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Bidder Behaviour in Swedish Simultaneous Procurement Auctions
Umeå University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Centre for Regional Science (CERUM).
2005 (English)Report (Other academic)
Abstract [en]

Given no capacity constraints and the same set of competitors one would expect the same identity of the bidder having the lowest cost to complete all contracts simultaneously auctioned. Results based on bid level data from Swedish procurement auctions of internal cleaning service contracts suggests otherwise. The same bidder is found on simultaneous auctioned contracts although this bidder has not submitted the lowest bid on all contracts. A possible explanation is that bidders submit aggressive bids on some contracts in order to be given other contracts with less aggressive bids and thereby maximizing the total profit.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
CERUM, Umeå , 2005. , 15 p.
, CERUM Working Paper, ISSN 1404-5362 ; 80
National Category
URN: urn:nbn:se:umu:diva-13815ISBN: 91-7305-847-5OAI: diva2:153486
Centrum för regionalvetenskap (CERUM), 90187, Umeå
Available from: 2009-07-09 Created: 2009-07-08 Last updated: 2009-07-09Bibliographically approved

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ReferencesLink to record
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