I denne artikkelen analyserer vi den tiltenkte effekten av revisjonsforordningen om begrensninger i honorar for rådgivningstjenester (537/2014/EU). ³⁷ Den monetære begrensningen på rådgivningstjenester er satt til maksimalt 70 prosent av de siste tre års gjennomsnittlige honorar for lovpålagt revisjon. ³⁸ Vi undersøker hvorvidt målsettingen om økt revisjonskvalitet gjennom reduserte rådgivningstjenester har stadfeste i empiri.

Vi benytter estimerte skjønnsmessige periodiseringer som måleparameter på revisjonskvalitet, ettersom dette er et relevant mål på revisors evne til å begrense ekstreme og opportunistiske regnskapsvalg fra ledelsen (Myers mfl., 2003). For å beregne andelen av estimerte skjønnsmessige periodiseringer har vi benyttet Modified Jones Model, som gjennom empiri har vist seg å være blant de mest anerkjente og brukte som indikasjon på lav regnskapskvalitet (Dechow mfl., 1995). Vi deler inn tre ulike nivåer på estimerte skjønnsmessige periodiseringer: resultatøkende, reduserende og absolutt. Det som skiller denne studien fra tidligere forskning, er blant annet dens rekkevidde. Undersøkelsen gjennomføres for 30 land i Europa, i perioden 2009 til 2015. Som et eksplorativt bidrag deler vi inn i fem ulike strata basert på regnskapsteoretiske likheter mellom nasjonene, og sammenligner mot hovedmodellene. Videre undersøker vi også hvorvidt vårt datasett kan underbygge 70 prosent-grensen på honorar for rådgivningstjenester slik den er fastsatt i revisjonsforordningen.

Vår analyse kan antyde at rådgivningstjenester påvirker revisjonskvalitet negativt. Dette innebærer at en økning i rådgivningstjenester indikerer synkende kvalitet på revisjonen som utføres. Videre kan våre funn tyde på at begrensningen på honorar for rådgivningstjenester antageligvis er satt for høyt.

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to describe, illustrate and provide a deeper understanding of team composition and labor allocation in audit teams by quantifying the exact value of resources at different levels of the audit production. Audit teams have been considered as a black box in audit research. Therefore, this paper reports descriptive statistics on (levels and proportions of) hours and costs allocated to auditor ranks (and the number and value, i.e. billing rates, of auditors for different ranks and the entire team) to shed new light on audit teams. Design/methodology/approach This study uses a proprietary data set containing disaggregated information on hours, costs and billing rates for each team member in each of 908 audit engagements. The data are provided by a Swedish Big 4 audit firm. The study uses a purely descriptive approach and categorizes auditors into seven ranks. As size and the publicly listed status are crucial determinants of audit production, the paper splits engagements in public and private companies and reports statistics for size quartiles of both public and private clients. Findings The paper provides descriptive statistics for (1) client size, (2) audit team members, (3) audit hours, (4) audit costs, (5) proportion of audit hours, (6) proportion of audit costs, (7) billing rates and (8) variation of billing rates. Results show that compared to private clients, the audit firm allocates higher effort from auditors in higher ranks and lower effort from auditors in lower ranks to public clients. Another finding is that allocation varies with client size for private clients, but less so for public clients. Originality/value In an area with sparse literature, this descriptive study serves as a first step to improve our understanding and guide future research. It provides concrete support for previously known theory.

This paper examines how audit effort, measured by the estimated number of audit hours used to perform the clients' audits, is associated with engagement partners' formal education, continuing professional education (CPE), and professional experience. Although the literature provides considerable evidence for the determinants of audit fees, our understanding of how audit effort is related to these partner characteristics is limited. The aim of this paper is to shed light on partner-specific factors that may influence how much audit effort they and their team members exert. Using a sample of 1,738 unique partners and 178,770 client-year observations, we find evidence that auditors with a master's degree exert more effort than those with a bachelor's degree. We also find a positive relation between audit effort and CPE. The relation between audit effort and professional experience is nonlinear: the least experienced auditors put in the least effort, moderately experienced auditors exert the most effort, while the effort level of the most experienced auditors is in between. We also document that the accuracy of going concern modified audit reports is higher for more knowledgeable auditors.

This study examines the consequences of sanctions against individual Swedish auditors issued by the Supervisory Board of Public Accountants (SBPA). The results provide no support for individual auditor client loss after receiving a sanction. However, we find that Big 4 auditors have a lower salary after the sanction than before. Finally, we do not find that auditors become more conservative in their reporting after being sanctioned. Collectively, our results support that public oversight sanctions have relatively limited consequences for auditors of private companies.

This study tests the association between time pressure, training activities and dysfunctional auditor behaviour insmall audit firms. Based on survey responses from 235 certified auditors working in small audit firms in Sweden,the analysis shows that perceived time pressure is positively associated with dysfunctional auditor behaviour,while the level of participation in training activities such as workshops and seminars is negatively associated withdysfunctional auditor behaviour. These findings suggest that audit quality is at risk when auditors experience highlevels of time pressure but also that auditors who frequently take part in training activities to a lesser extent engagein dysfunctional auditor behaviour.

Purpose: The paper aims to investigate audit and non-audit fees during the global financial crisis (GFC) in an environment that is relatively sparsely regulated with regard to the provision of non-audit services.

Design/methodology/approach: Audit and non-audit fees were studied during pre-GFC (2006-2007), GFC (2008-2009) and post-GFC (2010-2011) periods.

Findings: During the GFC, Swedish companies benefited from an increase in sales and total assets, although return on assets decreased. In this setting, the auditors charged higher audit fees compared with the pre-GFC period, despite the absence of increased audit reporting lags. A significant increase in audit fees continued during the post-crisis periods with auditors paying more attention to companies’ leverage and whether they report losses. At the same time, the companies spent less on non-audit services.

Research limitations/implications: This study is limited to companies from Sweden, which was less affected by the GFC.

Practical implications: GFC auditors are able to charge higher audit fees to public companies including those that are well-performing during financial crises, and they are also able to increase the audit fees in the post-crisis period. This implies that auditors put in extra audit effort to compensate for higher risk, or that they are good at negotiating prices with their clients. However, non-audit fees decreased during the same period, implying that the demand for these services drops under financial instability.

Originality/value: The study highlights auditors’ behavior in the liberal economic environment and it studies both audit fees and non-audit fees before GFC, during GFC and after the GFC. The GFC appears to have provided audit firms the opportunity to extract higher audit fees. Our findings are of interest to managers, auditors and regulators.

We examine the effect of auditor-in-charge characteristics on audit quality using the propensity to issue a going-concern opinion as the measure of audit quality. We extend the sparse literature on auditor-in-charge characteristics by investigating how audit quality is related to the number of audit assignments and the age of the auditor. First, there is a concern that a very large number of assignments negatively affect the time and effort invested in each assignment and that the auditor may take shortcuts in important audit procedures in order to save time. Second, based on theories on career stage, older auditors may lack inherent motivation to invest enough effort in training activities and learning auditing standards. We use a sample of 1,145 privately held small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) that filed for bankruptcy between October 2008 and September 2009. Our results show a negative association between the number of audit assignments held by the auditor-in-charge and audit quality, and we find that the age of the auditor-in-charge is negatively associated with audit quality. This study shows that auditor-in-charge characteristics are important determinants for audit quality in private companies and suggests that regulators should pay attention to these quality concerns and evaluate whether an upper limit on the number of assignments held would be an effective way of improving audit quality.