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International Environmental Policy Reforms, Tax Distortions, and the Labor Market
Umeå University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Economics.
2006 In: FinanzArchiv, ISSN 0015-2218, Vol. 62, no 2, 199-217 p.Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2006. Vol. 62, no 2, 199-217 p.
URN: urn:nbn:se:umu:diva-2770OAI: diva2:141036
Available from: 2007-11-13 Created: 2007-11-13Bibliographically approved
In thesis
1. Essays on agricultural and environmental policy
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Essays on agricultural and environmental policy
2007 (English)Doctoral thesis, comprehensive summary (Other academic)
Abstract [en]

This thesis consists of a summary and four papers. The first two papers address political economy and indus-trial organization aspects of agricultural policy, and the last two international aspects of environmental policy.

Paper [I] explains Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) subsidies to farmers by the influence of farmer interest-groups with an EU-wide membership. The analysis is based on panel-data for fifteen commodities over the period 1986-2003. Because the CAP is set as an overall EU policy, effective lobbying presents a collective ac-tion problem to the farmers in the EU as a whole. Indicators of lobbying, which are based on this perception, are found to explain part of the variation in agricultural support.

In Paper [II], the Bresnahan-Lau framework is used to analyze whether policy reforms, i.e. the two-price sys-tem (an input quota, 1986-1991) and a general deregulation of dairy policy (1991-1994) had any market power effects on the Swedish butter market. The results show that the null hypothesis of no market power cannot be rejected, for any of the specific policy reforms, at any reasonable significance level.

Paper [III] concerns the welfare consequences of environmental policy cooperation. It is assumed that coun-tries finance their public expenditures by using distortionary taxes, and that they differ with respect to compe-tition in the labor market. It is shown how the welfare effect of an increase in the expenditures on abatement depends on changes in the environmental damage, employment and work hours. The welfare effect is also related to the strategic interaction among the countries in the prereform equilibrium.

In Paper [IV] environmental policy in an economic federation, where each national government faces a mixed tax problem, is addressed. It is assumed that the federal government sets emission targets, which are imple-mented at the national level. It is also assumed that the economic federation is decentralized. The results high-light a strategic role of income and commodity taxation, i.e. each country uses its policy instruments, at least in part, to influence the emission target.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Umeå: Nationalekonomi, 2007. 103 p.
Umeå economic studies, ISSN 0348-1018 ; 719
agricultural policy, political economy, income and commodity taxation, economic federation, environmental policy, lobbying, cooperatives, market power, policy cooperation, distortionary taxes, labor market, Nash game, Stackelberg game
National Category
urn:nbn:se:umu:diva-1432 (URN)978-91-7264-446-5 (ISBN)
Public defence
2007-12-05, N200, Naturvetarhuset, Umeå universitet, 901 87, Umeå, 13:15
Available from: 2007-11-13 Created: 2007-11-13Bibliographically approved

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