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Social software for coalition formation
Umeå universitet, Teknisk-naturvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för datavetenskap.
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2006 (Engelska)Ingår i: Theory and Applications of Relational Structures as Knowledge Instruments II: International Workshops of COST Action 274, TARSKI, 2002-2005, Selected Revised Papers / [ed] Harrie de Swart, Ewa Orłowska, Gunther Schmidt and Marc Roubens, Springer Berlin/Heidelberg, 2006, Vol. 4342, s. 1-30Kapitel i bok, del av antologi (Refereegranskat)
Abstract [en]

This paper concerns an interdisciplinary approach to coalition formation. We apply the MacBeth software, relational algebra, the RelView tool, graph theory, bargaining theory, social choice theory, and consensus reaching to a model of coalition formation. A feasible government is a pair consisting of a coalition of parties and a policy supported by this coalition. A feasible government is stable if it is not dominated by any other feasible government. Each party evaluates each government with respect to certain criteria. MacBeth helps to quantify the importance of the criteria and the attractiveness and repulsiveness of governments to parties with respect to the given criteria. Feasibility, dominance, and stability are formulated in relation-algebraic terms. The RelView tool is used to compute the dominance relation and the set of all stable governments. In case there is no stable government, i.e., in case the dominance relation is cyclic, we apply graph-theoretical techniques for breaking the cycles. If the solution is not unique, we select the final government by applying bargaining or appropriate social choice rules. We describe how a coalition may form a government by reaching consensus about a policy.

Ort, förlag, år, upplaga, sidor
Springer Berlin/Heidelberg, 2006. Vol. 4342, s. 1-30
Serie
Lecture Notes in Computer Science, ISSN 0302-9743 ; 4342
Nyckelord [en]
stable government, MacBeth, relational algebra, RelView, graph theory, bargaining, social choice rule, consensus
Nationell ämneskategori
Datavetenskap (datalogi)
Identifikatorer
URN: urn:nbn:se:umu:diva-80618DOI: 10.1007/11964810_1ISBN: 978-3-540-69223-2 (tryckt)ISBN: 978-3-540-69224-9 (tryckt)OAI: oai:DiVA.org:umu-80618DiVA, id: diva2:650518
Konferens
Theoryand Applications of Relational Structures as Knowledge Instruments II
Anmärkning

Series: Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence (subseries of: Lecture Notes in Computer Science)

Tillgänglig från: 2013-09-22 Skapad: 2013-09-22 Senast uppdaterad: 2018-06-08Bibliografiskt granskad

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Totalt: 134 träffar
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