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Cournot duopoly when the competitors operate under capacity constraints
Umeå University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Centre for Regional Science (CERUM).
Umeå University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Umeå School of Business and Economics (USBE), Economics.
2003 (English)In: Chaos, Solitons & Fractals, ISSN 0960-0779, E-ISSN 1873-2887, Vol. 18, no 3, 577-592 p.Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

The paper considers Cournot duopoly where the competitors have capacity constraints. An isoelastic demand function, which always results when consumers maximise utility functions of the Cobb–Douglas type, is used. It has been demonstrated that isoelastic demand, combined with constant marginal costs, results in complex dynamics. The purpose of the present paper is to reconsider the case, using in stead cost functions with capacity limits. This is a point on which Edgeworth insisted as important. Comparisons between cases of few large and many small competitors cannot be made when firms have constant returns and hence are all infinitely large in potential.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2003. Vol. 18, no 3, 577-592 p.
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URN: urn:nbn:se:umu:diva-100250OAI: diva2:790955
Available from: 2015-02-26 Created: 2015-02-26 Last updated: 2015-02-26

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