On the Semantics of Logical and Metaphysical Necessity
2005 (English)In: Fifth European Congress for Analytic Philosophy, University of Lisbon, 27-31 August 2005: Book of Abstracts, 2005, 7-8 p.Conference paper, Abstract (Other academic)
Short abstract: We distinguish between two interpretations of the necessity operator of alethic modal logic: the logical and the metaphysical one. On the logical interpretation, ‘Necessarily A’ is true just in case A is logically true. According to the metaphysical interpretation, ‘Necessarily A’ is true if and only if it couldn’t have been the case that not-A. In this paper I describe a formal semantics (model theory) for a language of modal predicate logic that combines operators for logical and metaphysical necessity. The logical relationship between logical and metaphysical necessity is examined. Finally, I discuss to what extent this semantics gives us reasons to reject Quine’s criticism of quantified modal logic—especially the criticism of quantification into contexts governed by an operator for logical necessity.
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2005. 7-8 p.
Philosophy, modal logic, necessity, possibility
IdentifiersURN: urn:nbn:se:umu:diva-9131OAI: oai:DiVA.org:umu-9131DiVA: diva2:148802
Fifth European Congress for Analytic Philosophy, University of Lisbon, 27-31 August 2005
Jag deltog i ECAP 5 i Lisaabon som invited speaker. Själva uppsatsen publicerades inte, men ett längre abstract publicerades i "Book of Abstracts"2008-03-042008-03-042013-08-23Bibliographically approved