On an alleged truth/falsity asymmetry in context shifting experiments
2012 (English)In: Philosophical quarterly (Print), ISSN 0031-8094, E-ISSN 1467-9213, Vol. 62, no 248, 530-545 p.Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Keith DeRose has argued that context shifting experiments should be designed in a specific way in order to accommodate what he calls a ‘truth/falsity asymmetry’. I explain and critique DeRose’s reasons for proposing this modification to contextualist methodology, drawing on recent experimental studies of DeRose’s bank cases as well as experimental findings about the verification of affirmative and negative statements. While DeRose’s arguments for his particular modification to contextualist methodology fail, the lesson of his proposal is that there is good reason to pay close attention to several subtle aspects of the design of context shifting experiments.
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
John Wiley & Sons, 2012. Vol. 62, no 248, 530-545 p.
contextualism, intuitions, thought experiments, methodology, epistemology
Research subject Theoretical Philosophy
IdentifiersURN: urn:nbn:se:umu:diva-54170DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9213.2012.00059.xISI: 000305474100005OAI: oai:DiVA.org:umu-54170DiVA: diva2:516265
Article first published online: 10 APR 20122012-04-182012-04-172012-07-17Bibliographically approved