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Lindström, Sten
Publications (10 of 28) Show all publications
Lindström, S. (2017). Church-Fitchs argument än en gång, eller: vem är rädd för vetbarhetsparadoxen?. In: George Masterton, Keizo Matsubara and Kim Solin (Ed.), Från Skaradjäkne till Uppsalaprofessor: festskrift till Lars-Göran Johansson i samband med hans pensionering (pp. 160-171). Uppsala: Department of Philosophy, Uppsala University
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Church-Fitchs argument än en gång, eller: vem är rädd för vetbarhetsparadoxen?
2017 (Swedish)In: Från Skaradjäkne till Uppsalaprofessor: festskrift till Lars-Göran Johansson i samband med hans pensionering / [ed] George Masterton, Keizo Matsubara and Kim Solin, Uppsala: Department of Philosophy, Uppsala University , 2017, p. 160-171Chapter in book (Other academic)
Abstract [sv]

Enligt ett realistiskt synsätt kan ett påstående vara sant trots att det inte ens i princip är möjligt att veta att det är sant. En sanningsteoretisk antirealist kan inte godta denna möjlighet utan att accepterar en eller annan version av Dummetts vetbarhetsprincip:

(K) Om ett påstående är sant, så måste det i princip vara möjligt att veta att det är sant.

Det kan dock förefalla rimligt, även för en antirealist, att gå med på att det kan finnas sanningar som ingen faktiskt vet (har vetat, eller kommer att veta) är sanna. Man kan därför tänka sig att en antirealist skulle acceptera principen (K) utan att därför gå med på den till synes starkare principen:

(SK) Om ett påstående är sant, så måste det faktiskt finnas någon som vet att det är sant.

Ett mycket omdiskuterat argument – som ytterst går tillbaka till Alonzo Church, men som först publicerades i en uppsats av Frederic Fitch i Journal of Symbolic Logic 1963 – tycks emellertid visa att principen (K) implicerar principen (SK).

I uppsatsen diskuterar jag några olika sätt att undgå Church-Fitch paradoxala slutsats. Ett tillvägagångssätt är att ersätta kunskapsoperatorn med en hierarki av kunskapspredikat. Ett annat är baserat på distinktionen mellan faktisk och potentiell kunskap och ett förkastande av den vanliga modallogiska formaliseringen av principen (K). Den senare typen av lösning betraktas både från ett realistiskt och ett icke-realistiskt perspektiv. Utifrån denna analys kommer jag fram till slutsatsen att vi, vare sig vi är realister eller antirealister rörande sanning, kan sluta oroa oss för vetbarhetsparadoxen och ändå uppskatta Church-Fitchs argument.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Uppsala: Department of Philosophy, Uppsala University, 2017
Series
Uppsala Philosophical Studies, ISSN 1402-1110 ; 60
Keywords
sanning, Kunskap, vetbarhetsparadoxen
National Category
Philosophy
Research subject
Theoretical Philosophy
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:umu:diva-139509 (URN)978-91-506-2642-1 (ISBN)
Available from: 2017-09-15 Created: 2017-09-15 Last updated: 2018-06-09Bibliographically approved
Cantwell, J., Lindström, S. & Rabinowicz, W. (2017). McGee's Counterexample to the Ramsey Test. Theoria, 83(2), 154-168
Open this publication in new window or tab >>McGee's Counterexample to the Ramsey Test
2017 (English)In: Theoria, ISSN 0040-5825, E-ISSN 1755-2567, Vol. 83, no 2, p. 154-168Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

Vann McGee has proposed a counterexample to the Ramsey Test. In the counterexample, a seemingly trustworthy source has testified that p and that if not-p, then q. If one subsequently learns not- p (and so learns that the source is wrong about p), then one has reason to doubt the trustworthiness of the source (perhaps even the identity of the source) and so, the argument goes, one has reason to doubt the conditional asserted by the source. Since what one learns is that the antecedent of the conditional holds, these doubts are contrary to the Ramsey Test. We argue that the counterexample fails. It rests on a principle of testimonial dependence that is not applicable when a source hedges his or her claims.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
DPHT Stockholm, 2017
Keywords
Ramsey Test, conditionals, counterexample
National Category
Philosophy
Research subject
Theoretical Philosophy
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:umu:diva-136338 (URN)10.1111/theo.12115 (DOI)000402174600005 ()
Available from: 2017-06-19 Created: 2017-06-19 Last updated: 2018-10-16Bibliographically approved
Lindström, S., Dybjer, P., Palmgren, E. & Sundholm, G. (Eds.). (2012). Epistemology versus Ontology: Essays on the Philosophy and Foundations of Mathematics in Honour of Per Martin-Löf. Dordrecht: Springer
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Epistemology versus Ontology: Essays on the Philosophy and Foundations of Mathematics in Honour of Per Martin-Löf
2012 (English)Collection (editor) (Refereed)
Abstract [en]

