On imagism about phenomenal thought
2011 (English)In: Philosophical Review, ISSN 0031-8108, E-ISSN 1558-1470, Vol. 120, no 1, 43-95 p.Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Imagism about Phenomenal Thought is (roughly) the view that there is some concept Q (for some sensory quality Q) that we can employ only while we experience the quality Q. I believe this view is theoretically significant, is or can be made intuitively appealing, and is explicitly or implicitly accepted by many contemporary philosophers. However, there is no good reason to accept it. Or so I argue.
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2011. Vol. 120, no 1, 43-95 p.
IdentifiersURN: urn:nbn:se:umu:diva-50819DOI: 10.1215/00318108-2010-018OAI: oai:DiVA.org:umu-50819DiVA: diva2:469286