Environmental policy negotiations, transboundary pollution and lobby groups in small open economies
2007 (English)Report (Refereed)
This paper analyzes the consequences of lobby group activity for policy outcomes in economies with transboundary pollution and international environmental policies. International environmental policies are characterized as pollution taxes determined in a negotiation between two countries and it is found, among other things, that the presence of local lobbying tends to reduce the level of pollution taxes. Furthermore, an increase in the environmental concern - here de fined as an increase in the number of environmentalists - may reduce the pollution tax in both countries. It is also possible that increased environmental concern in one country reduces the pollution tax in the other country.
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Umeå economic studies, ISSN 0348-1018 ; 722
transboundary pollution, lobbying, pollution tax, Nash
Research subject Economics
IdentifiersURN: urn:nbn:se:umu:diva-3623OAI: oai:DiVA.org:umu-3623DiVA: diva2:142412