This book brings together philosophers, mathematicians and logicians to penetrate important problems in the philosophy and foundations of mathematics. In philosophy, one has been concerned with the opposition between constructivism and classical mathematics and the different ontological and epistemological views that are reflected in this opposition. The dominant foundational framework for current mathematics is classical logic and set theory with the axiom of choice (ZFC). This framework is, however, laden with philosophical difficulties. One important alternative foundational programme that is actively pursued today is predicativistic constructivism based on Martin-Löf type theory. Associated philosophical foundations are meaning theories in the tradition of Wittgenstein, Dummett, Prawitz and Martin-Löf. What is the relation between proof-theoretical semantics in the tradition of Gentzen, Prawitz, and Martin-Löf and Wittgensteinian or other accounts of meaning-as-use? What can proof-theoretical analyses tell us about the scope and limits of constructive and predicative mathematics?

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Dordrecht: Springer, 2012. p. 412
Series
Logic, Epistemology and the Unity of Science ; 27
Keywords
Constructive Type Theory, Dummett, Gentzen, Intuitionism, Martin-Löf, Martin-Löf's type theory, Mathematical structuralism, Meaning-as-use, Prawitz, Proof Theory, Wittgenstein, axiom of choice (ZFC), category theoretic foundations, predicativistic contructivism, set theory
National Category
Humanities Natural Sciences
Research subject
Mathematical Logic; Theoretical Philosophy
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:umu:diva-57490 (URN)10.1007/978-94-007-4435-6 (DOI)978-94-007-4434-9 (ISBN)978-94-007-4435-6 (ISBN)
Available from: 2012-08-02 Created: 2012-08-02 Last updated: 2018-06-08Bibliographically approved
Lindström, S. (2012). Introduction. In: Dybjer, P.; Lindström, S.; Palmgren, E.; Sundholm, G. (Ed.), Epistemology versus Ontology: Essays on the Philosophy and Foundations of Mathematics in Honour of Per Martin-Löf (pp. vii-xiv). Dordrecht: Springer
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Introduction
2012 (English)In: Epistemology versus Ontology: Essays on the Philosophy and Foundations of Mathematics in Honour of Per Martin-Löf / [ed] Dybjer, P.; Lindström, S.; Palmgren, E.; Sundholm, G., Dordrecht: Springer, 2012, p. vii-xivChapter in book (Refereed)
Abstract [en]

This book brings together philosophers, mathematicians and logicians to penetrate important problems in the philosophy and foundations of mathematics. In philosophy, one has been concerned with the opposition between constructivism and classical mathematics and the different ontological and epistemological views that are reflected in this opposition. The dominant foundational framework for current mathematics is classical logic and set theory with the axiom of choice (ZFC). This framework is, however, laden with philosophical difficulties. One important alternative foundational programme that is actively pursued today is predicativistic constructivism based on Martin-Löf type theory. Associated philosophical foundations are meaning theories in the tradition of Wittgenstein, Dummett, Prawitz and Martin-Löf. What is the relation between proof-theoretical semantics in the tradition of Gentzen, Prawitz, and Martin-Löf and Wittgensteinian or other accounts of meaning-as-use? What can proof-theoretical analyses tell us about the scope and limits of constructive and predicative mathematics?

