We evaluate whether an econometric technique that is used in the spatial econometrics and network effects literature can be adopted as a test for collusive bidding in public procurement auctions. The proposed method is applied to the Swedish asphalt cartel that was discovered in 2001. Our dataset covers the period 1995–2009, which makes it possible to test for conditional independence between complementary cartel bids before and after 2001. Our estimates show a significant positive correlation between complementary cartel bids during the cartel period, whereas a non-significant correlation is shown during the later period. The variance of the parameter estimate of interest also differs between the periods, which suggests a structural change in bidding behavior among cartel members between the two periods.

Theories of inter-jurisdictional tax-competition, yardstick competition and expenditure spillovers all assume fiscal decisions of one jurisdiction to influence fiscal decisions of other jurisdictions. This paper empirically addresses the issue if the income tax setting behavior by one local government influence the tax setting behavior of other local governments. The main purpose of this paper is to test for inter-jurisdictional influence in tax setting behavior across Swedish jurisdictions. In particular, the aims in this paper is to answer two questions: 1) Do the local tax level in one jurisdiction depend on the tax level in other jurisdictions, and 2) Do tax adjustments in one jurisdiction depend on tax adjustments in other jurisdictions. The empirical strategy is to use spatial econometric methods to estimate fiscal reaction functions where, conditional on other covariates, the tax rate in one jurisdiction depends on the tax rates in other jurisdictions. In the previous literature it is often assumed that interaction only exist among geographically close jurisdictions such as jurisdictions who share a common border or are within a pre-defined geographical distance. Although such definition are reasonable, it is also reasonable to define closeness based on distance in for instance population size or population density, age structure and political preferences. That is, a densely populated jurisdiction may relate and more influenced by the tax setting behavior by other densely populated jurisdictions compared to geographically closer but small jurisdictions. Moreover, we also allow for sequential decision making in that the tax decision made by municipality  at time  depend on the tax rate in a neighbouring municipality  at time .

A data set covering all 290 Swedish municipalities between 2003-2016 constitute the base of analysis. One advantage of using data on local Swedish governments is that they have for long enjoyed considerable autonomy from the national government in that they set their own budget, make their own priorities and exercise powers of income taxation. Another advantage of is that since they work within the same legal and institutional system, many of the problems associated with cross-country studies are avoided. Our results points in the direction of no or small effects.

Does academic research affect local growth? Empirical evidence based on Swedish data, Regional Studies. The hypothesis that research activities do not merely affect the growth rate within the municipality hosting the university or university college but spill over to neighbouring municipalities is tested using data covering the Swedish municipalities between 1990 and 2010. Research activities are measured as the number of dissertations and the number of papers published in academic journals with peer-review system. The results suggest academic institutions by their presence and 'production' of human capital and new knowledge through research affect the regional growth pattern in both the municipality where the academic institution is located and the growth pattern of neighbouring municipalities.

Theories of inter-jurisdictional tax- and yardstick competition assume the tax decision of one jurisdiction to influence the tax decision of other jurisdictions. This paper empirically addresses the issue of horizontal dependence in local income tax rates across jurisdictions. Based on a large data set covering Swedish municipalities over a period of 14 years our results points in the direction of a positive horizontal dependence due to inter-jurisdictional tax competition.

This paper explores the potential of using the Moran’s I statistic to detect complementary bidding on public contracts. The test is applied to data concerning the so-called Swedish asphalt cartel, which was discovered in 2001. Using information on submitted bids and procurement characteristics for both the cartel period (1995–2001) and the post-cartel period (2003–2009), the Moran’s I correctly predicts complementary bidding behavior for linear and quadratic specifications when such behavior is likely to exist, and rejects such behavior when it’s unlikely to be present. Remarkably, the Moran’s I also correctly indicates and rejects complementary bidding on the basis of information on the separate bids alone.

In this paper we test the hypothesis of strategic interaction in the provision of elderlycare services across Swedish local governments. The theoretical model used for this purposedi¤ers from that presented by Brueckner (2000) in that the elderly (poor) are not allowedto migrate but the workers (rich) who pay for the elderly care are. The empirical analysisis based on a data set covering Swedish municipalities during the period between 2003 and2011, and a spatial lag econometric model is applied to estimate reaction functions. Theresults provide no clear-cut evidence for strategic interactions in the provision of elderly careservices which contradicts some previous research in this area.

This chapter gives an exploratory description of the spatial distribution of relative local tax bases and private wealth as well as the growth rate in these variables across Swedish municipalities during the period 1992–2013. The main aim is to test the hypothesis that municipalities with relatively high tax bases and high private wealth, such as relative capital incomes or private property values and changes in these variables, are more spatially clustered than could be caused by pure chance. The chapter is purely descriptive where we make use of two frequently used statistical tests for spatial correlation, the global Moran's I and the local G i* (d)-statistic, as well as maps to identify what we refer to as regional 'hot spots'. That is, clusters of municipalities with high local tax bases and private wealth in combination with high growth rates in these variables. This chapter also serves as a guide to how the global Moran's I and the local G i * (d)-statistic could be used with application to the spatial distribution of local tax bases and private wealth across Swedish municipalities. Even though this paper focuses on local tax bases and private wealth, the method applied could of course be used to identify other types of clusters such as industrial clusters, clusters of individuals and/or industries with specific human capital and knowledge, different types of crimes, etc.

Theoretical models of strategic interaction between local governments are often implemented empirically using spatial econometric techniques. In order to empirically discriminate between different theoretical explanations for strategic interactions, it is important to ensure that the spatial weights matrix W reflects the theoretical mechanisms behind the interaction of interest. However, researchers do not usually have the information required to adequately define its elements in such a way. Here, we present a method for defining these elements that captures the interest of one jurisdiction's inhabitants in the local politics of their neighboring jurisdictions even when this information is not directly available to the researcher. The method is suitable for use in empirical models of strategic interaction between local jurisdictions and can be used to define spatial weights matrices for spatial econometric models that will be used to test or control for yardstick competition across jurisdictions.

Controlling for differences in taxes and transportation costs, the Nordic Competition Authorities claims, in a report from 2005, that food prices are 11% higher in Sweden compared to the EU-15 countries. One explanation for this put forward in the report is the limited competition on this market which suggests there to be a potential for lower food prices. This paper focuses on distributional effects of a price decrease on food. Based on a simple model of household utility, the households demand for food is derived and estimated. Price and income elasticities for different income groups are then calculated based on these parameter estimates. Our results suggest that food is a normal good with an average income elasticity of approximately 0.18 and a price elasticity of 0.45. In addition, and of importance from a policy perspective, the results indicate the income elasticity to differ across income groups while price elasticities are constant.