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Non-factualism and evaluative supervenience
Department of Philosophy, Uppsala University, Uppsala, Sweden; Department of Philosophy, Humboldt University, Berlin, Germany.ORCID iD: 0000-0002-2650-523X
2021 (English)In: Inquiry, ISSN 0020-174X, E-ISSN 1502-3923Article in journal (Refereed) Epub ahead of print
Abstract [en]

Supervenience in metaethics is the notion that there can be no moral difference between two acts, persons or events without some non-moral difference underlying it. If St. Francis is a good man, there could not be a man exactly like St. Francis in non-evaluative respects that is not good. The phenomenon was first systematically discussed by R. M. Hare (1952), who argued that realists about evaluative properties struggle to account for it. As is well established, Hare, and following him, Simon Blackburn, mistakenly took the relevant phenomenon to be weak rather than strong supervenience, and the explanations they offered for it are accordingly outdated. In this paper, I present a non-factualist account of strong supervenience of the evaluative and argue that it fares better than competing realist views in explaining the conceptual nature of the phenomenon, as well as in offering an account of the supervenience of the evaluative in general, rather than more narrowly the moral. While Hare and Blackburn were wrong about the specifics, they were right in that non-factualists can offer a plausible account of the supervenience of the evaluative, that in certain respects is superior to competing realist explanations.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Routledge, 2021.
Keywords [en]
Expressivism, metaethics, relativism, Simon Blackburn, supervenience
National Category
Philosophy
Identifiers
URN: urn:nbn:se:umu:diva-217368DOI: 10.1080/0020174x.2021.1980432ISI: 000715564500001Scopus ID: 2-s2.0-85118627029OAI: oai:DiVA.org:umu-217368DiVA, id: diva2:1816004
Funder
Swedish Research Council, 2019-02905Available from: 2023-11-30 Created: 2023-11-30 Last updated: 2023-12-04Bibliographically approved

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Franzén, Nils

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Citation style
  • apa
  • ieee
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  • Other style
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Language
  • de-DE
  • en-GB
  • en-US
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  • nn-NO
  • nn-NB
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  • Other locale
More languages
Output format
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  • asciidoc
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