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Russellian panpsychism is often regarded as a theory of mind that bears promise of integrating conscious experience into the physical causal order. In a recent article by Howell, this is questioned. I will argue that failure to address Howell´s challenge properly has deeper consequences than it might initially appear; epiphenomenal micro-qualia means that we have lost a unique opportunity to gain insight into necessities in nature. In order to make use of this opportunity, however, some initial assumptions commonly made must be dropped: most crucially, the assumption of mind-body distinctness. In what follows, I try to provide a sketch of how a slightly different version of Russellian panpsychism can be formulated that builds around identity instead of mind-body distinctness. This version of panpsychism can meet Howell's challenge, but what is more, it can be met in a way that fully makes use of the special place occupied by panpsychism regarding the mysterious nature of the “necessary connection” between cause and effect.