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Is the mystery an illusion?: Papineau on the problem of consciousness
Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Philosophy and Linguistics.
2007 (English)In: Hommage à Wlodek: philosophical papers dedicated to Wlodek Rabinowicz / [ed] Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen, Lund: Lund University , 2007Chapter in book (Other academic)
Abstract [en]

A number of philosophers have recently argued that (i) consciousness properties are identical with some set of physical or functional properties and that (ii) we can explain away the frequently felt puzzlement about this claim as a delusion or confusion generated by our different ways of apprehending or thinking about consciousness. According to David Papineau's version of this view, the difference between our "phenomenal" and "material" concepts of consciousness produces an instinctive but erroneous intuition that these concepts can't co-refer. I claim that this account is incorrect. It is arguable that we are mystified about physicalism even when the account predicts that we shouldn't be. Further, and worse, the account seems to predict that an "intuition of distinctness" will arise in cases where it does not. I also make some remarks on the prospects for, constraints on, and (physicalist) alternatives to, a successful defence of the claim (ii).

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Lund: Lund University , 2007.
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URN: urn:nbn:se:umu:diva-6325OAI: diva2:145994

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Available from: 2007-12-09 Created: 2007-12-09 Last updated: 2014-05-23Bibliographically approved

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Sundström, Pär
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