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The Psychology Behind Tax Crime: An Evolutionary And Game Theoretical Scenario
Umeå University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Sociology.
2012 (English)In: Competitiveness: Psychology, Production Impact and Global Trends .Business Issues, Competition and Entrepreneurship / [ed] Alexander M. Beckford, Julianne P. Larsen, Nova Science Publishers, Inc., 2012, 47-57 p.Chapter in book (Refereed)
Abstract [en]

The article explores the relation between the willingness of corporate entrepreneurs to pay taxes and the impersonal demand of the tax authority upon corporate owners to fulfil the tax system. The relationship is discussed from a modern evolutionary and game theoretical standpoint including concepts as inclusive fitness, reciprocal altruism, prisoner’s dilemma, tit-for-tat, etc. The application of this theoretical model shows how entrepreneurs are willing to pay unselfish taxes if the taxes are distributed for community expenses such as schools, medical care, etc. and/or if they receive some direct tribute for their corporate activity, such as extra personnel provided by unemployment offices and paid for by the tax system. If entrepreneurs do not trust that the tax system will be used in either of these two forms, they are likely to feel that their resources are being confiscated. They can then logically - from evolutionary and game theoretical standpoints - evade taxes because they view themselves as cheated by an impersonal tax system.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Nova Science Publishers, Inc., 2012. 47-57 p.
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URN: urn:nbn:se:umu:diva-60757ISBN: 978-1-61324-415-9OAI: diva2:563148
Available from: 2012-10-29 Created: 2012-10-25 Last updated: 2013-06-13Bibliographically approved

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Alalehto, Tage
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