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Dualism and Exclusion
Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies. 1630 Idésam, Umeå University.ORCID iD: 0000-0001-6423-1324
2019 (English)In: Erkenntnis, ISSN 0165-0106, E-ISSN 1572-8420Article in journal (Refereed) Epub ahead of print
Abstract [en]

Many philosophers argue that exclusion arguments cannot exclude non-reductionist physicalist mental properties from being causes without excluding properties that are patently causal as well. List and Stoljar (Australas J Philos 95(1):96–108, 2017) recently argued that a similar response to exclusion arguments is also available to dualists, thereby challenging the predominant view that exclusion arguments undermine dualist theories of mind. In particular, List and Stoljar maintain that exclusion arguments against dualism require a premise that states that, if a property is metaphysically distinct from the sufficient cause of an effect, this property cannot be a cause of that effect. I argue that this premise is indeed likely to exclude patently causal properties, but that exclusion arguments against dualism do not require this premise. The relation that enables metaphysically distinct properties to cause the same effect in the relevant way turns out to be tighter than the relation typically posited between dualist conscious properties and their underlying physical properties. It is therefore still plausible that the latter causally exclude the former and that compelling exclusion arguments against dualism can be formulated by using a weaker exclusion premise. I conclude by proposing such a formulation.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Netherlands, 2019.
Keywords [en]
Dualism; Mental Causation; Causal Exclusion; Exclusion; Exclusion Argument; Non-Reductionism; Overdetermination
National Category
Philosophy
Research subject
Theoretical Philosophy
Identifiers
URN: urn:nbn:se:umu:diva-158424DOI: 10.1007/s10670-019-00118-1OAI: oai:DiVA.org:umu-158424DiVA, id: diva2:1307501
Available from: 2019-04-27 Created: 2019-04-27 Last updated: 2019-04-30

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Vaassen, Bram

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