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Dordrecht: Springer, 2012
Series
Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science ; 27
Keywords
Constructive Type Theory - Dummett - Gentzen - Intuitionism - Martin-Löf - Martin-Löf's type theory - Mathematical structuralism - Meaning-as-use - Prawitz - Proof Theory - Wittgenstein - axiom of choice (ZFC) - category theoretic foundations - predicativistic contructivism - set theory
National Category
Philosophy, Ethics and Religion Philosophy Algebra and Logic
Research subject
Theoretical Philosophy; Mathematical Logic
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:umu:diva-60039 (URN)10.1007/978-94-007-4435-6 (DOI)978-94-007-4434-9 (ISBN)978-94-007-4435-6 (ISBN)
Available from: 2012-09-29 Created: 2012-09-29 Last updated: 2018-06-08Bibliographically approved
Lindström, S., Palmgren, E. & Westerståhl, D. (2012). Introduction: The philosophy of logical consequence and inference. Synthese, 187(3), 817-820
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Introduction: The philosophy of logical consequence and inference
2012 (English)In: Synthese, ISSN 0039-7857, E-ISSN 1573-0964, Vol. 187, no 3, p. 817-820Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Keywords
logical consequequence, inference, model-theoretic semantics, proof-theoretic semantics
National Category
Humanities
Research subject
Theoretical Philosophy; Mathematical Logic
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:umu:diva-60036 (URN)10.1007/s11229-012-0180-1 (DOI)
Available from: 2012-09-29 Created: 2012-09-29 Last updated: 2018-06-08Bibliographically approved
Nilsson, J. & Lindström, S. (2011). Rationality in Flux: Formal Representations of Methodological Change. In: Erik J. Olsson, Sebastian Enqvist (Ed.), Belief Revision meets Philosophy of Science: (pp. 347-356). Dordrecht: Springer
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Rationality in Flux: Formal Representations of Methodological Change
2011 (English)In: Belief Revision meets Philosophy of Science / [ed] Erik J. Olsson, Sebastian Enqvist, Dordrecht: Springer, 2011, p. 347-356Chapter in book (Other academic)
Abstract [en]

A central aim for philosophers of science has been to understand scientific theory change, or more specifically the rationality of theory change. Philosophers and historians of science have suggested that not only theories but also scientific methods and standards of rational inquiry have changed through the history of science. The topic here is methodological change, and what kind of theory of rational methodological change is appropriate. The modest ambition of this paper is to discuss in what ways results in formal theories of belief revision can throw light on the question of what an appropriate theory of methodological change would look like.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Dordrecht: Springer, 2011
Series
Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science ; 21
National Category
Philosophy
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:umu:diva-60040 (URN)10.1007/978-90-481-9609-8_15 (DOI)000284290400015 ()978-90-481-9608-1 (ISBN)978-90-481-9609-8 (ISBN)
Available from: 2012-09-29 Created: 2012-09-29 Last updated: 2018-06-08Bibliographically approved
Lindström, S. (2009). Paradoxes of demonstrability. In: Logic, ethics and all that Jazz: Essays in honour of Jordan Howard Sobel (pp. 177-185). Uppsala: Department of Philosophy, Uppsala University
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Paradoxes of demonstrability
2009 (English)In: Logic, ethics and all that Jazz: Essays in honour of Jordan Howard Sobel, Uppsala: Department of Philosophy, Uppsala University , 2009, p. 177-185Chapter in book (Other academic)
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Uppsala: Department of Philosophy, Uppsala University, 2009
Series
Uppsala Philosophical Studies, ISSN 1402-1110 ; 57
Keywords
Logic, paradoxes, demonstrability, knowledge
National Category
Philosophy
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:umu:diva-23112 (URN)
Available from: 2009-05-30 Created: 2009-05-30 Last updated: 2018-06-08Bibliographically approved
Lindström, S. (2009). Possible worlds semantics and the Liar: Reflections on a problem posed by Kaplan. In: The Philosophy of David Kaplan. Oxford: Oxford University Press
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Possible worlds semantics and the Liar: Reflections on a problem posed by Kaplan
2009 (English)In: The Philosophy of David Kaplan, Oxford: Oxford University Press , 2009Chapter in book (Other academic)
Abstract [en]

In this paper I discuss a paradox, due to David Kaplan, that in his view threatens the use of possible worlds semantics as a model-theoretic framework for intensional logic. Kaplan’s paradox starts out from an intuitively reasonable principle that I refer to as the Principle of Plenitude.  From this principle he derives a contradiction in what he calls Naive Possible World Theory.  Kaplan’s metatheoretic argument can be restated in the modal object language as an intensional version of the Liar paradox. To solve the paradox, Kaplan favors a ramified theory of propositions, along the lines of Russell’s ramified theory of types. I shall attempt an alternative, less drastic, modification of the standard possible worlds methodology than the one favored by Kaplan.  The idea is to regard sentences that involve propositional quantifiers, like the Liar sentence: "All propositions contemplated by Epimenides are false" as being, in a sense, indexical: one and the same sentence can express different propositions when used in different possible worlds. Using this approach, I try to show that the intensional Liar paradox can be defused and no longer poses a threat to possible worlds semantics.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009
Keywords
philosophy of language, philosophical logic, possible worlds semantics, paradoxes, intensionality
National Category
Languages and Literature
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:umu:diva-19815 (URN)9780195367881 (ISBN)019536788X (ISBN)
Note
This paper is also published in Rojszczak, A., Cachro, J., Kurczewski, G. (eds.): Philosophical Dimensions of Logic and Science, Synthese library Vol. 320, Kluwer 2003.Available from: 2009-03-11 Created: 2009-03-11 Last updated: 2018-06-09Bibliographically approved
Lindström, S. & Palmgren, E. (2008). Introduction: The Three Foundational Programmes. In: Sten Lindström, Erik Palmgren, Krister Segerberg, Viggo Stoltenberg-Hansen (Ed.), Logicism, Intuitionism, and Formalism: What has Become of Them? (pp. 1-23). Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Introduction: The Three Foundational Programmes
2008 (English)In: Logicism, Intuitionism, and Formalism: What has Become of Them? / [ed] Sten Lindström, Erik Palmgren, Krister Segerberg, Viggo Stoltenberg-Hansen, Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 2008, p. 1-23Chapter in book (Other academic)
Abstract [en]

