This paper argues for the counter intuitive notion that some prejudice is morally justified. The argument is divided up into three parts: (1) what prejudice is, (2) the role of epistemology and (3) the final moral argument. The first section initially establishes a working definition which allows prejudice to be justified epistemically. The section then continues to demonstrate how prejudice has the logical structure of generic statements and facilitates a more generous view of prejudice and what it often expresses. The first section is concluded by explaining how prejudice is a result of the cognitive process called categorization, and how this cognitive process is inevitable and necessary. The second section addresses relevant epistemology, especially how belief comes to be epistemically justified. The papers argue for the notion of two different thresholds: justified belief and acceptance. This conception of epistemically justified belief is then connected to morality through Rosen’s following principle: “When X does A out of innocent ignorance, then X is guilt-free in that he did A, assuming that A would have been a guilt-free act if things were as X thought.” This bridge thereby allows prejudice to be morally justified through epistemic justification. The last section of the paper presents examples of prejudice and analyzes them by using the premises from the first two first sections. If epistemically justified belief necessarily generates moral justification, these examples illustrate prejudice which is morally justified. Two objections against this conclusion are then addressed. The first objection concerns the types of prejudice illustrated in the examples, and questions whether they really are prejudices. This objection is refuted by referencing the working definition of prejudice. The second objection concerns the harm prejudice impose on society on a larger level. Two versions of this objection are addressed and refuted.