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Reasons and Values in Environmental Ethics
Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies. (USSTE)
2010 (English)In: Environmental Values, ISSN 0963-2719, E-ISSN 1752-7015, Vol. 19, no 4, 517-535 p.Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

Ever since environmental ethics (EE) began to take form as an academic discipline in the early 1970s, the notion of intrinsic value has occupied a prominent position within the field. Recently, however, various types of critique have emerged within EE against invoking this notion. Contrary to these critiques, I argue that appeals to intrinsic value are not problematic, given the reason-implying sense of ‘intrinsic value’ that is most relevant to EE. I further argue that also those who criticise ‘intrinsic-value-talk’ in EE actually need this reason-implying concept of intrinsic value. However, once we realise that this is the sense of ‘intrinsic value’ that is most relevant to EE, it also becomes clear that it is the concept of a reason, rather than that of intrinsic value, that is most important to EE.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Isle of Harris: White Horse Press, 2010. Vol. 19, no 4, 517-535 p.
Keyword [en]
reasons, normative reason, intrinsic value, anthropocentrism, moral standing, environmental ethics
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Research subject
Practical Philosophy
URN: urn:nbn:se:umu:diva-37010DOI: 10.3197/096327110X531589ISI: 000284185200006OAI: diva2:357267
Available from: 2010-10-15 Created: 2010-10-15 Last updated: 2013-10-03Bibliographically approved

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