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The Twofold Rationale of Knowledge
Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies.
2024 (English)Independent thesis Basic level (degree of Bachelor), 10 credits / 15 HE creditsStudent thesisAlternative title
Kunskapens dubbla rationalitet (Swedish)
Abstract [en]

This is an essay that compares the epistemological theories of skepticism and foundationalism in two different ways. The first comparison is to look at the logic behind both theories. Skepticism is a theoretically strong theory, that presents counter arguments towards any theory positioning itself as positive.

We’ll also look at foundationalism, and the rationale of assuming foundational propositions for knowledge. Despite it being difficult to defend against the arguments of skepticism, it seems to be close to what we perceive knowledge to be in everyday situations.

Skepticism as a theory does not allow us to know. But within it can still be built a theory about something else, close to knowledge, that can be achieved. Foundationalism, as well, does not allow for knowledge with total certainty. The common rationale between both theories seems to be some sort of fallibilism — an uncertainty about knowledge.

However, foundationalism and skepticism seem to have opposite functions in our quest for sharpening our theory of knowledge. Skepticism acts as an ideal, a counter argument that constantly challenges every theory about what knowledge is, demanding to be defeated. Foundationalism acts as a grounding force, challenging our theories of knowledge to stay somewhat close to what has generally considered to be the action of knowing.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2024. , p. 20
Keywords [en]
Epistemology, knowledge, JTB, foundationalism, skepticism
National Category
Philosophy
Identifiers
URN: urn:nbn:se:umu:diva-226538OAI: oai:DiVA.org:umu-226538DiVA, id: diva2:1872495
Subject / course
Philosophy
Supervisors
Examiners
Available from: 2024-06-18 Created: 2024-06-18 Last updated: 2024-06-18Bibliographically approved

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CiteExportLink to record
Permanent link

Direct link
Cite
Citation style
  • apa
  • ieee
  • vancouver
  • Other style
More styles
Language
  • de-DE
  • en-GB
  • en-US
  • fi-FI
  • nn-NO
  • nn-NB
  • sv-SE
  • Other locale
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Output format
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  • text
  • asciidoc
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