Umeå University's logo

This paper addresses a utilitarian perspective on the following moral dilemma (the SNR dilemma): if two states share a natural resource, what moral obligations does one state have towards the other population regarding the use of the shared natural resource? I assert that there are two intuitive moral claims that will generate the intuitive verdict (the IV) regarding the SNR dilemma: (1) A moral obligation towards other populations and (2) a state’s (and its population’s) right to territory and its natural resources. The IV reasonably takes both moral claims into consideration, and a moral theory that does not appear to be able to respond to both moral claims is in a position of weakness compared to those theories which are able. I argue that utilitarianism is in an apparent position of weakness in this way. I then use the conflict between Egypt and Ethiopia over the Nile as an example of the SNR dilemma. A claim that utilitarianism can deal with the SNR dilemma in two distinct ways is presented: (i) under the assumption that independent states maximize utility, and (ii) under the assumption that a world government maximizes utility. I deem both alternative utilitarian arguments to deal with the SNR dilemma, but view (i) as superior as it operates in the status quo.

I answer three objections: one concerning the worry that utilitarianism does not respect both intuitive moral claims in all scenarios, one questioning whether utilitarianism actually fails to respond to one of the intuitive moral claims, and one concerning the relevancy and value of showing that utilitarianism can reach the IV in a non-instrumental way.

I conclude that utilitarianism is well equipped to deal with the SNR dilemma, either by generating the IV or by eliminating the SNR dilemma.