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Hayenhjelm, MadeleineORCID iD iconorcid.org/0000-0002-8031-3239
Publications (10 of 14) Show all publications
Hayenhjelm, M. (2019). Book Review: Oderdiek, John. Imposing Risks: A Normative Framework. [Review]. Ethics, 129(3)
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Book Review: Oderdiek, John. Imposing Risks: A Normative Framework.
2019 (English)In: Ethics, ISSN 0014-1704, E-ISSN 1539-297X, Vol. 129, no 3Article, book review (Other academic) In press
Keywords
risk, risk imposition
National Category
Philosophy Ethics Law
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:umu:diva-155284 (URN)
Available from: 2019-01-11 Created: 2019-01-11 Last updated: 2019-01-11
Hayenhjelm, M. (2019). Compensation as Moral Repair and as Moral Justification for Risks. Ethics, Politics & Society
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Compensation as Moral Repair and as Moral Justification for Risks
2019 (English)In: Ethics, Politics & Society, ISSN 2184-2582Article in journal (Refereed) Epub ahead of print
Abstract [en]

Can compensation repair the moral harm of a previous wrongful act? On the one hand, some define the very function of compensation as one of restoring the moral balance. On the other hand, the dominant view on compensation is that it is insufficient to fully repair moral harm unless accompanied by an act of punishment or apology. In this paper, I seek to investigate the maximal potential of compensation. Central to my argument is a distinction between apologetic compensation and non-apologetic compensation. Apologetic compensation, I argue, is an act that expresses regret and apology by means of some offer ofmoney, goods, or services. Non-apologetic compensation is an act that seeks to restore loss or harm without expressing regret or apology. In the paper, I defend the view that acts of compensation can be apologetic and argue that such apologetic compensation is sufficient for moral repair.

Abstract [pt]

Será a compensação capaz de reparar o dano moral causado por um acto errado anterior? Por um lado, há quem defina a função da reparação como reposição do equilíbrio moral. Por outro, a perspectiva dominante acerca da compensação considera que esta é insuficiente para reparar totalmente o dano moral a não ser que seja acompanhada de um acto de castigo ou de um pedido de desculpas. Neste artigo procuro investigar o potencial máximo da compensação. Uma distinção entre compensação apologética e compensação não apologética é central para o meu argumento. A compensação apologética é um acto que exprime arrependimento e um pedido de desculpas através de uma oferta de dinheiro, bens ou serviços. A compensação não apologética é um acto que procura restaurar a perda ou dano sem exprimir arrependimento ou um pedido de desculpas. Neste artigo, defendo a perspectiva segundo a qual os actos de compensação podem ser apologéticos e argumento que uma compensação apologética deste tipo é suficiente para a reparação moral.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
University of Minho; ILCH; Centre or Ehtics, Politics and Society, 2019
Keywords
compensation, apologies, reparations, restitutions, moral repair
National Category
Philosophy, Ethics and Religion
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:umu:diva-158412 (URN)
Available from: 2019-04-29 Created: 2019-04-29 Last updated: 2019-06-13
Hayenhjelm, M. (2019). Oberdiek, John. Imposing Risk: A Normative Framework. [Review]. Ethics, 129(3), 492-496
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Oberdiek, John. Imposing Risk: A Normative Framework.
2019 (English)In: Ethics, ISSN 0014-1704, E-ISSN 1539-297X, Vol. 129, no 3, p. 492-496Article, book review (Other academic) Published
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
University of Chicago Press, 2019
National Category
Ethics
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:umu:diva-157735 (URN)10.1086/701489 (DOI)000461493900008 ()
Available from: 2019-04-10 Created: 2019-04-10 Last updated: 2019-04-10Bibliographically approved
Hayenhjelm, M. (2018). Risk Impositions, Genuine Losses, and Reparability as a Moral Constraint. Ethical Perspectives, 25(3), 419-446
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Risk Impositions, Genuine Losses, and Reparability as a Moral Constraint
2018 (English)In: Ethical Perspectives, ISSN 1370-0049, E-ISSN 1783-1431, Vol. 25, no 3, p. 419-446Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

What kind of moral principle could be sufficiently restrictive to avoid the kind of large-scale risks that have resulted in catastrophe in the past, while at the same time not be so restrictive as to halt desirable progress? Is there such a principle that is not merely a precautionary principle, but one that could be based on firm moral grounds? In this article, I set out to explore a simple idea: might it be the case that reparability could serve as a moral constraint against risky policy decisions? The idea is simple, but comes in two forms. First, that it is morally wrong to impose a risk for harm that is, in principle, irreparable, such that it would bring about a permanent loss of a kind qua kind. Second, that it is morally wrong to impose a risk for a reparable (but not compensable) harm that exceeds what realistically could be repaired. I set out here to do two things. First, I describe the moral problem to be addressed for any principle-guiding decisions about risk. A central claim in this article is that risk decisions are epistemically impaired decisions, and that we must, alongside outcome uncertainty, also take both epistemic uncertainty and moral uncertainty into account. Second, I introduce the idea of reparability as a moral constraint in the form of two versions of the Reparability Principle. Such a principle, I argue, could have some interesting advantages that seem both morally intuitive and that come with some advantages against some of the epistemic challenges posed by risk impositions.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Peeters Publishers, 2018
Keywords
Risk, uncertainty, genuine loss, reparation, reparability
National Category
Ethics Philosophy
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:umu:diva-155252 (URN)10.2143/EP.25.3.3285424 (DOI)000454465200004 ()
Available from: 2019-01-14 Created: 2019-01-14 Last updated: 2019-01-14Bibliographically approved
Hayenhjelm, M. (2017). Four types of precaution. In: ECPR 2017: . Paper presented at European Consortium for Political Research.
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Four types of precaution
2017 (English)In: ECPR 2017, 2017Conference paper, Oral presentation with published abstract (Refereed)
National Category
Philosophy
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:umu:diva-140321 (URN)
Conference
European Consortium for Political Research
Available from: 2017-10-04 Created: 2017-10-04 Last updated: 2018-06-09
Hayenhjelm, M. (2014). Recension: Filip radovic (red.) Livets Mening, Lund: Studentlitteratur, 2012 [Review]. Tidskrift för politisk filosofi (3), 33-39
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Recension: Filip radovic (red.) Livets Mening, Lund: Studentlitteratur, 2012
2014 (Swedish)In: Tidskrift för politisk filosofi, ISSN 1402-2710, no 3, p. 33-39Article, book review (Other academic) Published
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Thales, 2014
Keywords
livets mening, meningen med livet
National Category
Humanities
Research subject
Practical Philosophy
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:umu:diva-104217 (URN)
Available from: 2015-06-08 Created: 2015-06-08 Last updated: 2018-06-07
Hayenhjelm, M. & Wolff, J. (2012). The moral problem of risk impositions: a survey of the literature. European Journal of Philosophy, 20(S1), E26-E51
Open this publication in new window or tab >>The moral problem of risk impositions: a survey of the literature
2012 (English)In: European Journal of Philosophy, ISSN 0966-8373, E-ISSN 1468-0378, Vol. 20, no S1, p. E26-E51Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

