Quasi-Realism, Absolutism, and Judgment-Internal Correctness Conditions
2013 (English)In: Johanssonian Investigations: Essays in Honour of Ingvar Johansson on His Seventieth Birthday / [ed] Christer Svennerlind, Jan Almäng, Rögnvaldur Ingthorsson, Heusenstamm: Ontos Verlag, 2013, 96-119 p.Chapter in book (Other academic)
The traditional metaethical distinction between cognitivist absolutism, on the one hand, and speaker relativism or noncognitivism, on the other, seemed both clear and important. On the former view, moral judgments would be true or false independently on whose judgments they were, and moral disagreement might be settled by the facts. Not so on the latter views. But noncognitivists and relativists, following what Simon Blackburn has called a “quasi-realist” strategy, have come a long way in making sense of talk about truth of moral judgments and its in- dependence of moral judges and their attitudes or standards. The success of this strategy would undermine the traditional way of understanding the distinction, and it is not obvious how it can be reformulated. In this paper, I outline the difficulty posed by quasi-realism, raise problems for some prior attempts to overcome it, and present my own suggestion, focusing on correctness conditions that are internal to the act of moral judgment.
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Heusenstamm: Ontos Verlag, 2013. 96-119 p.
Quasi-realism, relativism, absolutism, metaethics, Simon Blackburn, Allan Gibbard, Jamie Dreier, Neil Sinclair, Michael Ridge
Research subject Practical Philosophy
IdentifiersURN: urn:nbn:se:umu:diva-66882ISBN: 978-3-86838-190-0OAI: oai:DiVA.org:umu-66882DiVA: diva2:609610
ProjectsDisagreement, objectivity, and insensitive assessments