s theory does not bypass the difficulties he identifies for representationalism. In fact, Papineau’s theory arguably has no advantage at all over representationalism with regard to these issues. The features that concern Papineau about representationalist views do not derive—or do not derive solely—from the representationalism of these views. They (also) derive from a common-factorism of these views. And this common-factorism is embraced by Papineau as well as by most theories of consciousness and perception.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Springer, 2018
Keywords
Representationalism, Common-factor theory, Consciousness, Perception, Concrete, Abstract
National Category
Philosophy
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:umu:diva-150555 (URN)10.1007/s11098-018-1139-y (DOI)2-s2.0-85049835234 (Scopus ID)
Available from: 2018-08-12 Created: 2018-08-12 Last updated: 2019-06-04
Sundström, P. (2018). Primitive Colors: A Case Study in Neo-pragmatist Metaphysics and Philosophy of Perception [Review]. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Primitive Colors: A Case Study in Neo-pragmatist Metaphysics and Philosophy of Perception
2018 (English)In: Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, ISSN 1538-1617, E-ISSN 1538-1617Article, book review (Refereed) Published
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
University of Notre Dame Press, 2018
National Category
Philosophy
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:umu:diva-150556 (URN)
Note

Review of Joshua Gert, Primitive Colors: A Case Study in Neo-pragmatist Metaphysics and Philosophy of Perception, Oxford University Press, 2017, 237 pp., ISBN 9780198785910.

Review published 2018.06.11.

Available from: 2018-08-12 Created: 2018-08-12 Last updated: 2019-06-04Bibliographically approved
Sundström, P. (2015). Vad är varseblivningens genomskinlighet och vad följer av den?. Filosofisk Tidskrift, 36(3)
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Vad är varseblivningens genomskinlighet och vad följer av den?
2015 (Swedish)In: Filosofisk Tidskrift, ISSN 0348-7482, Vol. 36, no 3Article in journal (Other academic) Published
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Bokforlaget Thales, 2015
National Category
Philosophy
Research subject
Theoretical Philosophy
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:umu:diva-112438 (URN)
Available from: 2015-12-07 Created: 2015-12-07 Last updated: 2018-06-07Bibliographically approved
Sundström, P. (2014). Two types of qualia theory. Harvard Review of Philosophy, 20, 107-131
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Two types of qualia theory
2014 (English)In: Harvard Review of Philosophy, ISSN 1062-6239, E-ISSN 2153-9154, Vol. 20, p. 107-131Article in journal (Other academic) Published
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Harward review of philosophy, 2014
National Category
Philosophy
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:umu:diva-94884 (URN)
Available from: 2014-10-19 Created: 2014-10-19 Last updated: 2018-06-07Bibliographically approved
Sundström, P. (2013). Are colours visually complex?. In: Christer Svennerlind, Jan Almäng and Rögnvaldur Ingthorsson (Ed.), Johanssonian Investigations: Essays in Honour of Ingvar Johansson on His Seventieth Birthday (pp. 627-639). Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Are colours visually complex?
2013 (English)In: Johanssonian Investigations: Essays in Honour of Ingvar Johansson on His Seventieth Birthday / [ed] Christer Svennerlind, Jan Almäng and Rögnvaldur Ingthorsson, Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag, 2013, p. 627-639Chapter in book (Other academic)
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag, 2013
National Category
Philosophy
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:umu:diva-68051 (URN)
Available from: 2013-04-11 Created: 2013-04-11 Last updated: 2018-06-08Bibliographically approved
Sundström, P. (2011). On imagism about phenomenal thought. Philosophical Review, 120(1), 43-95
Open this publication in new window or tab >>On imagism about phenomenal thought
2011 (English)In: Philosophical Review, ISSN 0031-8108, E-ISSN 1558-1470, Vol. 120, no 1, p. 43-95Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

Imagism about Phenomenal Thought is (roughly) the view that there is some concept Q (for some sensory quality Q) that we can employ only while we experience the quality Q. I believe this view is theoretically significant, is or can be made intuitively appealing, and is explicitly or implicitly accepted by many contemporary philosophers. However, there is no good reason to accept it. Or so I argue.

National Category
Philosophy
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:umu:diva-50819 (URN)10.1215/00318108-2010-018 (DOI)
Available from: 2011-12-22 Created: 2011-12-22 Last updated: 2018-06-08Bibliographically approved
Sundström, P. (2011). Phenomenal concepts. Philosophy Compass, 6(4), 267-281
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Phenomenal concepts
2011 (English)In: Philosophy Compass, ISSN 1747-9991, E-ISSN 1747-9991, Vol. 6, no 4, p. 267-281Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

It’s a common idea in philosophy that we possess concepts of a peculiar kind by which we can think about our conscious states in ‘inner’ and ‘direct’ ways, as for example, when I attend to the way a current pain feels and think about this feeling as such. Such ‘phenomenal concepts’ figure in a variety of theoretical contexts. The bulk of this article discusses their use in a certain strategy – the phenomenal concept strategy– for defending the physicalist view that conscious states are reducible to brain states. It also considers, more briefly, how phenomenal concepts have been used to defend dualism about consciousness, and how they have been used to explain our special access to our consciousness. It concludes with a discussion about whether, and in what more precise sense of the term, we at all possess ‘phenomenal concepts’ of our conscious states.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Blackwell Publishing, 2011
National Category
Philosophy
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:umu:diva-50820 (URN)10.1111/j.1747-9991.2011.00384.x (DOI)
Available from: 2011-12-22 Created: 2011-12-22 Last updated: 2018-06-08Bibliographically approved
Sundström, P. (2008). A somewhat eliminativist proposal about phenomenal consciousness. In: Reduction and Elimination in Philosophy and the Sciences: Papers of the 31st International Wittgenstein Symposium. Paper presented at The 31st International Wittgenstein Symposium, Kirchberg am Wechsel, 10 - 16 of August 2008 (pp. 340-342). The Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society: Kirchberg am Wechsel
Open this publication in new window or tab >>A somewhat eliminativist proposal about phenomenal consciousness
2008 (English)In: Reduction and Elimination in Philosophy and the Sciences: Papers of the 31st International Wittgenstein Symposium, The Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society: Kirchberg am Wechsel , 2008, p. 340-342Conference paper, Published paper (Other academic)
Abstract [en]

This paper develops a proposal about phenomenalconsciousness that is (somewhat) eliminativist in two respects. First, regarded in the light of some commonways of conceiving of consciousness, the proposal is "deflationary". Second, it opens up space for adevelopment in which what we now naturally think about as consciousness turns out to be many different things.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
The Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society: Kirchberg am Wechsel, 2008
National Category
Philosophy
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:umu:diva-10902 (URN)
Conference
The 31st International Wittgenstein Symposium, Kirchberg am Wechsel, 10 - 16 of August 2008
Available from: 2008-11-03 Created: 2008-11-03 Last updated: 2018-06-09Bibliographically approved
Projects
Reference and Frege puzzles [F13-0220:1_RJ]; Umeå UniversityWhere is there causation? [F17-1096:1_RJ]; Umeå University
Organisations
Identifiers
ORCID iD: ORCID iD iconorcid.org/0000-0001-5378-3094

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