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One important distinction in psychology is between inferences based on associative memory and inferences based on analysis and rules. Much previous empirical work conceive of associative and analytical processes as two exclusive ways of addressing a judgment task, where only one process is selected and engaged at a time, in an either-or fashion. However, related work indicate that the processes are better understood as being in interplay and simultaneously engaged. Based on computational modeling and brain imaging of spontaneously adopted judgment strategies together with analyses of brain activity elicited in tasks where participants were explicitly instructed to perform similarity-based associative judgments or rule-based judgments (n = 74), we identified brain regions related to the two types of processes. We observed considerable overlap in activity patterns. The precuneus was activated for both types of judgments, and its activity predicted how well a similarity-based model fit the judgments. Activity in the superior frontal gyrus predicted the fit of a rule-based judgment model. The results suggest the precuneus as a key node for similarity-based judgments, engaged both when overt responses are guided by similarity-based and rule-based processes. These results are interpreted such that similarity-based processes are engaged in parallel to rule-based-processes, a finding with direct implications for cognitive theories of judgment.

The brain networks underlying human multiple-cue judgment, the judgment of a continuous criterion based on multiple cues, have been examined in a few recent studies, and the ventral precuneus has been found to be a key region. Specifically, activation differences in ventral precuneus (as measured with functional magnetic resonance imaging, fMRI) has been linked to an exemplar-based judgment process, where judgments are based on memory for previous similar cases. Ventral precuneus is implicated in various episodic memory processes, notably such that increased activity during learning in this region as well as in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) and the medial temporal lobes (MTL) have been linked to retrieval success. The present study used fMRI during a multiple-cue judgment task to gain novel neurocognitive evidence informative for the link between learning-related activity changes in ventral precuneus and exemplar-based judgment. Participants (N = 27) spontaneously learned to make judgments during fMRI, in a multiple-cue judgment task specifically designed to induce exemplar-based processing. Contrasting brain activity during late learning to early learning revealed higher activity in ventral precuneus, the bilateral MTL, and the vmPFC. Activity in the ventral precuneus and the vmPFC was found to parametrically increase between each judgment event, and activity levels in the ventral precuneus predicted performance after learning. These results are interpreted such that the ventral precuneus supports the aspects of exemplar-based processes that are related to episodic memory, tentatively by building, storing, and being implicated in retrieving memory representations for judgment.

The field of multiple-cue judgment focuses on the cognitive representations and processes involved in tasks where people need to integrate information across several cues into a judgment on a single criterion dimension. We present here an experimental approach to examine the influence of exemplar-based processes in human judgment, hypothesizing that a default exemplar-based process underlie judgment with emphasis on when cue-abstraction is discontinued. Using predictions from detailed cognitive models, we evaluate participants judgments on two tests with and without time pressure, after extensive learning with cue-abstraction. Results confirmed that participants were unable to use cue-abstraction under time pressure, but failed to confirm the expected shift to exemplar-based memory based on model fit on group level. Participants did however show typical behavioral markers for exemplar-based processes under time pressure, which emphasizes its likely contribution in the judgment process. Moreover, a large subsample of participants did show the expected shift to exemplar-based memory under time pressure. Nevertheless, the results provide novel insights to how exemplar-based processes influence cue-abstraction under time pressure, and open up for the idea of a default exemplar-based process in human judgment.