umu.sePublications
Change search
CiteExportLink to record
Permanent link

Direct link
Cite
Citation style
  • apa
  • ieee
  • modern-language-association-8th-edition
  • vancouver
  • Other style
More styles
Language
  • de-DE
  • en-GB
  • en-US
  • fi-FI
  • nn-NO
  • nn-NB
  • sv-SE
  • Other locale
More languages
Output format
  • html
  • text
  • asciidoc
  • rtf
The agential perspective: a hard-line reply to the four-case manipulation argument
Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies.
2019 (English)In: Philosophical Studies, ISSN 0031-8116, E-ISSN 1573-0883Article in journal (Refereed) Epub ahead of print
Abstract [en]

One of the most influential arguments against compatibilism is Derk Pereboom’s four-case manipulation argument. Professor Plum, the main character of the thought experiment, is manipulated into doing what he does; he therefore supposedly lacks moral responsibility for his action. Since he is arguably analogous to an ordinary agent under determinism, Pereboom concludes that ordinary determined agents lack moral responsibility as well. I offer a hard-line reply to this argument, that is, a reply which denies that this kind of manipulation is responsibility undermining. I point out that fully fleshed-out manipulated characters in fiction can seem morally responsible for what they do. This is plausibly because we identify with such characters, and therefore focus on their options and the reasons for which they act rather than the manipulation. I further argue that we ought to focus this way when interacting with other agents. We have no reason to trust the incompatibilist intuitions that arise when we regard manipulated agents from a much more detached perspective.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Dordrecht: Springer, 2019.
Keywords [en]
The four-case manipulation argument, Compatibilism, Incompatibilism, Moral responsibility, Intuitions
National Category
Philosophy
Identifiers
URN: urn:nbn:se:umu:diva-158016DOI: 10.1007/s11098-019-01292-2OAI: oai:DiVA.org:umu-158016DiVA, id: diva2:1303683
Funder
Swedish Research Council, 2014-40Available from: 2019-04-10 Created: 2019-04-10 Last updated: 2019-04-16

Open Access in DiVA

fulltext(252 kB)42 downloads
File information
File name FULLTEXT02.pdfFile size 252 kBChecksum SHA-512
41b1317cf19fbef591748c8c0aed760c95bd0c9b3df141a95ccc2251ae67a86376d1770aec042fbb3b5d70c94b427b9f5e605f933572c6888d2faf7b3e179a75
Type fulltextMimetype application/pdf

Other links

Publisher's full text

Authority records BETA

Jeppsson, Sofia

Search in DiVA

By author/editor
Jeppsson, Sofia
By organisation
Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies
In the same journal
Philosophical Studies
Philosophy

Search outside of DiVA

GoogleGoogle Scholar
Total: 42 downloads
The number of downloads is the sum of all downloads of full texts. It may include eg previous versions that are now no longer available

doi
urn-nbn

Altmetric score

doi
urn-nbn
Total: 106 hits
CiteExportLink to record
Permanent link

Direct link
Cite
Citation style
  • apa
  • ieee
  • modern-language-association-8th-edition
  • vancouver
  • Other style
More styles
Language
  • de-DE
  • en-GB
  • en-US
  • fi-FI
  • nn-NO
  • nn-NB
  • sv-SE
  • Other locale
More languages
Output format
  • html
  • text
  • asciidoc
  • rtf