Optimal taxation and asymmetric information in an economy with second-hand trade
2008 (English)Report (Other academic)
This paper concerns optimal income and commodity taxation in a two-type overlapping generations model, where used durable goods are traded in a second-hand market. As second-hand transactions are difficult to observe, we assume that the government is unable to directly control second-hand transactions via commodity taxation. A basic question is how the government in this case may use the second-hand market as a channel for relaxation of the self-selection constraint. We show how the appearance of a second-hand market for used durable goods affects the optimal use of labor income and capital income taxation as well as the optimal use of commodity taxation on new durable goods.
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Umeå: Umeå universitet , 2008.
Umeå economic studies, ISSN 0348-1018 ; 732
Optimal taxation, Intertemporal Choice, Durable Goods
Research subject Economics
IdentifiersURN: urn:nbn:se:umu:diva-2965OAI: oai:DiVA.org:umu-2965DiVA: diva2:141354