Incompatibilism and ‘Bypassed’ Agency
2014 (English)In: Surrounding Free Will: Philosophy, Psychology, Neuroscience / [ed] Alfred R. Mele, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014, 95-122 p.Chapter in book (Other academic)
In recent papers, Eddy Nahmias and Dylan Murray have proposed an error theory for intuitions supporting incompatibilism. They suggest that when people take responsibility to be undermined by determinism, they do so because they take determinism to imply that agents’ beliefs, desires, and decisions are bypassed, having no effect on their actions. This chapter first presents results from experiments designed to exclude certain sources of error in Nahmias and Murray’s studies, showing that their data, however puzzling, are robust with respect to minor variations in questionnaires. Second, it presents results from studies designed to provide more direct tests of the bypass hypothesis, results strongly suggesting that in spite of these data, the hypothesis is false. Third, it argues that, initial appearances notwithstanding, the explanation hypothesis can straightforwardly explain Nahmias and Murray’s data.
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014. 95-122 p.
bypass hypothesis, error theory, explanation hypothesis, incompatibilism, Nahmias and Murray
Research subject Practical Philosophy
IdentifiersURN: urn:nbn:se:umu:diva-97672DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199333950.001.0001ISBN: 9780199333950OAI: oai:DiVA.org:umu-97672DiVA: diva2:775564