Memory Self-Efficacy Beliefs Modulate Brain Activity when Encoding Real-World Future Intentions
2013 (English)In: PLoS ONE, ISSN 1932-6203, Vol. 8, no 9, e73850- p.Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Background: While the use of different cognitive strategies when encoding episodic memory information has been extensively investigated, modulation of brain activity by memory self-efficacy beliefs has not been studied yet.
Methodology/Principal Findings: Sixteen young adults completed the prospective and retrospective metamemory questionnaire, providing individual subjective judgments of everyday memory function. The day after, using functional magnetic resonance imaging, the participants had to memorize real-world intentions (e. g., return a book to the library), which were performed later on in a virtual environment. Participants also performed offline cognitive tasks evaluating executive functions, working memory, and attention. During encoding, activity was found in medial temporal lobe, left prefrontal cortex, medial parietal regions, occipital areas, and regions involved in (pre) motor processes. Based on results from the questionnaire, the group was split into low and high memory self-efficacy believers. Comparison of encoding-related brain activity between the 2 groups revealed that the low memory self-efficacy believers activated more the hippocampus bilaterally, right posterior parahippocampal cortex, precuneus, and left lateral temporal cortex. By contrast, more activity was found in dorsal anterior cingulate gyrus for the high-memory believers. In addition, the low-memory believers performed more poorly at feature binding and (at trend) manipulating visuospatial information in working memory.
Conclusion/Significance: Overall, these findings indicate that memory self-efficacy beliefs modulate brain activity during intentional encoding. Low memory self-efficacy believers activated more brain areas involved in visuospatial operations such as the hippocampus. Possibly, this increase reflects attempts to compensate for poor performance of certain neurocognitive processes, such as feature binding. By contrast, high-memory believers seemed to rely more on executive-like processes involved in cognitive control.
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2013. Vol. 8, no 9, e73850- p.
Medical and Health Sciences
IdentifiersURN: urn:nbn:se:umu:diva-83103DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0073850ISI: 000324338200081OAI: oai:DiVA.org:umu-83103DiVA: diva2:664910
FunderSwedish Research Council
This work was funded by the 2007 Goran Gustafsson Award in Medicine and a grant from the Swedish Research Council to Lars Nyberg. The funders had no role in study design, data collection and analysis, decision to publish, or preparation of the manuscript.2013-11-182013-11-182014-07-09Bibliographically approved