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Electoral accountability in a two-tiered government country
Umeå University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics.
2011 (English)In: Public Choice, ISSN 0048-5829, E-ISSN 1573-7101, Vol. 148, no 3-, 531-546 p.Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

In democracies, elections are the primary mechanism for making politicians act in voters’ interests, but voters are unable to prevent that some resources are diverted to political rents. With two levels of government, the rents are reduced if voters require higher beneficial public expenditures for reelecting incumbents. Voters can also strengthen their power by holding politicians liable also for decisions made by the other level of government. When the incumbent at one level acts as a Stackelberg leader with respect to the other, there is no risk of this leading to Leviathan policies on the part of the incumbents.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Springer Science and Business Media , 2011. Vol. 148, no 3-, 531-546 p.
Keyword [en]
moral hazard, separation of powers, Stackelberg, transparency, voting theory
National Category
Economics and Business Political Science
Research subject
URN: urn:nbn:se:umu:diva-37149DOI: 10.1007/s11127-010-9682-xISI: 000294688100015OAI: diva2:358091
Available from: 2010-10-20 Created: 2010-10-20 Last updated: 2014-10-09Bibliographically approved

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