umu.sePublications
Change search
CiteExportLink to record
Permanent link

Direct link
Cite
Citation style
  • apa
  • ieee
  • modern-language-association-8th-edition
  • vancouver
  • Other style
More styles
Language
  • de-DE
  • en-GB
  • en-US
  • fi-FI
  • nn-NO
  • nn-NB
  • sv-SE
  • Other locale
More languages
Output format
  • html
  • text
  • asciidoc
  • rtf
Charity, status, and optimal taxation: welfarist and paternalist approaches
Umeå University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Umeå School of Business and Economics (USBE), Economics.
Göteborgs universitet.
Úniversity of Graz, Österrike.
2019 (English)Report (Other academic)
Abstract [en]

This paper deals with tax policy responses to charitable giving, defined in terms of voluntary contributions to a public good, to which the government also contributes through public revenue; the set of tax instruments contains general, nonlinear taxes on income and charitable giving. In addition to consumption, leisure and a public good, individuals obtain utility from the warm glow of giving and social status generated by their relative contributions to charity as well as their relative consumption compared with others. We analyze the conditions under which it is optimal to tax or subsidize charitable giving and derive corresponding optimal policy rules. Another aim of the paper is to compare the optimal tax policy and public good provision by a conventional welfarist government with those by two kinds of paternalist governments: The first kind does not respect the consumer preferences for status in terms of relative giving and relative consumption, while the second kind in addition does not respect preferences for warm glow of giving. The optimal policy rules for marginal taxation and public good provision are similar across governments, except for the stronger incentive to tax charitable giving at the margin under the more extensive kind of paternalism. Numerical simulations supplement the theoretical results.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2019. , p. 67
Series
Umeå economic studies, ISSN 0348-1018 ; 959
Keywords [en]
conspicuous consumption, conspicuous charitable giving, optimal taxation, warm glow
National Category
Economics
Research subject
Economics
Identifiers
URN: urn:nbn:se:umu:diva-164196OAI: oai:DiVA.org:umu-164196DiVA, id: diva2:1361484
Funder
Marianne and Marcus Wallenberg FoundationAvailable from: 2019-10-16 Created: 2019-10-16 Last updated: 2019-10-21Bibliographically approved

Open Access in DiVA

No full text in DiVA

Other links

URLURL

Authority records BETA

Aronsson, Thomas

Search in DiVA

By author/editor
Aronsson, Thomas
By organisation
Economics
Economics

Search outside of DiVA

GoogleGoogle Scholar

urn-nbn

Altmetric score

urn-nbn
Total: 52 hits
CiteExportLink to record
Permanent link

Direct link
Cite
Citation style
  • apa
  • ieee
  • modern-language-association-8th-edition
  • vancouver
  • Other style
More styles
Language
  • de-DE
  • en-GB
  • en-US
  • fi-FI
  • nn-NO
  • nn-NB
  • sv-SE
  • Other locale
More languages
Output format
  • html
  • text
  • asciidoc
  • rtf