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Settlement probability asymmetries in the Swedish Labour Court
Umeå University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Umeå School of Business and Economics (USBE), Economics.ORCID iD: 0000-0003-1071-5774
2014 (English)In: European Journal of Law and Economics, ISSN 0929-1261, E-ISSN 1572-9990, Vol. 38, no 3, 485-512 p.Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

This paper focuses on settlement probabilities for different types of representation within the Swedish Labour Court. Empirical estimates on a set of cases concerned with unjust dismissals show that private representatives are generally less likely to reach a settlement than their union counterparts. The settlement probabilities converge following court-mandated information disclosure, which suggests that information asymmetry is an important factor in explaining differences in settlement behaviour and that private negotiations are not sufficient in general.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
New York, 2014. Vol. 38, no 3, 485-512 p.
Keyword [en]
unjust dismissals, negotiations, settlements, trade unions
National Category
Economics
Research subject
Economics
Identifiers
URN: urn:nbn:se:umu:diva-95350DOI: 10.1007/s10657-013-9397-9Scopus ID: 2-s2.0-84877901734OAI: oai:DiVA.org:umu-95350DiVA: diva2:758828
Available from: 2014-10-28 Created: 2014-10-28 Last updated: 2017-12-05Bibliographically approved
In thesis
1. Essays on temporary work agencies and the economic analysis of law
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Essays on temporary work agencies and the economic analysis of law
2014 (English)Doctoral thesis, comprehensive summary (Other academic)
Abstract [en]

This thesis consists of an introductory chapter and four self-contained papers on temporary work agenciesand the economic analysis of law.

Paper [I] adds to the theoretical literature on the incentives of Temporary Work Agencies (TWAs). Using aprincipal-agent model with hidden action to model two main types of contracts between a TWA and a ClientFirm (CF), the TWA is shown to potentially act against the best interest of the CF when helping to fill avacant position. The results also suggest that the adverse effect of the incentive misalignment is larger whenthe worker is going to be leased instead of hired by the CF. However, this effect could potentially be offsetby introducing a sufficient level of competition among the TWAs.

Paper [II] uses individual-level data on young adults to estimate how the probability of being employed inthe Swedish temporary agency sector is affected by whether a partner or other family member has experienceof temporary agency work. The results show a significant effect from all peer groups of a magnitude thatcorrespond to the other most influential control variables. We also find that this cohort of the agency sectorhas a relatively high education level compared to the regular sector, and that there are predominately menworking in thissector.

Paper [III] analyses possible effects on total employment, and the distribution between agency work andregular contracts as a consequence of the implementation of the EU Temporary and Agency Workers Directive in Sweden. The analysis is based on changes in the compensation to agency workers in a calibratedextension of a Mortensen-Pissarides search model. Even though the results suggest a negative net effect ontotal employment, the implementation is shown to increase (utilitarian) welfare, and an increased transitionprobability from the agency sector into regular employment will increase welfare even further.

Paper [IV] focuses on settlement probabilities for different types of representation within the Swedish LabourCourt. Empirical estimates on a set of unjust dismissal cases show that private representatives are generallyless likely to reach a settlement than their union counterparts. The settlement probabilities converge following court-mandated information disclosure, which suggests that information asymmetry is an importantfactor in explaining differences in settlement behaviour. Privately instigated negotiations are therefore ingeneral insufficient for making cases with non-union representation reach the same settlement rate as caseswith union representation.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Umeå: Umeå universitet, 2014. 23 p.
Series
Umeå economic studies, ISSN 0348-1018 ; 897
Keyword
temporary work agency, family work experience, young adults, Sweden, labour law, EU direc- tive, unemployment, unjust dismissals, negotiations, settlements, labour unions
National Category
Economics
Research subject
Economics
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:umu:diva-95474 (URN)978-91-7601-152-2 (ISBN)
Public defence
2014-11-21, S213h, Samhällsvetarhuset, Umeå universitet, Umeå, 13:15 (English)
Opponent
Supervisors
Available from: 2014-10-31 Created: 2014-10-29 Last updated: 2014-10-30Bibliographically approved

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