Why Reasons Need Not Be Conceptual
2006 (English)In: 10th National Postgraduate Analytical Philosophy Conference, 2006Conference paper (Refereed)
In this talk I will be concerned with the issue of conceptual versus nonconceptual content of reasons. More specifically I will be focusing on whether perceptual experiences need to be conceptual in order to qualify as justifiers for beliefs. Two things will be brought out in this talk: first, I shall argue that conceptual content – in the sense of concepts being the constituents of experiential content – is a necessary condition for justification only if we are committed to a particular account of propositions and their constituents. I claim that an account of justification does not require that we decide in favour of any particular account of propositions. Secondly, I shall argue that conceptual content – in the sense of subjects having to possess the relevant concepts – is a necessary condition for justification only on the assumption that a subject needs to be capable of recognizing and stating her reasons as reasons. This requirement is unreasonable and might be a result of a level confusion regarding epistemic justification.
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
IdentifiersURN: urn:nbn:se:umu:diva-6512OAI: oai:DiVA.org:umu-6512DiVA: diva2:146181