Cournot Duopoly when the Competitors Operate under Capacity Constraints
2002 (English)Report (Other academic)
The paper considers Cournot duopoly where the competitors have capacity constraints. An isoelastic demand function, which always results when consumers maximise utility functions of the CobbDouglas type, is used. It has been demonstrated that isoelastic demand, combined with constant marginal costs, results in complex dynamics. The purpose of the present paper is to reconsider the case, using in stead cost functions with capacity limits. This is a point on which Edgeworth insisted as important. Comparisons between cases of few large and many small competitors cannot be made when firms have constant returns and hence are all infinitely large in potential.
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2002. , 27 p.
, CERUM Working Paper, ISSN 1404-5362 ; 50
IdentifiersURN: urn:nbn:se:umu:diva-24689OAI: oai:DiVA.org:umu-24689DiVA: diva2:227154
Distributor:Centrum för regionalvetenskap (CERUM), 90187, Umeå
Published in Chaos, Solitons and Fractals ISSN 0960-0779 2003 vol 18 no 3 pp 577-592. Elsevier. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. doi:10.1016/S0960-0779(02)00678-12009-07-132009-07-092012-04-02Bibliographically approved