This paper surveys the current philosophical discussion of the ethics of risk imposition, placing it in the context of relevant work in psychology, economics and social theory. The central philosophical problem starts from the observation that it is not practically possible to assign people individual rights not to be exposed to risk, as virtually all activity imposes some risk on others. This is the ‘problem of paralysis’. However, the obvious alternative theory that exposure to risk is justified when its total benefits exceed its total costs faces the standard distributional challenges of consequentialism. Forms of contractualism have been proposed as a solution, but how exactly such theories can be formulated remains problematic, especially when confronted with the difficult cases of mass, novel, risk such as climate change.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Blackwell Publishing, 2012
National Category
Philosophy
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:umu:diva-140316 (URN)10.1111/j.1468-0378.2011.00482.x (DOI)
Available from: 2017-10-04 Created: 2017-10-04 Last updated: 2018-06-09Bibliographically approved
Hayenhjelm, M. (2012). What is a fair distribution of risk?. In: Sabine Roeser, Rafaela Hillerbrand, Per Sandin, Martin Peterson (Ed.), Handbook of Risk Theory: Epistemology, Decision Theory, Ethics and Social Implications of Risk (pp. 909-929). Springer
Open this publication in new window or tab >>What is a fair distribution of risk?
2012 (English)In: Handbook of Risk Theory: Epistemology, Decision Theory, Ethics and Social Implications of Risk / [ed] Sabine Roeser, Rafaela Hillerbrand, Per Sandin, Martin Peterson, Springer, 2012, p. 909-929Chapter in book (Refereed)
Abstract [en]

What is a fair distribution of risk? This chapter will look into three separate, but related, aspects of fairness in risk distributions. Firstly, I will locate the object of fairness when it comes to risk distribution. In contrast to distributions of goods, which we want to both increase and distribute fairly, risks are something we want to decrease and distribute fairly. The question of fairness in risk distributions is the question of how to combine these two partially conflicting claims; to fairness on the one hand and to risk reduction on the other. Secondly, I will take a closer look at what an equal distribution of chances for harm might be. I will point to the problem that the very idea of distributing probabilities entails. Thirdly, I address the question of when deviations from equal distributions of risks may be justified and how such inequalities can be addressed in a fair way. It will be suggested that the locus of fairness of risk should be sought in two steps: (1) the justification of particular risky activities, where the level of risk and the spread of that risk is taken into account, and (2) that any resulting higher risk for certain groups or individuals should be addressed through a combination of consent, precaution, and compensation, seeking to even out unfair exposure.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Springer, 2012
National Category
Philosophy
Research subject
Practical Philosophy
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:umu:diva-140314 (URN)10.1007/978-94-007-1433-5_36 (DOI)978-94-007-1432-8 (ISBN)978-94-007-1433-5 (ISBN)
Available from: 2017-10-04 Created: 2017-10-04 Last updated: 2018-06-09Bibliographically approved
Hayenhjelm, M. (2008). Vad kan riskkommunikation göra åt riskproblemen?. In: Johannes Persson, Nils-Eric Sahlin (Ed.), Risk & Risici: (pp. 91-108). Bokförlaget Nya Doxa
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Vad kan riskkommunikation göra åt riskproblemen?
2008 (Swedish)In: Risk & Risici / [ed] Johannes Persson, Nils-Eric Sahlin, Bokförlaget Nya Doxa, 2008, p. 91-108Chapter in book (Other academic)
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Bokförlaget Nya Doxa, 2008
National Category
Philosophy
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:umu:diva-140318 (URN)978-91-578-0518-8 (ISBN)
Available from: 2017-10-04 Created: 2017-10-04 Last updated: 2018-06-09
Hayenhjelm, M. (2007). Trusting and taking risks: a philosophical inquiry. Stockholm: Kungliga Tekniska högskolan
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Trusting and taking risks: a philosophical inquiry
2007 (English)Book (Other academic)
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Stockholm: Kungliga Tekniska högskolan, 2007
Keywords
Förtroende Risk
National Category
Philosophy
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:umu:diva-119256 (URN)978-91-7178-773-6 (ISBN)
Note

Diss. (sammanfattning) Stockholm : Kungliga Tekniska högskolan, 2007

Available from: 2017-10-04 Created: 2017-10-04 Last updated: 2018-06-09
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ORCID iD: ORCID iD iconorcid.org/0000-0002-8031-3239

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