Det där är ingen icke-zebra!: epistemisk-deduktiv slutenhet och skepticism
Independent thesis Basic level (degree of Bachelor), 10 credits / 15 HE creditsStudent thesis
Departing from Fred Dretske’s groundbreaking article, this essay explore the epistemic closure principle: the principle that states that knowledge is closed under known implication. It also explores the relationship to skepticism, various attempts to challenge and defend the principle, as well as developing a new perspective where the skeptical premise is seen as an a priori justified tautology that can be overriden by a posteriori experience. I argue that Dretske’s illuminating example makes it clear that there is an unescapable choice between either rejecting a skeptical premise however intuitive it may seem or inextricably having to admit a skeptical conclusion.
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2011. , 25 p.
epistemologi, logik, epistemisk slutenhet, skepticism, a priori, tautologi
IdentifiersURN: urn:nbn:se:umu:diva-52691OAI: oai:DiVA.org:umu-52691DiVA: diva2:506643
Lindblom, Lars, FD
Samuelsson, Lars, FD