The period in the foundations of mathematics that started in 1879 with the publication of Frege's Begriffsschrift and ended in 1931 with Gödel's Über formal unentscheidbare Sätze der Principia Mathematica und verwandter Systeme I can reasonably be called the classical period. It saw the development of three major foundational programmes: the logicism of Frege, Russell and Whitehead, the intuitionism of Brouwer, and Hilbert's formalist and proof-theoretic programme. In this period, there were also lively exchanges between the various schools culminating in the famous Hilbert-Brouwer controversy in the 1920s.

The purpose of this anthology is to review the programmes in the foundations of mathematics from the classical period and to assess their possible relevance for contemporary philosophy of mathematics. What can we say, in retrospect, about the various foundational programmes of the classical period and the disputes that took place between them? To what extent do the classical programmes of logicism, intuitionism and formalism represent options that are still alive today? These questions are addressed in this volume by leading mathematical logicians and philosophers of mathematics.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 2008
Series
Synthese Library: Studies In Epistemology, Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science, ISSN 0166-6991 ; 341
Keywords
Philosophy of mathematics, Foundations of mathematics, logicism, intuitionism, formalism
National Category
Philosophy
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:umu:diva-11297 (URN)10.1007/978-1-4020-8926-8_1 (DOI)000267280800001 ()978-1-4020-8925-1 (ISBN)978-1-4020-8926-8 (ISBN)
Available from: 2008-12-10 Created: 2008-12-10 Last updated: 2018-06-09Bibliographically approved
Lindström, S., Palmgren, E., Segerberg, K. & Stoltenberg-Hansen, V. (Eds.). (2008). Logicism, Intuitionism, and Formalism: What has become of them?. Springer, Dordrecht, Nederländerna
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Logicism, Intuitionism, and Formalism: What has become of them?
2008 (English)Collection (editor) (Refereed)
Abstract [en]

The period in the foundations of mathematics that started in 1879 with the publication of Frege's Begriffsschrift and ended in 1931 with Gödel's Über formal unentscheidbare Sätze der Principia Mathematica und verwandter Systeme I can reasonably be called the classical period. It saw the development of three major foundational programmes: the logicism of Frege, Russell and Whitehead, the intuitionism of Brouwer, and Hilbert's formalist and proof-theoretic programme. In this period, there were also lively exchanges between the various schools culminating in the famous Hilbert-Brouwer controversy in the 1920s.

The purpose of this anthology is to review the programmes in the foundations of mathematics from the classical period and to assess their possible relevance for contemporary philosophy of mathematics. What can we say, in retrospect, about the various foundational programmes of the classical period and the disputes that took place between them? To what extent do the classical programmes of logicism, intuitionism and formalism represent options that are still alive today? These questions are addressed in this volume by leading mathematical logicians and philosophers of mathematics.

The volume will be of interest primarily to researchers and graduate students of philosophy, logic, mathematics and theoretical computer science. The material will be accessible to specialists in these areas and to advanced graduate students in the respective fields.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Springer, Dordrecht, Nederländerna, 2008. p. 512
Series
Synthese Library ; 341
Keywords
Philosophy of mathematics, Foundations of mathematics, logicism, intuitionism, formalism
National Category
Philosophy Philosophy
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:umu:diva-11296 (URN)978-1-4020-8925-1 (ISBN)
Available from: 2008-12-13 Created: 2008-12-13 Last updated: 2018-06-09Bibliographically approved
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