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Race to the Top in Traffic Calming
KTH, KU Leuven.
Umeå University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Centre for Regional Science (CERUM).ORCID iD: 0000-0002-2697-1062
2014 (English)Conference paper (Other academic)
Abstract [en]

We study the competition of two suburbs that are facing transit traffic flows. We show that in the absence of toll measures, the Nash equilibrium leads to a race to the top in traffic calming, except for the measures that do not affect the generalized cost of traffic. The Nash equilibrium is compared to two types of centralized decisions: the symmetric solution and the asymmetric solution. It is shown how the asymmetric solution that concentrates all transit traffic in one suburb is better but can only be realized if the authority over the local roads is transferred to the central authority.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2014. 1-25 p.
Keyword [en]
Transport, Externalities, Traffic calming, Multi-level government, Regulation
National Category
Research subject
URN: urn:nbn:se:umu:diva-89681OAI: diva2:722833
ITEA Annual Conference and Summer School on Transportation Economics (Kuhmo-Nectar), Toulouse, France, June 2-6, 2014, Toulouse, France
Available from: 2014-06-09 Created: 2014-06-09 Last updated: 2015-04-22Bibliographically approved

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Race to the Top in Traffic Calming

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Proost, StefWestin, Jonas
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Centre for Regional Science (CERUM)

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