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Explaining away epistemic skepticism about culpability
Stockholm University.ORCID iD: 0000-0003-3112-0673
2017 (English)In: Oxford studies in agency and responsibility: vol 4 / [ed] David Shoemaker, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017Chapter in book (Refereed)
Abstract [en]

Recently, a number of authors have suggested that the epistemic condition on moral responsibility makes blameworthiness much less common than we ordinarily suppose, and much harder to identify. This paper argues that such epistemically based responsibility skepticism is mistaken. Section 2 sketches a general account of moral responsibility, building on the Strawsonian idea that blame and credit relates to the agent’s quality of will. Section 3 explains how this account deals with central cases that motivate epistemic skepticism and how it avoids some objections to quality of will accounts recently raised by Gideon Rosen. But an intuitive worry brought out by these objections remains. Section 4 spells out this remaining worry and argues that, like traditional metaphysical responsibility skepticism, it has its source in a non-standard explanatory perspective on action, suggesting that strategies for explaining away the intuitive pull of traditional skepticism are applicable in this case too.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017.
Keywords [en]
blameworthiness, epistemic condition, responsibility skepticism, quality of will, Gideon Rosen, explanatory perspective
National Category
Philosophy
Research subject
Practical Philosophy
Identifiers
URN: urn:nbn:se:umu:diva-129373DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198805601.003.0008ISBN: 9780198805618 (print)ISBN: 9780191843563 (electronic)OAI: oai:DiVA.org:umu-129373DiVA, id: diva2:1059627
Funder
Riksbankens JubileumsfondSwedish Research CouncilAvailable from: 2016-12-22 Created: 2016-12-22 Last updated: 2018-06-09Bibliographically approved

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Björnsson, Gunnar

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CiteExportLink to record
Permanent link

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Citation style
  • apa
  • ieee
  • modern-language-association-8th-edition
  • vancouver
  • Other style
More styles
Language
  • de-DE
  • en-GB
  • en-US
  • fi-FI
  • nn-NO
  • nn-NB
  • sv-SE
  • Other locale
More languages
Output format
  • html
  • text
  • asciidoc
  • rtf