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What is a Mental State?: The Phenomenal Individuation of Mental States
Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies.
2018 (English)Independent thesis Advanced level (degree of Master (One Year)), 10 credits / 15 HE creditsStudent thesisAlternative title
Vad är ett mentalt tillstånd? : Fenomenell individuering av mentala tillstånd (Swedish)
Abstract [en]

Mental states are usually thought to be individuated by two different individuation principles: one for intentional states and one for phenomenal states. This calls in question the underlying unity of the mental. I’ll here argue that this Standard View of individuating mental states can have several unwanted consequences if combined with other common assumptions. These mainly concern the individuation of intentional states, and, more specifically, individuation by content. I propose that all mental states should be individuated by one individuation principle, namely by phenomenology. I’ll, then, reply to some objections to this view.

Abstract [sv]

Mentala tillstånd anses ofta vara individuerade av två olika individueringsprinciper: en för intentionala tillstånd och en för fenomenella tillstånd. Detta väcker tvivel om det mentalas underliggande enhet. Jag argumenterar här att denna allmänna syn på individueringen av mentala tillstånd kan ha flera oönskade konsekvenser om den kombineras med andra vanliga antaganden. Dessa berör främst individueringen av intentionala tillstånd, och, mer specifikt, individuering baserat på innehåll. Jag föreslår att alla mentala tillstånd borde individueras baserat på en individueringsprincip, nämligen att alla mentala tillstånd borde individueras baserat på fenomenologi. Jag kommer sedan att besvara några invändningar mot denna syn.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2018. , p. 50
Keywords [en]
Mental states, Mental state-individuation, Individuation, Phenomenology, Content essentialism, Token physicalism
Keywords [sv]
Mentala tillstånd, Individuering av mentala tillstånd, Individuering, Fenomenologi, Innehållsessentialism, Token-fysikalism
National Category
Philosophy
Identifiers
URN: urn:nbn:se:umu:diva-149650OAI: oai:DiVA.org:umu-149650DiVA, id: diva2:1223472
Subject / course
Philosophy
Supervisors
Examiners
Available from: 2018-06-25 Created: 2018-06-25

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CiteExportLink to record
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Cite
Citation style
  • apa
  • ieee
  • modern-language-association-8th-edition
  • vancouver
  • Other style
More styles
Language
  • de-DE
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  • en-US
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  • nn-NO
  • nn-NB
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More languages
Output format
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