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Moral Attitudes for Non-Cognitivists: Solving the specification problem
Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies. Göteborgs universitet.ORCID iD: 0000-0003-3112-0673
2014 (English)In: Mind (Print), ISSN 0026-4423, E-ISSN 1460-2113, Vol. 123, no 489, 1-38 p.Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

Moral non-cognitivists hope to explain the nature of moral agreement and disagreement as agreement and disagreement in non-cognitive attitudes. In doing so, they take on the task of identifying the relevant attitudes, distinguishing the non-cognitive attitudes corresponding to judgements of moral wrongness, for example, from attitudes involved in aesthetic disapproval or the sports fan’s disapproval of her team’s performance. We begin this paper by showing that there is a simple recipe for generating apparent counterexamples to any informative specification of the moral attitudes. This may appear to be a lethal objection to non-cognitivism, but a similar recipe challenges attempts by non-cognitivism’s competitors to specify the conditions underwriting the contrast between genuine and merely apparent moral disagreement. Because of its generality, this specification problem requires a systematic response, which, we argue, is most easily available for the non-cognitivist. Building on premisses congenial to the non-cognitivist tradition, we make the following claims: (1) In paradigmatic cases, wrongness-judgements constitute a certain complex but functionally unified state, and paradigmatic wrongness-judgements form a functional kind, preserved by homeostatic mechanisms. (2) Because of the practical function of such judgements, we should expect judges’ intuitive understanding of agreement and disagreement to be accommodating, treating states departing from the paradigm in various ways as wrongness-judgements. (3) This explains the intuitive judgements required by the counterexample-generating recipe, and more generally why various kinds of amoralists are seen as making genuine wrongness-judgements.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2014. Vol. 123, no 489, 1-38 p.
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Research subject
Practical Philosophy
URN: urn:nbn:se:umu:diva-95689DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzu031ISI: 000342720300001OAI: diva2:760437
Swedish Research Council, 2009-1517
Available from: 2014-11-03 Created: 2014-11-03 Last updated: 2015-04-17Bibliographically approved

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Björnsson, Gunnar
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